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
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ANNUAL REPORTS

OF THE

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WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1899.

REPORT OF THE
MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

IN THREE PARTS.

PART 3.

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ARRANGEMENT OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1899.

VOLUME I. Parts 1-6.—Report of the Secretary of War and all other reports except those of the Chief of Engineers and the Chief of Ordnance.

VOLUME II. Parts 1-6.—Report of the Chief of Engineers.

VOLUME III. Report of the Chief of Ordnance.

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OF THE
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PART III.

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No. 1.

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., March 17, 1898.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
*Department of the Pacific and
 Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.*

SIR: The following detailed report of the fires and accompanying events that occurred on the 22d and 23d of February are submitted for the information of the department commander:

A few minutes after 8 p. m. on the 22d, a fire was noticed in No. 10 Calle Lacosta, in the suburb of Santa Cruz, this city. The house was the abiding place of Filipinos of ill repute. The police, as represented by the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., arrived on the spot almost immediately, and were able to establish beyond a doubt that the fire was of incendiary origin, and that kerosene oil was the fluid used in starting it. The entire fire department of the city and volunteer brigade of English firemen and their engine were on the ground with reasonable promptness, and all worked with a zeal that was very commendable. The wind at the time was variable, and it was necessary to fight the fire from three sides. Efforts were made to prevent the efficiency of the firemen by occasional shots from the surrounding houses. This was stopped by calling up some of the provost guard. Efforts were also made to destroy the fire hose by puncturing it, but the police cured this trouble with commendable promptness.

The locality was well selected for the nefarious purpose of the incendiary. The buildings were constructed of light materials and the streets narrow. Furthermore, it was a district peopled by Chinamen and they had large stores of dry cocoanut shells stored for fuel. The light fiber of these shells not only ignites very readily, but they catch sparks in clouds. Owing to these causes it was 11 o'clock p. m. before the fire department could get sufficient control of the fire to assume the offensive and subdue it. This fire burned two blocks, as shown in the accompanying map, marked A. It would seem that the object of the fire was to burn out the barracks of the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers and the police company on Calle Dolores.

About the time the fire in Santa Cruz was brought under control a second one was noticed in the suburb of Tondo. At this time a westerly wind was blowing a good sailing breeze, and the fire was situated in the Nipa district of the suburb. It was both useless and dangerous to struggle against it. This fire was started by insurgent soldiers who had entered the city by passing around the left of General MacArthur's line. It was started at different points to windward of the location of two of the city police stations—Companies M and N, Thirteenth Minnesota—with the evident intention of roasting them out. The possibility of such tactics on the part of the enemy had been foreseen and provided against. The police companies took position to defend the suburb of Binondo at Paseo de Ascarraga, and were promptly supported by other troops of the provost guard, Company E, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Captain Pratt, joining them by way of Jolo street, and Company H, Second Oregon, Captain McDonough, by way of calle de Santo Cristo. These troops checked any advance on the part of the enemy from Tondo, and the fire exhausted its material by 2 o'clock. Unfortunately, enemies were on all sides and occasional shots were fired from houses in the vicinity.

The first attempt of the incendiaries to start a fire in the rear of the troops was made in the main building of the Binondo Market. But this effort failed, through the vigilance of the police, who discovered it before it had gotten beyond their power to master it. A second and successful effort was made by setting fire to some nipa structures outside the main building. The wind had increased, and this fire, coming before that at Santa Cruz was extinguished, the fire spread westward and southward with rapidity. The firemen reached the locality at 2.30 greatly fatigued, and the volunteer brigade seemed to have become totally discouraged, and left the place with their engine without even getting up steam. Fortunately provisions had been made for such a contingency by sending for Major Gantenbein's battalion of the Second Oregon Volunteers.

Some powder cartridges had been previously arranged for with Capt. W. T. Wood, chief ordnance officer, and for some axes with the Engineer Department, both of which arrived on the ground in time to meet this emergency. The fire at this time had hopelessly involved the two blocks next to the mercado. It was futile, with the means at hand, to attempt to check the fire to leeward, but it seemed possible to prevent its getting a hold across calle de Lavazares. After the English volunteer brigade had taken their engine from the scene it became necessary to organize a volunteer fire company from the battalion of the Second Oregon Volunteers, and to send and seize the engine and to call all other engines from the Santa Cruz district, at the risk of a second outbreak there. During the time required to accomplish these things the only means at hand for checking the flames were powder, axes, water carried in buckets, pots, etc. The time finally came when the only resort was powder. The danger points were mainly confined to two corners, one the southwest corner of calle Lavazares and calle Fundidor (No. 14 calle Fundidor), and the other the northwest corner of Lavazares and Santo de Cristo streets (No. 48 calle Santo Cristo). The building first named was so much ablaze that it had started the fire in the building across the street. As it was still possible to extinguish the fire across the street by pressing Chinamen and carrying water in buckets, pots, etc., if the house across the street was neutralized, it was determined to use a powder charge of a 10-inch gun in destroying that building. This building was hopelessly involved in the fire at the time, and the exploding of the cartridge only hastened its demolition by a few moments. The building on the northwest corner of Lavazares and Santo Cristo streets (No. 48 calle Santo Cristo) was two stories high, and when it became fully involved it was evident that it would be impossible, with the means at hand, to prevent the house on the northeast corner taking fire unless some radical measures were taken. A powder cartridge was carried in inclosed in its metallic case and was exploded in the corner of the building for the purpose of wrecking it, which it did. This cartridge only hastened the destruction of the building, as it was already so fully involved in the flames that it could not have been defended, and as a matter of fact no effort, under the conditions, would have been made to do so. In the meantime the block south of calle de Santo Cristo and between calles Lavazares and de Clavel had burned rapidly, and before a sufficient number of streams could be gotten on it the flames had crossed calle de Elcano, and before its progress could be stopped about one-third of this block also was in ashes. The market, two full blocks,

and about one-third of another were burned at this place. This third fire was subdued by 7 a. m. of the 23d.

The enemy still held possession of the northern portion of the suburb of Tondo, above Moriones street, and while the provost guard was engaged in suppressing the fire and preserving order in the city they were busy erecting barricades and field works, for which purposes they used materials ready at hand for building purposes, foundation stones, railroad iron, etc., and in many instances the walled courts and houses were occupied. After the provost guard had had some rest and breakfast 6 companies were sent to throw these invaders out of the city. Two companies of the Thirteenth Minnesota, 2 companies of the Second Oregon, and 2 companies of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, the whole being under the direction of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry. The work was thoroughly done, and the city was cleared of armed organized insurgents by 5 p. m. In this contest the loss of the enemy was severe, as they were in some instances caught in inclosures from which they could not escape, and they would not surrender. The houses along the line of the enemy's retreat were nearly all burned during the affair. As they were nearly all of nipa, the loss in money value was not great.

The loss in Binondo was the heaviest, and it will be necessary to take some steps to provide new market accommodations for that suburb in the near future.

The lesson learned by these fires is that we are living in the midst of cruel enemies, who are capable of resorting to any means to further their ends.

The work performed by the provost guard was exceedingly satisfactory. All did their very best.

I wish to make special mention of Sergt. Leon H. Chick, Battery H, Third U. S. Artillery, who was acting under the direction of Capt. W. T. Wood, chief of ordnance, in placing and firing the powder cartridges. The fuse of the second cartridge failed, and the building was one sheet of flame in the lighter materials of the upper story. Sergeant Chick simply asked, when it became apparent that the first fuse had probably failed, if Captain Wood wished the fuse replaced, and on receiving an affirmative answer he entered this fire trap, renewed the fuse, and caused the explosion of the cartridge, which so wrecked the building as to enable the fire to be checked with the means then at hand. This quiet discharge of so perilous a duty is, in my opinion, worthy of special recognition, and I therefore recommend Sergeant Chick for the appointment of ordnance sergeant, which I am informed is a position he seeks, and also that he be granted a certificate of merit.

Drawings showing the districts burned in shaded lines are forwarded herewith.

The following reports are also inclosed: Report of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry; report of Maj. Percy Willis, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; and report of Col. Fred W. Ames, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, which contains the reports of Captains Morgan, McKelvey, Robinson, and Metz; also those of Lieutenants Snow and Bruckart.

Respectfully submitted.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Provost-Marshal-General.

No. 2.

MANILA, P. I., *February 24, 1899.*

ADJUTANT TWENTY-THIRD U. S. INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to instructions from the provost-marshal-general, I yesterday, February 23, with 2 companies of my battalion (K, Lieutenant Moore, and M, Lieutenant Stritzinger), 1 officer and 35 men each, proceeded at 10.30 o'clock a. m. to the Tondo district, in the northern part of Manila, to dislodge and destroy a party of Filipino soldiers, supposed to be about 150, who had worked through General MacArthur's lines the night before. The command went in light marching order, without rations, and with 100 rounds ammunition on the person and a like amount on two carts. The first of the enemy were encountered a short distance from (beyond) the cuartel of Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota. At about this time I was joined by Company E, Captain Davis, and Company M, Captain Poorman, Second Oregon, under Major Willis of that regiment; also Company C, Lieutenant Snow, and Company M, Captain McKelvey, Thirteenth Minnesota. A great measure of the success of the day was due to these troops, which had preceded me nearly an hour, and by repeated charges had cleared several blocks of sharpshooters, forcing them back from house to house, and killing many.

We encountered five very substantial barricades extending across the street. These were successively charged, as were numerous houses used as places of concealment, and the latter were invariably burned. As a result, but few remain along the road to Caloocan.

When near the railroad depot 2 troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry reported, and I sent them to scour the woods to the east, while I proceeded with an extended skirmish line to the right and left of the road, in the direction of Caloocan. There was little opposition along the road beyond the city, but several skirmishes occurred in the thickets to the right, in one of which Lieutenant Stritzinger had 1 man (Private John L. Barker, Company M, Twenty-third Infantry) dangerously wounded, shot through leg and arm, and 1 man killed (Private Edward Reaver, Company G, Twenty-third Infantry)—the only losses in the Twenty-third Infantry. Private Reaver had become separated from his company in another part of the city, and reported to Lieutenant Stritzinger a short time before he was killed. One man (Private George W. Baker, Company G, Thirteenth Minnesota) was dangerously wounded by a shot in the neck. These were the only losses of the day.

During the afternoon I received orders from the provost-marshal-general to cover the ground well out to General MacArthur's line, which I did, reaching the headquarters of the Twentieth Kansas at 4.50 o'clock p. m., and starting on my return at 5 o'clock, reaching barracks at 6.45 o'clock.

Owing to the nature of the fighting, it is difficult to more than approximate the number of the enemy killed, but I believe it to be not less than 75. A captain of the Second Oregon counted in one block 34 dead, and Lieutenant Moore, Twenty-third Infantry, counted 13 in another small yard.

There were many prisoners made; only the men were retained, and were sent back in squads to the Minnesota cuartel. It is impossible to state accurately how many, but more than 150, at least 95 per cent of whom were soldiers, some in uniform clothing, but more with their uniform hastily pulled off, showing the usual white garb of the natives. Yards and houses were strewn with the discarded uniforms.

The conduct of officers and men is to be commended. All behaved in the coolest manner under the new conditions of street fighting; and, although all had been up throughout all of the previous night, and were without food or coffee for thirteen hours, not a murmur of complaint was heard.

Private Ira B. Smith, Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota, was struck by a spent ball directly over the heart, but was not disabled. The ball penetrated the clothing and was pulled from the flesh.

A number of rifles were captured; I can not state how many. The companies were more or less detached and returned after dark.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. A. GOODALE,
Major, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

10 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA REGIMENT, U. S. V.,
Manila, March 1, 1899.

Brig. Gen. R. P. HUGHES,
Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the anticipated uprising or outbreak of the insurgents and their sympathizers and the threatened burning of this city was, to a certain extent, realized on the dates of February 22, 23, and 24. The localities of the fires were in Santa Cruz, Tondo, Binondo districts, and north and east of Bilibid Prison, and a determined attack by armed natives made on Companies C and M of my regiment in Tondo, and promiscuous firing from buildings in Binondo. The pursuit and punishment of the insurgents, February 23, by a force consisting of 2 companies of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, 2 companies of the First Oregon Volunteers, and Companies C and M of the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, under command of Major Willis, of the First Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and afterwards, Major Goodale, of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, has been duly reported to you. The actions of the officers and men of my regiment can not be too highly commended, as every available officer and man used every effort in putting out different fires, and doing their patrol and guard duty during this most trying and dangerous period. The work of Companies C and M in repulsing the attacks made upon them, and finally driving the insurgents out of the district, and finally following and killing and capturing many of them, was superb. All the companies of my regiment were under arms in their stations, and double patrols were actively engaged in covering their respective districts throughout the city, but nothing of a serious nature occurred in any district under our supervision except those reported.

The reports of the commanding officers of Companies C, D, G, L, and M, in whose districts the fires and disturbances occurred, are so clear and concise that I attach hereto a verbatim copy of them.

The list of casualties resulting from the above occurrences is as follows:

Capt. N. C. Robinson, Company C, wounded in the upper lip; Sergt. George K. Sheppard, Company C, wounded in calf of leg; Private Thomas S. Galvin, Company C, wounded in left shoulder; Private George S. Wooding, Company C, wounded in buttock; Private Ira B. Smith, Company C, wounded in chest (slight); Private Merton S. Grinnel, Company D, wounded inside (slight); Private Herman H. Hillman, Company D, wounded in left wrist (slight); Private John Hartfield, Company D, wounded in side (slight); Private George W. Baker, Company G, wounded in neck; Capt. James E. McKelvey, Company M, overcome by heat; Private E. J. Fehr, Company M, wounded three times (serious); Private Oscar Frykman, Company M, wounded in right arm.

Very respectfully submitted.

FRED W. AMES,
Colonel Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, Chief of Police.

No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY C,
THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Manila, February 28, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to report of the engagement of my command during the night of February 22, 1899.

At 12 o'clock midnight, February 22, the sentry at the gate of Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota quarters, reported fires starting to the north of the quarters. The company was immediately called out, and leaving 20 men at the company quarters to protect same, I took the balance of the command down Calle Lemery to Calle Azcarraga, and there formed line and built breastworks; also stationed men on the bridge over canal and at the head of Calle de Ylala to prevent the rebels from coming farther in town and firing the more thickly-populated districts. The men on the bridge were soon engaged with quite a heavy fire, which they returned. The part of the company in the breastworks on Calle Lemery had full command of that street and of the entrance to the company quarters, thus preventing any entrance to the quarters by the rebels. There was a continuous fire coming from the company quarters, so I knew they were holding their own for the time being. About 1.30 I was reinforced by two companies of the Second Oregon. I placed one company on the bridge over the canal and the other company at the head of Calle Ylala. I then sent Sergeant-Major Krembs to Company C quarters to see if they needed assistance. He reported to Lieutenant Snow, in command of the station, but was told that they had everything well in hand, and so reported to me.

Having been wounded early in the fight, I was relieved of my command by Major Willis, Second Oregon, and ordered to the hospital by General Hughes.

The casualties during the time I was in command are as follows:

Captain Robinson, Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, wound in upper lip as he was leaving the company quarters.

Sergeant Sheppard, shot through the calf of leg, about 100 feet below company quarters, on Calle Lemery.

Private Galvin, shot through the shoulder at about the same time that Sergeant Sheppard was hit.

Private Wooding, shot in buttock while lying in the breastworks on Calle Lemery, evidently from some house in rear of our line.

The conduct of my men while under my command was excellent, they remaining cool and paying strict attention to orders.

Respectfully submitted.

N. C. ROBINSON,
Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

Col. F. W. AMES,
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

No. 5.

MANILA, P. I., February 25, 1899.

Col. F. W. AMES,
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of an engagement with the Filipino insurgents occurring on February 23, 1899:

At 12 o'clock midnight on that date the guard noticed three separate fires about 300 yards north of the company barracks and turned in the alarm. In five minutes nearly all the company were up in arms and all but 20 enlisted men ready to fall in at assembly. Within two minutes after the fires were first seen firing was heard in that direction, which increased steadily for ten minutes and gradually came nearer.

Capt. N. C. Robinson left the barracks and moved down Calle Lemery double time with about three-fourths of the company, leaving me with the following members of the company to guard the barracks: Sergt. F. C. Robinson; Corpls. Eugene Crandall, A. Frank Kavanagh, and Edward Jungbauer; Musician Joseph Groh; Privates John J. Kelley, Olin H. Espy, William Compton, James M. Baptie, Harry Pomeroy, Herbert C. Shannon, David H. Kimball, William F. Kern, Harry G. Bogart, Daniel F. McCarthy, Dennis J. McConville, William M. Dunn, William C. Breman, William E. Gowling, and Michael D. Collins.

Immediately after the firing began the bullets flew thick and fast around the building used as company quarters, many balls penetrating the walls. The front gate was closed, the guards having been brought in, but the patrol of 4 men being still out, the latter joining the main portion of the company on Calle Azcarraga some time later.

While leaving the barracks to take up a position along Calle Azcarraga, in order to prevent any attempted advance by insurgents, Captain Robinson, Sergt. George K. Sheppard, and Private Thomas F. Galvin were wounded. Shortly afterwards Private George S. Wooding was also wounded.

The men remaining in quarters took posts at the upper windows and ground-floor doorways and began a fire at about 10 insurgents who lay behind a low stone wall on the opposite side of the street. The insurgents were armed with Remington rifles. I judge there were about 90 or 100 of the enemy, but they kept under cover of stone walls. Our men fired steadily, but without effect, except the killing of 1 insurgent, who had picked up a revolver, dropped by one of the company while marching down Calle Lemery, and which was found under the insurgent's corpse; also saw about 6 other natives drop, but think they were only wounded, as their bodies were not found later. Our heavy fire undoubtedly prevented the enemy from attempting to force an entrance into the inclosure, although the shots came dangerously close to us at times. The natives had an advantage over my men, in that they could fire over the low stone walls across the street and then drop flat, while our elevated positions made good targets whenever we exposed ourselves to fire in return. This state of affairs continued until 2 o'clock a. m., or about one and one-half hours, when suddenly, as the burning Nipa huts made it too hot for the insurgents, the latter quickly withdrew at the sound of their bugle and retreated through the opposite block, firing the light structures as they went.

During the attack the surrounding country for a mile or more was as light as day, and the constantly increasing heat made it very uncomfortable for us, at the same

time causing great anxiety as to the safety of our building from being destroyed by fire. In about a half hour the huts and larger buildings on the west, south, and northeast of us were enveloped in flames, throwing millions of sparks into our inclosure and onto the barracks, many of which entered the partially opened windows. I ordered all available buckets, tubs, etc., filled with water, to be placed in readiness for use, but found it necessary to moisten the outside walls of the building at once, as well as the floors near the windows and other openings. While this was being done a number of the men carried out most of the furniture and all ordnance and equipments. A few cots and nettings were partly burned by sparks.

The burning bamboo produced a continuous crackling sound, very similar to rifle shots, and this fact made it difficult to determine the strength of the enemy. At 4 o'clock a. m. I decided that all was safe; the air was still filled with smoke, but nearly all of the huts in the vicinity had been destroyed. Nothing but stone walls remained standing to the north and northeast of us.

I understand Company M of our regiment was attacked just before the insurgents opened fire on Company C barracks, but am unable to state any facts in connection with this point.

A large residence on our south was left unmolested, excepting a search for arms, which I personally conducted. Our men had been fired upon from its windows during the attack. No arms were found here, although a number of Mauser cartridges and some empty shells were discovered. Some of the furniture in this building was taken to our quarters for safe-keeping.

There were no casualties among the 21 men stationed in Company C barracks, although 14 bullet holes were counted in one room and over 30 in another.

I am, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. SNOW,
Second Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding Company C.

No. 6.

MANILA, P. I., February 25, 1899.

Col. F. W. AMES,
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movements of my command (Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry) while in the battalion acting against the Filipino insurgents on February 23, 1899:

Weather fair and warm; earth dry.

The company left its quarters at about 10 o'clock a. m., February 23, 1899, and joined the other 3 companies at Tondo Church five minutes later. The battalion left Tondo Church at about 11 o'clock a. m., marched north along the beach fronting Manila Bay a quarter of a mile, and halted. Having reconnoitered, 3 companies formed a skirmish line, with Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, on the right, extending to Calle Lemery. A small swamp lay immediately in front of the center of Company C, a rather open space nearly 100 feet wide. The order for the battalion to advance having been given, we moved forward, skirting the swamp, our right and left diligently searching all buildings whenever an insurgent or male native was seen. The company, reunited on the center after passing the swamp, continued to advance, maintaining the alignment. Five or six men attempted to cross the edge of the swamp and sank in mud and water to their thighs, but quickly extricated themselves.

At the outset each man had about 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition. The line halted every 50 yards to fire, driving the enemy before them, the insurgents being ensconced in houses and behind fences, trees, and buildings, nearly always out of sight, but apparently not over 300 yards ahead, judging by the sound of their shots, which came mostly from Mauser rifles. From the beginning shots were fired from a point somewhere on our right, and I ordered 3 volleys from about 10 men to be aimed and fired at a line below the open windows of several huts situated at an angle to the east of Calle Lemery. These volleys evidently had the desired effect, for no more shots came from that quarter, and 6 or 8 men, with myself, immediately crossed the street. Previous to this no volley had been heard. Having only 1 noncommissioned officer with the company, he remained near its center. No people were found in the houses we searched, except a few very old men and some women and children, whom we did not molest further than searching their clothing. A steady rain of Mauser bullets traveled down Calle Lemery in our direction, but the men were careful not to expose themselves unnecessarily. Having advanced

slowly for about twenty minutes, keeping up a steady fire, we found ourselves to be about 200 yards from the first heavy barricade of stone placed across Calle Lemery by the enemy. A large, substantial building, inclosed by a high stone wall, stood to the left of the street at that place, and there the insurgents made a good stand. The squad with me fired several volleys at the building and barricade, and at the same time my men on the left of the road sent a couple of well-directed volleys into the building. Then a charge of the entire company followed, and in the enthusiasm the men rent the air with cheers. Suddenly 5 or 6 natives carrying rifles retreated from behind the rocks as fast as they could run, but turned a corner to the left, directly in advance of them, and were lost to view. Reaching the barricade, part of Company C took position behind it, but were not fired upon from the building. Later it turned out that a number of the enemy (about 20) were in the house and yard, but had all been killed as a result of our fire.

Here our entire firing line seems to have halted for a short rest, the men having become overheated from exertion. So far none of our company had been hit. While the main portion of it remained behind the rocks across Calle Lemery, gaining a short respite, the 8 men who originally crossed the road with me were still on its right, about 50 yards in advance of the barricade. We lay down and opened fire on the huts on the opposite side of the street, about 200 yards or so ahead, from which Mauser and Remington bullets came whistling over our heads or between the bamboo structures that sheltered us to some extent.

While lying here with a private of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry on my left and the others to the right, including Private Ira B. Smith, Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, both these men were hit at the same time by Remington bullets. The wounds were both mere scratches in the breast, having been inflicted by spent balls or very poorly reloaded shells. Both men continued doing duty.

We again advanced; searched the tramway station, finding nothing, although the insurgents were seen to run toward the bridge across the canal 150 yards to the north, just in front of which was placed the third barricade, the second being across Calle Lemery at the railroad station. Here we halted again, and I met Major Goodale, of the Twenty-third Infantry, who had closed in on our right with 2 companies of the Twenty-third Infantry. He gave me orders to search a territory of about half a square mile, just across the bridge and to the right, and to capture any natives found. Not stopping to ask where Major Willis was, I carried out the above orders, finding no Filipinos. Before our reaching the bridge on our return the balance of our original battalion had crossed it to our side, as near as I could learn, and Company C took its position in column of fours, marching in this formation to Caloocan, as far as General MacArthur's division. During the march no insurgents were encountered, although the sergeant and 8 men from Company C formed a skirmish line to the left of the road and advanced to the lagoon, where they rejoined the column. From Caloocan the return march was immediately taken up. Upon reaching Tondo district, Manila, company returned to its barracks, being dismissed at 6.15 p. m., having had nothing to eat since morning and no sleep the previous night.

Am unable to state the total number of insurgents captured, but would estimate the number of insurgents killed at 50. One hundred and twelve prisoners were taken to our company quarters (Tondo police station), and from there to the quarters of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry at Manila.

At the tramway station, during our halt, more ammunition was brought from the city and distributed. Some of the men had only a few rounds left, but subsequently did no shooting. In all about 3,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by the company during the engagement. The only casualty occurring in Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, was Private Ira B. Smith, very slightly wounded in the breast.

Following is a list of the men in the company taking part in the fight as far north as the first barricade: Lieut. J. F. Snow, Sergt. J. McHeffner, Musician J. E. Groh, Privates Armeson, W. C. Breman, H. R. Bogart, J. R. Baptie, H. L. Beckford, C. M. Barlow, J. F. Beasom, P. J. Beiber, C. W. Boxer, T. S. Colcord, Robert Cotton, M. D. Collins, C. A. Campbell, C. D. Crowther, J. E. Darnody, A. Dickey, Wm. M. Dunn, M. A. Durham, C. H. Espy, W. G. Fink, W. C. Frick, F. L. Kelley, H. L. Keeler, C. W. MacCormack, James Mullorkey, Harry Pomeroy, B. W. Parsons, W. J. Ritchie, I. B. Smith, C. H. Still, W. R. Stephenson, G. Whitty, and J. G. Wallace.

At this point Privates Cotton, Collins, Dunn, Fink, Frick, and Wallace were detailed to assist in conducting prisoners to the rear, and they remained at our company barracks.

The following men joined me: Privates W. C. Bruce, V. A. Anderson, M. P. Beaty, W. S. Elvidge, C. B. Gordon, W. M. Brack, and O. J. Pederson, the last-named

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man bringing ammunition and then driving back to quarters. The other 6 men remained with the company during the march to Caloocan.

Musician Joseph E. Groh was detailed as Major Willis's orderly trumpeter.

I am, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. SNOW,
*Second Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding Company C.*

No. 7.

BINONDO POLICE STATION,
Manila, P. I., February 26, 1899.

SIR: I respectfully report that on Wednesday afternoon, February 22, Mr. J. Braga informed me confidentially that there would be an attempt made to burn the city that night and that there would be a general uprising. I immediately telephoned this to the office of the chief of police.

Early in the evening I noticed a fire in the Santa Cruz district, so I immediately assembled my company and held them in readiness for any emergency. About 9.30 one of our patrols reported that an attempt had been made to fire the Santa Christo Street Market. I at once sent out a squad of 8 men and extinguished the fire, and with the assistance of a large number of Chinamen tore down all overhanging sheds. About 10 o'clock all but 2 men returned to quarters; the other 2 being left on guard at the market. Shortly after, I noticed that the Tondo district was burning, and more or less firing in that direction. Soon after, our men reported that Santa Christo Market was again on fire. I at once sent a squad of men to each of the following named streets: Santa Christo, Ilang Ilang, Elcano, Caballero, Asuncion, Canba, and Madrid. The remainder of the district, to the Point, being covered by the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry. About 11 o'clock, Company H, Second Oregon, reported to me for duty, and as everything was quiet in this district, I sent them to assist Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, who had asked me for assistance. They shortly returned and patrolled this district, Company C having been reenforced by other troops. After having sent out the squads, I personally repaired to the market to see what headway the fire was making. I then at once sent a messenger to the station and telephoned the office of chief of police for fire apparatus, which failed to arrive for some time. We finally got two lengths of hose and a nozzle, but the pressure on the water mains was so light that no effective work was done. About 1 o'clock some powder was sent me from the arsenal; also two companies from the Second Oregon.

The fire by this time had got considerable headway and had crossed Santa Christo street. I sent 1 company of the Second Oregon down to Elcano street to do what they could to stop the fire in that direction. I then ordered a building at the corner of Lavensares and Tmedidore and another at Santa Christo and Lavensares blown up with powder, which checked the flames. A detail of 10 men, with axes, was sent into the building at the corner at Lavazares and the canal, chopping off the wood-work as fast as it caught on fire, and literally stopping the fire with axes.

About this time the fire apparatus arrived, and after considerable delay in getting up steam, several streams of water were brought into play and shortly afterwards the fire was under control. The burned district is bounded by Clavel, Caballero, Lavensares, and the canal, that portion facing on Caballero being only partially destroyed. I am unable to state what the loss amounts to. During the entire night and up to 10 o'clock a. m. on the 23d my entire company was on duty. During the entire night my men were being fired at from buildings and the fire returned whenever it was possible to locate the persons firing on them.

The following-named enlisted men were slightly wounded: Privates Merton G. Grinnell and John Hartfield, while on Calle Sevilla, and Private Hermann Hillman, while on Calle Elcano.

Too much praise can not be given the men of my own company and of the others that were sent out to assist me. They all took hold and worked with a will under the most trying and difficult circumstances. Order was preserved throughout the entire district, and during the entire night we had the situation well in hand. The large amount of property destroyed was due to the lack of facilities for extinguishing the fire.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. E. METZ,
Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, in Charge of Binondo Station.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, Manila, P. I.

No. 8.


STATION COMPANY G, THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS,
Manila, P. I., February 28, 1899.

Col. FRED W. AMES,
Commanding Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.


SIR: I have the honor to inclose two sketches showing the districts in Santa Cruz
burned on February 23 and 24, 1899.

Very respectfully,

OSCAR SEEBACH,
Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.



Sketch of district in Santa Cruz burned Thursday night about 10 p. m., February 23, 1899.



District in rear of Santa Cruz burned Friday about 2 p. m., February 24, 1899.

No. 9.

SANTA CRUZ POLICE STATION,
Manila, P. I., February 23, 1899.

Col. F. W. AMES, *Chief of Police.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that shortly after the patrol from this company passed the Filipino house of ill fame at No. 22 Lacosta, i. e., shortly after 8 p. m., February 22, 1899, a fire, evidently of incendiary origin, broke out in said premises. The fire was still confined to the second story of No. 22 Lacosta when the patrol from this company, viz, Corporal Meyers and Privates Madden and Christenson, Company L, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, arrived, so it had been started but a few minutes before their arrival. The smell of burning kerosene was distinctly perceptible, proving the fact of its origin.


Although the bomberos were promptly on the ground, it was from thirty to forty minutes after the fire started before the water was put on the fire. Considerable delay was caused through their inability to locate the fire plugs, and numerous attempts to cut hose and otherwise interfere with efficient fire fighting occurred.

Private Myer, Company L, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, knocked a Filipino down, with the butt of his revolver, whom he found trying to puncture hose; and I heard of similar cases, but so far have not been able to verify the reports.

It was not until after 11 p. m. that the fire was under control.

The burnt district is on Calle Lacosta, Calle Arranque, and Calle Gandara.

Owing to the very irregular streets in this district a written description of the section burnt would avail little, therefore I have drawn a sketch of the section, showing the extent of the fire.



A...Indicates where fire started at Calle Lacosta No. 22

■...Indicates portion burned.

Sketch of burned district, Santa Cruz.

The fire burned from No. 4 Calle Lacosta to the building on the corner of Gandara; on Calle Gandara it burned to No. 8; on Calle Arranque it burned both sides of street from Calle Lacosta to the alley.

Fire occurred February 22, 1899, starting at about 8.30 p. m.

Very respectfully,

A. S. MORGAN,
Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

No. 10.

Colonel AMES,

Commanding Officer, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry:

I have the honor to submit the following report, covering the actions of Company M, from the beginning of the fire in Tondo, at midnight, February 22, until about 2.20 p. m. the following afternoon, at which time I was prostrated by the heat and compelled to turn over the command to my first lieutenant, Leigh D. Bruckart:

My men were nearly all up with arms ready when the fire in Tondo started, there

having been a fire previously in Santa Cruz and a slight alarm. When the fire in Tondo was first reported by the guard in the church tower it was about 250 yards up Calle Sande. A patrol of a dozen men under Lieutenant Bruckart went out to try and stop its progress by tearing down neighboring huts. They had been gone but a few moments when other fires in various parts of Tondo were reported, and a sharp fusilade from the right, on Calle Lemery, above Company C quarters, gave me the cue. I ordered the company out to their previously designated stations to resist any attack and sent out messengers to recall outlying guards and the patrols.

Those men under Lieutenant Bruckart soon returned, with the exception of the lieutenant, Sergt. W. H. Lawrence, Privates Hall and Thompson. The last three named had gone out farther and the lieutenant went to warn them, but finding them out of sight and hearing came back. The three enlisted men made for the beach and came back in about ten minutes. In the meantime, and following, the fire gained rapidly and completely surrounded the church. We were in a dangerous position until nearly 3 o'clock in the morning, when the eastern side was burned off. I then took out a patrol of 20 men and scouted the ground to the north for 600 yards. No shots were fired.

At daybreak an alarm called out the company and I ordered Lieutenant Bruckart out with a skirmish detail of 30 men. They covered the ground to the north for 500 yards, having 2 men slightly wounded, and killing a number of insurgents. They returned about 10.30, leaving 2 outposts, and Lieutenant Bruckart reported a line of stone barricades out some 600 or 700 yards and that it would take about 1 battalion to drive out the insurgents.

I reported this to General Hughes. At noon 2 companies of the Second Oregon arrived at the church, under command of Major Willis, soon followed by Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

I reported to Major Willis, who designated my company as the reserve to the skirmish line which he proposed to form across Tondo and drive back the insurgents. He ordered Lieutenant Bruckart to accompany him as guide and aid. The column moved about 12.20 p. m. I had 45 men, and Second Lieutenant Limperich, second in command. We carried about 100 rounds of ammunition per man. The fighting began about 1 o'clock. I proceeded with my company, as per orders, about 200 yards in the rear of the line.

At the first line of insurgent barricades, which were taken in a charge, my men were on the firing line doing good work.

We then dropped to the rear, on the next advance, stopping eventually at the car barns. Here I became affected by the heat and was ordered by Captain Law, assistant surgeon, Thirteenth Minnesota, to the hospital. I turned over the command to Lieutenant Bruckart, who was sent back by Major Willis for that purpose.

The further actions are reported by him, with an account of the morning's skirmishes and the 2 men wounded.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES E. MCKELVEY,
Captain Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

No. 11.

MANILA, P. I., February 25, 1899.

Colonel AMES,
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, on February 23, 1899:

It was about midnight, and while the fire in the Santa Cruz district was still burning, that the guard in the tower reported a fire about 150 yards from the church on Calle Sande. It was then confined to one native hut. With a small force of men I attempted to stop the progress of the fire by tearing down the neighboring huts. Numerous rifle shots in rapid succession and the appearance of fires in other localities showed that the insurgents were carrying out their threat to burn Manila. My small force fell back to quarters, running a gantlet of fire from the force of insurgents on Calle Lemery above Company C station.

Company M turned out promptly. The men were stationed in positions to resist an attack on the church and others to watch for fires about the building. A large number of native women, children, old men and Chinamen sought refuge in the churchyard; they were searched and allowed to come in.

The fire spread around the church and was, no doubt, set by the insurgents, as the tower guard reports the fire appearing in dozens of places about the district. For

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about two hours and a half it raged with fury, bent on burning us out. Although completely surrounded, the hot air, smoke and cinders filling the air, and the church building on fire in several places, every man kept his senses and worked quietly. By 3 o'clock the danger was over. Then the guards were doubled; Captain McKelvey took out a heavy patrol to reconnoiter and the rest retired. The patrol found the insurgents occupying the buildings and positions some 300 yards away to the north.

At daybreak, about 6 o'clock, numerous shots were fired at the church, and the company was called out. The tower guard saw no one near, so scouts were sent out and later I took out a skirmish detail of 25 men. We located the insurgents in the marshes and small islands of the lagoon and behind a line of street barricades about 400 yards north on Calle Sande and on Calle Lemery. A number of insurgents occupied houses and ruins near the lagoon; they were driven out by a small force of Company M men—about a dozen. It was during one of these charges to dislodge the enemy that 2 Company M men were wounded. This stopped further advances, as the enemy was too strong. I posted two strong outposts about 250 yards out and with the rest returned to the church, where I reported to Captain McKelvey what had been developed and a plan to dislodge the enemy.

This was to send out a battalion of 4 companies in a line as skirmishers, swing the right forward rapidly and drive the enemy through the swamp onto the beach, where a platoon of men could pick them off. Captain McKelvey then reported to General Hughes and just before noon Major Willis, Second Oregon, with Companies E and M, Second Oregon, arrived to carry out my plan. Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, under Second Lieutenant Snow, made out the 4 companies.

The formation for the attack was Companies E and M, Second Oregon, and Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota, in the order named from left to right, in line of skirmishers, with Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, as reserve. This formation was preserved until Tondo bridge was reached. The insurgents were driven steadily back, C Company, Thirteenth Minnesota, making one charge that practically cleared the way up Calle Sande.

After a rest at the bridge the line was formed with M Company on the left and the advance thus made to Caloocan, which was reached about 5.30 o'clock in the evening. During the advance a squad of men under Corporal Maxson reenforced my outpost on the left and advanced up the narrow stretch of land along the beach. They report many insurgents seen to cross over to Malabon. A number were also killed. As far as I can learn, 116 insurgents were killed and a greater number wounded during the advance.

Captain McKelvey was prostrated by the heat during the afternoon, and then Major Willis, who had asked me to accompany him, ordered me to command. No casualties in Company M during the afternoon.

Casualties.—Wounded; E. J. Fehr, shot in three places during the morning advance; serious; in general hospital. Oscar Frykman; slight wound at same time; on duty.

Respectfully submitted.

LEIGH D. BRUCKART,
First lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota.

No. 12.

MANILA, P. I., *February 26, 1899.*

Maj. PERCY WILLIS,
Second Oregon U. S. Volunteers.

SIR: I have the honor to hand you herewith a report of the part my company took in the engagement with the insurgents in Tondo on February 23, 1899:

About 9.30 a. m. on the 23d instant I received orders from Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran to have my company ready to move at once. There were but 43 enlisted men available, and part of them, with Lieutenant Platts, had been on guard all night at the penitentiary. Captain Davis, Company E, had received the same orders, and in about twenty minutes the 2 companies, under your command, marched to the Tondo Church, where we were joined by Companies M and C of the Thirteenth Minnesota. About 200 yards beyond this church, in obedience to your command, the companies deployed, Company E, Second Oregon, on the extreme left, Company C of the Thirteenth Minnesota on the right, and my company in the center, with Company M of the Thirteenth in reserve.

At the command, the line advanced, taking advantage of cover and avoiding streets as much as possible. The line had advanced but a short distance when the enemy opened fire on us from the nipa huts and from the trees. We returned the fire when we could locate the enemy, but with very slight effect. As the line advanced it

became necessary to burn the native shacks to dislodge the insurgents. This we did as we advanced, and in a very short time the main body of insurgents was located in a stone inclosure and behind breastworks of stone across the streets in front of my company. A heavy fire was opened up by both sides, with telling effect on the enemy. The insurgents behind the breastworks retreated to the stone inclosure and continued the fighting until a flank attack by the right of my company forced them to surrender.

We killed 30 natives, wounded 9, and took about 20 prisoners, all without a man of my command killed or wounded.

The fighting for the day, so far as my company was concerned, ended here.

I was ordered to deploy my men on the left of the main road to Caloocan, but after advancing about one-fourth mile found the country impassable on account of water, and had to return to the main road, which we followed until we reached the stone bridge, beyond the car shops. Here we deployed on the right of the Minnesotas, and, with Captain Davis's company on my right, we continued on to Caloocan, burning all the native huts on the way. After a short rest both Companies M and E of the Second Oregon returned to their quarters. The Minnesota companies, having joined Major Goodale's command, returned ahead of us.

This was the first engagement for my company, but they behaved like veterans. Lieutenant Platts deserves special mention, and both sergeants and corporals looked well after their duties. My company fired about 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Time of active fighting, about three hours; distance marched, 14 miles.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. POORMAN,
Commanding Company M, Second Oregon U. S. V.

No. 13.

MANILA, P. I., February 24, 1899.

Maj. PERCY WILLIS,

Commanding Second Battalion, Oregon U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of my company's actions during the skirmish and advance to Caloocan from Tondo, February 23, 1899:

After receiving your order to deploy as skirmishers and protect the left flank of the line, we advanced steadily with short rests for better fire facilities, using both individual and volley firing, as position of our line and enemy would permit. We burned all houses in our rear, after thoroughly examining them, and sent to the rear about 50 male prisoners. After the last halt on stone bridge I was ordered to cross the lagoon and advance in skirmish line toward Caloocan, examining and burning all houses in our front. In carrying out these instructions we could not find a single stand of arms and very few knives of any kind, although careful search was made for them.

After reaching the railroad station about 2 miles north of Tondo we relieved the Montana company holding the road, and, awaiting your advance, halted for lunch. Up to this point the country was full of houses, and we burned them all after sending about 100 men and women to the rear. As they were not armed or in resistance and our force was small we did not put them under arrest.

To sum up events we killed probably about 30 insurgents, as we counted 25 in our front while advancing. We sent to the rear 50 prisoners and burned nearly 100 houses.

Our total casualties were a slight superficial wound on index finger of left hand of Martin Hildebrandt. We had a force of 50 men with Captain Davis and Lieutenant Dunbar in command. I can not speak too highly of the conduct of the men, as my only difficulty was to hold them back and prevent unnecessary exposure to fire.

Very respectfully,

R. E. DAVIS,
Captain, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Company E.

No. 14.

MANILA, P. I., February 25, 1899.

Maj. PERCY WILLIS,

Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to present the following report of the operations of Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, during the afternoon of Thursday, February 23, 1899:

About 11 o'clock noon on the day mentioned, Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota


20 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Volunteer Infantry, consisting of 45 men under command of Capt. James E. McKelvey, joined the battalion commanded by Major Willis. When the battalion was drawn up in skirmish formation, Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, was made the reserve and kept in the rear until the skirmish line made its first halt and rest, about halfway from the Tondo Church and the stone bridge across the canal. In the meantime a detail of men from Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, who occupied an outpost on Calle Lande, joined Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota, at my order. Another outpost, consisting of about 10 men, advanced along the beach and narrow stretch of land between the bay and lagoon. This small force kept their line nearly equal with the battalion and only stopped when they came to the Vitas Inlet. Here they succeeded in cutting off a small force of insurgents who attempted to pass through the swamps into Tondo. A number of insurgents were killed while crossing the inlet to Malabon.

On the further advance of the battalion, Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, still remained as the reserve, sending details back for ammunition and with provisions. When the battalion stopped the second time between the car house and stone bridge, Captain McKelvey was prostrated by the heat and exhaustion and later removed to the general hospital. I was ordered to take command by Major Willis. From this point, it being about 2 o'clock, Company M was part of the skirmish line, advancing on the extreme left, setting fire to all buildings which might serve the enemy, until Calocan was reached, about 5.30 o'clock.

No casualties occurred in Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. Respectfully submitted.

LEIGH D. BRUCKART,
First Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.



Sketch of burned part of Santa Cruz district, Manila.

REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. HARRISON GRAY OTIS, U. S. V.

**HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
*Malolos, Bulacan (Luzon), April 2, 1899.***

**ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
*War Department, Washington, D. C.***

SIR: In compliance with regulations and instructions, I have the honor to submit the following preliminary and incomplete report (1) of the operations of this brigade from the 1st to the 31st day of March, 1899, inclusive. The report is necessarily only a partial one, for the reason that I have not yet received the official reports of the several regimental commanders, nor are complete official casualty lists, by regiments, at hand, though I am able to give in this report the brigade's losses in the aggregate.

I make my preliminary report at this time for the special reason that I am about to be relieved, at my own request, from the command of the brigade, (2) and I am unwilling to relinquish it without first narrating, even though it be imperfect, the recent operations of the command against the enemy in the field.

During the time following the battle of Caloocan, fought February 10, 1899, to March 24, 1899, inclusive, the brigade occupied its intrenched position on a line running in a general northwest and southeast direction from near the shore of Manila Bay, just north of Caloocan, to and beyond the Church de la Loma, the whole brigade line being about 2½ miles long.

The brigade was then composed of the Third U. S. Artillery acting as infantry, the First Montana Infantry, the Twentieth Kansas Infantry, and the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry (6 companies).

Within the forty days and over during which the brigade held this line, facing an active enemy, the troops were under a frequent and annoying fire night and day from strong rebel intrenchments stretching along almost the entire brigade front, and they suffered casualties in killed and wounded aggregating, during the period indicated (February 11 to March 24), 49 officers and men. This number includes the losses suffered by one company of the First Montana Infantry in the sharp and stubborn fight of February 23, in the rear, at and about the Tondo Bridge (3).

In these desultory affairs the enemy suffered, it is believed, more than corresponding losses at the hands of the brigade. In one notable minor combat alone, which has already been officially reported to you, a small detachment of the Third U. S. Artillery, aided by detachments of the First Montana and Tenth Pennsylvania regiments, engaged a much larger body of the enemy, belonging to the battalion Tarlac, who had emerged from their cover in a wood 1,200 or 1,500 yards in front of Blockhouse No. 2, driving them back and inflicting upon them, by the admission of one of the prisoners taken, a loss of 22

killed and wounded—double the number of our men actually engaged on the advance firing line.

On the left of the division line, near the bay, where the Twentieth Kansas Infantry had its position, our soldiers suffered most from this annoying rebel fire (4), but in return inflicted no light punishment upon the enemy, killing and wounding numbers of them, from day to day, by an effective sharpshooting fire.

An escaped Spanish prisoner reported to me that a shell fired by the Navy against the Filipino intrenchments near Malabon exploded, killing and wounding between 40 and 50 rebel soldiers (5).

This period of wearing duty, desultory firing, and frequent casualties was brought to an end by

THE MOVEMENT AGAINST MALOLOS.

The orders for the advance of the division northwardly were first given by the division commander (conditionally) to the brigade and regimental commanders at a conference held in the church at Collocan (6) on the night of March 22. These orders and instructions were somewhat modified two days later and, so far as they affected the First Brigade, were substantially as follows (7):

The enemy's main force was understood to be then on a line running eastwardly from Polo to Novaliches and the Rio Nuncia, with a strong outpost line extending from just north of Caloocan to San Francisco del Monte and Maraquina.

The orders for the new positions and distribution of the First Brigade were as follows, in substance:

Such changes in the respective positions of the other regiments of the brigade were to be made by me as would bring the Third U. S. Artillery on the left of the brigade line, without, however, altering the position then held by it. In the forward movement this command was to march directly against the enemy in its immediate front, moving out from its intrenchments on the left of the Second Brigade (Tenth Pennsylvania), and also to the left of the separating ravine; 1½ battalions to move forward on the firing line and one-half of a battalion to be in support.

The Twentieth Kansas Infantry was to take position on the right of the Third Artillery, occupying the ground between the ravine indicated and the dirt road running northwardly through the Pennsylvania camp; 2 battalions on the firing line, with a third battalion in support.

The First Montana Infantry was to be posted to the right of the Twentieth Kansas, with the left resting on the same road; 2 battalions on the firing line, 1 battalion in support (8).

In subsequent marches the railroad track was made the dividing line, separating the flanks of the two brigades.

The preliminary movements necessary to bring about these several changes of position were quietly made on the night of March 24, and apparently without discovery by the enemy. The positions evacuated by the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana Regiments were at once occupied by the Third Brigade of the First Division, under Brigadier-General Wheaton (9).

The leading feature of the plan to be carried out, as explained by the division commander, was to pierce the enemy's center (10), to do which—

The first advance was to be made with a view to occupying the

Caloocan-Balantasig (or Balintauac) road, about 1 mile in front of Blockhouse No. 2, and running in a general east and west direction.

(At the conference it was explained that the First Nebraska Regiment of the Second Brigade was to have one of its flanks resting on the river San Juan, but at that time it had not been determined which bank the regiment would occupy.)

The second advance was to be to the next parallel road northward of the Balantasig road, the Third Artillery touching the Tuliahan River west of Cabatuhan and extending eastwardly along the road to the village of Banlac, the other regiments of the brigade on a line to the right.

On the third advance the First Brigade was to pass the river Tuliahan by the left flank, and advance on the village of Bibana, supposed to be on the enemy's main line, the Third Artillery resting on that village, and the Kansas and Montana regiments prolonging the line so as to conform to the movements of the Second Brigade generally, the whole movement thus bringing the division on a line eastwardly of Novaliches.

The fourth movement, change of front to the left on the Third Artillery, bringing the right of the First Brigade opposite Polo.

The orders further required the impedimenta to be reduced to the minimum, the men marching without blankets or tents, but carrying one day's rations and not less than 100 rounds of ammunition per man on their persons, 200 rounds more per man and two days' rations to be kept available in the regimental carts, or transported upon pack animals. As a matter of fact, however, a large proportion of the men carried 200 rounds each, of their own choice.

Before the movement was begun the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment had been transferred, by order of the division commander, to the Second Brigade, for tactical reasons. This left the First Brigade with an effective strength on the fighting line, on the morning of March 25, of 2,184 officers and men. The number of effectives on March 26 was 2,037, and this small number was further reduced from day to day by casualties in the several combats which took place during the advance on the rebel capital.

At 6 o'clock on the morning of March 25 the brigade advanced, according to instructions, from its positions in front and to the right and left of the Church de la Loma.

The Second Brigade, having farther to march in order to get into position, had to move half an hour earlier.

The positions of the different regiments of my brigade, taken up the night before, were substantially at right angles to the Caloocan-Balantasig road, running north.

The advance, once begun, was almost continuous, the enemy being steadily driven before us from the start, and the prescribed plan for the preliminary movements was largely carried out during the first day, with some modifications rendered necessary by certain unforeseen features of the situation developed during the advance.

The two parallel roads referred to were taken and passed during the first two hours, and before 8 o'clock in the morning the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas regiments had gained the north bank of the Tuliahan River, the men wading and swimming the stream at points where the water was neck deep and even deeper. The river was intrepidly crossed by the advance of these regiments under a severe

fire from the intrenched enemy—firing at short range from his works on the north bank.

The advance of the first-named regiment, crossing the river in the face of a strongly occupied blockhouse on the north bank, suffered considerable losses in its determined onset, but inflicted severe punishment on the enemy, driving his picked troops from the blockhouse after killing many of them on the bank of the river. Here Lieutenant Abernethy, Third Artillery, again distinguished himself by gallant conduct in action with his command.

The advance of the Twentieth Kansas (including Company H, under Captain Clarke) having also encountered a sudden and severe fire from the enemy's intrenchments on the north bank, the men of the first line, with some men from other regiments, rushed gallantly down the steep bank into the unknown stream, wading or swimming it under a telling fire, which resulted in 8 casualties in the Kansas company alone.

The rush of our soldiers was so sudden and impetuous that the enemy was unable to escape, and nearly the entire detachment, according to information subsequently derived from a native (the detachment numbering 30 men), died where they fought, having been attacked in both front and flank by the impetuous volunteers and shot down at short range. Out of the whole number of Filipinos engaged at that particular point 26 were killed outright, 2 mortally and 1 slightly wounded, and only 1 appears to have gotten away (11).

During the day's movements through the difficult country traversed, interspersed as it is with dense jungles, thorny thickets, bamboo belts, difficult streams, and treacherous morasses, the regiments and battalions of the brigade unavoidably became somewhat separated, more particularly the First Montana, which had been so delayed that but 1 battalion succeeded in crossing the Tuliahan early in the day with the other regiments. In the afternoon another battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, crossed, and the remaining battalion, under Colonel Kessler, which had swerved so much to the right that by personal direction of the division commander it was temporarily attached to and operated with the Second Brigade during the latter portion of the day, succeeded in passing the river before dark.

The day's casualties in the brigade aggregated 68 killed and wounded.

Information reached the army here of the burning and evacuation of Malabon, and of the flight of the enemy before Wheaton's advance.

The brigade bivouacked for the night on the north bank of the Tuliahan.

On the morning of March 26 the advance was resumed. The divisions occupied Malinta during the afternoon, and Polo in the evening, both places having been fired by the enemy under the incendiary order of the rebel general, Luna, signing himself "General in chief of operations." A complete copy of this order was secured later on.

The day's casualties in the brigade numbered 11.

The command bivouacked near Polo and a little south of Meycanayan.

During the early part of the day the Tenth Pennsylvania acted with the First Brigade.

On March 27 the advance was resumed at 7 o'clock a. m., the column passing through Meycanayan, which was also found in flames, having been fired by the enemy. The column reached the Maralao early in the day.

The enemy having here shown himself in unknown force on his right, involving a possible flanking movement against our left, I

directed a battalion of the Twentieth Kansas to debouch from its line of march along the dirt road, deploy into the timber, and drive out the concealed foe. This order was speedily followed by another to send in a second battalion, and then a third, the whole under Colonel Funston, who, after a spirited combat along the south bank of an arm of the Miralao River, drove the enemy from their intrenched positions on the north bank, and killed and wounded a number of them. Colonel Funston then crossed a small detachment to what proved to be an island. These troops were subsequently withdrawn when it was discovered that the stream was not the main river. Later in the afternoon this regiment was ordered to the right, with instructions to cross the river by the railroad bridge where the Third Artillery had already crossed. This reliable regiment, small, but efficient, had been heavily engaged during the afternoon, suffering 18 casualties, but driving the enemy in its front, as usual.

The First Montana, which, under instructions, had been marching during the day in the rear, on the dirt road, in columns of four, as a train and artillery guard, was ordered up late in the afternoon to furnish details for bridge building, an improvised bridge over the Miralao having been ordered to be constructed a short distance below the railroad bridge. The regiment encamped for the night on the south bank of the river. It sustained 4 casualties while moving into position near the bridge.

On March 28 the advance was resumed. The brigade passed the rivers Bocaue and Bigaa, the troops marching over the railroad bridge, which had been saved by the army from the enemy's attempt to fire it. The horses and mules crossed by swimming.

The column flanked the large town of Bulacan, lying to the westward, nearer to the bay, and reported to be occupied by the rebel leader Gregorio del Pilar with 500 troops, and reached the river Guiguinto in the afternoon. The Twentieth Kansas, of the First Brigade, and the Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Second Brigade, passed the river at the railroad bridge. The Third Artillery and First Montana bivouacked on the south bank. A severe engagement was fought on the north bank just before dark, the rebel rear guard having been driven off with a loss of 29 men killed and wounded in the Twentieth Kansas alone. Seven casualties occurred in the First Montana during the day while the regiment was marching in the rear on the dirt road (12).

Lieutenant Kimmell, Third Artillery, of my staff, had his horse killed by a stray bullet during a halt, and one of my orderlies had his horse wounded later in the afternoon on the south bank of the Guiguinto.

Indication of demoralization and desperation on the part of the rebel forces were frequent as the division advanced, and unmistakable signs that Aguinaldo's army was rapidly going to pieces were seen all along the line of march. The burning of towns under Luna's destructive and senseless order steadily continued, though the incendiaries were not infrequently so hard pushed by our advancing forces that they had scant time to apply the torch, and in that way an occasional native village escaped.

The enemy was also frustrated in his efforts to destroy the railroad bridges, all of which were saved through the alertness and energy of the American advance.

On March 30 the brigade marched in the afternoon, in its designated position in the line, from Guiguinto station to the rebel trenches a couple of miles south of Malolos, where a small party of the enemy

were discovered strongly entrenched across the railroad track. The encounter was unexpected at the moment. The rebel detachment suddenly opened with rifle fire upon the division and brigade commanders, their staffs, and orderlies, who had assembled on the railroad track during a temporary halt, only a few yards away. To repel the attack and drive off the assailants a company from the Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Second Brigade, advancing on the right of the railroad and a company of the Twentieth Kansas abreast of it on the left of the track, were simultaneously ordered forward on the double quick, driving out the enemy and occupying his trenches. No casualties occurred here on our side, and none was discovered at that immediate point on the Filipino side.

The brigade bivouacked for the night, the formation of the line being substantially as on previous marches.

THE FALL OF MALOLOS.

On March 31 the brigade moved early from its bivouac of the previous night, marching directly against Malolos in conjunction with the Second Brigade and the divisional artillery. The First Brigade advanced in substantially the same relative order, as to the respective regimental positions, as on previous days, the right (the Twentieth Kansas) touching the railway line, the First Montana joining on its left, and the Third Artillery on the extreme left; the first-named regiments with 2 battalions each on the firing line and 1 battalion each in support, the Third Artillery (now much reduced by the casualties of the campaign) with a battalion and a half on the firing line and a half a battalion in support.

The advance was necessarily slow and tiresome on account of the difficult character of the country passed over, it being full of swamps, lagoons, marshes, bamboo thickets, and dense banana groves, necessitating frequent changes from marching by the front, in line of battle to flank movements toward the right, followed by successive deployments again into line of battle to the left after having passed the numerous obstacles encountered.

The chief resistance and the principal firing appeared to come from the right, being directed against the Second Brigade.

No casualties occurred in my brigade during this day (13).

My advance continued steadily toward the town, barring more delay such as have already been described, until the Second Battalion (Cooke's of the First Montana Infantry) had reached a point within 150 or 200 yards from the outskirts on the southerly and westerly side. Here a halt was called and Miller's battalion was ordered up to the close support of the other. I had already arrived at this point with 2 staff officers and 3 orderlies, where I waited the further orders of the division commander.

While the Montana battalions were in position here, halted and awaiting orders, heavy black smoke was discerned issuing from nipa huts on the edge of the town directly in front of my line, and presently smoke and flame burst out from Aguinaldo's "palace," located on the public square.

At this juncture, and very shortly after my advance had halted in the position indicated, Major Mallory, of the division staff, appeared upon the ground, at about 9.35 a. m., and conveyed to me direction



RAILROAD BRIDGE NEAR MARILAO ADVANCE ON MALOLOS

from Major-General MacArthur to send the Third Artillery into the town, provided I found the way clear.

As this order had evidently been issued by the division commander on the supposition that the Third Artillery was the most advanced regiment of the line on the left flank—the nearest troops to the border of the town on that side—I pointed out to the staff officer that the Montana battalions were at the moment the nearest troops to the outskirts of the town at that point, the Third Artillery having been delayed by the enemy's resistance and a longer route. My suggestion to send in one of the Montana battalions without further delay was accordingly concurred in, and I at once gave the necessary order. This was about 9.40 o'clock a. m. At the same time I directed that the Third Battalion (Miller's) should follow in close support of the Second. In five minutes, or at about 9.45 a. m., these troops were at the public square in front of the Filipino dictator's "palace," then completely enveloped in flames, its roof and walls falling in with loud crashes.

The remaining battalion of the First Montana, under Colonel Kessler, entered within a few minutes, followed closely by the Third Artillery, under Major Kobbé, which, as already stated, had had a longer and more difficult march than the other regiments in closing in to the right and center from the extreme left of the line.

Colonel Funston, with a small detachment of the Twentieth Kansas, had entered about 9.30 a. m., at a point nearer the railway line, which had been his right guide during the advance. He reported to me on the public square at about 10 a. m.

Shortly afterwards the First Brigade flag, surmounted by the national colors, were flying from an improvised staff erected in front of the burning headquarters building of a departed rebel government (14).

Before sending my troops into the town I transmitted stringent orders, which had been received from the major-general commanding, to the effect that there must be no burning or other destruction of property by our troops; that fires already set by the enemy should be extinguished, if possible; that public and private property should be placed under guard; that there should be no looting whatever by the troops, no straggling or other unsoldierly conduct; in short, that perfect order should be maintained throughout the captured city. These orders were carried out effectively, heavy guard details from the First Montana and the Third Artillery regiments being promptly posted by me for that purpose in that quarter of the city.

Then reporting in person, with my regimental commanders, to the division commander at the railway station, I was directed by him to march the brigade through the city, keeping on the left of the railroad track, and to a point half a mile northward and westward of the city limits, there to take position on a line extending to the left of railroad and at right angles, substantially, to the track; the Third Artillery on the extreme left, as before, with 1 battalion from each regiment deployed 500 yards in front, constituting a strong outpost line.

These dispositions were made as soon as practicable. The order was subsequently changed, however, so as to leave 1 battalion of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment available for patrol duty on the Bulacan road.

The regiments having taken up their respective positions, the weary, though triumphant and happy, soldiers proceeded to make themselves

as comfortable as the extreme heat and the scarcity of shade and water would admit of.

Late in the evening an order reached me from division headquarters directing the detail of a major and a battalion to be employed as an observation column, and to move in the direction of Calumpit, on the railroad, on the following morning. I accordingly detailed Major Miller and his battalion of the First Montana, who reported to the division commander for orders and prepared to move accordingly.

Thus, after an arduous and brilliant campaign by the Second Division, supported by other troops, lasting seven days and involving frequent combats, numerous casualties among our troops, and heavy losses by the enemy, Malolos, the recent capital of the so-called Filipino "revolutionary government," fell before the American arms.

I have undertaken to describe in this report only the part taken by my brigade in the successful operations resulting in the city's capture and the dispersion of the rebel army defending it.

It is my grateful privilege to again highly commend the conduct of the officers and men of my command through the campaign. They have shown in an eminent degree the qualities of good soldiers—obedience, discipline, endurance, courage, steadiness, patriotism, and the most magnificent ardor in battle. The regimental commanders—Col. Harry C. Kessler, First Montana Infantry; Col. Frederick Funston, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, and Maj. W. A. Kobbé, commanding the 2 battalions of the Third U. S. Artillery (serving as infantry)—have again proved in actual field service their capacity and fitness for their responsible posts, and their skill and gallantry under fire. I again recommend them, and each of them, for such special mark of distinction as the commanding general and the War Department may be pleased to confer upon them "on the merits."

It is my grievous task to have to report that the casualties of the brigade during the seven days' operations particularly described in this report aggregate 136 killed and wounded, thus swelling the brigade's total casualties in battle since the outbreak of the rebellion to 285, or considerably more than 10 per cent of the average effective strength of the command actually engaged in the campaign from first to last.

A tabulated statement, in numbers, of the casualties in the brigade during March, including the operations against Malolos, is forthcoming.

The complete list of casualties by names, regiments, and companies enumerating the killed and mortally wounded, and describing the number, nature, and seriousness of the wounds inflicted, also goes forward through regular military channels.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARRISON GRAY OTIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

NOTES.

- (1) Drafted at Malolos; completed at Nagasaki.
- (2) Pending final official action upon my resignation, tendered after the fall of Malolos.
- (3) Heretofore reported and not properly included in the report of March operations.

(4) Here, on the extreme left, the contending lines were much nearer together than at any other point, the intrenchments being only about 225 yards apart.

(5) Who, in their childish curiosity, had applied a lighted cigarette "where it would do the most good."

(6) Abandoned.

(7) Being based upon the general plan of campaign drawn up by the corps commander.

(8) The division commander and his staff, with the divisional artillery, advanced by this road.

(9) The operations of this (Wheaton's) brigade, acting independently, but in close cooperation with the division during its advance, proved a most valuable aid in the general operation from first to last, especially as General Wheaton took entire charge of the division supply train.

(10) The dispositions made had brought the First Brigade practically in the center of the division line, and the task of piercing the enemy's center was specifically assigned to this command, acting in conjunction with the other troops of the division in the general forward movement.

(11) Particular mention is made of these minor affairs, not because of their importance when compared with the larger operations of the campaign, but to illustrate the peculiar nature of the fighting, the obstacles our troops had to contend with, and the irresistible character of the American advance.

(12) The casualties were further examples of losses inflicted on our troops at very long range by the enemy's far-reaching Mauser rifles, whose shots not infrequently took effect at more than 2,000 yards distance.

(13) The resistance of our advance had grown feebler and feebler at each succeeding point of contact on the march to Malolos, notwithstanding the strong defensive works constructed at frequent intervals by the Filipinos; and at Malolos practically no stand at all was made by the demoralized enemy.

(14) The enemy's line of retreat, all the way from Caloocan and Malabon to Malolos, had been made by his own act literally a pathway of incendiary fire and a scene of needless desolation.

REPORT OF AN EXPEDITION TO THE PROVINCE OF LA LAGUNA, LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, APRIL 8 TO 17, 1899, BY MAJ. GEN. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V., COMMANDING.

APRIL 8 TO 17, 1899.—Expedition to the province of La Laguna, Luzon, Philippine Islands.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of an expedition to Santa Cruz, in the province of La Laguna.

Santa Cruz, the richest and most important city of La Laguna province, is situated on a neck of land on the southeastern shore of Laguna de Bay and is the outlet for the produce of the rich country to the south and southeast.

The insurgents were reported here in force and full of confidence, and in compliance with the verbal instructions of the general commanding the department this expedition was organized. Its purposes were:

First. The capture of Santa Cruz, and if possible to cut off the enemy's retreat.

Second. Destruction of the telegraph lines.

Third. The distribution among the inhabitants of the country of copies of the United States commissioners' proclamation.

Fourth. The location and capture of launches or gunboats in the hands of the insurgents.

Fifth. After the capture of Santa Cruz, the country and towns to the east and north along the east coast of the lake were to be reconnoitered.

Sixth. All this having been accomplished, it was contemplated to reembark and make a landing and advance upon Calamba.

The expedition was to be limited in strength to approximately 1,500 men. It was to be transported to its destination in cascos, towed by steam launches up the Pasig River and on the lake. The hour of departure and destination were to be withheld, but the former was to be fixed so that the journey might be made during the night, arriving at the point of landing at or before daylight.

To carry out the verbal instructions from the department commander in detail, the following order was promulgated:

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 19. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.

The following-named organizations will be immediately prepared to take the field on a special expedition. They will be equipped in light marching order and will be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition per man and ten days' rations, two of which will be "travel rations," and will be carried in the haversack:

Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Gale's squadron, Troops C, G, and L, 219 men.

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Patten's battalion, Companies C, D, E, and I, 290 men.

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Hasbrouck's battalion, Companies A, G, L, and K, 311 men.

First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, Linck's battalion, Companies A, C, D, and F, 225 men.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Fraine's battalion, Companies C, D, I, and K, 248 men.

Two mountain guns (Hawthorne's battery), Lieutenant Koehler, commanding, with necessary equipment, etc., and 60 rounds of ammunition for each piece (shell and shrapnel), 16 men.

For the purpose of this expedition the authorized sharpshooters whose names have been reported to these headquarters, with the officers selected to command them, will be temporarily organized as follows:

First company, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, 9 squads, 45 enlisted men, and Fourth Cavalry, 3 squads, 15 enlisted men, commanded by Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry; 60 men.

Second company, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, 8 squads, 40 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. W. J. Gruschus, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Third company, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, 8 squads, 40 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. R. H. Hartman, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.

Fourth company, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, 12 squads, 60 enlisted men, commanded by First Lieut. W. E. Weigle and Second Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

Making a total of 1,509 men.

With the exception of those belonging to the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, sharpshooters will remain for rations with their respective companies, and those detached from the companies not taking part in this expedition will be assigned for rations to companies of their regiments above designated, but will be held under charge of squad leaders and the officers assigned to command them, in readiness to respond promptly to calls for service in their special duties.

The Washington detachment will be equipped as a separate company.

Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to command the battalion of sharpshooters.

Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V., is assigned to command the forces as thus organized, and will report in person to the major-general commanding the division for detailed instructions.

The Quartermaster and Medical departments and Signal Corps will furnish the necessary personnel and material.

Brigade commanders are charged with the concentration of the troops of their respective commands at a point and time to be designated by telegraph from these headquarters.

No transportation other than by boat will be provided except from camp to place of embarkation. As the journey by boat will probably be made during the night, company commanders will arrange to have coffee made and served during the night or just before landing, which will doubtless occur about daylight or before.

It is the desire of the major-general commanding the division that this expedition have a thorough and complete organization, and to that end the companies will be divided into squads, and a noncommissioned officer as chief will be assigned to the charge of each. This assignment to squads will be made permanent, and the men will remain attached to the squads to which they are assigned, except when changed by direction of the company commander, and the chief of squad will keep in his possession a list of names of the men of his squad, and he shall know at all times the whereabouts of each man and be able to account for them.

In battle the men of each squad will constitute "comrades in battle," and will support and assist each other. In no case will a man be abandoned, except when specially so directed by the company commander in each case. When a member of a squad is killed, wounded, or otherwise disabled, the fact will be immediately reported by the chief of squad to his next superior. In case it becomes necessary to detach individual men from squads, they will be sent in pairs, and the chief of squad will know that all of his men are accounted for.

One of the purposes of this expedition is the fulfillment of a desire and determination of the United States Government to prove to and reassure the Filipinos that a campaign conducted by Americans through a hostile country can and will be prosecuted according to the most generous rules of civilized warfare. To this end General Orders, No. 7, series 1898, and No. 7, current series, these headquarters, and paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 15, current series, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, will be rigorously enforced.

Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, is assigned to command the gunboats forming a part of this expedition. He will also arrange, prescribe, and superintend the formation of the flotilla and the order of sailing of the same, taking due and proper precautions against accident.

During the absence of the major-general commanding the division on this expedition the line of intrenchments from Pasig to Pasay will be in charge of Brig. Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., commanding Second Brigade, who will assume control of all the troops remaining of the First Division.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Subsequent to the issue of the above order, verbal instructions were given placing Maj. D. W. Figgins, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, in command of the designated battalion of that regiment, and detailing First Lieut. E. E. Southern, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, to command the fourth company of sharpshooters, in place of First Lieut. W. E. Weigle, of the same regiment.

Capt. W. W. McCammon, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, commanding that regiment by virtue of seniority, accompanied the Second Battalion of his regiment.

Maj. Herbert Cardwell, division surgeon, U. S. V., as chief surgeon of the division, provided an efficient corps of medical officers and hospital men. (See Appendix 1.) Chinese coolies were supplied for litter bearers, thus increasing the efficiency of the Hospital Corps.

The United States Army gunboats *Laguna de Bay*, *Napindan*, and *Oeste* had been assigned to duty with the expedition.

On the evening of April 7 the following message was sent brigade commanders:

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
April 7, 1899.

BIGADE COMMANDERS:

The division commander directs that all troops selected for duty with the expeditionary brigade will be reported to Brigadier-General King, at San Pedro Macati, promptly at 4 o'clock p. m. to-morrow, the 8th instant, and will embark immediately.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

About sunset all the troops were embarked on 8 launches, 17 cascos and 2 bancos, and the journey up the river commenced. Owing to the winding, narrow channel, inexperienced pilots, and frequent grounding of launches and cascos, the journey to the lake consumed the night. Through the indefatigable efforts of Captain Grant (see Appendix 1, p. 46) the entire flotilla was formed at 4 o'clock a. m., and the start for the lake was made (see Appendix 2, p. 43).

At 10.30 a. m. the flotilla assembled off Santa Cruz, and the following plan of attack was communicated to the command:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

ON BOARD U. S. LAUNCH MARIA,
Off Santa Cruz, P. I., 10.30 a. m., April 9, 1891

The gunboat *Laguna de Bay* will take position north and a little east of Santa Cruz, the *Napindan* south of west of the city, the *Oeste* directly in front and opposite west of city. The disposition and operations of these gunboats will be under charge of Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.

The sharpshooters under command of Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, will land under the guns and opposite the position of the *Napindan*. These troops will be the first to debark. They will be supported and immediately followed by the 2 battalions of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. The North Dakota will land on the left and the Idahos on the right flank of the Fourteenth Infantry, protecting its adjacent flank.

The above embarkation will be under the immediate charge of Brig. Gen. Cha. King, U. S. V.

The Fourth Cavalry squadron will be towed to a point near the position assigned the gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, to be debarked at such point, under the protection of that gunboat, as may be determined after the landing of the Fourteenth Infantry battalions has been accomplished.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

The landing was accomplished with much difficulty, owing to a stiff breeze blowing and consequent rough sea. Many of the troops were compelled to wade ashore through water at first shoulder deep.

After landing, the command under Major Weisenburger, the senior officer, advanced a short distance according to plan. Almost immediately a sharp fire was developed on their right. The enemy was routed with loss, leaving 10 dead. Darkness coming on, the troops bivouacked for the night on the lines. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 11, p. 48; 34, pp. 59.)

Along the north of the city the enemy was in force and well fortified. In view of the near approach of darkness, a landing was attempted. However, verbal instructions were given and disposition made for the landing of Gale's squadron and the attack on the north side of the town. (See Appendix 17, p. 50.)

During a personal examination of the condition of the command made after nightfall, it was ascertained that General King was so seriously ill that he had been unable to land with his command, and that he would probably not be able to participate in any part of the expedition. (See Appendix 5.)

The immediate command of the line was assumed by myself, General King was authorized to return to his headquarters (see Appendix 6), and the next officer in rank, Major Weisenburger, was verbally appointed to command of the provisional brigade.

At daybreak next morning, the 10th instant, the troops were again put into position, 3 companies on the right of the road leading north toward the town, the remainder extending to the left until the first rested on the beach. The artillery moved along the road supporting

by Company I, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry. The advance toward the city was immediately taken up.

The illness of General King caused much embarrassment, some confusion and delay, but thanks to the energy and efficiency of my staff officers this was soon overcome. To Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was intrusted the center of our advancing line, and Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, conducted the left flank. These gallant officers, fully alive to the responsibilities resting upon them, were equal to the occasion, and no line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently led, as the results proved. I desire to commend these officers in the highest terms for the gallant work done by them on this occasion. It must be understood that no transportation accompanied the expedition, officers were all on foot and carried on their backs all their supplies and equipments. Still these officers moved from point to point where their presence was required, led in the charge and in the advance over difficult and dangerous places, keeping the line continuous, unbroken, moving continually, driving and destroying the enemy at every point. I especially commend these officers for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion.

To Major Weisenburger I wish to express my appreciation of his valuable services.

More or less opposition was encountered, but when the large bridge crossing the river in the edge of the city was approached the enemy was developed in strong force, entrenched and occupying well-fortified positions. Without hesitation Captain Hasbrouck and his battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Washington sharpshooters, and some of the Idaho battalion charged across the bridge and completely routed the insurgents. At the same time the troops on both sides of the bridge waded rapidly across the river and engaged the enemy at close range, inflicting severe loss. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 15, p. 49; 34, p. 59.)

Under cover of the fire of the gunboat *Napindan* the cavalry had landed and charged the trenches on the water front, as planned. (See Appendices 10, p. 46; 17, p. 50.) The enemy was driven back out of these trenches into the city against our main line, which, advancing from the south, had just crossed the river and entered the city, as above described. The only means of escape was toward the northeast, in which direction the insurgents fled in great disorder. In doing so they were exposed not only to the fire of our land forces, but also to a very effective fire from the machine guns on the boats. (See Appendices 11, p. 46; 12, p. 48.) Ninety-three insurgent dead were picked up on the streets and on the open ground northeast of the city and buried. Thirty of their wounded were captured and taken in hospitals, where 3 shortly afterwards died. Forty-one other prisoners were captured, and, with the exception of a few, were afterwards given their freedom. (See Appendix 10, p. 46.) Many of the dead and wounded of the enemy were undoubtedly carried away by their comrades or escaped discovery in the thickets, where much of the fighting was done, and which also flanked their avenue of escape from the city. Forty-two dead insurgents were subsequently found in those thickets and buried by our troops. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.)

Our casualties were 3 enlisted men, Fourteenth Infantry; 2 enlisted men, First Idaho, and 1 officer and 1 enlisted man, Fourth Cavalry, wounded. None killed, none missing. (See Appendices 15, p. 49; 16, p. 49; 17, p. 50; 34, p. 59.)

The prisoners and wounded of both armies were sent to Manila the night after the battle.

The Hon. H. A. Ramsden, H. B. M. vice-consul at Manila, had presented credentials from the military governor and accompanied the division headquarters from that city. (See Appendix 21.) He participated in the engagement resulting in the occupation of Santa Cruz, and was of great assistance during the entire expedition. His thorough knowledge of the Spanish language and of the characteristics of the natives was of much aid in securing information from captives and friendly Filipinos.

It was learned that, with the exception of the few Chinese shopkeepers whom we found in the city, all the inhabitants had fled to the mountains on the day previous. The provincial governor and commandant of the insurgent forces had also made his escape before we landed. His immediate subordinate in military command, a colonel whose name was not learned, is reported to have died fighting in the trenches south of the city.

Headquarters were established in the governor's palace, and proper disposition was made of the troops for the night.

The following order was issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDER } No. 2.	HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, <i>Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899—2 p. m.</i>
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1. This command, with the exception of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, will be prepared for marching orders early to-morrow morning. Two days' cooked rations will be taken in haversacks. It is probable that no access to the cascos can be had until the night of the 12th.

2. Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to the command of the expeditionary brigade.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain Gale, as provost-marshal, with his dismounted squadron as provost guard, protected the houses and such property as were left in the city from injury and removal. No burning of houses or looting of property occurred. (Appendix 8, p. 45.)

The proclamation of the United States commission (see Appendix 36) was freely distributed in the houses of the city, to be found by the inhabitants on their return, and, as opportunity offered, distribution outside our lines was made.

The telegraph line running south from Santa Cruz was destroyed for more than a mile, and so much of it as followed the main road northward was left to be utilized by us on our advance. (See Appendix 10, p. 46.)

From a prisoner it was learned that the steam launches and other water craft in the possession of the insurgents had been concealed in a navigable river near Pagsanjan, an important town about 5 miles northeast of Santa Cruz. It was believed that the remnant of the enemy which escaped from Santa Cruz had fallen back to Pagsanjan. The latter point thus became the next objective, and the following orders were issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } No. 3.	HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, <i>Santa Cruz, P. I., April 10, 1899.</i>
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The command will march at 6 a. m. to-morrow, the 11th instant, with two days' cooked rations in haversack. The direction will be toward Pagsanjan. The order of march will be as follows:

Sharpshooters in advance, Fourteenth Infantry, Idaho Volunteer Infantry battalion, and North Dakota Volunteer Infantry battalion. The artillery will march

in rear of the Fourteenth Infantry. The greatest precaution will be observed in the advance. In case the enemy is met, and if it is necessary to deploy the column, the Fourteenth Infantry will deploy to the right and left of the road, center resting on the road. The artillery will form in the center of the Fourteenth Infantry and will be supported by the left company of the right battalion of that regiment. The Idaho battalion will deploy to the right of the Fourteenth Infantry and push well to the front. The North Dakota Volunteer Infantry battalion will deploy to the left of the Fourteenth Infantry, also pushing well to the front.

The effort will be to make a wheel to the right and left, the right wing making a left wheel and the left wing making a right wheel, the idea being to encompass or surround the town.

By command Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Verbal instructions were given for the gunboats to proceed before daybreak to the mouth of the Pagsanjan River and remove the obstructions placed near there by the insurgents. (See Appendix 10, p. 46.) After this was accomplished, the gunboats were to come up the river and cooperate with the land forces, which would leave Santa Cruz shortly after daybreak and move by the main road northeastward toward Pagsanjan. The advance of the gunboats up the river was prevented by the bar which the obstructions had caused across the channel at the mouth of the river. (See Appendix 22, p. 52.)

The movement of the land forces was made as planned, leaving Santa Cruz shortly after daybreak, Captain Gale and his squadron remaining in the city as a garrison.

After advancing along the main road about 2 miles our scouts developed the enemy strongly intrenched across the road and along the adjacent open field. The column promptly deployed and the artillery brought into action, as had been contemplated and directed in General Field Orders, No. 3, given above. The enemy fled precipitately as soon as the artillery opened on them. The insurgent loss was reported as 8 dead; left on the field. Our casualty was First Lieut. E. E. Southern, First Washington, severe wound, right arm. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 25, p. 53; 34, p. 59, 61, 69, 89.)

The advance was resumed toward Pagsanjan, and the town occupied without further resistance. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 34, p. 59.)

With the exception of 2 Spaniards, who claimed to have escaped from the insurgents, and a few Chinese, the town was entirely deserted.

The steam launches *Orani* and *El Capitan* and casco No. 689 were found in the river at the town. The other launches were reported by a prisoner to have been moved farther up the river, and to have on them 2 machine guns. Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was sent up the river with the North Dakota battalion to secure these launches and bring them down to the town. This was done without casualty, and to the two launches found at the town were added 4 more, viz, *Covadonga*, *Nueva Ecija*, *Suerte*, and *Oceania*, also casco No. 1888. (See Appendix 34, p. 59.)

Companies C and E, Fourteenth Infantry, and the Washington sharpshooters were sent down the south bank of the river to meet the gunboats and assist in removing the obstructions near the mouth of the river. After proceeding about 2 miles they were fired on by insurgents concealed in a church on the north side of the river in the small town Lumban. The river at that point is not fordable, and the ferry had been destroyed before the arrival of our troops, who, being unable to cross the river, engaged the enemy from the south bank. By a well-directed fire the insurgents were dispersed. (See Appendixes

25, p. 53; 34, p. 61, p. 65.) Shortly afterwards the Idahos, who crossed on cascos farther up, arrived and occupied the town. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 34, p. 61; 34, p. 67.)

The command on the south bank then continued down the river to the obstructions. (See Appendix 25, p. 53.) Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was sent down to and occupied position across from Lumban where the main road crossed the river. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.) Company I, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Field, commanding, remained at Pagsanjan as provost guard. (See Appendix 34, p. 65.)

Meanwhile the gunboats had engaged a force of the enemy at the mouth of the river and routed them. (See Appendix 22.)

The captured launch *Orani* was manned by a soldier crew and run down the river to a point near the obstructions the night of April 1. On the day following the remainder of the launches and the cascos were brought down under the supervision of Captain Grant. (See Appendix 23, p. 52.) In this work the gunboat *Napindan*, Second Lieut. Thomas Franklin, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, commanding, rendered great assistance, that gunboat having been able to pass over the bar and come up the river after the obstructions had been removed the morning of the 12th instant.

It was found that there was not sufficient water on the bar to permit the passage of the captured launches into the lake. A dredge was accordingly sent out by order of the department commander. Arriving the 12th instant, it was set to work cutting a channel through the bar. (See Appendixes 23, p. 52; 24, p. 53.)

A ferry having been improvised at Lumban the artillery, sharpshooters, Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, and the First North Dakota were crossed to the north side of the river April 1 and with the First Idaho proceeded to Longos, a lake-side village of some size, without meeting any opposition. (See Appendixes 30, p. 54; 34, p. 61; 34, p. 63; 34, pp. 65, 66.)

Captain Patten's battalion, with the exception of Company D, which acted as support for the artillery, was concentrated at the mouth of the river, where it remained guarding the dredges until the close of the expedition. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.)

With a view to securing a good place to reembark the troops at the movement on Calamba the North Dakota battalion was sent from Longos shortly after noon the 12th instant to reconnoiter the town of Paete, located about 4 miles farther north on the lake shore, where it was reported a good landing place could be found. After advancing about 1 mile the enemy was discovered intrenched across the road and immediately opened fire from behind almost impenetrable undergrowth on the mountain side. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.) Major Fraine promptly disposed his command to execute a flank movement on the enemy, who were pouring a heavy fire into the advance guard; 4 of them were killed and 3 wounded, one mortally. Of the latter and 3 killed belonged to a party of 5 flankers who had been sent up the hillside. Their surviving comrade, Private Thomas Stetland, Company C, First North Dakota, remained with them, and his cool and unerring aim successfully held the enemy back until reinforcements came. Then, after carrying his wounded comrade to the rear, he assisted in recovering the bodies of the killed. (See Appen-

dixes 27, p. 54; 34, pp. 61, 68.) He has been recommended for a medal of honor.

At the first sound of firing Lieut. William Brooke, Fourth U. S. Infantry (now captain, Thirty-fifth U. S. Volunteer Infantry), aid-de-camp, was sent to ascertain the cause. He reported the engagement of the North Dakotas, and asked for reenforcements. (See Appendixes 26, p. 54; 30, p. 57.)

The artillery, with its support, Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, and the sharpshooters were hastened forward under command of Major Weisenburger. (See Appendixes 30, p. 57; 34, p. 61; 34, pp. 63, 68.)

Boarding the gunboat *Laguna de Bay* a position was secured near the beach from which it was possible to aid the artillery in shelling the enemy. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.)

As our line advanced its flanks were marked by signal flags, carried by Capt. E. A. McKenna and a private, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps. (See Appendixes 28 and 30, p. 57.)

After an engagement lasting about one hour the enemy was driven up the mountain side and dispersed.

The command then continued to and occupied Paete without further resistance. (See Appendix 34, p. 61.) Here was found a good place for the reembarkation of the troops.

On the 13th instant Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry and the First Idahos were brought forward from Longos. (See Appendixes 34, p. 61; 34, p. 66.) Two tugs were asked for to tow back the dredge and such of the captured launches as were unable to go in with their own steam. (See Appendix 30, p. 57.) They were supplied. (See Appendix 32, p. 58.)

It had been a part of the original plan to move by water to a point near Calamba, and there debarking the troops to continue our land operations along the south and west shores of the lake, where many important towns are located. This plan was changed by the department commander April 15, and the expedition ordered to return to Manila. (See Appendix 32.)

On the 16th instant, the last of the launches having been brought into the lake, the troops at Paete, at the mouth of the river, and the garrison at Santa Cruz were reembarked on cascos and returned to San Pedro Macati and Manila (see Appendix 34, pp. 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69), arriving the 17th instant.

Appended hereto are copies of brief reports rendered the department commander as opportunity offered for transmission; of reports of subordinate commanders; of correspondence, orders, in fact, every available record pertaining to the expedition.

Attention is invited to final reports of subordinate commanders, which are as a rule so complete and lucid as to merit especial commendation.

Lists of the names of officers considered entitled to brevet commissions "for distinguished conduct and public service in the presence of the enemy" and of enlisted men who are entitled to special consideration, who have been mentioned in this and accompanying reports, are submitted as follows:

List of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled commissions "for distinguished conduct and public service in the presence of the under section 1209, Revised Statutes.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recomm
Clarence R. Edwards.	Major, assistant adjutant-general volunteers (captain, Tenth Infantry, U. S. A.).	<p>Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899: "The illness of General King caused much embarrassment, some delay and confusion, but thanks to the energy and efficiency of my staff officers this was soon overcome. "To Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, was intrusted the center of our advancing line, and Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, conducted the left flank. "These gallant officers, fully alive to the responsibilities resting upon them, were equal to the occasion, and no line of battle could have been more courageously or intelligently led, as the results proved. I desire to commend these officers in the highest terms for the gallant work done by them on this occasion. It must be understood that no transportation accompanied the expedition, officers were all on foot and carried on their back all their supplies and equipments. Still these officers moved from point to point where their presence was required, led in the charge and in the advance over difficult and dangerous places, keeping the line continuous, unbroken, moving continually, driving and destroying the enemy at every point. "I especially commend these officers for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion." (See p. 35, report.)</p>	Major, service
Charles G. Starr	Major, inspector-general volunteers (captain, First Infantry, U. S. A.).		Do.
J. J. Weisenburger...	Major, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.		Lieutenantcy, tears.
J. H. Fraine	Major, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	<p>Commanding expeditionary brigade, Apr. 9 to 16, both days inclusive. Battle of Santa Cruz, Apr. 10, 1899: "To Major Weisenburger I wish to express my appreciation of his valuable services." (See p. 35, report.) Battle near Paete, Apr. 12, 1899: "The conduct of Major Weisenburger was such as to materially encourage the men." (See Appendix 34b, Maj. J. H. Fraine's report, p. 68.)</p> <p>Commanding battalion First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry on expedition to province of Laguna, Apr. 9 to 16, inclusive. Battle near Paete, Apr. 12: "Maj. J. H. Fraine, of the North Dakota battalion, deserves high praise for the very effective work done by him in the trying ordeal he went through with when his battalion was so fiercely attacked by a concealed foe on the 12th instant." (See Appendix 34, Maj. J. J. Weisenburger's report; Appendix 29, p. 62.)</p>	Do.

ist of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled to brevet commissions, etc.—Continued.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recommendation.
H. G. Gale.....	Captain, Fourth Cavalry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, Apr. 10: "Captain Gale was not only successful in landing his squadron in the face of the insurgent intrenchments, but also contributed no small part to the capture of this town by dislodging the enemy and taking their fortifications on the north." (See Appendix 10, p. 46.)	Major, regular service.
lfred Hasbrouck, jr.	Captain, Fourteenth Infantry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10: "More or less opposition was encountered, but when the large bridge across the river in the edge of the city was approached the enemy was developed in strong force, intrenched and occupying well-fortified positions. Without hesitation Captain Hasbrouck and his battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Washington Sharpshooters, and some of the Idaho battalion, charged across the bridge and completely routed the insurgents." (See Appendix 10.)	Do.
A. McKenna	Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.	Battle near Paete, April 12: "As our line advanced, its flanks were marked by signal flags, carried by Capt. E. A. McKenna and a private, United States Volunteer Signal Corps." (See Appendix 30.)	Major, volunteers.
William Brooke	First Lieutenant, Fourth Infantry. Aid-de-camp. (Now captain, Thirty-fifth Volunteer Infantry.)	Battle near Paete, April 12: "The conduct of officers and men was excellent. The conduct of Lieutenant Brooke was such as to materially encourage the men." (See Appendix 34, Major Fraine's report, p. 68.)	Captain, regular service.
E. Southern	First Lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "Lieutenants Southern and Hazzard, of the Washington Sharpshooters, deserve special mention for the manner in which they responded to every call, bringing their men out to the front and aiding and efficiently handling their men so as to fully meet every expectation in the service for which that company was organized. They were always in the front, and notwithstanding the fact that theirs was a most dangerous duty, they handled their men with such skill and efficiency that their casualties were extremely light." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Captain, volunteers.
T. Hazzard	Second Lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10: "Owing to my being dismounted, I was unable to exercise supervision of the entire line, and I am indebted to Second Lieuts. J. S. Parker and Le Roy Eltinge, of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, for their intelligent, useful cooperation." (See Appendix 17, Captain Gale's report, p. 50.)	First Lieutenant, volunteers.
oy Eltinge	Second Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry.		First Lieutenant, regular service.
Parker.....	Second Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry.		Do.

42 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

List of names of officers of the Army, Regular and Volunteer, considered entitled commissions, etc.—Continued.

Name.	Rank, regiment, or corps.	Description specific act of gallantry.	Recommendation.
F. M. Savage	Second lieutenant, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding Company G, Fourteenth Infantry.	Battle of Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899: "All the officers and men did splendidly; I would especially recommend Second Lieut. F. M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry, for his gallant conduct in leading his company (G, Fourteenth Infantry) across the bridge at Santa Cruz under a heavy fire." (See Appendix 34, Captain Hasbrouck's report, p. 66.)	First lieutenant, regular
W. C. Gelger	Second lieutenant, Fourteenth Infantry, aide to brigade commander.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "In addition to the officers and men specially mentioned for gallant conduct in action by various officers, whose reports are herewith transmitted, I desire to call attention to the very excellent work done by Second Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry. This officer acted in the capacity of aide to the brigade commander after the sharpshooters were returned to their respective companies, and during the entire expedition he was indefatigable in the discharge of that duty, carrying the orders of the brigade commander from one end of the line to the other during the progress of the action before Santa Cruz and during the other operations of the expedition. In the action on the 12th instant, when the North Dakotas were attacked on the road from Longos to Pacte, Lieutenant Geiger was out at the very front, exposed to the full fire of the enemy. He returned to the brigade commander with full information as to the situation, and when the battery arrived on the ground he again exposed himself and assisted the battery in getting into position at the front; and during the whole action his coolness and courage was marked by all the officers of the command." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Do.
B. M. Koehler.....	Second lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.	Expedition to province of Laguna, April 9 to 16, both days inclusive: "Lieut. B. M. Koehler, commanding the battery, also deserves mention for the able and efficient manner in which he handled his battery on all occasions." (See Appendix 34, Major Weisenburger's report, p. 62.)	Do.

List of enlisted men entitled to special consideration.

Name.	Grounds for basing recommendation.	Recommendation.
Sergeant Balch, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry.	Advancing within 30 yards of the enemy by wading river at Santa Cruz and shooting insurgent officer rallying enemy. (Appendix 34, p. 70.)	Recommended for commission in one of the new volunteer regiments. (Commission received in Thirty-seventh Volunteer Infantry.)
Corpl. H. Brand, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Remained at point of advance near Paete, April 12, and indicated to battery location of enemy. (Appendix 35, p. 92.)	Special mention in orders.
Corpl. Robert J. Wilson, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Swimming river to capture launches near Pagsanjan. (Appendix 35, p. 76.)	Do.
Private A. C. Erickson, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.do.....	Do.
Private B. Holler, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.do.....	Do.
Private C. Talley, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.do.....	Do.
Private J. J. Wampler, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in engagement near Paete, April 12, 1899. (Appendix 34, p. 68; 35, p. 70.)	Do.
Private Thomas Sletteland, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in action near Paete, April 12, 1899. (Page 22, report; appendix 34, p. 68.)	Has been recommended for a medal of honor.
Private George Scott, Company A, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.	Bravery in action of Santa Cruz, April 10, and near Paete, April 12. (Appendix 34, p. 69.)	Special mention in orders.
Private F. A. Heiter, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.	"Privates Fred A. Heiter, Twentieth Kansas, and Emory S. West, First North Dakota, Volunteer Infantry, should be specially mentioned for intelligent obedience of Captain Grant's orders, being detached from the gunboat as members of the crew of a small boat, indicating channel," etc. (Appendix 10, p. 46.)	Do.
Private E. S. West, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.		

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 1.

DETAIL FOR EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES.

Brigade Surgeon George Franklin Shiels, U. S. V.; Maj. Frank D. Pease, surgeon, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Maj. Lewis R. Dawson, surgeon, First Washington Volunteer Infantry; First Lieut. Franklin M. Kemp, assistant surgeon, U. S. A.; C. H. Lowell, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.; 2 hospital stewards; 2 acting hospital stewards; 12 privates, Hospital Corps.

APPENDIXES 2 AND 3.

LIST OF STEAM LAUNCHES SUPPLIED FOR USE OF THE EXPEDITION, AND FORMATION OF THE FLEET FOR THE JOURNEY UP THE LAKE.

Maria, on which were embarked division headquarters; *Caridad*, on which were embarked Brigadier-General King's headquarters; *Angele*, *Ceres*, *Norte*, *Oriente*. (The press correspondents accompanying the expedition courteously offered the use of their launch, the *Oriente*, to assist in towing cascos up the lake, thus rendering valuable assistance.)

FORMATION OF FLEET.

The U. S. A. gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, accompanied by the *Maria*.
 The U. S. A. gunboat *Oeste* off starboard quarter, and about 1,000 yards in rear.
 The U. S. A. gunboat *Napindan* in rear of all.
 Each gunboat and launch, except the *Maria*, towing its allotment of cascos and bancos, the launches keeping the relative positions assigned them by Captain Grant.

APPENDIX 4.

ON BOARD U. S. LAUNCH MARIA,
Off Santa Cruz, P. I., April 9, 1899—10.30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM OF ASSIGNMENT AND DUTIES OF LAUNCHES IN THE DEBARKATION OF
 TROOPS IN FRONT OF SANTA CRUZ.

Angele, to two cascos of sharpshooters.
Ceres, to three cascos, containing Captain Patten's battalion of Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
Norte, to three cascos, containing Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
Caridad, to two cascos, containing Fourth U. S. Cavalry squadron.
 The first three launches, after debarking their troops, will return for remaining troops as may be subsequently ordered.
 By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX 5.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the field, Santa Cruz, P. I., April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *First Division, Eighth Army Corps.*

SIR: I have found it necessary to put Gen. Charles King on sick report in quarters, feeling that his physical condition renders him unfit for the hardships of the present campaign. The cause of the general's condition is cardiac depression, probably due to fatty degeneration of the heart.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE FRANKLIN SHIELS,
Major and Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 6.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Santa Cruz, Luzon, April 10, 1899.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES KING, U. S. V.

SIR: In view of a report from the chief surgeon that your illness will not admit of your performing the duties called for in the next few days, the major-general commanding authorizes you to proceed with Lieutenant Hutton, aid-de-camp, to your headquarters, by the gunboat *Oeste* returning this p. m. with wounded to Manila.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX 7.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,
Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899—10.30 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Eighth Army Corps and Department of the Pacific.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following brief report of the capture of this city. A more detailed report will follow as soon as I have received reports from subordinate commanders. This report will go by the courtesy of the press boat.

We embarked and pulled out from San Pedro Macati, as already reported, but were much delayed through the ignorance of the launch pilots. The entire night was necessary to pull the launches and cascoes clear of the ground they had run on in the river.

However, the cascoes and launches were assembled and started in the lake about 4 a. m. yesterday. The accompanying general field order will explain itself. Agreeable to this order all the troops, except the Fourth Cavalry, were landed yesterday afternoon and evening. At 1.30 p. m. the first shot was fired by the *Napindan*. The landing was not completed until late in the evening, due to the rough weather.

The line was formed and a short advance was made on the south and east of the city, and the troops encamped on their lines as soon as darkness set in. Only slight resistance was encountered last night.

At daylight this morning the advance was continued and the city captured without trouble. The Fourth Cavalry debarked at daylight north of the city.

As far as can be learned the insurgents' loss is 68 killed and about 40 wounded. These numbers, at least, were to my own knowledge killed and wounded. Our loss, no killed, about 6 wounded, one of whom probably fatally, belonging to the Fourteenth Infantry. No casualties among officers. Some prisoners, other than wounded, captured, and the killed and wounded reported were, to my knowledge, insurgent soldiers in uniforms and under arms.

The wounded will be sent in this afternoon with a detailed report.

Telegraph lines cut early this morning, and will be destroyed this afternoon. I will start in morning up the lake coast to the north, in which direction the escaping Filipinos from this place retreated.

Please send word to Mrs. Lawton that we are all well; also notify other ladies of staff.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, Commanding.

APPENDIX 8.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER ALL ORGANIZATIONS.

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you submit to these headquarters at once a concise and brief report of the operations of your command up to and including the capture of Santa Cruz, 9.10 a. m.

An accurate statement of the number of casualties on our side—killed, wounded, and missing—will be embraced in this report, as will also a careful statement of the number of killed and wounded insurgents in the immediate front of your command.

Orders have just issued, directing all cascoes containing supplies, rations, etc., of your command to be immediately towed near the stone dock in front of the town that your troops may have convenient access to the supplies.

Attention is again invited to the restrictions enjoined in General Orders, No. 19.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—Our killed, wounded, and missing will be reported by name and organization.

Captain Gale, Fourth Cavalry, has been appointed provost marshal and has been directed to use his command as a provost guard. They will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

C. R. E.

APPENDIX 9.

U. S. GUNBOAT LAGUNA DE BAY,
Off Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Santa Cruz.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Lieutenant Franklin reports the natives moving from the right hand on east side of the bay from the west side, and quite a number of soldiers with them. He also reports good water up there; about such a place as where troops landed yesterday.

Your obedient servant,

F. A. GRANT,
Captain, Commanding United States Gunboats.

APPENDIX 10.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Santa Cruz, Luzon, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: With reference to the brief report sent you this morning I have the honor to add the following:

As reported at the time to you by telegraph, the command, on 8 launches, 17 cascoes, and 2 bancos, left San Pedro Macati at 5.15 p. m., April 8, and proceeded up the Pasig River to the lake. This portion of the journey by water consumed the night until 4 next morning, when, through the indefatigable, intelligent efforts of Capt. F. A. Grant, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, the entire flotilla was formed at the entrance to the lake. The winding, narrow channel and inexperienced pilots caused great loss of time through the frequent grounding of launches and cascoes, which had to be floated by the launch *Maria* operating under Captain Grant's orders.

Privates Fred A. Heiter, Twentieth Kansas, and Emory S. West, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, should be especially mentioned for intelligent obedience of Captain Grant's orders, being detached from the gunboat as members of the crew of a small boat indicating channel, etc.

The start up the lake was made at 4 a. m., the press boat *Oriente* having volunteered its aid, towing cascoes. The 3 gunboats, *Laguna de Bay*, *Oeste* and *Napindan*, also acting as tugs.

At 10.30 a. m. the flotilla was assembled off Santa Cruz, and General Field Orders, No. 1 (copy furnished you this morning) issued. The plan of attack was communicated to subordinate officers, and assignment of launches to duties connected with landing the troops was made.

The landing of troops was greatly interfered with by a stiff breeze, many of the troops being compelled to wade ashore from water shoulder deep.

The infantry and battery were landed on the beach south of the city and after a short advance meeting short, sharp fire on the right. Darkness came on and they bivouacked for the night. The Fourth Cavalry was not landed on the north, as night was so near and the insurgents were to be seen well fortified near the beach where the landing was to be made.

At daybreak this morning I landed on the left flank of the line, walked along to the right, which was found resting on the main road leading from the south into the town. A telegraph line was found and cut.

Owing to the incapacitating sickness of Brig.-General Charles King, U. S. V., Major Weisenburger, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., commanded the expeditionary brigade. The troops were at once put in position, 3 companies Idaho on the right of the road, the artillery section on the road, supported by Company I of the Idahos, on the left of the road, Captain Hasbrouck's battalion Fourteenth Infantry, Washington sharpshooters, Captain Patten's battalion Fourteenth Infantry, and North Dakota battalion, in the order named, the last resting its left flank on the beach. The advance toward the city was then taken up, I personally supervising the right of the line, Maj. C. R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, the center, and Maj. C. G. Starr, inspector-general, the left.

To Major Weisenburger and those of my staff I wish to express my appreciation of their able services.

Little opposition was encountered until the main bridge of the city was approached. Here Captain Hasbrouck's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry and some of the Idahos and Washingtons made a beautiful charge, completely routing the enemy. Captain Hasbrouck's direction of this movement and conduct during it are worthy of special mention.

The Fourth Cavalry squadron was successfully landed as directed at daybreak in the morning, under cover of an effective fire from the gunboats. Captain Gale was not only successful in his landing in the face of the insurgent intrenchments, but also contributed no small part to the capture of this town by dislodging the enemy and taking their fortifications on the north.

The gunboats under Captain Grant did fearful execution to the enemy fleeing from the city.

Enclosed herewith are reports of subordinate commanders. I would request, on account of lack of time and facilities, that a copy of this report and inclosures be made and transmitted to headquarters First Division for record.

The following casualties have been reported to these headquarters:

Killed, none. Wounded: Fourteenth Infantry, Private William Somars, Company D, cut in right arm with bolo knife in hands of wounded insurgent; First Sergeant

Wall, Company A, gunshot wound, wrist, slight; Private Pitts, Company G, gunshot wound, head, fatal. Fourth Cavalry, Second Lieutenant Eltinge, gunshot wound, finger, slight; Private J. Grabowski, Troop C, gunshot wound, head, serious. First Idahos, Private A. Pearson, Company A, gunshot wound, wrist, slight; Private G. B. Manning, Company C, gunshot wound, left foot. Missing, none.

Enemy's losses: Killed, 93, seen, counted, and buried. Wounded, 30 in hospital, 3 since died. All of the above were insurgent soldiers in uniform and with arms. Prisoners, 41, only a small portion of whom are believed to be soldiers.

One case of smallpox just found in Fourteenth Infantry.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U S V., Commanding.

P. S.—I have ordered the command to move at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning to Paganjan, where I am informed the insurgents fleeing from here have gone, and also where I am informed there are 6 launches and other craft concealed in the river. The gunboats will move before daylight to the mouth of the river, endeavoring to remove obstructions which have been placed there, and then proceed up the river as far as they can go.

The wounded, both ours and the insurgents, I send to Manila to-night on a casco in tow of the gunboat *Oeste*; also the prisoners, who I am certain are soldiers.

Two miles of telegraph along to the south has been destroyed, the wire reeled up and in our possession. The line leading to the north we will destroy on our return, as we will use it ourselves until the operations in that direction are completed.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 11.

U. S. GUNBOAT NAPINDAN, April 10, 1899.

Maj. F. A. GRANT,

Utah Light Batteries, Commanding Gunboats.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following brief report of the part taken by the *Napindan* in to-day's action:

At 6.30 a. m. I landed Major-General Lawton and his staff on beach at the left of our line, and then anchored opposite to that spot. About 7 a. m. saw *Oeste* open fire on insurgents west of Santa Cruz. Saw enemy retiring from her fire. Shelled them at 2,300 yards. Saw our line advancing and ceased firing, for fear of killing our men, although I saw some good chances to hit the enemy. Then rounded the point and came alongside the *Laguna de Bay*, as I felt sure the enemy would be compelled to retire from the town before our troops, and felt sure they would be open to our fire. Fired a few shells at the large buildings and then, by your order, went into the shore as close as possible, to the northeast of the *Laguna de Bay*, and about 800 yards or more distant. After about 10 minutes, asked and received permission from you to fire a couple of shells at some huts northeast of the town; did so and just then saw about 200 of the enemy come out of the town and retire rapidly across a large level plain opposite my boat. Opened with gatling and shell on them at ranges from 1,200 to 800 yards. Saw our troops come out of town and press them so close that I had to let them go until they were opposite and beyond me for fear of hitting our own men. The enemy fled rapidly to the cocoanut groves. Must have suffered heavily from our fire, to which I think my boat contributed somewhat, as I saw this plain dotted with bodies after they had fled. Saw several small parties making for the hills across this plain to the east. Fired on them at 3,000 yards. This terminated my share of the proceedings.

As for the part I took in yesterday's skirmish, it was small—covered landing of sharpshooters and their supports, below Santa Cruz, by shelling the woods. No reply by enemy. Then patrolled coast and saw nothing until about 5.50 p. m., when I distinctly saw the enemy fire on the left of our line. Ran in close to shore and dispersed them. Anchored off cascos for the night.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS FRANKLIN,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-third Infantry, Commanding *Napindan*.

APPENDIX 12.

GUNBOAT OESTE,
Santa Cruz, P. I., April 10, 1899.

Maj. F. A. GRANT,
Commanding United States Gunboats.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows the operations of the gunboat *Oeste* during the taking of Santa Cruz.

At 6.30 a. m. received orders to cover the right flank of the Fourth Cavalry in landing.

At 7 a. m. took position on west side of mouth of Santa Cruz River. Just after the troops landed, at 7.20 a. m., about 50 of the enemy were seen advancing on them. Opened fire on them with Gatling and 1-pounder. After this the engagement became general and lasted about twenty-five minutes. At 7.45 a. m. the enemy retreated and the firing almost stopped. At 8.35 the troops on the right joined the Fourth Cavalry, and not being able to do any more there I reported back to you at Santa Cruz. Was then ordered to patrol near mouth of large river east of city, which I did until ordered in at 3.30 p. m.

In this engagement there were expended:

	Rounda
1-pounder	112
.30-caliber rifle	500
.45-caliber Gatling	2,000

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM C. WEBB,
Second Lieutenant, Utah Volunteer Artillery, Commanding *Oeste*.

APPENDIX 13.

SANTA CRUZ, April 10, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON,
Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: After landing the battalion of sharpshooters on yesterday afternoon all the members of that battalion were temporarily returned to their respective companies and took part in the operations against Santa Cruz with their companies and not as an organization of sharpshooters. This was true of all the sharpshooter battalion except the Washington company.

The Washington company operated with the Fourteenth Infantry during the taking of Santa Cruz. There were no casualties in this company. All casualties of the members of this command of sharpshooters will be reported with the reports from their regular organizations. The Washington company reports at least 50 insurgents killed on the line in their front.

The sharpshooter battalion is held in readiness for immediate concentration.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. WEISENBURGER, Major.

APPENDIX 14.

FIRING LINE, NEAR SANTA CRUZ, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Santa Cruz, P. I.:

In answer to your communication of this date, I have the honor to report that this battalion landed at 3.30 p. m. yesterday, the 9th instant, where it remained with deployed front until about 5 p. m., when it joined in a turning movement to the left. About one-half an hour later it encountered the enemy, and after some firing on either side, it charged and drove the enemy back.

The counted number of insurgents killed was 9, and 1 wounded.
My casualty was 1 wounded, of Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, viz: Private William Somars, cut in the right arm with a bolo knife in hands of wounded insurgent. The battalion bivouacked for the night on the road leading in a southwesterly direction from Santa Cruz.

This morning about 7 o'clock it moved forward in line and advanced to its present

position without opposition. No further casualties. One insurgent captured. No missing.

Very respectfully,

G. H. PATTEN,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

APPENDIX 15.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SANTA CRUZ, *April 10, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: By your direction I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, up to and including the capture of Santa Cruz.

The command left Pasig at 2.30 p. m. April 8, embarked in cascos at San Pedro Macati at about 5 p. m. the same day. The enlisted strength of the battalion is 329; officers, 5. The command left San Pedro Macati at about 6 p. m. and arrived off Santa Cruz the next morning, April 9, and disembarked from cascos at about 2 p. m.

At about 6 o'clock p. m. a turning movement was executed, wheeling with the left as a pivot. The command then moved forward, meeting with no opposition, halting after gaining about three-fourths of a mile, darkness having come on. The men bivouacked on the line, outposts having been established in front.

On the 10th the movement was resumed at about 7 a. m. At first no opposition was met with, but as the town was approached there was some. The battalion charged across the principal bridge of the town, driving the enemy from the other side into an open field, pursuing them for about 1,000 yards beyond the city, where a halt was made.

Casualties in this battalion are as follows: First Sergeant Wall, Company A, wounded in wrist, slight; Private Pitts, Company G, shot through front part of the head, wound pronounced by surgeon as fatal.

No men missing.

In the immediate front of my command there were about 30 insurgents killed; about 10 were captured, among them being 5 or 6 wounded.

Respectfully submitted.

A. HASBROUCK, Jr.,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion

APPENDIX 16.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION,
FIRST IDAHO U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Santa Cruz Road, April 10, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Santa Cruz.

SIR: I have the honor to submit report. This command left Macati road April 8, 1899, under General Orders, No. 19, comprising 225 men. Marched to San Pedro Macati, embarked on cascos and transported that night up Pasig River by tugboat *New York*, arriving in Laguna de Bay at 10 p. m., remaining at anchor until 4 a. m. April 9, thence across lake to a point about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Santa Cruz, disembarking and going into battle line at once. Line moved at 5.40 p. m. that date. This battalion was assigned on the right, maintaining that position on the evening of April 9 at a great disadvantage, owing to a too rapid advance on the part of the Fourteenth Infantry. At a point about 1 mile from start the right of the line came into an insurgent outpost of about 40 guns. While crossing an open field they opened a very strong fire on our right flank and rear. After sustaining this fire for about ten minutes, we located same and drove them out, going into camp for the night on a road in our front.

At 6.30 a. m. we again advanced, passing over $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, fording a stream, and are now located 1 mile southeast of Santa Cruz.

Casualties.—Killed, none. Missing, none. Wounded: Private Arthur Pearson, Company A, April 9, gunshot right wrist; George B. Manning, private, Company C, April 9, left foot.

Estimated killed and wounded Filipinos: April 9—killed, 8; wounded, none. April 10—killed, 30; wounded, none.

Very respectfully,

D. W. FIGGINS,
Major, Commanding First Idaho Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 17.

SANTA CRUZ, LUZON ISLAND, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Santa Cruz, Luzon Island.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of this date I have the honor to report that after reconnoitering for a landing immediately after daylight to-day I disembarked my squadron at 6.30 a. m. on a low flat spit to the west of Santa Cruz, and immediately advanced on the insurgent trenches, which I had previously located about 1,000 yards in my front. The advance was made over open ground with little or no cover, and intersected by the small river which passes to the west of Santa Cruz into the bay. The advance was made cautiously, as neither the strength nor the position of the enemy had been definitely located. The left of his line was soon discovered by my advance scouts, and the right troop (L, Fourth Cavalry, Lieutenant Parker) was advanced immediately after I had opened fire from my scouts on his left. At the same time the gunboat *Oeste*, on my right, opened fire on the same point, and after action of about fifteen minutes I again advanced the first two platoons of this troop, the enemy breaking from the trenches and retreating in mass to the woods toward my left, in number perhaps 100. The edge of the brush was then occupied, and after leaving a platoon for flank guard I then swung this troop toward the left and straightened my line.

The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, on my left, was meanwhile throwing shrapnel into the enemy's line, and my advance was continued until shortly before it was joined by the left of the brigade landed last evening.

At this time, finding my ammunition running low, I halted and sent to the rear for a fresh supply, which was slow in arriving. Had the supply been more ample it would have been easy to force the enemy at once into the town, which was done immediately on the arrival of the brigade. As it was, however, I remained in position until ammunition arrived and the brigade passed my right and entered the town with, I understand, little or no opposition.

My casualties are as follows:

Killed, none. Wounded: Second Lieut. Le Roy Eltinge, Fourth Cavalry, in hand very slight; Private Grabowsky, Troop C, Fourth Cavalry, in hand, serious.

The casualties of the enemy in my front are, from observation of officers of the squadron, 13 killed and wounded.

Owing to my being dismounted, I was unable to exercise constant supervision of the entire line, and I am indebted to Second Lieuts. James S. Parker and Le Roy Eltinge, of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, for their intelligent, useful cooperation.

The gunboats *Laguna de Bay* and *Oeste* rendered great and valuable assistance to the advance.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE H. G. GALE,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding Squadron.

APPENDIX 18.

SANTA CRUZ, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: The mountain battery landed from their cascos at 4.45 p. m. Reported Major Weisenberger for support for the battery and the major sent 1 company of the First North Dakota and ordered the battery to join the right of the line. I applied for and secured 30 Chinamen to carry my ammunition. The horses not having been towed into shore at the time, was ordered to the line, the cannoneers pulled the gun. Owing to the extremely soft ground we were obliged to cross, the battery reached the right of the line at 11.30 p. m. and camped for the night 300 yards in its rear.

April 10 the battery was ordered along the main road, keeping touch with the right flank; the battery did not open fire; there were no casualties in the battery; reached Santa Cruz at 9 a. m.

Very respectfully,

B. M. KOEHLER,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

APPENDIX 19.

SANTA CRUZ, P. I., April 10, 1899—1.25 p. m.

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to direction this day received I have the honor to herewith transmit a brief report of the operations of the Second Battalion, First North Dakota Infantry.

U. S. V., from 4 o'clock p. m., April 8, 1899, up to and including 10 a. m., April 10, 1899, and covering the operations of the capture of Santa Cruz.

The battalion left San Pedro Macati in 3 cascos, towed by the tug *Ceres*, at 4 p. m., April 8; arrived at Laguna de Bay and anchored near the flagship at 7.30 p. m. the same day. Left this anchorage in tow of same tug at 5 a. m., April 9; arrived at anchorage at Santa Cruz about noon, and made successful landing at 3.30 p. m., the battalion forming the left wing of the attacking force, our left resting on the lake shore and our right tending in a southeasterly direction and connecting with the left of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. About 5.45 p. m. we participated in the advance movement made by the entire line, advancing about 1 mile by orders of Maj. J. J. Weisenburger. Almost immediately after commencing the forward movement a desultory fire was commenced by the enemy on my front. It being too dark to see the enemy, no reply was made to its fire, and as our advance continued his fire slackened and finally died out in our immediate front. At about 7 p. m. our line was halted and remained in the same position until 9.20 p. m., when we were ordered to retire to a new line in the rear, which line was held until 7 a. m., April 10, 1899. At 7 a. m., the bugles sounding "forward," my battalion moved in a northeasterly direction toward Santa Cruz, the left of my battalion being near the lake shore, the right connecting the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. We advanced straight to Santa Cruz, meeting very little resistance, although at times a rather brisk fire was encountered. Arriving at Santa Cruz a few minutes before 10 a. m., we immediately took possession of the trenches vacated by the enemy. I saw 8 dead and 3 wounded Filipinos in the immediate front of my battalion before reaching Santa Cruz. I estimate their loss in my immediate front, in killed and wounded, as not over 20.

Casualties in my command, none.

The above report covers only the operations of Companies C, I, and D, Company K being, by command of Major Weisenburger, detached to the support of the mountain battery.

Very respectfully submitted.

JOHN H. FRAINE,
Major, First North Dakota, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 20.

SANTA CRUZ, April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, in the Field.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows regarding operations ending in capture of Santa Cruz:

One officer and nine men embarked at San Pedro Macati April 8, 1899, at 4 p. m. April 8 arrived with the expedition at Santa Cruz. During the engagements before Santa Cruz a signal man with a flag was stationed on each flank of the advancing army and marked the advance with flags, and the detail on the left flank advised the gunboat when to stop firing in the direction of our troops that were advancing. Same being done under orders of General Lawton.

No casualties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. McKENNA,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

APPENDIX 21.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I.

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

DEAR GENERAL: I take great pleasure in introducing the bearer, the Hon. H. A. Ramsden, H. B. M. vice-consul, who has taken the warmest interest in our cause and has often been helpful. He wishes to witness the movement of your division and I shall consider it a personal favor if you will please give him the assistance you can during the time he is with your command. I feel sure that you will find the same pleasure I have in Mr. Ramsden's companionship, and also find that he is one who thoroughly takes to outdoor work.

Wishing you all manner of success, yours, sincerely,

C. H. MURRAY.

APPENDIX 22.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

I have the honor to report that with both gunboats I reached the mouth of the river at 6.20 a. m., and found it impossible to enter, owing to low water and finding the formation of the bay very different from chart and that I could cover the whole river nearly to Pagsanjan. I left Lieutenant Franklin and steamed up to within 3,000 yards of Pagsanjan Church. The natives fired on the *Napindan's* boat and when she returned the fire we caught them in the flank and they did not stand five minutes, but started in the direction of the town. After they had entered the town I threw a few shells in that direction until, judging by your fire that your troops were close in, I ceased firing and awaited a signal from church, 3,000 yards away. After receiving your message regarding movements of troops on river I tried to get the *Maria* into the town for you, but failed, owing to the sea and the fact that wind had lowered water over a foot.

Major Weisenburger's troops have reached here, and I will have some boat up to town by daylight if possible. Do you want any cascos up here? If so, I respectfully suggest that, as Lieutenant Larsen is sick and I am alone, you place Lieutenant Brooke in charge of the launches and cascos for the present—at least until I can get this river clear. He is acquainted with boats and the only one I know of. I will keep going until boats can enter the river.

Very respectfully,

F. H. GRANT,
Captain Commanding U. S. Gunboats.

APPENDIX 23.

IN THE FIELD,
East Coast Laguna de Bay, April 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my command, except Gale's Cavalry squadron moved at 6 this a. m. in the direction of Pagsanjan; that we were attacked by a small force of insurgents 1 mile before reaching the town, the enemy firing from works constructed along an open front, over which we were compelled to pass. The command was deployed and drove the enemy easily from their position.

Our loss was Lieutenant Southern, commanding sharpshooters, First Washington Infantry; wound in right arm. The loss to the enemy was reported 6 or 8 killed. I did not have time to verify same.

The command then pushed rapidly to the town, which was taken without resistance. Six steam launches and two excellent cascos were captured. The Fourteenth Infantry were then pushed down the river to the gunboats, to assist in removing obstructions, and the First Idaho battalion was ferried across the river, and proceeding down the right bank captured without resistance the town of Lumbang. The gunboats engaged a small force of the enemy at the mouth of the river and dispersed them with reported severe punishment. Number killed not verified.

The telegraph line from Santa Cruz turned south along a road leading to Magdalen and Majayjay, to which places most of the citizens have fled. The towns taken so far have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants and were occupied only by insurgent soldiers. The whole country in this direction is on the run, and I do not think it is worth while to proceed farther north, as there seems to be no towns in that direction of any importance. It is desirable, however, to bring out the launches captured, and to that end Captain Grant will in the morning bring them down to the obstruction near the mouth of the river and under the guns of the *Napindan*. To remove this obstruction and to deepen the mouth of the river at two or three points so that the launches may come out the services of a dredge will be necessary, and send this by the launch *Norte*, which I trust may be permitted to tow out a dredge for that purpose. In the meantime I will re-embark my command and proceed to Calamba, unless otherwise instructed.

We have worked pretty hard, and the fatigue is beginning to tell upon the men. I am informed that quite a considerable force is at the latter place.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 24.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 12, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding Troops, Laguna de Bay.

GENERAL: I am directed to inform you that your communication of yesterday has been received, and to say in reply that the launch *Norte* is now being coaled and will leave before noon for Santa Cruz with dredge in tow.

You can move your forces to Calamba if you fully protect the troops you leave behind with dredge. From the nature and strength of the obstruction there it would appear that it will require a couple of days to sufficiently remove it in order to pass over the captured launches and cascos, and while there the dredge must be so protected as to make its capture impossible.

General MacArthur has had trouble on his line of communication, the enemy striking the railroad night before last in the vicinity of Bocaue, doing some damage to the track and cutting the telegraph wire. We lost all telegraphic communication until yesterday afternoon. The enemy was driven off with considerable loss, but with quite a list of casualties, amounting to some 25 or 30 among our own troops.

It becomes quite important to establish, as soon as practicable, a water base at Malolos. We have now secured, as we think, an entrance into the Malolos estuary, and wish a gunboat (the *Napindan*) to report here as soon as practicable.

The General desires to send his congratulations to you and your troops for the signal success which you have achieved.

You will find Calamba a very difficult place to approach. The beach for a very considerable distance out is very shallow, and the town lies 2 miles back from the shore.

It is reported here that you will find a considerable number of troops there. It is not necessary to attack if you do not consider the chances of success favorable. It might be better first to pay Morong a visit, but all this is left to your discretion.

Ovenshine reports all quiet in his front this morning. The *Sheridan* is expected here on Friday. No news of any importance received.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX 25.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE,
Eighth Army Corps, April 11, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON:

In accordance with General Field Orders, No. 3, dated headquarters United States forces, Santa Cruz, April 10, 1899, the column started at 6.35 a. m. April 11 in the order of march given in the order. At 7.15 a. m. the enemy fired on sharpshooters who were in advance.

Sharpshooters deployed and battery was called forward. At 7.20 a. m. Fourteenth Infantry deployed and took position immediately. At 7.25 a. m. Idaho Infantry deployed to the right, and at 7.30 a. m. North Dakota Infantry deployed to the left.

A general advance followed, with no resistance. Our troops reached the town of Pagsanjan at 8 a. m.

A halt of one hour was made in this town. At 9 a. m. 3 companies of Fourteenth Infantry (followed later by 3 more companies of same regiment) left Pagsanjan and marched down Lumbang River to meet and help gunboat up to Pagsanjan.

After going down river about 2 miles the column was fired on by enemy holding position on opposite side of river.

The line was immediately formed on bank of river and returned the enemy's fire with good effect. After some two hours' fighting enemy was driven from their position. During the fight a detachment of 10 men was sent on down the river to look up gunboat. After some distance, probably a mile, they returned without gunboat. At 1.30 p. m. column started for mouth of river, marching along bank. No resistance was met with during the march, and column arrived at mouth of river at 4.45 p. m. Men are now getting their supper. Will aid in getting obstructions out of river as soon as possible. Two casualties since column started from Santa Cruz.

Very respectfully,

J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Major, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 26.

ONE-HALF MILE SOUTH OF PAETE, P. I., *April 12, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION :

Major Fraine's battalion has become engaged about one-half mile from church. Major Fraine reports enemy to be on hills on right side of road and also in trenches in front across the road, about 300 yards in front. He would like to have artillery to shell roads in case it is needed and also some reinforcements. Is now sending one platoon from each company up the hill.

BROOKE, *Aid.*

APPENDIX 27.

PAETE, *April 13, 1899.*

To Maj. Gen. LAWTON,
Commanding Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I send you herewith the reports of the officers engaged in yesterday's action. In addition to the casualties mentioned in the report this morning, the slight wounding of Sergt. J. J. Charlton, of the First Washington United States Volunteers, should be mentioned.

Respectfully submitted.

J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Major, First Washington U. S. V.

APPENDIX 27 A.

PAETE, P. I., *April 13, 1899.*

Major WEISENBURGER,
Commanding Expedition of the Lake.

SIR: At 2.45, under orders received from you, I started from Longos with my battalion for Paete, advancing in column of fours, with point 200 yards in advance, column, point being followed by 20 sharpshooters at distance of about 100 yards and with sharpshooters out on right flank in jungle.

The country away from the road on each side is an almost impenetrable jungle and on the right-hand side rising on an angle of from 45 to 70 degrees and cut with gullies and dry beds of water courses. After proceeding three-quarters of mile along this road, at about 3.30 p. m. the point signaled back that there were insurgents about 75 yards ahead, behind a strong intrenchment. The sharpshooters were brought up and deployed. At that time a heavy fire from our right flank extending the entire length of the command, was poured into us.

A platoon from each company was sent into the jungle, the left resting on the road, the right swinging up the hill and making a left turn. While this movement was going on Lieutenant Brooke, division ordnance officer, arrived, and shortly afterwards Major Weisenburger, with mountain battery and Washington sharpshooters arrived and took up position in front of intrenchment first noticed by our point.

After about an hour of sharp fighting the line passed over the intrenchment and on to Paete, arriving at 6.15 p. m.

My loss during the engagement was as follows: Killed, 5; wounded, 1. Killed: Corpl. Isador Driscoll, Privates Peter Tomkins, Alfred Almen, William G. Lam, Company C, and Musician George Schneller, Company I. Wounded: Private Herbert J. Fyles, Company I.

Conduct of officers and men was exceptionally good. No trepidation was displayed. Orders were understood and obeyed promptly. The conduct of Lieutenant Brooke was such as to materially encourage the men. I desire to report to you, for such action as you may deem proper, Private John I. Wamples, Company D, and Private Thomas Sletteland, Company C, who each voluntarily took up extreme dangerous positions under heavy fire, where they could observe position of the enemy in their trenches. The case of Private Wamples was reported to me by Lieutenant Geiger, of the Fourteenth Infantry.

Very respectfully submitted.

JOHN H. FRAINE,
Major, First North Dakota U. S. V.

APPENDIX 27 A (1).

PAETE, P. I., April 13, 1899.

Major FRAINE,

Commanding Officer, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I was placed in command of the detachment of North Dakota sharpshooters about 3.10 p. m., on April 12, 1899, on the road between Longos and Paete. I sent 5 men as scouts about 100 yards ahead of my detachment. When within about a mile of Paete they saw breastworks across the road 150 yards ahead around where the road turned, halted, and notified me. I halted my detachment, notified Major Fraine, and sent 1 corporal and 4 privates as scouts to locate the insurgent line to the right, and deployed the balance of my men in skirmish line to the left of the road, taking protection behind a small stone fence. The insurgents opened a heavy fire from the front and right, and during this fire Corpl. Isadore Driscoll, Private William G. Lamb, Private Alfred C. Almer were killed, and Wagoner Peter W. Tompkins wounded (all of Company C, First North Dakota Volunteers).

When advance was ordered I marched my men in skirmish line on the left side of the road into Paete, arriving here at 6.15 p. m.

The conduct of the men was at all times admirable, perfectly steady, and cool.

I would draw special attention to the conduct of Privates Wamples of Company D and Sletteland of Company C as particularly meritorious under the adverse circumstances.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. THARALSON,
Second Lieutenant, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteers.

APPENDIX 27 B.

PAETE, P. I., April 13, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER OF INDEPENDENT BRIGADE,

Operating on the Laguna de Bay.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of the company of Washington sharpshooters in the engagement of yesterday the 12th:

We left Longos about 3 p. m. to support the battalion of North Dakotas that were engaged with the enemy between Longos and Paete, and immediately on arriving at that point of engagement placed my command at the front and opened fire on line of intrenchments about 3.30 p. m., locating a strong fortification across the road, from behind which we received a heavy fire until the battery arrived, which by splendid work dislodged the enemy, after which we proceeded to Paete, arriving about 6 o'clock p. m.

During the engagement First Sergeant J. J. Charlton received a slight wound in the leg.

Very respectfully,

RUSSELL T. HAZZARD,
Lieutenant, First Washington Volunteers, Commanding Sharpshooters.

APPENDIX 27 C.

PAETE, April 13, 1899.

Major WEISENBURGER, *Commanding Expedition.*

SIR: The battery received orders to join the firing line at about 2.15 p. m. It moved out from Longos and after about an hour's march went into action to dislodge the insurgents from an intrenchment placed across the road at about 1½ miles from Paete.

After making a reconnaissance I found the battery could be placed in a protected place 400 yards from the trench. After the battery fired a few rounds the insurgents left the trench. The position occupied by the battery was on a line with the sharpshooters. The battery was supported by Company D, Fourteenth Infantry.

There were no casualties in the battery or in Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, acting as its support.

Very respectfully,

B. M. KOEHLER,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

APPENDIX 28.

PAETE, April 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows regarding engagement of the 12th instant, before Paete:

Signal flag was carried by men on left of advance of sharpshooters, marking our left flank.

No casualties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. MCKENNA,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

APPENDIX 29.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES BRIGADE,
IN THE FIELD, ON LAGUNA DE BAY, April 13, 1899.

General LAWTON,
Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Since making report of day before yesterday, the troops of my command engaged in the following operations:

Two companies of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, under Captain Patten, were left at the mouth of San Juan River to assist in the removal of obstruction to navigation, and they are still there. The Washington sharpshooters and 4 companies of Fourteenth U. S. Infantry were moved up the river to the church at which the Idaho battalion bivouacked the night before. A ferry was constructed and the troops named together with the battalion of North Dakota and the mountain battery were ferried across the river. All the troops got across by 12.30 p. m. The command was moved forward on the road to Longos and arrived there at about 2 p. m. At 3 p. m. the battalion of North Dakota Volunteer Infantry was ordered to proceed on the road to Paete. They immediately went forward, proceeding very cautiously. The road is very narrow, running along the shore of the lake at the base of very steep and thickly-wooded hills to the right of the road. After proceeding about a mile the troops were fired on by the enemy concealed well up on the hillside as well as from the front from behind a very strongly-constructed breastwork thrown across the road.

Major Fraine immediately deployed his men and put them under cover. One platoon from each company was deployed up the hillside to flank the enemy. The hill at this point stands almost at an angle of 45 degrees and is covered with a heavy growth of thickly-matted tropical timber cut up by deep ravines and gullies with many large rocks and stones which afforded splendid places of concealment to the enemy.

The Dakota troops promptly returned the enemy's fire. The Washington company of sharpshooters and the mountain battery were at once ordered to the front. The fire from the enemy was exceedingly warm along the road. The battery opened up on the enemy's position, as did also the gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, and greatly assisted in dislodging the enemy. The whole line then advanced and drove the enemy before it; at 6 p. m. the troops took possession of the town of Paete, and bivouacked for the night.

Major Fraine is entitled to the greatest praise for the excellent manner in which he handled the difficult problem before him. His dispositions were promptly and efficiently made and he is entitled to the credit for the good work done.

I wish to mention Private George Scott, of the company of Washington sharpshooters, for gallant conduct during the action yesterday. When information was wanted as to the best position for placing the battery Private Scott volunteered for the service, went to the front in open view of the enemy, exposed to the fire from the breastwork and the hill as he advanced, until he gained the desired information, and as coolly returned to his command.

All the men and officers behaved with great gallantry and deserve praise for their work yesterday.

Casualties yesterday were 4 killed from Company C, North Dakota; 1 man killed in Company I, North Dakota, and 1 man wounded in Company I.

Casualties of the enemy impossible to ascertain.

Respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Major, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 30.

APRIL 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pending the arrival of the dredges, I moved along the east shore of the lake to Longos, entering the town without opposition, all the inhabitants having previously deserted the town. I then directed Major Fraine with his battalion North Dakota Volunteers to proceed to the town of Paete. About one-half mile out his advance guard was fired on. At the sound of the firing Major Weisenberger with the battalion of the Washington and Fourth Cavalry Sharpshooters and the guns under command of Lieutenant Koehler, Sixth Artillery, with a support of Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, were hurried to his assistance. In the meantime I proceeded to the gunboat *Laguna de Bay* and proceeded to the flank of the line, the gunboat opening on the enemy with shrapnel and Gatlings as they could be seen running to the rear.

At the first fire of the enemy, which was upon the advance guard, 3 men were killed and 3 wounded; 1 more man was wounded later. The strength of the enemy was estimated at not to exceed 50.

The list of killed and wounded are as follows:

The following are our casualties: Killed, mortally wounded and since died, Corp. Isadore Driscoll, Company C, North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Wagoner Peter Thompkins, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Private Alfred Alman, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Musician George Scheneler, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. Wounded, Sergt. J. J. Charlton, Company H, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, slight; Private Herbert Files, Company L, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, serious.

Our work has been very constant and trying and many men are becoming exhausted. I sent in to-night the men killed and wounded and those too sick to accompany the command.

The chief surgeon has reported to me that unless it is imperatively a military necessity a rest for a day should be given the men.

We have succeeded in getting all the boats below the obstructions in the river, and there is now only the "bar" at its mouth. One boat, the *Covadonga*, is out, and I sent her with the sick and wounded. We will get all the others over the bar some time to-night, so that I could not safely move to-night if I wished. I will therefore load to-night and move out in the evening, as though returning, and then after dark turn toward the place of disembarkation.

There have been found and buried at Santa Cruz, and since my last report and in addition to the number then reported, 42 Filipino soldiers. We have about 21 bona fide insurgent prisoners, not counting the wounded, and there are also about 60 Chinamen who beg to be taken to Manila, and say they will surely be killed if left on the return of the insurgents. I will send them in to-morrow.

Three of the launches captured can run in with their own steam; the other three are disabled and must be towed in, and a tug should be sent for that purpose, also one to tow the dredges. We can not possibly spare ours if we move as we must. I suggest that five days' field rations be sent out in cascos for the number of men set forth in General Orders, No. 19, current series, First Division headquarters, as the constant handling caused by the means of transportation and frequent movement of troops renders these rations necessary to make up the deficiency. These rations should arrive by the 15th instant. I inclose herewith report of Major Weisenburger.

Attention is invited to the special mention in this report of Major Fraine and Private Scott.

As soon as the firing was heard I sent my aid, Lieut. W. Brooke, Fourteenth Infantry, with orderlies, to the point of attack, with instructions to keep me informed. He remained with the left and most advanced part of the line, rendering efficient and valuable service until the troops reached Paete.

Captain McKenna, U. S. Volunteers, Signal Corps, himself carried the flag on the left and extreme front that marked our advance for the information of the *Laguna de Bay*.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON, *Major-General*.

APPENDIX 31.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 12, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding Troops, Laguna de Bay.

GENERAL: The general desires to send his congratulations to you and your troops for the signal success which you have achieved.

* * * * *

Ovenshine reports all quiet in his front this morning. The *Sheridan* is expected here on Friday. No news of importance received.

Very respectfully,

THOS. H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Laguna de Bay, April 14, 1899.

A true extract. Copy respectfully furnished for the information of Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, commanding expeditionary brigade.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Copies furnished for distribution.)

APPENDIX 32.

MANILA, P. I., April 15, 1899.

MY DEAR GENERAL: We send you the two launches. It has been difficult to obtain them, as there is so much work to do in unloading vessels in the harbor. Please have them pick up the property you intend them to tow into the city and send them along at once. The dredge should be left in the upper Pasig to do the necessary work there. Have just received a telegram from Captain Sewell that he is in the mud at Pasig. He will be hauled off very soon.

I have been at a loss as to what definite instructions to give you, due to the fact of the existing necessity to strike a hard blow at the north very quickly and while we have the volunteers with us, and to the importance of permitting you to finish your mission in the bay. I have concluded that it is most essential for you to return your troops as soon as possible in order that all available organizations can operate in the north. We can work on the lake at any time and much better, I think, during the rainy season when the water is high than now. I am afraid that you will not be able to get into Calamba at the present time without the greatest difficulty.

You will therefore return with your troops as soon as you can consistently do so and we will fix up for you a new point of departure. There has been an exchange of treaty ratifications and the newspapers report the fact that it has been duly proclaimed by the President. If the volunteers insist on going home, we shall soon be very weak again and it will be two months before we can concentrate the regular regiments which have been designated to come to the Philippines; besides, about 2,000 men must be sent within a few days to Mindanao and the Jolo Archipelago. General MacArthur is having trouble on his line and the insurgents up there must be stirred up. Lieutenant Brooke, I think, will be off in a couple of hours.

Very sincerely, yours,

E. S. OTIS.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding Troops, Laguna de Bay.

APPENDIX 33.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
Manila, P. I., April 17, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to the orders of the division commander, I embarked on the launch *Covadonga* about 10.30 p. m., Thursday,

April 13, 1899, near Santa Cruz, to proceed to Manila and secure and bring back to the front a suitable hospital boat.

I arrived in Manila at 6 p. m. Friday evening, transferred all sick and wounded to the hospital, and immediately called upon the chief surgeon of the corps at his quarters.

I had already telegraphed him from Pasig, stating the necessity for such a boat, and he informed me that he had shown the telegram to the general commanding the corps and had no doubt the boat would be furnished in the morning.

He instructed me to put the reasons stated in the telegram in writing and report to his office at 8 a. m. Saturday morning.

I did so, and meanwhile found a suitable boat for the purpose and got a price for her purchase and her rent.

The communication was taken to the general, and I was instructed to return at 2 p. m.

I did so, and was told by the chief surgeon that a boat could not be furnished. In obedience to my instructions, I then saw the general personally, and was told by him that the expedition was ordered home at once.

I immediately applied for transportation to rejoin the command, and was told that no launch would go to the front unless the *Angele* was repaired.

I kept myself in communication with the transportation quartermaster's office till Sunday afternoon, when I was informed positively that no launch would leave for the front.

This in explanation of my absence from the staff of the division commander after Thursday evening, April 13, 1899.

Very respectfully,

HERBERT W. CARDWELL,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 34.

TAGUIG, P. I., April 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: The following is a report of the operations of the troops under my command on the recent Laguna de Bay expedition:

Pursuant to Division General Orders, No. 19, troops were assembled at San Pedro Macati, P. I., on the 8th day of April, 1899, at 4 o'clock p. m., as follows: First Battalion, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Companies D, E, C, and I, under Capt. George H. Patten; Second Battalion, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Companies A, G, K, and L, commanded by Capt. A. Hasbrouck, jr.; First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, Companies A, C, D, and F, under Maj. D. W. Figgins; First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Companies C, D, I, and K, in command of Maj. J. H. Fraine; First Battalion of Sharpshooters, consisting of 4 companies, made up as follows: First Company, 45 enlisted men from the Fourteenth Infantry and 15 men from the Fourth Cavalry, commanded by Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry; Second Company, 40 enlisted men from the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, under First Lieut. H. J. Gruschus, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Third Company, 40 enlisted men from the First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, under command of First Lieut. R. H. Hartman, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry; Fourth Company, 60 enlisted men from the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, under command of First Lieut. E. E. Southern and Second Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, First Washington Volunteer Infantry; the battalion commanded by the undersigned. Two mountain guns, Hawthorne's Battery, 16 men under command of Second Lieut. B. M. Koehler.

The brigade so formed was under the command of Brig. Gen. Charles King.

The expedition also comprised the river gunboats, *Laguna de Bay*, *Napindan* and *Oeste*, together with 6 launches for towing the troops and dispatch boats and about 15 cascos for transporting the troops and supplies, under the command of Capt. F. A. Grant, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, the whole expedition being under the command of Major-General Lawton.

The expedition embarked on cascos at San Pedro Macati and went up the Pasig River, occupying the entire night in going up the river and getting into Laguna de Bay.

Great difficulty was encountered in the navigation of the river owing to its tortuous channel and many shoals, causing the repeated grounding of the steam launches towing the cascos. The entire expedition emerged from the river into Lake Laguna de Bay by 7 o'clock a. m., on April 9, and then proceeded across the lake to Santa Cruz, which was reached about 2.30 p. m. The troops were disembarked as rapidly as possible after the shore had been shelled by the gunboats.

The first to disembark were the sharpshooters. No resistance was encountered and all the troops were safely ashore by 5 o'clock p. m. General King was confined to his steam launch by illness and could therefore not land with the troops.

He was subsequently ordered to return to the city and taken to the hospital for treatment, and by order of Major-General Lawton, Maj. J. J. Weisenburger of the First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., was placed in command of the expeditionary brigade. Upon the receipt of this order all the men constituting the sharpshooter battalion, with the exception of the Washington company, which was organized and rationed as a separate company, were ordered to report for duty to the respective organizations to which they belonged.

As soon as the troops were all ashore, line of battle was formed for the attack on Santa Cruz, which was about 3 miles distant. The First Idaho Battalion was on the right of the line; to its left was the First Battalion of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, then the company of Washington Sharpshooters; then the Second Battalion of the Fourteenth United States Infantry; and, on the extreme left, the battalion of North Dakota Infantry. The 3 troops of cavalry under Captain Gale did not form part of the main line, but had been landed near the town and farther to the north of where the remainder of the troops took position.

At about 5.45 p. m. the main line began to advance under orders to execute a left turn, in such manner as to bring the line which had been formed parallel to the lake shore, perpendicular to the shore and then to advance upon the town.

The movement was promptly commenced, and the right of the line had nearly reached its position, perpendicular to the lake, when it encountered the enemy and met a pretty sharp fire. The fire was mainly on the front of the First Idaho Battalion, First Battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, and the Washington Sharpshooters. The enemy was firing from the shelter of breastworks, trees, bamboo clumps, and a network of bamboo obstructions erected by the insurgents. The line steadily advanced and drove the enemy from its position. After advancing about a mile, night came on and the line halted and the men bivouacked for the night on a road which ran nearly parallel to our front. At about 6.30 on the morning of April 10, the line again advanced and continued the attack on the city. The Fourth Cavalry also advanced from the other side of the city, and the attack here was aided by the gunboats which poured a very effective fire into the enemy. The last stand of the enemy was made at the river just to the south of the town of Santa Cruz but he was speedily dislodged by the fire of our men and a spirited charge which drove him in disorder from his trenches, into, through, and out of the town to the open ground to the north, where many were killed by the fire of our men and the rapid-fire guns on the gunboats. While the fight was going on to the south of the town, the 3 troops of the Fourth Cavalry were doing magnificent work in front of the place and aided very materially in its capture. The losses to the enemy are not known, but they must have been quite heavy considering the number of troops engaged. Taking into consideration the fact that our burial parties buried over 90 of the enemy's dead picked up on the streets of Santa Cruz and on the open ground in the immediate vicinity of the town, and that this did not cover one-fifth of the ground fought over, and that many of the enemy's dead and wounded were scattered through the woods in which the fight was made, it would be a conservative estimate to say that the enemy's loss here was not far from 400.

The troops bivouacked just outside the city of Santa Cruz until the morning of the 11th, when the column was formed and proceeded in the direction of Pagsanjan. After proceeding about 1½ miles in the direction of Pagsanjan, the sharpshooters, who constituted the advance guard, came in contact with the enemy, who was posted behind a breastwork thrown across the road at a bridge crossing a small stream of water. Line of battle was immediately formed, in the same order as on the previous day, the battery in the center on the road. The battery went into action in short order, and after putting a few shrapnel into the insurgent trench, the enemy hurriedly abandoned the same. A spirited fire was also directed by the sharpshooter against the enemy, and in a very few minutes the entire position occupied by him was carried. The whole line advanced in such a manner that the town of Pagsanjan was entirely encompassed by the troops. The town fell into our hands without further resistance. In the small skirmish in the morning Lieut. E. E. Southern commanding the Washington Sharpshooters, was wounded in the right arm, receiving a compound fracture, and was sent to the rear, and during the remainder of the expedition this company was commanded by Lieut. R. T. Hazzard, of the First Washington Infantry, U. S. V. After entering the town the command captured and took into its possession 6 steam launches as follows: *El Capitan*, *Orani*, *Oceanica*, *Coradonga*, *Suerta*, and *Na. Ecija*, and two cascos.

These launches and cascos were subsequently towed down the river and were

brought to Manila and turned over to the proper authorities. Within an hour after the taking of the last-named town, 2 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, and the Washington Sharpshooters were ordered to proceed down the river to its mouth, there to assist in removing the obstructions placed therein by the insurgents. After proceeding down the river about 2 miles, the command was fired upon by a small party of the enemy concealed behind a stone wall and in the church at the town of Lumbang, on the opposite side of the river. The fire was promptly returned by our troops. The river was too deep to ford; the insurgents had destroyed the ferry and had removed all boats to their side of the river, consequently we could not cross over to drive them out. After engaging the enemy for nearly two hours we succeeded in dislodging them from their position, whereupon the command proceeded to the mouth of the river, communicated with the gunboats, examined the river obstructions, and at nightfall bivouacked at and near the mouth of the river. While the little affair at Lumbang was in progress, the battalion of Idaho Infantry under Major Figgins was crossed over the river near Pagsanjan and proceeded down the river to Lumbang, took possession of the place, and occupied it until next day. The First Battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry also proceeded down the river and bivouacked for the night on the opposite side of the river from Lumbang.

On the morning of April 12, acting under orders from Major-General Lawton, all but 3 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry returned up the river to Lumbang, where the ferry was reconstructed and all the troops, including the battalion of the First North Dakota Infantry and the battery were ferried across the river, which crossing was completed at about 1 o'clock p. m.

As soon as the various organizations were crossed they were dispatched along the road to the town of Longos, which was occupied without resistance at about 2.30 o'clock p. m., April 12. The 3 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the command of Captain Patten, were left at the mouth of the river to cover the work of removing the obstructions, and remained there until the work was completed and the captured launches were safely brought into the lake, when these companies were embarked on board the cascos on the evening of the 16th and joined the expedition on the return journey to San Pedro Macati.

At about 2.45 p. m. orders were received from the major-general commanding the expedition to send 1 battalion to the next town, Paete, for the purpose of making an examination of the facilities for landing the cascos and embarking the troops. Maj. J. H. Fraine, of the North Dakota Infantry, was ordered to move at once and to observe great caution in making his advance, as the enemy was reported to be in the vicinity. The battalion promptly formed and proceeded along the road toward Paete. After proceeding along the road for about 1½ miles this battalion was fired upon by the enemy concealed in the heavy timber to the right side of the road and also from a heavy breastwork thrown directly across the road. The firing became so heavy that it was deemed necessary to send support to the North Dakota Battalion.

The company of Washington sharpshooters, the mountain battery with its support, Company D, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, were ordered up to the front.

On arriving on the firing line, the North Dakota battalion was found deployed along the road under the cover of a stone wall and an embankment in the construction of the road, with two platoons deployed in skirmish line up the side of the hill.

A very heavy fire was poured into the road from the hillside by the concealed foe. Two more platoons were ordered to be deployed on the hillside and directed to execute a left turn of the entire line until the same was perpendicular to the road, and then to advance on the flank of the enemy; the sharpshooters were deployed on the left of the road and ordered to flank the enemy's trench; the battery was brought into position on the road and opened on the enemy's position; the gunboats also opened on the enemy and in a few moments the engagement became general along the whole line. The enemy quickly broke, their position was carried, and by 6.15 p. m. we were in possession of the town of Paete. The North Dakota battalion, the battery, Company D, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and Washington sharpshooters occupied Paete on that night, while the 4 four companies of the Fourteenth Infantry and the Idaho battalion remained at Longos.

On the morning of April 13 these 2 battalions were moved to Paete where all remained until the 16th instant.

At about 2.30 p. m. on Sunday, the 16th instant, orders were received from the division commander to embark all the expeditionary forces on board cascos. This was done, and in the evening all the troops of the expedition were towed across the lake to the Pasig River. The river was reached shortly after daylight on the morning of the 17th instant, and the expedition then proceeded down the river to San Pedro Macati, at which place they were dispatched as follows: The Fourteenth Infantry and the Fourth Cavalry to their barracks in Manila, the battery, the North

Dakotas and the Idaho infantry battalions, and the Washington sharpshooters to their respective former stations.

The casualties on this expedition, considering all the circumstances, were very light and are as follows:

William Somars, private, Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, wounded April 9, 1899; John W. Pitts, private, Company G, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, wounded April 10, 1899; George Wall, first sergeant, Company A, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; Bertie A. Lowe, private, Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; Allen M. Shelleday, private, Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; Alonzo R. Johnson, private, Company K, Fourteenth Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; Moses P. Pritchard, Company A, Fourteenth Infantry, wounded; Isidor Driscoll, corporal, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, killed in action April 12, 1899; Peter Tompkins, wagoner, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, killed in action April 12, 1899; Alfred Almen, private, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, killed in action April 12, 1899; W. Lamb, private, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, killed in action April 12, 1899; George Schellner, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, killed in action April 12, 1899; Alfred J. Fyler, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, wounded in action April 12, 1899; George Hensel, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, wounded in action April 12, 1899; Arthur Pearson, private, Company A, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, wounded April 9, 1899; George B. Manning, private, Company C, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; E. E. Southern, first lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, wounded April 11, 1899; J. J. Charlton, first sergeant, Washington sharpshooters, wounded April 12, 1899.

The commanding officer of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry has not reported any casualties in his command.

In addition to the officers and men specially mentioned for gallant conduct in action by various officers, whose reports are herewith transmitted, I desire to call attention to the very excellent work done by Second Lieut. W. C. Geiger, of the Fourteenth Infantry. This officer acted in the capacity of aid to the brigade commander after the sharpshooters were returned to their respective companies, and during the entire expedition he was indefatigable in the discharge of that duty, carrying the orders of the brigade commander from one end of the line to the other during the progress of the action before Santa Cruz and during the other operations of the expedition. In the action on the 12th instant, when the North Dakota battalion was attacked on the road between Longos and Paete, Lieutenant Geiger was on the very front, exposed to the full fire of the enemy, he returned to the brigade commander with full information as to the situation and when the battery arrived on ground, he again exposed himself and assisted the battery in getting into position at the front and during the whole action. His coolness and courage were marked by the officers of the command.

Lieut. B. M. Koehler, commanding the battery, also deserves special mention for the able and efficient manner in which he handled his battery on all occasions.

Lieutenants Southern and Hazzard, of the Washington sharpshooters, also deserve mention for the manner in which they responded to every call, bringing their men out to the front and aiding and efficiently handling their men so as to fully meet every expectation in the service for which that company was organized. They were always in the front, and notwithstanding the fact that theirs was a most dangerous duty, they handled their men with such skill and efficiency that their casualties were extremely light.

Maj. J. H. Fraine, of the North Dakota battalion, deserved high praise for the very effective work done by him in the trying ordeal he went through when his battalion was so fiercely attacked by a concealed foe on the 12th instant.

All the officers of the entire command were prompt and assiduous in the discharge of their duties. The brigade commander is particularly indebted to the officers of the Fourteenth Infantry for many valuable suggestions made by them in carrying out the operations of the brigade.

The conduct of the men throughout was all that could be expected. No better soldiers ever were engaged in carrying on a successful expedition.

Before closing this report I wish most respectfully to make an observation regarding the organization of the sharpshooter battalion. For the purpose of this expedition this battalion was made up from details from the various companies of the respective regimental organizations from which the troops comprising the expedition were taken. The battalion of sharpshooters was composed of 4 companies, but of the 4 companies composing this force only 1 was fully organized and equipped as a separate company. For the purposes of rations and for all purposes other than actual field operations, all the companies comprising the sharpshooters' battalion

except that of the First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., were attached to the companies from which the respective details were taken. As a result of this system, after the expedition commenced operations, it happened that the companies to which the sharpshooters were attached for rations, etc., became widely separated, leaving these sharpshooter details in a manner orphans, thrown out upon a cold and heartless world. As a consequence, it was found necessary to disintegrate all the sharpshooter companies except that of the First Washington, and to return the various details to their respective companies for duty, because of the difficulty of sending these details to their companies for rations and other company work and then promptly reassembling them again for the special duty of sharpshooters. The only company that was ready at all times for this special purpose was the one that was organized and equipped as a separate company from the First Washington Infantry, and that company was the only one which was used and which served in that capacity during the expedition.

Respectfully submitted.

J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Major, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.,
Commanding Expeditionary Brigade.

P. 8.—Since writing the above report information has been received from the commanding officers of several organizations taking part in the expedition, of the number and kind of arms captured during the expedition. Not all the companies have reported in response to the request of the division commander for this information. So far as reported, the result is as follows:

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry: 1 muzzle-loading shotgun, 2 wooden guns with cartridge barrels, 1 primitive cannon, 10 Remington rifles, 10 Mauser rifles. Of these, 3 Mausers and 6 Remingtons were destroyed on the field.

Hawthorne's battery, 4 bolos.

Washington company sharpshooter, 14 bolos or machetes, 14 Mauser rifles, 5 Remington rifles. All the rifles taken by this company were destroyed on the field.

Respectfully submitted.

J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Major, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.,
Commanding Expeditionary Brigade.

ON PASAY ROAD, April 20, 1899.

Major WEISENBURGER,
First Washington Volunteers.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the lake expedition by the platoon of the mountain battery. The battery landed at Santa Cruz at 5 p. m., and reported to Major Weisenburger for support and orders. Company A of the ——— were detailed to act as support for the battery, which was ordered at 6 o'clock p. m. to join the right of the line. The horses having been towed up with the Fourth Cavalry, the battery moved across the swamp without them, and about 11 o'clock p. m. went into camp about 300 yards in rear of the Fourteenth Infantry.

On the morning of the 10th the battery marched into Santa Cruz along the road. The battery did not go into action entering Santa Cruz, as they encountered no strong resistance along their line of march. On the morning of the 11th the battery marched in column behind the Fourteenth Infantry toward Pagsanjan. The battery went into action at 700 yards before the line of woods skirting Pagsanjan and succeeded in silencing a heavy fire. During this action one of the gun horses was shot through the back by a Mauser bullet, but was not seriously injured. The battery sustained no casualties. Company D of the Fourteenth Infantry acted as support. The battery entered Pagsanjan at 8.30 a. m., and left for the ford opposite Lumban at 2.30 p. m., where it remained for the night. The battery crossed the ford and entered Lumban at 11.30 a. m., April 12, and marched on to Longos. At this place the battery was ordered, at 2.15 p. m., to the front as the sharpshooters had met with a strong resistance about 1½ miles in front of Paete. After making a reconnoissance I found the insurgents had an intrenchment of heavy limbs across the road about 400 yards in advance of where our sharpshooters had halted. I placed the guns on this line and after firing a few shots the heavy firing from the trench ceased and the insurgents withdrew. There were no casualties in the battery. Company D, Fourteenth, acted as support for the battery. The battery remained at Paete until Friday morning, April 14, when it embarked and went to Santa Cruz, and remained there until Sunday, when we left for Manila.

Very respectfully,

B. M. KOEHLER,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

ON PASAY ROAD.

Major WEISENBURGER,
First Washington Volunteers.

SIR: The arms captured by the men of this battery on the lake expedition were reported to the headquarters of the division by their request of some time ago. The only arms captured were 4 bolos.

Very respectfully,

B. M. KOEHLER,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,
In trenches near Pasay, P. I., April 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE,
Laguna de Bay.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry in the recent expedition to Santa Cruz and other points on Laguna de Bay, viz:

In obedience to General Orders, No. 19, current series, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, and orders from the general commanding the Second Brigade, First Division the regiment, having been relieved by the Twenty-second Infantry, proceeded in two battalions, at about 3 o'clock p. m. the 8th instant, to San Pedro Macati, on the Pasig River, distant about 3 miles.

The battalions were commanded, the First, consisting of Companies D, E, C, and I, by Capt. George H. Patten, Fourteenth Infantry, and the Second, Companies A, G, K, and L, by Capt. Alfred Hasbrouck, jr. The company commanders were as follows:

First Battalion.—Lieut. Perry L. Miles, Company E; Lieut. Louis M. Nuttman, Company D; Lieut. Robert Field, Company I; Lieut. James B. Kemper, Company C.

Second Battalion.—Lieut. Frank M. Savage, Company G; Lieut. Patrick M. Mullay, Company L; Lieut. Joseph L. Gilbreth, Company A; Lieut. Donald McNulty, Company K.

Lieut. William S. Biddle, jr., acting regimental adjutant, and Lieut. William A. Burnside, acting regimental quartermaster, accompanied regimental headquarters. Lieut. W. C. Geiger, aid-de-camp to brigade commander.

After a short delay at San Pedro Macati, the companies were embarked about 6 p. m. on cascos and proceeded up the Pasig River toward the lake. The voyage was tedious and wearisome to all, owing to the launches grounding several times where obstructions had been placed and to the crowded condition of the cascos. However, shortly after dawn, the 9th instant, the flotilla emerged upon the lake and proceeded in the direction of Santa Cruz, effecting a landing of the troops at about 3 o'clock p. m. The regiment having disembarked, the two battalions were formed in line in extended order, the Second upon the left, by command of Major Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, commanding brigade, at about 5 o'clock p. m. began a wheel to the left, the pivotal point advancing slowly in the direction of Santa Cruz. The wheel was continued until the line was perpendicular to that from which it started on the lake shore, crossing marshy rice fields and struggling through underbrush, sugar-cane fields, and jungle. At the outer edge of the rice fields the line encountered the first opposition, meeting, when within the brush, with a heavy fire from concealed foe. The First Battalion continued to advance, returning the fire of the enemy, and at the proper time charged and drove him from the field; the Second Battalion, on the left, continuing its advance and keeping in touch with the First, as nearly so as was possible under the circumstances. The regiment continued its advance until a road was reached distant about 1½ miles south from Santa Cruz, where by order of the brigade commander, it halted. The line was rectified and all went into bivouac for the night. Outposts, which were frequently fired upon during the night, were established upon the flanks and in front of the battalion. (See list of casualties attached marked "A.")

April 10, a. m., advanced upon Santa Cruz and its suburbs, the second battalion meeting with a spirited resistance at the river, forcing, by a gallant charge, however, over a stone bridge and through the water, the retirement of the enemy, who left a number of dead upon the field. The town was passed through and bivouac established for the night about 1½ miles north and east from the city, cossack posts established, and the usual precautions taken against surprise. (See casualty list attached marked "A.")

April 11 proceeded early in the morning toward the town of Pagsanjan. The second battalion deployed as skirmishers upon the right, Company D supporting section

of mountain battery, and Companies E, I, and C deployed upon the left by direction of the division commander. The town was taken after some skirmishing with the enemy, and Company I, Lieutenant Field, detached as a provost guard. After a brief halt the line advanced this time upon the town of Lumbang, but did not cross the river, it being too deep to ford and there being no boats available at the time. The enemy fired from the town across the river, but did no damage, and Companies C and E proceeded to the mouth of the river by order of Major Weisenburger to cover working parties engaged in removing obstructions. Company D remained with the battery and the other companies bivouacked for the night distant nearly a mile from where the obstructions were at the mouth of the river. Outposts were duly established.

April 12 Companies A, G, K, and L returned up the river and crossed at Lumbang, which our troops had occupied during the night. Companies E, C, and I (the latter having joined from provost duty) remained at mouth of river. Company D continued with the battery.

The advance was continued along the lake shore road without any casualty, arriving at Longos, where bivouac was made for the night.

April 13 moved on and occupied the village of Paete, where Companies L, A, G, K, and D, with battery, remained until Sunday, April 16 (Companies E, I, and C continuing at mouth of river), when the troops were embarked upon the cascos and toward evening pulled out toward the Pasig River, Companies E, C, and I rejoining from mouth of river en route upon cascos supplied. Continued across the lake during the night and entered the Pasig River the next morning, down which we proceeded to Manila, where we arrived early in the afternoon, disembarked and marched 2½ miles to the Cuartel de Malata, and went into quarters which the companies had left hastily on the 4th of February last to meet the hostilities in the suburbs.

The regimental commander feels it due to the officers and enlisted men who were upon the expedition to add a word of commendation. To the battalion commanders he feels under deep obligations for the promptness and clearness with which all orders were observed and executed.

The company commanders were at all times active and clear in their conception of the varying situations, and in every instance were quick to see and utilize the means at hand to lessen the hardships their men were subject to, the men who bore the burden and were all that American soldiers should be at all times.

To Lieutenant Biddle, acting regimental adjutant, and Lieutenant Burnside, acting regimental quartermaster, he owes more than a word of commendation can convey. These officers were at all times active and clear in the discharge of their duties, whether upon the fighting line or in bivouac.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Inclosed please find copies of reports of battalion commanders, marked B (first) and C (second), respectively.

WILLIAM W. McCAMMON,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,
Pasay, Manila, P. I., April 25, 1899.

Maj. J. J. WEISENBURGER,
First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to report in compliance with your letter of the 20th instant: The following arms were captured by members of this command during the expedition to Laguna de Bay, viz: One muzzle-loading shotgun, 2 wooden guns with cartridge barrels, 1 primitive cannon, 10 Remingtons, 10 Mausers, of which 3 Mausers and 6 Remingtons were destroyed.

Very respectfully,

W. W. McCAMMON,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

CUARTEL DE MALATA,
Manila, P. I., April 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT FOURTEENTH INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the First Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, consisting of Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Lieut. Perry Miles; Company D, Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Lieut. Lewis N. Nuttman; Company I, Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Lieut. Robert Fields, and Company C, Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Lieut. James B. Kemper, landed south of Santa Cruz

about 3.30 p. m. the 9th instant, where it remained with deployed front until 5 p. m. when it joined in a turning movement to the left. About one-half an hour later encountered the enemy, and after some firing on either side it charged and drove the enemy back.

The actual number of killed insurgents in my immediate front was 9, and wounded. My casualties were 1 wounded of Company D, namely, Private William Somars cut in the right arm with bolo in hands of wounded insurgent. The battalion bivouacked for the night on the road leading in a southeasterly direction from Santa Cruz. About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 10th we moved forward in line of battle to a position outside of Santa Cruz, meeting but little opposition, and camped outside of Santa Cruz during the remainder of the day.

On the 11th it formed part of the advance guard in the movement toward Pagsanjan, east of Santa Cruz. About a mile from Pagsanjan the point was fired upon by the enemy, and three companies of the battalion were deployed to the right of the road, the fourth, Lieutenant Nuttman's, being detailed as battery guard. The command advanced in line of battle without meeting serious opposition and entered the town about 9.30 a. m. I was then directed by the major-general commanding to leave one company (Fields's) at Pagsanjan as a provost guard and proceed on the road toward the northeast along the river Lumbang. About a mile and a half from Pagsanjan the road crosses the river where the town of Lumbang is situated on the opposite side of the river. We were fired upon from the town, which, I should judge, was held by 25 or 30 insurgents. A position was taken up along the bank and the enemy driven out. At 3.30 p. m. the battalion was ordered to the mouth of the river to communicate with the gunboats and to remove obstructions. On the 12th the obstructions were removed, they consisting of bamboo poles driven into the bed of the river. The battalion remained at the mouth of the river until the night of the 16th, when it went on the cascoes and returned to Manila, reaching there the afternoon of the 17th.

We had no casualties on our side after the Santa Cruz fight and none missing.

All of the officers performed their duties with zeal and intelligence, and the conduct of the men was all that could be desired in every particular.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. H. PATTEN,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

MANILA, P. I., April 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT FOURTEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth United States Infantry, from April 8 to 17, 1899, inclusive.

The battalion consisted of Companies G, L, A, and K, commanded by Second Lieut. F. M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry; Second Lieut. Patrick Mullan, Second Lieut. J. L. Gilbreth, Fourteenth Infantry, and Second Lieut. Donald McNulta, Fourteenth Infantry. Left trenches at Pasay about 2.30 p. m., April 8, arriving at San Pedro Macati about 4 p. m.; embarked on cascoes about 5 p. m.; left about 6.30 p. m.; arrived off Santa Cruz and disembarked about 2 p. m., April 9. Commenced movement against the city 6.30 p. m. Halted on account of darkness 7.30 p. m.; resumed movement next day at daylight, the 10th instant. Charged across the bridge and killed many of the enemy in the open beyond the town. Bivouacked there for the night. Moved at 7 a. m., 11th instant, to Pagsanjan; met there no opposition to speak of; entered town at 11 a. m. Moved down the river about 2 miles; engaged enemy; stayed there about two hours; moved down as support to troops at mouth of river, remaining there over night. Marched up river on the 12th instant to Lumbang, remaining there over night. The following morning, 13th instant, marched to Paete, bivouacked there until the 16th instant; embarked on cascoes and returned to Manila, and we entered quarters at Cuartel de Malata.

Casualties: No missing; 1 killed (Pitts, John W, private, Company G, Fourteenth Infantry); 3 wounded (Pvt. Moses Pritchard, Company A, Fourteenth Infantry; Sergeant Wall, Company A, Fourteenth Infantry, and Alonzo Johnson, wagoner, Company K, Fourteenth Infantry).

All the officers and men of the command did splendidly. I would especially recommend Second Lieut. F. M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry, for his gallant conduct in leading his company (G, Fourteenth Infantry) across the bridge at Santa Cruz under heavy fire, and would also mention that Second Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry, was one of the first across the bridge.

Respectfully submitted.

ALFRED HASBROUCK,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST IDAHO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
*Gumbo Point, April 21, 1899.*Maj. J. J. WEISENBURGER,
First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: In compliance with your request I have the honor to report the following:

The First Battalion of this command, consisting of Companies F, A, C, D, and 20 sharpshooters from Second Battalion, left Macati road, April 8, in compliance with General Orders, No. 19, headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, and marched to San Pedro Macati, embarking there on cascoes and being towed by tugs up the Pasig River to Laguna de Bay, and remaining at anchor there until 4 a. m. April 9, then proceeding across the lake to point $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Santa Cruz, there landing, forming into battle line at once. Line moved at 5.40 p. m. This battalion was assigned on right at a point about 1 mile from start. The right of the line while crossing an open field came on to an insurgent outpost of about 40, who opened a very strong fire on our rear. After sustaining this fire for about ten minutes we located the same and drove them out, and then going into camp on road in our front. At 6.30 a. m., April 10, this command again advanced $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, fording stream, being then 1 mile east of Santa Cruz.

In the skirmish of the 9th Private Pearson, Company A, was wounded in left wrist and Private George B. Manning, Company C, was wounded in left foot.

April 11 this command advanced on Pagsanjan on the right of the Fourteenth Infantry, crossing a high mountain and river on the way to Pagsanjan, and then being ferried across Lodi River on cascoes and proceeding to town or pueblo of Lumbang, which was captured without resistance. Command remained there over night. The remainder of brigade being ferried over from west side, this command proceeded in advance to Longos, remaining there over night. On the next afternoon, by division order, this command proceeded to Paete, remaining there three days and nights; embarking on cascoes at 2 p. m. April 16, and being towed down lake and Pasig River to San Pedro Macati, where we arrived at 10 a. m., from there proceeding to our position in trenches, Second Brigade, First Division, joining Second Battalion there. This command was on outpost duty every night at each stopping place. The command suffers considerably at the present time from sore feet, itch, chafing, and pemphigus.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

D. W. FIGGINS,
*Major, First Idaho, Commanding.*SAN NICHOLAS, P. I., *April 19, 1899.*Maj. J. J. WEISENBURGER,
First Washington Volunteers.

SIR: Pursuant to request contained in your letter of April 18, 1899, I have the honor to herewith transmit a report of the movements of my battalion on the Laguna de Bay expedition.

At 4 o'clock p. m. April 8, the battalion, having been loaded on 3 cascos, left San Pedro Macati in tow of the launch *Ceres*, arrived at Laguna de Bay and anchored near flagship at 7.30 p. m. same day. Left this anchorage in tow of same tug at about 5 a. m. April 9, arrived at anchorage near Santa Cruz about noon, and made successful landing at 3.30 p. m., the battalion forming the right wing of the attacking force, our left resting near the lake shore, our right extending in a southeasterly direction and connecting with the left of the Fourteenth Infantry. About 5.45 p. m. we participated in the advance movement made by the entire line, advancing about 1 mile toward Santa Cruz by order of the brigade commander. Almost immediately after commencing the advance a desultory fire was commenced by the enemy on my front, growing heavier toward the right. It being too dark to see the enemy no reply was made to his fire, and as our advance continued his fire slackened and finally died out in our immediate front. At about 7 p. m. our line was halted and remained in its position until 9.20 p. m., at which time retired to a road about 100 yards to the rear, which line was held until morning. At 7 a. m. April 10 the bugle sounded an advance. My battalion moved forward in a northeasterly direction toward Santa Cruz, keeping the same relative position, although at times a rather brisk fire was encountered, arriving at Santa Cruz a few minutes before 10 a. m. Immediately took possession of the trenches vacated by the enemy. I saw 8 dead and 3 wounded insurgents in the immediate front of my battalion before reaching Santa Cruz. I estimate their killed and wounded in my immediate front prior to reaching Santa Cruz at about 20. Casualties in my command, none.

I was much assisted by the presence and advice of Major Starr, of General Lawton's staff, during this advance. Company K did not remain with the battalion, it

being detached on the 9th to support the battery. Remained at Santa Cruz until a. m. April 11, at which time I moved out on the Pagsanjan road and waited until 6.40 a. m. The column moved forward to Pagsanjan, my battalion forming the rearguard for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, when the enemy was encountered and my battalion was deployed in double time to the extreme left of the line, and pushed forward rapidly by the left oblique so as to form the left horn of a crescent, the Fourteenth Infantry forming the center. Movement continued until my left entered Pagsanjan, resting on the Pagsanjan River, where we immediately took possession of two steam launches, the *Capitan* and *Orani*, and 1 casco. The streets were rapidly reconnoitered and the battalion assembled at the cathedral, leaving a guard on the captured boats. At 8 a. m. the battalion crossed the Santa Cruz River on the south side of Pagsanjan and proceeded up the Pagsanjan River, accompanied by Maj. C. R. Edwards and a native guide for about 1 mile, where the steam launches *Oceanica*, *Covadonga*, *Suerte*, and *Na. Ecija*, and casco 1888 were found on the opposite side of the river. Volunteers being called for, Corpl. Robert J. Wilson and Private Erickson, of Company D, and Captain Purdon, Privates Holler and Falley, of Company I, swam the river and brought ropes from the launches to our side of the river, where 20 men were placed on each vessel, and they were poled down to Pagsanjan, the rest of the battalion protecting them against possible attack. Pagsanjan was reached at 11.45 and vessels delivered to quartermaster.

During the operations resulting in the capture of the four last-named launches and casco, I was greatly benefited by the advice and active assistance of Maj. Clarence Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, First Division. Remained at Pagsanjan until a. m. April 12; then to the ferry between San Juan and Lumbang, reaching ferry 9.35; succeeded in crossing at 12.20; arrived at Longos at 1.50, where preparations were made for dinner. Before this could be prepared orders were received to proceed at once to Paete and report the condition of landing place. Left Longos at 2 in column of fours, with a point out about 200 yards in front of column, point being followed at about 100 yards by 20 sharpshooters, the condition of the adjacent country not permitting us to put out flankers. The men were instructed to keep a sharp lookout for any insurgents who might be in the jungle to our right or left. The road runs along a very steep hill, rising at an angle of from 45 to 70 degrees, and the hill is covered with bamboo, rattan, and other growth, and so cut up with dry gullies and bowlders as to be almost impassable. After proceeding a short distance things looked so suspicious a squad of 5 men was sent up the hill about 200 yards as flankers, and almost at the same time the point signaled back that they had found the enemy. My adjutant, Lieutenant Aspinwall, Lieutenant Geiger, and myself went forward after I had halted the column and reconnoitered the position and found the enemy in a squad of 12 to 20 behind a very strong breastwork across the road about 75 to 100 yards ahead of the point. Instructing Lieutenant Tharalson, in command of sharpshooters, to deploy his men on left of road so as to command the intrenchments, which was done immediately and well, I started to the rear to dispose the column to the best advantage. At this time a very heavy fire from the hillside and trees along the entire command was poured into us. I immediately deployed one platoon from each company into the jungle up the hill to our right, the left resting on the road, the entire line making a left wheel, and advanced when the line was perpendicular to the road. This movement was executed promptly and as quickly as the nature of the ground would permit, the platoons firing by volleys. While this movement was going on the division ordnance officer, Lieut. William Brooke, arrived, and shortly afterwards Major Weisenburger, a company of Washington sharpshooters, and a mountain battery arrived and took position on front of the trench first noticed by the point. After about one hour of sharp fighting the entire column advanced, and meeting no further resistance, arrived at Paete at 6.15 p. m.

My losses during this engagement were as follows:

Killed: Corpl. Isador Driscoll, Company C; Wagoner Peter Tompkins, Company I; Private Alfred Alman, Company C; Private W. C. Lamb, Company C; Musicians George Schneller, Company I. Wounded: Private Hubert J. Fyles, Company I, and Private August W. Hensel, Company K.

The conduct of officers and men was excellent; all orders were obeyed promptly and intelligently. Conduct of Lieutenant Brooke and Major Weisenburger was such as to materially encourage the men. I desire to particularly call attention to the conduct of Privates Thomas Sletteland, of Company C, and John J. Wampler, of Company D, whom I deem worthy of special mention. Private Wampler voluntarily took up an advanced post under heavy fire, for the purpose of observing the enemy; his case was reported to me by Lieutenant Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry. The conduct of Thomas Sletteland I am personally cognizant of. He was one of a squad of 5 men first sent up the hill as flankers, and is the sole survivor. When the first volley was

fired, 3 of his comrades fell dead and 1 mortally wounded. Alone and unsupported he drove back the squad of the enemy, who occupied a trench 10 yards away, on two separate occasions, when they came over the trenches, presumably for the rifles of the dead and wounded; he carried off his wounded comrade, Tompkins, when assistance came and assisted others, under heavy fire, to find his dead comrades. Lieutenant Geiger, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, was also with the skirmishers on the left side of the road, and while I was not personally present, it is reported by the men to me as that of a very gallant officer.

Remained at Paete until Sunday, April 16; at 3 p. m. embarked on cascos and reached San Pedro Macati at 12 m. April 17, and immediately took up our old positions on the hillsides southwest of San Nicholas.

Very respectfully,

J. H. FRAINE,
Major, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

PASIG, P. I., April 20, 1899.

Maj. J. J. WEISENBURGER,
Commanding Brigade, Laguna de Bay Expedition.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows of the operations of the Washington sharpshooters in the recent expedition.

Leaving Pasig April 8 at 2.30 p. m. with 60 men, under command of Lieut. E. E. Southern and Lieut. R. T. Hazard, proceeded to San Pedro Macati and embarked aboard Casco No. 16 in company with 40 North Dakota and Idaho sharpshooters, making 140 men in a space intended for 100. Left San Pedro Macati for Santa Cruz about 4.30 p. m. and arrived off Santa Cruz April 9 about 2 p. m. in tow of launch; was cut loose and made landing by wading and pulling casco ashore. I immediately formed skirmish line and awaited landing of other troops, which was completed about 5 p. m. Soon after a skirmish line was formed and the line advanced, coming in contact with the enemy in the brush about three-fourths of a mile from shore. A very hot skirmish ensued, lasting until dark and ending with a charge by our forces, which resulted in driving the enemy from their position and our troops took possession of the road leading to Santa Cruz and which was held during the night, and early in morning we advanced on Santa Cruz, which we charged and captured in good order, driving the insurgents into the open ground beyond, where quite a number of insurgents were killed. The company of Washington sharpshooters were in the thickest of the fight and led the charge across the river. When the bridge was reached, a squad was asked for to rush the stone breastwork on the bridge. Private George Scott, Company A, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, volunteered to do it and led away 50 yards in advance of the line. We bivouacked just outside of Santa Cruz for the night, and at 6 a. m. April 11 we headed a column that marched on Pagsanjan, and when about 2 miles south of Santa Cruz came in contact with the enemy which ended in a skirmish during which Lieut. E. E. Southern was wounded in the right arm and was sent to the hospital. The enemy being routed, we marched into Pagsanjan without further resistance.

We left Pagsanjan about 11.30 a. m., at the head of a battalion of Fourteenth Infantry and started for the mouth of the river on which Pagsanjan is situated, and when about 2½ miles down the river we came onto companies of the Fourteenth Infantry engaged with insurgents in a church across the river, when we halted and formed in skirmish line on the river bank and assisted in driving the enemy from their position, after which we proceeded to the mouth of the river, returning the next morning, the 12th instant, to the place where we assisted the two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, where we crossed the river in small boats and proceeded in front of brigade to Longos, arriving about 2 p. m.; and while at lunch were ordered to proceed to the assistance of the North Dakota battalion that had come in contact with the insurgents about a mile up the river toward Paete. We arrived on the line about 3.30 and immediately took the front and opened fire at once with good effect. Private George Scott volunteered to go forward and locate the enemy's fortifications on the road, which he did, receiving a volley that it seemed impossible to survive, but he came out without a scratch and reported a heavy breastwork across the road, and in a few moments the battery arrived and, while supported by a squad of Washington sharpshooters, dislodged the enemy, and we proceeded to Paete, arriving about 6.30 p. m., April 12. During the last skirmish Sergt. J. J. Charlton was slightly wounded and sent to the hospital.

We remained in Paete until 4 p. m., April 16, when we boarded the cascos and proceeded to Pasig, arriving April 17, 1899, at 12.30 p. m., and reported to the regimental commander for duty.

I desire to especially commend Private George Scott, Company A, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, for his actions during the expedition; he is a cool-headed soldier, and is worthy of any honor that may be given him. I also desire to make special mention of Sergt. E. T. Balch, of Troop L, Fourth Cavalry, who, with his squad, was attached to my command during the expedition; he was the first man to cross the river by wading during the charge on Santa Cruz and shot an insurgent leader who was endeavoring to rally his men. He was not over 30 yards from his mark, and was the mark of an entire squad of insurgents, but with a nerve that is seldom shown, he halted and deliberately shot the leader of the squad that was advancing on us by a side street, and immediately the remainder broke and ran.

I submit the above as a true report of the operations of the Washington sharpshooters during the recent expedition on Laguna de Bay.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. T. HAZZARD,
Lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Sharpshooters.

[Inclosure.]

PASIG, P. I., April 25, 1899.

Maj. J. J. WEISENBURGER, *Taguig, P. I.*

SIR: Obedient to request for report of number and kind of arms captured on Laguna de Bay expedition, I report as follows: Fourteen bolos or machetes, 1 saber, and 19 guns (14 Mausers and 5 Remingtons).

The guns were all broken up on the field, as it was impossible to carry them.

Very respectfully,

R. T. HAZZARD,
Lieutenant, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Sharpshooters

APPENDIX 35.

MANILA, P. I., May 31, 1899.

Maj. CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In response to the inquiries made by you in our conversation of this morning, I have the honor to report that the names of the men who swam the Pagsanjan River in the capture of the launches, April 11, in your immediate presence, are as follows: Robert J. Wilson and Private Albert C. Erickson, of Company D, First North Dakota, U. S. V.; that at the same time a little farther down the river where the launch lay, Capt. W. R. Purdon, Privates Benjamin Holler and Chesley Tolley, of Company I, First North Dakota U. S. V., did the same thing.

I would also draw your attention to the conduct of Private John J. Wampler, of Company D, First North Dakota U. S. V., on April 12, reported to me by Lieutenant Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry, and of Corpl. Herbert Brand, who, at the time of the advance on Paete, April 12, was the point in advance, who discovered the trench of the enemy, and who, during all the firing, maintained his position until the arrival of the battery and indicated to the battery commander its location.

Very respectfully,

JOHN H. FRAINE,
Major, First North Dakota U. S. V.

APPENDIX 36.

PROCLAMA.

AL PUEBLO FILIPINO:

La cesión de la soberanía española sobre las Islas Filipinas, hecha por aquella nación á favor de los Estados Unidos en el tratado de Paris, últimamente celebrado y ya ratificado por el Gobierno Americano, hace lagunas semanas y por el de España el día 29 de marzo, ha sido consumada completa y absolutamente, en conformidad con las leyes internacionales, mediante la expresada ratificación de ambas Potencias contratantes.

A fin de que la alta responsabilidad y obligaciones contraídas por los Estados Unidos

de modo definitivo en virtud del mencionado título puedan ser cumplidas de manera tal que consulte al propio tiempo los respetables intereses de los habitantes de las Filipinas, Su Excelencia el Presidente de los Estados Unidos ha constituido con los abajo firmados una comisión civil sobre asuntos filipinos, investida de todos los poderes necesarios para el desempeño de su noble cometido.

La Comisión empieza por asegurar al pueblo filipino la buena voluntad y los sentimientos fraternales que hácia él abrigan el Presidente de los Estados Unidos el pueblo americano. El propósito y objeto del Gobierno Americano, fuera del cumplimiento de las obligaciones que solemnemente ha asumido ante las naciones al aceptar la soberanía de las Islas Filipinas, es el bienestar, la prosperidad y la felicidad del pueblo filipino, su engrandecimiento y elevación á una honrosa posición entre los pueblos más civilizados del mundo.

Su Excelencia el Presidente de los Estados Unidos cree que esta felicidad y perfección del pueblo filipino se han de alcanzar con el afianzamiento de la paz y del orden, con la garantía de la libertad civil y religiosa, con el establecimiento de la justicia, con el cultivo de las letras, ciencias y artes liberales y prácticas, con la amplitud de relaciones exteriores, con la expansión de las empresas industriales y mercantiles, con la multiplicación y mejoramiento de los medios de comunicación en el interior, con el desarrollo, por medio de los inventos mecánicos modernos, de los grandes recursos naturales del Archipiélago, y, en una palabra, con un constante ahinco, por parte del pueblo filipino, de perseguir estos útiles fines y de realizar tan nobles ideales que constituyen la más alta civilización humana.

Desgraciadamente, estas elevadas miras del pueblo y gobierno americano han sido mal interpretada por algunos habitantes de ciertas Islas. Y como consecuencia las fuerzas americanas amigas han sido atacadas sin provocación ni causa.

Y porqué estas hostilidades? Que desean los más sensatos filipinos? Pueden acaso desear más que lo que los Estados Unidos están pronto á conceder? Somos patriotas y queremos la libertad, dicen. La Comisión asevera que los Estados Unidos no solamente quieren, sino que ansian establecer en las Filipinas un ilustrado sistema de gobierno ajo el cual el pueblo filipino goce de la mayor autonomía y de la más amplia libertad que están en consonancia con los supremos fines del gobierno y sean compatibles con las obligaciones que, en virtud de su soberanía sobre el Archipiélago, han contraído los Estados con las naciones civilizadas del mundo.

Trabajando los Estados Unidos vivamente por el bienestar y el adelanto de los habitantes de las Islas Filipinas, no puede existir ningun conflicto verdadero entre la soberanía americana y los derechos y libertades del pueblo filipino. Porque así como los Estados están prontos á enviar ejércitos, escuadras y todos los innumerables recursos de una nación grande y poderosa para mantener y hacer respetar su legítima soberanía en las Islas Filipinas, así también están siempre más dispuestos á difundir la paz y la felicidad entre el pueblo filipino, á garantizar una legítima libertad, á protegerle en sus justos privilegios é inmunidades, á habituarle á un gobierno libre y propio, cada vez más amplio y á fomentar en él estas democráticas aspiraciones, sentimientos é ideales que conducen á un provechoso desarrollo nacional.

La Comisión espera poder visitar los pueblos filipinos en sus diversas provincias, con el propósito de cultivar mútuas y más íntimas relaciones, y también para escuchar las más ilustradas opiniones de los naturales acerca de la forma ó formas de gobierno que sean más adecuadas á las distintas condiciones de estos pueblos, las más propias para encaminarles á obtener su más cumplido bienestar, es decir, las más conformes con sus costumbres, tradiciones, sentimientos y caros ideales. Al establecerse y mantenerse el nuevo gobierno en las Islas Filipinas, la política de los Estados Unidos será consultar las miras y deseos y procurarse consejo, cooperación y ayuda del pueblo filipino.

Mientras, se invita al pueblo filipino á tomar en consideración algunas bases fundamentales, por las cuales los Estados Unidos se regirán en sus relaciones con ellos. Se juzgan más importantes las siguientes:

1ª. La supremacía de los Estados Unidos deberá ser y será puesta en vigor en todo el Archipiélago, y aquellos que la rechacen no podrán conseguir más fin que su propia ruina.

2ª. Se concederá al pueblo filipino la más amplia libertad y autonomía que sean conciliables con el mantenimiento de un sabio, justo, estable, efectivo y económico gobierno, y compatibles con los soberanos derechos y obligaciones internacionales de los Estados Unidos.

3ª. Los derechos civiles de los Filipinos han de ser garantidos y protegidos del modo más amplio y eficaz. La libertad religiosa será asegurada; asimismo la igualdad de todos ante la ley.

4ª. El honor y la justicia, no menos que la amistad de los Estados Unidos, no consenten usar del pueblo filipino ó Islas que habita á guisa de objeto ó medio de explo-

tación; siendo la mira del Gobierno americano el bienestar y el adelanto del pueblo filipino.

5ª. Ha de ser garantizada al pueblo filipino una administración pública, moral y efectiva, en la cual del modo más practicable tendrán entrado los naturales.

6ª. La cobranza y aplicación de las contribuciones é impuestos se han de fundar en bases sanas, justas y económicas. Los fondos públicos, recaudados honradamente serán aplicados solamente en satisfacer los gastos regulares y propios que ocurrieren por el establecimiento y mantenimiento del Gobierno filipino, y además para el mejoramiento general que los intereses públicos pudieren requerir. Los fondos locales, percibidos para usos locales no serán aplicados á otros fines. Con una administración fiscal tan prudente y honrada es de esperar que las necesidades del Gobierno serán muy en breve compatibles con una considerable rebaja de las contribuciones.

7ª. Se establecerá una administración de justicia pura, pronta y efectiva en la que serán eliminados los procedimientos dilitarios y vejatorios y cotizados servir sumamente la conclusión y toda especie de prevaricación.

8ª. Se favorecerá la construcción de caminos ferrocarriles y otros medios de comunicación y transporte, así como cualesquiera otras obras públicas de notoria utilidad para el pueblo filipino.

9ª. El tráfico y el comercio interior y exterior, la agricultura y otras profesiones industriales y el general desarrollo del país en interes de sus habitantes serán con stante objeto de solicitud y diligente cuidado.

10. Se han de establecer adecuadamente escuelas elementales en las cuales los niño del pueblo serán educados. Se procurán también facilidades apropiadas para má elevada educación.

11. Reformas en todos los departamentos del Gobierno, en todas las ramas del ser vicio público, y en todas las corporaciones influyentes en la veda común del puebl serán emprendidas sin dilación y se llevarán á cabo de conformidad con el derecho ; la justicia, de tal modo que satisfaga las bien fundadas demandas y los más alto sentimientos y aspiraciones del pueblo filipino.

Tal es espíritu con que los Estados Unidos vienen al pueblo de las Filipinas. Si Excelencia el Presidente ha dado instrucciones á la Comisión para hacerlo conoce públicamente. Obedeciendo á este mandato, la Comisión desea poner de manifest su propia buena voluntad para con el pueblo filipino, é invitar cordialmente á su jefes y personas de representación á conferencias personales, con el fin de conocers mutuamente y cambiar ideas y opiniones.

Manila, 4 de abril de 1899.

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN,
Presidente de la Comisión.
GEORGE DEWEY,
Almirante U. S. N.
ELWELL S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.
CHARLES DENBY.
DEAN C. WORCESTER.

JOHN R. MACARTHUR,
Secretario de la Comisión.

PAHAYAG.

SA MANGA TAGA FILIPINAS :

Ang Tratado de Paz, ò Pag cacasundo sa capayapaan, nang Estados-Unidos a España, na mav ilang lingo lamang na, pinag tibay nang nangunguna, at sapagcat pinag tibay din naman nang icadalaungpuò nang Marzo nang nahuhuli ang Pag caca loob бага sa Estados-Unidos nang capangvarihan ó pagca may ari nang España s Islas Filipinas, na natatala sa nasabing pag cacasundo ay naga ap nang lubos, ayoi sa pinag untos nang mañga leyes internacionales.

Upan din ang daquilang pananagot at mangã catungculan na inaming lubos nan Estados-Unidos av mangyaring masunod sa lalong icasusulong at icalalagó nang mang mahalagang cayamanan nang mangã namamayan sa Islas Filipinas, ang Guinoon Presidente sa Estados-Unidos ay nag tatag sa mangã napifirma sa ibaba nito nan isang Comision civil tungcol sa mangã bagaybagay dito sa Filipinas, na sila, i, pina calooban nang boong capangyarihang cacailanganin sa pag tupad nang canilan catungculan.

Ang Comisión ay nagnanasang ipaquilala sa bayan filipino ang magandang caloc ban at sintang capatid na sacanila, i, tinataglay nang Presidente sa Estados-Unido at nang bayan Americano. Ang tanging nasat, t; dahilan nang Gobierno Ameri

cano, bucod sa pag ganap sa mangā daquilang catungculan na inaco sa harap nang mangā Naciones nang tangapin ang soberania nang Islas Filipinas, ay ang icagagaring icayayaman at icaguiguinhaua nang bayang filipino at ang caniyang icataas at icasusulong sa isang marangal na calagayan sa guitna nang mangā bavang lalong civilizado sa Mundo.

Ang acala nang Guinoong Presidente nang Estados-Unidos, na ang capalarang ito at cagalingan nang bayang filipino ay macacamtan sa catibayan nang pagcacasundo at cuhusayan; sa capangacuan nang libertad civil at religiosa; sa pag hahalal nang Justicia; sa pagca alam nang mangā letras, ciencias at artes liberales at practicas; sa pagdami nang mangā relaciones, ó caquilalang naciones estrangeras; sa pag capal nang mangā pagcacaquitaan nang icabubuhay, nang trafico, t, comercio; sa pag unlol at lalong pagbuti nang mangā paraan icadadali nang pag lalagbay sa mangā bayan-bayan; sa icalalagó sa paraan nang mangā bagong inventos mecánicos nang mangā-daquilang yaman nang naturaleza sa Archipiélago, at sa madaling salita; sa isang ualang humpay na pagnanasa nang bayang filipino sa pay aaral niyaong mangā paquinabangan bagay at ang pagcaganap nitong nahal ns caisipan, na siyang ipinagui-guing dapat nang tauo sa lalong mataas na civilización.

Sa casamaang palad, ang malinis na nasa at hangad nang bayan at Gobierno americano, ay biniguan nang maling cahulugan nang mangā namamavan sa ilang Islas dito. At parang naguing bungā, ang mangā tuerzas ó sundalong americano, dating caibagan, ay canilang inauay cahit ualang dahilan pinagmulaan.

At Baquit ang ganitong galit? Anó ang ninanais nang may mangā bait na filipinos? May mananasa pa caya silang hihiguit sa maipagcacaloob sa canilang madali nang Estado-Unidos? Cayo, i, mangā patriotas at nag ilbig nang libertad: ang inyong uica. Ang Estados-Unidos hindi lamang ibig. cundi pinacananasang mag lagay sa Filipinas nang isang maalam na sistemang Gobierno ó pamamahala, na sa canilang lilim magtamó ang bayang filipino nang lalong malaquing autonomía, ó sariling capangyarihan sa pamamahala, at malauac na calayaan na na-aayon sa mangā daquilang nais nang Gobierno at cabagay niyong mangā catungculan na sa pag tangap nang soberanía nang Archipiélago, ay inamin nang Estados-Unidos sa manga naciones civilizadas sa Mundo.

Sa pagcat ang tanging pag pipilitan gauin nang Estados-Unidos ang icaguifuinhaua at icasusulong sa cagalingan nang mangā taga rito sa Islas Filipinas, ay hindi mangyaya ing magcaroon nang anomang tanay na pagcacasigalot ang Soberanía Americana at ang mangā derechos at libertades nang bayang filipino. Sa pagca, t, cun ang Estados-Unidos at macapag-papa lalang madali nang mangā ejércitos escuadra at nang di mabilang na cayaman nang isang Nacion malaqui at macapang yavarihan nang maingatan at maitauid ang tunay niyang Soberanía sa Islas Filipinas, ay gayon din naman lagui nang nahahandang lalo sa pagcacalat nang capayapaan at caguinhauahan nang bayang filipino: sa pangangacong pagcacalooban nang isang tunay na calayaan sa pagtatangol nancanilang mangā matuid na privilegios; sa sila, i, amoin sa isang gobierno liberal at ucol, na palagni nang palagui, at sila, i, masulong tuina sa canilang mangā democraticang nasa, hilig sa caisipan na siyang naghahatid sa isang daquilang, capaquinabangan nang bayan.

Ang Comision umaasang macadadalao sa mangā bayan nang Filipinas sa cani-caniyang provincia sa nasang magcaroon nang mangā tunay at tapat nacaquilala at nang caniyang maalaman sa lalong marurunon na pasiva nang taga ri o. cun anong forma ó formas na gobierno ang lalong pararapat sa mangā bayang filipinos, ang na ga nabagay sa paghahatid sa canila sa mataas na cagalingan at na-anvon sa canilang mangā caugalian naguisnan, hilig at mangā manal na caisipan. Nang itatag at iraos ang gobierno sa Islas Filipinas, ang politica nang Estados-Unidos, ay ang sumanguni sa mangā hangad at nasa, at magcaroon nang hatol. saclolo at tulong nang ba ang filipino.

Samanta ang hindi inaanyayahan ang bayang filipino na magisip-isip nang mangā bases fundamentales, na sucat alinsunurin nang Estados-Unidos sa canilang pag saalitaan. Inacala ang lalong may mangā halaga hay ang mangā sumusuood.

1°. Ang supremacia ó cadaquilan nang Estados-Unidos ay quiquilalanin sa boong Archipiélago, at ang mangā ayao cumilala ay ualang cacamtan cundi ang caniyang capahamacan.

2°. Pag cacalooban ang bayang filipino nang lalong malapad na libertad at autonomia ó sariling pamamahala, na naaayon sa pag iingat nang isang ma-alam, tapat, matibay, tunay at económicong gobierno at hindi nalalaban sa mangā soberinos derechos at catungculang internacionales nang E. U.

3°. Ang mangā derechos civiles nang bayang filipino ay sasagutin at ipagtatangol na lubos at ang libertad religiosa ay igagalang.

4°. Ang pur at justicia, gayon din ang caniyang pagcacaibigan, ang bayan Filipinas ay ipagbabawal gamitin, na parang isang par an nang pagcabuhay. Ang tanging nasa nang Gobierno Americano ay ang icagagaling at icayayaman nang bayang Filipinas.

5°. Ipagtatangol din naman ang isang malinis at tunay na administración civil na gaganapin hangang manvavari nang mangá taga rito.

6°. Ang paniningil at pag gagasta nang mangá contribuciones at derechos, ay mangbubuhat si mangá dahilong mabuti, matuid at económicos. Ang mangá fondos públicos na sisingiling malinis ay gugulin lamang sa pag babayad sa mangá gastos regulares at na nangyayari sa pagca tatag nang Gobierno Filipino, at bucod dito para sa lalong cagalingan nang lahat na cacailanganin nang público. Ang mangá fondos locales, na naglalabis sa mangá cailangan nang lugar, at hindi magagamit sa ibang dahilan. Sa isang administracion fiscal na mabait at may puri, ay mapaniniualaan na ang mangá cailangan nang Gobierno ay madaling matatacpan at magcacaroon nang malaquing rebaja ang mangá contribuciones.

7°. Mag lalagay nang isang malinis, madali at tunay na administracion de justicia na dito ang mangá casalanan pag susumbong nang hindi totoo, pag su hol at pag úlo dahil sa salapi ay lubos na bubunutin ang caugat ugatan.

8°. Pamumulaan ang pag gana nang mangá daan, ferrocarriles at iba pang paraan sa icadadali nang pag paroon parito at pag hacot nang mangá ari at calacal at iba pang mangá obras públicas na maliuanag ang cagalingan sa bayang filipino.

9°. Ang tráfico at comercio sa loob at lahas, ang agricultura at iba pang industriang pagcacaquitaan at icayasaman nang bayan sa cagalingan nang mangá namamayan at siyang lagui nang salagaan at pacacaingatingatan.

10. Mag bubacas naman nang mangá escuelas elementales na pag aaralan nang mangá bata sa bayan. Pag pip litan naman ang mangá icadadaling na uncol para sa mangá lalong mataas na educacion.

11. Reformas ó pagbabago sa lahat nang partamento nang Gobierno, sa lahat nang ramo nang servicio público at sa lahat nang mangá corporaciones na macayuyungyun sa pamumuhay nang bayan ay agad pamumulaan at tatapusin nang maayon sa derecho at sa justicia, na macasia бага sa mangá tapa na pananaing at mangá mahal na hilil at nasa nang biyang filipino.

Ito ang espiritu nang naparitong Estados Unidos sa bayang Filipinas. Ang guinoon Presidente ay binigulan nang instrucciones ang comision nang maipaquilala sa calahatan sa pag alinsunol sa can'u ang ito, ay ninanasa nang comision ihayag ang sari niyang mabuting caloban sa bayang filipino at anyayahan sa boo niyang puso an canivang mangá, pinuno at mangá tauong may representacion na sila, i, magconferencia sa dahalong macaquilala at magcapahayagan nang canilang mangá cais pán.

Manila 4 de april de 1899.

JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN,
Presidente de la Comisión.
GEORGE DEWEY,
Almirante U. S. N.
ELWELL S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.
CHARLES DENBY.
DEAN C. WORCESTER.

JOHN R. MACARTHUR,
Secretario de la Comisión.

the purpose of attracting the attention of the enemy in that position, and holding as large a force in that vicinity as possible to prevent the reenforcement of Calumpit.

As will be observed from the following report, many changes necessarily occurred in the original plan, and the objective was, after the fall of San Miguel, extended to San Isidoro.

To carry out the verbal instructions received from the department commander, the following orders were issued :

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 20. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 19, 1899.

The following named troops of this command will hold themselves in readiness to march on receipt of notice:

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (dismounted).

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Two field guns, Scott's battery (D, Sixth Artillery).

Two mountain guns, Hawthorne's separate battery.

The command will be supplied with ten days' rations, and each man will carry on his person 100 rounds of ammunition, and 100 rounds per man will be taken in reserve. The Quartermaster's Department will furnish the necessary transportation. As transportation is very limited, the command must be equipped in the lightest possible marching order. Nothing whatever will be permitted to be transported except rations and ammunition and the least possible equipment for officers. Wagons must be loaded to 3,000 pounds and carts to 1,500 pounds, exclusive of forage taken for the animals.

The chief quartermaster of the division will temporarily perform the duties of chief commissary of subsistence.

The teams on the march will be under the control of the chief quartermaster and will march in rear of the command in the order which the troops are marched.

The regimental and battalion trains will be in charge of the regimental and battalion quartermasters, or, in case there is no such officer, then a suitable and competent sergeant, who will report to and be under the direction of the chief quartermaster on the march.

Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, is announced as provost-marshal of the expedition, and his squadron will form the provost guard. Straggling, looting, pillaging, burning, or the commission of any unlawful excesses on the part of any member of this command is prohibited, and the provost-marshal will exert himself to prevent the same.

The officers representing the various staff corps on duty at these headquarters will be held responsible that their respective departments are properly equipped and provided for any emergency that may arise on this expedition.

The inspector-general will ascertain by personal investigation that the command is properly equipped and supplied as contemplated in this order.

Communication will be maintained with this command on this expedition by field telegraph. Capt. E. A. McKenna, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, who has been acting as chief signal officer of this division, will take the necessary steps to accomplish this object.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In addition to those mentioned in the above order, the following named organizations were detached from the Second Division for duty with the expedition: Two battalions (Companies F, G, H, M, and C, K, L), Third U. S. Infantry; 2 battalions (Companies A, B, I, L, and F, G, K), Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; 2 battalions (Companies G, K, L, M, and C, D, E, H), Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (mounted), and 1 gun, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery. The battalions of the Third Infantry were camped north of this city near La Loma Church; the other organizations were farther north and in the vicinity of the railway.

It was arranged by the department commander that, with the exception of the battalions of the Third Infantry, the troops from the

second Division would concentrate at Bocaue, and, marching via Santa Maria, make a junction with the main column at or near Norzagaray. Maj. C. G. Starr, inspector-general, U. S. V., was sent, April 21, to Bocaue to conduct that column.

At 5 o'clock p. m., April 21, 1899, the troops mentioned in General Orders, No. 20, current series, these headquarters, given above, were concentrated near La Loma Church, about 4 miles north of Manila, in obedience to verbal instructions conveyed by staff officers, and bivouacked for the night.

The battalions of the Third Infantry, Capt. J. W. Hannay, of that regiment, commanding, were encamped about a mile distant. Captain Hannay reported his command for duty with the expedition, and received verbal instructions to join the column directed to march next morning, as indicated in the following order:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 1. } *In the field, near La Loma Church, Manila, April 21, 1899.*

This command will march at 5 o'clock to-morrow morning, the 22d instant, in the following order:

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, which will constitute the advance guard of this command.

Hawthorne's separate mountain battery.

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

Third U. S. Infantry.

Scott's platoon, Dyer's battery.

Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, which will constitute the rear guard of this command.

The trains will form on the road in the above order, as indicated in General Orders, No. 20, current series, these headquarters under the charge of the chief quartermaster. The rear guard will march in rear of the wagon trains.

No one, other than those authorized, will march with the trains. These authorized persons will be provided with written authority approved by the commanding officer of their regiment.

Under no circumstances will any person be permitted to ride on wagons or carts. Ambulances will march in rear of troops just in advance of the wagon train.

Proper and suitable dispositions will be made by the commanders of advance guards to insure the safety of the command on the march. In column the sharpshooters will be held in readiness to be instantly deployed on either flank in case of attack or alarm.

The march will be in the direction of Novaliches. A staff officer will accompany the advance guard to indicate the road.

The Signal Corps detachment will operate under the instructions of the chief signal officer.

The principles set forth above will obtain on the march until further orders. With the exception of the artillery, which will retain its relative position in column, organizations will advance in column daily, the advance guard of one day forming the rear guard of the day following.

By command of Major-General Lawton.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As reported by their respective commanding officers, the effective strength of the several organizations forming the command at La Loma is as follows:

	Officers.	Men.
Third U. S. Infantry (8 companies)	17	683
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	22	945
Squadron Fourth U. S. Cavalry	3	218
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry (8 companies)	22	453
Scott's platoon (D, Sixth Artillery)	1	32
Hawthorne's separate mountain battery	1	23
Total	66	2,354

At 5 o'clock a. m., April 22, the column formed and marched northward toward Novaliches.

After proceeding about 6 miles a small force of the enemy was encountered. But little resistance was met, the enemy falling back rapidly on the deployment of the first five companies of the North Dakotas. After driving the enemy for about a mile, column was reformed and the march continued. (Appendix, p. 128.)

The enemy in greater force was developed about a mile farther on meeting our advance with a determined resistance, pouring in a fire from both sides of the road. Four companies of the North Dakota were deployed and brought into action, routing the insurgents, who were driven back about 2 miles across the Rio de Tulihan and through Novaliches, which was occupied by our troops about 10 a. m.

Our casualties were 2 enlisted men, First North Dakotas, wounded and several cases of heat prostration. (Appendix, p. 129.)

Considerable difficulty was experienced in crossing the transportation over the river, the north bank of which is solid rock through which no suitable approach to the ford for wagons had ever been constructed.

During the afternoon the pickets of the Twenty-second Infantry on the northeast side of the village were fired on by the enemy, who were intrenched on a hillside near the San Mateo road, about 1,700 yards distant. (Appendix, p. 129.) Scott's artillery platoon was brought into position, and with shell and shrapnel temporarily silenced the enemy (Appendix, p. 130), scattering shots continuing throughout the night.

An ambulance had been telegraphed for to take in the wounded men whose condition was so serious as to prevent their continuing with the expedition. (Appendix, pp. 129, 130.) It arrived about midnight and immediately returned to Manila, reaching there next morning without incident. (Appendix, p. 131.)

It seemed probable that the insurgents who had moved off to the northeast would close in behind us on our advance to the northward next morning and destroy our telegraph line. An additional supply of ammunition would be needed if continued opposition was met along the line of march. Both of these matters were brought to the attention of the department commander, and information received that a detachment would be sent to keep up the telegraph line as long as possible and that additional ammunition would be supplied in a few days. (Appendix, pp. 129, 131.)

The town being entirely deserted by the inhabitants, the troops occupied nipa huts as quarters for the night. Everything of value including rice and other provisions, had been removed before the arrival of our troops.

At 5 o'clock next morning, the 23d instant, the command was again on the move northward, San Jose being the objective point.

Telegraphic instructions were sent Major Starr, at Bocaue, to push his cavalry forward and open communication with the main column when near Norzagaray. (Appendix, p. 130.)

On leaving Novaliches the road which up to that village had been with the exception of the approaches to the ford, passable for wagons and carts, now became a mere footpath. Great difficulty was experienced in moving the wagon train, the "road" leading over a succession of hills and through deep valleys. On the former the troops

and animals were exposed to the burning rays of the sun and in the latter they labored through jungle and mud holes. The trail was rough, and the heat so intense it was necessary to unhitch the carabao on many of the divides and lead them down to the water holes to soak for half an hour, thus greatly impeding the progress of the train. (Appendix, pp. 130, 131, 132, 133).

Headquarters Third and Twenty-second regiments of infantry and Scott's artillery platoon reached the ford crossing the Pasunkambor River, about 2 miles south of San Jose, at 3.30 o'clock p. m., and rested for the night.

The squadron—Fourth Cavalry, Hawthorne's battery, and the North Dakotas, with the wagon train, went into camp about 4 miles in rear; the men and animals being almost completely exhausted. The advance during the day had been without contact with the enemy.

Early next morning, April 24, the Twenty-Second Infantry and Scott's artillery platoon were sent forward, accompanied by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, of the division staff, to reconnoiter the town of San Jose. None of the enemy was encountered and the town was occupied about 8 o'clock a. m. (Appendix, p. 131.)

The Third United States Infantry was posted at the approaches to the ford, where the advance portion of the column had rested the night before, to protect the passage of the transportation.

The remainder of the command, with the wagon train, resumed the advance toward the river. The same conditions (or worse, if possible) as on the day previous continued to impede the progress of the wagon train. Captain Gale, with his dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, furnished the advance guard and convoy of the train, and with his entire command rendered valuable aid assisting in building bridges and making roads. Lieutenant Hawthorne, with his mountain battery detachment, Major George Penrose and Lieutenant Kemp, of the Medical Corps, with their hospital squads and Chinese litter bearers, lent willing hands to overcome what frequently appeared insurmountable obstacles to further progress. But of the North Dakotas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, it is desired to express special appreciation. They exchanged their well-performed duties of advance guard of the day before for the laborious ones of rear guard of the two days necessary to reach Norzagaray. This regiment had orders to leave nothing behind, and literally carried transportation over bad places and put squads of men in the shafts to replace worn out and dead bulls. Every service—even to the use of pick and shovel—was performed by each, from the colonel down to the private, with the same commendable earnestness that has given this regiment its reputation for cheerful and effective accomplishment of any task set it. (Appendix, pp. 131, 132.)

About 1 o'clock p. m., April 24, Lieutenant Boyd with his mounted Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, reached San Jose, bringing information of the arrival of the Bocaue column, under Colonel Summers, at Norzagaray; returning to Norzagaray with his troop the same day. (Appendix, p. 131.)

The wagon train of the main column arrived at San Jose during the night. Both men and animals completely worn out. (Appendix, pp. 131, 132.)

For the movement on the morning of April 25 the following instructions were given :

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Jose, Luzon, April 24, 1899.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR.

The command will be prepared to march as usual to-morrow, the 25th instant, as soon as it is practicable to get the transportation on the road. Each separate command will be accompanied by its transportation and is charged with the assistance and safe conduct of the same.

Captain Gale's squadron of the Fourth Cavalry will accompany the commanding general as escort. With the above exception, the command will move out in the following order :

Third U. S. Infantry, advance guard.

Hawthorne's mountain battery.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Scott's artillery platoon.

Ambulances.

Twenty-second Infantry, rear guard.

Transportation will be carefully inspected and loads reduced to the minimum.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As directed, the column resumed the advance in the morning at the usual hour. The commanding general and staff, accompanied by Troop L, Fourth Cavalry, as escort, moved out without waiting for the column, headquarters arriving at Norzagaray about 12.30 p. m. without incident, the escort coming in about an hour later. (Appendix, p. 132.)

Colonel Summers reported that his column had left Bocaue April 23; that soon after crossing the Rio Guyon at 2.45 p. m. the enemy was encountered by the cavalry, which was in advance; a battalion of the Oregons was deployed and the advance continued, meeting with but slight resistance until the bluffs overlooking Norzagaray were reached; here 2 battalions and the cavalry engaged the enemy until darkness came on, when they rested for the night. On the following morning the enemy was driven out of Norzagaray and across the river, the town being occupied about 7 a. m.

Our casualties: Three enlisted men, Thirteenth Minnesota, and 1 enlisted man, Fourth Cavalry, wounded; 1 horse killed. (Appendix, pp. 132, 133.) He had then sent a battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota down the river toward Angat to reconnoiter the road in that direction. (Appendix, p. 133.) Captain Heath's battalion, Second Oregon, and Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, were sent toward San Jose to open communication with the main column. (Appendix, p. 134.)

Major Eastwick's battalion of the Second Oregon, Captain Spear's battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota, and detachment of Utah Volunteer Light Artillery left Norzagaray about 6 o'clock the morning of the 25th and advanced toward Angat. The enemy was encountered in considerable force. After a spirited engagement, during which the artillery was brought into action, the insurgents evacuated the town and took up a position across the river, the fire from which was silenced; a portion of the town was burned, and the troops returned to Norzagaray. Casualties: One enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, wounded. (Appendix, pp. 136, 142.)

While the engagement at Angat was in progress troops in camp at Norzagaray were fired on by the enemy from across the river; this

kept up for some time, but was finally silenced. (Appendix, pp. 136, 138.)

The effective strength of the Bocaue column was as follows :

	Officers.	Men.
Troop I, Fourth Cavalry	1	68
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.....	24	561
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry	25	490
Detachment Utah Volunteer Light Artillery		15
Total.....	50	1,129

which, with the main column, gave a grand total of 116 officers and 4,473 men.

April 26 the Third and Twenty-second Infantry, the First North Dakota, and Hawthorne's mountain battery were put into camp at Angat. (Appendix, p. 136.)

The following orders were issued reorganizing the troops from the Second Division (Bocaue column):

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 2. } Norzagaray, Luzon, April 26, 1899.

(1) The First and Second battalions, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and the Second and Third battalions, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, having reported at these headquarters in obedience to Field Orders, No. 21, headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, April 20, 1899, are constituted a provisional brigade.

(2) Colonel Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to command the provisional brigade, constituted in the preceding paragraph.

(3) Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, having reported at these headquarters in compliance with verbal instructions from the commanding general Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, will report for duty under the immediate direction of the division commander.

(4) The section of the Utah Volunteer light artillery which reported at these headquarters in compliance with verbal instructions from the commanding general Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, is attached to Scott's platoon, Battery D, Sixth Artillery. The section commander will accordingly report without delay.

(5) Commanding officers will frequently inspect their transportation and keep the loads at the minimum.

(6) In view of the small amount of ammunition with the command, every precaution will be taken to prevent its unnecessary use.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

April 26 the mounted troop was sent on reconnoissance along the west bank of river, and about 2 miles west from Angat, toward Marunco, encountered the enemy in force, reported to be about 500, 200 being actually counted by Captain Birkhimer, of the division staff. (Appendix, p. 133.) At the same time one battalion of the Oregons under Major Eastwick forded the river just above Norzagaray and drove the enemy from the country opposite Marunco. Major Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of 6 or 7 killed and 9 prisoners captured. (Appendix, pp. 138, 142, 149.)

On the morning of April 27 the troops at Norzagaray, with the exception of Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, moved down the left bank of the river to Angat and went into camp at that point, except Colonel Summers's brigade, which continued down the river and went into camp at Marunco. (Appendix, p. 142.)

On the report of Lieutenant Boyd that the enemy was trying to cross the river at Norzagaray, 2 companies of the Twenty-second Infantry were sent from Angat to that point April 27. (Appendix, pp. 140, 189, 190, 192.)

April 28, Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer of the expedition (Appendix, p. 142), escorted by one battalion each of the Oregon and Minnesota regiments, commanded by Major Diggles, made a reconnaissance north from Angat for the purpose of locating any roads or trails leading in that direction. The enemy was developed in small force, but was soon dispersed by a flank movement. The party then returned to Marunco, having failed to find a road of any description other than a narrow sled path. (Appendix, p. 142.)

Telegraphic communication was established with Manila, via Bocaue, April 28, and the occupation of Marunco reported to the adjutant-general of the department, as was also a contemplated movement on San Rafael, to take place the day following. (Appendix, p. 144.) For this movement two columns were organized: One, consisting of the Provisional Brigade and Hawthorne's mountain battery, under command of Colonel Summers, to move down the right bank of the river and occupy San Rafael; (Appendix, p. 144); the other, consisting of the First North Dakota, Third United States Infantry, and Scott's artillery platoon, to move down the left bank, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, to support Colonel Summers. (Appendix, p. 144.) Early next morning, April 29, instructions were given for this movement as indicated (Appendix, p. 145); and at 4.33 a. m. the adjutant-general of the department was informed that the movement on San Rafael had commenced; that if hostilities were to cease telegraphic notice should be given at once. (Appendix, p. 145.)

The troops which did not participate in the movement on San Rafael remained at their camps at Angat and Norzagaray, under the command of Maj. L. Parker, Twenty-second Infantry. (Appendix, p. 147.) The transportation of the participating organizations was left behind with suitable guard detachments in readiness to be promptly brought forward if ordered. (Appendix, p. 146.)

After waiting a reasonable time for instructions from department headquarters, the division commander and staff proceeded down the left bank of the river and joined Colonel Treumann's column, which, later, developed the enemy, estimated to be about 300 strong, just before reaching a point opposite San Rafael. (Appendix, p. 148.) After about one hour's spirited engagement, during which the enemy had been driven some distance, telegraphic instructions were received from the department commander that the command remain at Angat until it receive its supplies. (Appendix, p. 147.) This telegram had been received at Angat at 9.08 a. m. and hurriedly brought forward by mounted courier. Reply was immediately sent that the intention to move on San Rafael had been telegraphed the night before; that notice of the commencement of the movement had been given that morning; that the command would return to Angat as directed; and that the possibility of encamping our advance near San Rafael had been considered. A brief account of the operations of the morning was also given. (Appendix, p. 147.) Verbal instructions for the return to Angat were at once given Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann and sent Colonel Summers, of whom nothing had as yet been heard. The

former had dispersed the enemy, inflicting some loss, although but 1 killed fell into our hands, with him his rifle and 86 rounds of ammunition. Our casualties were Second Lieut. C. C. Todd, Third Infantry, slight gunshot wound, right thigh; 2 enlisted men, Third Infantry, and 1 First North Dakota, wounded, the latter seriously. (Appendix, p. 148.)

Colonel Summers's column on the right bank of the river had advanced to and occupied San Rafael without meeting opposition. (Appendix, p. 147.) As ordered, this command, as well as that which had driven the enemy down the left bank, returned to the camps of the night previous (Appendix, p. 148), necessarily permitting the enemy to reoccupy San Rafael should he so desire.

During the morning of April 29 a telegram was received from the adjutant-general of the department informing that rations would be sent from Bocaue Sunday morning, April 30; that representatives of the insurgent army were in Manila, and that everything would "be peaceful, at least while they are in our lines;" also, that the orders to advance on San Miguel might be changed. (Appendix, pp. 146, 148.) Reply was made that rations would be received at Angat, and receipt of information concerning peaceful conditions and possible change of objective acknowledged. (Appendix, p. 148.)

Later in the day, after the return of all of the troops to their original positions, a telegram was received from the adjutant-general of the department, stating that it was not necessary the "entire force should return, but sufficient of it to insure safety of train" and return of escort from Angat; that the armistice requested by the insurgents had not been granted; and that on moving, our next objective would be Baliuag, "where a considerable force" of the enemy was reported to be. (Appendix, p. 148.)

With the exception of the escort and wagons which were sent to Bocaue to bring up supplies (Appendix, p. 147), the command remained in camp, the Provisional Brigade at Marunco, near Angat; Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, at Norzagaray, headquarters; and the remainder of the expedition at Angat, April 30.

A detachment of scouts was organized consisting of 25 specially qualified enlisted men, selected from organizations in the command (Appendix, p. 150), and an experienced civilian scout (Mr. W. H. Young) was employed as chief scout (Appendix, p. 149) and placed in charge (Appendix, p. 153).

On the morning of May 1, Troop I, Fourth United States Cavalry, was ordered to join the command at Angat (Appendix, p. 151), and, with a view to resuming the forward movement at the earliest possible moment, the following orders were issued:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }	HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 4.	<i>In the Field, Angat, Luzon, May 1, 1899.</i>

If practicable, this command will move to-day as soon as the issue of rations is completed.

The order of march will be as follows:

Provisional Brigade (Colonel Summers commanding);

Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry;

Mounted troop of cavalry; and

Scott's battery will cross the river at a suitable ford and proceed, if possible, down the north bank to San Rafael, where they will encamp for the night.

The commanding officer Third Infantry will report his command to Colonel Summers and march under his instructions.

The mounted troop will accompany the major-general commanding.

The issue of rations will be made to Colonel Summers's column first, to enable it to commence the crossing as soon as possible of its transportation.

The First North Dakota, Twenty-second Infantry, and Hawthorne's battery will proceed down the south bank of the river under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann (the commanding officer Twenty-second Infantry and battery reporting to Lieutenant-Colonel Truemann) to a point near or beyond where the last skirmish occurred. Maj. C. C. Starr, inspector-general, will accompany this column, representing the major-general.

A detachment of mounted cavalry will report to Major Starr to be used in maintaining communication with the column on the north bank.

A party of scouts specially detailed from these headquarters will precede each column to the point indicated; but this will not relieve the commanding officer of each column from the responsibility for the proper precaution on the march.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Colonel Summers was directed to send to Angat at once for rations, and to then commence crossing the river. Before noon his command was moving across and down the river (Appendix, pp. 149, 153); and by 3 p. m. Lieutenant Colonel Treumann's command had received its rations and was advancing down the left or south bank of the river as ordered. (Appendix, p. 154.)

About 2 miles below the Marunco Ford Colonel Summers's scouts and advance guard were fired on by sharpshooters, who were speedily dislodged and silenced. (Appendix, p. 156.) When within a mile and a quarter of San Rafael, 2 of the scouts developed a force of the enemy about 200 strong, which they drove back toward the main body on a ridge to the right and rear of the town (Appendix, p. 156), and held them in check until Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran came up with 2 battalions of the Second Oregon and forced the enemy back through the town, across the river, and into the jungle on the opposite bank. The remainder of Colonel Summers's column continued on the road along the river and entered the town about the same time as Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran's detachment. The enemy opened a heavy fire on the town from the thickets across the river; Scott's artillery was brought into position by the division commander, within easy rifle range, and by a well-directed fire dispersed the enemy, the column on the south bank cooperating. Our casualties were: 1 enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, killed; 1 enlisted man, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, and 3 enlisted men, Second Oregon, wounded. (Appendix, pp. 156, 157.) The enemy, whose strength was estimated at 1,000, must have suffered many casualties although none fell into our hands. (Appendix, p. 157.)

The troops on the right bank of the river rested in the town that night; the other column bivouacked on the opposite side of the river. The adjutant-general of the corps was informed by telegraph of the result of the day's operations; that the forward movement would be resumed at 5 o'clock next morning (May 2), and that resistance was expected from there on. (Appendix, p. 157.)

Both columns took up the advance down the river next morning as planned, the column marching along the left bank under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann meeting opposition about 1 mile above Bustos, drove the enemy, and occupied the town without casualty (Appendix, p. 157); shortly afterwards the scouts crossed the river to Baliuag and announced their arrival by ringing the cathedral bells at 12 noon. (Appendix, pp. 156 and 157.)

The command on the right bank, under Colonel Summers, met the

enemy about 2 miles out from San Rafael, skirmished, driving them for more than 2 miles, when both troops and noncombatants were seen fleeing in great confusion along the road to San Miguel and other roads to the west and northwest. Owing to the great number of women and children, and what appeared to be wounded men being carried on litters, our fire ceased and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping it might assure them of safety. Capt. J. F. Case, of the division staff, Sergt. Maj. J. W. Marshall, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and Private Edmund Schutehaus, jr., Company A, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, flag orderly, conducted the flag toward these people until when within 500 yards the detachment was fired upon and returned to our lines. (Appendix, pp. 146, 157, 158, 161.) Colonel Summers's command was then deployed and an effort made to surround and cut off the fugitives, but they scattered in the wildest confusion. (Appendix, p. 157.) Captain Gale was sent with his dismounted squadron and mounted troop along the San Miguel road for the purpose of cutting off those who were attempting to escape in that direction. After proceeding about 3 miles the enemy opened fire from the front; 2 troops were deployed and moved forward rapidly on either side of the road, skirmishing with what seemed to be the rear guard of the enemy, until 35 of our men fell from heat exhaustion, 8 of them in a comatose condition. The pursuit was discontinued, and the command proceeded 'cross country to the left and entered Baliuag from the north without further incident.

In the operations of May 2, during which Gen. Gregorio del Pilar's division was routed and the important cities of Baliuag and Bustos occupied by our forces, the column on both sides of the river were engaged, yet our casualties were only 2 enlisted men, Third Infantry, wounded. (Appendix, p. 157.)

The effective work of the scouts since their organization was reported to the adjutant-general of the department, as well as the intention to send them to look up the enemy above mentioned as engaged in "concentrating storehouses." Also, permission was requested to send Colonel Summers forward on the San Miguel road to the Maasin River crossing that night or the following morning. The exaggerated strength of the enemy was pointed out, as well as his demoralized and disintegrating condition and failure, thus far, to offer determined or effective resistance. The impracticability of the country for vehicles off the roads on account of the daily rains was also reported. (Appendix, pp. 157 and 164.)

In reply authority was given to send Colonel Summers forward as proposed, provided he was "strong enough to take care of himself," and instructions were given to search for and destroy subsistence stores which the enemy was sending into the Maasin country. (Appendix, pp. 164, 166.)

Accordingly the following orders were issued;

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }	HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 5. }	<i>In the field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 3, 1899.</i>

The following named troops, fully equipped, under command of Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, will proceed as early as practicable to-morrow morning, the 4th instant, on the San Miguel road as far as Maasin and occupy that town:

Provisional brigade.

Third U. S. Infantry (First and Second Battalions) and the section Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.

The artillery and infantry organizations will be immediately reported to Colonel Summers by their respective commanding officers.

The chief signal officer will make the necessary arrangements for telegraphic communication with this column.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 3, 1899.

Col. OWEN SUMMERS,

Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Expedition to Maasin.

COLONEL: With reference to General Field Orders, No. 5, current series, these headquarters, the major-general commanding directs me to inform you the corps commander is assured that subsistence belonging to the insurgent army is being sent into the country of Maasin for future use. You will let scouting parties, of sufficient size to insure safety, find and destroy subsistence belonging to insurgent army, respecting private property and reporting amount destroyed.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Telegraphic communication, via Quingua and Malolos, was now established, and, in compliance with telegraphic instructions from department headquarters (Appendix, p. 162), a company of infantry was sent to the former place for the purpose set forth in the following orders:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 6.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

One company of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, to be designated by the commanding officer of that regiment, will this morning proceed to and occupy the town of Quingua.

The commanding officer of that company, upon arrival at that point, is charged with keeping open the road from this town and preventing interference with the rail road from the north.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The detachment of scouts which had been sent out on the San Miguel road encountered the enemy, at least 200 strong, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, some 3 miles out from Baliuag. They attacked and routed the enemy, and the mounted troop, which had been sent out as a reinforcement, took up the pursuit, which continued until darkness came on. There were no casualties on our side. (Appendix, p. 164.)

Colonel Summers, with his provisional brigade, the two battalions Third Infantry, and the Utah gun, left Baliuag en route to Maasin early May 4. (Appendix, pp. 161 and 167.) No opposition was met until the advance arrived at the river opposite Maasin, when the enemy, about 400 strong, opened fire from intrenchments on the Maasin side of the river. Colonel Summers deployed his command, crossed the river under fire, charged and carried the intrenchments and drove the enemy beyond the town, which he occupied. Our casualties were Capt. P. S. Heath, Second Oregon, slight wound of leg, and 2 enlisted men, Thirteenth Minnesota, severely wounded. The enemy left 4 killed on the field. (Appendix, pp. 167, 187.)

The scouts were sent out in the afternoon with instructions to find and destroy all supplies of the enemy in the country to the northeast between San Rafael road and Maasin River. They were cautioned to respect the persons and property of noncombatants, to conceal their

movements as much as possible, and avoid assuming the offensive against the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 166 and 167.) Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, was sent up the river toward the foothills of the mountains with verbal instructions to the same effect.

During the day, May 4, the wagon train left for Malolos to bring out supplies which would arrive there the day following; it was accompanied by the sick and wounded in ambulances. (Appendix, pp. 166, 176, 177.)

Much annoyance was caused by the Chinese coolies, furnished by the quartermaster department as litter bearers and laborers, wandering from the organizations to which they were attached and committing many minor depredations, necessitating the issue of the following orders:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } No. 7.	HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, <i>In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.</i>
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Hereafter each Chinese cooly with this command will be required to wear upon his hat, or other conspicuous part of his clothing, a tag which will be legibly marked in English the name of the organization to which the wearer is assigned or belongs.

Commencing to-morrow, the 5th instant, all such camp followers found without the identification tag above required will be arrested and turned over to the provost guard.

No cooly wearing such an identification tag will be required to perform labor for individuals or organizations than that to which he is assigned or belongs, and no unauthorized person will, in any way, interfere with any Chinaman not misconducting himself.

Commanding officers of organizations are charged with the prompt execution of the above orders, and will be held strictly accountable for the conduct of the coolies assigned or belonging to their respective commands.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Large quantities of rice and sugar were found in Baliuag, much of it in storehouses said to belong to the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 165, 169.) A conservative estimate of the contents of storehouses not manifestly private was no less than 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar, which, with the quantities not included, but none the less available, would undoubtedly be sufficient to subsist all troops of the enemy for at least six months. (Appendix, p. 170.) A large storehouse of the tax collector was opened and the contents issued to the natives, who claimed to have been robbed of their rice by the insurgents and were now in a famishing condition. (Appendix, p. 170.) Under the careful supervision of the provost-marshal this distribution was continued at the suggestion of the department commander to families residing at Baliuag and vicinity. (Appendix, p. 169.)

Telegraphic information was received from the palace (department headquarters) May 6 that it was reported Generals Geronimo, who had 3,000 troops in the vicinity of San Mateo, and Pio del Pilar, with about 2,000 in and around Antipolo, had received instructions from Aguinaldo to proceed with their united forces by a mountain road to Norzagaray, thence via Angat, San Rafael, and Bustos, for the purpose of cutting off our lines of communication and supplies, which was supposed to be by Angat, then to attack our flank. Caution was made to watch well by scouting parties the country to the east. (Appendix, pp. 161, 178.) Reply was immediately made that the company of North Dakotas escorting the party taking up telegraph line via Angat would be warned to watch for the enemy; that the mounted troop now east of

San Rafael and Maasin would be pushed farther east, and that Colonel Summers, at Maasin, would be notified to watch the enemy's movements (Appendix, pp. 178, 187), and later that the mounted troop would be on the hills southeast of Norzagaray, where the country could be observed for miles; also that three companies would be at San Rafael next morning. The department commander's views as to the situation and wishes regarding movement of the expedition were requested, as well as permission to have Colonel Summers drive the enemy from San Ildefonso, and threaten San Miguel. (Appendix, p. 179.) To this the adjutant-general of the department replied that it was "not prudent to advance Summers north until the reported movement of insurgents from south develops," and that his command should be held in readiness to unite with the troops at Baliuag to crush the enemy should he appear in force. (Appendix, p. 180.)

Since the occupation of Baliuag by our forces large numbers of the inhabitants had returned, and on May 6 verbal permission was given them to hold a meeting in the public square, or plaza, for the purpose of electing a capitan municipal, or mayor, to administer the civil affairs of the town and represent its interest in connection with the military forces occupying it. The result of this election was announced in the following orders, which were published in English, Spanish, and Tagalog:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 8. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899.

For the purpose of official and just representation of the inhabitants of this town with the military authorities, as well as for temporary convenience in restoring and maintaining order among the former, the citizens were authorized to meet and elect a mayor (capitan municipal). The result of such meeting has been the election of Señor Francisco Guerrero, who is therefore announced as mayor, and authorized to select a council and such other assistants or officers as may be necessary to properly administer municipal affairs. He will be accordingly respected and obeyed.

The United States will in no way be held accountable or responsible for any salaries or compensation.

By command of Major-General Lawton.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

This mayor of Baliuag was the first native official, by virtue of election by his peers, holding office in these islands under the jurisdiction of the United States.

While the command was held waiting for the movement of the enemy from the south to develop (Appendix, p. 167) preparations were made for the advance toward San Miguel. It was learned by reconnoissance that the enemy, when driven out of Maasin, had fallen back to San Ildefonso and was intrenching along a ridge about 1,800 yards south of that town. (Appendix, pp. 175, 181, 190.) The engineer officer went to Maasin on May 8, and with one company each from the Minnesotas and Oregons reconnoitered and sketched the enemy's position. (Appendix, pp. 187, 191.) During the reconnoissance Maj. A. M. Diggles, Thirteenth Minnesota, was mortally wounded. (Appendix, pp. 187 and 191.) Nothing remained to be done by the force at Maasin beyond keeping the enemy well under observation and the command in readiness to attack when ordered until authority to advance could be obtained from department headquarters. (Appendix, p. 192.)

Parties sent out from Maasin and the scouts found and destroyed more than 100,000 bushels of rice, large quantities of corn and sugar, also reloading tools and uniforms. (Appendix, pp. 175, 201, 202.)

Early May 9 Capt. H. C. Hodges, with Companies B, C, H, and L, Twenty-second Infantry, made a reconnoissance along the roads leading from Beliuag toward San Luis and Candaba without finding any signs of the enemy, all natives seeming to be engaged in peaceful pursuits. (Appendix, pp. 192 and 193.)

In a telegram to the adjutant-general of the department on the morning of May 9 it was suggested that the scouting east of Norzagaray would clear up the situation in that direction, and permission was asked to call in the troops which had been engaged the last three days in a fruitless search for the Antipolo and San Mateo columns, stating that the expedition would "then be ready to move immediately in any direction." (Appendix, p. 189.) To this reply was received authorizing the withdrawal of the scouting parties, but making no reference to the implied request for orders to advance (Appendix, p. 189), the remark in a telegram of the day previous, "You will hardly be able to make any decided move until MacArthur gets in condition" (Appendix, p. 188), remaining the latest from department headquarters on this most interesting subject. Next morning a telegram was sent the adjutant-general of the department asking if further instructions were to be waited for before moving (Appendix, p. 193), to which he replied in the affirmative, stating that "Certain information which we are expecting is important before directing further operations." (Appendix, p. 193.)

May 11 telegraphic instructions were received that the expedition should be prepared for a movement on the following Monday (May 14) and should be rationed to include May 25. Information was given at the same time to the effect that a battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry would be sent on the morning of May 12 to join the expedition; that the gunboats (on the Rio Grande de la Pampanga) (Appendix, pp. 194, 198, 199, 200) and General MacArthur (commanding Second Division at San Fernando) should be ready to advance at the same time (May 12), MacArthur by Mexico and Candaba, making a junction with this expedition at San Miguel, if necessary, from which point its movement would be in a westerly direction. (Appendix, p. 200.) On the day following this plan for a concerted movement was changed, the adjutant-general of the department stating in a telegram of that date, "General MacArthur thinks he can not move successfully via Mexico and Candaba," and that it was in contemplation sending the entire Seventeenth Infantry, 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry, and part of Light Battery E (Andrews's), First Artillery, equipped with 3 mountain Hotchkiss guns, "to move as an independent column on Candaba, with aid of gunboats," which column would join the main expedition at San Miguel, or with which the expedition could later join on the river south of San Isidro. (Appendix, p. 206.) This column was organized, moving up the river, and was joined by the expedition south of San Isidro according to plan, as will appear later.

On account of a rumor that the enemy at San Miguel had been greatly reenforced (Appendix, p. 194) the scouts were sent to report to Colonel Summers at Maasin. He was directed to have them search for a road to the east of San Ildefonso which was supposed to lead into the main road north of that point and secure all the information possible as to the location and strength of the enemy. (Appendix, p. 194.)

Captains Birkhimer and Case, of the division staff, were ordered to proceed to Maasin May 12 to thoroughly acquaint themselves with and reconnoiter the enemy's position with a view to the future operations of the command. They were instructed to confer with the commanding officer at Maasin, requesting the necessary assistance, including the use of the scouts. (Appendix, p. 199.) Additional instructions were given Captain Birkhimer, verbally, to locate positions from which field artillery could be used with advantage and to examine the road passing to the east of San Ildefonso into the main road north of that place. (Appendix, p. 203.) When these staff officers arrived they found the scouts examining the enemy's position at San Ildefonso and drawing therefrom considerable fire, to which they returned only an occasional shot when a good target presented itself. Two companies (84 men) Second Oregons, under Major Eastwick, were secured as support, and, withdrawing the scouts to be used as escort, Captain Birkhimer reconnoitered the enemy's front, Captain Case meanwhile sketching the position. As they approached the enemy's left the scouts were subjected to a hot fire, the support having been sent by a circuitous route, under cover, leaving only the staff officers and scouts, about 20 men in all, to be seen by the enemy. The fire came from a knoll which commanded the adjacent country, particularly that over which the scouts were advancing. Without hesitation these few men charged and drove the enemy from the knoll, back onto his main line, and occupied the position, waiting the arrival of the support for which Captain Case had gone. While in this position the scouts (one being wounded) were under a heavy fire, delivered with great precision over previously measured and marked ranges. By effective marksmanship the enemy was held in check until the support could come up, when their fire immediately lessened. The scouts were replaced on the knoll by an equal number from the support to prevent any untoward movement of the enemy in that direction, and the reconnoissance resumed.

On a point due east of San Ildefonso the enemy could be seen withdrawing in haste toward San Miguel. Parties could also be seen moving independently to the northeast. From a hilltop, commanding a view of both San Ildefonso and San Miguel, it could be seen that the enemy had evacuated the former.

It was now shortly after 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The command, scarcely 100 strong, was concentrated at the front, and after a few minutes' rest continued the reconnoissance toward San Miguel. In doing so the enemy was forced back to the vicinity of that city, losing several in killed and wounded while skirmishing. Returning as far as San Ildefonso, Captain Birkhimer forwarded a brief report of the day's operations and stated that that point was then held by our forces. (Appendix, pp. 181, 204.) The report was repeated to the adjutant-general of the department, with remark that a reconnoissance had been ordered that morning, but without intention of advance making attack. (Appendix, p. 204.)

Captain Birkhimer was instructed to have the scouts "keep in touch with the enemy and open communication with them if possible," exercising caution to avoid capture or harm. (Appendix, p. 204.) Later, Colonel Summers reported the occupation of San Ildefonso by a battalion of his command, and the presence of the enemy 3 miles beyond that point. (Appendix, p. 206.) A telegram was sent the adjutant-

general of the department that the Oregons and Minnesotas would be ordered to occupy San Ildefonso, the Third Infantry (8 companies) remaining at Maasin. (Appendix, p. 208.) Nothing to the contrary being received from higher authority, Colonel Summers was directed to make the above disposition of his command and to keep the enemy well under observation. (Appendix, p. 208.)

During the day's operations many wounded were seen being carried to the rear, among them, as was afterward learned, a captain and a lieutenant. Four killed and 6 wounded were found on the field. (Appendix, p. 204.)

Almost immediately after the occupation of San Ildefonso an insurgent officer entered our lines under a flag of truce and presented a communication from General Gregorio del Pilar, requesting that a safe-conduct to Manila be granted a Filipino commission authorized to arrange terms of peace. (Appendix, pp. 206, 207.) In accordance with instructions from department headquarters (appendix, p. 207) he was sent in to Manila, Capt. Robert Sewell, aid de camp, accompanying. After a short conference with the department commander he returned to Baliuag, and from there outside our lines, bearing with him a letter to General Pilar from the division commander promising safe-conduct to and from Manila for the proposed commission. (Appendix, pp. 206, 207, 216, 217.)

In acknowledgment of the dispatch regarding the Candaba column (see p. 209, *supra*), and with reference to the enemy's peace advances, an entire lack of faith was expressed in the propositions to discuss terms of peace, which were believed to be only a scheme of the enemy for time to gather supplies, strengthen positions, and bring us into the rainy season. It was pointed out to the adjutant-general of the department that already the fields were partly covered with water, and that twenty-four hours' rain would render travel with transportation impossible. Immediate resumption of operations under the then favorable weather conditions was urged, the opinion being offered that from experience the enemy was not believed to be in very great force nor disposed to show much pertinacity. The necessity for a good interpreter and for maps of the country north of San Miguel was also stated. (Appendix, p. 209.) To this, reply was received that it was contemplated putting Major Kobbé, Third Artillery, in command of the column to move along the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and that "your advance must be postponed a day or two to get troops in position." (Appendix, p. 209.)

Captain Birkhimer, with the scouts, only 18 of whom were able to march after the fatiguing work of the preceding day, moved out from San Ildefonso toward San Miguel at an early hour, May 13, to carry out the original instructions to examine the enemy's position, and, their later orders, to keep in touch with the enemy. To secure unity of action (appendix, p. 212), Captain Case accompanied the support, which consisted of one company each of the Minnesotas and Oregons, under command of Capt. P. S. Heath, of the latter regiment. Advancing northward neither opposition nor considerable parties of the enemy were encountered until when, within about a mile of San Miguel, the scouts in skirmish line entered a thicket and were met by volleys from a force of no less than 300 of the enemy lying behind rice-field dykes, about 100 yards distant, and right and left flanks resting, respectively, upon the steep bank of a large stream and behind a dense thicket.

Captain Case brought the support forward promptly in extended order, but before it could come up and engage, the 12 scouts on the left of the center, encouraged by two of their number (Chief Scout Young and Private Harrington), under the direct supervision of Captain Birkhimer, broke from the bushes which temporarily concealed them and charged straight across the open for the right center of the enemy's line, which wavered, broke, and, carrying with it the flanks, precipitately fled before the scouts could reach it. The enemy on reaching the buildings in the outskirts of the city fired from behind houses and other cover. Being driven rapidly eastward through the town, part took a northerly direction toward San Isidro, another part went southeast in the direction of Biacnabato, and, as usual, many small parties moved off independently in other directions. Just before reaching the bridge, which crosses the river near the center of the city, while pursuing the enemy, Chief Scout Young received a severe wound through the right knee. Although given every attention, and receiving the most skillful treatment the hospitals of Manila could afford, the wound resulted fatally. (Appendix, pp. 212, 214, 215, 216, 222, 226, 227, 230, 231, 239.) In the disabling and death of this man the expedition and the service lost an ideal chief of scouts.

Having driven the enemy from the city, immediate disposition of the command (116 men) was made to hold it until reinforcements could arrive, and dispatches were sent informing the division commander of the result of the morning's reconnoissance. (Appendix, p. 212.)

The adjutant-general of the department was informed of the capture of San Miguel (appendix, p. 212), and Colonel Summers was instructed to send a battalion at once to occupy it. (Appendix, p. 213.)

The expedition, which was still (May 13) being held at Baliuag, waiting for supplies, reinforcements, and what had been most frequently requested, and was most desired, viz, orders to advance, thus reached its objective—San Miguel, as a result of two reconnoissances by less than a score of picked men supported on both occasions by less than a full company of infantry. Captain Birkhimer and the following-named 11 surviving scouts, who so gallantly charged and routed the enemy at San Miguel, have been recommended for Congressional medals of honor:

Private Eli L. Watkins, Troop C, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Private S. Harris, Troop G, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Private Peter McQuinn,¹ Troop L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Corpl. F. L. Andres, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private J. McIntyre, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private G. Jensen, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private W. H. Downs, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private P. Hussey, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private F. Summerfield, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private E. Lyon, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

Private J. Harrington, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

The wounding of Chief Scout Young and one of his detachment comprised our casualties in the operations of the day. Three of the enemy's dead were found on the field. (Appendix, p. 212.)

Later, Colonel Summers's entire command was moved forward to San Miguel, with the exception of four companies of the Third Infantry, two of which remained at Maasin and two at San Ildefonso. (Appendix, pp. 213, 216.)

¹ Peter Quinn.

The payment of \$30 Mexican for each serviceable rifle surrendered by disbanded detachments of the insurgent army or others was authorized in a telegram of May 13 from the adjutant-general of the department (Appendix, pp. 210, 211). Immediate announcement was made to the command, and, in Spanish and Tagalog, to the native population, every effort being made to get the information within the enemy's lines (Appendix, p. 210). Measures were taken to provide for prompt payments (Appendix, pp. 210, 211, 212, 213).

May 13, in reply to a telegram saying the expedition would move as soon as rations, then en route, were distributed (Appendix, p. 214), the adjutant-general of the department stated, "It is thought that the time for your advance can be fixed this evening (Appendix, p. 215)." The matter of the size of the detachment to be left at Baliuag on the advance of the expedition was also touched on in this telegram.

That point possessed great strategic importance. Seven main roads converged there; it was the market center for a large territory, and had a considerable present population who professed friendliness to and desired the protection of our Government. Also, our line of communication, for a time at least, would be via Baliuag and Malolos, and unless protected would be speedily cut. As a result of telegraphic correspondence on the subject, it was finally decided to leave a battalion at Baliuag (Appendix, pp. 217, 218, 220, 221, 224).

The company at Quingua was ordered to Baliuag May 14 (Appendix, p. 220), a garrison for that point having been supplied from another command (Appendix, p. 220).

About 9 a. m. the adjutant-general of the department was informed by telegram that all supplies for the expedition would arrive and be distributed that day; that the command could not move that afternoon, and that, unless otherwise instructed, headquarters would proceed to San Miguel at noon that day. (Appendix, p. 218.)

Reply was received inquiring whether the 3.2-inch gun from General MacArthur's command and the two companies Third Infantry from Calumpit, which had been ordered to join the expedition at Baliuag (Appendix, pp. 218, 219, 220), had yet arrived, and stating, "Commanding general directs that you hold your forces in readiness to move, but do not move till ordered from here." (Appendix, p. 218.) Reply was made acknowledging receipt of orders to hold the force in readiness to move, and inquiring if it was desired that headquarters be held at Baliuag until further orders (Appendix, p. 218); and that the artillery and companies of the Third Infantry had not yet arrived, but, having left Calumpit at noon the day previous, they should arrive at any moment. (Appendix, p. 219.) A telegram was later received from the adjutant-general of the department authorizing an advance as soon as the artillery, companies Third Infantry, and transportation reached Baliuag. It also stated that Major Kobbé was preparing the column to proceed up the Rio Grande, but could not move before Tuesday (May 15); that he was placed under the supervision of the commanding general of this expedition, but that all orders organizing the column and directing Major Kobbé's advance on Candaba would be given from department headquarters. (Appendix, p. 217.) These instructions regarding the Candaba column were repeated to Major Kobbé (Appendix, p. 224) on his reporting to the expedition commander. (Appendix, p. 220.)

Companies E and I, Third Infantry, First Lieut. H. Freeland commanding, and one 3.2-inch gun, light battery D (Dyer's) Sixth Artillery, joined at Baliuag during the afternoon, from the second division at Calumpit. (Appendix, pp. 218, 219.)

Under authority granted by the department commander in the telegram quoted above (Appendix, p. 218), verbal orders were given in the afternoon of May 14 for the command to advance from Baliuag to San Miguel next morning, leaving a battalion Twenty-second Infantry behind to garrison the former. (Appendix, pp. 221, 224.) The movement commenced at the usual hour on the morning of May 15, headquarters being joined at Maasin by its escort, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, which had the day previous arrived at that place from a scout north and east of San Rafael. (Appendix, pp. 225, 226, 231.) As the column passed through Maasin and San Ildefonso it was joined by the companies of the Third Infantry left at those points by Colonel Summers on his advance. The march to San Miguel was without incident. Headquarters arrived there about 10 o'clock a. m. in advance of the column, the rear of which came up the next morning.

In reporting arrival of headquarters at San Miguel (Appendix, p. 231), San Isidro was naturally assumed as the next objective, and plans were suggested, based on recent information, for the movement of columns to the north and east, one to go forward that afternoon along the San Isidro road, across which it was reported a small force of the enemy had thrown up intrenchments about 2 miles out (Appendix, p. 231); another column to reconnoiter Sibul and Biacnabato and the country to the northeast. It was also stated that if the gunboats and Kobbé's column could go as far up as Arayat he could probably be met there. The enemy was reported as demoralized, discouraged, and disintegrating, and the opinion was offered that much force or opposition need not be anticipated at San Isidro. (Appendix, pp. 231, 232.)

In reply to the above telegram (Appendix, p. 231) San Isidro was named as the next objective, unless the progress of the expedition were so impeded by the enemy as to render it probable that the subsistence would give out, in which case a road to the Rio Grande should be sought and an effort made to communicate with Kobbe's column and the gunboats, where rations could be found. Caution was given to watch to the right, stating, "It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato; report not verified." (Appendix, p. 232.) In acknowledging receipt of the message specifying the next objective, the following was sent the adjutant-general of the department: "Am rationed to include the 26th instant and find troops have some savings. Have also along extra coffee and sugar. Can on a pinch get along till end of month. Continued rains would block me; perhaps the enemy may. So far they have shown no alarming strength. My men are in good spirits and will run over anything confronting them." "Will reconnoiter to the east in the morning as indicated. Summers will move on toward San Isidro; will be supported by French." (Appendix, p. 232.) The command was cautioned to exercise all economy in the use of rations and ammunition. (Appendix, p. 234.)

At 3 o'clock p. m. May 13 Colonel Summers, with his provisional brigade and the Utah gun, in accordance with verbal orders, moved out

from San Miguel on the San Isidro road, Captain Case, of the division staff, accompanying. The enemy was engaged shortly after leaving San Miguel and driven rapidly northward about 4 miles to a point 1 mile north of Salacat (Bulac), which was occupied by our troops. At this point the enemy was strongly intrenched on the north bank of a river and in force of about 300, but when charged by our forces fled, leaving killed, wounded, and equipments behind. Our casualties: one enlisted man, Thirteenth Minnesota, slight, nondisabling wound of right wrist. The known casualties of the enemy were, 16 killed, including an officer, and 5 wounded, who fell into our hands. Twenty-six guns were captured from the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 232, 233.) Colonel Summers's telegraphic report of the engagement was reported to the adjutant-general of the department, with remark that "this was a brilliant engagement, for which Colonel Summers and his command deserve great credit." (Appendix, p. 232.)

May 16 a reconnoissance was made in the direction of Sibul and Biacnabato by the dismounted cavalry squadron, 2 battalions Third Infantry, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, and Hawthorne's mountain battery, under command of Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth Cavalry. The lack of a competent guide and the condition of the roads and trails prevented the reconnoissance being continued beyond Sibul, and the column returned that night to San Miguel without having encountered the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 233, 234, 235, 236.)

The troops at Salacat advanced to and occupied San Roque about 9 a. m. May 16, without meeting opposition. The scouts, under command of Lieut. J. E. Thornton, Second Oregon, were sent forward to reconnoiter and search for water, one battalion of the Oregons following as support. About 2½ miles out they were fired on by the enemy, whom they drove across a bridge over a deep river some 40 feet wide. The enemy set fire to the bridge and retired to trenches which commanded it and the road to the southward by frontal and enfilading positions. Under a heavy fire the scouts charged across the bridge into the nearest trenches, routing the enemy, who retreated to San Isidro (Factoria), leaving 6 killed, among them an officer, 6 wounded, 2 prisoners, 14 Mausers, 2 Remingtons, equipments, and ammunition. (Appendix, p. 236.)

While the greater number of the scouts were engaging the enemy in the trenches, a few, recognizing the extreme importance of saving the bridge (a wooden structure) from burning, devoted all their energies to putting out the fire, and in doing so were exposed to the fire of the enemy until the latter was routed by their comrades. The support coming up, the enemy was driven to the city (San Isidro), about a mile distant; then, returning to the bridge, both scouts and support set to work repairing it. (Appendix, p. 236.)

In repeating Colonel Summers's telegraphic report of the affair the division commander remarked: "I desire to specially commend Colonel Summers and those he mentions. Colonel Summers has been active and intelligent in his work. He will take the city in the morning. I also call attention to the fact that my scouts were again commended. Harrington, killed, the only casualty, is the man who has several times before been commended for unusual bravery. He was as noble and brave a soldier as I have ever known, and his death and the disabling of Young, who organized the scouts, will be a great loss to us." (Appendix, p. 236.)

The following-named scouts who participated in the engagement at the burning bridge, which they saved from destruction, were recommended for Congressional medals of honor:

Peter Quinn, private, Troop L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Simon Harris, private, Troop G, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

E. C. Lyon, private, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

M. W. Robertson, private, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

Frank High, private, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

M. Glassley, private, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

R. M. Longfellow, private, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. W. McIntyre, private, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. B. Kenne, private, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Eli L. Watkins, private, Company C, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

G. Jensen, private, Company D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Charles P. Davis, private, Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

S. A. Galt, private, Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

W. H. Downs, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. Killion, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Frank Ross, private, Company H, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Otto Boehler, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

J. F. Desmond, private, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

W. F. Thomas, corporal, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

F. W. Summerfield, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Patrick Hussey, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

T. M. Sweeney, private, Company K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Col. J. W. French, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding his own regiment and the First North Dakotas and Scott's three guns, had been sent forward during the afternoon to camp at Salacat for the night, and the next day to join Colonel Summers for the contemplated movement on San Isidro May 18. (Appendix, p. 237). Colonel Summers's rapid advance and the result of the fight at the bridge changed the plan. Colonel French was ordered to leave a battalion with his transportation and to hurry forward to join Colonel Summers, who was advised of these reenforcements and directed to make disposition of

his troops that night for the attack next morning. (Appendix, p. 237.) Colonel Summers wired that it would be impossible to place the command in position that night, but that he would make proper disposition for attack by daylight. (Appendix, p. 238.)

About 4 o'clock a. m., May 17, headquarters and staff left San Miguel, arriving about 6 a. m. at the front, which was found to be just north of the bridge and trenches occupied the day before by the scouts and Second Oregons. Telegraphic communication was established with San Miguel and corps headquarters without delay and the movement on San Isidro commenced. Colonel Summers deployed the column; the Twenty-Second Infantry on the left, their right resting on the road; the First North Dakotas and the First Battalion Second Oregons on right of road, along which Scott's battery followed; the scouts preceded the right of the line. Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, operated on the left of the road.

The command advanced toward the town, and when within about 1,800 yards of it, fire was opened on the scouts of the Oregons and on the North Dakotas on the right of our line. (Appendix 315a, 318a, 332a, 478b, 353a.)

The advance was continued and the city occupied by our forces—our casualties, 1 enlisted man each Thirteenth Minnesotas and Second Oregons, slightly wounded; an insurgent loss of 15 killed, 20 wounded, 3 prisoners. Seven guns and 4 horses fell into our hands. (Appendix, pp. 238, 239, 240.)

Prompt telegraphic report of the capture of the city was made to the adjutant general of the department (Appendix, p. 240), and, later, summary of Colonel Summers's report of operations and casualties was wired. (Appendix 240.) The department commander replied, congratulating the expeditionary forces and designating Arayat, down the Rio Grande, as our next objective. (Appendix, p. 240.)

Several Spaniards who claim to have been held prisoners by the insurgents were found in the city, among them 3 officers, who were provided with food and later returned to Manila. (Appendix, p. 239),

Many wealthy natives remained with their property and families, and at once applied for and were accorded protection by our troops. Dr. Albert, a former peace commissioner selected by the Filipino congress, of which he was still a member (Appendix, pp. 244, 245), reported the presence at his residence of a large number of noncombatants, including the wives and children of insurgent officers, and gave much information concerning the doings of the insurgent leaders. (Appendix, pp. 244, 245.)

It was learned that the insurgents had had at this place 14 prisoners—13 Americans, including a lieutenant of our Navy, and 1 Englishman—whom they had moved back into the mountains on our advance. Letters from the prisoners, including one from Lieutenant Gilmore (copies of which will be found in the Appendix, p. 243), were delivered by Señor Raymon Rey, an aged Spaniard and fellow-prisoner, who had escaped and was employed as guide for the expedition. (Appendix, p. 243.)

The afternoon of the capture of San Isidro it was rumored that the enemy had fled toward Gapan, a town of considerable importance about 4 miles east of San Isidro, where the army had a field hospital filled with wounded. It was reported next day from department

command also joined (Appendix, p. 261), and all proceeded down the river to the vicinity of Mount Arayat, where the command rested for the night.

The entire command left its bivouac early in the morning of May 21, and proceeded down the river, arriving at the ferry near the town of Arayat shortly after sunrise, without meeting opposition. Considerable labor was required to prepare the approach to the ferry for the passage of wheeled vehicles and in improvising a suitable raft for the crossing of stores and ammunition. This was done under the supervision of Captain Case, of the division staff. (Appendix, p. 262.) The river at this point is about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep, and, as indicated by its banks, subject to a considerable rise at some seasons of the year.

The advance of the column—a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry—entered the town of Arayat at 7.12 a. m., and found no evidence of the presence of the enemy anywhere in the vicinity. (Appendix, p. 262.)

Two companies of the Twenty-second Infantry, which had crossed the river at Cabaio and marched without opposition down the right bank, rejoined here. These companies had had to push their way through thick underbrush, finding nothing but cross trails.

As rapidly as possible the command was ferried over to the west bank of the river and entered the town, the last of the column getting in next morning. (Appendix, p. 262.)

The column which had been advancing up the river, under command of Maj. J. A. Kobbé, Third Artillery, joined the expedition at Arayat at about 8 a. m. (Appendix p. 262). This column, which had in no way participated in the expedition, which had practically terminated at San Isidro, was reported by Maj. J. A. Kobbé as composed of the following troops:

	Officers.	Men.
Light Battery E, First Artillery.....	3	59
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry.....	23	1,119
Ninth U. S. Infantry.....	9	369
	35	1,547

The launch and cascoes carrying supplies had grounded about 2 miles below Arayat. (Appendix, p. 262.)

On the morning of May 22 the entire command moved on down the river toward Candaba, pursuant to telegraphic orders from department headquarters (Appendix, p. 261), arriving without incident about noon of the same day.

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from the adjutant-general of the department (Appendix, p. 264) the following orders were issued, relieving from further duty with the expedition the troops composing Colonel Summers's provisional brigade:

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 11. } *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 22, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of this date, the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry is relieved from duty with this command and will proceed to Manila.

The commanding general in relieving this regiment desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by its officers and men while on this expedition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 12. } *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 22, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of the 22d instant, the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry (Second and Third battalions) is relieved from duty with this command and will proceed under orders of Col. O. Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, to the south bank of the river at Calumpit; at that point Colonel Summers will report to the adjutant-general of the corps.

The commanding general in relieving this regiment desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by its officers and men while on the expedition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The organizations mentioned in the above orders left Candaba en route to Calumpit on the morning of the 23d of May.

During the day, after the departure of the troops for Calumpit, considerable firing was heard to the eastward in the direction of San Miguel and Baliuag. A battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, commanded by Captain Ballance, and the detachment of scouts were sent in the direction from which the sound of the firing came, but were unable to discover anything, the swamp preventing their continuing to the San Miguel-Baliuag road. (Appendix, p. 267). Later it was learned that the troops in San Miguel in obedience to orders from department headquarters had, under command of Captain Hannay, Third Infantry, started to Baliuag to join the garrison at that place; that they met the enemy near San Yldefonso and were engaged almost continuously the rest of the way to Baliuag. The insurgents were in strong force and suffered severely. Captain Hannay is entitled to much credit for the way in which he handled his regiment (10 companies) during a series of difficult situations. He was prostrated by heat, and as a result of overwork during the expedition was unable until June 3 to report the details of the engagement. (Appendix, pp. 267, 268.)

Casualties: One enlisted man killed; 1 officer (Lieut. J. A. McArthur) and 14 enlisted men, Third Infantry, wounded. (Appendix, p. 268.) Insurgent loss reported at 50 killed and 50 wounded. (Appendix, pp. 267, 268.)

During the evening of May 23 telegraphic orders were received from the adjutant-general of the department, breaking up the expedition, and the following orders were issued early next morning. (Appendix, p. 266.)

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 13. } *In the Field, Candaba, Luzon, May 24, 1899.*

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions of the 23d instant from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps the following movement and reassignment of troops now belonging to this command are ordered:

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry: Headquarters and 2 battalions to San Fernando; 1 battalion to Candaba and San Luis (headquarters and 3 companies at Candaba, 1 company at San Luis).

Seventeenth U. S. Infantry to San Fernando.

Third U. S. Infantry: Five companies to Baliuag, 4 companies to San Fernando and 1 company to Quingua.

Separate mountain battery (Hawthorne's) to Baliuag.

The section Utah volunteer light artillery (1 gun) to Candaba.

The squadron Fourth Cavalry (Gale's), Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, the battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, and Scott's platoon, Battery D, Sixth Artillery (3 guns), to Manila.

Regimental commanders will designate the battalions of their respective commands for detached service.

Troops will not move from their present stations until subsequent orders are received from these headquarters, but will hold themselves in readiness to move promptly.

With the exception of those returning to Manila, the troops above mentioned will report by telegraph to the commanding general, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, when movement is commenced and upon arrival at new stations.

The commanding general in thus breaking up this expedition desires to express his appreciation of the efficiency, courage, and uncomplaining endurance constantly shown by the troops composing it.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The movement commenced shortly afterwards under verbal orders conveyed by staff officers. Headquarters embarked on the protected launch *Oceania* by 9 a. m., and proceeded down the river to Calumpit, thence by rail to Malolos, to carry out the instructions from the department commander in regard to distributing and rationing the troops added to General MacArthur's command (Second Division), and to supervise the rearrangement of the Thirteenth Minnesotas guarding the railway. (Appendix, pp. 266, 268, 269.) The infantry destined for Manila was shipped in by rail from Calumpit as rapidly as possible, and the artillery, the mounted troops, and the wagons marched overland. (Appendix, p. 269.) In view of the repeated attacks of the enemy on the troops returning from San Miguel, it was deemed prudent by the department commander (Appendix, p. 269) to leave the 10 companies Third Infantry and Hawthorne's 2 guns at Baliuag, withdrawing the battalion Twenty-second Infantry and dismounted cavalry as first ordered (Appendix, p. 269). However, 2 companies Twenty-second Infantry were held temporarily at Quingua (Appendix, p. 269), the other 2 proceeding to Malolos, where they were held temporarily. On May 26 it was reported that a force of the enemy was being concentrated in the vicinity of Baliuag, and instructions were given to the commanding officer at that point to send out reconnoitering parties in the direction of the enemy to ascertain the facts. (Appendix, pp. 280, 281, 282, 283, 285.)

A battalion was ordered from San Fernando by the adjutant-general of the department for use in connection with Baliuag if found necessary, and late in the afternoon Roach's battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry arrived at Malolos. (Appendix, p. 280.) Companies D and M, Twenty-second Infantry, were returned to Quingua, making a battalion of that regiment at that point. (Appendix, p. 282.) Troop I, Fourth Cavalry was also sent there temporarily. (Appendix, p. 282.)

One company of the Third Infantry, under Lieutenant Moore of that regiment, developed a force of the enemy in the direction of San Rafael, and being encumbered with 2 wounded men was forced to continue the engagement until relieved by 2 more companies, when the enemy was dispersed. (Appendix, pp. 283, 285.)

Recommendation was made that no more troops be withdrawn from Baliuag at that time, as it was an important point which the enemy would doubtless endeavor to recover. (Appendix, p. 285.)

General MacArthur sent a staff officer to look after the Baliuag situation, and the whole matter was turned over to him May 26. (Appendix, pp. 285, 287.)

The adjutant-general of the department was informed that all organizations to return to Manila were en route or would be during the day (May 26), and instructions requested. (Appendix, p. 285.)

Next morning, May 27, telegraphic instructions were received, in accordance with which headquarters returned to Manila that afternoon, nothing important having developed in the meanwhile. (Appendix, p. 286.)

The wagon train arrived in Manila May 30, terminating the expedition, although this practically took place at San Isidro when the department commander named Arayat as the next objective. (Appendix, p. —.)

An appendix embodying copies of brief reports rendered to the department commander; reports of subordinate commanders which were at the time forwarded; of correspondence, orders, circulars; in fact, every available record pertaining to the expedition, is hereto attached, and should be read in connection with the text of this report.

The medical history of the expedition is succinctly given in the report of the chief surgeon, and forms a part of the Appendix. (Appendix, pp. 114, 117.) His mention of the North Dakotas is worthy of notice.

In addition to the mention of officers and others already made in this report and its Appendix, the following is to be added:

From the preliminary work connected with the organization of the expedition until return of headquarters to Manila the adjutant-general of the division, Maj. Clarence R. Edwards, assistant adjutant general, U. S. V., rendered service worthy of special commendation.

He participated in the engagements at Novaliches, San Rafael (2), Baliuag (including the pursuit and fight with the enemy's rear guard on the San Miguel road), and at San Isidro. On all these occasions he exhibited that cool demeanor and disregard of personal danger that have characterized his bearing in the presence of the enemy.

The voluminous work of his office was efficiently and promptly disposed of, often under most trying circumstances. His administrative ability, professional zeal, and military talent merit substantial recognition.

In the advance from La Loma to Novaliches Capt. William E. Birkhimer, Third U. S. Artillery, acting judge-advocate, was, by order, present during the entire day with the point of the advance guard. He performed his duties with efficiency, and with the disdain for personal danger when under fire that constantly characterized this officer throughout the expedition. His conspicuous gallantry at San Yldefonso and at San Miguel has already been a matter of comment. For the latter engagement he has been recommended for a medal of honor.

Upon arrival at Norzagaray there was no other means of communication except by carrier pigeon or courier. A dispatch by the former was sent that day through the courtesy of Mr. Bass, of the New York Herald, to whom acknowledgment is due. On the following day, telegraphic communication not having yet been established, it was necessary to communicate by messenger. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Colonel Sumner's advance and its safety for small parties was problematical. Maj. Charles G. Starr, inspector-general of the division, was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly.

At the first battle of San Rafael, April 29, Major Starr accompanied the advance guard throughout the day. To him, Capt. Robert Sewell, aid, and to Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth Cavalry, who volunteered his services as aid that day, I desire to express my appreciation.

They were subjected to a hot fire, but always rendered cool and efficient service.

During this battle, just before the enemy was developed, an incident took place that should be mentioned, in that it made known that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in civilian dress, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. He was ordered in to be reprimanded and sent to the rear. Something in the man's bearing and appearance caused a change of intention. He was directed to go to the front and bring in a citizen that definite information about the location of San Rafael might be obtained. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes three shots were heard; Young appeared, as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with 86 rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had run on to an insurgent outpost of 8 men, alone, killed 1 and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard, which was soon under a rapid and hot fire.

During the second battle of San Rafael, May 1, the division and personal staffs were, as usual, constantly under fire. Second Lieut. E. L. King, Eighth U. S. Cavalry, aid, reported just before this, his first engagement. His cool demeanor when under a hot fire from across the river, as he stood mounted near the battery, is worthy of special mention.

Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth U. S. Artillery, is deserving of commendation for the intelligent and fearless handling of his battery on this occasion.

The energetic pursuit and sharp engagements with the rear guard of the retreating insurgent forces from Baliuag toward San Miguel May 2 has been reported, except the fact that this engagement was under the able command of Capt. G. H. G. Gale, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Few quartermasters ever had greater difficulties to overcome, and none could have rendered more cheerful and untiring service than did Capt. C. C. Walcutt, chief quartermaster of this division. From the 21st of April to the last day of May he spared himself neither night nor day in his indefatigable efforts to render the expedition a success.

Capt. P. J. Perkins, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, by intelligent, indefatigable work kept up telegraphic communication between the front and the base of supply until, after recovering the Baliuag-Angat-Bacaue line, he was forced by illness to return to Manila, turning over his department to Capt. E. A. McKenna, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps. The latter remained in charge of the signal service of the expedition until telegraphic communication was temporarily abandoned on the departure of the command from San Isidro. His courage, devotion to duty, and professional ability merit special commendation.

In addition to the professional zeal and executive ability always shown by Maj. H. W. Cardwell, chief surgeon of the division, his cheerful willingness to be of use, in whatever capacity, should be recognized. This ability frequently brought him under fire, notably at the first battle of San Rafael.

In the afternoon of the 17th instant, after the battle of San Isidro, several insurgents wounded were reported abandoned on the field of the morning's fight outside of our lines. Maj. George H. Penrose, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., accompanied by First Lieut. F. M. Kemp,

of the Regular Medical Corps, with ambulances, was sent to care for them and bring them in.

These officers met a few natives whom they took to be insurgents, and unhesitatingly attempted to capture them. They, revolvers in hand, rode down two and found their rifles hidden in the bamboos near by. Major Penrose and his orderly, while watering their horses at the ford, returning, were surprised by two or three Mauser volleys from the enemy concealed across the river. Six insurgents wounded were brought to the hospital. While on the firing line during the skirmish at Cabaio next day, Dr. Kemp's horse was shot through the head. Whatever their duties, these officers always showed earnestness, energy, and ability in the accomplishment.

The Hon. H. A. Ramsden, H. B. M. vice-consul at Manila, had rendered valuable service during the expedition to the province of Laguna, by reason of his thorough knowledge of the Spanish language and familiarity with the characteristics of the natives. He was by special invitation a guest of headquarters and, as formerly, proved himself in every way a valuable addition to the staff. Much regret was felt and expressed when illness demanded his return to Manila from Angat. In the hope that his indisposition might be soon over, request of the department commander was made that Mr. Ramsden's presence might be again solicited. (Appendix, p. 150.)

Mr. F. W. Carpenter, chief clerk, adjutant-general's office, showed the same efficient loyal qualities throughout this expedition as during the Laguna de Bay expedition, when he won the commendation of his commanding officers, under fire as well as for efficiency in his legitimate duties.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX.

Operations of May 23, 1899.

MANILA, P. I., June 3, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to telegraphic instructions from First Division, Eighth Army Corps, May 22, 1899, I left San Miguel with 10 companies Third Infantry, 1 gun Hawthorne's mountain battery, and detachment of Signal Corps, for Baliuag, P. I., at 6.15 a. m. May 23.

Upon arriving at the outskirts of San Yldefonso, at about 8 a. m., the command was halted and details sent back from each company for the purpose of assisting the wagons through creek crossing. While so halted the detachment of the Signal Corps, engaged in taking up the wire, had, with its escort, advanced some little distance beyond the point, and suddenly came upon an outlying party of insurgents, who summoned them to surrender. This they refused to do, and firing was commenced. At the place in question the slight elevation of ground on which stands the village of San Yldefonso, sprang up from the marshy ground on our right and, running directly across the road from San Miguel to Baliuag, finally swung off to our left and rear. The firing at first being more pronounced on the left of the road, Companies L and K, Second Battalion, with Company C, Third Battalion, were deployed on that flank. Company A, the advance guard, continued on, on either flank of the road, while Company M was thrown off well forward and to the right flank. The companies on the left pressed well forward against a heavy fire, and soon gained the summit of the ridge upon which stands the village, but the right

wing gained too much ground to the right, and not having advanced sufficiently, being held back by heavy ground, Company G, Third Battalion, had to be thrown in to fill the interval and help carry that company forward. Before the arrival of this second company on the right the enemy's fire had become somewhat heavy in that direction, but soon died away. As there appeared to be considerable continuity in the enemy's line of fire to our left, I directed Lieutenant Hawthorne to drop a couple of shells at the point, approximately to the center of the enemy's line, which he did with excellent effect. The fire of the enemy slackened at once and his line evidently broke in half, his left retreating to our right and front in a general direction toward the swamp and Candaba, his right moving off in well-organized bodies toward the mountains to our left and rear.

Firing ceased and the assembly sounded at about 10 a. m., we being in possession of the village and the enemy in full retreat.

At this time word was brought to me that Captain Cooke, who was guarding the wagon train with the First Battalion, had been heavily attacked on his right and rear. Captain Beall's battalion (Third), consisting of G and C Companies, with Hawthorne's battery, were told off to proceed to Captain Cooke's assistance, but upon arriving at the outskirts of the village I found that there was no longer need of reinforcements, as the enemy had been speedily and effectively repulsed. (See Captain Cooke's Report A.) After the wagon train had been closed up with the command, a halt was made until 11.30 a. m., during which time the men were allowed to make coffee.

Our losses in this engagement were 2 men of the First Battalion (Captain Cooke) and 1 man of Company C, who was with the train guard, wounded. The enemy's loss, approximately, were: Killed, 19; wounded, 16; prisoners, 10 at least; 14 rifles and 1 horse captured.

I regret to say that the town of San Yldefonso was set on fire by some of the Chinamen following up our command, and was almost completely destroyed. At 11.30 a. m. we left San Yldefonso, proceeding in the direction of Maasin, which point we reached about 1 p. m.; the advance guard and the reserve had already crossed the river and were advancing slowly along the road through the village, while K Company was on the bamboo bridge crossing the river, when suddenly a heavy volley was poured in from the left and front, coming from a slight bush-covered elevation in that direction. As there was no time for hesitation or waiting for reinforcements, the reserve, L Company, was formed into line at once to the left under cover of some nipa huts, and with A Company on its right was pushed forward directly into the face of the fire. This had the desired moral effect, and the enemy began to fall back. In the meantime Companies M and K were deployed and sent forward, one on the left between L Company and the river and the other on the extreme right of A Company. The whole line then advanced about a mile, driving the enemy rapidly before it. There being a favorable opportunity during this advance for shell fire against huts on the right opposite the center of K Company, Lieutenant Hawthorne was ordered to fire 2 or 3 rounds in that direction, which he did with good effect.

As soon as the enemy was sufficiently dispersed recall was sounded and the men given time to have coffee. In this engagement there were no casualties on our side, the enemy's loss being 15 killed and 18 wounded, while 9 rifles and 1 horse were captured. Among the killed at this point was one Filipino captain, while 3 captains were captured, 1 of whom was badly wounded, but succeeded in some way in escaping. This seems to have pretty well disposed of 4 of the 5 captains whose companies were said to occupy Maasin. While at Maasin, perceiving that my men would be very nearly exhausted before we reached Baliuag should the enemy continue their attacks, I wired Captain Gale of the Fourth Cavalry, commanding at Baliuag, to, if possible, send a battalion of infantry to meet me.

Leaving Maasin at about 4 p. m. we continued to march until reaching a point some 2 miles south of there, where the road passes into a heavy growth of timber on either side, dips down suddenly to a narrow but deep creek, crossed by a small stone bridge. To the left of this bridge on the far side of the creek, and about 100 yards of the road, is a heavy bamboo thicket. The enemy allowed the point to almost reach the bridge before opening fire. This fire was an exceedingly heavy one, both in volume and rapidity. First Lieut. John A. McArthur, Third Infantry, commanding the advance guard, and 2 enlisted men of A Company were wounded in the first volley. L Company, the reserve, was deployed to the left on the near side of the bridge. K Company was ordered to cross the bridge, keeping to the right and form in line on the left and advance. M Company was ordered to take position in the timber and over on the left flank of the hill on which the main body of the detachment was, the object being to smother from that point the fire from the bamboo thicket below and to the right front of it. This company meeting with heavy hedges

and other obstacles drifted off by its right flank and finally wound up on the extreme right. As soon as the line got fairly started after the enemy, which was not longer than five minutes, the pursuit was kept up rapidly and without faltering until the enemy was routed, and driven for a distance of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

As the Second Battalion (Captain Buttler, commanding) pushed off farther to the left, the Third Battalion, consisting of Companies G and C, was deployed and pushed forward to a commanding ridge in front in order to cover the front of the column. Unfortunately, at this point our loss was heavy, being 1 man killed, 1 commissioned officer, and 11 enlisted men wounded. These casualties all occurred at or near the bridge already mentioned. The thickets and trenches at the side of the road where the detachment was rendered it impossible to deploy from that position to the left and front, so it was necessary to pass troops in single file across the bridge to the front in order to outflank the enemy's position, and in doing this the losses were necessarily incurred.

The enemy's losses in this engagement are not definitely known, as most of the fighting was in heavy undergrowth and at close quarters; moreover, the hour was late and there was no time after the action to search the field, but it is known to be very heavy, and my officers computed to have been heavier than in either of the two previous engagements. Four prisoners, 4 rifles, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, however, were captured at this point. While the advance was thus heavily engaged, the rear guard and wagon train sustained and repulsed an attack in force. (See Exhibit A.) The march was resumed at about half past 6 o'clock. G and C Companies, Third Battalion, acting as advance guard, instead of A and L Companies, withdrawn for rest.

After progressing about a mile a few shots were fired upon the advance guard. This occurred as the command was about to descend into a small valley between two rolling hills. As the ground to the left front of the main column offered facilities for deployment and commanded the ground to the front, and as the command was tired, I deployed 1 company to the left in open order at the brow of the hill, and fired some volleys at those points on the opposite ridge, where the enemy were seen. I also brought up Hawthorne's mountain piece and fired 3 rounds at a large nipa house to the left and front, into which some of the enemy had been seen withdrawing. The second of these shots burst immediately over the hut, and a body of some 30 to 50 natives rushed out and fled into the woods. We then moved forward again and had gone but a short distance before Captain Kreps, Twenty-second Infantry, reported to me with his battalion. We finally arrived at Baliuag about 9 p. m.

To summarize: The detachment from San Miguel in the course of fifteen hours marched 14 miles on the road, encountered the enemy four times, and fought three engagements, each lasting from one to two hours. It captured 27 rifles and 2 horses, took some 50 prisoners, including 2 captains; killed at least 50 of the insurgents and wounded as many more, suffering in so doing a loss of 1 man killed on the field, 1 officer and 14 enlisted men wounded.

The tactics employed were of the simplest and are comprised in the old Duke's apothegm at Waterloo, "Up guards, and at them!" But I can not too highly praise the quiet, unswerving courage of the men who faced the heaviest fire from concealed and waiting enemy, and steadily, calmly, and resistlessly advanced toward that fire, with a moral superiority which nothing could stand up against. The moment this advance began the conflict really ended; there was nothing left but pursued and pursuers, and the pursuit continued unbrokenly and unceasingly until the halt and assembly was sounded. It was good to look at.

My conception of the orders under which I was acting is that I was to return my command from San Miguel to Baliuag, and my whole aim was to successfully and properly execute that order, so the pursuit was never continued beyond such a point, and insured the dispersal of my assailants. Nor did I attempt to encamp upon the road, knowing that did I so do the insurgents would not only have harassed my men by musketry fire all night, but that they would also have thrown up intrenchments and made my march next day both more difficult and more expensive. Moreover, my command was practically without tentage and rain was to be expected.

From what I can learn the insurgent command at San Yldefonso was composed of Gen. Gregorio Pilar's brigade under the command of one of his brothers. I did not ascertain the point from which it came. It had a wagon train with it, and among the troops was a battalion in red trousers.

The insurgents at Maasin and the next point beyond came from the vicinity of Candaba and from the vicinity of Sibul, and were told the night before both our direction and the day of our starting. This shows either that the wires are tampered with or that there are spies around, either at San Miguel or Manila.

The force at Maasin comprised 5 companies from 175 to 250 men, while that at the

last point of actual conflict was much larger and under the command of Col. Simon Bever, who had Lieut. Col. Julian Pilar. The subordinate officers of these independent columns did not know of any other force being out except their own and they were posted independently of each other, arriving on the ground just before we did and so not having time to throw up cover.

A part of the force at San Yldefonso came, I believe, from the vicinity of Sibul, and they retreated in that general direction.

In conclusion I desire not only to express my thanks and appreciation to all the officers and men of the command both of the Third Infantry and also of Hawthorne's battery and the Signal Corps, but I desire to invite the special attention of my superior officers to the following officers whom I consider deserving of special recognition, both by reason of their individual merit and as types of their high class:

Cooke, Capt. L. W., Third Infantry, for gallantry and ability by the manner in which he repulsed a determined attack upon his rear and right at San Yldefonso, and by his not being led away by the excitement of the action in his front to neglect the wagon train of which he had charge.

Buttler, Capt. W. C., Third Infantry, for great gallantry, in that being in command of the Second Battalion forming the advance of the detachment en route from San Miguel to Baliuag, and the command being constantly threatened with attack from the front; he remained always at the point of danger and quickly deployed his advance guard when attacked, pushed them under heavy fire at close range boldly and directly forward against the enemy, thus asserting from the very first that moral and physical superiority which is our mainstay in conflict with these natives.

McArthur, First Lieut. John A., Third Infantry, for conspicuous gallantry, in that being in command of the advance guard of a detachment of United States troops en route from San Miguel to Baliuag on the 23d of May, 1899, he executed the closest supervision over his command, and that upon suddenly being fired upon by the enemy in ambush he never hesitated or stopped, but forming his command into line toward the point of attack moved directly and deliberately upon the enemy. This on three separate occasions, during the last of which he was severely wounded in the ankle.

I regret that I am not able to render a fuller report, but having been taken ill immediately after the occurrences in question, I was sent to Manila on the 25th instant and it has been impossible for me to acquire the necessary data.

I inclose the reports of Captain Buttler, commanding Second Battalion, marked "Exhibit B," as also those of Captain Beall and Lieutenant Moore, whose companies composed the Third Battalion, marked "Exhibit C," and also one of Captain Cooke, commanding First Battalion and in charge of rear guard and wagon train. This marked "Exhibit A."

Very respectfully,

JNO. W. HANNAY,
Captain, Third Infantry, Commanding Detachment.

EXHIBIT A.

BALIUAG, *May 30, 1899.*

ADJUTANT DETACHMENT THIRD INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the march from San Miguel to Baliuag the 23d ultimo my battalion constituted the rear guard and was charged with the safety of the train as well. A train made up of mules and water buffalo is quite a problem to move under peaceful conditions but becomes a source of danger when threatened or attacked by the enemy. The order of march of my battalion when leaving San Miguel was 1 company in rear of train, deployed according to drill regulations, with 3 companies in column of fours on the road in advance of the train with flankers. No point being necessary except when too far in rear of the main column to be safe without it. When the main column was first attacked at Yldefonso this formation was changed by sending 1 company to march in column of files on the right and parallel to the road near the center of the train, thus being ready to fight quickly on either side of the train, along or near its center. This left 2 companies on the road, one platoon of which were deployed as skirmishers with its center on the road and in advance about 1,500 yards; the remainder in column fours near the head of the train. During the fighting of the main column at Yldefonso the train was delayed by a creek with a muddy bottom and steep, slippery banks to such an extent that the entire train did not effect a crossing until the main column had pushed the enemy through and beyond Yldefonso and all firing had ceased at the front. When the head of my command had nearly reached the suburbs of Yldefonso, the enemy, here-

tofore concealed in the high grass, about 800 yards to the right and a little to the rear of the advance, rose up and made me aware of their presence by a fine volley from at least 400 rifles, followed by yet another and thereafter at will. Their line being nearly parallel to the road, I led the company and a half off the right of the road in an oblique direction into a low place which gave good protection from the enemy's fire, and here deployed and quickly advanced to a slight rise in a paddy field, where several volleys were delivered with telling effect, the men lying down. Then another advance was made and a like fire delivered, when a charge was ordered, the men responding splendidly and yelling like demons. This charge was stopped by an impassable mud run with abrupt banks 8 feet high. Here fire was resumed, when the enemy retired from our front; but before this occurred I could see that I had disposed near the center of the train also attacked and was advancing on the enemy. A part of my immediate command was immediately put in motion by the right flank, but before it had proceeded far the enemy had been driven back and disappeared. The company in rear of the train was attacked at the same time. Casualties of the enemy: Five were seen to fall, but as they were quickly carried off it can not be known whether they were killed or wounded. Our casualties were 2 men wounded and 1 mule.

The march was then resumed and the main column was joined on the southern outskirts of Yldefonso. In leaving Yldefonso the rear guard was held on the ridge until the train had proceeded about 1,500 yards across the valley toward Maasin, when the same dispositions of my command heretofore maintained was resumed. At Maasin, where the main column was again attacked, the head of the train was about 150 yards north of where brigade headquarters were when we occupied the town earlier in the month.

Although we could not then see the enemy, or the main column for that matter, the enemy's fire swept over and around us, and why no damage was done I can not understand. At the first volley one column was deployed to the right of the road and advanced to the river. The other company deployed to the left side and parallel to the road, and laid down until it was certain the fight in front was on that side of the road. Here we were fired upon by two niggers from behind slight cover, who then ran away, but were stopped by the fire of a squad killing one and wounding the other. When it was determined that the fight was on the left of the road, the company last referred to was moved forward up the river about 145 yards. Here it was halted, and Lieutenant Wygant, with one platoon, was sent to gain a position on the river if possible, and to keep abreast of the fire on the other side. The remaining platoon was advanced about 100 yards farther to a point where an open field of fire was had, and just then a small body of the enemy appeared, having crossed from the opposite side of the river. A few well directed volleys sent them into cover, and no more was seen of them.

About this time the company that had first deployed and had been advanced to the river on the right of the road, finding the fighting was to the left, joined the platoon above mentioned. Lieutenant Wygant, owing to the jungle and the rapidity with which the enemy were driven up the river, was unable to gain touch with or even see the main column, though its left was on the opposite side of the river and at first close by. All firing shortly after ceased. When the train was crossed to the main column the rear guard, supported by 1 company, remained on the north bank, while all were taking a needed rest and coffee.

The march being resumed, the rear guard was left on the north bank of the river and the company to support took position across the river, to the left, on a slight eminence commanding the road and crossing on that side. The rear guard and the company referred to remained in their respective positions until the train had advanced beyond effective rifle range, when the rear guard company and the one in support regained their positions of the march. From this time on one company marched in rear of the train, in support of the rear guard company. When the third attack was made on the main column, I should say about 2 miles from Maasin, the rear guard in rear of the train was also attacked by quite a large force, necessitating the deployment of the company in support, and later another company was sent to be ready if needed. One platoon of the company at the head of the train was deployed and moved to the left to an open field, where it was joined by its remaining platoon, where it halted and laid down waiting for any of the enemy drifting around the fire in front. The company that had been marching parallel with the train had been sent for and taken position at the head of the train. Shortly after these dispositions were made, a number of the enemy appeared drifting back from the front and were driven off by volleys from the company already in position on the left and waiting for them. The rear guard drove the enemy back and regained its position in respect to the train. Three men were wounded in H and 1 in F Company of this fight.

Not long after a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry from Baliuag came up and relieved my battalion as rear guard. Baliuag was reached about 7.30 p. m., a tired but confident rear guard. In the attack on the train at Yldefonso I think that there must have been 800 of the enemy. In the last affair, owing to the cover, I can not be sure of the number, but think there must have been 400.

The officers and men of this battalion are deserving of full praise. The officers, as usual, behaved with coolness and gave timely orders, the men obeying promptly and firing coolly and carefully.

Very respectfully,

L. W. COOKE,
Captain, Third U. S. Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

P. S.—I can not even state approximately the number of the enemy in the third engagement, as they had excellent cover and we were retiring. There can be no doubt, however, but that their loss was heavy.

L. W. COOKE,
Captain, Third Infantry.

EXHIBIT B.

BALIUAG, P. I., May 29, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Detachment Third U. S. Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report that a battalion of the Third Infantry, consisting of Companies A, L, M, and K, constituting the Second Battalion, left San Miguel, P. I., about 6 a. m., May 23, forming the advance of 10 companies of the Third. Company A formed the advance guard and was commanded by First Lieut. J. C. McArthur.

Company L, commanded by Second Lieut. Tenny Ross formed the support. Companies M (Capt. F. I. Day) and K (Second Lieut. Robert Hannay) constituted the reserve.

The command having marched about 2 miles was halted about 1 mile north of San Yldefonso. Just as it halted an attack was made on the column from the east, left of the road. Company A immediately formed a line of skirmishers, Company L formed rapidly on the left of Company A, Company K on the extreme left, east of the road, company M on the right, west of the road.

A rapid advance was made, the enemy was driven from the town of San Yldefonso, and retreated to the west. Six Filipinos were found killed and 7 wounded.

Company A captured 8 Mausers and a large amount of ammunition. Company L captured 4 rifles. Duration of fight, 1 hour. Strength of enemy, about 200. No one wounded in the command.

About 11 a. m. the command left San Yldefonso and arrived in Maasin about 12.40 p. m.; the command was halted with A, L, and M Companies across the river. Company A still constituted the advance guard. The command had just halted when a very strong attack came from the left, east of the column, the enemy being about 100 yards from the road. Companies A and L rapidly formed a skirmish line to the left. Company M on the left of Company L, Company K moving up the road and forming on the right of A. Companies A, L, M, and K advanced with great rapidity, giving the enemy a heavy fire. The charge was sounded and the Filipinos were driven about 1½ miles to the east.

Twelve of the enemy were killed, including an officer, and 17 wounded. Company A captured 2 officers and 9 rifles, mostly Mausers; Company L, 2 rifles and a large amount of ammunition.

No one was wounded in the battalion. There were about 300 Filipinos.

After resting an hour and a half the command continued on its march and about 4 o'clock it was attacked for the third time from the left (east) of road by a heavy fire from the enemy 100 yards in front, concealed in very thick underbrush. Companies A and L, of the advance guard, with K on the left, formed rapidly a line of skirmishers; Company M marched up the road under a heavy fire and formed on the right. The battalion charged and drove the enemy about 2 miles.

Two enlisted men were killed, and 1 officer (Lieutenant McArthur) and 12 enlisted men wounded in the battalion.

There were about 500 Filipinos, and it is impossible to give the number of the enemy killed and wounded, on account of the nature of the country, but to judge from the two preceding fights, a large number were killed and wounded. A large amount of ammunition was found by the enlisted men during the fight (Mauser,

original, 1896, some 1898). In all the combats the enemy retreated to the right (west) and left (east) of the road toward Candaba and Sibul.

In all the combats the celerity with which the companies were formed as skirmishers and the coolness and gallantry displayed by the officers in command was excellent, and I especially commend the company commanders, Capt. F. I. Day (M), First Lieut. J. C. McArthur (A), Second Lieut. Tenny Ross (L), and Second Lieut. Robert Hannay (K).

Lieutenant McArthur, who was wounded during the third fight, carefully and with great coolness and gallantry in every engagement, formed and led his company (A), and he is entitled to special praise.

Very respectfully,

W. C. BUTTLER,

Captain, Third U. S. Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

[EXHIBIT C.]

Report of movements of Company C, Third Infantry, May 23, 1899.

Company C, forming with G Company Third Battalion, under command of Captain Beall, left San Miguel shortly after 6 a. m., May 21, forming part of a column consisting of 10 companies Third Infantry and 1 mountain gun, with the necessary transportation. The Second Battalion was leading, followed by the Third Battalion. C Company was the sixth company in column. We had proceeded about 3 miles and were halted when the enemy opened fire on us. C Company was sent to the left to support the leading battalion. I deployed to protect the left flank and connected to my right. Groups of the enemy were seen moving off to our left and the company fired effectively at them. We received a heavy fire from a hill about 500 yards to our left front, but we drove the enemy from this position. The company assembled on a hill to the east of San Yldefonso and joined the column in the road when the men had lunch. Private Frank, of Company C, was shot in the neck while on duty with the wagon train, but the wound is not serious. We moved out again about noon in the same order, and when crossing the river at Maasin encountered a heavy fire from the enemy posted along the bank of the river to the left of the road. The men laid down until the battalion in front had deployed, when we crossed on the bridge and moved off to the left to support the leading battalion. No firing was done by the company in this skirmish. C Company had charge of the prisoners captured during the day and at this time the number was increased by two Filipino captains. After resting about an hour the column moved forward again, and had gone a mile or so when the enemy was encountered. I moved C Company to the left along a creek and deployed to the front. We were ordered to assemble shortly after, and then moved forward again, deploying to the left of the road in advance of the other battalion. G and C Companies then moved forward as advance guard and met a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry a mile or so farther on. Reached Baliuag about 8 p. m.

Very respectfully,

J. T. MOORE,

First Lieutenant, Third Infantry.

Report of the operations of Company G, Third Infantry, on May 23, 1899.

The company left San Miguel about 6 a. m., as a part of the Third Battalion, Third Infantry, commanded by Captain Beall, Third Infantry. It was a part of the main body of the column. Brisk firing having been developed in front of San Yldefonso, G Company was deployed to the right of the road, and advanced upon and passed through the town, halting and assembling at the church. Patrols were sent through the town with orders to arrest all able-bodied men. Among men brought in three had parts of the insurgent uniform concealed about their persons. When about to cross the stream Maasin, about 1 p. m., some several volleys passed over the companies from the left front. Replied immediately with three volleys, then rushed the company across the stream and fired three more volleys from the cover on the road bank. Found 1 insurgent officer and 4 privates dead upon the field covered by the fire of the company. Left Maasin about 1 p. m. and about 2 miles from that point deployed the company to the left of the road and went into action. No results were observed except the disappearance of the enemy.

The company acted as advance guard a part of the remainder of the way into Baliuag, where the company arrived about 9 p. m., very much fatigued but cheerful and ready for further duty.

The casualties during the day were 1 private (Sullivan, James), slightly wounded at Maasin. His injury did not cause him to fall out.

I can not praise too highly the coolness and efficiency of every man in the company during the three engagements.

Respectfully submitted.

F. M. BEALL,
Captain, Third Infantry.

MANILA, June 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report covering the period from April 27 to May 31, 1899, while I was serving on the staff of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, as acting engineer officer.

On April 27, at Narzogaray, I received General Field Orders, No. 3, First Division Eighth Army Corps, same date, and immediately reported at Angat.

I left Angat at 9.30 a. m., April 28, with 1 battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota under Major Diggles, and crossing the Quingua River at a ford just south of the town worked east and north in continuation of the reconnoissance of April 26, made by Major Eastwick and 1 battalion of the Second Oregon; crossed the range into the valley of the stream tributary to the Quingua River, opposite Angat; encountered about 200 insurgents of General Pantaleon Garcia's command. After twenty minutes long-range fire the insurgents withdrew, and the column proceeded down the right bank of the Quingua River as far as the town of Binanban, opposite Marunco, without further opposition where we recrossed the river and joined the main command.

April 29, with Colonel Summers's command, I crossed the river at Marunco and moved westerly to the town of Polo, toward San Rafael. At Polo we struck the main road, the only one on the north bank of the river. All our work previous to this had been over mountain ranges or narrow valleys with only narrow trails or sleigh tracks to follow.

San Rafael was entered without opposition at 1 p. m., whence, on receiving orders from the division commander, the column returned to Marunco.

The road from Polo to San Rafael is a good graded pike with three small bridges. The surrounding country is sharply rolling and well-wooded and difficult to pass through on skirmish line. At San Rafael the country grows more level and open with little uncultivated ground.

May 1, I once more crossed the river with Colonel Summers's command and moved from Polo toward San Rafael. About 1½ miles out of the latter town the enemy outposts were encountered by our scouts, who drove them back on their main body and also dislodged the entire force of nearly 1,000. The insurgents fell back to the north and the west, taking up a strong position a half mile from the outskirts of the town. Their position was such that in case of a frontal attack the attacking force would be enfiladed by the fire of a force on the opposite side of the river. The attack was, however, delivered on the flank and the enemy driven to the northward.

May 2, at 6 a. m., I moved with the scouts on the road to Baliuag. A strong force was encountered near San Felipe, but were soon dislodged.

On approaching Baliuag a large number of natives were seen moving to the north. A white flag having been shown on the insurgent line, I advanced by request. General Lawton, accompanied by the three orderlies bearing the flag of truce. When within about 500 yards of their lines we were fired upon by some 30 insurgents under the direction of 2 mounted officers, whereupon I returned to our line.

Baliuag was taken about noon May 2. On the morning of May 4 I accompanied the column of Colonel Summers northward to Maasin, where 400 insurgents, strongly intrenched, were found. After a sharp engagement the enemy was driven out and the town occupied by our troops, and I returned to Baliuag.

May 5 I went to Quingua to examine fords and arrange for a ferry in case of a rise in the river.

On the 8th, by permission of General Lawton, I went to Maasin and, with 2 companies of Colonel Summers's command as escort, reconnoitered and sketched the enemy's position at San Yldefonso. The enemy, over 1,000 strong, held a strong position here and opened a hot fire on us.

The reconnoissance being completed I returned to Baliuag.

May 12, by order of General Lawton, Captain Birkhimer, of the division staff, and myself went to Maasin and, accompanied by Young's scouts and 2 companies as support, advanced toward San Yldefonso for the purpose of making a detailed reconnaissance of the enemy's position and strength; working our way to the extreme right of the enemy's position, we exposed ourselves, drew their fire and secretly retired. Next, we approached their center and repeated the same tactics. A hill on their extreme left commanded the country we wished to examine, and it became necessary to dislodge an outpost of the insurgents, some 30 in number. This was done very gallantly by Young's scouts.

The hill we found controlled the enemy's position, and they quickly discovering the small force opposing them made a determined attempt to retake the place, advancing fully 300 yards and to within 500 yards of our position. The situation was so serious that I finally left the position after a conference with Captain Birkhimer, who remained with the scouts, and proceeded to find and bring up our support. On the approach of the support the enemy retired, evacuating their strong position, and moving north toward San Miguel, while we followed them to within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of that place, inflicting considerable damage to their rear guard.

On our return San Yldefonso was occupied by our support shortly reenforced by troops from Colonel Summers's command.

May 13, at 6 a. m., Captain Birkhimer and myself, with Young's scouts and 2 companies under Capt. H. L. Heath, Second Oregon, moved toward San Miguel. By agreement with Captain Birkhimer I accompanied the support and he the scouts to insure uniformity of action.

Small outposts of the enemy were met and driven in, but no considerable force opposed our advance until the scouts, emerging from a stretch of woods, found the enemy 600 strong, under Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, in position less than 200 yards away. Without waiting for support, Chief of Scouts Young and his band of heroes charged the center of the enemy's line, broke it and sent the enemy flying into and through the town. A more gallant action was never seen on any field, and one fit to go on record as an example of unexcelled coolness, daring, and good judgment.

A retrograde movement, under the circumstances, would have been suicidal, and this fact was grasped instantly by Young and the gallant men under him.

Just at the close of this charge, with the fruits of victory already within his grasp, Chief of Scouts Young received the wound which ultimately caused his death.

I wish to pay my tribute to the memory of the bravest man it has ever been my fortune to meet. Combining fearlessness with an unerring judgment, he instinctively inspired the confidence in all minds which he so well deserved. His life was heroic and his death inspiring.

At the first fire I had directed the deployment of the support, and finding that the enemy's line overlapped our own, I detached the flanking parties to protect our advance. Although we moved immediately, the advance of the scouts was so rapid that our line was not engaged until the enemy was entirely clear of the town. I immediately rode back to San Yldefonso for reenforcements, which were hurried forward and the place held.

On May 15, having learned from an escaped Spanish prisoner the location and number of a force of the enemy at San Jose, 3 miles north of San Miguel, I went with Colonel Summers's brigade to that point. Three hundred of the enemy were strongly intrenched here, but were driven off with severe loss. They left 16 dead and 5 wounded on the field.

May 16 I accompanied a column under Captain Gale, Fourth Cavalry, to Sibul. No force of the enemy was met, though hundreds of fugitives were found in the town and were told they might return to their homes.

May 17 I accompanied General Lawton's staff to San Isidro and participated in the capture of that place. The roads from Baliuag north are all dirt roads, good in dry weather, but practically impassable when wet.

In San Isidro I met Señors Dr. Albert and Arsemio, former members of the Filipino congress and peace commission, and through them, at the request of General Lawton, I entered into correspondence with the insurgent authorities, with the result that on May 18, in company with Lieutenant King, aid-de-camp, and Captain McKenna, signal officer, I met the Philippine peace commission, of four members, outside our lines and escorted them in.

May 19 I examined both banks of the Rio Grande as far as Cabaio. May 20 I crossed the river with 7 companies of the Second Oregon under Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, at a point opposite San Antonio, where we found Colonel Tecson with 6 companies of insurgents. An attack was immediately made from the front, while the scouts under Lieutenant Thornton, Second Oregon, who had crossed the river at San Isidro, opened fire from a point somewhat in rear of the insurgent left flank. The

insurgents broke and fled in great disorder, leaving 5 dead on the field. The column then proceeded to San Antonio along the right bank of the river to a point opposite Cabaio, where we crossed the river and rejoined the main column. At 4 p. m. I accompanied General Lawton to a point near the Arayat ferry.

May 21 was taken up in crossing the Rio Grande at the Arayat ferry, which was successfully accomplished by the entire command.

May 22 I moved to Candaba with division headquarters. On May 23, by permission of General Lawton, I returned to Manila, where I have been on duty since that date.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. F. CASE,
Brevet Major and Acting Engineer Officer.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
Manila, P. I., June 2, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to furnish you herewith a copy of the official report this day forwarded by me to the Surgeon-General United States Army regarding the work of the medical department and Hospital Corps during the expedition to the north under the command of Major-General Lawton.

Very respectfully,

HERBERT W. CARDWELL,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON,
Manila, P. I., May 31, 1899.

SURGEON-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to present herewith a special report on the work of the medical department and Hospital Corps during the expedition under the command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., into the provinces of Bulacan, Nueve Ecija, and A. M. de la Pampampa from April 21 to May 30, 1899, inclusive.

On receipt of General Orders, No. 20, Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, dated Manila, P. I., April 19, 1899, designating the troops to take part in the expedition, I required a report from the medical officer of the designated troops as to the physical condition of the medical officers and Hospital Corps men of his command, and as to whether he was sufficiently supplied to carry out the movement contemplated, which was specified as to occupy ten days.

Medical officers—Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Capt. John A. Kulp, U. S. A., and Dr. Isaac W. Brewer, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.; Gale's squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (three dismounted troops), Dr. G. W. Daywalt, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A.; First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Maj. F. D. Pease—Capt. and Asst. Surg. Black being on sick leave; Scott's battery, Dr. E. K. Johnstone, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A., who had not reported but was hurried from Corregidor in time to take the field; Hawthorne's battery, no medical officer.

Under verbal orders from the division commander I detailed Maj. George H. Penrose, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., as brigade surgeon on the expedition, and Lieut. F. M. Kemp, assistant surgeon, U. S. A., from the Fourteenth United States Infantry, to act as ambulance surgeon.

I secured from Capt. F. R. Keefer, commanding officer of the ambulance company, 4 ambulances. These ambulances were in bad order, with leaky canvas and leaky water tanks, no tools, and no spare parts. Animals consisted of one team of 4 native ponies in bad order and two teams of 2 mules each, and for the fourth ambulance I secured, through the division quartermaster, one team of 4 native ponies, the quality of which was not guaranteed, and which proved to be bad.

Hearing semiofficially that battalions from Third U. S. Infantry, Oregon and Minnesota Volunteers would join the column later, I investigated their condition as to medical officers and Hospital Corps men. Finding that the Third Infantry had no medical officer with them, the chief surgeon borrowed, at my request, Dr. Van

Wagemen from the hospital ship *Relief*, and secured an order from corps headquarters detailing Dr. Pitcher from the Seventeenth Infantry to the Third Infantry.

I drew from the Quartermaster's Department 20 extra litters for the use of a squad of 40 Chinese litter bearers furnished by the Quartermaster's Department and assigned by me pro rata to the different organizations.

Maj. G. H. Penrose drew from the purveyor's storehouse sufficient medical and surgical supplies to enable him to conduct a brigade field hospital without tentage, and drew from the commissary 100 rations in addition to liberal supply of beef extract, cocoa, and malted milk.

The Quartermaster's Department was unable to furnish any transportation for these supplies, and it was necessary to load them into ambulances if they were to be carried at all. This seriously interfered with our facilities for transportation of the sick and wounded.

In this connection I desire to express the opinion that the Chinese coolie can be made to play a very important and useful part in any campaigning in these islands. If assured that he will receive his pay and rations he will do any amount of work and face any amount of rifle fire, but he requires to be under the constant supervision of some authority.

In the Oregons each private of the hospital corps was charged with the oversight and made responsible for the presence at all times of 2 coolies with 1 litter, and the service rendered was excellent.

Toward midday of April 22 the command engaged the enemy near Novaliches, and in the capture of that town 1 man was severely wounded and a number of Third and Twenty-second Infantry men had fallen to the rear from heat, and late at night it was decided that the best interest of these men demanded their speedy transfer to the hospital in Manila. As the next day's advance was to be into an unknown and hostile country, it was deemed ill advised to deplete our small ambulance train, and the general commanding wired to Manila for assistance.

An ambulance, with an escort, was sent out, arriving about 3 a. m., and the wounded and seriously sick were transferred to the hospital.

During the 23d, 24th, and 25th of April the command traversed a mountain range, which was to all intents and purposes impassable for vehicles of any description. During these days the ambulances, together with the remainder of the baggage train, were moved bodily by hand, by large details of soldiers, over the worst parts of the road, notwithstanding which all ambulance animals arrived in Norzagaray in very bad condition.

At this point the column was joined by battalions from the Third Infantry, Second Oregon, and Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, with 1 mounted troop of cavalry (Fourth United States) on native ponies, and 1 Utah fieldpiece.

This auxiliary brigade had 2 ambulances with 2-horse teams each. They appeared to be in good condition and seemed to be welcome additions to our train.

On April 27 the headquarters and ambulance train moved into Angat, and receiving instructions from corps headquarters to send a wagon train to Bocaue, on the railroad, 14 miles distant, to procure rations, advantage was taken to send all sick and wounded from the command by ambulance and escort wagons to that point for shipment to Manila.

On April 29 an advance was made upon San Rafael from both sides of the river. As no road was known to exist on the north side of the river, the ambulances took the south bank, along which route all the fighting of that day occurred.

Under orders from higher authority San Rafael was abandoned and the command returned to Angat, and on May 1 a second advance was made on San Rafael, following the same route. The ambulance train, however, forded the river (Rio Grande) at Marunco and proceeded on the north bank, with the exception of 1 ambulance, which accompanied the column on the south bank. On this occasion all the fighting was on the north bank of the river until after the town had been captured. The road was bad, and the bridges very insecure, and the horse teams proved balky and vicious. The fact that Lieutenant Kemp succeeded in getting his train into San Rafael that night evinced dogged persistence with the hardest kind of physical labor for every man in the ambulance train.

At this point it became possible for the quartermaster to designate 1 escort wagon to accompany the train.

The following day the advance was continued on both sides of the river into Bustos, on the south side of the river, and into Baliuag, on the north side.

The fighting at one time on this day extended over a front which from extreme right to left flanks was nearly 4 miles.

At Baliuag the main column remained nearly two weeks, during which time an advance column, accompanied by 2 ambulances, advanced upon and took in order

Maasin, San Yldefonso, and San Miguel. During this time all sick and wounded from the command were transported, via the ford of the Bulacan River, at Quingua, about 14 miles from Malolos, on the railroad, thence to Manila. This required several trips of all available ambulances and the use of all escort wagons returning for rations.

The ford at Quingua was very bad, the water rising several inches into the beds of the wagons, necessitating great delay in carrying patients across a primitive bamboo bridge, and necessitating constant doubling back and forth of the mule teams, as the pony teams had to swim.

At this time it became evident that the horse teams were utterly and absolutely worthless, and if they had been taken into action they would have necessitated the abandonment of the ambulances. This matter was properly reported to the division commander, and before the advance to the north the general designated two 2-mule teams from the pack train to replace the horses.

On May 15 headquarters and ambulance train moved to San Miguel, and from thence, in two succeeding days, to San Isidro.

In making the advance on San Isidro it was considered advisable to leave all sick and wounded at San Miguel, leaving the ambulances empty for the accommodation of any wounded. Three ambulances were left in San Miguel and 3 taken with the advancing column. Fifty-one patients were left behind in the care of the senior medical officer present.

Upon the arrival of the main column at San Isidro it became evident that the troops remaining at San Miguel and south of that point were to be cut loose from the main column with a base of supplies at Malolos, and that the main column was to seek for itself a new base of supplies by a further advance down the Rio Grande.

Telegraphic instructions were thereupon sent to the senior surgeon at San Miguel to care for the sick left there, and to return, via Malolos, to Manila, such as needed hospital treatment at the first possible chance, and to forward immediately to San Isidro 1 ambulance, the escort wagon, and all the brigade supplies not absolutely necessary for the care of the sick on hands for two days.

Through error in the transmission of the telegram the surgeon retained what he considered legitimate supplies for ten days, which was, in fact, everything on hand and forwarded to San Isidro the ambulance only.

The following day it became necessary to send an ambulance to San Miguel with certain women accompanying, an alleged peace commission.

- This ambulance was ordered to be immediately returned and to bring the supplies which had been held at San Miguel by mistake.

Lack of transportation for the commission at San Miguel necessitated the ambulance proceeding to Baliuag, and it never succeeded in joining the column until it reached Candaba and was about to be broken up four days later. It only succeeded in doing this by making the most roundabout trip through Calumpit.

The first advance down the Rio Grande met with serious resistance near Cabaio at dusk, and Lieutenant Kemp used proper discretion in bringing the wounded back to San Isidro rather than attempt surgical treatment of 3 very serious cases in the night on the bivouac without tentage. The following day the main column advanced and forded the Rio Grande with much trouble at or near Arayat.

The following day the entire column moved down the river to Candaba, from which point all sick and wounded were transported by river army gunboats to Calumpit on the railroad and thence to Manila.

At this point the expedition was broken up and the ambulance train proceeded to Manila by road, occupying the greater part of three days for the trip.

On May 23, while the main column was at Candaba, the troops left at San Miguel were ordered to proceed to Baliuag. From one point to the other they were in constant running fight, the insurgents making repeated attacks upon the baggage and ambulance trains.

The Third U. S. Infantry had during this day 2 killed and 14 wounded, all of whom they transported into Baliuag and thence to Manila.

All or a portion of the ambulance company were present in action against the following points: Novaliches, Narzagaray, Angat, Marunco, San Rafael (2), Bustos, Baliuag, Maasin, San Yldefonso, San Miguel, San Isidro (2), and Cabaio, together with a number of smaller skirmishes.

At every stopping place of the column, Major Penrose immediately instituted in some vacant house or convent a suitable shelter for the sick and wounded. This field hospital was equipped with surgical and sterilizer chests, and permanent dressing were applied to all wounded, together with such other surgical procedures as were necessary.

I append a tabulated statement of completed cases in the field hospital. Of these

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 117

515 cases, 102 were returned to duty with the command, and 413 were transferred to hospitals in Manila.

The First North Dakota Volunteers had less sickness of any kind in proportion than any other command in the expedition, and had they not turned over a number of men for transportation on the last day of the trip, most of whom would have continued to do duty if there had been any duty to perform, their figures would have seemed incredible when compared with other organizations. This in spite of the fact that the regiment especially distinguished itself both in the rapidity and thoroughness of its work in the advance, and in the hard work done by every man when in the rear with the bull teams.

The surgeons and officers of the regiment attribute their immunity from sickness to the fact that during the entire trip the regiment never missed a meal, and never was more than an hour late. Every company carried coffee boilers and other cooking utensils, and two days' rations on small pony carts which were kept closed up with their column, no matter what the state of the roads or what the opposition by the enemy or from commanding officers of other organizations. The fact that none of the carts belonged to, or had ever been issued by the Quartermaster's Department, did not prevent their increasing to a greater degree than any other man when in the rear with the bull teams.

In conclusion, while hampered by the insufficient number of medical officers, Hospital Corps men, and ambulance animals, the sick and the wounded were at all times promptly and correctly attended, and were transferred to Manila with the least possible degree of discomfort.

On the occasion of the wounding of Major Diggles, and later of Civilian Scout Young, special trips were made to insure their speedy delivery to city hospital.

Very respectfully,

HERBERT W. CARDWELL,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

	Killed and died of wounds.	Wounded.	Accident.	Diarrhea and dysentery.	Malarial fever.	Sore feet.	Heat exhaustion.	Typhoid.	Others.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Second Oregon Volunteers.....	1	5	2	33	15	9	5	1	11	79	20	436
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry.....				10	2	1	1		4	18	23	1,119
Ninth U. S. Infantry.....				11	3	1			3	18	9	309
Third U. S. Infantry.....	2	17	3	21	25	8	10	5	11	100	14	742
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.....	2	4	5	42	27	2	7		20	109	20	682
Fourth U. S. Cavalry.....		1	1	9	15	3	6		3	25	5	278
Sixth U. S. Artillery.....		1	3	2	3				5	13	2	47
Hospital Corps, U. S. A.....				2	2					7	1	17
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.....	3	3	2	36	12	2	0		21	85	22	643
Utah Artillery.....					2					2		22
Signal Corps.....				3	2				1	6	2	20
First North Dakota Volunteers.....		4	1	18	20		2		6	51	20	458
Civilians.....	1				1					2		
Total.....	9	35	17	187	108	26	37	6	90	515	178	4,932

The Seventeenth and Ninth Infantry were with the command but two days prior to the completion of this report.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND OREGON INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Quartel de Espana, Manila, P. I., June 10, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the provisional brigade under my command from April 22, 1899, to May 25, 1899.

In compliance with Special Orders, No. 21, Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, dated Malolos, April 20, 1899, 7 companies of the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. (companies A, B, F, G, I, K, L, and M), and detachment of the Hospital Corps, Maj. Percy Willis, commanding, and 8 companies Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V. (companies C, D, E, G, H, K, L, and M), Maj. Arthur M.

Diggles, commanding, Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Second Lieutenant Boyd, manding, and a section of Utah Light Artillery, Sergt. J. A. Anderson, command assembled at Bocaue bridge on the afternoon of April 22, 1899, at which time assumed command of same.

The following morning, April 23, the column of troops above mentioned left north of the bridge at Bocaue at 5.30 o'clock, wagon train with ten days' rations and ammunition following, and proceeded on road toward Norzagaray the purpose of forming a junction at that point with the column under the command of Major-General Lawton. Passed through Santa Maria at 6.45 a. m., and arrived River Guyon at 9.15 a. m., and rested during the heat of the day. Left river at p. m. and advanced on road toward Norzagaray. The cavalry in advance commenced skirmishing with the enemy about 3 o'clock p. m. One battalion of the Oregon were deployed in line of skirmishers and advanced with occasional fire until the overlooking Norzagaray was reached at 4 p. m. At this point, with the cavalry on the right dismounted and 2 battalions of the Second Oregon on the left, considerable firing was done with the enemy until dark. At dark command drew back and into camp at water, about 2½ miles from Norzagaray. Distance traveled during 12 miles. Casualties, none.

On the following morning, April 24, broke camp at 5.35 and advanced to Norzagaray. The enemy were entirely routed and driven in disorder across the river. The command entered the city at 6.50 a. m. Frank Witlinger, private, Thirteenth Minnesota, slight gunshot wound left wrist, spent ball; W. D. Burlinger, sergeant, Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota, gunshot wound through left knee, severe; H. Donaldson, private, Company G, Thirteenth Minnesota, strain in muscle of right thigh; William Herr, private, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound in left hand, slight; 1 man Troop I, killed.

After arriving in Norzagaray, 1 battalion Thirteenth Minnesota, Capt. C. T. Smith commanding, was sent out to reconnoiter on road north of Norzagaray leading to Angat, with instructions to discover the enemy's position and strength if possible without bringing on an engagement. On arriving at about 1,500 yards of the town of Angat this battalion was attacked by the enemy, numbering about 50, who fired several volleys from what appeared to be trenches extending along the river bank to the north and south of a large church. In this position they commanded the country for at least 2,000 yards, east and south. After making a close observation of the topography of the country, and reconnoitering the position of the enemy, found a good road from Norzagaray, having traveled a distance of 5 miles.

Captain Heath's battalion, Second Oregon, and Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, left Norzagaray at 9.30 a. m. with instructions to proceed south on road leading to San Jose to form a junction with General Lawton's command. They proceeded south a distance of 5 or 6 miles. The roads were found extraordinarily rough, and about 1 o'clock p. m., the men having become exhausted, the command was halted and Lieutenant Boyd instructed to proceed down the road 3 or 4 miles, or until he formed a junction with General Lawton's command. At 2.45 p. m. Lieutenant Boyd reported with information that he had formed a junction with General Lawton's command after proceeding about 3 miles.

The command then returned, arriving at Norzagaray at 5.45 p. m.

The country passed over was hilly, and the roads in very bad condition. No armed natives were seen, and there was no indication that the country was occupied by armed natives. Distance traveled about 14 miles.

The following morning, April 25, at 5.50 o'clock, Major Eastwick's battalion, Second Oregon, Captain Spear's battalion, Thirteenth Minnesota, and detachment of Utah Light Artillery, under Sergt. J. A. Anderson, left camp at Norzagaray and advanced north on road to Angat. After discovering the enemy's position a piece of artillery was placed at an advantageous point on top of hill overlooking town and began shelling the town. At the same time the infantry was deployed in line of skirmishers and advanced under a heavy fire from the enemy, and drove them back after a very stubborn resistance, and entered the city at 7 o'clock a. m. Upon entering the city received a very heavy fire from enemy, who had crossed the river and taken up a very strong position on bluff overlooking Angat on opposite side, their fire silenced only after rapid and continuous fire lasting nearly an hour.

Having no instructions to occupy the town, returned to Norzagaray at 10 o'clock a. m. Distance traveled, 5 miles.

Casualties: A. T. Williams, private, Company E, Thirteenth Minnesota, gunshot wound left shoulder.

The enemy's strength at this point was estimated at from 1,000 to 1,200.

While this command was absent at Angat troops in camp at Norzagaray were harassed by natives from across the river. A hot fire was kept up for some time. Natives were finally silenced.

Casualties: Sergt. R. Harrington, Company F, Second Oregon, gunshot wound in back of neck.

At 12 o'clock noon General Lawton and staff arrived at Norzagaray and assumed command.

On the following morning, April 26, Maj. P. G. Eastwick's battalion, Second Oregon, was instructed to cross the river at Norzagaray and make reconnoissance of opposite bank and adjacent country. This command advanced until arriving opposite Marunco, where they forded the river and returned to camp. On April 27, in compliance with instructions of the division commander, the provisional brigade, consisting of the Second Oregon Infantry and Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, reorganized under General Field Orders, No. 2, Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, dated at Narzagaray, April 26, 1899, left that point at 7.40 a. m., and marched to Marunco, arriving at 11.30 a. m., no resistance being encountered. Distance traveled, 6 miles.

Before entering Marunco Major Eastwick's battalion, Second Oregon, left the road opposite Angat and proceeded across hills west of Angat and following the valley took a northeasterly course through rice fields to a point on ridge overlooking the town of Sulucan, making a thorough reconnoissance of the country passed through, and entered the town of Sulucan, which was found deserted. This battalion then proceeded down the road and reported at Marunco, no insurgents were seen, and the country passed through was agricultural land. Distance traveled by this battalion after leaving the road, about 5 miles.

One battalion Second Oregon, under command of Captain Heath, and 1 battalion Thirteenth Minnesota, under command of Captain Masterman, the 2 battalions being under the command of Major Diggles, were instructed to and forded the river at Angat at 8.45 a. m. in company with Captain Case, engineer officer, started in a northerly direction gradually veering round to the left, passed up the valley and over a considerable mountain. As the command was about to emerge from the brush on the farther side of the mountain they received a heavy fire from the enemy. As the bullets passed very high they were evidently directed against the few scouts who were stationed on top of the mountain. The command advanced and opened fire on them driving the enemy from their position. Another party opened fire on the command on the left. Three platoons were sent on a high elevation to occupy their attention and cover the movements of the remaining troops in the valley. The command advanced through the valley directing their march toward the river, crossing same at a point a little below the town of Marunco. Returned to command at 4 p. m. Quite a number of streams were crossed on this trip and several sled paths, but no practicable road of any description was found. The country passed through was very rough and almost impassable, troops being compelled to march in single file during a large portion of the time.

On April 29 the Second Oregon Infantry, Major Willis commanding, the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, Major Diggles commanding, and Hawthorne's battery left Marunco at 6 o'clock a. m., fording the river at that point, and advanced on the road leading to San Rafael. On arriving on hilltop overlooking San Rafael, about 1½ miles from the church, 2 battalions of the Thirteenth Minnesota were deployed as skirmishers to the right and rear of the town, their left resting on the road. The battery and Second Oregons on the left. Advanced and entered the city at 12.20 p. m., meeting no opposition, and found the town deserted.

In compliance with orders, command returned to Marunco, leaving San Rafael at 3.30 p. m. and arriving at Marunco at 6 p. m., returning through Polo and fording the river at that point. Distance traveled about 15 miles. The country passed through after fording the stream was found to be thickly wooded and nothing but sled paths winding through the hills and through deep gulches, it being necessary to dismount field pieces and carry them through these rough places. After reaching the main road near Polo, the road was found to be in fair condition, with the exception of one bridge, which required repairing before the artillery could be taken across.

April 30 the command remained in camp at Marunco and the troops were mustered for pay.

May 1, in compliance with General Field Orders, No. 4, headquarters First Division Eighth Army Corps, dated at Angat, Luzon, May 1, 1899, the Provisional Brigade (Second Oregon and Thirteenth Minnesota) and Scott's battery left Marunco with wagon train at 11.50 a. m. and forded the river at that point, and proceeded on main road to Polo toward San Rafael. After advancing on the road about 2 miles the advance guard was fired upon by insurgent sharpshooters, who were dislodged and fire was silenced by the scouts and flankers. Upon arrival within about 1½ miles of San Rafael the advance guard was again fired upon by the enemy, who held a position on the ridge to the right and in the rear of the town. The Second

Oregon Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, with instructions to clear the ridge and enter the town from the rear, moved forward against the enemy. Major Willis's battalion deployed in line of skirmishers and advanced to the front.

Major Eastwick's battalion, acting as support to Scott's battery, and Thirteenth Minnesota proceeded down the road and entered the town at 4.30 p. m. After entering the town the enemy opened heavy fire from across the river from the left and in front. Our troops were immediately placed in position and returned the fire. The commanding general arriving at this time, Scott's battery was placed into position and after shelling the enemy for about thirty minutes silenced their fire. The 2 battalions of the Second Oregon under the command of lieutenant-colonel, which had marched to the right, entered the town from the rear at 6 p. m., having forced the enemy back and from their position. The Third U. S. Infantry (2 battalions, Captain Hannay, commanding) reported for duty at 5.20 p. m. The distance traveled, about 5 miles. Enemy were estimated at about 1,000. Their loss was considerable; unable to estimate their exact number.

Our casualties were as follows: Private Frank Lewis, Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota, killed; William Betzold, private Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, gunshot wound, left arm; Edgar J. Chamberlin, corporal Company K, Second Oregon Infantry, gunshot wound through right leg above knee; William E. Smith, Company K Second Oregon, gunshot wound, left arm, fracturing same; John T. Reeves, private Company A, Second Oregon, gunshot wound through right leg, severe.

The remains of Frank Lewis, Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota, were buried in the square in front of the church, it being impossible to transport the body.

May 2.—Under instructions from the division commander, the provisional brigade Third U. S. Infantry and Scott's battery, accompanied by wagon train, left San Rafael at 6 a. m., preceded by Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer, and scouts, advanced on road to Baliuag. A short distance from San Rafael scouts and advance guard were repeatedly fired on by the enemy. The column advanced along road passing through several small villages, with 1 battalion of the Third in advance, in line of skirmishers, arriving at opening about 1½ miles from Baliuag. Fire was opened on our line by the enemy who held strong position on opposite side of opening, protected by line of bamboo thickets; were also in front and to the left from a strongly fortified position in the village of Santa Aeno. Scott's battery immediately placed into position and opened fire on the enemy. One battalion of the Third Infantry deployed in line of skirmishers on the right. Commanding general arrived at this time and assumed command.

Under his direction battery ceased firing, it being reported from the line that a flag of truce was seen advancing to our lines, and by direction of the division commander Capt. J. F. Case, Sergt. Maj. John W. Marshall, Second Oregon, and the commanding general's orderly, with the division flag as a flag of truce, advanced toward the enemy's lines.

Upon arriving at a point about 300 yards from the enemy's lines they were fired upon, and immediately dismounted and retired as soon as possible.

The Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry was placed on the right of the Third Infantry and deployed in line of skirmishers, facing toward Baliuag, same having been entered at 3.10 p. m., scouts having entered in advance of main column and found the place deserted by the enemy. Distance traveled, 7 miles. Enemy's loss severe, unable to estimate the exact number, it being reported from the line that a large number of wounded, carried on stretchers, could be seen.

Our casualties were as follows:

Jacob Fisher, Company E, Third Infantry, gunshot wound dorsal side of penis; Frederick Miller, private, Company L, Third Infantry, penetrating wound left thigh fracturing bone.

The command, after arriving in Baliuag, were assigned quarters and went into camp. Outposts and street patrols were established, and sentries placed over all Government property.

May 4.—The Provisional Brigade, Third Infantry, and detachment Utah light artillery left Baliuag at 6.40 a. m., and advanced on road leading to Maasin. Found enemy very strongly entrenched on river bank in front of Maasin, and drove them out after repeated and heavy fire. Command immediately followed across the river and occupied Maasin, the enemy retiring to San Yldefonso. Went into camp at Maasin at 11.35 a. m. Distance traveled, about 8 miles. Enemy's loss severe, exact number not known.

Our casualties as follows: Fred Buckendorf, private, Company L, wounded in left side, serious; James Barrett, private, Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota, wounded in right shoulder, severe.

May 5.—In camp at Maasin, Luzon, Martin Rekdahl, private, Company G, Second

Oregon Infantry, accidentally shot himself in right foot, slight. Henry Lehman, private, Company M, Third Infantry, accidentally shot through left arm and into body; died and was buried at Maasin. Captain Spear's battalion was sent out to reconnoiter. Company E (Lieutenant Mellinger) proceeded to the west along the river for about 2½ miles. Destroyed 500 bushels of rice in bins and 150 bags. The enemy was not sighted and but a few houses found containing families. He reports having seen a long wagon train, consisting chiefly of bull carts moving in a northerly direction. Company H (Captain Bjornstad) covered about 2 miles to the northwest. Didn't encounter any enemy, but found about 100 rounds of new Remington ammunition, lately buried, which he destroyed. Also found 8 bolos hid in a straw stack. Company D (Captain Metz) covered about 2 miles to the northwest. He destroyed 494 sacks of rice and 45 bushels in bins, three 5-gallon cans of sirup, and 15 barrels of sugar. He reported seeing the enemy at a distance at about three-quarters of a mile to the front and left.

Company C (Lieutenant Bunker) went to the east about 2½ miles. He destroyed about 500 bushels of rice in bins. Reported seeing a few natives moving who claimed their destination was Baliuag. The enemy was not encountered and no shots were fired.

Major Willis's battalion, Second Oregon, left camp at 8 o'clock a. m. and advanced on road leading toward San Miguel. The enemy were sighted in a town about 2 miles from Maasin. They had very strong intrenchments and their number estimated to be about 1,000. Their position was on a hill in the town with a line extending about a half a mile from each side of the road. The country from Maasin for the first mile was quite thick with trees and shrubbery, but from there on was open.

May 6.—In camp at Maasin.

May 7.—In camp at Maasin. Major Willis's battalion left camp at 7.30 a. m., and marched north, following road for about 2 miles, where battalion was halted. Major Willis then with a small bodyguard went forward to a point of hill in front of town of San Ildefonso, about 800 yards distant. The enemy did not appear in as great numbers as previously seen, not over 150 being visible. Saw several mounted officers moving about. Trenches appeared to be facing south and southeast.

May 8.—In camp at Maasin. At 1.30 p. m. Colonel Summers, with Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry (Lieutenant Walsh), Company F, Second Oregon (Lieutenant Grim), acting as escort, and Captain Case, engineer officer, left camp for the purpose of investigating the enemy's position with view to attack, Maj. A. M. Diggles, of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, accompanying party. Arriving on hilltop overlooking San Ildefonso, the command halted, and Captain Case, with Colonel Summers and party, proceeded to make observations of the enemy's lines. The enemy were seen deploying in line on ridge to the right of road, and presumably into trenches. Bugle calls were heard in the city, and the enemy could very plainly be seen, their number estimated to be about 1,000. Captain Case made drawings of position of the enemy, and just on completion of same, enemy opened fire from a small, low ridge in advance of their main position. Company F immediately took position on crest of hill overlooking the works of the enemy and fired three volleys for the purpose of locating their exact position. Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, took position behind hill and awaited orders. While in this position Maj. A. M. Diggles, who was standing in road at the head of this company, was struck in the forehead by a bullet coming apparently from down the road. The wound was mortal. John G. Miller, corporal, Company F, Second Oregon, gunshot wound left arm, slight. Command returned to camp at 4 p. m., having traveled a distance of 4 miles.

May 9 and 10.—In camp at Maasin.

May 11.—In camp at Maasin. Young's scouts reported at 6 p. m., 26 men.

May 12.—In camp at Maasin.

May 13.—Provisional brigade, consisting of Second Oregon, Thirteenth Minnesota, detachment Utah light artillery, left Maasin at 8 a. m. and advanced on road toward San Miguel. Passed through San Ildefonso at 9.25 a. m., enemy having been driven out by the scouts earlier in the morning. At 1.35 p. m. Captain Case reported the capture of San Miguel by Young's scouts and 1 company of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry and 1 company of the Second Oregon Infantry, under command of Captain Heath. The main column left San Ildefonso at 3.15 p. m., arriving at San Miguel at 5 p. m. Distance traveled from Maasin, 8 miles.

May 14.—In camp at San Miguel.

May 15.—Left San Miguel at 3 p. m. and advanced on road leading to San Isidro. Immediately after leaving San Miguel, Company K, of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, advance guard, engaged the enemy and drove them rapidly through and beyond Salacut, killing and wounding quite a number and capturing 26 guns.

First Sergt. H. M. Howard, Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota, gunshot wound in right wrist, slight.

Arrived at Salacut at 5.05 p. m. and went into camp, having traveled a distance of 4 miles.

May 16.—Left Salacut at 6 a. m. and advanced on road leading to San Isidro. Scouts in advance engaged the enemy and drove them across the river and from strong trenches occupied by them, after a short and very severe engagement.

The enemy on retiring across the river set fire to bridge, which the scouts extinguished in face of fire from enemy.

This river is not fordable and the bridge was a very important necessity to the command. Their number was estimated at more than 100, of whom 6 were killed, 7 wounded, and 1 captured; 14 guns taken. Our loss was Private James Harrington (scout), Company G, Second Oregon, killed. Command arrived at San Roque at 9.30 a. m. and went into camp. During the afternoon the wagon trains arrived and were pulled across the stream by hand and into camp. At 11 o'clock p. m. Colonel French reported the Twenty-second Infantry for duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann reported 1 battalion of the North Dakota Infantry the same hour; Scott's battery reported also; these troops being under command of Colonel French.

May 17.—Provisional brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second Infantry, 1 battalion of the North Dakota Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, Second Oregon Infantry, Scott's battery (3 guns), detachment Utah light artillery (1 gun), left San Roque at 5 a. m. and advanced on road leading to San Isidro. Arriving in sight of town, troops were deployed in line of battle, North Dakotas and Second Oregons on right of road and right of line; marched into position in column of files. The Twenty-second Infantry took position on left of road; battery center on road, with Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry in column of files on each side of the road.

The extreme right and left of the line deployed well to the front, forming a shallow V shape. In this position the line advanced. The right became immediately engaged with the enemy, who were in strong force in front of San Isidro, on the right of the road. Fire was returned, and the command continued to advance. After advancing a short distance line halted; battery placed in position and shelled the right flank of enemy. The main fire of the enemy having been silenced by the artillery, the line continued to advance and entered the city at 9.40 a. m. The Twenty-second Infantry on the left of the line met no enemy, and entered without any resistance whatever. Enemy's loss was very great; exact numbers not known.

Our casualties: Martin E. Tew, private, Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota, gunshot wound in right leg, very slight; Frank M. Butts, private, Company L, Second Oregon, gunshot wound in right leg, slight. Distance traveled, 5 miles.

Major Eastwick's battalion and 1 battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry both under command of Major Eastwick, left San Isidro at 4.40 a. m. and proceeded east and occupied the town of Capan, arriving at 6.10 p. m. The column, preceded by an advance guard, entered the town without resistance. At 7:30 p. m. the Thirteenth Infantry reported to Major Eastwick and went into camp, having marched direct from San Miguel.

May 18.—In camp at San Isidro. Major Eastwick reported back to this place with the 2 battalions under his command at 8.15 a. m.

May 19.—In camp at San Isidro. Immediately after breakfast headquarters building was fired upon by a few insurgent sharpshooters from across river. At 5 a. m. the provisional brigade, consisting of Second Oregon Infantry and Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, left camp at San Isidro and advanced on road toward Santa Ana.

At a point about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from San Isidro, and opposite San Antonio, the Second Oregon Infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, forded the river with Major Willis's battalion deployed as skirmishers; commenced to advance at 8.30 a. m. Main column continued toward Cabaio, which place was entered at 12 noon. The Second Oregon Infantry engaged the enemy at 8.30 a. m. and drove them back killing 3 or 4, and advanced through San Antonio, and, fording the river, arrived at Cabaio at 4.15 p. m., having traveled a distance of over 10 miles. The main column went into camp on entering the city at 12 noon. The wagon train, having taken different and shorter route, arrived at 10 a. m.

May 21.—Left Cabaio at 5.30 a. m. and marched on road leading to Arayat; arrived at river bank opposite at 12 o'clock noon, and during the afternoon transported wagon train and supplies and forded the river. Went into camp near Arayat. Distance traveled, 10 miles.

On the same day, wagon train following a short distance in rear of column, guarded by Companies A and L, Second Oregon, was fired on by enemy in position on opposite side of the river. Returned fire and silenced the enemy. No casualties.

Camped for the night in small village on opposite side of the river, near Arayat.

May 22.—Left camp at 5 a. m. and marched on road leading to Arayat, arriving

at said point and reporting to the commanding general at 5.30 a. m., and, according to instructions, proceeded to Candaba, following in rear of Colonel French's column, passing through Santa Ana and arriving at Pasing, a small village opposite Candaba, at 10.30 a. m., having traveled a distance of about 8 miles.

May 23.—Left camp at Pasing at 6.05 a. m. and advanced on road leading to Calumpit, passing through the villages of Catalina and San Sebastian, arriving at San Luis at 9.30 a. m. Distance traveled, 6 miles. At 1.15 p. m. column moved forward again, passing through the villages of San Rita and San Petro, arriving at San Simon at 2.45 p. m. On arrival of wagon train at 3.45 p. m., a heavy rain falling, went into camp for the night. Distance traveled, 3½ miles. Total distance traveled during the day, 9½ miles.

Andrews's battery (D, First Artillery), attached to provisional brigade per verbal orders commanding general Eighth Army Corps.

May 24.—Broke camp at San Simon at 5.30 a. m. and passing through the villages of San Jose, Santa Lucia, Apalat, San Bicent, and Sulapan, arriving at Calumpit at 8.30 a. m., having traveled a distance of 10 miles. Went into camp.

May 25.—According to instructions, the provisional brigade, consisting of the Second Oregon and Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, was dissolved, the Thirteenth Minnesota being stationed along the railroad from Caloocan to Malolos and the Second Oregon returning to its quarters in the Cuartel de España, in Manila.

In closing this my official report of operations of my command, and in compliance with instructions of the division commander, I have the honor to specially request and recommend for promotion for meritorious and faithful service during the campaign, the following officers:

Maj. Percy Willis, Second Oregon Infantry.

Maj. Philip G. Eastwick, jr., Second Oregon Infantry.

Capt. H. L. Heath, Second Oregon Infantry.

Capt. (now Maj.) J. P. Mastermann, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.

Capt. C. T. Spear, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.

Capt. Oscar Seebach, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.

First Lieut. Eugene P. Crowne, Second Oregon Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general.

First Lieut. L. H. Knapp, acting quartermaster and commissary in connection with his other duties as commissary of the Second Oregon Infantry.

Second Lieut. F. A. Mead, acting ordnance officer, Second Oregon Infantry.

In recommending these officers for promotion I desire to call attention to their untiring efforts and faithful performance of every duty assigned them, and furthermore, the successful accomplishment of same, as well as their consideration of the officers and men under them.

I have the honor to recommend that medals of honor be granted Sergt. Maj. John W. Marshall, Second Oregon Infantry, Sergt. J. A. Anderson, in charge of section of Utah light artillery, and Private Gilbert F. Smith, Company F, Second Oregon Infantry, as evidence of meritorious and faithful services.

In recommending Sergt. J. A. Anderson, I desire to call attention particularly to the efficient work of section of battery under his command in front of the enemy at Naragaray on April 24, when, in face of the fire of the enemy, the artillery was moved on the firing line and advanced with the line on the road within 400 yards of the enemy, and upon all other occasions this soldier is to be complimented upon the efficient manner in which he handled his piece and the effective execution.

As a closing remark I desire to express my appreciation of having had the opportunity of serving and being under the immediate command of an officer of the ability, tact, and consideration of the division commander, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,
*Brevet Brigadier-General,
Commanding Provisional Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.*

SECOND SQUADRON, FOURTH CAVALRY,
Morong, P. I., June 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with requirements of paragraph 797, Army Regulations, I have the honor to report as follows regarding the duties and operations of this command, as a portion of what is known as Major-General Lawton's northern expedition, during April and May of the current year.

The squadron, consisting of Troops C, G, and L, Fourth Cavalry (dismounted), reported for duty with the expedition in camp near the Chinese hospital, in rear of La Loma Church, on the evening of April 21, having by previous orders been assigned to duty as provost guard of the expedition. The following day it acted as rear guard of the expedition, reaching Novaliches shortly before dark.

On April 23 and 24 it was the advance guard of the wagon-train escort, the balance consisting of two battalions of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. During these two days, in which but a portion of the wagon train was advanced to San José del Monte, the squadron, besides making itself useful in moving the baggage of the command, was constantly on the alert against harassment on the left flank, along which frequent small parties and pickets of the enemy were seen, but who failed to annoy us.

On April 25 the squadron, leaving the main body of the column, acted as escort to the commanding general to Norzagaray, where it awaited the arrival of the rest of the command, the town being already occupied by our troops.

The march, so far as the squadron was concerned, from Norzagaray to Baliuag, was without incident. Baliuag was reached about noon of May 3, the squadron receiving orders to proceed up the road leading toward the north and cut off refugees of the enemy, who had been seen crossing the rice fields. The advance was begun up this road, which afterwards developed to be the main road to San Miguel, and after crossing about half the distance to the high land on the north side of the rice lands, was fired on by a party of the enemy, who occupied the high ground in front. Two troops were at once deployed and moved forward alternately on either side of the road, but the advance was stopped, due to the excessive heat and the exhaustion due to the same.

The third troop was sent to the flank and covered the ground designated, obtaining no prisoners.

After sufficiently resting the men I followed this troop, and having made a swing to the left, covering a large section of the country north of the town and obtaining no results, I went into Baliuag and reported there for duty.

The duty of provost guard was resumed two days later, having been performed by the Oregon regiment during the meantime.

The stay at Baliuag was uneventful, the routine duty of provost guard being performed by the squadron, which left Baliuag on the 16th, reaching San Miguel the same day.

On the following day I was sent by the commanding general to Sibul, having in addition to the squadron 2 battalions, of the Third Infantry and 2 guns. This journey, due to insufficient information and poor guides, was abortive, and the command returned to San Miguel that night exhausted and having accomplished nothing.

On the 18th of May the squadron marched to Gapan, forming a portion of the temporary brigade commanded by Capt. J. W. Hannay, Third Infantry, and was returned to San Miguel on the 19th, marching the following day for Baliuag, where it arrived as a reenforcement to the temporary garrison on May 21.

On May 25, being relieved from duty at Baliuag and ordered to Manila, I started via Malolos, arriving there the following day, and on May 27 took rail transportation, reaching Manila at about noon.

There were no casualties in the squadron during the expedition.

Very respectfully,

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command on the northern expedition during parts of the months of April and May, 1899.

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, I reported with my command, 2 guns of Light Battery D (Dyer's), Sixth Artillery, to Major-General Lawton, at La Loma at 5 p. m. on the 21st of April.

On the 22d the column marched to Novaliches where our gun was placed in action against a party of the enemy intrenched on the summit of a sugar-loaf-shaped hill. The enemy was silenced, but not dislodged, as the target was difficult to reach with shell and shrapnel seemed to tear up the crest of the hill without catching the enemy who appeared to be in a trench just in rear of the crest.

They would disappear at the flash of the gun and reappear after the burst of the projectile. The range was 1,100 yards and their elevation above that of the gun upward of 200 feet. On the 23d the march was resumed and was uneventful, and

ly interesting from the remarkable number of almost impracticable places to be found in any given portion of the trail.

April 24.—The column reached San José, where I applied for and obtained permission to keep the battery wagon containing forage rations and spare ammunition up with the guns. I experienced no difficulty in doing this, and thereafter my mind was relieved and the men and animals received their food at the proper times.

April 25.—The command accompanied the advance guard to Norzagaray, where the section of B Battery, Utah light artillery, under Sergeant Anderson of that battery, reported to me.

April 27.—The command was ordered to Angat, where, on the 29th, I received orders to report with 2 guns to Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, First North Dakota Volunteers, and I went with him toward San Rafael along the south bank of the river.

Near the latter place the enemy was encountered and I succeeded in getting 1 gun into action well up on the enemy's left flank. After the third shot his fire ceased. After a rest and a dinner the command returned to Angat.

May 1.—I was directed to report to Colonel Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, commanding provisional brigade at Marunco. I drew rations and in the afternoon reported to Colonel Summers and marched to San Rafael, fording the river just below Marunco and going down the north side of the stream.

Arrived in San Rafael, the division commander ordered me to put the 3 guns in action against a force of the enemy in the woods across the river. Compliance with this order was delayed and a serious accident nearly caused by the brigade commander, without my knowledge, detaching the rear piece and ordering it into the exact place where the limbers of the other pieces were to rest. With horses a serious collision would have resulted, but this was prevented by the slowness and natural timidity of the mules with which the guns were equipped. The engagement lasted nearly an hour, and in the course of it Private William Betzold, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, was wounded in the arm.

May 2.—The column marched to Baliuag, engaging the enemy about 2 miles from that place. The battery was in action a short time at a range of 2,300 yards.

No casualties.

May 3 to 14, inclusive, was spent in Baliuag. On May 4 was detached and ordered to report to Colonel Summers. It took part in the capture of Maasin and in one or two minor engagements between San Miguel and San Isidro, reporting again to me before the engagement resulting in the taking of the latter place.

May 14.—Sergeant Markland, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, reported to me with 1 section of that battery at Baliuag. The next day the battery marched with Gale's squadron (dismounted) to San Miguel.

May 16.—I was ordered to report to Colonel French, Twenty-second Infantry, near the old church. At 3 p. m. the column of Colonel French took the road for San Isidro, going into bivouac about sundown at a small village whose name I have not been able to learn, but again took the road at 9 p. m., pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the division commander to reinforce Colonel Summers, commanding provisional brigade.

The camp of the latter was reached about 11 p. m.; the Utah section, detached at Baliuag May 4, reported to me immediately.

The position given the battery by verbal order was on the road in column of sections, the head of the column to be on the skirmish line as it advanced. The battery was engaged some minutes and did effective work. There were no casualties, but 2 mules were shot, one of them fatally.

On May 18 I was ordered to send 2 sections to report to Colonel Summers, and to report with the other 2 to Colonel French, Second Provisional Brigade. I placed Sergeant Anderson, B Battery, Utah Light Artillery, in command of the platoon reporting to Colonel Summers.

At 3 p. m. the Second Provisional Brigade started for Cabaio and found the enemy near that place entrenched on both sides of the Rio Grande. A spirited engagement occurred, which was ended by darkness. One cannoneer (Private Charles Heinz) had his foot crushed by the wheel of a gun carriage going into action.

Hearing the brigade commander (Colonel French) express a wish to know whether the river was fordable, induced 2 men of the battery (Privates Robert Bard and William Brady) to go with my permission and find out. They waded nearly across the river undiscovered by the Filipino sentinel on the opposite bank, though they got within a few yards of him. Returning, they reported to Colonel French that the stream was fordable.

Next day the march was resumed to Cabaio, where the command encamped until 3 p. m. on the 20th, when it started for Arayat, bivouacking about a mile above the Arayat ford.

On the 21st the crossing to Arayat was effected; on the 22d the command marched to Candaba. Here on the 23d the other platoon of the battery, under Sergeant Anderson, reported to me.

On the 24th I received orders to leave the Utah section at Candaba as part of the garrison of that place and to proceed with the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry and 1 battalion Ninth Infantry, all under command of Lieut. Col. Treumann, First North Dakota Infantry, to Manila.

This column marched to Apalit on the 24th, and on the morning of the 25th of May crossed the Rio Grande and went into camp at Calumpit.

Here an order was received from division headquarters at Malolos for all commands to return to Manila by rail.

About 5 p. m. on the 26th of May the train arrived, and at 10.30 p. m. the command reached its quarters at the Bishop's Palace, Paco.

With reference to the roads traversed, they were good, with the exception of that from Novaliches to San Jose, which was no more than an ill-defined trail.

There are some stone bridges, for the most part in good condition, but the wooden bridges were almost without exception wholly unsafe for loaded wagons. The plan I usually followed was to unhitch the mules and lead them over, then unlimber and haul the limber and gun carriage across separately by means of a prolonge; this limited the load on any one span to about 1 ton.

The wagon was at no time loaded to its full capacity, and I required it on several occasions to be partially unloaded and the property carried across. I found that whenever bamboo entered largely into the composition of a bridge, that bridge could support far more than its appearance would lead one to suppose.

Between Manila and Norzagaray there are many small streams, only to be crossed by fording. With one exception (about 3 miles north of Novaliches) these have rocky bottoms, but they are usually more or less difficult of access, owing to the approaches being of a width to accommodate the narrow sleds and carts used in that country. The crossing of the river just below Marunco is very good indeed, the banks being low and the stream shallow, its bed being of coarse gravel. The water all through this country was excellent.

From Baliuag to San Isidro the road was fair, but gave evidence of becoming impassable in wet weather. The streams are all mud bottomed and unfordable, and the bridges mostly wooden and in bad condition. The water is mostly stagnant and bad, and at San Miguel the very air seemed charged with malaria.

A good road runs from San Isidro to Arayat, but the ford at the latter place is deep, the water running over the limber chests.

From Arayat to Candaba, the road was good, except for a broken bridge at Santa Ana, and that from Candaba to Calumpit is good, and remarkable for the fact that there is not a single bridge on it, nor does it need one, except where it crosses the river at Calumpit. There the only means of crossing are the footbridge, on the railroad bridge, and a swing ferry with a capacity of one wagon.

The health of the men was excellent until after several days had been spent at Baliuag, when fever and dysentery began to appear, and these grew rapidly worse as the command advanced northward. Seven men of my original 32 were sent to the hospital—1 from a wound, 2 from local abscesses, and 1 from cellulitis, 2 from fever, and 1 from dysentery.

The behavior of the men was at all times good. Some of the hardest work on the march fell to their lot, but they stood it cheerfully. Such work as repairing bridges, digging down approaches, lifting on the guns, or hauling on the prolonge fell to their lot daily, often a great deal of it, and the teams being reduced (4 mules to a gun instead of 6) they had to march most all the time, yet I never heard a word of complaint.

With such men as I command it is hard to discriminate in the matter of recommendations, and nothing occurred on the expedition that called for more than a simple performance of duty, except perhaps the performance of the two men before mentioned; but there is one man I wish especially to mention and to recommend that he be granted a certificate of merit. He is private John Clark, Battery D, Sixth Artillery. He has served under me since the beginning of the war, and whether it was to repair under fire a revetment blown away by the blast of a gun, to dig, to build bridges, to do any one of the numerous onerous jobs that fall to the lot of an artilleryman in a wild country, or to fill his post (No. 2) at the piece, no matter how hot the fire or how exposed the position, Clark was the first man in place, and he was unfailing in this, though very ill at times, and the example he thus set was of great value indeed in an organization of so many young men. Private Clark is now serving his — enlistment.

Very respectfully,

E. D. SCOTT,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith statement of transportation of this command as inspected by me this day. I have assumed a load for the 4-mule escort wagons at 3,000 pounds, and the 2-mule at 2,500. Pony carts can carry about 500, and the caribao or bull carts only 1,000 under ordinary conditions. The pack-mule load is assumed at 200 pounds.

The transportation is all in fair shape, especially the mule escort teams. The pack train is fair; animals are in good condition, there being but two sore backs; but the mules are green, will not follow the bell, and many are much too large for pack mules. The packers are, most of them, new hands (only three being old packers), and the loads must be light.

The caribao carts are of all sorts and kinds. All are heavy, some have solid wood wheels, and all are utterly unsuited for army transportation with a moving column. The best speed to be gotten from them is only about 2 miles per hour, under rather than over, and about 7 miles per day is their limit on distance. They must be soaked in water every hour or so or they fall in harness, and all around are about as thoroughly unsuited to our uses as it is possible to conceive of.

As contract transportation to haul supplies to a depot where time was not considered they might answer, but only for such purpose. The falling of a caribao necessitates stopping the entire train to wait till he is watered and soaked and on his feet again, or leaving behind in an enemy's country a cart with its load and a few men as guard to take big chances on ever getting to camp. The roads only permit of one cart at a time and not a double line, and the train is strung out for a longer distance than safety admits of.

Pony carts are only makeshifts to carry small loads, such as officers' and company mess outfits, and they add also to the length of the line.

Good roads are a necessity for both pony and bull carts, and a slight rain adds 100 per cent to the difficulty of getting either along. A heavy rain will render these roads impassable to either.

Two bull carts have, as a rule, been assigned each company. The average strength being placed at 75, five days' rations will weigh 1,400 pounds, 100 rounds of ammunition (Krag) per man, 622 pounds, and the company mess outfit and officers' small supply of stores push up 100 pounds more, making 2,122 pounds in all, or a good load for a fine road.

If the ammunition be Springfield the load is increased by 200 pounds. Three carts per company of 75 men is little enough, and with two carts the wagon guard spends most of the time tugging at the ropes to pull them along. All this under the best conditions. Under others the rate of progress can only be judged by the experience of the column from Novaliches to San Jose and Norzagaray, where the men were forced to take the place of the bulls under the yokes, and about 3 miles per day was the rate of march.

Very respectfully,

C. G. STARR,
Major, Inspector-General, U. S. V., Inspector-General.

TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS SENT AND RECEIVED.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 20, 1899.

CIRCULAR.

The officers of the personal and division staffs will assemble at La Loma Church promptly at 5 p. m. to-morrow, the 21st instant, prepared to take field as contemplated in General Orders, No. 20, current series, these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, April 20, 1899.

General MACARTHUR, *Malolos*:

Will you kindly let me know what troop of cavalry you will send to me? I will communicate with you later as to the time and place of sending it.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, 20.

General LAWTON:

Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Boyd, will join you at any time or place you may designate. How would it be to have them join the infantry column at Bocaue and march with them to the point where they will join you on the road? If they are to be sent to Manila it will take several days to arrange the matter and use up the horses considerably. In any event I ought to know quickly what is desired, so as to make the necessary arrangements.

MACARTHUR.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, April 20, 1899.

General MACARTHUR:

Very well. Let the troop meet me on that road as you suggest.

LAWTON, *Major-General, U. S. V.*

[Telegram.]

MALolos, April 20, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Cavalry troop and 1 gun of Utah Artillery will accompany infantry from Bocaue.

MACARTHUR.

HDQRS. FIRST NORTH DAKOTA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Novaliches, April 22, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of my command this day. My regiment being the advance guard of the column, left camp at 5 a. m., sharp, a point and flankers being sent out from the leading company (H) after leaving the trenches of the Fourth Infantry near La Loma. The column advanced about 6 miles without opposition, when a small force of the enemy was encountered. The support of Company H was deployed, Companies B and I extending the line to the right and Companies A and G on the left. The enemy made but feeble resistance, and after driving them for about a mile, the companies were again put in column.

Continuing about a mile, the enemy was encountered in larger force, a spirited fight developing on both sides of the road to our front, principally on our left. Companies H and B deployed on the left, and Companies A and G on the right of the road.

The enemy was at once engaged and routed, being driven back about 2 miles through the village of Novaliches, which is now occupied. The firing line experienced some difficulty in crossing the Rio de Tulihan. Company B in crossing a narrow but very deep part of the stream lost a number of rifles and ammunition belts but all of them were recovered later.

Novaliches was occupied at 10 a. m., and I was ordered to establish a line of outposts to the left. The line as occupied extends from the Rio de Tulihan to a point just beyond the village of Novaliches, being placed at from 400 to 1,200 yards west of the road.

Following are the casualties in my command: Corporal Fred C. Hausche, Company B, severe wound in right breast, exit in back; Private Howard E. Fell, Company H, contusion of left side, caused by bullet striking and exploding two cartridges in belt; and 2 men in the hospital overcome by heat and exhaustion—Private Ralph Callahan, Company H, and Private Arthur E. Ellston, Company C. A number of others were temporarily overcome from the same cause but later reported to their companies.

Respectfully submitted.

W. C. TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Novaliches, April 22, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
*First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Twenty-second
and Third U. S. Infantry, Fourth U. S. Cavalry,
Hawthorne's and Scott's batteries.*

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that your organization is charged with the safe crossing of your transportation over the river just below this town.

Very respectfully,

EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Copy shown chief quartermaster.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Novaliches, April 22, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Third U. S. Infantry.

CAPTAIN: The general directs that all your transportation be placed on this side of the river before dark to-night, that you may not be delayed on the march to-morrow.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Novaliches, April 22, 1899—6 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Palace, Manila:

Transportation across the river. Much worn out. Insurgents, about 50, moved out on San Mateo road, about 1 mile, where they have a trench from which they fire occasionally. I will move to-morrow early. The insurgents will doubtless close in behind me and occupy this position and cut communication. If opposed along line of march, as I have been to-day, will require additional supply of ammunition. Strong escort will be necessary to anything coming to us.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Novaliches, April 22, 1899—6.52 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Surgeon now reports seriously wounded man liable to die if not sent in to Manila. Chance for his life if returned. Can not ambulance and escort from La Loma church be sent out to-night? Can not spare one of mine; besides there will be great difficulty in recrossing stream with ambulance. Kindly answer.

LAWTON.

130 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 22, 1899

General LAWTON:

Ambulance has been ordered from First Reserve Hospital and escort is in reading at La Loma Church to go with it to you. Am awaiting information from the hospital that ambulance has started. When notified will inform you of hour of departure from hospital and La Loma.

BARRY, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 22, 1899

General LAWTON:

Ambulance with 2 hospital-corps men and escort of 1 officer and 25 men left Loma Church for your camp at 11.40 p. m.

BARRY, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Novaliches, April 23, 1899

Maj. C. G. STARR,
Inspector-General, Bocaue:

Just started for San Jose. Our telegraph line will probably be cut when we leave this town. The general directs that you push out your cavalry and open communication with us when near Norzagaray. We were fired on by small force for 4 miles yesterday. Our casualty, only 2 wounded.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, April 23, 1899

LAWTON:

Both dispatches received. Thanks. Your movement to-day I expect will be considerable in my front. I would, therefore, like to hear from time to time you are getting along and what you find. The Bocaue column leaves this a. m. in good shape, nearly 1,300 strong. My own arrangements are all ready to commence operations to-morrow, and expect to be fully engaged 4.30 a. m. If you are at San Jose you may hear some of the noise. Good luck and hearty good wishes for best success in every direction.

MACARTHUR

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, April 23, 1899

General LAWTON:

Am here by order waiting opportunity to join my regiment. General MacArthur states it will be at least three days. If any opportunity arises whereby I can rejoin sooner, please wire me.

BALLANCE, Captain

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
About 3 Miles North of Novaliches, April 23, 1899

Colonel BARRY:

The general has gone on with the Third Infantry as advance guard, followed by Third and Scott's platoon. Road frightful. Left me here to make crossing and to look after rest of command after crossing train. No opposition as yet since leaving Novaliches. Am surprised that the line has not been cut.

EDWARDS

[Telegram.]

MANILA, April 23, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Front*:

Glad to hear from you. Nothing new. *Puebla*, with companies Ninth Infantry, just arrived with large mail.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, Manila, April 23, 1899.

Major EDWARDS, *Front*:

Ambulance with escort sent to Novaliches arrived this morning. No insurgents seen. General Hall will send out detachment to-day toward Novaliches and keep your telegraphic line in communication up as long as possible. Tell General Lawton Bocane column has over 300 rounds of ammunition per man. We can probably supply him with more ammunition in a few days. It depends upon developments now encouraging.

By command Major-General Otis:

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

FRONT, April 23, 1899.

Colonel EDWARDS:

Captain Hannay wants breakfast for 720 men, Third Infantry, Twenty-second Infantry; wants enough for breakfast and supper for officers' messes from pony carts, and Dr. Bower, of headquarters mess, desires in addition 2 cans corn beef and crackers and coffee for 5 men. The general made no request. All Chinese carriers under guard.

Captain GALE.

[Telegram.]

SAN JOSE, April 24, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Twenty-second Infantry arrived 8 a. m. Town deserted; wholly nipa huts; three or four old stone foundations for long-destroyed houses; water abundance vicinity; good stream three-fourths mile north San Jose, size one you are on; some rice, etc., in town; road north of San Jose looks much better than yesterday's trail; looks like it was old real road, requiring repairs, perhaps, but yet remains of real road.

Captain BIRKHIMER,
Acting Judge-Advocate.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Jose, April 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Palace, Manila*:

Bocane column reached Norzagaray early this morning. Found small force and drove them out. Communicate with me here by Boyd's troop, Fourth Cavalry. Transportation not yet up; animals absolutely worn-out and 3 caribou dead. All command, except one regiment, assisting transportation forward, and are obliged practically to carry it along. Hope to get it into camp to-night. As soon as it is all in camp I will go forward personally to Norzagaray. Lieutenant Boyd reports several bad places on road ahead of us. Am just going to see about bridging first crossing.

LAWTON.

[Telegram.]

ROAD, April 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

At 5.30 there remains to be crossed 12 bull teams, Twenty-second Infantry; three 2-mule wagons, Third Infantry; 1 bull team, Fourth Cavalry; 14 bull teams, North Dakota. Four bulls have died; have secured 2 to replace them. The Twenty-second Infantry teams are played out, and the carts have to be brought in by hand. All the others will require much assistance from the men. The North Dakotas have pulled up everything found helpless. The progress across the wet ground is very slow. Will try to get everything up to-night.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 24, 1899—8.15 p. m.

General LAWTON:

Following just received from MacArthur: "To-day's operations concluded with General Hale's brigade at ford across the Quingua almost directly north of Malolos at which point he charged a trench which he occupied, killing about 25 insurgents therein. Altogether, he reports he has killed about a hundred insurgents."

His own loss is very small; not more than 3 killed, about a dozen wounded. The work to-day has not been as rapid as I hoped, but has been pressed as vigorously as possible in consideration of the heat and density of the bamboo jungles.

The brigades are now connected, and operations will be resumed early in the morning. Altogether, the day's work has been very satisfactory indeed. Hale's brigade had a severe engagement at Quingua, losing 2 officers and 4 enlisted men killed, 3 officers and 40 enlisted men wounded; principally Nebraska. Colonel Stotsenberg killed. Gunboat *Napindan* shelled force of insurgents out of Taytay. Line is down, and this may not reach you for some time. Now 8.15 p. m.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

CAMP HANNAY, April 25, 1899.

Adjutant-General EDWARDS, *San Jose:*

Am starting out. Had to rest both men and animals.

HANNAY.

[By carrier pigeon.]

NORZAGARAY, April 25, 1899—4 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

I arrived here at noon to-day. Colonel Summers arrived near the town the evening of the 23d. Was met by the enemy, and drove them back to town. Early 24th drove enemy across river, where they are now in small force firing across river, doing no damage. Our loss, 5 wounded, none severely.

This morning Colonel Summers went to Angat with 1 battalion each regiment and drove enemy out of city, a portion of which was burned. My command will not reach here until to-morrow. They are all engaged in bringing up their transportation, which they literally have to haul themselves. The trail is not very good, and many crossings of streams with steep banks, at some of which nearly a whole day is required to pass over the train. There is no road directly to San Miguel from here, only a bad rough trail. The only road is the one along the swamp, over which MacArthur is to move. Our transportation is impracticable only on the best of roads. Our line is cut most of the time, and I doubt the possibility of keeping it up. I think a line to Bocaue would be better. Colonel Summers's command have but 5 days' rations; I have 6. The road from Bocaue is good, and anything coming should be sent that route if possible.

LAWTON, *Major-General, U. S. V.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 25, 1899—9.30 p. m.

General LAWTON:

Is there a road from Norzagaray or Angat to Quingua? If so, and the line is open long enough, will try and make arrangements in that direction. Answer quickly.

BARRY, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 25, 1899—9.35 p. m.

General LAWTON:

Can keep MacArthur at Calumpit, and you can move back on road taken by Summers to railroad at Bocaue, or some intermediate point on that road, where you can be furnished with supplies and pack train. You can move them by wagon road north and join MacArthur east of Quingua.

Unless you do this you will be forced to move with your transportation by Angat west to Baliuag, preceding MacArthur to that point by a day or two. I think it better that you should move back to some point at Santa Rita, on Bocaue road, then north to Bintoc, where MacArthur can join you. Answer.

MacArthur has not yet taken Calumpit. His loss to-day was considerable, but he was successful.

OTIS.

[Letter.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

SIR: Your messages of 9.30 and 9.35, 25th instant, reached me this morning. The command with transportation has not yet reached this point. I hope to get it all up this evening. The mounted troop was sent this morning on reconnoissance west along left bank of river to look at roads and fords. Two miles west of Angat enemy was encountered in force; reported to be about 500; 200 were actually counted by Captain Birkhimer, who accompanied the cavalry. Enemy threw out strong skirmish line, and cavalry halted and remained in observation of the enemy.

At the same time cavalry started, 1 battalion Oregons forded river opposite this place and drove enemy from country opposite. They were plainly seen from this point scattering.

Some 50 moved up river in southeast direction, others down toward main body. Our troops occupied high ground and moved down river opposite Agnat. As soon as my command arrives will cross Colonel Summers's command and move by both banks down river and endeavor to throw my flanks around enemy and destroy some of them. Concerning your message of 9.30, there seems to be no direct road from this place to Quingua, the only route for wagons being via Baliuag or Bocaue.

I will be prepared to follow the instructions contained in message of 9.35 as soon as my column has arrived and I have driven the enemy from this vicinity.

I desire, however, to submit the following suggestions: From the best information I can obtain I learn that there are at this place and at Angat about a thousand men, 600 armed and 400 bolo men. They are reported to have plenty of ammunition and expended it freely at long range, mostly Remington; but very little food. General "Panta" (Panteleon de Garcia) commanding a few local troops, but mostly troops driven from Malabon about March 25 or 26. The actions of the enemy indicate that they are disintegrating, as small detachments have been seen wandering in different directions over the country, and there seems to be little organization. They have been well cut off from the east and south and the mountains in the up-river country, and the main force has been pushed north and west.

I feel sure that we are on their extreme left and can double them up. Our problem is transportation. Buffalo carts are out of the question for even ordinary marching, except over smooth, hard roads; for rapid movements over rolling country they are impracticable. The conditions of marching are such that the soldier is taxed to the utmost capacity of his endurance to carry his rifle, ammunition, and blanket roll without being yoked into a cart to haul supplies, as we have been obliged to do and

are doing at this moment. A number of our bulls have died; I can not ascertain accurately how many, but 10 or more, and the men pull along the carts.

These bulls have died from exhaustion and not from any disease. The 4-mile teams have done very well with help over bad places and on the hills, but the 2-horse and mule teams could not more than pull the empty wagon.

I have therefore no transportation, even after the reduction of weight by consumption of rations.

We have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope when I get my transportation in to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, and readjust and arrange it so that it can continue over good roads and make short marches each day. The 50 pack mules will give us very little material assistance, they will not carry one day's rations for the whole command, and I must still rely upon the bull teams. I can, however, give the pack train to the squadron of cavalry including the mounted troop, and it will carry ten days' rations for the whole squadron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements, and they will be strong enough to maintain themselves anywhere.

My suggestion, then, is to let me move west down the river by both banks to near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days' rations. Then let me move north along road through San Yldefonso to San Miguel, and let MacArthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on my right flank and in communicating distance, and thus the whole country between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande on the west will be covered. I believe the movement will disintegrate the insurgent army in that section, and I gather from the information received that the roads suggested are very good.

The signal officer has reported it impossible to maintain the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. He has sent out two or oftener each day to repair it, but as often it is cut, and the last time a long section was removed, and he did not have wire enough to repair it. I suggest that it be taken up from the Manila end toward Novaliches, and I will send out and take it from this end as far as possible; and then that a line be laid out to me with a supply train if it be sent.

I do not believe I will be much in advance of MacArthur if my suggestion is approved. At any rate, I feel that I have force enough for any emergency.

A reply by return of this escort will reach me before I can be ready to move.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila P. I. April 27, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,

Commanding United States Troops, Norzagary, P. I.

GENERAL: In sending telegraphic suggestions to you concerning your advance, it was recognized that your proper line of march was the road to Baliuag, but the great difficulty of supplying you with rations and ammunition presented itself, and had you marched with that celerity which good roads would have permitted you would have been obliged to have retraced your steps, or at least to send in your transportation on the Bocaue line in order to obtain your supplies. Once leaving Angat for Baliuag, with General MacArthur's command investing Calumpit, we could not supply you, and it would be impracticable to detail the strong column which would be necessary to guard the supply trains out and still keep open MacArthur's line of communication and defend properly this section of the country.

Fully 3,500 insurgents have appeared in front of Ovenshine, and Pilar is active in the Morong district. Now that MacArthur will soon shake off the insurgents at Calumpit, and as it is necessary for you to rest your worn-out troops, it is believed that you will not precede MacArthur more than one day, if at all, and the march to Baliuag becomes practicable. At that point I have looked for concentration of insurgent troops; but should MacArthur force them up the line of railroad, they will not be able to make a concentration before reaching San Miguel.

We can not ascertain as yet whether the road north and to the west of the swamp and along the Rio Grande is practicable for wagons. If MacArthur can determine that it is he can move by that route; otherwise he must move on the road to Baliuag, and thence on the same road north to San Miguel, after having joined your column. I have lost all confidence in any map which I have yet seen and two wheels

effort have been unsuccessful in getting the services of a guide who knows the country. Had we obtained information of the condition of the road from Novaliches to Norzagaray you would have moved by Bocaue, but the results accomplished have been excellent and you have pushed all the insurgents to the north and to your left, which an advance on the Bocaue line would not have done. The success accomplished justified the difficulties surmounted.

As to furnishing you with supplies, we are making every effort to get transportation ready. You called for ammunition from Novaliches and the 50 pack mules are intended to carry it to you, and not rations, as you seem to suppose. The rations will be sent by twenty 4-mule teams, and we are getting them together as fast as we can. We can not possibly start them out before Saturday, if then, and we do not know yet over what route to send them. Major Starr informs me that the well-defined road on my map north from Sta. Maria is a trail. There is a road north from Bigaa which apparently strikes in at Bustos, opposite Baliuag, and it may be possible to supply you by that route when you have moved down the river from Angat. This will be determined later, depending upon developments, and you will be obliged to keep yourself in communication with these headquarters by scout, if necessary, for the next two or three days. There is nothing behind you except small detached parties. We have daily communicated with Novaliches, and have brought in by wagon all the property which your troops threw away. The largest insurgent party yet seen consisted of 15 men. We shall probably take up the telegraph line to Novaliches, and may have to abandon that to the north, unless you are successful in recovering it. I will see what Colonel Thompson can do over the Bocaue road in keeping up line of communication, but I have not much confidence in his ability to do so.

Twenty 4-mule teams are now being rapidly prepared to send over to Bocaue overland on Saturday and Sunday, together with the 50 pack mules. Your supplies will go by rail to that point. The mules are being shod as rapidly as possible and every effort possible is being made to give you supplies. All this transportation will go out from Bocaue or Bigaa, with a considerable escort, and we will do the best we can to have you supplied in season. In the meantime you must preserve what rations you have on hand, making them last as long as you can. This letter is ready to go now, but Major Starr has not yet reported for the morning train and I have sent the train on. He will probably report here in time to take the 2 o'clock train up.

General Hall has just reported from Deposito that there is a largely increased force of insurgents in the Mariquina Valley confronting the pumping station, and that firing is quite brisk there.

Very sincerely, yours,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, April 26, 1899.

STARR, Norzagaray:

Head of advanced guard is about 3 miles from Norzagaray. Third Infantry is immediately in rear and bringing along its own train. I don't know how far back the rest of the column is.

J. C. MACARTHUR,
First Lieutenant, Third Infantry.

[Telegram.]

APRIL 26, 1899.

Major EDWARDS or Major STARR:

One company Third Infantry and 3 ambulances passed telegraph station at 12.30 a.m. Now 1 p.m. Other troops and more wagons approaching station. Rained considerably past thirty minutes.

RHEA,
Signal Sergeant.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN:

Commanding general directs that you let each regiment come along independent of the others, bringing with it its own transportation. Lieutenant Brooke will be at the top of the hill to take the Third Infantry to camp. The rest of the column will follow to camp, which will be at Angat.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

IN FIELD, April 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER SECOND OREGON:

SIR: Have driven enemy outpost from this ridge. About 50 insurgents have left this position and moved south 20 degrees east. This is rough country, and I will keep on ridge to bluff opposite Angat. Will signal by wigwag anything unusual.

EASTWICK, *Major.*

[Letter.]

ANGAT, April 26, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON,

Commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: There is a good place to camp west of Angat, on paddy field, as troops are camped on at Norzagaray. There is ford at Angat that apparently has much been used. No armed enemies thus far seen. Two shots from height northwest of Angat. North end of Angat not as much burned as other part.

WM. E. BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Acting Judge-Advocate.

[Letter.]

THREE-QUARTERS OF A MILE BEYOND ANGAT,
April 26, 1899—4 p. m.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Same men yet ahead as seen this morning. Seen at 3.45 in same place that I saw them this a. m.—300 of them.

Insurrectos in party of 18, all of them armed, crossed at ford 1 mile below, at 3 p. m.; driven out by Oregons. Party of 20, looked like insurrectos, and I think are, also seen on other side river below where Oregons were and farther back, also at 3 p. m.

We were attacked at 3 p. m. by scouting party which retired when we replied, with half a dozen men. We hold road at high bluff abutting on river. Have used as outpost and outlook.

Have half dozen little posts scattered along high ridge to prevent flanking. We propose to defend this place if the enemy attacks. The opposite country toward mountains is alive with humanity escaping. Please send up food and material for this troop. They have no rations, their horses no forage. It began raining and rained hard since 3.30 p. m.

WM. E. BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Acting Judge-Advocate.

P. S.—Also send something for me to eat and drink.

W. E. B.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

Captain BIRKHIMER:

The major-general commanding directs that as soon as enough of your column arrive from San Jose to establish a proper picket, you can return with Boyd's troop.

Acquaint the commanding officer with the situation, but don't stampede him. Instruct him not to do any firing unless attacked.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, PROVISIONAL BRIGADE.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your command in readiness to march at any time to-morrow morning after 6 o'clock.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

Captain GALE,
Commanding Squadron and Provost-Marshal.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your command in readiness to march at 6 a. m. to-morrow.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

Lieutenant SCOTT,
Commanding Platoon Dyer's Battery.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your command in readiness to march at 6 a. m. to-morrow.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.

Captain HANNAY,
Commanding Third Infantry:

Commanding general directs that you move your regiment, with its transportation independent of the rest of the column. Lieutenant Brooke will meet you at the top of hill to conduct you to camp. Colonel Treumann has been notified.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

FIELD STATION, *April 26, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Horse wagons, Third Infantry, passed signal station ahead of North Dakotas.

WM. J. McLEAN,
Second Lieutenant, First North Dakota Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

FIELD STATION, *April 26, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Twenty-second Infantry, with wagon train, has passed signal station.

B. C. LOCKWOOD,
Captain, Twenty-Second Infantry.

[Letter.]

IN THE FIELD, *Norzagaray, April 26, 1899.*

ADJUTANT,

Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of reconnoissance made to-day from this point and on east side of the river as far as Angat. The command consisted of the following companies: B, M, G, and F, of the Second Regiment Oregon Volunteers, and left Norzagaray at 8.25 a. m., fording the river at a point 600 yards south, upstream from the church. The depth of the stream was 1½ feet. From this point the command moved in a northerly direction, inclining slightly to the east, and at a distance of half a mile intersected a road with course due east and west. Turning to the east for a hundred yards we entered a small village, one of the buildings of which contained some 300 bushels of rice and several hundred pounds of sugar. From this point northeast the command followed a trail or sled track for 500 yards to a small creek, fordable at any point. Thence, ascending a small hill through rolling country with cultivated fields and wooded knolls, the advance party was met by a fire from the insurgent outposts, placed at the top of the next rise, some 300 yards beyond.

The insurgents, some 15 in number, under command of an officer, were driven back, retreating in a southeasterly direction. The command moved forward in a generally northerly direction, following the crest of the range of hills which tend in a north and south line, with flankers thrown out when the nature of the growth permitted, though for the most part it was necessary to move in column of files with flanks unprotected. At nearly every prominent point was a small lookout station, and pile of brush for signal lights, which we burned. At the head of the creek, where the bridge turns sharply to the west, our advance party was again fired upon by the insurgents from a ravine some 400 yards to the northeast. The fire was returned with some effect, driving the insurgents into the brush. The command followed the ridge to the west to a point overlooking the river.

At this point 26 insurgents were seen, and being fired on retreated to the northeast, leaving 1 wounded man, who is now in our hospital. The command then entered the valley and skirted the base of the ridge, halting at the river under the protection of a bluff for forty-five minutes for lunch. At 12.45 p. m. again taking up the march, ascended the next ridge, where the advance guard was met by a volley from some 5 insurgents in the valley on the other side. Returning the fire, they were driven beyond range. These insurgents were dressed in red uniforms and armed with Mausers and Remingtons. From this point could be seen many natives moving north. The command then proceeded on the ridge and to the ford half a mile north of Angat. The water here was 3 feet deep at this ford, and, crossing at the point, half of forty-five minutes was made. The command then returned to the point on the road on the west side of the river, arriving at 4 p. m.

In numerous places in the hills stores of rice, corn, and sugar were found, as also some few bolos, but no firearms. It is estimated that about 6 or 7 insurgents were killed, and 9 prisoners were taken and are now in confinement. Distance traveled estimated at 10 miles.

Attached hereto, marked "Exhibit A,"¹ is a sketch of the country traversed, and Exhibit B consists of some correspondence found in a house previously occupied by the insurgents. Exhibit C consists of insurgents' telegraphic dispatches concerning the uprising in Tondo of February 23, 1899.

Very respectfully,

P. G. EASTWICK,
Major, Second Oregon

EXHIBIT B.

MANILA BATTALION, *Fourth Company.*

Received from Sergeant Tonto, of the third company, 450 rounds Remington copper ammunition.

ANTONIO VIDAL,
First Lieutenant.

To the honorable PRESIDENT:

As we need reinforcements here, I ordered all the companies to unite at this place for a stand.

PANCERO.

¹ Not found.

ANGAT, April 23, 1899.

Third Lieut. TOTO DABID:

Can you lend me your horse, so that my cousin can go to Arcadia? Two, if possible—one for me. Good-bye.

SIMAS.

EXHIBIT C.

[Supplement to the Heraldo Filipino, Thursday, February 23, 1899, 8.30 a. m.]

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN POLO, FEBRUARY 23, 1899, 8.07 A. M.

Major Tirona to the Secretary of War.

To-day at 8 a. m. the citizen Perfecto, commissioner, passed, stating that he left Tondo at 2 in the morning of to-day. States that there is firing going on on Calle Azarraga from Mariano Ponce's troops of Tondo militia. First fire Oriente factory, afterwards, Tondo, caused by our troops. Firing also on General Pio's line. Sending messenger that office. This leaf for free distribution.

[Supplement to Heraldo Filipino, Friday, February 24, 1899.]

COUNTRYMEN:

Let us rejoice that the men of North America showed themselves in their true light, for if it had not been so, we might have been sunk in the mire; let us therefore thank God who has willed the war. Nothing good can be expected from these people, who, on the contrary, can teach us all the evil we wish to learn from them; the proof is that of the barbarities inflicted on our brethren in Manila. These men watch for a lack of care, an unprotected house, and then attack it.

In order to give free rein to their infernal desires, the principles of morality are nothing to them, and can not hold them back. They have outdone the savage of the North, and have not an iota of shame or decency. They thrust their hands into dishes and take what they want, without even asking permission, or even, after taking what they want, say thanks. If they find the family sleeping the siesta they enter the room without permission from anyone, as if it were a forest. In the stores they take what they want, and, if the owner tries to collect from them, they shoot him. It seems almost impossible to believe it, and our hands tremble in recording such abominations. These deeds are a shame on the nation which gives them birth. History records no more hateful deeds, even committed by a savage. Various cases have occurred where women have been handled all over their persons, and their money taken from them, as well as anything else they may have, and if this happens in out-of-way places, they strip their clothing from them. Are these the deeds of an honest people? Is this the people who was to teach us decency and morality? Are these to be our teachers? Such acts as these are committed by no other people on the globe. This is the nation of unrestrained liberty. This is the nation which does not know how to teach women to become mothers! This is the nation where honor is yet unknown, in a word, is a nation hated by all other nations! A nation which knows not honor, has not an atom of feeling. Are these our protectors? Better death be related to a people whose evil is inborn. Away with the wretches. Destruction to the Americans. Down with the United States.

[Letter.]

NORZAGARAY, P. I., April 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

SIR: A few insurgents tried to cross the river at this place. They had blanket rolls and rifles. From the fire I judge there were 10; 6 were seen. My men are now along the bank. My outpost was engaged at 300 yards.

Very respectfully,

C. T. BOYD,
Second Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 27, 1899—12.02 p. m.

Lieut. C. T. BOYD,
Commanding Troop Fourth Cavalry, Norzagaray:

SIR: The general says "O K." That is what he left you there for—to keep the insurgents out of the town and to report anything unusual.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 27, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY:

SIR: The general commanding directs me to inform you that Lieutenant Boyd, left at Norzagaray, reports enemy trying to cross river at that place, and directs that you send 2 companies at once to his support. The companies will probably be required to remain all night.

Very respectfully,

C. R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, April 27, 1899.

Lieutenant BOYD,
Commanding Troop Fourth Cavalry.

SIR: The General has sent 2 companies to relieve you from outpost duty and help keep out the insurgents. You stay there until you get further orders.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 27, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS:

Kindly let bearer, an official interpreter, interrogate your wounded prisoner, and oblige,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 3. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 27, 1899.

Capt. J. F. Case, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, is detailed on special duty at these headquarters as acting engineer officer of this expedition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the following is an epitome of the information elicited from a wounded insurgent officer whom I am sending in an ambulance to-day. This man was captured by Captain Eastwick's battalion of the Oregon during a reconnoissance made on the 26th instant across the river from Norzagaray.

"General Pantaleon Garcia retired from Malabon with the Manila battalion, now composed of some 700 men, armed with Remingtons; ammunition faulty. This battalion is under complete command, composed of old Spanish carabineros, and Seventy-third Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Pacheco in charge. Formerly occupied the towns of Norzagaray, Angat, Santa Maria, and Maruco, headquarters at Angat. This battalion keeps its complete organization and obeys all orders of their chief, Garcia. This latter is on good terms with Aguinaldo, with who he corresponds frequently by messenger, taking four days to do so. Has asked Aguinaldo for instructions and reinforcements, but in the meantime retires toward San Miguel de Mayumo, where Aguinaldo is supposed to be.

"If rebels knew treatment received from Americans many would surrender, as they are perfectly aware of the movements of the Americans. Officers do not desert, as they fear treatment from the Americans, and these men are in awe of their commanders.

"Tulisanes, or robbers, are at foot of the mountains and frequently harass the insurgents.

"The Novaliches and San Jose insurgents are under no recognized leaders and do not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but act separately.

"The enemy are falling back toward San Miguel, where Aguinaldo is supposed to be, and when they are all retired there will be a force of more than 1,200 men."

This man seems to be very intelligent and very well satisfied of having the opportunity of returning to Manila, and perhaps would be a very interesting person to have examined by your own officers. His name is Tito David, and he says he is a son-in-law of an old employee of Smith, Bell & Co., Manila.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Letter to General Pantaleon.]

CUARTEL DE LAS FUERZAS DE LOS E. E. U. U.

Excimo Señor General Don PANTALEON GARCIA:

EXCIMO SEÑOR GENERAL: Encontrandome on frente de un official tan, caballero, como renombrado, y teniendo tanta consideracion a un spellido tan illustre como el de S. E. analogo al del distinguido o afamado patriota companero en armas, es mi deseo, antes de proceder en adelante deaveriquar, dirijiendome personal mente a V. E., Si no hay medios por los cuales podemos llegar a un intendimiento comun con el laudable proposito que tienda a terminar hostilidades y procurar la par a este hermoso pais.

Me seria muy grato aun solamente el poder see portader de alguna proposicion razonable a este fin.

Aprovecho este oportunidad para manifestar mi respecto y consideracion.

Dios que a V. E. ms as.

ANGAT, y 27 de Abril de 1899.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, April 27, 1899.

General LAWTON:

General Otis directs that you send Captain Birkhimer at once to this city for duty with the examining board of which he is a member. He should come in to-morrow without fail. War Department has cabled for the result of the examinations and directs speedy termination of the same.

BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE,
FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field at Marunco, Luzon, April 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

Sir: In compliance with instructions of the division commander of the previous evening, 7 companies Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., and 8 companies of the

Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V. (with one day's travel rations), and wagon train were prepared and waiting orders at 6 a. m. to move from Norzagaray. At 7.40 o'clock a. m., after receiving instructions from the division commander, the column left Norzagaray and proceeded toward Angat. On arriving at point half a mile from Angat (according to instructions) 1 battalion Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. (Maj. P. G. Eastwick, jr., commanding), left the column and proceeded across the mountains to the left, with instructions to make a reconnoissance of that portion of the country and form a junction with the main column at Marunco. At Angat 1 battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V. (Capt. J. P. Masterman), and 1 battalion of Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. (Capt. H. L. Heath), under the immediate command of Maj. A. M. Diggles, crossed the river at the ford at south end of town, where they were joined by Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer, with instructions to make reconnoissance of that portion of the country lying to the east and north of Angat and rejoin the main column at Marunco.

Brigade commander, staff, and the remaining battalion, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V. (Capt. C. P. Spear), and wagon train proceeded through Angat and entered Marunco at 11.30 o'clock a. m., having met with no opposition, and bivouacked according to instructions.

Distance traveled, about 6 miles. No casualties.

Reports of Maj. A. M. Diggles and Maj. P. B. Eastwick, jr., inclosed.

Very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,

Colonel Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Report.]

MARUNCO, P. I., April 28, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Provisional Brigade, First Division.

SIR: I have the honor to report concerning the reconnoissance which you directed me to make yesterday.

By your order I left your column at 8.50 a. m. and forded the river at Angat, taking 1 battalion of the Second Oregon, commanded by Captain Heath, and 1 battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota, under command of Captain Masterman. You having directed me to march under the general direction of Captain Case, engineer officer, I halted after fording the river.

At about 10.45 Captain Case reported and we immediately started in a northerly direction, putting out an advance guard and flankers a little larger than would seem necessary, as I desired to cover as much ground as possible so as to observe any roads which might be in the country. The column gradually veered around to the left, passing up a valley and over considerable mountain. As we were about to emerge from the brush on the farther side of the mountain we were saluted by a heavy volley from the enemy. The bullets, however, flew far over our heads, evidently directed against a few scouts which were stationed on the top of the mountain. From the brush at the foot of the mountain we gave them a few well-directed volleys, driving them from their position. Then another party opened on us farther on our left, and I sent three platoons into a high elevation to occupy their attention and cover the movements in the valley. A few very well directed volleys, however, seemed to disperse them entirely. In about twenty minutes they made their appearance on our right, on the side of a mountain fully 2 miles away. The column then marched down through the valley, directing our march toward the river, and aiming for a point a little below the present camp. We entered a small town, which offered no resistance, and marched up the river to a ford, where we crossed and returned to camp at 4 o'clock.

In our reconnoissance we found quite a considerable stream, several sled paths, but no practicable road of any description, even the sled paths dwindling down to mere gutters in places. The country is very rough, and the troops were compelled to march in single file during the large part of the time. I judge the number of guns directed against us by the enemy were between 60 and 75. Probably three or four times that many men were in the different parties.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

A. M. DIGGLES,

Major, Commanding Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.

[Report.]

IN THE FIELD, Marunco P. I., April 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT SECOND OREGON INFANTRY.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from the commanding officer I have the honor to report that the First Battalion, companies B, K, G, and F, proceeded to the hills

west of Angat and then following the valleys took a northwesterly course through rice fields to a point on a ridge overlooking the town Sneucan (?), which was entered and found deserted. The command then proceeded by road to this point. No insurgents were seen, and the country passed through was agricultural land. Distance traveled estimated at 5 miles.

Very respectfully,

P. G. EASTWICK, Jr.,
Major, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

[Letter.]

MANILA, April 27, 1899—2.55 p. m.

Major STARR:

Please tell Captain Perkins that I start to-day building a line Bocaue to Norzagaray and he should start at that end and work till he meets me.

McKENNA, Captain.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, April 27, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Please direct Colonel Summers to send in name of candidate for his regiment for appointment as second lieutenant United States Army without further delay. He was directed by General MacArthur to do this some time since and has already delayed action on entire list.

BARRY, Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SECOND U. S. INFANTRY,
April 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: Having been unofficially informed that derogatory rumors are in circulation among the enemy in respect to our treatment of prisoners, and that there is a prospect of successfully informing them of the real condition of affairs, I have the honor to place my services at the disposal of the commanding general as a messenger, should he consider them necessary.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. KULP,
Captain and Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SECOND U. S. INFANTRY,
Angat, P. I., April 27, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded, approved.

Captain Kulp, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A., is an officer of determination, prudence, and undoubted courage. I have had occasion to commend him for bravery in action. The only regret I have in approving this patriotic offer is fear for his personal safety. This he is willing to incur. If successful, great good may result.

LEO O. PARKER,
Major, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

[Letter.]

HQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, Luzon, P. I., April 28, 1899.

Capt. J. S. KULP,
Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.

(Through commanding officer Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.)

SIR: In reply to your communication of the 22d instant, volunteering to place your services at the disposal of the commanding general, he directs me to inform you of his appreciation of your patriotic offer, and to assure you that he will avail himself of your services should an opportunity occur.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER PROVISIONAL BRIGADE.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold in readiness your command to proceed to-morrow morning, the 29th instant, to the other side of the river by the nearest ford; move along the river and occupy the town of San Rafael.

You will leave behind a suitable guard for your transportation, and make arrangements to the end that the transportation may be hurriedly brought forward to the command should subsequent orders require.

Hawthorne's battery has been directed to report to you. A cooperative force composed of 2 regiments of infantry and 1 platoon of artillery (2 guns) will move by the side of the river to support you if necessary.

You will not move except on further notification from these headquarters.

As severe rains to-night as occurred last night would suspend the movement.

One day's rations will, as usual, be carried by each soldier.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER SEPARATE MOUNTAIN BATTERY.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your battery in readiness to report to Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, commanding provisional brigade at Marunco, to-morrow, the 29th instant, for the purpose of joining his command in a movement against the town of San Rafael.

A suitable guard will be left with the transportation, and arrangements made that the transportation may be hurriedly brought forward to the command should subsequent orders to that effect be received.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Second Platoon, Battery D, Sixth Artillery.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your platoon (2 guns) in readiness to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, to-morrow morning, the 29th instant, for the purpose of joining his command in movement against the town of San Rafael.

One day's ration will, as usual, be carried by each soldier. A suitable guard will be left with your transportation, and arrangements made that the transportation may be hurriedly brought forward to the command should subsequent orders to that effect be received.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, THIRD U. S. INFANTRY.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold your command in readiness to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, to-morrow morning, the 29th instant, for the purpose of joining his command in movement against the town of San Rafael.

One day's rations will, as usual, be carried by each soldier. A suitable guard will

be left behind with the transportation. Arrangements will be made that the transportation may be hurriedly brought forward to the command if subsequent orders to that effect be received.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold in readiness your command to move on receipt of notice to-morrow morning, the 29th instant, through Marunco, by the south or west bank of the river, to support Colonel Summers' command, which has been directed to take the town of San Rafael by movement on the north or east bank of same river.

The Third Infantry and Scott's platoon of artillery (2 guns) will report to you.

A suitable guard will be left with the transportation, and such arrangements made that the transportation can be hurriedly brought up to the command if subsequent orders to that effect are received.

One day's rations will, as usual, be carried by each soldier.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 28, 1899.

Lieutenant BOYD,
Commanding Troop I, Fourth Cavalry.

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you send at once a detachment consisting of 1 noncommissioned officer and 10 men to escort party putting up telegraph line toward Bocaue.

Signal party are already on the road and escort will overtake them.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 28, 1899.

General MACARTHUR, *Calumpit*:

Have a rumor that you have won a decisive victory, and that the enemy sues for peace. I congratulate you with that earnest sincerity which you will understand.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 28, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific:

Connection just completed. Occupied Marunco yesterday. Will take San Rafael to-morrow, if possible. Heavy rain last night. Still raining.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 28, 1899

General LAWTON:

All supplies for your command will leave Bocaue Sunday morning. Where you want them delivered?

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 29, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Eighth Army Corps:

The supplies should follow us up by this road.

LAWTON, Major-General, Volunteer

[Telegram.]

BAGBAG BRIDGE, April 28, 1899

Major-General LAWTON:

Many thanks, dear Lawton, for your cordial greetings, which are hardly justified by the actual facts. By the splendid daring of Funston, under the skillful control of General Wheaton, we made quite a remarkable passage to the Rio Grande yesterday with very small loss, but which in connection with two previous days' work, in which they lost very heavily, so impressed the insurgents that General Luna to-day sent his chief of staff with the information that the Filipino government had ordered suspension of hostilities and wished to negotiate for peace. Luna's officers are in Manila, but what has transpired since their departure from here I do not know.

MACARTHUR

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, April 28, 1899

General LAWTON:

Commanding general remarks that there is considerable force of the enemy in the vicinity of Baliuag; force forming at San Miguel has been brought down by General Luna, who commands the insurgent forces in MacArthur's front, sent his chief of staff through our lines under a flag of truce. He came to Manila this afternoon for conference with General Otis with a view to peace, under instructions from Aguinaldo. He is now here and will probably return to Luna's command to-morrow. MacArthur forced the passage of the Rio Grande yesterday in grand style; drove the enemy from his trenches, inflicting severe loss on him, and continued his advance to Apalit. Luna expressed great admiration for the brilliant achievements of the Americans in forcing the passage of the river, which he considered impossible.

BARRY

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 28, 1899

PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to deliver to you civilian teamster Connolly, formerly an ambulance driver with this expedition.

This man was discharged April 26 for disobedience of orders, and immediately thereafter was identified by Private Longdoe, D, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, as the person who robbed two native women in Novaliches on April 25 and who struck and seriously wounded one of them. Please place this man in custody until necessary papers can be furnished, which will be done at the earliest possible moment.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding

CIRCULAR.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, April 29, 1899—4.15 a. m.

The move, as indicated in orders of last evening, will be accordingly made this morning.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

C. R. EDWARDS,
Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 29, 1899.

Maj. L. S. PARKER,
Commanding Twenty-second Infantry.

SIR: The general directs me to inform you that during his absence you will be in command of the troops at this camp (Fourth Cavalry squadron, Utah artillery, detachments, etc.) as well as Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, at Norzagaray.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—The general and staff are just leaving. His flag remains here. May send for it later with headquarters property, etc.

C. R. E.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, April 29, 1899.

General LAWTON, *Angat*:

Commanding general directs that you remain at Angat till supplies reach you. He does not understand what you mean by saying: "The supplies should follow us by this road." Answer.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, near San Rafael, April 29, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Wired you last night my intention to move this morning an advance party to San Rafael. Wired you again this morning that I had started. I sent Summers with the Oregons and Minnesotas down north bank of the river, and Treumann, with North Dakotas and Third Infantry, down south bank, leaving all baggage and transportation at Angat. Accompanied latter column myself; met enemy in small force an hour since and have driven them some distance. Have not heard from column on opposite bank. Will withdraw back to Angat as directed. Had considered the possibility of encamping my advance near this place and meant that transportation with supplies should follow if I did so.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, April 29, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Wagon train left Manila this morning for Bocaue under escort; will be loaded at Bocaue and proceed under large escort Sunday. You will return as soon as possible the five 2-mule teams with escort, which should return to Bocaue Monday. Remain where you are until train joins you. Representatives of the insurgent army here, and everything will be peaceful, at least while they are in our lines. Your orders for advance on San Miguel may be changed. If you receive wagon train at Angat relieve escort there; it will be sufficient. Answer at once.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

148 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 29, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Message referring to wagon train and supplies, and informing me that my advance upon San Miguel may be changed, received. I have returned from San Rafael. Troops will return to this place. Command under Colonel Treumann. No Dakotas proceeding down south bank were fired upon nearly opposite San Rafael about 300 insurgents. They were driven out of the country with some loss, although 1 dead man fell into our hands. His rifle and 86 rounds of ammunition were secured. Lieutenant Todd and 2 privates, Third Infantry, and 1 private, No Dakotas, slightly wounded. Rations will be received at Angat and train return with escort immediately, as directed. Your instruction concerning peaceful conditions while insurgent representatives are within our lines noted.

LAWTON, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE BRIDGE, *April 29, 1899*

General LAWTON:

Baggage train and pack mules here. Will load at daylight. Shall come about myself, as early as possible, with orderly. Armistice ends this evening. Here are instructions for you from General Otis that were not to be sent by wire. All well. Ramsden just in O. K.

KING, *Aid*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *April 29, 1899*

General LAWTON:

Your aid, Lieutenant King, joins you to-morrow and will acquaint you with situation. Necessary that you should receive supply train at Angat, with MacArthur's troops escort. Not necessary that your entire force should return, but sufficient of it to insure safety of train and return of MacArthur's troops from Angat. Your objective upon moving will be Baliuag, where considerable force of enemy reported. The armistice requested by insurgents not granted.

By command of General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., April 29, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Having been directed to furnish a statement of the instructions given me by the corps commander for delivery to Major-General Lawton at Angat, I have the honor to submit the following:

The corps commander stated to me that had he known that General Lawton's command was at San Rafael he would not have ordered his return, but that he did not know until the return was about completed. That General Lawton's next objective was Baliuag, where it was expected he would encounter about 3,000 insurgents intrenched. That one brigade of General MacArthur's command would be moved in the direction of Baliuag, so as to be in supporting distance and could be called upon if needed. That while the corps commander desired as expeditious movement as possible, care should be exercised as regards to transportation.

The corps commander also gave me instructions in regard to the transportation that was to join General Lawton's command via Bocaue and information regarding the situation on the south line. Notes of these instructions were taken, but the book since became useless, due to rains, and was thrown away.

Very respectfully,

EDWARD L. KING,
Captain, Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. V., Aid-de-Camp

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, April 29, 1899.

Lieutenant BOYD,
Commanding Troop I, Fourth Cavalry.
(Through Major Parker.)

SIR: The commanding general directs that you escort Captain Perkins's signal detachment with your troop in taking up wire to Novaliches. He will confer with you. The two Second Oregon men that brought your detached horses back can report to Twenty-second Infantry to go back first opportunity.

Very respectfully,

C. R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
April 29, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Angat, Luzon.

SIR: In compliance with written instructions from the division commander, dated at Angat, April 28, 1899, my command, consisting of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., and the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., accompanied by Hawthorne's Battery (2 guns) and Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, broke camp at 6 o'clock a. m., on April 29, 1899, and crossing the Rio de Quingua opposite Marunco, passing through the deserted town of Binagbag, and proceeded to cross the country, following trails and crossing streams and gulches, encountering many obstacles, necessitating the dismounting of the guns, which were transported by hand. After going about 2 miles, reached the main road leading to San Rafael and Pulo.

Advanced on main road, passing through Pulo and Talocson, both villages being deserted. Arriving at a point about a quarter of a mile from San Rafael, the command, with the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, deployed in line of skirmishers, with left resting on road on left of line, with Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., as support, advanced upon town and entered same at 12.30 o'clock, meeting with no opposition, and found the town deserted. Distance traveled, 7 miles.

At 3.30 o'clock p. m., in compliance with instructions from division commander, command returned to Marunco, fording the river at Pulo, and arriving at camp at 6 o'clock p. m. By this route a distance of 2 miles was saved, distance traveled on return being 5 miles.

From river bank opposite Marunco to main road leading to San Rafael, found the country very rough and broken; no roads, only poor trails leading through dense thickets of underbrush, into deep gulches and over hills, utterly impassable for trains.

Main road leading to San Rafael was found in fair condition, with the exception of one small bridge, which was easily repaired, and is passable for wagon train. No armed insurgents were seen.

Total distance traveled, 12 miles. No casualties.

Very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,
Colonel Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.,
Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 30, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER OF THE DIVISION.

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you employ William H. Young as a guide and scout during this expedition at the usual compensation.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

150 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
In the Field, Angat, Luzon, April 30, 1898

1. Private Joseph De Brugh, Company F, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry detailed on special duty at these headquarters. He will be sent to report to acting engineer officer without delay.

2. The following-named enlisted men are detailed on special duty as scouts during this expedition; they will be excused from all other duties and will remain with their respective companies for rations.

Fourth U. S. Cavalry: Private Watkins, Troop C; Private Harris, Troop G; Private Peter Quinn, Troop L.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry: Privates G. Jenson, Company D; Powell Killon, Company H; Corporal Thomas and Privates J. C. Smith and Patrick Hussey, Company K; Privates Christensen and Davis, Company G; Privates Andres, O. Luther, and McBain, Company B; Private Shetland, Company C; Privates M. Glavin and C. Wilson, Company A; Privates Desmond and Otto Boehler, Company I.

Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry: Privates Harrington and High, Company J; Private W. Scott, Company K; Private J. B. O'Neil, Company L; Privates I. Lyon and M. Robertson, Company B.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you hold 2 companies of your regiment in readiness to proceed on notification from these headquarters as escort to wagons and ambulances on Bocaue road to meet and relieve supply train and escort no route to this point from Bocaue. The companies will have dinner in time to start.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

The chief quartermaster will send some wagons from here to take loads from mule teams, leaving them to return to Bocaue and bring them back.

C. R.

The ambulance will go on with the 4 Fourth Cavalry men and return to-morrow.

C. R.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps:

Mr. Ramsden, British vice-consul, came out with me, bringing a servant who can speak Tagalog. He was obliged to return last evening. He was invaluable as interpreter, and I now have no one, being without guides. I must communicate with citizens.

Mr. Ramsden expressed a willingness to return and the consul would consent. May I ask General Otis to request such consent?

LAWTON,
Major-General, Volunteer

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Fourth Cavalry Squadron.

SIR: The division commander directs that you furnish from your command a detail of four men to accompany an ambulance, leaving with wagons from this place this afternoon on Bocaue road.

The ambulance will carry wounded to Bocaue, and on its return to-morrow the detail will act as escort.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE, April 30, 1899.

GENERAL LAWTON, *Angat:*

Wagon and pack train leaves Bocaue at 9 o'clock. You can expedite matters by sending battalion a few miles out on the road to receive train and permit present escort, Fifty-first Iowa, to return to Bocaue.

You should send out with your escort three or four 2-mule teams to relieve the five 2-mule teams which return to Bocaue.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT,
Chief Quartermaster:

(The foregoing telegram repeated.)

The General wishes you to attend to this. I will advise you when the battalion starts.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps:

Following just received here:

"BOCAUE BRIDGE, 30.

"Captain WALCUTT:

"Only about three packers know their business; balance said they were packers, but are not. Pick out some packers there.

"BOCAUE BRIDGE, 30.

"Captain WALCUTT:

"Message received; mules very soft; hard to make pack mules stand up; will try to get train out within half an hour; have to leave some of the rations."

Both signed "Devol, quartermaster."

This seems to be the condition at this hour and is not very encouraging.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

152 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

IN THE FIELD, BOCAUE ROAD, *April 30, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Am at a point 6 miles from camp. Pack train here. Wagon train not yet up. the 20,000 rations for command 74 cases of hard bread and 164 cases tomatoes can not be loaded on wagon train. None of the sale stores are in wagon train. Capt Bootes says it will take six 4-mule wagons to bring the stuff up. None of the quartermaster's stuff needed is on train and not all the ammunition. Probably eight teams will be required to bring up everything. Answer.

WALCUTT

Above repeated to adjutant-general, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, with the following remark:

"I have ordered wagons to be unloaded and returned for balance of supplies. I send my wagons for unloaded stores.

" LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, April 30, 1899

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster:*

Unload the five 2-mule teams and return for additional supplies. If necessary, use in some of your teams, leaving stores piled where you are until they can be brought in by pack train, which can be sent back. Hold 1 company there. Let another company come on with train.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE ROAD, *April 30, 1899*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Seventy-two thousand rounds on wagon train; can not find out how much was left. No one knows exactly what is on train besides rations.

WALCUTT, *Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

FIELD, BOCAUE ROAD, *April 30, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *Angat:*

With your approval I can send back two 2-mule teams, which, with those in 2-mule wagons, will give eight 4-mule teams, with which all the supplies can be brought to-morrow.

The loaded wagons here can be left in charge of the one company.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899—7.10 a. m.

Lieutenant BOYD,

Commanding Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, Norzagaray.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you break camp this morning and move over to this place, near Captain Gale's squadron.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

COLONEL SUMMERS.

SIR: The general directs that you send up immediately and get your rations, as indicated in accompanying orders; then to commence crossing at once.

Captain Walcutt is issuing rations up here by the church.

Yours,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

(General Field Orders, No. 4, inclosed.)

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

To the COMMANDING OFFICER, OREGONS, NORTH DAKOTAS, FOURTH CAVALRY.

SIR: The scouts detailed in special orders of yesterday will, until further orders, during this expedition, be reported to Mr. William H. Young, chief of scouts of this expedition.

The blanket rolls of the scouts will be carried on the transportation.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

Major EDWARDS, *Angat:*

(This information given to operator out on line, at or near 8.40 this morning, May 1.)
Lieutenant Brooke left for Bocaue; says tell Major Edwards that he will push things along and get pack train in to-night if possible.

There are four mule teams passing, now about 4 miles south, this way.

OPERATOR, *Six Miles South of Angat.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, May 1, 1899.

Lieutenant BROOKE,

Aid-de-Camp General Lawton, Bocaue:

The General directs that you return with four 4-mule wagons immediately. Do not wait to load them.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

Captain BOOTH (or any other commissioned officer):

Please send back to this place immediately, without escort, the four 4-mule wagons belonging to this command. Send them as they are now, loaded or unloaded. Do not send any other transportation than the four 4-mule wagons sent to Bocaue from here.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

FIELD, MALACANAN, *April 30—10.30 p. m.* (Sent May 1, 1899.)

LAWTON: Twenty thousand rations ordered to be at Bocaue and Major Devol ordered to load what he could of them on 20 wagons. Leave the remainder at that point. Your staff officers reported roads good and wagons loaded with about 3,000 pounds. Not knowing that a supply of subsistence stores shipped for officers were sent hereafter the prescribed field rations will be sent you, and officers must subsist on them while on the march. Not necessary that you should send back to Bocaue, you will next be rationed from Malolos. Go on with what you have as soon as you can get teams to camp. Mules and drivers poor, and all three of the packers ignorant but the experts sent from San Francisco. We have done the best we could. Your supplies at Bocaue will be cared for. Not advisable to ask for services of vice-commandant. Return MacArthur's battalion as soon as possible. Answer.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY

Received at Angat, 9.20 a. m., May 1, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific:

Your message dated 10.30 p. m., April 30, received at 9.20 a. m., May 1. In meantime wagons were sent for supplies left at Bocaue. They have been recalled. Wagons reached my camp at 11 o'clock last night. Rations are being issued and preparations made to march to San Rafael to-day. I will get along very well with the transportation. Now have good packers in cavalry. Battalion Fifty-first Iowa escorting train, relieved by troops my command half way to Bocaue yesterday, and Fifty-first Iowa ordered to return. Should have been back last night.

LAWTON, *Major-General*FIELD, *April 30—7.15 a. m.* (Sent May 1, 1899.)

LAWTON:

Ammunition will go by first opportunity. No train till 8 a. m. to-morrow morning.

MCGINNES, *Chief of Ordnance*

(This ammunition was for Mr. Young.—C. R. E.)

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE, *May 1, 1899.*

Captain WALCUTT:

Two 4-horse loads of ammunition here. Can haul sales stores and balance rations. If it is not necessary for me to have an escort it will give me one or a 2-horse team.

BOOTES, *Commissary of Subsistence*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE, *May 1, 1899.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Angat:*

Please read those messages I sent to Captain Walcutt if he is not there and let him know.

BOOTES, *Commissary of Subsistence*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, May 1, 1899.

Mr. YOUNG, *Chief of Scouts*:

The General instructs me to inform you that you may start your scouts as soon as the troops start crossing the river.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

Captain BOOTES, *Commissary*:

In answer to Captain Walcutt's dispatch, please do not send here any transportation that does not belong here. No escort need return. Let the ammunition remain.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE BRIDGE, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Angat:

Shall I bring back the three empty wagons that were trailed in here with me? Animals were used on other wagons. As I come light, I can trail them back.

BROOKE, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Angat, May 1, 1899.

Lieutenant BROOKE, *Aid*:

No. Those empty wagons were to be turned in.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE BRIDGE, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Just arrived 10.25. Message received. Wagons with sick arrived 9.30 a. m. to-day. Will start back at once with the four 4-mule teams; none loaded. Roads good.

BROOKE, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

BOCAUE BRIDGE, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Angat:

Left here at 11 o'clock a. m. with the four 4-mule teams.

BROOKE, *Aide.*

[Letter.]

ANGAT, P. I., May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to request that Lieut. W. A. Campbell, Twenty-second Infantry, be ordered to report to his company.

He has been sick in the hospital in Manila, but has now recovered and is desirous of joining.

His services are very much needed, as the company is now commanded by an officer who has only been in the service a few weeks, and there is no other available officer in the regiment.

Very respectfully,

JOHN GREEN BALLANCE,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

[First indorsement.]

ANGAT, P. I., *May 1, 1899.*

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, approved, recommending that this officer be requested for by telegram.

LEO. O. PARKER,
Major, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Request that Lieut. W. A. Campbell who, it is understood, has been reported for duty, be ordered to join his company. Services much needed. He can join the command at San Rafael, where I expect to be to-night.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Angat, May 1, 1899—5.10 p. m.

Colonel SUMMERS:

The general suggests that perhaps you had better get up a little on them. The North Dakotas may be getting in.

Very respectfully,

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 1, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Twenty-second Infantry detachment, 4 officers and 75 men, proceed to Malolo to-morrow. Will escort signal party placing telegraph line to Quingua, thence to join you first opportunity. General Hale moves over Pulilan road to-morrow. Can give assistance if necessary. Expect to make telegraphic communication with you at Baliuag. Observe road to San Miguel if practicable.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE,
FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Rafael, Luzon, May 1, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with General Field Orders, No. 4, Headquarters First Division Eighth Army Corps, dated Angat, Luzon, May 1, 1899, the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., Scott's Battery, broke camp at left Marunco with wagon trains at 11.50 o'clock a. m., May 1, 1899, and, crossing river at ford at Marunco, proceeded on the main road through Pulo to San Rafael. At point about 2 miles from the ford the advance guard was fired upon by insurgent sharpshooters, who were dislodged, and therefore silenced, by scouts and flankers. Upon arrival within about one-quarter of a mile of San Rafael the advance guard were fired upon from a bridge to the right and rear of the town. Two battalions Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, with instructions to clear the bridge and enter the town from the rear, proceeded to move against the enemy. Major Willis's battalion, deployed in line of skirmishers, advanced to the front. Major Eastwick's battalion moved by the right flank. Scott's Battery (3 guns), supported by 1 battalion Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V. on the left of the line, proceeded down the road and entered the town at 4.20 o'clock p. m. After entering the town, enemy opened a heavy fire from across the river on the left and front of our line. Our troops were immediately thrown into position and returned the fire of the enemy. The commanding general arrived by this time.

Scott's Battery was placed in position and, after shelling the enemy's position for about thirty minutes, silenced their fire. The two battalions Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran, which had marched to the right, entered the town from the rear at 5.30 p. m., having forced the enemy back and from their position. The Third U. S. Infantry reported for duty to the brigade commander at 5.20 o'clock p. m. Distance traveled about 5 miles. The enemy were estimated to number about 1,000; their loss was considerable—exact number not known.

Our loss was as follows: Frank Lewis, private, Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., shot and killed; William Betzold, private, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, slight gunshot wound in left arm; Edgar J. Chamberlain, corporal, Company K, Second Oregon, slight flesh wound through right leg above the knee; William E. Smith, private, Company K, Second Oregon, compound fracture of left arm; John F. Reeves, Company A, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., gunshot wound through right leg, entering above and coming out below knee. Private Frank Lewis was buried in the square in front of the church, it being impossible to transport his body.

Very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,
*Colonel Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding Provisional Brigade.*

TELEGRAPHIC REPORTS OF THE OPERATIONS OF MAY 1 AND 2, AND INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF BALIUAG, MAY 2.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Rafael, May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Advanced to San Rafael by both banks of the river. Considerable resistance on both sides. One man killed, 4 wounded. Drove enemy down river. Will move forward again at 5 to-morrow morning. Expect resistance from this on.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Command under Colonel Treumann, marching along south bank, met opposition about 1 mile from Bustos. Drove enemy and occupied town at 11.30 a. m. One-half hour later scouts crossed the river and entered Baliuag, and rang cathedral bell at 12 o'clock. Command under Colonel Summers met enemy about 2 miles from San Rafael; skirmished, driving enemy for 2 miles, when he came in view of troops and citizens fleeing in great confusion along road to San Miguel and other roads leading northwest and west. Guns were turned on them, but owing to the great number of women and children and what appeared to be wounded men being carried on litters fire was discontinued and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping that we might assure them of safety, but when the flag had reached within 500 yards of the people it was fired upon. Troops were then deployed and an effort made to cut off and surround the fugitives, but they scattered in the wildest confusion. Captain Gale, with mounted troop and his squadron, followed the retreating column along road toward San Miguel about 5 miles, skirmishing with enemy's rear guard. He pushed very rapidly until 21 men fell, being overcome with the heat, 8 being comatose. Our loss, altogether, 2 wounded. Serious punishment inflicted on the enemy. Some of his dead and wounded are in our hands, but I have not ascertained how many. The arms of the killed and wounded were secured.

At Bustos a Spanish prisoner escaped, informing me that 6 insurgents were killed and 14 wounded. He also informed me that Pilar, brother of General Pio de Pilar, was here with 800 men, and General Garcia. All have gone toward San Miguel. I await instructions.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Note to foregoing.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 2, 1899

Captain Gale reported later to me that out of the 2 dismounted troops engaged with the fleeing San Miguel rear guard, in less than twenty minutes 35 men fell from heat prostration, 8 of them in comatose condition.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

[Report.]

BALIUAG, May 5, 1899

ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

SIR: In compliance with the direction of the regimental commander, I have honor to make report of the operations of my command, consisting of the First Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, in the capture of Bustos.

On May 1 the battalion left camp at Angat about 2.45 p. m., and proceeded along the road along the left bank of the Quingua or Bagbag River toward Bustos with particular incident, except the firing of the first North Dakotas, which had advance until we reached a series of rice fields opposite San Rafael. The next morning promptly at 6 o'clock the battalion moved out as the advance guard of the brigade, and was composed of Company A, Lieutenant Godfrey commanding; Company K, Lieutenant Wassell commanding; Company F, Lieutenant Dalton commanding in regular advance guard formation, except that distances were diminished, owing to the difficulties presented by the nature of the country. In addition, 12 scouts of the division were sent about 500 yards in advance of the point. A Company composed of the vanguard, K and I the support, and F Company the reserve.

My original orders directed me to preserve touch with the Third Infantry on the other side of the river. This was easy to do at first, as the road runs near the river for several miles; later the road departs from the river, rendering it necessary to reinforce the right flankers with half a company from the support. Later, at about 2½ miles from Bustos, the river takes a large bend from the road until it is about a mile from the road. This area is covered by cultivated fields, interspersed with thickets of bamboo and brush. The flankers reported the insurgents in force in the bend. I ordered 3 companies to move by the right flank until the front reached the river, then to move forward, leaving 1 company in the road as reserve. Finding the distance to the road too great to be covered by 3 companies, I sent a message to the commanding officer giving the situation. He ordered my remaining companies to join me and later sent Company G of the Second Battalion. I moved forward, driving the insurgents back into Bustos and across the river. The river can be forded in most places, but there is a particularly good ford near the pueblo of San Elina, about 2 miles from Bustos. This was used by the Filipinos, as was also the ford to Baliuag. It was quite a surprise to the insurgents to be discovered in the woods in this bend, and they were no doubt there lying in ambush for the probable purpose of making a flank or rear attack when our men should attack the forces behind the stone barricades defending Bustos. This supposition is borne out by the fact that the insurgents were not behind intrenchments, which is the first time I have known them to be so situated since March 19; and also because women and children were with them, and in the hollows and brush, besides the household goods and other valuables, carabaos, and milch cows, all of which they had left behind in their retreat.

Just previous to this movement, about 8 a. m., I received orders from the commanding officer that, as the distance to the river was so great, I need not keep in touch with the troops on the other side. At the beginning of this last movement I was in direct touch with the extreme left of the Third Infantry, and Lieutenant Godfrey spoke to them.

Having received the above orders, I pressed forward, making a change of direction to the left so as to sweep every piece of woods in the entire bend. I was at this time on the extreme right of the gravel bank of the river, on horseback. I proceeded on a swing about one-quarter of a mile, until opposite the little pueblo of San Elina on the right bank of the river, where the enemy opened up a galling fire from behind a stone wall and another point a little farther down the river, which I had been told was intrenched (but I had not yet verified it). The point from which the enemy fired was a little in advance of my right flank, and the nearest fire was not over 100 yards from me. I was mounted on a gray horse, close to the water, and nearly the whole platoon was in skirmish line on the gravel shore without cover of any kind. The enemy fired several heavy volleys at us at this close range before we could

helter, yet not a man was hit. There seems to be little danger of being hit while facing the enemy, except by mere accident. I noticed that most of the men of the battalion seemed to fully realize this, and I am certain that they are ready to face and charge any insurgent firing line, even behind strong intrenchments.

I kept the men under cover until the fire slackened, and then commenced a flank attack on the enemy, which, with the front fire of the Third Infantry, caused the enemy to leave San Elina. I then continued sweeping the bend of the river until I got into the open field in the river bottom near Bustos, when the fire from Bustos and up the river from Baliuag became so severe that I found it advisable to halt. The fire from Bustos was from a barricade and houses. I then sent forward a force of scouts and sharpshooters up the river, who fired on the men behind the barricade from their left flank, and moved the 5 companies by the flank back to the main road, then moved them to the front under cover. The movement, which was plainly seen by the enemy on both sides of the river, together with the fire from the flank, caused the enemy to abandon the barricades and retreat, some across the river to Baliuag, but the majority on the Bustos side went down the Quingua River. I recalled the sharpshooters of my command from the flank and took them, with some of the scouts belonging to the division, past the barricade into the town, where I arrived a few moments before 11 o'clock. I was annoyed by shots from Baliuag, on the other side of the river. I had expected that the Third Infantry would take Baliuag at the same time my battalion took Bustos, but, for reasons not known to me at that time, it did not do so, and in order to stop the annoying fire from Baliuag, scouts crossed the river and silenced it. I could have easily crossed the river and taken Baliuag at 11.15 a. m., but did not do so, as my orders only contemplated the taking of Bustos. After taking Bustos I placed Lieutenant Godfrey's company on guard over all the houses, with strict injunction to prevent any soldier from entering any house without authority, and to prevent looting. I posted the remaining companies of my battalion along the river, and ordered Company G (Lieutenant Thorn), which had been attached to my battalion, about 1 mile down the river, and came back to Bustos and reported to the commanding officer, who had arrived in the meantime.

The battalion which I commanded made the front and flank attack on the enemy's main barricades, drove them out of them and from the town, and captured and entered Bustos at 11 a. m.

The force of the enemy was unknown. When I commenced operations I was told that there were from 2,000 to 4,000 insurgents in front of me, but I have since learned from several Filipinos that there were about 2,000. One intelligent and seemingly reliable Filipino of position, living between Baliuag and San Elina, informed me that there were 300 insurgents in my front on the left bank and 500 behind the walls and intrenchments at San Elina on the left bank, from which place I received the heavy flank fire heretofore mentioned, and that there were 1,300 men in Baliuag, of whom a majority retreated toward San Ildefonso; that the troops were commanded by General of Division Gregorio del Pilar, and that most of the troops were raised in the province of Bulacan. He also informed me that if the general in command would publish an edict that the men could return to their work and that the women would be protected from violence, most all would be glad to return to their homes. All the companies did excellently, largely due to the company commanders. Lieutenant Godfrey as commander of the vanguard handled it with skill, and it was due to the vigilance of his right flankers that the ambush, and a flank attack which would probably have had a disastrous result, was prevented.

I am very happy to state that there were no casualties from bullets, due first to the excellent marksmanship of the insurgents; second, to the way in which the battalion attacked the flank, and, third, the strict attention paid to keeping the men protected from fire whenever it was possible to do so.

I do not know the losses of the enemy, but know from the statement of the reliable Filipino that he personally counted in the early part of the fight 4 dead soldiers being carried off on the backs of others, and a number of wounded, which he did not count. He said he left for the hills when the firing became heavy, but would estimate the number, but said that all were carried toward San Ildefonso on men's backs and not in carts. Personally I did not see a dead or wounded soldier, but they were sufficient to cause them to abandon a strongly intrenched position when attacked by an advance guard of one-fifth their number. No guns were captured, but some Remington ammunition was found and destroyed; also a quantity of corn, rice, and sugar in warehouses.

The command camped in Bustos that night, and the next day, May 3, under orders, crossed the river and camped in Baliuag.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GREEN BALLANCE,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

160 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY, *May 8, 1899.*

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, through commanding officer North Dakota volunteers.

In my opinion, Major Ballance deserves great credit for the manner in which he conducted the advance guard. By his skill and prudence he so developed and flanked the enemy as to prevent the execution of a surprise which I believed the enemy had planned, and in all human probability accomplished without a casualty what would have cost dearly.

I desire also to commend the zeal displayed by his officers and men carrying out his instructions.

LEO E. PARKER,
Major, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HDQRS. FIRST NORTH DAKOTA VOLUNTEERS,
Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the assistant adjutant-general, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

Major Ballance deserves great credit for the manner in which he carried out his orders. His skirmish line moved forward with energy and over very difficult ground, driving the enemy before him from positions evidently intended as a surprise for our flank and rear. The insurgents were also forced to abandon strongly barricaded position on the main road, leading into Bustos, by being flanked by Major Ballance's force. Officers and men displayed zeal and energy in carrying out their instructions.

W. C. TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota Infantry Volunteers, Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

From the best information obtainable the insurgent force referred to was not to exceed 800 strong.

I heartily concur in the favorable mention of Major Ballance and the officers and troops herein credited.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Copy of translation of letter (Spanish).]

SEÑOR PRESIDENT AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL IN CHIEF:

This evening, being in conference with Gregorio del Pilar, he received a communication from Maj. Luis Gatmaytan, chief of two companies who occupy San Rafael stating that he had had a battle with the enemy of the said city for the space of three hours, and that because of the lack of ammunition he was forced to retire to Acti and the forces of the same general and two incomplete companies in Tiebogan also had battle, and for the same reason as the other retired to Bustos. At the same time our forces retired the enemy also retired, and I suppose that they have encamped at Marunco, and for this reason General Pilar ordered that the column of Señor Concepcion that is in this city to-night should follow to Angat, but because of the news of the new occupation of San Rafael by the enemy he occupied the said city of San Rafael.

The other companies of Pilar's brigade occupy Pulilan, Santa Barbara, Bustos and this city. Quinua, according to General Pilar, is a very bad position, because the enemy is able to direct three forces against it, coming from Bigaa, Guiguinto, and Malolos, and for this reason he considers it inconvenient to occupy the place by any of our forces.

This is all the official news I have the honor to present to my commander in chief whom may God guard.

El commandante de estado mayor.

ANDRES TRIA.

BALIUAG, May 1, 1899.

[Copy of translation of letter (Spanish).]

To the Señor PRESIDENT AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL IN CHIEF AT SAN ISIDRO:

I have the honor to state to your excellency that during a trip to this city this morning nothing new has occurred. I am remaining here in peace and tranquillity, although there is a scarcity of inhabitants.

Concerning the commission you have given me, the Señor Major Sylvester Domingo and Captain Esteban de la Rama last night were in San Miguel, and I have given them compliments, ordering them in form and verbally as you directed, with all their respective forces, to the end that all captains have received the orders.

The chief of the column of sharpshooters, Señor Varancio Conception, who was in Maasin, after receiving the written order of his captain, began the march for the point for which he was destined, but with the news that the enemy had abandoned San Rafael, Norzagaray, and Angat, retiring toward Santa Maria. We agreed with Señor Conception that it would be more opportune to occupy with his column at Angat and its surroundings, suspending his march to San Roque, and he will take from this place the direction of the said city of Angat. Of this determination he will give account to General Pilar for his knowledge.

The column of Señor Conception is composed of 4 companies of sharpshooters—1 of Cavite, another of Novores, and the other 2 companies from the battalion of Manila. That, in conjunction, forms 7 complete companies; all in all, 570 rifles, the greater number being Mausers, but all scarce of ammunition.

We have in this column 3 Mauser rifles and 5 Remingtons useless, with 1 sack of empty shells. I have signaled to Señor Conception that he shall notify his captains as soon as possible, so that he will impress upon his captains and soldiers the necessity of saving empty shells in all places where they may have battles.

With this letter will go 4 scouts and a lieutenant of cavalry with 2 soldiers.

Any further news I will give you full account of.

God guard yourself.

El commandante estado mayor.

ANDRES TRIA.

MAY 1, 1899.

The above translation of letters telegraphed under the following:

BALIUAG, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following translations of letters captured here are sent for the information of general commanding.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Report.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 3, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Under the instructions from the division commander the Third U. S. Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., Scott's battery, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., and wagon trains left San Rafael at 6 o'clock a. m. of May 2, 1899, preceded by Capt. F. J. Case, acting engineer officer, and scouts, advanced on road to Baliuag.

A short distance from San Rafael scouts and advance guard were repeatedly fired upon by sharpshooters of the enemy. The column passing through Pantubig, Cainan, and Casa Ha de Uto with 1 battalion of the Third U. S. Infantry in advance in line of skirmishers. Arriving at opening about half a mile from Baliuag fire was opened on our line by the enemy, who held strong positions on the opposite side of opening, protected by a line of bamboo thickets; were also in front and to the left, from a strongly fortified position in the town of Santa Aeno. Scott's battery was immediately placed in position and opened fire on the enemy; 1 battalion Third U. S. Infantry deployed in line of skirmishers on the right. Commanding general arrived and assumed command. Under his direction battery ceased fire, it being reported from the line that a flag of truce was seen advancing toward our lines. By direction of the division commander, Capt. J. F. Case, acting engineer officer of the division, Corporal Marshall, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., and the commanding general's orderly, with flag of truce, advanced toward the enemy's lines. Upon arriving at a point about 400 yards from the enemy's line were fired upon by the

enemy. They dismounted and retired as soon as possible. The Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., were brought up on the right and deployed in line of skirmish facing across the front of the main line. In this position the lines were advanced and closed in on the town of Baliuag, and entered the town at 3.10 o'clock p. m. Scouts having entered in advance of the main column and found the place deserted by the enemy. Distance traveled about 7 miles. Enemy's loss severe, but unable to estimate the numbers, it being reported from the line that large numbers wounded could be seen carried upon stretchers.

Our casualties were as follows: Jacob Fisher, corporal, Company E, Third U. S. Infantry, flesh wound, dorsal side penis; Frederick Miller, private, Company Third U. S. Infantry, penetrating wound left thigh and fracture of bone.

The command after arriving in Baliuag were assigned quarters and went into camp. Outposts and street patrols were established and sentries posted over all Government property.

Very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,
Colonel Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding Provisional Brigade

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 2, 1898

General LAWTON, *Baliuag*:

Remain at Baliuag watching San Miguel road until you receive rations via Malolos. Detachment of Twenty-second Infantry (5 officers, 89 men, at Quingua) will be ordered to join you to-morrow, carrying telegraphic communication via Malolos. General Hale's brigade, at Pulilan, will be ordered back to-morrow at Calumpit; will advance on San Fernando. Our force at Baliuag will cover railway communication until your future advance is directed. Enemy now concentrating large store houses some miles east of Maasin, on Maasin River, northeast of you some 8 miles, in the country. Look in that direction; main force there. What supplies do you need? Acknowledge.

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 2, 1898

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN, *Bustos*:

Put your command in camp. Take command of troops and town. Hold responsible for people and property.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

ONE MILE EAST OF PULILAN, May 2, 1898

General LAWTON, *Front*:

Arrived here 1 mile east of Pulilan this forenoon with South Dakota and Iowa regiments, 2 guns, 1 Gatling, half troop of cavalry, and will remain here awaiting developments. Small party of insurgents at Pulilan retreated toward Baliuag. (Glorio del Pilar said to be at Baliuag. Could get no definite information as to force but do not believe to be large. Please answer via Quingua Station situation of your front.

HALE, Brigadier-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 2, 1898

Brigadier-General HALE, *Quingua Station*:

Occupied Baliuag as well as Bustos; considerable fighting. Pilar was here as well as others; all retreated on road to San Miguel in utmost confusion.

LAWTON, Major-General

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 2, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Detachment of Twenty-second Regiment arrived here. Telegraphic line completed to this point at 6 p. m. Will push forward to Baliuag in the morning.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 2, 1899—10 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Eighth Army Corps:

Telegram received. Need ordinary rations and tobacco for men and a few stores for officers. Detailed list will be forwarded as soon as possible.

LAWTON, Major-General.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., May 2, 1899.

Lieut. W. A. CAMPBELL,
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry:

SIR: The bearer, Miguel Trujillo, guide and scout, reports to you, by the department commander's order, to go with you and report to General Lawton. The department commander directs that you take charge and see that he goes through with your party and reports to General Lawton on his arrival.

Very respectfully,

FRED W. SLADEN,
Aid-de-Camp.

Reported May 3, 1899, at Baliuag.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila:

In addition to rations, commissaries for officers, and tobacco for men, telegraphed last night, the following articles of clothing are required by this command:

Shoes.—One pair 5a, 3 pairs 5b, 1 pair 6a, 2 pairs 6b, 1 pair 6c, 1 pair 7a, 77 pairs 7b, 1 pair 7d, 1 pair 7e, 1 pair 7f, 1 pair 7g, 1 pair 7h, 1 pair 7i, 1 pair 7j, 1 pair 7k, 1 pair 7l, 1 pair 7m, 1 pair 7n, 1 pair 7o, 1 pair 7p, 1 pair 7q, 1 pair 7r, 1 pair 7s, 1 pair 7t, 1 pair 7u, 1 pair 7v, 1 pair 7w, 1 pair 7x, 1 pair 7y, 1 pair 7z, 1 pair 8a, 77 pairs 8b, 6 pairs 8c, 2 pairs 8d, 4 pairs 8aa, 1 pair 8cc, 4 pairs 9a, 45 pairs 9b, 1 pair 9c, 2 pairs 9aa, 25 pairs 10b, 1 pair 10d, 2 pairs 11b, 1 pair 11c.

Canvas trousers.—Eleven pairs No. 1, 40 pairs No. 2, 41 pairs No. 3, 17 pairs No. 4, 5 pairs No. 5, 1 pair No. 6.

Khaki trousers.—Three pairs No. 1, 21 pairs No. 2, 26 pairs No. 3, 15 pairs No. 4, 11 pairs No. 5, 15 pairs No. 6, 4 pairs No. 7, 2 pairs No. 8, 1 pair No. 9, 1 pair 32 waist, 35 leg.

Cotton undershirts.—Three size No. 1, 81 size No. 2, 83 size No. 3, 38 size No. 4, 3 with 38-inch chest.

Khaki drawers.—One hundred and forty-four size 2, 270 size 3, 216 size 4, 2 size 5.

Cotton socks.—Six No. 9, 277 No. 10, 465 No. 10½, 56 No. 11, 12 No. 12.

Woolen socks.—Forty-one No. 10, 288 No. 10½, 35 No. 11.

Campaign hats.—Two No. 6½, 2 No. 7½, 1 No. 7¾, 2 No. 7¾, 1 No. 7¾.

Double-breasted flannel shirts.—Four No. 1, 22 No. 2, 20 No. 3, 8 No. 4.

Leggings.—Nineteen No. 1, 47 No. 2, 6 No. 3.

Khaki blouses.—One No. 2, 3 No. 3, 1 No. 4.

Cotton drawers.—Three No. 1, 8 No. 2, 14 No. 3, 2 No. 4, 3 pairs 34 waist, 35 leg.

LAWTON, Major-General.

164 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

Captain HANNAY:

General states that you can take such feed for your horses as is necessary, making memorandum of same. Have it done by your order.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Presuming there will be no occasion to use any of my troops south or east of river, I will ferry over command at Bustos to-day. River deep; no ford.

LAWTON, *Major-General, U. S. V.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *Baliuag:*

Your dispatch, saying you would ferry your command over at Bustos and that you presumed there would be no use for any of your troops south and east of river, just received and approved.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

I have organized a most efficient detachment of scouts, employing Mr. W. H. Young, an old frontiersman, a prospector and scout, as chief, with twenty-five selected volunteers. They have done and are doing excellent and effective work. On both sides of river they have advanced half day ahead of the command. Located and developed enemy and sent information to column. Two of them drove back a skirmish line of 200 men and held them until command came up. They have brought in from 1 to 4 guns every day. I will send these men to look up enemy constructing storehouses, as indicated in yours of last evening. Would like to send Colonel Summers forward on San Miguel road to crossing Maasin River to-night or in the morning. I found here a very intelligent Spaniard who has been in charge of repairs of arms, etc., for insurgents. He knows place where cartridge factory is; about 5 hours' march; would like authority to try to find it. I have also an intelligent native, formerly governor of this place; born here. Would like authority to employ one or both, Spaniard and native, as guide and interpreter. I find enemy's strength always exaggerated. They have offered no determined or effective resistance. Are greatly demoralized and are breaking into small parties and disintegrating. With a squadron of mounted men I could have destroyed the whole outfit from here yesterday, but our men on foot can not stand the extra exertion in this awful heat. Those who suffered sunstroke yesterday fell as though shot. The mounted troop did excellent work, but could make but slow progress because very small detachments of enemy's rear guard could stop them. It has rained nearly every day and the country off the roads is impracticable for vehicles.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 3, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Your proposition to send General Summers to Maasin River on San Miguel road approved, provided he is strong enough to take care of himself. You should also send 75 men to Quingua to keep route open and prevent interference with railroad

om north. Am assured that supplies are being sent into country of Maasin for
ture use. Leave parties of such sufficient size to safely find and destroy subsistence
longing to insurgents, respecting private property. Report amount destroyed.
telegraph line by Quingua should have reached you by this time. Might retain both
ies while in your present position. Secure the services of such civilian employees,
aniards or natives, as you may deem necessary.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899—7.20 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Since wiring this morning a good ford has been found and command crossed with-
out ferry.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

It has been found upon investigation that Captains Esteban, Mariano, Albino, and
oyance, of the insurgent army, reside in this city, the first-named having been col-
lector of taxes for this district. They own a large storehouse in which is stored rice,
estimated about 50,000 bushels, about 30,000 being in the storehouse of the first-
named. There are at least fifteen other storehouses, said to belong to private parties,
not yet examined. There are also stored large quantities of sugar.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Scouts sent out on road toward San Miguel. Found about 200 insurgents 3 miles
out. Attacked and drove them. Hearing the firing the mounted troop was sent to
enforce the scouts. Insurgents driven until dark. No casualties on our side.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899—6 a. m.

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Colonel Summers, with his provisional
regiment and the Third United States Infantry, is under orders to immediately break
camp and march to the north. He has been authorized to withdraw his guards, out-
posts, etc.

The commanding general directs that you push from your command at once the
necessary outposts and pickets to relieve those thus withdrawn. Captain Gale, pro-
vost-marshal, with his squadron, will provost the town.

Very respectfully,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

SIR: The commanding general directs that you furnish the bearers, Salvador Grem and Juan de la Tove, escaped Spanish prisoners, transportation to Malolos, and see that they are sent to Manila to report to provost-marshal-general.

Very respectfully,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 4, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Leave here 8 a. m. for headquarters by General Otis's orders. Go by way of Malolos. Don't know how I will get over; will do the best I can. Have orderly and 2 horses.

BIRKHIMER.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

Captain BIRKHIMER, *Malolos:*

Just sending company Twenty-second Infantry to occupy Quingua. Train will start to Malolos to-day and return with supplies; however, signal wagons go in this morning unattended. Fancy there is no enemy between here, Quingua, and Malolos.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 4, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Ten days' field rations, tobacco, and clothing requested for your command will be sent to Malolos in railway train to-morrow a. m.; also a few subsistence stores for sale to officers. MacArthur has met enemy in considerable force at Santa Tomas; now fighting for bridge crossing. Insurgents have fired town.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 4, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Will send you supplies, rations, and clothing to Malolos to-morrow. Send your train to Malolos for them via Quingua; the troops you send to Quingua can escort it. What is disposition of your troops this morning?

BARRY.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

Mr. W. H. YOUNG,
Chief of Scouts.

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you proceed this afternoon with your whole detachment in a northeasterly direction, covering the country lying between the San Rafael road and the Maasin River. The object of your scout will be to find and destroy all magazines, storehouses or caches, or subsistence or other supplies belonging to the enemy. You will observe carefully any trails or roads and follow tracks of carts or sleds to ascertain if they lead to the places where stores have

been concentrated. All private individuals and property will be respected. You will keep a record of the kind and quantity of stores destroyed and the place of storage and report same to these headquarters. As it will be impracticable to carry sufficient supplies you must depend upon the country for subsistence.

You are especially charged to bear in mind that the object of your expedition is not an aggressive one against the troops of the enemy. You must conceal yourselves and your movements as much as possible. After accomplishing the object of your mission the general does not object to your securing all the guns you can from the enemy on your return. The expedition should cover a period of several days. If practicable you will communicate progress from time to time. You can arrange certain signals which can be understood.

The general commanding relies upon your good judgment, courage, and caution to make the expedition a success, and each and every member of your detachment is relied upon to render faithful and obedient compliance with your orders as chief. He also relies upon your manhood as American soldiers to show due respect and consideration to helpless women and children and noncombatants generally.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Colonel Summers with Oregons, Minnesotas, Third U. S. Infantry, and Utah gun en route to Maasin. Scouts about to start for country between San Rafael road and Maasin River. One company Twenty-second Infantry about to start for Quingua; all other troops at this place. Train will start for Malolos as soon as possible.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 4, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Colonel Summers's command had skirmish with insurgents, probably 400, just before entering this town. Colonel Summers deployed his command and drove them off in the direction of San Miguel. He now occupies this town, where he will camp to-night. Two of our men wounded; enemy had trenches.

SEWELL, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 4, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

Arrived at 11.15, meeting strong opposition from enemy intrenched on north side of river. Casualties: Capt. H. L. Heath, commanding Company A, Second Oregon, struck by spent ball on the leg, slight; Fred Buckendorf, private, Company L, Thirteenth Minnesota, wounded on left side, serious; James Barrett, private, Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota, wounded in right shoulder, severe. Roads in some places impassable; necessary to repair same. One or two more rains will be impossible for wagon trains to pass. Enemy's strength here to-day estimated between two and three hundred, armed with Mausers. Enemy's loss, 4 dead on the field; no means of estimating their wounded. Now raining very hard.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899

Colonel SUMMERS,
Commanding Provisional Brigade:

Captains Case and Sewell have arrived and reported. I congratulate and thank you and your command for the fine manner in which you succeeded in crossing under fire of the enemy and capturing their works and town.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteer*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Captain Sewell, of my staff, who accompanied Colonel Summers this morning to Maasin, has returned and reports that no enemy was met until arrival at river site Maasin, when enemy, 400 strong, opened on our advance from intrenchments opposite side of river. Colonel Summers deployed, crossed the river under fire, charged and carried the intrenchments, driving the enemy beyond the town. Enemy's loss considerable, but not ascertained. Captain Sewell left. He saw several dead and wounded insurgents. Colonel Summers has done well and deserves credit. He must stay where he is until sunrise. I shall suggest a reconnoissance to San Yldefonso to-morrow. I have telegraphed to Maasin.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteer*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899—5.10 p.m.

Colonel SUMMERS:

The commanding general directs that you send back tomorrow morning, in charge of a quartermaster with proper escort, enough transportation to transport from Quingua ten days' rations, clothing, etc., as well as officers' mess supplies for your command. The transportation here has been sent to haul supplies from Malolos to Quingua.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 4, 1899*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION.

Shall I send the wounded and such that may be unable to proceed further to Baliuag?

SUMMERS, *Colonel, Commanding Brigade*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899

Colonel SUMMERS:

Commanding general approves your recommendation as to wounded and incapacitated. They can come in by your transportation to-morrow.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Arrived at Malolos at 7 p. m. Was delayed at Quingua by bad ford. Had to unload all of the sick. No stores here especially marked for General Lawton's command.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Letter.]

BALIUAG, PROVINCE OF BULCAN, May 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from the commanding general I have examined 37 storehouses in this city, and estimate their contents at between 65,000 and 70,000 bushels of unhulled rice (pilai) and between 2,200 and 2,500 pelouces of raw sugar, each pelouce weighing from 125 to 150 pounds.

Respectfully,

G. G. GALE,

Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Provost-Marshal.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER OF THE DIVISION.

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that you pay the sum of \$10 (Mexican), to each of the two native guides and interpreters who were secured by Mr. Ramsden, H.B.M. vice-consul, and were in service at these headquarters from April 21 to 29, 1899.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Examination of 37 storehouses gives by conservative estimate over 100,000 bushels of rice and 160 tons of sugar stored in them. About 7 storehouses not examined. To burn them would be to burn the town, besides they are mostly fireproof, being of stone with iron roofs. Instructions requested.

LAWTON, Major-General, Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 5, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Regarding stores of sugar and rice at Baliuag reported by you, it is evident that they are insurgent war supplies, and must be confiscated. Unless you can ascertain that a portion of these supplies are private stores, all should be destroyed, although it might be well to distribute them as far as possible to families residing there and in vicinity who desire to receive them. Take the whole matter under further consideration before proceeding to final action.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Examination storehouses completed. Forty-seven found; does not include stores or apparently private stores or deposits. Very conservative estimate 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar. I had already opened large storehouse of tax collected and am issuing to all citizens who need rice. The river from this point is navigable for bancas, some of which are now here—one loaded with corn—and these stores might be shipped to market and sold at auction. I made a rough estimate that there are stores enough in this town alone to supply the whole insurgent army six months. It might be well to hold onto this place until some disposition can be made of stores. They will doubtless be claimed by private parties, and perhaps some is so owned. Scouting parties are out from this place and from Maason to the east and north, fires are to be seen in that direction—presumably the burning of supplies. The quantity reported does not include that found at Bustos, where there is a large amount, including corn.

LAWTON, *Major-General, U. S.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 5, 1898*

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

Sergeant Anderson, in command of section of Utah battery, has 38 percussion shells but 14 shrapnel shell. Respectfully request that 50 shrapnel shells be sent by wagon train. Shall I send mule team for it?

SUMMERS, *Colonel Commanding*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1898

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin:*

Ammunition for field pieces has been shipped with rations. Will forward you as soon as it comes. When did transportation start?

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1898

Captain WALCUTT,
Chief Quartermaster, Malolos:

The Utah gun is nearly out of shrapnel. Scott has wired Major Young at Malolos to turn over same to you. If he does so, send it along. Suppose the Utah supply depot is at Malolos. It appears that Utah pieces use different ammunition.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 5, 1898*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Wagon train, with escort of one battalion, left 6.30 a. m.

SUMMERS, *Colonel*

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 5, 1899.

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Young not here. Have wired him that transportation will be here until 1. Have nothing from stores.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Memorandum on above.]

For states that Major Young is at front of MacArthur's division, and has 1 there."

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Infantry rations expire to-night. Am one day behind balance command; 7s, instead of ten, would straighten out. Have asked Captain Buttler to 8 boxes ammunition to replenish.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 5, 1899.

LAWTON:

7s' rations and clothing for your command have gone up on this morning's for Devol in charge. To what date do you consider these rations supply 8s?

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

7s' rations will supply command to include 11th instant.

LAWTON.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

WALCUTT, Malolos:

Supplies arrive, load first those for Third Infantry, Oregon, and Minnesotas. To have trains from these commands at Quingua to-night to receive them. Use is at Quingua looking after crossing.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

Rehmann, private, Company M, Third Infantry, flesh wound of left fore-
ior surface, midway between elbow and wrist; nonpenetrating and flesh
in same bullet on left side, over tenth rib, about 6 inches above enteriom
inous process of ilium; caused by bullet from Colt revolver; accidental.

SUMMERS, Commanding.

172 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin*:

Have you sent scouting parties out to look for insurgent supplies? I see fires to the west of you, and presume they are your scouts burning insurgent stores.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 5, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Scouting parties have been sent to the east and north; have not yet reported. Will report particulars on their return.

Colonel SUMMERS,
Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 5, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Scouting parties reported back. Seventeen thousand forty-five bushels and 644 sacks rice destroyed. Eight bolos discovered in straw stack.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding Provisional Brigade.

(Repeated to the Palace.)

(Telegram.)

MALOLOS, *May 5, 1899.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Following received from Major Young, Utah artillery:

"Our ammunition is in car at Bagbag. Please procure from car 65 rounds shrapnel for battery; wire chief ordnance officer Manila to send it out by p. m. train, if you can wait. Our ammunition is packed in boxes containing 5 complete rounds. If you wire arsenal make it clear that you want complete rounds with smokeless powder for Utah gun."

Bagbag is 2 miles above here. Please wire instructions.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899—1.45 a. m.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos*:

Your dispatch about Utah gun received. The general says O. K. Wire the chief ordnance officer as suggested. However, get ammunition if you can, as Utah gun is without it.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 5, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Train arrived at 11.15. Twenty thousand field rations, 12 boxes quartermaster supplies, and 2 wagon loads commissaries for officers; in all, 40 wagon loads.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

I recommend upper ford one-half mile above here. Water is 4 inches deep in ambulance bed, and is falling one-half inch per hour. Have sent detail for large banca and telegraphed Walcutt for rope and pulley blocks to be used if river rises. Current is easy and approaches fair; bottom good. Have you any further instructions for me here?

CASE, Acting Engineer.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

CASE, Acting Engineer, Quingua:

Your message received. General states all right. No further instructions.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT,

Chief Quartermaster, Malolos:

Captain Case just returned here; says he left instructions about ford and ferry with telegraph operator, Quingua. He thinks water will have fallen enough for you to cross at ford.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Pass.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

All persons are forbidden to in any way interfere with bearer, an aged servant of Señor Gonzales, of this town, so long as he remains on his master's premises. The pony he has in charge as well as the stores on the premises are not to be removed except by order from these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Pass.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1899.

Let the bearer, a native, pass out of our lines to-day only to bring his family.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 5, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Colonel Thompson wishes to recover wire by way of Angat, Norzagaray, and Bocaue. No objection, as your line by Malolos and Quingua can be maintained.

BARRY.

174 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field May 5, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER,
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: Captain Perkins, with a detachment of the Signal Corps, has been instructed to take up the Baliuag, Bustos, Angat, and Bocaue telegraph line.

The commanding general, therefore, directs that you order one company of regiment to accompany this detachment as escort in the recovery of this line. Upon completion of this duty the company will rejoin the regiment as soon as practicable.

Direct the commanding officer of the company so detailed to confer with Captain Perkins.

Rations can be obtained from Lieutenant King, aid-de-camp.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 5, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Young reports destruction of 15,000 bushels grain about 8 miles northeast point. He is at Angat to-night. Says he met large numbers of natives returning to their homes in the valley, and all seemed to appreciate the fact that their homes were not burned, and surprised to find everything as left by them in their flight. That insurgent soldiers are becoming dissatisfied on account of no victories, no pay, and no food, and are discarding their uniforms and returning to their homes.

LAWTON, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 5, 1898*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Two thousand bushels rice discovered this p. m. and destroyed.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding Provisional Brigade

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 11, 1898*

General LAWTON:

Can you send necessary transportation to Calumpit to receive there the equipment 3.2-inch gun which General MacArthur has been directed to send you? Also move to Baliuag the 2 companies of Third Infantry now at Calumpit Bridge? The 2 companies can escort artillery and will remain with you. Arrange this matter with General MacArthur by wire. Orders will be given commanding officer 2 companies Third Infantry to report to you for instructions. Light Battery E, First Artillery, 100 men, arrived this morning on *Hancock* without guns, equipment, ammunition, which are to follow on transport *Leeanaw*, which left San Francisco 3d instant. This battery will be equipped at once with the 6 mountain (Hotchkiss) 1.65 caliber, 3 of which will report to you and 3 to MacArthur. It is Third Infantry at Calumpit, not Twelfth, 8 companies of which you have with you now.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

After further investigation, I find the ammunition factory referred to is the one formerly established at Bacalor, and now removed to Mexico, which is, of course,

province and near MacArthur. I have also investigated the location of es northeast of this place, and am convinced that no storehouses, buildings, lerstand them, have or are being constructed, but that the enemy are accumu-arge stock of supplies in caches along the base of the mountains north of ay. My scouts, sent several miles on the trail shown on the map running runco north toward Biacnabato, found large caches of rice in ravines, g several tons each, herds of cattle, sheep, and buffalo, evidently gathered in case the insurgents were driven into the mountains. It was on this trail to send the cavalry squadron with pack transportation. The Spaniard o seems to be well informed and desires to return to Manila. I think you a valuable information from him.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 6, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

still in our front. Small parties of same seen reconnoitering about 1 mile from our outposts. Scout captured spy this evening and informed by him force at San Yldefonso is in the vicinity of 2,000, intrenched on ridge south and commanded by Capt. Catalino Beralde and Capt. Fanslino Cajano. ing a small force of the enemy was seen in line of skirmishers about 2 miles camp, and small parties seen moving to the south and west. ; scouts not seen here. Could be used to good advantage in case an attack ; more force and 2 more guns could be used to advantage. The spy reports enemy have 2 large pieces at San Miguel.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 6, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

ndred and ninety-four sacks of rice and 45 bushels; 15 gallons sirup and 15 gar destroyed 2 miles to the northeast; 500 bushels and 150 sacks destroyed west on river; 500 bushels destroyed about 2 miles east, near river, and ;,000 and 2,500 bushels destroyed three-quarters of a mile to east, near river.

SUMMERS, *Colonel Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 6, 1899.*

LAWTON:

report localities at which rice and sugar found and destroyed by your scouts ured, and what section of country your scouts are observing to-day. Mac-success at Santa Tomas and San Fernando greater than at first reported. loss was very severe, they leaving some 50 or 60 dead on the field, and a couple of hundred rifles.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

sent from here day before yesterday send in report as follows: "Destroyed 00 bushels rice, 7 tons sugar, large quantities cloth from which uniforms , a lot of shoulder straps, gold lace, buttons, etc., for same; a quantity of on, large lot of empty shells, 3 sets of reloading tools. Killed officer on fine horse; got horse. This a. m. destroyed about 20,000 bushels rice, natives to belong to Captain Ambrosio, of insurgent army." Scouts will con-ir work.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

176 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Quingua* :

Major Starr has been sent down by the general to help you out.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 6, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Martin Rekdahl, G, Second Oregon, accidentally shot by himself in right foot, ball passing through metatarsal bone back of toe; slight. Henry Lehman, private Company M, Third U. S. Infantry, died from effects of wound received yesterday.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 6, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Arrived Quingua, 10.15. All stores and wagons have been crossed over. Walcutt and empty wagons will start for Malolos in about an hour. No trouble to cross empty wagons. Third infantry and train will start about 2 p. m. and camp at Baliuag. Sick and wounded left for Malolos about 9 a. m.

STARR.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 6, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Walcutt is en route for Malolos with 20 wagons and expects to get balance of stores and return to-night. All stores left here are on north side of river under guard; these are about 4 wagonloads, but Walcutt hopes to pick them all up. Third Infantry all loaded and pulls out about 2 p. m. As there is nothing for me to do here, I will return, unless otherwise ordered.

STARR.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Commanding, Maasin* :

What were the localities at which rice and sugar were destroyed by your scouts already reported? General desires to know at once.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Major STARR, *Inspector-General* :

The general says O K. Come back if you think best.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 6 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Eleven teams got across the ford; unloaded 8 on this side and started to ferry stuff; finally the raft sank and the men are carrying what is left across on a poor bridge. *Reloading quartermaster supplies.* Sent wagon with two others back to try ford

greater number of men than previously used will lend a hand. I have given out of stores to be issued to organizations in Summers's command; of these there are more than enough to complete issue. Balance I have requested as far as possible and taken to Baliuag and turned over to King. The rations potatoes, onions, salmon, corned beef, raw beans, bacon, sugar, salt, pepper, and so on, hence are both weighty and bulky. I had anticipated same kind at Malolos with that I had drawn on supplies at Malolos. I intended to replace them as they came up. This labor was not all lost. If there are no objections I will take 20 wagons but one back. That one carrying ammunition for Utah gun. The loads from headquarters transportation to Knapp is going on as rapidly as possible. If the road on the other side of Baliuag is practicable, could I not take that way? This ford is a bad one for new mules and drivers, being slightly crooked the ferry is slow. I have no further use for the pack train on this expedition.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 6, 1899.

GENERAL, Baliuag:

Still at Malolos 7 crates bacon, 48 cases salmon, 68 crates potatoes, 22 crates barrels vinegar, 145 boxes hard bread, and stores for sale to officers and men. Walcutt takes 20 wagons back.

STARR.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 6, 1899.

WARDS:

Just received notice that 6 box shrapnel and 4 box shell have been sent to Scott's battery. Is it important that they should be brought over to-day? They have not yet arrived, but train is due in a few minutes.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

WALCUTT:

Is it important that Scott's ammunition come over here, though not necessarily have you not wagons enough? Captain McKenna tells me that my typewriter went to Malolos last night, but conductor refused to put it off. McKenna said it would be up again on the next or to-day's train. Scott wired Bocaue to put it on on this train. Fancy you will find it.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 6, 1899.

WARDS:

Stand five days' rations more are to be sent up tomorrow. Would it not be better to have them reduced to a certain extent—raw beans, for instance, and a proportion of the raw vegetables.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 6, 1899.

WARDS:

Bought ammunition, typewriter, and stationary. Will take all of them, and have room enough left in wagons to bring stuff left in Quingua.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos* :

As acting chief commissary make such recommendations as your experience suggests. Anything reasonable will be approved by the General. Keep your transportation to haul supplies. Will send the best teams from here to haul from Quingua.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos* :

The general says all right, come right along with it; then we can arrange to send back for the other five days' stuff. The Summers brigade transportation not yet arrived.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag May 6, 1899.

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN,

Commanding North Dakotas, Twenty-second Infantry, etc. :

The commanding general directs that you send your best transportation in the early morning to-morrow, with a quartermaster in charge and one company to be designated by you as escort, to Quingua, to receive and transport here to your command five days' rations, which Captain Walcutt is hauling from Malolos to Quingua. Five days' additional rations will arrive at Malolos to-morrow, and Captain Walcutt will transport them to Quingua.

Very respectfully,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 6, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Reported that General Geronimo, who has 3,000 troops at or in the vicinity of San Mateo, and General Pio del Pilar, who has about 2,000 in and around Antipolo, have received instructions from Aguinaldo to proceed, with their forces united, by mountain road to Norzagaray and Angat for the purpose of falling on your flank and to destroy your line of communication. Enemy evidently thinks you are supplied by Angat. The insurgent force at San Mateo was ready to move last night. It is fairly well armed and has a fair amount of ammunition and rice. Subsistence and ammunition transported by extra men. Watch well, by scouting parties, country to the east of you. The reported line of enemy's march is Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and Bustos. Also rumored that a force may strike at Santa Maria. General Hall will send out detachments to watch road by Novaliches. Acknowledge receipt.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Message concerning forces from Antipolo and San Miguel received. Company North Dakotas escorting signal party taking up line to Bocaue via Angat will be warned to be on the lookout. Mounted troop of cavalry to and east of San Rafael and Maasin River and will be pushed farther east, and Colonel Summers, at Maasin, will be notified to watch enemy's movements.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Error in reading your message concerning forces from Antipolo via San Miguel for San Mateo discovered. An additional force will be sent to watch Norzagaray.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

Escort Party recovering Telegraph Line Baliuag-Bustos-Angat-Bocause.

SIR: The commanding general directs me to inform you that it is reported a large force of insurgents will move by mountain road from San Mateo and Antipolo toward Norzagaray and Angat for the purpose of following our flank. The San Mateo force was reported ready to move last night. The general therefore directs that you keep scouts well out in the direction indicated and be on the alert, advising him promptly of anything unusual found or seen.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

Escort with Signal Detachment.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you go no further than Angat. You will occupy that town. Telegraphic communication will be kept up between this town and Angat. There will probably be stationed at San Rafael the 3 remaining companies of your battalion under Major Fraine.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin:*

Have received word from General Otis, which has been confirmed by scouts, that strong force insurgents is marching toward Norzagaray from San Mateo via San Jose. Keep enemy in your front well under observation and hold your command ready to attack if ordered. Ammunition for your gun and entire supplies here will go forward early in the morning. Have you heard or seen anything of Young's scouts?

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Message concerning advance of insurgents on San Jose road received. Mounted troop cavalry will be on hills southeast of Norzagaray on San Jose road. Can observe country for miles. Company at Angat, 3 companies at San Rafael early in morning. What are general's views as to situation and his wishes as to my movements? Would like to have Summers drive enemy from Yldefonso and threaten San Miguel.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

180 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

IN THE FIELD,
Short Distance from San Rafael, May 6, 1899

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Line reconstructed that we took down this morning. On return find infantry company camped near river, so will bivouac here for the night. Will have captain company send message if any news.

PERKINS, Captain

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 6, 1899*

General LAWTON, *Baliuag*:

Not prudent to advance Summers north until the reported movement of insurgents from the south develops. Information received is correct. The object of the movement is to drive in your flank, cut your line of communication, and the force to operate against you is large. Should insurgents appear in force you should withdraw Summers and crush them with all the force at your disposal, and Summers' troops should be kept well in hand that they may join you at short notice. Kobbé is being put in charge of all troops on railroad. He is making his disposition this evening. Bigaa and Bocaue are weak, and he will reinforce those points. It is possible insurgents may strike vicinity of Santa Maria. Five days' ration for your command to-morrow.

BARR

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 6, 1899*

General LAWTON:

Following just received from Captain Prescott, at Bocaue Bridge:

"Reconnoitering party sent out from here reports that it is reported to them by natives that an armed body of insurgents was advancing toward San Jose from the south."

BARR

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
Baliuag, May 6, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Stores reported destroyed by Colonel Summers were found from three-fourth 2 miles east and northeast of Maasin, up river. About 1,000 bushels 2½ miles on river. That destroyed by Young's scouts was found in country northeast of place, between Maasin River and San Rafael road.

LAWTON, Major-General

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 9.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 7, 1899

Second Lieut. W. J. McLean, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, is detached on special duty at these headquarters during this expedition as assistant to the quartermaster. He will accordingly report without delay.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 7, 1899*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Found three breaks in wire; in one place 100 feet entirely removed.

PERKINS

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 8, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION :

Summers has reconnoitered his front in good shape, and formed plan of attack much in the way proposed by the general, but adapted to local conditions. I am going over lines with him and will sketch plans for your perusal.

CASE, *Acting Engineer Officer.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 7, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Scouts sent to reconnoiter to the east of San Yldefonso report reaching about 1,800 yards of town and discovered enemy's outpost, and reports enemy engaged constructing trenches, although the force less than that heretofore reported. Major Willis with 1 battalion made reconnaissance to the front and discovered no changes from previous report except that the enemy's force seems less. No more stores discovered. About 500 bushels at this place will be destroyed when ordered to move.

SUMMERS,
Colonel Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS., FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899-7.30 a. m.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin:*

General Otis does not approve any further advance until the force reported in our rear is located and disposed of, and it is possible that we may have to turn back and meet them; therefore hold your command together ready to withdraw at short notice. I advise that you hold most of your train this side of river.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899.

Mr. YOUNG, *Chief of Scouts:*

Move all your scouts as quickly as possible to Norzagaray, near which place on the road to San Jose you will find the mounted troop of cavalry. It is reported that a strong force of insurgents is coming over that trail toward Angat. There are troops at San Rafael and at Angat. Assist the cavalry all you can, and make it as hot as possible for the advance of the insurgents. There are said to be two generals with them—Geronimo and Pio del Pilar. Get one or both if you can. Lookout for 5 pack mules lost near San Rafael when we came up.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 7, 1899.

C. R. EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General First Division:*

Troop I got here last night. They report that no insurgents have passed through here since they arrived. They are out scouting; will be back here to-night.

J. H. JOHNSON,
Captain Company L, North Dakota Volunteers.

182 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Courier.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899,

Lieutenant Boyd, *Angat*:

Send your scouts out well toward San Jose, being very careful and wary. I must know if the enemy is in force on that road or in that vicinity. I have sent orders to Young's scouts to join you. Report often; at least every four hours.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 7, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Just posted a squad of 14 men at the crossroad near Norzagaray. Nothing in sight except friendly natives moving back.

JOHNSON,
Captain, North Dakota Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 7, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Infantry company and detachment Signal Corps are at Angat. Line O. K. Await further instructions. At present we are just beyond place where General Lawton's camp was.

PERKINS.

CAMP NEAR NORZAGARAY, *May 7, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Saw 2 mounted scouts about 3 miles this side San Rafael; they got away. Captured a lieutenant at Angat. I camped at Angat last night. Lieutenant says there are 4 or 5 companies 4 miles from here in the mountains. He was sent in for information. I went in to Norzagaray at daylight; no insurgents there. Twenty-five, all armed, went through there at 7 p. m. last night; part had Remingtons, the rest Mausers. Captured a toll collector. My men are on the hills and see nothing of the column. Insurgents reported all starving here and going to San Miguel.

BOYD.

[Telegram.]

SAN RAFAEL, *May 7, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Arrived at San Rafael 9 a. m. Everything quiet.

FRAINE, *Major, North Dakotas.*

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 7, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have been out to ridge where Lieutenant Boyd has been since morning. All quiet. He wishes me to say that a platoon of his men is about 2 miles farther on, and nothing has transpired. No one seen at sundown. He will return to church at Angat leaving patrol on road toward bluffs above Norzagaray. Captain Johnson will move his company up to church, as will I the telegraph office. Will put my instrument a ridge where Boyd is, in a. m. Telegraph line cut between here and Norzagaray, but will reconstruct to-morrow.

PERKINS.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Received the general's telegram at 3.30 p. m. I am moving out toward San Jose. I can not telegraph again till I come back.

BOYD, Lieutenant.

[Telegram.]

SAN RAFAEL, May 17, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Nothing unusual noted on the way out here. Will see Major Fraine and return to Balinag.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

SAN RAFAEL, May 7, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON:

All scouts are now in and report having seen no armed insurgents, except a force of about 150 4 miles northwest, which force was traveling north. Natives seem fairly to agree in their statements to scouts that insurgents have moved their hospital and cartridge factory from San Miguel to San Isidro, and all intending to follow. Many natives here profess friendship for United States, and say they want rice. I have about 20,000 bushels under guard in warehouses. Firing heard on north side this morning.

J. H. FRAINE.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, May 7, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Is the report that insurgent column passed Norzagaray last evening, going north, confirmed? If so, it must be column which marched from San Mateo early yesterday morning. Hall had troops at Novaliches last night, and no insurgents passed on that road. Give all the information you can with regard to strength and positions of enemy. MacArthur, at San Fernando, reports insurgents to his right and front, left and front, and a small force to his rear, at Bacalor.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899.

Major FRAINE, San Rafael:

Five pack mules were lost on advance from Angat to San Rafael. See if you can recover them. Make inquiries of natives and offer reward of \$10 (Mexican) for return of each. Boyd as yet discovered nothing of column; is now pushing out on San Jose road; otherwise nothing new.

EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 7, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Have scouted the San Jose road. I went to a hill from which I could see the river one-half mile this side of San Jose. No insurgents could be seen. It does not appear that the column has arrived at San Jose. None of the natives along the road knows of any insurgents this side of the river. Women and children in the shacks formerly deserted. One native said 35 insurgents passed through his place, stealing all he had. This was over the river above Norzagaray. The natives report thieving parties annoying them and are coming in. Will report every four hours during the night.

BOYD, Lieutenant Cavalry.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899—8.55 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

No large body of insurgents has passed north from San Mateo unless they went east of Jan Jose and Norzagaray. The party seen in Norzagaray is estimated at 25, and said to be a part of a force of 4 or 5 companies, scattered in the mountains northeast of Norzagaray, coming into the valley for food. I have had troops at and received reports to-day from Malolos, Quingua, Maasin, San Rafael, Angat, Norzagaray, river crossing 1 mile north of San Jose, and from Young's scouts in country north of Angat. Insurgents are reported in small parties northeast of Norzagaray making their way to San Miguel, and a small force intrenching at San Yldefonso in front of Colonel Summers. Otherwise there are no insurgents reported in my vicinity. The cavalry troop and Young's scouts will cover the country east of the San Jose trail to the river and across it if possible and ascertain positively whether or not any column is passing or has passed north from San Mateo.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 7, 1899—9.29 p. m.*

General LAWTON:

The insurgent San Mateo column was directed to march by mountain road to east of Norzagaray. It should not have appeared on San Jose road.

Kobbé reports no insurgent troops on Santa Maria and Norzagaray road. Natives have returned to their homes and are busy plowing and planting.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899—10.30 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The information sent me from your office is as follows: "Reported that General Geronimo, who has 3,000 troops at and in the vicinity of San Mateo, and General Pio del Pilar, who has about 2,000 in and around Antipolo, have received instructions from Aguinaldo to proceed with their forces united by mountain road to Norzagaray and Angat for the purpose of falling on your flank and to destroy your line of communication. Enemy evidently thinks you are supplied from Angat. The insurgent force at San Mateo was ready to move last night. It is fairly well armed and has fair amount of ammunition and plenty of rice. Subsistence and ammunition transported by extra men. Watch well by scouting parties country to the east of you. The reported line of enemy's march is Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and Bustos." It is noted that you say the insurgent column will proceed by mountain road to Norzagaray, and not to the east of that place. If there is a road or trail to the east of the one I have scouted, it is not shown on any map I have, and is not known to me certainly. Up to dark this p. m. no insurgent column had shown itself at Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, or Bustos. My scouts have gone as far east as they well could in the time consumed. As I have reported, I have instructed the mounted cavalry and scouts to cut into the mountains east of the San Jose-Norzagaray trail to ascertain positively if there is any other trail over which the forces in question are going or have gone.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 7, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Message received by you regarding route of San Mateo column correct. The column was to strike Norzagaray by mountain road east of San Jose and Norzagaray road. This road not on map. It was to strike your support line of communication.

at Norzagaray and proceed thence by Angat, San Rafael, and Bustos. There is no doubt this order was given by Aguinaldo and that troops in San Mateo were placed in readiness to march. Don't know to a certainty whose orders Pilar's troops received, but it is reported at San Mateo that they had received the orders issued there. Unless column seen from your lookout at Norzagaray soon it did not march as ordered or is back in mountains on trail. The scouts should not penetrate far into mountains, and if column does not appear in next twenty-four hours near Norzagaray it need not be feared.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899—7.20 a. m.

Major FRAINE, *Commanding, San Rafael:*

An escort of 4 men from here accompany sergeant Signal Corps, going to Angat, repairing line. You may expect them about 8.30 a. m. across the river from you on main telegraph line. The commanding general directs that you relieve this escort there by 4 of your command to accompany signal detachment as far as Angat, then return. Send the Baliuag party back here.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN RAFAEL, *May 8, 1899.*

Major-General LAWTON:

All quiet here. Returning natives say no insurrectos within 10 miles. Spanish prisoner says all fighting men have gone to Miguel and San Isidro.

FRAINE, *Major.*

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 8, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Baliuag:*

All quiet here this a. m. Lieutenant Boyd got away with his troop about 6. Captain Johnson is posting squad at crossroad near Norzagaray. Lieutenant Boyd desires me to say that in case he has news he will send in report; otherwise will wait until his return this p. m. or later. Have you any instructions for me?

PERKINS.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

PERKINS, *Angat:*

Yours received. No additional instructions, unless it would be well to remain there temporarily to facilitate communication, as you have done so well there. Information from that source is important at this time. Give us everything.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN JOSE, VIA ANGAT, *May 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Have scouted a few miles south of San Jose. There is nothing unusual here except all the rice has been removed. I shall camp on the river one-half mile from this place to-night. Young and his men go up the river 5 miles, and to-morrow will connect with me near Norzagaray. They go as far as the mountains. The natives say that no insurgents have been here. Since the division passed through I can find no native who knows of a trail from San Mateo to Norzagaray except by this town.

BOYD, *Lieutenant.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

Lieutenant Boyd,

Commanding Mounted Troop, near San Jose, via Angat:

Your scout yesterday to San Jose sufficient. I desired country east of San Jose and Norzagaray road scouted. Return, going northeast to river. Cross it if necessary and come in at or north of Norzagaray. Be very cautious and do not venture far into mountains. Keep Young's scouts with or near you. Hasten back.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The following, just received, is repeated for your information:

"San Rafael, May 8, 1899.—General Lawton: All quiet here. Returning natives say no insurgents within 10 miles. Spanish prisoner says all fighting men have gone to Miguel and San Isidro. Fraine."

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899—4.30 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Lieutenant Boyd reports nothing unusual in country scouted by him to-day—miles east of Norzagaray and San Jose trail. Natives report no insurgents since American troops passed; also reports he can find no native who knows trail from San Mateo to Norzagaray, except via San Jose. Lieutenant Boyd will return.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Pass.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

Grant safe conduct to Señor Antonio Gonzales, his family and property. He is Spaniard living in San Rafael.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 8, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Arrived 9.05. Roads dry and hard. Met natives returning toward Baliuag.

CASE

[Letter.]

BALIUAG, *May 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

SIR: I was informed by telegraph a few days ago by Second Lieut. C. S. Babco First Cavalry, that he had been ordered to join my troop for duty, and have received notice to-day that he left Manila on the 2d instant for the purpose of joining. wagon train from Malolos has arrived without him, I presume he has been directed or delayed, and would respectfully request that he be inquired for and directed to join without delay, if practicable.

Respectfully,

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

GENERAL, *Palace*:

That Second Lieut. C. S. Babcock, First Cavalry, be ordered to join Captain [unclear] Squadron; one of these troops without an officer. Lieutenant Babcock wired [unclear] that he had been directed to join C Troop. Nothing further has been [unclear] him.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 8, 1899.*

LAWTON:

reports Lieutenant Babcock at San Fernando, and that he will send him to [unclear] as possible.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 8, 1899.*

LAWTON:

send you a commissary captain? Bootes is available if you wish him.

BRAINARD.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1899.

BRAINARD,

Chief Commissary of Subsistence:

By all means send me Captain Bootes. Need him very much.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 8, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

As Bootes has been directed to report to you for duty as issuing commissary.

BRAINARD.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 8, 1899.*

At

opened fire on reconnoitering party. Major Diggles, Thirteenth Minnesota, and Corpl. J. G. Miller, Company F, Second Oregon, wounded. They have [unclear] position, and I am just starting back to explain it.

CASE, *Acting Engineer Officer*.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 8, 1899.*

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

reconnaissance to the front of enemy. Found them still holding position, intrenched and in force; enemy opened fire on party. Casualties: Maj. Diggles, commanding Thirteenth Minnesota, shot in head—serious; John G. [unclear], Company F, Second Oregon, wounded in right arm—slight. Captain [unclear] accompanied party and made field notes.

SUMMERS,

Colonel Commanding Provisional Brigade.

188 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 8, 1898*

General LAWTON:

Major Devol will send to Malolos for you to-morrow morning 500 proclamations printed in both Spanish and Tagalo.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 8, 1898

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Department of the Pacific:*

Referring to capture of insurgent lieutenant reported by Lieutenant Boyd, I do to ask if any exceptions should be made in the rule that prisoners captured should be fed and released? A great number of supposed insurgents have been captured including some who were wounded; all have been released after examination wounded as soon as able to travel. One seriously wounded died.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteer*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 8, 1898*

General LAWTON:

Prisoners of rank or importance should be sent to Manila. They will include captured officers. The two gunboats met with great success yesterday in Rio F reaching Guagua, 5 miles from San Fernando, General MacArthur's headquarters. They drove off all insurgent forces from that river. They will return to that sea to-morrow and seek entrance to the Rio Grande, endeavoring to reach Calumpit. You will hardly be able to make any decided move until MacArthur gets into position.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 8, 1898*

General LAWTON:

Have directed Devol to send engine and car to Malolos at once to bring Diggle to Manila. He will see Major Crosby at hospital, who will send doctor necessary appliance and ambulance will meet train on arrival in Manila.

BARRY

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 8, 1898*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Everything seems quiet here this evening. Infantry outposts returned at dawn, reporting have seen none but amigos returning. Message to Lieutenant sent to him by his returning messenger at 4.42 p. m. No suspicious Filipinos from church tower in a long watch with field glasses this p. m. Couple of men were across river, report inhabitants cultivating and planting seed.

PERKINS

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, *May 9, 1898*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

All quiet here this a. m.

PERKINS, *Captain*

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Sergeant from Boyd's troop reports that they camped about 1 mile north of San Jose last night. Scouts left yesterday to go across river and north to rejoin Boyd in neighborhood of Norzagaray. He expects to reach here about 1 or 2 o'clock p. m.

PERKINS.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Department of the Pacific:*

The scouting to-day to the east of Norzagaray will, I think, clear up the situation in that direction. I would like to call in the troops sent out, as the rations are about exhausted, and I will then be ready to move immediately in any direction. All reports received this morning indicate no new developments.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 9, 1899.

General LAWTON:

You can withdraw your scouting parties as indicated in your dispatch of this morning.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Scouting parties North Dakota just returned from Norzagaray and 3 miles east of Angat. Saw nothing suspicious.

JOHNSON.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

Captain JOHNSON, *Angat:*

As soon as the cavalry and the scouts and your escort with telegraph come back to Angat, the commanding general directs that you return here with your company; that is, with the understanding that nothing new is discovered. Tell the cavalry troop, also the scouts, they can return independently. Captain Perkins can take up the line from Angat here.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

Major FRAINE, *San Rafael:*

The commanding general directs that you hold your command in readiness to return and join your regiment here by 3 p. m. to-day. If you hear nothing further at that time, start. Have signal operator cut his instrument and return with you. Your Angat company will probably return to-morrow morning. It is directed to wait for mounted troops, scouting and signal detachment.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

190 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 9, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Young's scouts left San Jose at 3.30 p. m. yesterday. I received the General's message at dark. I remained in San Jose until sunset. This morning a trail to the northeast connected me with Young a few miles south of Norzagaray. Here we saw one insurgent unarmed. We crossed the river south of Norzagaray 2 or 3 miles and crossed back at Norzagaray. Young's men went to the last ridge next to the mountains east to head of river. Nothing was seen except an old telegraph line. Natives in Norzagaray say no insurgents have been in vicinity since we came here. Part of Young's men are footsore. Shall I turn the captured lieutenant and tax collector loose?

BOYD, Lieutenant

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 9, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Returned to Angat 6.45, having gone 7½ miles toward Bocaue and return. No insurgents seen. Will start for Baliuag daylight. Captain Johnson reports all quiet here to-day. Troops and scouts all here.

PERKINS

[Telegram.]

ANGAT, May 9, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Young's men found some muster rolls across the river in a storehouse contain about 1,500 bushels of rice. The natives say they need rice, but are afraid to touch this. They say the insurgents come, take rice, pigs, chickens, and pay for nothing. May Young burn this rice? It is just across the river, about a hundred yards.

BOYD, Lieutenant

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899

Lieutenant BOYD, Angat:

Tell Young to try and issue it to the poor, and if they won't take the rice, burn it.
EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, May 9, 1899

General LAWTON:

Cordial greetings. How are things getting on in your front? I have a good position here, but the insurgents are rather numerous in the vicinity. How are your men standing the strain of the weather? It is telling with considerable force on the command.

MACARTHUR, Major-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899

General MACARTHUR, San Fernando:

Glad to get your message. Everything quiet and satisfactory with me, except that I feel we are too slow. There is a small force entrenched confronting my advance at San Yldefonso, near San Miguel. Wished to go for them several days ago and in

uel, but General would not consent. Have been scouting country east of
for large force said to be moving on my flank and rear, but can find
ly transportation worries me more than the enemy. Sunstroke, dysen-
alaria are very bad. Have sent in more than 200 sick. Major Diggles
) probably fatally wounded yesterday; shot through head on reconnois-
at are your plans? When and in what direction will you move? It rains
y day.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

MEMBERS,
Commanding United States Forces, Maasin:

ling general directs that you wire as soon as possible effective strength
and, commissioned and enlisted, by company and battalion.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 9, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

strength First Battalion, Second Oregon, Major Willis commanding, First
Hartman, adjutant: Company A, 2 officers, 75 men; B, 2 officers, 53
10 officers, 263 men. Second Battalion, Second Oregon, Maj. P. G.
r., commanding, First Lieut. Rhees Jackson, adjutant: Company F, 1
men; Company G, 1 officer, 53 men; Company K, 2 officers, 54 men; total,
d 169 men. Field and staff, 6 officers and 4 men. Hospital detachment,
tal, 22 officers, 443 men.

h Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., Capt. J. P. Masterman: Second Battalion,
Sebach, commanding: Company G, 1 officer, 71 men; Company K, 2 offi-
ers; Company L, 1 officer, 64 men; Company M, 3 officers, 72 men; total,
33 men. Third Battalion, Capt. C. T. Spear, commanding: Company C,
2 men; Company D, 2 officers, 74 men; Company E, 2 officers, 259 men.
staff, 7 officers, 4 enlisted men. Hospital corps detachment, 6 enlisted
l, 22 officers, 562 men.

8. Infantry, Captain Hannay, commanding: First Battalion, Captain
manding: Company G, 1 officer, 84 men; Company H, 1 officer, 78 men;
, 1 officer, 84 men; Company F, 1 officer, 78 men; total, 4 officers, 424
nd Battalion, Captain Buttler commanding: Company M, 1 officer, 77
any A, 1 officer, 82 men; total, 1 officer, 78 men. Company K, 1 officer,
al, 4 officers, 314 men. Hospital detachment, 2 officers and 7 men.
aff, 5 officers. Total, 15 officers, 645 men.

ngth of command; Field and staff, 3 officers, 4 men; Second Oregon, 22
men; Thirteenth Minnesota, 22 officers, 562 men; Third Infantry, 15
men; detachment artillery, 17 men; total, 62 officers, 1,666 men.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 9, 1899.*

ARDS:

guel Trujillo is here with 20 Filipinos, mostly women and children.
al Lawton desire them passed to Manila?

O'HARA,
Captain Third Artillery, Commanding.

192 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, *May 9, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

We have reached a satisfactory strategic position on this line, but my command is considerably reduced by constantly recurring casualties and sickness. My present purpose is to open communication with the bay by Bacolor and Guagua, but with my reduced force and a quite numerous enemy in front conservative action is necessary. Of the general's views and purposes which prevail I am not informed. Had a call from Senator Beveridge, of your State. I wish you could see him and talk with him.

MACARTHUR.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

General MACARTHUR (*via Malolos*):

Again I thank you for your message. We are practically in the same condition, except that I feel I have strength enough for anything in my front. This place possesses great strategic importance. Seven highroads converge here, and it is the important market center for this section. I found supplies of rice, sugar, and Indian corn sufficient to feed the whole insurgent army for six months. My movements are dictated in detail, and I have not been advised as to my future disposition; as a result, am not altogether happy. I am earnest, however, in my efforts to do all that is possible. I hope I shall have an opportunity to meet Senator Beveridge. He is a friend and a classmate of a brother-in-law. The natives in my vicinity are resuming usual conditions. They are plowing and planting, and I have appointed a mayor and started a civil administration.

LAWTON.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Sent scouting parties out on roads west 7 miles toward Candaba and San Luis. Party on road to Candaba went in sight of town. No insurgents seen or heard of. People returning to their homes and employed in domestic avocations. Have reports from Maasin, San Rafael, Quingua, Angat, and Norzagaray. All quiet and no change. Report from mounted cavalry and scouts crossed river east of Norzagaray and scouted to mountains, returning by the north to Norzagaray; no insurgents seen. Have called in all parties from the east. A large proportion of people returned to this city. To preserve order and for the convenience of administration called together leading people who selected Francisco Guerrero, whom I appointed mayor. I believe this place is of sufficient importance to be held by us, some seven main roads converging here. So far as this command is concerned it is in readiness to move in any desired direction.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers.*

[Letter.]

BALIUAG, P. I., *May 9, 1899.*

ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY, *Baliuag.*

SIR: I have the honor to report the following: In accordance with verbal orders the Third Battalion made a reconnoissance along the roads leading from this point to Candaba and San Luis, respectively. The companies were ready in the plaza at 5.20 a. m., but did not march until 5.50 a. m. The time intervening was used in getting information as to the streets leading from this town to the roads in question.

Companies B and L, under command of Lieutenant Chase, Twenty-second Infantry went on the San Luis road about 7 miles, carefully reconnoitering the country along the road, and returned at 5 p. m. No sign of the enemy was seen. All of the people were engaged in peaceful occupations. Many small hamlets were filled with

ple; also many people were on their way back to Baliuag. Two or three hamlets are apparently fully inhabited. Both roads are wagon tracks across the country, passable in good weather, impassable in wet weather. There is a bamboo footbridge at Bari-Pari. A ford there can be used, but it is very deep for about 10 or 15 feet in the middle; it will prove very difficult for a large command. The footbridge needs repairs. The country is level and open, interspersed with fringes of timber of small trees, principally bamboo.

My command returned at 3.30 p. m.

From Bari-Pari the town of Candaba can be seen about 6 miles to the north, apparently.

Very respectfully,

H. C. HODGES,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

It is my understanding that I am to await further instructions before moving. Am I right?

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 10, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

You are right in awaiting further instructions before moving. Certain information which we are expecting is important before directing further operations.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

IN FIELD, *May 10, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Left Angat 5.45 a. m. to-day. Am recovering wires to Baliuag. Everything running smoothly. Expect to reach Baliuag about 1 o'clock p. m. Everything quiet.

PERKINS.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 10, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

In what condition is road to Yldefonso and San Miguel? Also road to Candaba on the Mindanao River, for movement of wagon transportation? General MacArthur reports that he is not thoroughly prepared to move. Gunboats are seeking entrance to the Mindanao River.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baliuag, May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Road to Yldefonso and San Miguel a dirt pike, not macadamized, with stone-arched culverts and bridges, now dry and perfectly practicable for carts. Road to Candaba is a dirt road over country, not graded or piked; practicable for wagons and carts; would not be after heavy rains.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

194 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Letter.]

BALIUAG, *May 10, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to request that the 2 mountain howitzers belonging to my battery, and at present on the lines near Pasay, be ordered to join me at this place for future operations of the division. By thus bringing up my force to 4 guns the offensive power of the battery will be much increased and will require but the addition of 20 men who will come with them. I can furnish my own transportation as heretofore.

Very respectfully,

H. L. HAWTHORNE,
First Lieutenant, Sixth U. S. Artillery, Commanding Separate Mountain Battery.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Request that Hawthorne be sent his 2 mountain howitzers from Pasay line. The necessary transportation is with them.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, *May 10, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Gun left here for Calumpit with one buffalo cart, which will go through to your command. The Third Infantry is on the railroad, and as all troops serving thereon were removed from my command some days ago, I presume they are making arrangements for the transportation of the infantry. Telegraphed Barry to this effect a few hours ago, and have heard nothing in reply, so I suppose they are making the necessary arrangements. The buffalo cart will be sufficient for the gun.

MACARTHUR.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899—3.20 p. m.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin:*

I have ordered the scouts under Mr. Young to proceed to Maasin and report to you to-night. I wish them to go out very early in the morning, and to operate on the enemy's left flank and toward San Miguel, and to find a good route to the trail leading to the rear of the enemy back of Yldefonso, and to gather all information possible as to strength and location of enemy and to inflict as much damage and annoy them as much as possible. I have had a report that enemy has been greatly reenforced. Find out all you can, and send out spies if you can procure any.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 10, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Captain Grant and 2 gunboats at Calumpit. If he succeeds in passing them under bridge will be of great service to you. Doubtful if the 2 guns Hawthorne calls for can be spared. Insurgents several thousand strong on southern line. Attack vicinity San Pedro Macati this morning. Their efforts were quite persistent there, and no more guns can be spared from that line. Will see what we can do to furnish you with additional artillery.

By command of General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 195

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 10, 1899—5.19 p. m.*

General LAWTON:

Can send 2 Hotchkiss mountain guns, caliber 1.65, with pack outfits—this to add Hawthorne's Battery; this best we can do now. There are also harnesses and shafts to go with these guns. In case pack rigging is not desired, will send on to-morrow p. m. train to Malolos, if desired. Answer and specify amount of ammunition you desire for these guns.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 10, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS:

Four days' rations will leave here at once for your command. Have them unloaded so that wagons and escorts can return to-morrow.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 10, 1899—6.07 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Unless the Hotchkiss guns referred to can be sent equipped with men and animals could not utilize them. We have no animals that can be spared from their present use. Lieutenant Hawthorne suggests that Captain Dyer can spare animals and men for this purpose. In case they are sent, about 24 boxes (288 rounds) ammunition could be sent, or about 144 rounds to the piece. Prefer harness and shafts.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the field, Baliuag, May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Request that convalescents and others that can be returned to duty with this command be sent to-morrow afternoon's train.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 2.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 10, 1899.

Private John A. Edick, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, is detailed on special duty at these headquarters as teamster during this expedition. He will be sent to report to the chief quartermaster of the division without delay. By command of Major-General Lawton.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following report repeated; the information comes from a reliable source and I believe can be depended upon. Water in river rising from rains.

"May 11, 1899.—Adjutant-General, First Division: The Rio Grande River is reported by the natives living here to be navigable at all stages for small steamers as far north

196 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

as Candaba, with a minimum depth of 6 feet. Above Candaba there is no regular line of steam navigation, though so far as known no serious obstruction exists for a considerable distance north of that point. The natives expressed a belief that a steamer drawing 4 feet can go to San Antonio and San Isidro.—Case, Acting Engineer Officer.”

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

I hear from two sources this morning that Pio del Pilar and Geronimo have arrived at San Miguel or Yldefonso with their forces. One source, the servant of Antonio Gonzales, a Spaniard who has resided here for many years and speaks English, was sent by his master yesterday to Marunco, where he was informed by people at that place that Pilar with many men had passed north through the mountains. The other source, Estaben Villacorte, the former tax collector here and a man of wealth and prominence, fled from here to the country in the vicinity of San Miguel, returned last night and reports that he was informed Pilar and Geronimo Lisario had arrived with a large force and were now at San Miguel or Yldefonso. Neither of these people saw any of the troops referred to, but heard the reports. I report to you in full for what it is worth. I sent a spy last night to San Miguel, who promised to bring full information as to strength and position of insurgents.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Spy sent out last referred to in my last, just returned. Did not go through because frightened and turned back.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS:

The commanding general directs that you send enough of your transportation at once, with small escort, to take from this place 1,100 rations per day, to include the 17th, for all your command except the Third Infantry. These rations, it was ordered, were sent you last night with the Third Infantry; the error was just discovered.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Quingua*:

The general says you can proceed with your transportation to Malolos. Take the transportation of your train not used last night.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Pass.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, May 11, 1899.

The bearer is the wife of Antonio Gonzales, who, with her three children (one daughter and two sons), also two servants, to Manila to join her husband. General Lawton desires that she be accordingly passed.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

LACARTHUR, *San Fernando* :

Telegraphs me 2 companies Third and 1 gun to be sent me from Calumpit
range with you for transportation, etc. Please wire me what transportation
and what will be required.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 11, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

fully request permission to visit Lieutenant Foster confined in hospital and
tended to live. Commanding officer my brigade commander approves request.
Permission is made upon the request of Lieutenant Foster, my classmate, to see me.

W. S. BROWN,
Second Lieutenant, Third Infantry.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

S. BROWN.

through Colonel Summers, commanding brigade) :

My commander authorizes your visit to Lieutenant Foster; expects you to
be here as soon as practicable.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 11, 1899.*

Provisional Brigade Quartermaster :

One of our mules dead. Can you bring another?

BURR.

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 11, 1899.*

Adjutant-General :

draw rations here. Can get them here from Malolos by 2 p. m. to-morrow.
Advise me then if transportation is furnished. Shall I order rations now?

H. FREELAND, *Third Infantry.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Palace*:

to call attention to the fact that I have no officers of rank except Colonel
Summers. Would like active and energetic officer if available; otherwise prefer no

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 11, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Do you like General Funston assigned to your command? He is available.

BARRY.

198 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, May 11, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from Adjutant-General Barry, I rep to you by telegraph.

FREELAND,
First Lieutenant, Third Infantry, Commanding

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899

Lieutenant FREELAND, *Third Infantry:*

Do you report in person or with a command? If the latter, what is your command and what transportation has it and to when rationed?

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, May 11, 1899

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General:*

I am at Calumpit in command of 2 companies of the Third Infantry, guarding bridge and town. I am rationed up to noon to-morrow. I have 2 bull carts received the following telegram about 2 p. m. from Adjutant-General Barry: "Reply by telegraph to General Lawton at Baliuag for instructions."

FREELAND

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899

Lieutenant FREELAND,
Third Infantry, Calumpit:

The commanding general directs that you proceed with your command to place and report. Your command will be equipped in the lightest possible marching order with 300 rounds of ammunition, 100 to be carried on the person, and should be rationed to include the 21st instant, including the gun section, which you will also escort. How much more transportation will you need?

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, May 11, 1899

EDWARDS:

I will require 4 more bull teams. Is there a road to Baliuag other than back to Malolos? No information obtainable here.

FREELAND,
First Lieutenant, Third Infantry

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899

Lieutenant FREELAND, *Third Infantry:*

Yes; there is the same road that General Hale took through Pulilan. When you be ready to start with rations to 21st, ammunition, etc.?

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, May 11, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*:

Have the ammunition here. Rations all have to be sent to Bagbag from Malolos and brought there by cart 2 miles. No transportation obtainable here. The 2 carts here I have shipped by train from Bocaue.

H. FREELAND, *Third Infantry*.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 3.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 11, 1899.

1. Private Arthur L. Barton, Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, is detailed on special duty at these headquarters as teamster during this expedition. He will be sent to report to the chief surgeon of this division without delay.

2. The following enlisted men are detailed on special duty as blacksmith and teamster, respectively, at these headquarters during this expedition.

Private Frank Hungerford, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Private Robert Jager, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

They will be sent to report to the chief quartermaster of the division without delay.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps:

Effective strength of this command, including Company M, Twenty-second Infantry, at Quinga, is: Second Oregon, 2 battalions, 22 officers, 434 enlisted men; Thirteenth Minnesota, 2 battalions, 21 officers, 554 enlisted; Third Infantry, 2 battalions, 15 officers, 638 enlisted; 1 gun Utah Artillery, no officers, 17 enlisted; total, 58 officers, 1,643 enlisted, under Colonel Summers at Maasin. Twenty-second Infantry, 3 battalions, 21 officers, 884 enlisted; First North Dakota, 2 battalions, 23 officers, 455 enlisted; Gale's squadron, 4th cavalry, 3 officers, 209 enlisted; Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, 2 officers, 63 enlisted; Hawthorn's separate battery, 1 officer, 23 enlisted; Scott's platoon, 1 officer, 29 enlisted; total, 109 officers, 3,306 enlisted men. Strength of the 2 companies Third Infantry at Calumpit not known here. One battalion between this place and Quinga—3 companies here and 1 at latter place—I think will be sufficient.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 11, 1899.

Capt. W. E. BIRKHIMER, *Third Artillery, Acting Judge-Advocate*, and

Capt. J. F. CASE, *Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Acting Engineer Officer.*

SIR: The commanding general directs that you proceed to-morrow morning, the 12th instant, to Maasin, and thoroughly acquaint yourselves and reconnoiter the enemy's position, with a view to the future operations of this command.

Confer with Colonel Summers, commanding at Maasin, and request of him such assistance as may be necessary, including the use of Young's scouts.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

200 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 11, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

In addition to troops to join you already mentioned, a battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry will probably be sent, the other 2 battalions to go to MacArthur. It is intended to carry your fighting force to 4,000 men in view of the report you sent with reference to Pilar and Geronimo. Might it not be well to watch San Rafael and your right on Maasin River?

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 11, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

In case of advance how large force necessary to leave at Baliuag for protection of position and inhabitants? General MacArthur has been directed to send you one gun of Captain Dyer's battery fully equipped. The transport *Arizona* with Twenty-first Infantry reported entering harbor. Report strength of your available force, including Quinga detachment and two companies Twelfth Infantry now at Calumpit, and which will probably be directed to join you.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 11, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

You should be prepared for forward movement on Monday next and be rationed to include the 25th instant. Battalion of Seventeenth Infantry will be sent to you on Saturday supplied with two days' rations and 200 rounds of ammunition per man. What additional supplies do you need? Gunboats and cascos and General MacArthur should be ready to advance on Monday; MacArthur by Mexico, Candaba (?) movement by Ildefonso to San Miguel, then in westerly direction. MacArthur can join you near San Miguel if found necessary. Have transportation at Malolos by noon for battalion infantry.

BARRY.

[Letter.]

ANGAT, *P. I., May 12, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Baliuag.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I camped at San Rafael the evening of the 10th instant; on the 11th marched to the vicinity of ford on the river San Rafael (road to Angat); scouted country to the north for 3 miles; found 1 mule; no indications of any force of the enemy; country difficult, except for column of file, or troopers—what we would call "wood trails." Señor Gonzales lives at Tamboba and had left for Baliuag the afternoon of my departure. Natives can give no information as to aperejos, etc., of lost mules, and haven't seen the animals for eight or ten days. To-day I return to the vicinity of ford and will try to find a road indicated on map running north, and to the east of the road leading to Maasin from Baliuag. Expect to be in the vicinity of San Rafael evening of the 13th.

CECIL STEWART,
First Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding Troop I.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 12, 1899.

Col. OWEN SUMMERS,

Commanding Officer United States Forces, Maasin.

DEAR COLONEL: I send you under separate cover 100 proclamations. The General would like to have you distribute them as well to your front as possible.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 12, 1899.

Maj. C. G. STARR,
Inspector-General, U. S. V., Inspector-General of the Division.

SIR: The general commanding directs that you proceed at once to inspect the transportation of this command, and that you will note and report briefly the amount, kind, condition, and capacity of the same by battalion, independent companies, and detachments, and in the hands of the chief quartermaster. You will also instruct each commanding officer, including brigade, regimental, battalion, company, and detachment commanders, in the name of the general commanding, that nothing must be transported except the absolute essentials, and that everything that can possibly be dispensed with must be thrown away or abandoned. These officers must be made to understand that transportation is limited to an unusual degree, and that more or other transportation is impossible to procure; that unless the spirit of these instructions are faithfully executed the success of this expedition will be jeopardized and perhaps destroyed.

Commanding officers and others having control of transportation must be impressed with the importance of exercising proper care of the animals and to see that they are properly fed, watered, and rested whenever possible.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Major STARR:

The commanding general desires a report of the ammunition on hand. At the same time you are inspecting transportation, find out how much each organization has.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith memoranda of insurgent stores destroyed by the scouts detailed in Special Field Orders, No. 1, current series, these headquarters.

It will be noted that of rice they destroyed over 40,000 bushels; of corn, more than 12,000 bushels, as well as 283 uniforms, several sets of reloading tools, and quantities of tobacco and other supplies.

In the house of Captain Ambrosio, of the insurgent army, which is supposed to have been one of the local insurgent headquarters, were found a partly used receipt book containing record of war donations, all of which are forwarded to you under separate cover.

Mr. W. H. Young, whom I have placed in charge of these scouts, has rendered excellent service. He has, with his party, effectively covered an extent of country in four days which a regiment of infantry could with difficulty cover in twice that period.

Not the least gratifying feature of the work of these scouts is their uniformly humane and manly treatment of women and children and noncombatants generally, as reported by inhabitants of the country operated through.

The services of these scouts have been from the beginning peculiarly valuable, and are daily increasing in value as a result of experience. The individuals detailed were in all cases men who had either lived for years on our Indian frontier, were inured to hardship and danger, and skilled in woodcraft and use of the rifle, or had demonstrated during their service in these islands peculiar fitness for the work contemplated. A roster of detachment of scouts is herewith inclosed.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Memorandum.]

BALIUAG, Luzon, May 12, 1899.

insurgent supplies captured and destroyed by Young's scouts between May 5 and 10, both dates inclusive, while traveling northeast from Baliuag, then through the foothills opposite San Rafael and Angat.

Corn	bushels..	12,250
Rice	do....	40,000
Tobacco.....	pounds..	250
Sugar	jars..	30
Insurgent uniforms.....		283
Remington reloading tools.....	sets..	2

In addition to the above, there was a quantity of kerosene and cocoanut oil destroyed; also 14 bolos.

ROSTER OF SCOUTS OF FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, IN THE FIELD.

Mr. W. H. Young, chief of scouts, in charge.
Fourth U. S. Cavalry.—Private Watkins, Troop C; Private Harris, Troop G; Peter Quinn, Troop L.
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.—Privates Jensen, Company D; Powell and Killion, Company H; Corporal Thomas and Privates Smith and Hussey, Company K; Privates Christinsen and Davis, Company G; Privates Andres, Luther, and McBain, Company B; Private Sletland, Company C; Privates Glasley and Wilson, Company A; Privates Desmond and Boehler, Company I.
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.—Privates Harrington and High, Company G; Private Scott, Company K; Private O'Neil, Company L; Privates Lyon and Robertson, Company B.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

LIEUTENANT FREELAND, *Third Infantry* :

When will you be ready to start? Wish to know, that transportation may be sent you. Can not you draw rations to include the 21st? All troops here are so rationed.
Answer.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC :

The assignment of General Funston will please me very much.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

MANILA, May 12, 1899.

GENERAL LAWTON :

General Funston very desirous to go, but doctor forbids, as his wound is still troublesome and might become serious on exposure in the field.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

LIEUTENANT FREELAND, *Calumpit* :

Draw rations sufficient only for your journey here. Will send you 2 escort wagons. Send small detachment to Pulilan to escort them.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 12, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Baliuag*:

Young and scouts left camp about 3 a. m. Drove enemy's outpost in and advanced about 1,200 yards from enemy's line, and at 5.20 drew the enemy's fire, which was heavy and continued until now. Captains Birkhimer and Case reported, and have gone to the front with an escort of two companies. Escort furnished at request of Captain Birkhimer. Firing continues again.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin*:

Neither my scouts nor my staff officers have instructions to reconnoiter the enemy's front. On the contrary, they have been especially instructed to examine the country around the enemy's left, to reconnoiter a road shown on the map, leading east, and to try to reach a road running east and west coming in behind or north of Yldefonso. They were especially instructed to keep out of enemy's range and sight if possible. I do not desire a fight or engagement with the enemy if it can be avoided. I did authorize the scouts to pick off any of the enemy that came in their way. Please see that these instructions are carried out as far as practicable.

LAWTON,
Major-General of Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 12, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Firing ceased. Scouts are carrying out instructions sent these headquarters by telegram yesterday as far as possible. Captains Birkhimer and Case have the general's instructions. It would be impossible to approach enemy's left without being detected. Will see that instructions are carried out as far as possibly can.

SUMMERS,
Colonel Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Captain GALE, *Commanding Squadron.*

SIR: The commanding general directs that you detail at once 5 men to accompany 2 wagons to Pullian, when they will turn over the wagons and return to this place.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Commanding, Maasin*:

Quartermaster, Third Infantry, reports death 1 mule. Have matter investigated immediately as to cause and responsibility. Report result by wire these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

204 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 12, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION :

Investigation directed by division commander of the death of 1 mule, was found death caused by intestinal colic and retention of urine. Cause of sickness supposed to have been the rice, which is the principal food. Everything was done to save the mule, but owing to the total absence of any horse medicine of any kind it was impossible. No responsibility attached to anyone.

SUMMERS,
Colonel, Commanding Provisional Brigade

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899

Captain WALCUTT, Malolos :

Report by wire immediately your arrival at Quingua.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

Quingua, May 12, 1899

Major EDWARDS:

Train arrived at 9.15; could not begin loading last night until 6 o'clock on account of train from town being late.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster

[Telegram.]

SAN YLDEFONSO, May 12, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

With scouts and 84 men under Eastwick flanked and drove the enemy out of the place, before 1.30 p. m. Pursued him to near San Miguel. Eastwick held position until further orders. Estimate the enemy at 200 by actual count as filed out of town. One scout (Private William A. Lockwood, Company C, North Dakota) wounded in the knee; moderate. Four enemy killed; 6 or more wounded, including 1 officer. Perfect Reyes, second lieutenant, and 1 bugler came in under flag of truce.

BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate

The foregoing was repeated to the adjutant-general of the department with the following remarks:

"This morning sent Captains Birkhimer and Case to make reconnoissance of the enemy's flank to discover position and advisability of flank attack. Had no intention of advance making attack.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899

Captain BIRKHIMER, Maasin:

Accept and express to Captain Case, Major Eastwick, his men, and Young's men my heartiest thanks for the good work to-day. Have scouts keep in touch with the enemy, open communication with them if possible, but be sure not to let them get possession of any of our men, or do us any harm.

LAWTON, Major-General

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 12, 1899.*

EDWARDS:

ment has been sent to Pulilan to meet wagons.

FREELAND.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

nt FREELAND, *Calumpit:*

you withdrawn your escort? Wagons with small escort just returned report they could not find them at Pulilan. Lieutenant Babcock and small escort going again, will connect with your escort Pulilan, or go on farther.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 12, 1899.*

s, *Adjutant-General:*

ment of 24 men and a sergeant left Pulilan as soon as I received your dis- send them. Have not heard of them since.

FREELAND.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 12, 1899.*

T-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

is across river and on road to Baliuag, 11.45 a. m.

WALCUTT, *Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

WALCUTT, *Quingua:*

anding general directs you to execute orders given in previous dispatch iding 2 wagons to Pulilan. Report action.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

3UMMERS, *Maasin:*

iere to-morrow with sufficient transportation the small escort to carry to ip rations for your whole command to include the 25th instant—eight days.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

nt FREELAND, *Third Infantry, Calumpit:*

to failure of telegraph message to catch quartermaster, Quingua, the wagons arrive until late to-night or early to-morrow morning at Pulilan; so you will eep escort there. Captain Kreps' company, Twenty-second, is at Quingua.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 12, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Send officer from Gregorio del Pilar to these headquarters on morning train to Manila from Malolos. Tell officer who accompanies him report probable time of arrival in Manila, that transportation may meet train.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

MAY 12, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Telegraph station established in San Yldefonso and ready for business.

Lieutenant GIBBS, *Signal Officer.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN, *Commanding.*

SIR: The commanding general directs that you send from your command early to-morrow morning, with small escort, 20 bull carts to go to Quingua and haul rations to this place. The rations will be placed this side of the river at Quingua.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 12, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

General MacArthur thinks he can not move successfully via Mexico and Candaba. It is in contemplation, therefore, to send you the entire Seventeenth Infantry and 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry, also part of Andrews's light battery, with 3 mountain Hotchkiss guns to move as an independent column on Candaba with aid of gunboats. Gunboats with cascos carrying supplies for this column to Candaba; this will take enemy confronting MacArthur in reverse and relieve him, while at the same time he will cover all the Pampanga province, thus far penetrated, and give inhabitants protection. Your Candaba force, if attacked by Luna, who is on railroad, can be relieved by MacArthur. The protection of the gunboats will insure safety of your Candaba column and it can join you at San Miguel, or you can later join it at river south of San Isidro.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 12, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Scouts have returned. One battalion of my command now occupies San Yldefonso, which was deserted by the enemy, who are now located 3 miles beyond there. I send to you, under an escort of officers, an insurgent officer accompanied with communication addressed to me, which represents him as an ambassador from Gregorio del Pilar, general of brigade, chief of Filipino forces in San Yldefonso, requesting that he be sent to Manila for the purpose of appearing before the American commission to make arrangements for peace.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

The above was repeated to the palace with the following remark:

"Shall send the officer on as soon as he arrives here, unless receive instructions to the contrary."

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Has Lieutenant Mead with Filipino officer arrived? Have you any objection to moving the balance of my command into and to occupy San Yldefonso to-morrow?

SUMMERS, Colonel.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, Commanding, Maasin:

Lieutenant Mead has just arrived here. The general will instruct you as to movement of your command to-morrow morning or as soon as he hears from corps headquarters.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 12, 1899.

Capt. R. SEWELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., Aid-de-Camp.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you accompany Second Lieut. Perfecto Reyes of the insurgent army, who was to-day, with his orderly, admitted into our lines under a flag of truce, to Manila, and report to the corps commander.

You will start at 5 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, the 13th instant, in plenty of time to catch the morning train at Malolos.

Upon reaching Malolos, you will report by telegraph to corps headquarters the probable time of your arrival in Manila, that transportation may meet the train.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Lieut. Perfecto Reyes, of General del Pilar's staff, the officer coming in under flag of truce, has arrived. He states that he is sent by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar to see the general in command at Manila, to ascertain if General del Pilar, who is authorized by Aguinaldo, may receive authority to visit the officers in Manila for the purpose of arranging terms of peace. He will remain here to-night, and will leave in the morning in time to catch the first train. Captain Sewell, of my staff, will accompany him, who will wire you when train starts.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Please inform me the general's wishes as to force to be left at this place and at Quingua.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May 12, 1899.

General LAWTON:

What force do you consider sufficient for Baliuag. As to Quingua it will be taken care of by Major Kobbé, commanding, in addition to railroad.

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Two companies at least should be left here. I think, however, that number will be sufficient.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

I shall order Colonel Summers to occupy Yldefonso with the Oregon and Minnesota regiments, leaving the Third Infantry at Maasin. Have ordered scouts to keep in touch with enemy and reconnoiter San Miguel.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Maasin:*

You can occupy Yldefonso with Oregons and Minnesotas, leaving Third Infantry at Maasin. Keep enemy well under observation.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 12, 1899.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, *Palace:*

Am sending Captain Perkins in sick this p. m.; not fit for duty. If you can spare him, would like Captain McKenna.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 12, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Captain McKenna will be sent at once to take charge of your lines. Extremely sorry to hear Perkins is too sick to continue.

THOMPSON,

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 12, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Am under orders to join your command. Will leave here to-morrow and reach Baliuag Saturday night or Sunday morning via Malolos. Is there anything I can bring that will be beneficiary? Lieutenant Gibbs will attend to anything in the signal line should Captain Perkins leave before my arrival.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899—7.35 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Message referring to Candaba column received last night. Whatever plan the general adopts for me will, it is needless to say, be executed to the best of my ability. I have no faith in the propositions to discuss terms of peace; believe it only a scheme of time to enable enemy to gather supplies, strengthen their position, and bring us in the rainy season. The delays in my movements disturb me very much. The fields are now in places covered with water, and twenty-four hours' rain will render travel with transportation impossible. The weather is now favorable, and every day lost may cost us dearly. Is MacArthur using his cavalry? I could use the mounted troops to great advantage. Gunboats should reach Candaba as soon as possible. I am possibly mistaken, but the enemy have not impressed me as being a very great force or as showing much pertinacity. I need a good interpreter badly; a Spaniard who can speak English well, with salary sufficient to insure faithful service, would be best. Send me best maps; I have nothing showing country north of San Miguel. The enemy's position around San Miguel will be thoroughly examined to-day. Much regret that General Funston is unable to come. Trust that he will be able to join me.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 13, 1899—8.50 a. m.*

GENERAL LAWTON:

Contemplating putting Major Kobbé in command of the 4 battalions Seventeenth and Ninth Infantry and mountain artillery and move to Candaba. One battalion of Seventeenth now at Bagbag, one goes up this p. m., and one to-morrow morning. Battalion Ninth Infantry, also artillery, goes up to-morrow. Your advance must be postponed a day or two to get troops in position. It may be possible to move Kobbé to Candaba river road, accompanied by gunboats, in which event it will not be necessary to furnish him much wagon transportation. Answer.
 By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899—10.15 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Piece of artillery and companies Third Infantry from Calumpit not yet arrived. I am strongly of the opinion detachment should be left at this place, otherwise communication will be cut. I will move as soon as rations now en route are distributed. Message conveying reward for surrendered arms received.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

QUINQUA, *May 13, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Leave here about 7 o'clock.

SEWELL, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 13, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Wagons for Freeland reached him about 7.30 to-day.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 13, 1899*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, *Baliuag*:
Arrived 8 o'clock. Train leaves about noon.

SEWELL

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 13, 1899*

EDWARDS:

Devol wires this morning that General Otis will give orders later about increase transportation. Don't know exactly what this means, but send for your information.

WALCOTT

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 13, 1899*

Major EDWARDS:

Just before leaving, yesterday, I was compelled to get a man to replace sick telegrapher. Eltinge supplied Arthur Beecroft, of G Troop. Dr. Cardwell says sick telegrapher will be O. K. in day or two.

WALCOTT

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 13, 1899*

Major EDWARDS:

I wish to join my regiment—Twenty-second Infantry. Please send me instructions.

FRENCH

Note on above telegram:

“DEAR MAJOR PARKER:

“Have wired him instructions. Suggested to-morrow a. m. Thought you would like to know.

“Yours,

“C. R. EDWARDS

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899

Colonel FRENCH,

Headquarters Twenty-second Infantry, Manila:

Join, via Malolos, Twenty-second here. Transportation hauling supplies Malolos to-day and to-morrow. Would therefore suggest you take early morning train, bringing your mount. Wagon train will bring your luggage. Delight to see you.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 13, 1899—9.55 a. m.*

LAWTON:

You are authorized to pay \$30 (Mexican) for each serviceable rifle delivered you by disbanded detachment of the insurgent army or others. This offer should be known as widely as possible.”

BAR

Telegraphed to Colonel Summers and commanding officer Third Infantry, a. m.: “Have it translated, if possible, and distributed as widely as possible. Inside the enemy's lines by any means possible.”

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Lieutenant STEWART,
Commanding Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, San Rafael.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you return with your command to-morrow morning, the 14th instant. He desires that you acquaint the people of the offered reward of \$30 for each insurgent rifle turned in at this headquarters.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 13, 1899.

The commanding general directs that you employ as guide Filiberto Garcia, an escaped Spanish prisoner.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 13, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Am endeavoring to obtain for you interpreter who speaks Spanish and English well. Difficult to find. No very reliable maps of country north San Miguel. Colonel Miller will send you by p. m. train the best obtainable.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Quartermaster, Malolos:*

What is the situation now? Answer. The transportation will probably not be required by the Seventeenth Battalion, and therefore you can hurry our supplies along as fast as possible. It is important to get them up. It is not necessary to hold transportation for the Seventeenth, as they will not come there.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 13, 1899.*

For EDWARDS:

Have already sent 7 wagons loaded with stores from supplies here. Am waiting arrival of train from town to load others. The additional 4 wagons is a great help. The wagons sent to Quingua are to unload at point directed by the General and return to Malolos. Have arranged with Kreps for a guard for such stores as long transportation can not take.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Quartermaster:*

General has just received orders from headquarters to pay \$30 (Mexican) for every rifle turned in here. The general wants you to make provision to pay for the first anyway. It is important to have cash paid the first few men so delivering.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

212 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 13, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Have \$1,000 with me. Will wire for more if you think necessary.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Arrived corps headquarters at 1.30 p. m., leave on afternoon train for Malolos, and expect to arrive at headquarters, First Division, about 7.30 this evening, with insurgent officers and orderly, who desire to reach their own lines to-night.

SEWELL, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 13, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT,

Chief Quartermaster, First Division, Malolos:

General suggests you send here by Captain Sewell, returning from Manila this afternoon, if practicable, \$200 (Mexican silver) to pay for arms turned in. Get instruction from corps headquarters regarding method of payment of rewards offered for insurgent arms and what funds payable from.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN YLDEFONSO, May 13, 1899.

EDWARDS:

Have captured San Miguel, and am holding it.

CASE

Repeated to the Adjutant-General, Department Pacific, with the remark: "The following from my acting engineer officer, who went out this a. m. with scouts to reconnoiter enemy's position at San Miguel."

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Captured this place at 12.30 p. m. by scouts supported by Company A, Second Oregon, Lieutenant Kelly, commanding, and Company H, Minnesota, commanded by Captain Bjornstad, both under Captain Heath, Second Oregon. Captain Case is with me. Two wounded, Chief of Scouts Young, through knee, moderate; Private Erickson, Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota, through lungs, and arm also, serious. Killed, 1 enemy. We had 118 force altogether. Enemy under Gregorio Pilar, 600 strong. It was a bold and gallant fight that took this place. Shall hold place with present force until further orders. If it be permanently held should have 200 more troops at once. The town is in good order, not burned. Most inhabitants left, but some stayed.

BIRKHIMER,

Captain, Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May 13, 1899.

Lieutenant BROOKE:

Ammunition called for will go on this p. m. train.

MCGINNESS.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 13, 1899.

-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Lawton's telegram received. I have sent all the wagons to Quingua, send in three detachments. There are remaining 14 wagon loads, which number I had intended to bring back from Quingua, load to-night and make early morrow. I think this is yet best plan. The 19 wagons can then take full Baliuag. With new transportation I can bring forage and a few other quartermaster supplies and pick up what is left at Quingua. Will this be satisfactory?

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Telegram.]

SAN YLDEFONSO, May 13, 1899.

-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

are at San Yldefonso. Shall I go back to San Miguel, and have you any orders for Birkhimer or myself?

CASE, Acting Engineer Officer.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 13, 1899.

WARDS:

Sewell took \$200 (Mexican). Have wired headquarters for instructions and payment.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

WALCUTT, Malolos or Quingua:

received. General says O. K.; use your own judgment. Wires from Birkhimer that they went with scouts and 2 companies. Captured San Miguel. Summers is moving up to occupy town. Third Infantry will stay at Maasin Yldefonso.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 13, 1899.

WARDS:

Following just received from Barry: "Money paid for arms will be drawn from public funds. Simple receipt for money received by person delivering gun and receipt of ordnance officer to whom gun turned over sufficient evidence of transaction. If quartermaster's funds used in emergency, can be placed from public command of Major-General Otis."

If practicable, please get signatures in ink. If name as written can not be obtained, have name spelled out before person receiving money gets away.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Telegram.]

SAN YLDEFONSO, May 13, 1899.

-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

are here all right; making slow progress owing to condition of Filipino horses.

KING, Aid.

[Telegram.]

SAN YLDEFONSO, *May 13, 1899—9.30 a. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, *Baliuag*:

Have arrived with Thirteenth Minnesota and Second Oregon and established headquarters at this place.

SUMMERS,
Colonel Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Captain CASE, *Ildefonso*:

The general desires you and Birkhimer to pick three or four nice houses for our headquarters. He wishes a careful provost of the town and that the citizens shall not be disturbed nor their property confiscated nor injured. If he receives no orders to the contrary, he will move his headquarters to San Miguel to-morrow morning.

He congratulates you, Captain Birkhimer, and the other officers and men engaged in the morning's splendid work.

The general much regrets Young's injury. Do everything you can. Telegraph line should be rushed to San Miguel.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS:

Captain Case wires that San Miguel is captured. The commanding general directs that you send a battalion at once to occupy the town, and order forward the Third Infantry as soon as they can get their transportation, or sooner if possible.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 13, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Have you received piece of artillery from MacArthur and the 2 companies Third Infantry from Calumpit? Probably you can move on with right column as soon as ready, leaving Kobbé to prepare and proceed with Candaba column as soon as ready. In such event would it be necessary to leave detachment at Baliuag?

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Piece of artillery and companies Third Infantry from Calumpit not yet arrived. I am strongly of the opinion detachment should be left at this place, otherwise communication will be cut. I will move as soon as rations now en route are distributed. Message conveying reward for surrendered arms received.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Concerning Kobbé's command received. River road reported good, and to be no reason why his command should not march with gunboats, his men carried in casks. By this means the men's packs could be carried and the journey thus hastened. No transportation can be spared from this. It is all overtaxed now.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 13, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Column will not draw on you for any transportation. He will be furnished with small amount, and Devol will send you extra wagons and harness so as to utilize pack animals if you consider best. MacArthur states that he has a single mounted man. It is thought that the time for your advance is this evening. Quingua can be watched by railroad guards, and with the aid of 2 strong companies at Baliuag your communication should be kept

and of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 13, 1899.*

SUMMERS, *San Ildefonso:*

Chief of scouts, is reported wounded. He is a brave, gallant man, and everything possible be done for his welfare and comfort.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

SAN ILDEFONSO, *May 13, 1899.*

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Get ambulance for wounded, and have directed Colonel Summers to move in support of Captain Birkhimer. They are just ready to move, under Lieutenant Yoran, Second Oregon.

CASE, *Captain, Acting Engineer Officer.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

BY, *First Reserve Hospital, Manila:*

Chief of scouts, my command, seriously wounded yesterday. Send to him at this a. m. He is a man of unusual courage and character. He has been loyal to me, and yesterday successfully led a most desperate charge against more than ten to one. As a personal favor, I ask every possible consideration

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Captain BIRKHIMER, *San Miguel*:

The general desires information relative to numbers of insurgents stationed there before the capture, where the troops went, their present whereabouts, etc.; in fact, any information that can be gained by inquiry among natives. Can anything be learned of Pio del Pilar or Geronimo and their 5,000 men?

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 13, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS:

The commanding general directs that you leave the 2 companies of the Third now at Maasin and the 2 companies now at Ildefonso until further orders.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

SAN ILDEFONSO, *May 13, 1899.*

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*:

Colonel Summers has gone to San Miguel. Your message regarding disposition of Third has just been read to me. Here is Colonel Summers's order: "Assemble your command at once and make disposition as follows: Leave 2 companies at Maasin with instructions to join wagon train with supplies from Baliuag, to act as additional escort to same; leave 2 companies at San Ildefonso to guard this point and such supplies and Government stores as may be left there, and press forward with the balance of your command and report to me at San Miguel without delay, which I now occupy." Shall I change orders to correspond to your message?

CASE, *Acting Engineer Officer*.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., May 13, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding United States Forces, Baliuag, Luzon.

GENERAL: The commanding general of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands directs me to inform you that you will reply to the communication addressed to you by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, of the Philippine forces at your front, which communication was delivered to me by Captain Sewell, of your staff, and is herewith returned; that should General Aguinaldo desire to send representative men to confer with the United States commission, now in session in this city, you are at liberty and will pass such body through your lines, promising them safe conduct to and from Manila and ample protection during their stay there. Railway transportation between Malolos and Manila is freely accorded.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, Luzon, May 13, 1899.

Brig. Gen. GREGORIO DEL PILAR,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Your messenger, Lieut. Perfecto Reyes, duly arrived at my headquarters about 8 o'clock last evening, he having been sent to me by Colonel Summers, commanding one of my brigades, then encamped at Maasin.

After due consideration I decided that it would be best to let your messenger, Lieutenant Reyes, proceed himself to Manila, and present in person to the general commanding the forces in the Philippine Islands your inquiry. Lieutenant Reyes was accompanied by an aid-de-camp of my staff, and they have just returned.

I inclose you a copy of the reply of the commanding general to me, from which you will observe that he freely accords to you and to the commission to whom you refer all that you and they desire on request, and should they decide to honor me by passing through the lines under my command, it will afford me great pleasure to offer them every courtesy and assistance in my power to further their wishes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General Commanding United States Forces.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

When companies Third Infantry, piece artillery, and your transportation have reached Baliuag you can then advance. Major Kobbé preparing column to-day, but can not proceed up Rio Grande before Tuesday. He is placed under your supervision, but all orders organizing the column and directing him to advance on Candaba will be given from here in order to save you trouble. If communication kept open with you, you will have no difficulty moving Kobbé's column hereafter. Should we lose communication with you, you can communicate with Kobbé from San Miguel. Grant with gunboat making reconnoissance to-day. Will report result to you as soon as possible.

By command Major-General Otis:

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 14, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Late telegram from Barry says: "Orders issued to-day assigning you to command of column comprising 3 battalions Seventeenth Infantry, 1 battalion Ninth Infantry, and Andrews's light artillery, First Artillery, and directing you to report by telegraph to Major-General Lawton for instructions." I have General Otis's verbal orders in addition to foregoing, received yesterday, to include in my command gunboats, cascos, etc., now here.

KOBBE, *Major Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *Manila, May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

In view of number of insurgents to northeast of your line of march can not you leave full battalion Twenty-second at Baliuag? When Kobbé leaves on Tuesday there will be no troops in that vicinity excepting those left by you, and any severe casualties suffered by the Baliuag detachment will be greatly regretted. I am under the impression that the insurgents have a considerable force north of and east of Norzagaray, and it seems that 300 of the fleeing insurgents retreated yesterday on the road to Biaciabato. Answer.

OTIS.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Battalion, 4 companies Twenty-second, will be left here, Captain Lockwood commanding, as suggested by commanding general. Gun and 2 companies of Third Infantry arrived. Will move command from this place to-morrow morning.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION,
Baliuag:

Arrived all right, and put Filipino officer outside lines about 2.30. Await further orders here.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 14, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION,
Baliuag:

Just arrived yesterday. Scouted country along mountain's trail leading north to San Miguel to a point northeast of Maasin. Country clear of any body of insurgents. Small bands, 20 to 30, have been there not long ago. Many natives coming in from that section.

STEWART.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.—9 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

My supplies will all reach me and be distributed to-day. Two companies Twenty-second Infantry will be left at this place. Command can all move this p. m. I shall, unless otherwise instructed, proceed with my headquarters to San Miguel at 12 o'clock to-day.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Has the piece of artillery from MacArthur's command with companies of Third Infantry from Calumpit joined you yet? Commanding general directs that you hold your forces in readiness to move, but do not move till ordered from here. Answer.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *San Miguel:*

Let affairs remain in statu quo in your command. The orders from department headquarters are to hold troops in readiness, but not to move until further orders are received.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Orders to hold forces in readiness to move received. Is it desired I hold my headquarters here until further orders?

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Calumpit*:

Kindly inform me when Lieutenant Freeland and battery, Third Artillery, left. Nothing heard from them as yet.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Lieutenant Freeland with his command left here about 12.30 p. m. on 13th.

KIRBY, *Operator.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Artillery and 2 companies Third Infantry not yet arrived. Operator at Calumpit reports that they left at noon yesterday. Should arrive any moment.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*
(Received at Baliuag 8.16 a. m.).

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Am interviewing native residents for information regarding roads, etc. Aguinaldo reported in hiding. Sentiment of natives seems friendly. No news of Pio del Pilar and his 4,000. Everything quiet here.

CASE, *Captain, Acting Engineer Officer.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION,
Baliuag:

From residents here I learn that there were 900 insurgents at Baliuag, but Pilar arrived here with 600, the balance having deserted. He has desertions daily. Soldiers have received no pay and are discouraged. Pilar and troops have gone to San Isidro, which town is reported fairly well intrenched. Country from here is all level and roads good. In Gapan are more than 500 wounded and no means of removing them. Aguinaldo passed through here 12 p. m. April 19. Pilar has had no word from him since and considers himself abandoned by insurgent government. Between here and San Isidro is an insurgent depository with 3,000 cabanes of rice, cows, horses, mules, etc. Think I can get plenty of guides and spies here.

CASE, *Captain, Acting Engineer Officer.*

Repeated to Palace.

[Telegram.]

MAILOLOS, *May 14, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS, *Baliuag*:

Yesterday 19 wagon loads were taken to Quingua and crossed. Of these 13 wagons returned here for loads and were partly loaded last night and loading completed this a. m., and train started at 7.30. Everything aboard except hay. McLeod at Quingua in charge with orders to proceed as train is up. Am going to pick out the teams from the pack train and have everything ready. I found this morning what appeared to be a roll of maps for General Lawton, marked "important instructions." Given to deliver it immediately upon reaching Baliuag.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

BAGBAG, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Am ordered to report to General Lawton from here, under instructions from General Otis, as yet verbal and incomplete.

W. A. KOBBE, *Major, Third Artillery.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Maj. W. A. KOBBE, *Third Artillery:*

Your telegram received. The commanding general desires that you again report when you receive your complete instructions.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Lieutenant STEWART,

Commanding Mounted Troop, Maasin:

Commanding general directs that you remain there with your troop. Send in a detachment to draw rations. Your wagon is returned to you and rations now here. Your baggage can be taken to you in the wagon. Keep the pack mules until further orders. Two of your men are hunting you in San Rafael with orders from here.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Lieutenant McLEAN:

Send the Twenty-second Infantry 1 more wagon, making 4 in all. Walcutt will probably give them another, as they had that many when they came.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Lieutenant Boutelle, Third Artillery, and 51 enlisted men have reported here for station. Arrived at 9.40 a. m.

KREPS, *Captain Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain KREPS, *Commanding, Quingua:*

Commanding general directs that you proceed here with your company and join your regiment.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Wagon train across ford and ready to start. I await instructions.

McLEAN, Acting Assistant Quartermaster.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 13, 1899.

MAJOR EDWARDS:

Battalion Seventeenth Infantry arrived here 9.15. Are they to join General Lawton's command? They have no transportation and no orders.

WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

LIEUTENANT McLEAN:

General directs that you come on with train as soon as possible.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you at once designate from your command 2 companies to remain and occupy this town when the main command moves. Direct the commanding officer of this to be designated and to report to these headquarters in person.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION,
Baliuag:

What are instructions, if any, for scouts this morning? Is it desired to make reconnaissance in force, as yesterday and day before, and push in any direction before General Lawton arrives?

BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

CAPTAIN BIRKHIMER, *San Miguel:*

Commanding general says "Let things remain in statu quo to-day."

EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain BIRKHIMER, *San Miguel*:

Commanding general desires to know why no reply has been received here to message sent you making inquiries about situation at San Miguel. Answer at once.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION,
Baliuag:

Message inquiring as to enemy I sent last night. Message as to number of insurgents here before capture was 600; according to best information about 200 went north toward San Isidro, the other 300 went south toward, reported direction, Biocnabrate; do not know where Pilar went; find some of inhabitants, both of low and high degree, most have been away. Spanish prisoners formerly here were lately sent to San Isidro. Do not know Geronimo's whereabouts. It is said here enemy has few troops at San Isidro; it is also said they have little ammunition and no means of replenishing. Their almost reckless expenditure of ammunition, both yesterday and to-day, seems inconsistent with scanty ammunition story. The people here, so far as I can find out, have not seen the number of 500 troops in this vicinity or anything near it. So far as I can find out at this time, enemy's loss both yesterday and to-day heavier than reported. Three dead to-day and several wounded; 2 officers wounded yesterday. The gallant conduct of Scouts Young and Harrington and about 10 other scouts in charging into the open to-day at least 200 Philippines at 150 yards' distance in heavy skirmish line and breaking it is above all praise. Some other of the scouts skulked; I know 2 of them.

BIRKHIMER,

Captain, Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate.

Repeated to Palace.

LAWTON,

Major-General, Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC,
Manila:

Following just received: "Malolos.—Battalion Seventeenth Infantry arrived here 9.15. Are they to join General Lawton's command? They have no instructions and no orders.—Walcutt, chief quartermaster."

I request instructions.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos*:

Your telegram just received. Have wired for instructions in regard to battalion Seventeenth Infantry.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Battalion Seventeenth Infantry, now at Malolos, is part of Major Kobbé's command. Kobbé is fully instructed in the premises, and is believed to be in from looking after affairs. The battalion should go on to Bagbag River.

BARRY.

Repeated to commanding officer, Seventeenth battalion, Malolos.

LAWTON.

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

Major-General LAWTON,
First Division, Baliuag.

SIR: I am very much dissatisfied with your designating a captain or any other staff officers assuming command or dictating to me any orders or furnishing information to you only through this channel, and if I am not competent for the position designated to me, would respectfully request to be assigned the command of my regiment.

SUMMERS,
Colonel Commanding Provisional Brigade.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS,
Commanding, San Miguel:

Division inspector-general has been directed to investigate your complaint first available opportunity. Unwarrantable assumption of command will not be countenanced.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Signal Station, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Several soldiers have presented guns taken from insurgents and claim reward as offered in your message. I have ruled that such reward can not be given to persons in the United States service. If the reward could be paid, however, it would greatly encourage our men.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos:*

Following just received from Corps Headquarters, and is repeated for your information and guidance: "Battalion Seventeenth Infantry now at Malolos is part of Major Kobbé's command. Kobbé is fully instructed in the premises, and is believed to be at the front looking after affairs. The battalion should go on the Bagbag River.—Barry, Assistant Adjutant-General."

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos:*

Be sure and get harness before you start. If necessary send wagons on in advance and hold one to bring harness. Command will move in morning.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Major Kobbé,
Commanding, Calumpit:

Following received to-day from Corps Headquarters is repeated for your information: "General Lawton: Major Kobbé preparing column to-day, but can not proceed up Rio Grande before Tuesday. He is placed under your supervision, but orders organizing the column and directing him to advance on Candaba will be given from here in order to save trouble. If communication kept open with you, will have no difficulty moving Kobbé's column. Hereafter, should we lose communication you can communicate with Kobbé from San Miguel. Grant, with gunboat, making reconnoissance to-day; will report result to you as soon as possible. By command Major-General Otis.—Barry."

By command of Major-General Lawton:

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899

COMMANDING OFFICER TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you order to remain the other 2 companies of Captain Lockwood's battalion, thus making the complete battalion of 4 companies that will occupy this town after advance of main body. Report accompanies.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS

BALIUAG, *May 14, 1899*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the following are the companies of Captain Lockwood's battalion to be left at this point: D, E, G, M. Shall 200 rounds of ammunition be left?

Very respectfully,

LEO. O. PARKER,
Major, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding

BALIUAG, *May 14, 1899*

Major PARKER,
Commanding Twenty-second Infantry:

In reply to your note to the adjutant-general First Division, General Lawton directs me to say that the companies of Lockwood's battalion should be given their proportion of the ammunition on hand in the regiment.

Very respectfully,

C. G. STARR, *Major, Inspector-General*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899*

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General:*

In replying to your message of inquiry as to why I did not reply to inquiries, say that the causes are two: First, I did not receive your message of inquiry until 9.30 p. m. Second, when message was received the line was reported to me not working order. The first moment the line was repaired was about 12.25 and I replied.

BIRKHEAD

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

DWARDS:

Now complete to San Miguel.

RHEA, *Signal Sergeant.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

T ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Nothing of mounted troop last night. Have delivered instructions to Colonel and Captain Birkhimer regarding outposts and scouts.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, *May 14, 1899.*

T-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION,

Baliuag:

Has gone forward. Transportation belonging to this detachment ordered to leave San Yldefonso. Minnesotas left here some ammunition and small amount of stores; they will send back for them.

COOKE, *Captain, Third Infantry.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 14, 1899.*

DWARDS, *Baliuag:*

Am fitting out 6 escort wagons with 4 mules each, reserving 2 for ambulance and 1 wagon at headquarters, there are left 14 mules. It is probable some of them will be required to improve horse teams with Third Infantry. Unless otherwise ordered, I will bring everything with me. No harness for headquarters' mules, but have wired for it. Will be ready to start about 4 o'clock.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

T ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Five thousand rounds Krag-Jorgensen ammunition should be here for 25 days. Three thousand rounds on way now, so am informed; expected this p. m. Ammunition officer here can supply 1,500 rounds more. Men about out. Both day and night before each man expended on average 150 rounds. Amount of ammunition asked for would be sufficient, in all probability, for some days. Five hundred rounds asked for. They average 50 rounds per man. We should have 500 rounds for them. These scouts use up ammunition very fast and do better than the others.

BIRKHIMER, *Captain, Third Artillery.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 14, 1899.*

DWARDS:

From Devol says additional harness will come here by to-morrow morning's mail which means to-morrow about noon. Will start 5 wagons and extra mules as sparejos are stored.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, *Malolos*:

The general says wire Devol to have harness unloaded at Malolos on up trip; for you to come right on here and leave a man and 1 wagon to get harness and then come right on.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *Manila, May 14, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Following report from Calumpit: "Gunboat *Covadonga* and launch *Oceanina* just returned. Lieutenant Webb reports river 18 feet deep, with intrenchments on west side and people friendly to San Luis. Here the enemy opened on both sides river killing 1 sergeant and slightly wounding 1 private. Gunboat drove enemy out of intrenchments, with loss of 20 killed. Boats have returned to Calumpit."

GREENE, *Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION:

Please have Corporal Thomas, Company K, North Dakota, bring out Krag-Jorgensen belonging to Private F. W. Summerfield; is a scout, now using broken Mauser.

BIRKHIMER, *Captain, Third Artillery.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Baliuag.*

Occupied San Miguel 4.55 p. m. Four companies Third Infantry, Captain Hannes commanding, reported 8.30 p. m. Made every effort possible to have Young returned to Baliuag, and it was necessary to use 2 mules from the battery for this purpose as the horses furnished with ambulance are absolutely worthless. All quiet at the time.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Mr. Young, chief of scouts, was seriously wounded while leading his men in a desperate but successful charge against odds of more than 10 to 1. Mr. Young is a man of intelligence, unusual courage and character. He has been valuable to me and his example has been inestimable. As a personal favor, I solicit the general's interest in his case. His wound will doubtless result in permanent disability. I would be glad if he could be given a commission in the volunteers to date from yesterday.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

DEAR MAJOR CROSBY:

We are sending you to-day Mr. W. H. Young, chief of our scouts, wounded yesterday in capture San Miguel, one of the bravest and most gallant men soldiers ever knew. General Lawton directed me to write a personal note and beg of you as a personal favor to him that you would show this man every attention that could be given the most deserving of "ours." We do hope his leg can be saved.

Sincerely, yours,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, Manila, May 14, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Telegraph fully about Mr. Young—age, nationality, former occupation. How long known to you; where you found him and how you came to hire him. Also what compensation he is receiving and what force of scouts he has charge of and status of scouts.

By command Major-General Otis:

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899.

Major CROSBY, First Reserve Hospital:

Kindly elicit and wire me following information concerning Mr. Young, chief scout, sent in wounded to you this morning: Age, nationality, former occupation.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, May 14, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Young's age, 41; nationality, American; former occupation, miner. He will probably not lose his leg, but have a stiff knee.

CROSBY, Major.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Baliuag, May 14, 1899—9 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Mr. Young now in First Reserve Hospital. Age, 41; nationality, American; Vermont; former occupation, miner; was with North Dakota regiment. Attention called to him by hearing of his exploits scouting with parties sent out whenever chance offered. Saw him first day of reconnoissance toward San Rafael. He was in advance of flankers. Ordered him called in. Intended to send him to rear of column. His appearance and explanation pleased me. I wished information concerning country and asked him to go forward and capture a citizen and bring him to me. Five minutes later he returned with rifle and bag of ammunition, having found enemy's picket, killed one and brought back his arms; also developed fact that enemy was close to our front, as we found. Prevented our running on to them unprepared. Sent for him next day; talked with and satisfied myself as to his qualifications. Informed him I desired his services and would employ him as scout and guide. Said he would be glad to serve, but did not care particularly for pay. He, however, accepted employment; no rate fixed. He was to receive the customary salary, which was not known to me. He was permitted to select 25 men whom he knew to be good, cool-headed men of courage, and they were detailed as scouts and served under his leadership. The result was most satisfactory; their work has been invaluable. They fell naturally under the influence of Mr. Young, as he is a natural leader, cool, deliberate, and even tempered. They have all become much attached to him. Eight of them volunteered to escort him from San Miguel to this place last night, arriving at midnight. Mr. Young has won the respect of all officers and men. He with his detachment went out from this place to seek the enemy's storehouses. Were gone four days without rations. Lived on the country. Dr. Crosby telegraphs me he will not lose his leg, but will have a stiff joint. When he recovers I will be glad to have him again, and if we have guerrilla warfare he will be very useful, but will probably be obliged to go mounted. He could undoubtedly enlist company of scouts from mustered-out volunteers.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 15, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Lieutenants Hawthorne and Scott would like to come on to San Miguel with Captain Gale's command.

FRENCH, Colonel.

[Telegram.]

MAASIN, May 15, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

Bull teams not up. Walcutt has gone back to see about them. Will wire when he returns.

FRENCH.

[Order.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

MEMORANDUM.

The scouts detailed in paragraph No. 2, Special Field Orders, No. 1, current series, these headquarters, will report to their respective company commanders for duty until further orders.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 15, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Maasin:

Anything this morning? Are ready to feel out toward enemy any direction. Suppose, however, without definite knowledge that it is so, that we will advance toward San Isidro when more are out. No new developments, except amigos coming in.

BIRKHIMER, Captain, Third Artillery.

[Telegram]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following just received and is repeated for your information: "San Isidro road, May 15, 1899.—Major Penrose, brigade surgeon: Wounded, Harry Howard, First Sergeant Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota, right wrist, flesh wound. Will go on. A number of prostrations. Have seen 7 dead natives and dressed 6 wounded, 2 seriously.—Richie."

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May 15, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Reward for rifles can only be paid Filipinos presenting insurgent rifles. Guns captured by soldiers are United States property.

MURRAY,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

River at stand; crossing deep, but practicable.

H. M. BOITELLE,
Third Artillery.

[Report.]

SAN MIGUEL, P. I., May 15, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Baliuag, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 12th instant, in company with Capt. J. F. Case, Second Oregon Volunteers, acting chief engineer, I left Baliuag under instructions to reconnoiter and thoroughly acquaint myself with the enemy's position, with a view to future operations of the First Division of the Eighth Army Corps. Aside from these general instructions, the duty was assigned men, by the division commander's verbal orders, of locating positions from which field artillery could be used with advantage against the enemy, together with a particular examination of the road leading from San Rafael-Biacnabato trail west to points west on the Baliuag-San Miguel road, north and south of San Yldefonso. In carrying out these orders I was directed to confer with Colonel Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, requesting such assistance as might be necessary, including the use of Young's scouts.

The latter numbered 26 men, about 16 of whom were found examining the enemy's position at San Yldefonso and drawing therefrom considerable fire when I arrived. Withdrawing the scouts, I proceeded under their protection to the extreme right of the enemy's line, scrutinizing the defensive features of the military character of the country in front of it. This course was pursued, moving constantly by our right flank, under cover as much as possible, over every foot of ground, up to within 1,000 yards of the enemy's line, until the road, San Yldefonso-San Miguel, was reached. In making the reconnoissance I was accompanied by Captain Case, to whom I am indebted for the topographical sketch herewith, and was supported by a battalion of the Second Oregon, 84 strong, commanded by Maj. P. J. Eastwick, of that regiment.

As the left of the enemy's position was approached, a lively fire was opened upon the scouts from a prominent, bastion-like knoll, dominating the country round, especially that over which they advanced. Major Eastwick's battalion was kept concealed as much as possible. This necessitated a longer detour than the scouts were compelled to make, and caused the latter to be halted occasionally in order that they should be well supported. This was particularly noticed at the knoll mentioned, which, however, was carried without delay or hesitation, the enemy falling off to their main line. But the scouts were here subjected to a veritable hail of bullets, poured in with the greatest precision by the enemy, who previously had measured and marked the range. It was here that Private William R. Trulock, Company C, North Dakotas, was wounded. The men were ordered to conceal themselves as well as possible, while firing was restricted to the necessities to a passive defense, awaiting the development of Major Eastwick's movement behind the hills in support. This was an unavoidable delay, but the moments were anxious. The enemy, growing in the belief that only the scouts were to be dealt with, were becoming constantly bolder, approaching our position under cover and with considerable skill. A firm front, with accurate firing, held them off. At length, when the support emerged from concealment in front of the knoll, the fact was signaled to the enemy by one of their scouts, and almost at once the heavy fire at our men on the knoll was perceptibly lessened. Replacing the scouts on this knoll by an equal number from the support, for the double purpose of denying this point of advantage to the enemy and guarding our left against a counter movement on their part, the movement by our right flank was resumed.

It was plainly evident that the enemy was not feeling so active as before, but the reason was not known. As we moved by our right, and consequently farther from our main line and forces at Maasin, greater caution was taken to keep the whole force well in hand. Upon reaching a point due east from San Yldefonso it was seen that the enemy were moving with some degree of precipitation toward San Miguel. They were, however, to be seen moving in many directions to the northeast, while a few fired upon us from a distance and to our rear.

Passing on, a high hill was reached northeast of San Yldefonso, from which San Miguel was plainly visible, and from which, also, the distinctly seen movements of

the enemy and of the people. The latter showed that San Yldefonso was ours. It was now 1.30 p. m. Collecting the command here, we again pressed on after a few moments rest toward San Miguel, on a road considerably east of the main one, for the purpose of completing the examination of the country contemplated by the division commander. In doing this the enemy was pressed back to the vicinity of San Miguel. In a resulting skirmish several of them were killed and wounded. Halting at 3.30 p. m., the supports were permitted to lunch, after which San Yldefonso was reached at 5 p. m., and whence a dispatch was sent through Maasin informing the division commander of the result of the day's operations.

From actual count it was concluded that the enemy numbered 200 men (armed) who left the town in a body. How many left irregularly, as evidently many did, by roads and paths out to the hills, there is no way of estimating. It is equally impracticable to estimate the enemy's loss. Four dead were left on the field, while it was observed that several disabled were being carried off, including, as it has been ascertained, 1 captain and 1 lieutenant. There was but 1 casualty on our side—Private Trulock, wounded, before mentioned. Later in the day San Yldefonso was garrisoned by our troops.

This was a very hard day's work. The scouts had nothing to eat from 3 a. m. until night, during which time they were constantly moving. The supports must have marched at least 15 miles that day. Fortunately the fine breeze alleviated the effects of the torrid heat.

On the 13th instant, still acting under instructions from the division commander to keep in touch with the enemy and explore the country around his position, I advanced with the scouts, 18 men, and Captain Case, in the direction of San Miguel. For support we had Company A, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., Lieut. F. S. Kelly commanding, and Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota, Capt. A. V. Bjornstad, commanding, the whole numbering 100 men, under Capt. H. L. Heath, Second Oregon Infantry.

The advance was made on the San Yldefonso-San Miguel road. The enemy's observation parties were soon encountered, but no opposition was offered to our advance until we arrived within 1,200 yards of the buildings of the town as seen across a field to the west thereof. Here as the scouts, advancing in skirmish line, penetrated a thicket they were received by volleys from a heavy skirmish line of the enemy lying behind rice embankments about 100 yards distant. Upon careful estimate I concluded that 200 Filipinos were directly in front of us, almost within speaking distance, while it was evident that the left of the enemy's line was concealed by a rise of the ground and the right of it by bushes. I had previously asked Captain Case to bring up the supports. This was promptly done, in extended order, but before these could arrive the scouts, under the leadership of Young and Private Harrington, charged out of the bushes into the field directly at the right center of the enemy's line in the open field, which wavered and broke, carrying back with it the rather reluctant flanks. Three enemy dead were left on the field, together with the horse of the commanding officer killed under him. The retreating enemy fired from behind houses and other obstacles, but were driven precipitately to the eastward, where they divided, part going toward San Isidro and the others in the reputed direction of Biacnabato, with the usual accompaniment of many stragglers escaping by paths over the hills. It was while driving the enemy through the town that the gallant scout leader, Young, in the advance, fell seriously wounded. This, together with the wounding of Private Albert Erickson, Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota, constituted our only casualties during both days. The number of casualties on the part of the enemy is not known, but it was observed that the column actuated toward San Isidro was accompanied by conveyances which appropriately might have been used for carrying off the injured.

Immediate steps were taken to secure possession of the city against the enemy, whose actions, hanging around the outskirts, seemed somewhat disquieting. The division commander was at once made acquainted with the situation of affairs by wire from San Yldefonso. During the afternoon Colonel Summers with reinforcements arrived, removing all anxiety as to the intentions of the enemy.

Both San Yldefonso and San Miguel were found practically deserted by the civil population, the former more than the latter, as in San Miguel several people in good stations of life, as well as some others less fortunate, came up at once to announce their presence and solicit humane treatment. The population of both places is said to have fled to the mountains.

In these two days of arduous service I have been assisted in a manner that could not have been surpassed. Colonel Summers, Second Oregon Volunteers, cheerfully gave me all the men I deemed necessary; both Major Eastwick and Captain Heath, together with the officers and men of their commands, rendered the most willing

and effective support; while in Captain Case I had an assistant whose intelligence and accomplishments all recognize, and whose bearing under fire was most conspicuous.

I desire to call attention in a particular manner to the bravery in all stations here they came under my eye of Chief Scout Young and Scout James Harrington, company G, Second Oregon Volunteers. They were always out toward the enemy, setting an example of intrepidity to the others, several of whom closely followed them. The charge of the scouts upon the enemy's line in front of San Miguel on the 13th instant was one of the rare events in war where true valor asserts itself against overwhelming odds; and seldom, indeed, has valor more triumphantly asserted itself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Acting Judge-Advocate.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

I arrived here with my headquarters this a. m. The following is the best information I can obtain:

SAN MIGUEL, *May 15, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: I have the honor to report that from information derived from escaped Spanish prisoners, natives, and my own observation I find the situation in our front as follows: A force under Colonel Texso and Maj. Simon Tercian is in Biacnabato, or vicinity, estimated at 500 men, this being a portion of the force driven from San Miguel in addition to a small garrison formerly there. In Sibul there is a force of 50 men. In Malabay there is a force of 200. General Gregorio del Pilar is in command, and he is probably in the vicinity of San Isidro. The road from here to San Isidro is reported fairly good—excellent in dry weather, but bad in rainy. Biacnabato lies 7 miles to the eastward, with a good road to within a short distance of the mountain. The pass to the town is reported narrow and winding and the road is a narrow trail. A force of 100 men and 2 officers is now reported to have moved within miles of this place and thrown up slight intrenchments across the road. The Spanish prisoners have all been taken to the provinces of Neuva Ecija and Ilocos Sur. All forces of the insurgents are reported as greatly demoralized and discouraged; desertions occur daily. Filipino returning this morning reports that Gregorio del Pilar, having received permission from General Lawton, has passed to the eastward of his place on his way to Baliuag. No news of General Pio del Pilar can be obtained here; only a few of the natives have heard of him and none have ever seen him.

Respectfully,

J. F. CASE, *Acting Engineer Officer.*

I, of course, assume that my next objective will be San Isidro. I do not anticipate much opposition and do not think I shall find much force there. I shall send forward, starting this p. m., a strong advance guard, and will support them with a strong force if necessary. In the meantime I would like to look up the country to the northeast and east, particularly Sibul and Biacnabato. The latter place I do not think I will have time to reach or take, but I would like to reconnoiter it. I think I will be able to move several columns from this point, and if the gunboats and Kobbé's column can go up as far as Arayat I can probably meet them there. I understand that Aguinaldo's family are now at Cabanatuan, and I might pay them a visit. The rear of my command will reach this place to-morrow a. m.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 15, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Your next objective is San Isidro, unless your progress so much impeded by enemy that your subsistence likely to give out, in which case you should seek road to Rio Grande and try to communicate with Kobbé's column and gunboats, where you will

find rations. Kobbé's column will be pushed up as rapidly as possible, but can not tell how far gunboats can ascend the river; believe they can ascend to Aravat, where the enemy have intrenchments. Watch well your right. It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato; report not verified. No change in MacArthur's front; still confronted by about 5,000 men.

By command Major-General Otis.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific:

Your message, specifying next objective, received. I am rationed to include the 26th instant and find troops have some savings; have also along extra coffee and sugar; can, on a pinch, get along till end of month. Continued rains would block me. Perhaps the enemy may. So far they have shown no alarming strength. My men are in good spirits and will run over anything confronting them. I will reconnoiter to the east in the morning, as indicated. Summers will move on toward San Isidro; will be supported by French.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SALACAT, *May 15, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

Enemy opened fire about a mile from this point; advanced upon and drove them from strongly intrenched position on north side of river and for a mile beyond. Engagement lasted about an hour. At this time the bodies of 16 dead Filipinos, 1 officer included, have been discovered; also 5 wounded. Twenty-one or more guns and equipments have been captured and about same number of bolos; roads in bad condition, and it would have been impossible to have gone beyond this point to-day, as the wagon train is now being pulled into camp by the men of this command; will follow instructions and move in the morning and cover distance of 5 miles, more or less, water considered. Good water at this point. If possible, would like to have wire kept up with command, so as to keep you more fully advised. Latest advices indicate Aguinaldo at San Isidro with considerable force; enemy's strength estimated to-day between 200 and 300. Casualties: First Sergt. H. M. Howard, Company K, Thirteenth Minnesota, slight wound in right wrist. Two Spanish prisoners sent back with Captain McKenna, as requested; considerable number of refugees in camp to-night. What disposition of wounded Filipinos shall I make? Telegraph station 500 to 600 hundred yards in our rear.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

Repeated to palace. This was a brilliant engagement, for which Colonel Summers and his command deserve great credit.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *Manila, May 15, 1899.*

COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

All officers and enlisted men of the Twenty-third Infantry belonging to companies on duty here on special duty are relieved in orders issued from these headquarters to-day and directed to report to company commanders and accompany regiment to Jolo, island of Jolo.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Repeated to Major Kobbé.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, May 15, 1899—7.45 p. m.

SUMMERS, *San Isidro Road:*

early to-morrow the cavalry battalion and 2 battalions Third Infantry, with me's battery, to reconnoiter Biacnabato. As the route is over a trail, I must have a Spaniard who is with you for guide. Therefore asked you to send him in. Your march to-morrow toward San Isidro. Do not go farther than 5 miles and find water.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

SUMMERS, *Commanding:*

General commanding has repeated your report to corps commander, with following "This was a brilliant engagement, for which Colonel Summers and his command deserve great credit." He desires to congratulate you and your troops on the heavy casualties. You hold the record of this war.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

LOCKWOOD,
Commanding, Baliuag:

General commanding directs that in case any representatives present themselves of Filipino insurgents, under letter of instructions from General Lawton, that give them every courtesy; make them your guests. Immediately advise these matters, as well as corps headquarters, and make the necessary arrangements to take them to Manila, as the letter indicates, under proper escort. It is reported here that Porfirio del Pilar will present himself at Baliuag.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

MAJOR-GENERAL
Department of the Pacific:

Following is repeated for your information: "San Miguel, May 15, 1899.—Major-General First Division.—Sir: I have the honor to report that in compliance with orders from division headquarters I proceeded at 3 p. m. with the First Battalion under Colonel Summers, consisting of the Thirteenth Minnesota, Second and 1 gun of the Utah Battery, north, on the San Isidro road, to the town 3 miles from this place. I had with me the escaped Spanish prisoner, Filipe Garcia, Gallar, as a guide and found his information correct in every particular. While this side of the town our scouts were fired on by an insurgent outpost of 20 men. I directed the deployment of the advance party to the left of the scouts and rode back and reported the situation to Colonel Summers, suggesting the movement to our left. Colonel Summers then deployed the First Battalion Thirteenth Minnesota and advanced on the trenches occupied by the enemy. A check was gallantly made in the face of a hot fire and the enemy driven back with considerable loss. They left one man mortally wounded, with his rifle and ammunition on the field, and carried several wounded with them. I estimated their strength at 70 men. We have no casualties. The enemy were driven a mile and a half from the town, where the troops will camp to-night. I estimate the number of enemy at 100, completely intrenched and armed with Mausers and Remingtons. Very respectfully, J. F. Case, captain, and acting engineer officer."

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers.*

[Order.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, Luzon, May 16, 1899.

CIRCULAR.

The commanding general directs that every economy be exercised in the use of rations. The command is not now in communication with the base of supplies, and it is probable that it will not secure such communications before the end of the month. For the same reason, care should be taken to prevent the waste of ammunition.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

SIBUL, *May 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

I arrived here at about 10 a. m., being delayed by bad roads (two bridges built) and by reconnoissance. Distance about 9 miles. It is reported that yesterday 50 or 60 insurgents arrived here from "Split Rock" and departed for San Isidro via (name unrecognized). There were none here on our arrival. I will leave shortly after noon for Penambaran, expecting to return to-night, and will start for "Split Rock" as early as practicable to-morrow. It is probably impracticable to carry the ammunition carts, but I shall attempt it to-morrow, as the guns can return if they can not go forward, or else use pack mules for the purpose. Several of the inhabitants place number of insurgents at "Split Rock" at 400 to 500. The town contains few permanent inhabitants. Those who are here are reassured and express intentions of returning to their homes; several parties were met to-day as they returned.

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

SIBUL, *May 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

It appears from what we are able to learn that we will have to return nearly to San Miguel in order to strike the trail to Penambaran, which is about as far from San Miguel as is Sibul. Also that the trail to the "Split Rock" from Sibul is impassable for stock, and we are not able to find anyone who knows it. I have, therefore, ordered Captain Cooke to return to San Miguel, and will go to Penambaran, endeavoring to reach San Miguel to-night also. The Spanish guide claims that it is only one hour from San Miguel to the "Split Rock" by the trail that he knows, and knows nothing about the other. The natives appear to know nothing, and it will undoubtedly save time to make a new start directly from San Miguel to-morrow.

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

IN FIELD, *May 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

I find from the natives at Sibul that the trail from there to Biacnabato is impracticable even for horses. They report ravines with bamboo footbridges and narrow pathway along steep hills. It is also reported as leading into the main road from San Miguel. From all these reasons I believe it much better to return to San Miguel and move against Biacnabato from that point. The road from San Miguel is reported good.

Respectfully,

J. F. CASE,
Captain and Acting Engineer Officer.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

G. GALE, *Commanding:*

Standing general directs that you return immediately.
respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

SAN MIGUEL, LUZON ISLAND, *May 16, 1899.*

GENERAL,
Division, Eighth Army Corps.

I have the honor to report that this morning, in obedience to verbal instructions of the division commander, with 2 battalions Third U. S. Infantry, dismounted Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, and Hawthorne's mountain artillery, started for Sibul, with intentions to reconnoiter this town, capture and destroy stores and equipments of the enemy supposed to be at Penambaran, reconnoiter and test the force of the enemy at the stronghold known as "Split Rock." The march to Sibul—about 9 miles—was accomplished readily

but several wet and muddy sloughs caused great inconvenience to the artillery and ammunition. I arrived at Sibul at about 10 a. m., and shortly after noon detachments of the Third Infantry started to find the trail to Penambaran. It was found at the time that such a trail existed, but the guide who accompanied me knew nothing of it, neither could the two natives whom I had impressed as guides show me the right road. It became necessary to retrace my march almost to the point of San Isidro, when I was met by a courier bringing orders to return to Sibul.

Orders were accordingly sent to the officer left in command at Sibul to come in with the troops with me. The road to Sibul will immediately be made passable for wheeled vehicles in wet weather, and is, when slightly wet, not so fatiguing for troops, both mounted and foot. Information of a trail very difficult, through the mountains from Sibul to the "Split Rock" was obtained, but no one was encountered who professed to know where it is. I was informed that by road this stronghold is only one hour's march from San Miguel, but do not think to be the truth. Sibul contains a fine sulphur spring, but has no permanent residents. All such as were there were reassured as to the good intentions of the Americans toward peaceful citizens, and copies of the proclamation of the division commander, and of the offer regarding purchase of insurgent arms were distributed.

respectfully,

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Detachment under command of Captain Gale, Fourth Cavalry, sent to reconnoiter the coast and northeast returned. Reached town of Sibul. Fifty insurgents left town last night for San Isidro. Country scouted rough; trails bad. No insurgents captured.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 15, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Following is repeated for your information: "San Miguel, May 15, 1899—General, First Division—Sir: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with verbal orders from division headquarters, I proceeded at 3 p. m., with the

column under Colonel Summers, consisting of the Thirteenth Minnesota, Second Oregon, and 1 gun of the Utah Battery, north on the San Isidro road to the town of Bulac, 3 miles from this place. I had with me the escaped Spanish prisoner, Filiberto Garcia Gallar, as a guide, and I found his information correct in every particular. A half mile this side of town our scouts were fired on by an insurgent outpost of 6 or 8 men. I directed the deployment of the advance party to the left of the scouts, and then rode back and reported the situation to Colonel Summers, suggesting the flanking movement to our left. Colonel Summers then deployed the First Battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota and advanced on the trenches occupied by the enemy. The attack was gallantly made in the face of a hot fire, and the enemy driven back with considerable loss. They left 1 man mortally wounded, with his rifle and ammunition, on the field, and carried several wounded with them. I estimate their loss at 6 or 7 men. We have no casualties. The enemy was driven $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond the town where the troops will camp to-night. I estimate the number of insurgents at 100, completely intrenched and armed with Mausers and Remingtons. Very respectfully, J. F. Case, captain and acting engineer officer."

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The following, just received, is repeated for your information:

SAN ROQUE, *May 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Arriving at this place at 9 o'clock a. m., I sent the scouts, under the able command of Second Lieut. J. E. Thornton, Second Oregon, with instructions to reconnoiter our front and to discover a near supply of water, 1 battalion Second Oregon following after as support. At a point about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from here the scouts were fired upon by the enemy. Returned the fire with good effect, and drove the enemy across the river, which is about 40 feet wide. Enemy burned bridge after them and retired to trenches on each side of the bridge, from which they could throw a direct flank fire. Enemy were driven from these trenches with a loss of 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 2 prisoners; 14 Mausers and 2 Remingtons, with equipments and ammunition, captured. No doubt a great many more were killed and wounded than reported, as they were seen carrying them from the scene of action. Enemy were driven to town reported by natives to be Factoria, situated about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from bridge, and larger than San Isidro, at which place they are enforced awaiting our advance. From information received from prisoners, the enemy's force at bridge was 2 companies; at Factoria, 4 companies; at San Isidro, 2 companies—a conservative estimate of 1,000 in all. Scouts succeeded in putting out fire on bridge before it was totally destroyed, which was very important, as river could not be forded, it being from 4 to 6 feet deep, with high banks on each side. One battalion Second Oregon and scouts now occupy both sides of the river, and are repairing the bridge under a competent officer. Too much praise can not be given the scouts for their efficient work. Lieutenant Thornton has proven himself a most capable and efficient officer, and is deserving of every praise possible. Our casualties: Scout James Harrington, private, Company G, Second Oregon, killed. Unless orders received to the contrary, will proceed across the river to-morrow, and will advance upon Factoria and San Isidro. What disposition shall be made of wounded Filipino prisoners, as they are considerable trouble?

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

Factoria is San Isidro. The former is the name given the town by the natives. I desire to specially commend Colonel Summers and those he mentions. Colonel Summers has been active and intelligent in his work. He will take the city in the morning. I also call attention to the fact that my scouts were again commended. Harrington, killed, the only casualty, is the man who has several times before been commended for unusual bravery. He was as brave and noble a soldier as I have ever known, and his death and the disabling of Young, who organized the scouts, will be a great loss to us.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Near San Isidro:*

The town Factoria is San Isidro. The former name is given it by natives. Colonel French has been ordered to report to you to-night with the Twenty-second Infantry, 1 battalion North Dakota, and Scott's battery. They had best be put into position to-night. I will start at 4 a. m. to-morrow, and reach you about 6.30.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

OPPOSITE CANDABA, P. I., ON RIO GRANDE LA PAMPANGA, *May 23, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, in the Field:

I have the honor to report as follows: At the trenches bordering the stream where we had an engagement with the enemy, where bridge was partially burned, just south of San Isidro, I was attracted by the unusual appearance of a dead Filipino. This caused me to examine in a careful manner his physique and clothing. The latter would class him as an officer. He was attired with scrupulous neatness; the nose, shoes, and clothing generally indicated one in an officer's station. I then scrutinized his features and was surprised to find them of a perfect Spanish type, of which I have seen no better among the Spanish officers at Manila, and precisely of their style. I will only add that I took some precautions during this examination as to preclude mistake regarding points I have mentioned. Press of other matters momentarily arising, as well as failure at first to appreciate the possible importance of this incident, have delayed my mentioning the matter before.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Judge-Advocate.

[Telegram.]

SAN ISIDRO ROAD, *May 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have moved 2 miles. Troops resting a few minutes. The roads are getting worse, and a little rain would make them absolutely impassable for wheeled vehicles. No enemy visible. The insurgent telegraph line completely demolished.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 16, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Captain McKenna says firing did not amount to much. It was by skirmishers. No reply made. Colonel Summers is at Signal Station now.

RHEA, *Signal Sergeant.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

The bearer, Vicente Estaban Pablo, escaped from the insurgents, so he says, and came into our lines. He has permission to return to Manila.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, Luzon, May 16, 1899.

Col. J. H. FRENCH,
Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you move, under verbal instructions given you this morning, at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

There is no necessity for an advance guard as there are troops in your front.

Each organization should look out for its own transportation and haul it over the bad places.

The tool wagon will report to you, as will also Lieutenant Scott's artillery, at the hour for marching.

Look out for the transportation of the column ahead of you if you come across it. Some of this transportation, which is hauling rations for Colonel Summers's command from Baliuag, was quite a distance in rear of his command yesterday.

Colonel Summers reports that there is no available water between the place where he camped last night and the point where he is now resting, about 7 or 8 miles from here, on the first stream beyond the crossroads.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT:

Colonel French will move at 3 p. m. from this camp. Send the tool wagon. Scott will go by the bridge at 2.45 p. m.

Yours,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

Lieutenant SCOTT:

Colonel French will start at 3 p. m sharp; be with him at that time. The headquarters tool wagon will go along with you and report to Colonel French.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Miguel, May 16, 1899.

W. H. YOUNG,
Chief of Scouts, First Reserve Hospital, Manila:

Harrington killed to-day at the head of the scouts, doing his duty like the brave and noble soldier he was. I hope you are getting along well.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN ROQUE, *May 16, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

I have ascertained to-night that it is correct, two towns are same. Will be impossible to place the commands coming up to-night in position only to have them bivouac at my camp and have them move out with me at daylight. The ground we will have to maneuver the troops over is crowded with a large growth of slough grass or rice paddies. My outposts from present camp are fully 2½ miles. I expect to arrive there by at least 6 o'clock a. m., and then make proper disposition of troops by daylight. Artillery will play a good part in this engagement.

SUMMERS, *Colonel.*

[Telegram.]

SAN ISIDRO ROAD, *May 16, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

The disabled wagon was repaired in time to come along with rest of wagons.

WALCUTT.

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May, 17, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

My command consists of 3 battalions Seventeenth Infantry, 1 battalion Ninth Infantry, 1 battery First Artillery, 6 mountain guns, 300 rounds ammunition per man, 100 per gun, and seven days' rations; is now 6 a. m., north and west side of Rio Grande with boats *Laguna de Bay* and *Comondonga* and armored launch towing 2 scoes; also 5 escort wagons, 1 ambulance, and detachment Signal Corps.

KOBBE.

[Telegram.]

HOSPITAL, *May 17, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

W. H. Young, chief of scouts, died at 5.57 p. m., May 16.

CROSBY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Isidro Road, May 17, 1899.

Major KOBBE, *Calumpit*:

Yours received. We are just about making an attack on San Isidro. We hope to take the city within the next hour.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MAY 17, 1899—8.45 a. m.

General LAWTON:

Just struck the enemy on our right. Line is advancing in good shape. Enemy are evidently shooting high, as a few buzz here. Am about 1½ miles from your position. Firing is against the Dakotas and Oregons, at about 1,000 yards. Left not yet engaged.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

General LAWTON:

Troops of left wing are in the town. Scouts have captured 4 Spaniards said to have been in command of enemy's forces. Will wait for you in town.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Isidro Road, May 17, 1899.

Captain HANNAY, *San Miguel*:

Leave 4 companies of your regiment to protect the town and property; prepare the balance to move at once in the lightest marching order, carrying full ammunition and one day's rations in haversack. Leaving all transportation behind. When you are ready to move, report to me from the telegraph office for orders.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

Captain HANNAY, *San Miguel*:

My first message should have read "balance of your command." My omission
LAWTON, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 17, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Will report at telegraph station for further orders when ready to move.

HANNAY, *Captain*.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Colonel French with the Twenty-second Infantry and North Dakotas reenforced Colonel Summers last night. At 7 this morning Colonel Summers deployed his forces and moved on the city driving the enemy rapidly before him. He now occupies the town, the enemy being still pursued. I have no report of casualties, but they are not great in any.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers*.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 17, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have already given orders to cavalry and artillery to be ready to move at once. One day's rations and full ammunition.

HANNAY, *Commanding*.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Following summary report of Colonel Summers report: On arrival at point across river about 2 miles from town, line of advance was formed, Twenty-second Infantry on left, right resting on road; North Dakota battalion and Oregon battalion on right of road preceded by scouts; Scott's battery following on road. Fire was opened on scouts at a point 1,800 yards from town—enemy was routed. City was entered at 9.30 a. m. Enemy's strength estimated at 2,000; their loss 15 killed, 20 wounded captured 3 prisoners, 4 horses, and 7 guns. Our loss was—slightly wounded, Private George F. Tew, Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota, right leg, also Private Butts Company L, Second Oregons, left thigh. Think Summers's estimate too great.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers*.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 17, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Congratulations for you and your troops. Your next objective Arayat down R Grande after troops have rested and peace restored at San Isidro. Arayat reports to be strongly intrenched. Kobbé and gunboats started up the river at 6 a. m. The early announcement fearing telegraphic communications may be lost.

OTIS.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

HANNAY, *San Miguel:*

Get on San Isidro road to where it forks to Gapan; there stop. Have your
it in wire and report. Take only men able to travel fast.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 17, 1899.*

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Move out infantry at once to forks of San Isidro road. Artillery and cavalry
ready. Will wire when fully started.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro Road, May 17, 1899.

HANNAY, *Commanding, San Miguel:*

Edwards says wait for further orders, nothing developed as yet, but he also wants
to know what is the trouble with the cavalry and artillery. Why are they not ready?

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 17, 1899.*

GENERAL, FIRST DIVISION,
San Isidro Road.

Ascertain as to cavalry and artillery.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 17, 1899.—1.42 a. m.*

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Squadron and battery just moved out.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

FORKS OF ROAD, *May 17, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION,
San Isidro:

Get to Gapan forks, on San Isidro road, with command.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

HANNAY, *Cross Roads:*

Did you arrive? What is condition of your men? Is there any good water
supply? Desire you to rest until 3 or 4 o'clock.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

CROSS ROADS, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Men are pretty tired from yesterday, but are good for a short march still. Good water at former telegraph station, 2½ miles.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

CROSS ROADS, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Will stop to get water about fifteen minutes.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

MAY 17—2.40 p. m.

Captain HANNAY, Cross Roads:

I wish you to proceed to and take Gapan to-night. The right-hand road leads to that place. You will find good water a short distance ahead on your road. Wire when you start. I will send a column from here to meet you at or near Gapan. Acknowledge receipt.

LAWTON, Major-General Commanding.

[Telegram.]

CROSS ROADS, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Telegram as to taking Gapan to-night received. Will start at 3.20 o'clock unless otherwise ordered.

HANNAY, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION,
San Isidro:

Mayor of town just informed me of rumor of insurgents going to make an attack on this place from the west and Angat.

LOCKWOOD, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

Captain LOCKWOOD,
Commanding, Baliug:

Commanding general hardly credits report. Large force of ours with gunboats left Calumpit this morning, going north. Gunboats now probably up as far as Candaba. However, general says keep your command well in hand. Keep a good lookout and your flanks protected.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION,
San Isidro:

I thought best let general know of rumor. Have four small parties out scouting. Command well in hand. May have to burn some houses to clear my front and flanks.

LOCKWOOD.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

Captain Lockwood, *Baliuag*:

General says don't burn any houses until flanks are attacked.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

SAN ISIDRO, *May 1, 1899.*

COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES ARMY.

Sir: Through the kindness of the bearer, Señor Ramon Rey, we, 14 American prisoners held by the Philippine Government, are enabled to send word through the lines and notify you of our presence here.

The following is a list of our names: Lieut. J. C. Gillmore, U. S. N.; W. Walton, Chief Q. M.; P. Vandvit, S. M. M.; J. Ellsworth, cox.; L. Edwards, lds.; S. Brisolose, S.; A. Peterson, app.; F. Anderson, lds., U. S. S. *Yorktown*, captured at Balaras April 1899. W. Bruce, E. Honeyman, Nevada cavalry, captured January 30, 1899. A. Bishop, Third Artillery, captured April 12, 1899. H. Huber, Hospital Corps; J. Brien, civilian; A. Sonnichsen, civilian, captured January 27, 1899.

We are about to march to the northward, where, we do not know. Up to Lieutenant Gillmore's arrival we have been treated in a most barbaric manner, starved, beaten, and bound, but since the advance of the United States troops our treatment has been a trifle better. We have been living on 5 cents a day, and most of us are nearly naked. The Spaniards have been treated even worse than us, being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery and various other diseases, but, whether incapable or not caring, the Government does nothing for them. The bearer, Señor Ramon Rey, has been a true friend to us; in fact, had it not been for him and his countrymen we should probably have been starved to death on the coast from Malolos. He is therefore entitled to the best consideration of every American.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT SONNICHSEN,
Formerly Quartermaster S. S. Zealandia.

IN PRISON, *San Isidro, May 1, 1899.*

ANY UNITED STATES OFFICER:

Will you kindly let Capt. Butler D. Price, Fourth U. S. Infantry, know that there are 7 men-of-war-men and myself, of the *Yorktown*, here? We were captured at Malolos on the 12th of last month. There are also 1 Englishman (J. O'Brien), 1 United States civilian (A. Sonnichsen), and 4 of the Army (Bishop, Third Artillery, S. A.; Honeyman, First Nevada Cavalry; Huber, Hospital Corps, and Bruce, First Nevada Cavalry).

Please show the bearer, Señor Raymon Rey, consideration.

J. C. GILLMORE,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[Letter.]

SAN ISIDRO, *May 1, 1899.*

COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES ARMY.

Sir: Through the kindness of the bearer, Señor Ramon Rey, we are enabled to send word through the lines and acquaint you of our presence here. Lieutenant Gillmore, 7 of his men, 4 soldiers, and 2 civilians compose our number. We are about to march to the mountains.

For God's sake, can nothing be done for us? We have been starving, abused, and treated like animals.

The bearer has been a true friend to us and deserves the best consideration of every American.

Respectfully,

ALBERT SONNICHSEN.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 17, 1899.*

GENERAL LAWTON, *San Isidro*:

General MacArthur reports that enemy has disappeared from his front; does not know the direction taken.

BARRY.

244 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

PROVOST-MARSHAL, MAJOR BALLANCE

SIR: The major-general commanding directs that Lieut. Mariano Perea, 2 other officers, and 2 soldiers, all escaped Spanish prisoners, be rationed from or with your command until there is a chance to return them to Manila. In case your supplies have not yet come up you can call upon the commissary, Captain Bootes, to issue them rations. Anyway, you take charge of their welfare.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

Admiral DEWEY, *Captain of Port:*

Find that Gillmore, unlike the other 7 sailor prisoners, received good treatment; was quartered outside of jail; was well and all right. They were taken north from here May 1.

EDWARDS.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

The bearer, Señor Ramon Rey, is the gentleman that showed much tenderness to American prisoners held in jail. He is entitled to every kindness and courtesy from us and will be accordingly treated.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 17, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *San Isidro:*

Following just received from Lieutenant Cunningham, Signal Corps, near St. Simon: "Have just heard from Major Kobbé. His command bivouacs to-night at San Luis. He expects to march for Candaba to-morrow at 6 a. m. Have asked him to send report covering to-day's operations and future movement for your information. Expect to hear from him late to-night or early to-morrow morning. I infer from his note San Luis was taken without particularly strong opposition.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in conversation with Dr. José Albert and Arsenio Cruz Herrera, residents of this place, I have learned the following: Aguinaldo and the insurgent government have been located here since the capture of Malolos. They departed from this place with a suitable guard on the afternoon of the 15th of this month. The congress, which met here on the 1st of May, voted unanimously on May 6 for a change of administration and for peace with the American Government on the terms proposed in the proclamation of the American-Filipino commission. A commission of 7 members was appointed for this purpose, of which the above-named gentlemen formed a part. It was intended to proceed to General Lawton's headquarters to-day, but the advance of the forces day before yesterday from San Miguel interfered with their arrangements, and a change of plan was made whereby the above-named gentlemen were removed from the commission and a new

mission appointed, which left for the north with Aguinaldo. They inform me the desire of four-fifths of the Filipinos for peace and expect that the new mission will present itself at this town for the purpose of going to Manila by morrow morning at the latest. Their congress has adjourned sine die and the members have returned to their homes. These gentlemen were both delegates to congress and their account of proceedings is undoubtedly correct. They report news of something over 4,000 in General MacArthur's front. Aguinaldo is reported to be in Cabanatuan, 18 miles north of this place. Col. Pablo Radilla, with 400 soldiers, was here this morning. The whereabouts of General Pilar is unknown. The peace commission is composed as follows: Buen Camino, president; Gen. Gregorio Aragon, Col. Manuel Aguelles, Florentino Torres, Pablo Campo, Dr. José Albert, Dr. Maximino Paterno, and Arsenio Cruz Herrera.

Respectfully,

J. F. CASE,
Captain and Acting Engineer Officer.

Above wired to Palace. The following information is submitted, and is, I believe, reliable.

LAWTON, *Major-General, U. S. V.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 17, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

(Through the commanding officer, provisional brigade.)

SIR: The commanding general has just learned with deep regret that the burial of Private Harrington, Company G, of your regiment, occurred at an early hour this afternoon. It was his intention to be present with his staff at the funeral of this brave man.

The General congratulates you and the members of your regiment, both commissioned and enlisted, on having had among you so gallant a soldier as James Harrington, for whom he entertained as great respect and liking as for any soldier of his acquaintance.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 17, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps, San Isidro, Luzon.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from division commander I left San Roque at 7 o'clock a. m. and advanced on road leading to San Isidro in the following order: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Scott's battery and detachment Utah Artillery; 1 battalion First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.; Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.; Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. On arriving across the river the line was formed with the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry on the left, their right resting on the road. First North Dakotas and 1 battalion Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., on right flank, preceded by scouts, Scott's battery following up the road. In this position the line was moved forward on San Isidro, fire being opened upon the scouts at a point about 1,800 yards from there, also on the right of the line. Line continued advancing and routed the enemy and entered the city at 9.30 o'clock a. m. Enemy's strength estimated at 2,000; their loss, as far as can be estimated, 15 killed, 20 wounded. Captured 3 prisoners, 4 horses, and 7 guns. Our loss: Private George F. W., Company F, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., very slightly wounded right leg; Private Butts, Company L, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. More complete report to follow.

Respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,
Colonel Second Oregon Infantry U. S. V., Commanding Provisional Brigade.

246 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Colonel FRENCH, *Commanding:*

The commanding general desires that you take your entire brigade. Lieutenant Scott will report 2 guns to you at once. Suggest that you see the General at once if you so desire.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Captain BIRKHIMER.

DEAR CAPTAIN: The General says if you feel so inclined you can go out with Colonel French this p. m. You may be of much assistance to the Colonel. He will not order—merely give you the option.

Yours,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899—p. m.

Colonel FRENCH, *Commanding.*

COLONEL: The commanding general states "all right." Go ahead with your movement as directed.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Kindly inform Captain Birkhimer.

C. R. E.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899—10 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific:

Colonel French, with his provisional brigade, Twenty-second Infantry, North Dakotas, and 2 guns Scott's battery, started at 3 o'clock this p. m., to Cabiao, where it was reported about 300 insurgents were, near San Fernando. He was fired upon by enemy, losing 4 men wounded, one of whom has since died. His brief report is repeated as follows:

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY, *May 18, 1899—6.40 p. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I met the enemy this side of San Fernando (the road strikes the river there). I deployed 1 battalion Twenty-second Infantry to the right and one to the left, and advanced, driving the enemy to the river. Then they showed in considerable force across the river, which we could not ford. It became dark, and I will halt here for the night and move on Cabiao at 5 a. m. to-morrow. There are still a few insurgents intrenched across the river. Casualties, 4 wounded, 3 severely.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. FRENCH,
Colonel Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

The enemy opened first fire on us from trenches in bend of road.

LAWTON,
Major-General Commanding.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Lieutenant THORNTON, *Commanding Scouts.*

SIR: The general desires that you be on a sharp lookout for flag of truce, and if it is sent to accord it all courtesy, and to bring its bearer or bearers to these headquarters with every care and civility.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you start that escort, 1 lieutenant and 10 men, at 1.30 p. m. He will find the stores and escort from Miguel that he will relieve at the crossroads, Gapan and San Isidro. They start from San Isidro at 1 p. m.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *San Miguel:*

Have 3 of the best teams with Third Infantry unload and put on them the stores left at San Miguel by the Thirteenth Minnesota, in charge of Corpl. P. G. Billerton, Company A, Third Infantry, viz, 57 boxes hard bread, 6 baskets potatoes, 5 crates onions, 3 boxes soap—do not bring vinegar—and start them immediately toward this place, sending with the wagons an escort of not less than 1 officer and 20 men. The hospital wagon and such other things as may be designated by the surgeon will also be brought up. Your escort will bring the wagons as far as the forks of the road, about halfway to this place, where they will be met by Captain Hannay's command turning with wagons, when the loads will be transferred and your teams and escort will return with Captain Hannay. Acknowledge receipt and report action.

LAWTON,
Major-General Commanding.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

COLONEL SUMMERS,
Commanding Provisional Brigade.

COLONEL: Commanding general directs that you take charge of the provost business soon as the other command pulls out. Kindly notify me when you have detailed provost-marshal. Naturally, your command will have to do everything.

Yours,

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, p. m., 1899.

PROVOST-MARSHAL, MAJOR WILLIS:

The general wants you to destroy all native "bino" that you may find and to prevent anyone selling it to troops. Take measures to keep it away from soldiers.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Letter.]

SAN ISIDRO, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
General Lawton's Division.

I would respectfully request that the following-named privates of the North Dakota Regiment and Second Oregon U. S. V. be detailed to serve with my command as scouts: Private T. M. Sweeney, Company K; L. A. Galt, Company G; F. Ross, Company H; McIntyre, Company B; O. H. Judd, Company D, North Dakota; and N. B. Huntley, Company L, Second Oregon U. S. V., and Longfellow, Company H, North Dakota. Private Andress, Company B, North Dakotas, to be relieved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. EDW. THORNTON,
Commanding Scouts.

[Letter.]

SAN ISIDRO, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: Private Scott of Company K, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteers, has failed to report to me in compliance with Special Field Orders No. 4.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. EDW. THORNTON,
Second Lieutenant, Second Oregon, Commanding Scouts.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Am here with command. Rain threatening; no tents. Can Gale's squadron rest to-morrow?

HANNAY, Commanding.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT, Chief Quartermaster.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you discharge and pay off the guide (Spaniard) employed at San Miguel.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Captain WALCUTT:

The commanding general directs that you employ Señor Ramon Rey, an escaped Spanish prisoner, at this place, as guide, at \$100 per month.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, San Miguel:

The peace commissioners will leave here at 6 a. m., to-morrow for Manila, via your place. They will need five carriages. Find out if you can get that many in San Miguel and let me know. Those they take from here must be sent back from San Miguel, and those taken by you will be returned from Baliuag.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 18, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON:

The five carriages will be furnished here and will be held in readiness.

LOCKWOOD, Major, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

General MACARTHUR, *San Fernando:*

Four commissioners, headed by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, will go under escort to-morrow, via Malolos, to see General Otis, and commission, from what I can understand, will not have definite results. From inquiry with one of its members, one of my staff officers reports that the former commission named by Aguinaldo to treat for peace has been dissolved by Luna. The latter arrested Buen Camino and Arguillas Cabanatuan and has sent them to Talavera. Luna, it appears, desires to be dictator; has the greater part of the army (five or six thousand) under his influence. Aguinaldo fears Luna and is but nominally in power. Present commission bears no more power than to request suspension of hostilities for short time to call congressional assembly for further action. This proposition from General Luna. Again, one of the commission reports that, previous to the capture of Calumpit, Aguinaldo had given Pio del Pilar orders to move from Antipolo to the assistance of Gregorio del Pilar at Baliuag. Pio did not comply with the order, deeming it inadvisable. Now, it is said, Pio is on the road with 1,000 men to invade towns in the province of Bulacan.

This afternoon sent French with Twenty-second and North Dakotas down river to Malabo. When reaching San Fernando, about 4 miles from here, met a force intrenched across the road estimated at 100. They were driven to the river. Our loss 4 wounded.

Have had very busy time last ten days. Insurgent government now at Tarlac.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 18, 1899.

Second Lieut. E. L. KING,

Eighth U. S. Cavalry, Aid-de-Camp.

Sir: The commanding general directs that you accompany to Manila, and report to the corps commander, the following commissioners: General Gregorio del Pilar, General Gracio Gonzaga, Alberto Bareto, and Lorenzo L. Ziaeta, of the insurgent forces, who were to-day admitted within our lines under a flag of truce.

You will start at 6 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, the 19th instant, or at such a time as the commissioners elect, for Malolos, from which point you will report by telegraph to the corps commander the probable time of your arrival in Manila, that transportation may meet your train.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 18, 1899.

MY DEAR MR. SCHURMAN: The bearer, Dr. Albert, I met upon entering this town. You will find him a gentleman of intelligence and education, and a strong exponent of the peace party.

He was a member of the May 4, Filipino assembly to select a commission to negotiate peace, and was selected to be a member of such commission. By some recent political change his name was left off the present commission. He is anxious to tell you the reason, as well as to acquaint you with the situation, and has made a personal request of me to gain him this favor.

250 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Two prominent confrères of Dr. Albert have been imprisoned by this recent reversal of political power. The doctor is still a member of the Filipino congress. I am sure you will be interested in what he has to say.

Trusting that I, too, may soon have the pleasure of seeing you again, believe me,
Very sincerely, yours,

H. W. LAWTON.

HON. JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN,
President American Commission, Manila, P. I.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 18, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Just heard from Kobbé. Not much opposition yesterday. He left San Luis for Candaba at 6 this morning. He has been ordered to hold Candaba until he can be informed of route taken by Luna's forces. MacArthur still thinks Luna retired on railroad. Major Bell out and ordered to advance until he can gain contact with enemy.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 18, 1899.*

GENERAL, *San Isidro:*

Kobbé reached bank of Rio Grande opposite Candaba at 9 a. m. to-day. An insurgent officer and 10 men left Candaba yesterday, going in direction of Arayat. No other insurgents had been at Candaba recently. Kobbé met with no opposition to-day. Roads good from Calumpit to Candaba. Kobbé's command will occupy Candaba this afternoon. Gunboat had no difficulty in reaching Candaba. Kobbé reports the river not navigable for gunboats beyond Candaba at this season of the year.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following information concerning the commissioners to arrange terms is communicated for the information of the commanding general: Translation telegram dated "Cabanatuan, 17th May, 1899, 5 o'clock 2 minutes.—The chief of the staff to Dr. Albert: Have received your telegram and transmitted it to the government in Tarlac. The commissioners have gone to their families. I believe they meet to-morrow to go to Manila to-morrow or the next day." A second one dated 9 o'clock 35 minutes, May 18, 1899: "The chief of staff to Dr. Albert, San Isidro, to be forwarded by Colonel Padella. Very urgent. The government has received your telegram of yesterday. They charge me to tell you to tell the general of the American forces will go this afternoon to San Isidro, hoping for the necessary orders to enable them to enter." I have arranged to send a couple of my staff outside the lines with Dr. Albert to meet these gentlemen and conduct them to my headquarters, after which they will be sent under a proper escort to Manila.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

SAN ISIDRO, *May 18, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following additional information is forwarded for the information of the commanding general.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: From information received from the commissioners here it seems that previous to the capture of Calumpit Aguinaldo had given Pio del Pilar orders to move from Antipolo to the assistance of Gregorio del Pilar at Baliuag. Pio del Pilar did not comply with the order, deeming it inadvisable. They say, however, that Pio del Pilar is now moving with 1,000 men to invade the towns in the province of Bulacaan.

Respectfully,

J. F. CASE,
Captain and Acting Engineer Officer.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, Manila, May 18, 1899.

General LAWTON:

General MacArthur reports from information almost positive he believes that 1,000 of Lunas have retreated to Florida Blanc and Porac, which are to his left; that Luna, with 3,000 armed men, are at Tarlac. He states that all his information is to the effect that Luna has not sent assistance to the east; is not likely to do so, as there is no cooperation between ——— and the force of San Isidro line. He states that Major Bell is on reconnoissance and now at or near Angeles; that he will not probably hear from him until late this p. m. MacArthur's information was obtained from inhabitants of the country and an Englishman, Mr. Sims, who left Tarlac last night and just entered his line. Should this information prove true all the force sent by you to San Miguel this a. m. should continue its journey to Baliuag. Troops at San Miguel can not be supplied during the season of heavy rains.

BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899—9.15 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Six companies Third Infantry, Gales squadron cavalry, and Hawthorne's battery made rapid march yesterday from San Miguel to Gapan to protect our right flank and intercept the enemy should he retreat in that direction. Their transportation and supplies still at San Miguel in charge of 4 companies Third Infantry. This force could drop back to San Miguel, occupy that place, and reenforce Lockwood at Baliuag. San Miguel and Baliuag are important to hold until it is known where the enemy recently confronting MacArthur has gone. Evidently he is trying to escape and therefore will divide into small parties. If he is coming this direction of east the disposition suggested will be good, as there are abundant supplies at San Miguel and Baliuag and they are scarce at other places. These troops can readily concentrate if necessary at Candaba, as there are roads to that place from both San Miguel and Baliuag. I will have enough left with me to take care of anything I can meet. Please answer quick.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Referring to your message this a. m., the following information considered reliable is forwarded: "The Adjutant-General, First Division.—Sir. The cartridge factory originally at Bulacaan was moved first to Baliuag, where it remained three days; thence to San Miguel, three days; thence it was taken to San Isidro, where it was in operation fifteen days. Indications of its being here exist at the present time. It was taken from here to Pambol, though their supply of saltpeter is exhausted and they have been unable to obtain more. From the location of the factory here the Filipinos have renamed the town Factoria.—J. F. Case, Captain and Acting Engineer Officer."

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN ISIDRO, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

My scouts went north this a. m.; came upon insurgent picket suddenly, who dropped his gun and fled; did not stop to fire; gun secured and brought in. Scouts followed about 2 miles; could not get sight of enemy.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The commissioners, consisting of Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, Gracio Gonzaga, Alberto Bareto, and Lorenza Ziaeta, have arrived here and will start forward at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Has the General any instructions?

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, May 18, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Please furnish Señor Gracio Gonzaga and the commissioners proper escort to Malolos, thence to Manila. Direct officer in charge to notify me of time of arrival of train in Manila, that transportation may be in readiness.

BARRY, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The Filipino party here consists of four commissioners and their assistants—seven in all. They have no transportation, and I shall be obliged to send them in an ambulance. From what I can understand their visit will come to very little, as their powers are limited. The following information, elicited from individuals of the party, is submitted: "Adjutant-General, First Division—Sir: I find that the former commission named by General Aguinaldo to treat for peace has been dissolved by General Luna. The latter arrested Buen Camino and Arguellas in Cabanatuan and has this afternoon sent them to Talavera. Luna evidently desires to be dictator, and has the greater part of the army (5,000 or 6,000 men) under his influence. Aguinaldo fears Luna, and is only nominally in power. The present commission bears no more power than a request for a suspension of hostilities for a short time to call an assembly of the congress for further action, and this proposition is from General Luna. The above information is derived from Dr. Albert and Señor Arsenio Cruz Herrera, members of the former commission, but out of power now, and they desire that their names in connection with this matter be kept secret.—J. F. Case."

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Report.]

HDQRS. FIRST NORTH DAKOTA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Malate, Manila, P. I., June 2, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command on the morning of May 17, 1899, resulting in the capture of the city of San Isidro:

Colonel Summers, commanding the forces, assigned me to the command of the right wing, composed of the First Battalion, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry—

Company H (Captain Eddy), Company B (Captain Gearey), Company G (Lieutenant Getchell), and Company A (Captain Moffet); Major White commanding the battalion and Major Willis's battalion of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

I moved my command in an oblique direction from the road in the order named, and deployed, with orders to Major White, whose battalion was on the right and the farthest advanced, to take general direction toward a grove of trees and bamboos and feel his way carefully, especially on his right flank.

The left of the Second Oregon battalion joined the right of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, which was similarly deployed on the left of the road, the plan of attack being to move on the enemy's position in the form of a V. The scouts under Lieutenant Thornton had been sent forward some time before and were exchanging shots with the enemy, who had taken up a strong position behind the loopholed walls of the cemetery on the outskirts of the town and in the edge of the timber in my front. The ground in front of the Second Oregon was an open rice field covered with a growth of high grass, except in front of the right company, which had to pass through timber, brush, and bamboo. Major White's battalion on the right had very difficult ground to pass over, being covered with dense bamboo thickets, thorny hedges, and close underbrush, with an occasional open space, the line all the while moving carefully forward.

The ground in front of Major White's battalion was reconnoitered by a scouting party of 16 men from Company H, under Captain Eddy. This party, with two scouts who joined them, were just emerging from a bamboo thicket on the edge of an open field when they discovered a large body of insurgents on the opposite side of the opening 500 or 600 yards in front of their outposts, extending some distance beyond our right flank. Captain Eddy disposed of his men in a favorable screened position to await the arrival of our line. Just at this time about 250 or 300 of the insurgents moved forward from the edge of the woods almost in a solid line, in excellent order, and, wheeling to the right, swung across the open field, with a poor attempt at an American cheer, their object being to cut off part of Thornton's scouts sent out ahead of the line. They were wholly unaware of the presence of Captain Eddy's men or that my line extended so far to the right, and were a most surprised lot of natives when Captain Eddy's men opened fire on them at a range of about 150 yards. Companies A and G and a part of Company B arrived on the line soon after the firing began, and a most effective fire was directed against the retreating enemy. The bugle calls could be distinctly heard and the natives rolled and tumbled over rice paddies and crawled on all fours in their efforts to gain the shelter of the woods.

The firing now became general in front of the North Dakotas and the right company of the Oregon battalion, particularly on front of Companies A and G of the North Dakotas. The line pushed steadily forward, keeping up a well-directed and effective fire, and the enemy made but a feeble resistance at a few points in small groups, and was soon in full retreat through the suburbs of San Isidro, part of their forces making their way to the river, others retreating on the road toward Gapan. Part of the latter force opened up a brisk fire on our right flank. Part of Major White's battalion was swung round to reply to it, and three or four volleys soon cleared that part of our flank and front. After re-forming the line I ordered an advance through the bamboos and timber, which in many places was almost impenetrable, and probably also accounting for the Oregon battalion losing touch with the North Dakotas. I learned later, however, that an order from Colonel Summers had ordered Major Willis to march his battalion into San Isidro. The order was also intended for my other battalion, but did not reach me. I pushed on to the road, sending scouts forward to the river, where many noncombatants with their families and goods had taken shelter. Small bodies of the enemy were seen in the distance retreating to the right in the direction of Castellan.

I remained there for nearly an hour awaiting orders; finally, at 11 o'clock a. m., moving toward the town, which I found occupied by our forces, my command being assigned to quarters.

There were no casualties in my command; a few men were overcome by heat, but later recovered.

The loss of the enemy must have been considerable; 5 or 6 dead and from 15 to 18 wounded were counted on the field as soon as our line passed over, and a number more had been carried away, as evidenced by bloody trails. Some of these were traced to native huts in the outskirts of the town, where several wounded Filipinos were found being cared for by natives. Later the ambulances brought in a number of wounded from the field.

The enemy had no trenches in our front, but the high rice paddies, covered with tall grass, and the drainage ditches afforded natural shelter and excellent means for

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screening himself from our fire. It was only when they could be seen jumping over the embankments or running across small openings that effective shooting was had.

Officers and men did splendidly; orders were obeyed promptly and intelligently, and the enemy was not given time to resist our advance when we had him on the run.

Very respectfully,

W. C. TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

[Order.]

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 4. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 18, 1899.

Second Lieut. James Edward Thornton, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, is detailed on special duty in command of the scouts detailed in Special Field Orders, No. 1, April 30, 1899. He will report to the commanding general for instructions and act under his immediate orders.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 18, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *San Isidro:*

MacArthur wired last night was quite positive that Luna's forces had retreated on railroad; but still not absolutely certain, would ascertain this morning. Let force at Gapan drop back to San Miguel, as suggested by you, with instructions to reenforce Lockwood at Baliuag. The movement from San Miguel to Baliuag can be arrested if desirable when more definite information concerning Luna's troops is received. In any case it is believed that Lockwood's position should be strengthened by at least a battalion of troops as soon as practicable. Kobbé not heard from yet, although it is known that he was at San Luis last night intending to take up march for Candaba at 6 o'clock this morning.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

Captain HANNAY, *Commanding.*

SIR: The commanding general directs that you return with your command to San Miguel. Upon arrival direct Captain Gale, with his squadron and 1 gun of Lieutenant Hawthorne's, to report to Captain Lockwood, commanding at Baliuag.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Baliuag:*

Captain Hannay, with 10 companies infantry and 1 gun, will remain at San Miguel, and Captain Gale, with his squadron and 1 gun, ordered to reenforce you.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May 18, 1899—7.50 a. m.

General LAWTON:

The small town of Gapan, short distance east of San Isidro, should be carefully inspected. Reported that insurgent gun factory moved there from Bacalor.

BARRY.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIGADE,
Cabiao, P. I., May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I left camp with Twenty-second U. S. Infantry and North Dakota Volunteers at 5.15 a. m., and took possession of Cabias at 7.30 a. m. The main road leading along the bank of the river was thoroughly exposed to the enemy's fire. I therefore marched command through the fields, well screened from the insurgents' view, for three-quarters of a mile, when I placed one column on the road, and continued the march of the others through the fields. In this I used a skirmish line covering the entire front.

Firing occurred on the right flank from across the river for some time after leaving camp and in front of this town and to the left of it. There were no casualties to-day. This town was built on the banks of a river which has since changed its bed, forming a new one half a mile away. The water supply is from wells.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. FRENCH,
Colonel Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

CANADABA, July 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

I desire to mention Capt. Henry C. Hodges, jr., Twenty-second Infantry, for good conduct while in command advance guard 2 companies in affair at San Fernando, May 19.

FRENCH, Colonel.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The Filipino commission have started, leaving at 8 a. m. They will be relayed at San Miguel and at Baliuag, and should reach Malolos to-night. Their coming will delay us one day.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, San Miguel:

Do everything possible to secure surrender of Filipinos, securing their arms. Assure them or the commanding officer that reward for arms will be promptly paid. Be careful not to be drawn into a trap. See that nothing of this comes to the knowledge of the commission or any of their party, or they may take some action to block it. Spread the news that a commission of Filipino officers is now on its way to Manila to arrange terms of peace as widely as possible. Keep me advised.

LAWTON, Major-General, Commanding.

256 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899—10 a.m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The following just received:

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Insurgent armed with Mauser surrendered last night. Reports 600 Filipinos, Sibul, anxious to surrender. Says 50 or 60 were there when Gale went up, but they left in time.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

With copy of reply.

SAN ISIDRO, *May 19, 1899.*

HANNAY, *Commanding, San Miguel:*

Try and raise among you \$30 (Mexican) and pay insurgent reward for gun. Quartermaster will repay you at once.

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding.*

Ten pieces have already been turned in to me by Filipinos and several paid. Some arrangement should be made to supply money promptly, as cash pay will have greater effect.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

The man who surrendered is a Spanish prisoner. Seems truthful and intelligent. Says 1,200 insurgents at Sibul and 500 at Split Rock. Gregorio del Pilar and Julian Pilar, with Pablo Tecson in command, armed with Mausers, Remington, and Ambert rifles; food, rice and carabao; 50 rounds per man and 13,000 in reserve. The force in Sibul, originally about 50 or 60, were reenforced yesterday from the province of San Isidro, between 10 and 12 a. m. Insurgents might surrender, but officers won't let them.

HANNAY.

Repeated to palace.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *Manila, May 19, 1899—10.31 a. m.*

General LAWTON:

The following has just been received and will be published to your command.
By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY.

HOT SPRINGS, V.A., *May 19, 1899.*

OTIS, *Manila:*

Convey to General Lawton and the gallant men of his command my congratulations upon their successful operations during the past month, resulting in the capture this morning of San Isidro.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899—

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Message conveying thanks of the President to this command received and fully gratefully appreciated by all. It will be published to the command at retreat.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *Manila, May 19, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Report disposition of your forces this morning and direction of movements. Kobbé instructed last night to hold Candaba and Santa Ana. One gunboat directed to work up river and test possibility of navigating the same above Candaba; the other to descend river and clear away insurgents at San Luis, who appeared after Kobbé's column passed. Did insurgent commissioners leave San Isidro this morning; and if so, by what route and when will they arrive at Malolos? French's dispatch received; also one concerning Pio del Pilar.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Disposition of forces this a. m.: Four companies Twenty-second Infantry, Baliuag; 3 troops cavalry, dismounted, and 1 gun Hawthorne's Battery en route to Baliuag; 10 companies Third Infantry and 1 gun Hawthorne's Battery at San Miguel; 8 companies Twenty-second Infantry, 8 companies North Dakotas, and 2 guns Scott's Battery, Cabiao, Colonel French commanding; 7 companies Second Oregon, 8 companies Thirteenth Minnesota, 2 guns Scott's Battery, and mounted troop cavalry at San Isidro.

Commissioners have gone via San Miguel, Baliuag, and Malolos. But for the arrival and sending off of the commissioners I should have started this morning with the command at this place down the river to Arayat, picking up French en route. Will start to-morrow morning, reaching Arayat 21st. Kobbé should move up west side of river and meet me at Arayat. After leaving here, telegraph line will be taken up back to San Miguel and I will have no communication until I reach Kobbé. The river is very deep where we have examined it, and I believe gunboat can get up. I have found no ford, and rafting across will be tedious, dangerous.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

This command will start at 5 o'clock to-morrow a. m. toward Arayat, abandoning this town. At the same time the signal detachment will commence taking up the wires toward San Miguel. As I will after that be without communication with you until I reach the line coming up the river, I will order commanding officers San Miguel and Baliuag to report directly to you. Please communicate any further instructions to-night.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, *San Isidro:*

Major Lockwood on sick report; left for Manila this a. m. All quiet.

KREPS, *Captain, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps:

Have had fever for three days; threatened with pneumonia. Doctor insists on my going to Manila for treatment. Everything quiet here.

LOCKWOOD, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER, *San Miguel*:

Filipino commission must have transportation from San Miguel to Baliuag. Taken by them from here must be returned to-night. If other conveyances can be found the ambulances must be used.

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Baliuag*:

Has the ambulance that brought the commission to Baliuag returned to San Miguel? Answer immediately if so, and state time.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 19, 1898*

Major EDWARDS:

Ambulance left here about 5 p. m. for San Miguel.

GALE, *Captain*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Isidro, May 19, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER, *San Miguel*:

Please be sure mail sent from here yesterday with Captain Gale goes on with Lieutenant King, now en route with commissioners. Where is Lieutenant Hawthorne?

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1898

COMMANDING OFFICER, *San Miguel*:

Captain Gale can pull out to-night and go to Yldefonso. Did you receive message concerning vehicles for commission? Gale can escort them as far as he goes.

LAWTON, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1898*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Message concerning vehicles for peace commissioners received. Only two vehicles secured as yet.

HANNA

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1898*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Will attend to mail. Lieutenant Hawthorne is here. Have raised \$30 and paid. Will try to disseminate news to insurgents, and will heed caution.

HANNAY, *Commanding*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Just arrived. Slow progress due to ponies being hot. Have pony carriages here, but will have to take ambulance to Baliuag. Expect to go faster from now on. Everything all right.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Gale's squadron has left; also commission.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Just arrived. After lunch will proceed. Transportation ready for me here. Have wired adjutant-general at headquarters that I shall arrive at Malolos by 6.30 p. m. Everything all right. Captain Gale with me from San Miguel.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Commission arrived safely and left for Malolos. Squadron camps to-night at river crossing. Have you any special instructions?

GALE, *Captain.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *San Miguel:*

Commanding general directs that you direct ambulance that belongs here, as soon as it returns from Baliuag, to return at once. It must get here before daylight to-morrow morning, as troops move from here at 5 a. m. Send escort of 5 men. This escort can return with signal detachment, which goes to Miguel to-morrow. Acknowledge receipt and report when it starts.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 19, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Message as to return of ambulance received. Will report start from here.

HANNAY, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

Lieutenant KING,
Aid, Malolos:

Commanding general directs that you immediately explain why you violated his explicit orders to send the San Isidro ambulance back. The failure has embarrassed this command.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

QCINGUA, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION :

My orders were that in case that there was no sufficient transportation at San Miguel for party to take a fresh team in ambulance. The ambulances of San Miguel were all going in with sick; carmetta transportation was not sufficient for party. I therefore took a fresh team at San Miguel, and upon arrival at Baliuag ordered it to return to San Miguel and thence immediately to San Isidro.. This was exactly as I understood my orders, and I had no intention of violating same, but of carrying out my orders and make the trip to Malolos as fast as possible.

KING, Aid.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION :

Arrived 6.45 p. m.

KING, Aid.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION :

Commission stops here to-night. Go by special train to Manila in the morning; probably start about 6 o'clock.

KING, Aid.

[Letter.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Troop I, Fourth Cavalry.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you report your troop for escort at 5 a. m. to-morrow at these headquarters. Your transportation will go with headquarters at head of train.

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Adjutant-General.

[Order.]

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 5.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
In the Field, San Isidro, May 19, 1899.

The following-named enlisted men are detailed on special duty at these headquarters: Private F. S. Harryman, Company L, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Private W. A. Crumley, Company A, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, and Private Ralph McCulley, Company B, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. They will accordingly be sent to report to the adjutant-general of the division.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official:

R. SEWELL,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General, Aid-de-Camp.

[Order.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.

MEMORANDUM.

Private W. L. Boise, Company —, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, who was left behind by his command, sick, at Maasin, is attached to Company A, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, for rations. He will be sent to join his command at the first opportunity.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Order.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 19, 1899.

CIRCULAR.

Unless orders to the contrary are received, this command will march at 5 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, the 20th instant.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

CLARENCE R. EDWARDS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 19, 1899:*

LAWTON, *San Isidro:*

After reaching Arayat proceed to Candaba by way of Santa Ana, where you can receive rations. The force at San Miguel will proceed to Baliuag to receive rations there after insurgent commissioners return from Manila.

SLADEN, *Aid.*

[Report.]

HDQRS. SECOND OREGON INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Cabaio, Luzon, May 20, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Provisional Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., pursuant to General Orders, No. 9, field series, and instructions from brigade commander, left San Isidro at 5 a. m., May 19, and proceeded down the Rio Grande de Pam-panga in southwest direction to a ford opposite the town of San Antonio.

The blanket rolls were left with the mule teams.

At 6.45 the advance guard crossed the river, and at 7.45 the regiment had finished crossing. Major Willis's battalion was thrown forward in skirmish order 500 or 600 yards from the river, and halted to await the arrival of the scouts, who had gone down on the west side of the river. At 8.05 firing was heard ahead; our scouts were engaging the enemy. Major Willis's battalion was ordered forward and instructed to engage the enemy as soon as the scouts were located. At 8.30, Lieutenant Thornton having sent a messenger to explain the position of the scouts and of the enemy, the First Battalion was again ordered forward, and soon engaged the enemy, driving them from the town, which we entered at 9 o'clock.

We then proceeded down the river in skirmish order, keeping our left upon the river bank in touch with the Thirteenth Minnesota, U. S. V., on the opposite bank. About 1 mile below San Antonio passed through small native village. Halted at 11.15 for lunch. Continued advance at 11.50, Second Battalion, Major Eastwick, in advance. About 1 o'clock we came in sight of Calliao, on the opposite side of the river. The road upon which we had been traveling turns, leaving the river, and the dense jungle compelled us to take gravel beds along the river. Captain Case, who was our guide, crossed the river and soon sent back word for the regiment to follow. Forging the river at 3.30 p. m. we continued the march, entered Callaio, and went into camp at 4.15 p. m.

Respectfully,

GEO. O. YORAN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 20, 1899.

FIRST DIVISION:

Escort to meet signal corps on San Isidro has left here.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, May 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

No ambulance from Baliuag yet. Had escort and relay team waiting all night.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Arrived 8 a. m.

KING, Aid.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 20, 1899.

General LAWTON,

Care Major Kobbé, Candaba, or elsewhere:

Grant telegraphs from Candaba as follows: "Have just returned with launch and small tugboat. Inspected river half way to Arayat. Cascoes can be taken up this far. Gunboats can not pass Candaba. At least 200 cascoes, launches, and bancas have passed down river last three days with families." Major Kobbé telegraphs "Two battalions Seventeenth Infantry will occupy Santa Ana this evening. Entire command rationed to include the 23d. The remaining five days' rations stored at Calumpit, for which I will send cascoes in time. Think report of insurgents exaggerated." Kobbé has been informed of your desire to meet him at Arayat on the 21st instant. He is marching on the west bank of the river.

BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

ARAYAT, May 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

The advance of this command entered this city at 7.12 this morning in command of Captain Ballance, Twenty-second Infantry, without resistance. The advance of Kobbé's command arrived about an hour later. The rivers could not be forded, and a ferry has been constructed by Captain Case, acting engineer officer, and the transportation is rapidly being crossed. Colonel French's brigade will be crossed to-day and Colonel Summers's to-morrow morning. The launch and cascoes are aground 2 miles below. Unless otherwise ordered I will direct Kobbé to return to-morrow morning and will myself march with French to Santa Ana, as previously instructed, Summers following in the afternoon. The courier carrying this message will await reply at the end of the wire.

LAWTON,
Major-General of Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, May 21, 1899.—12 m.

General LAWTON, Arayat:

No instructions except to continue on to points heretofore designated. Everything progressing favorably at San Miguel, Baliuag, and other towns to which natives are rapidly returning. A severe storm predicted. Commissioners still here. Your family and those of other officers with you well. Have received your two dispatches from Arayat, also one from Kobbé.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

SAN MIGUEL, *May 21, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

The ambulance will join you via Candaba.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

May 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

As we were about marching from San Isidro yesterday a. m., a few shots from the enemy were fired from the opposite side of the river. The following report which is repeated gives the result:

IN THE FIELD, *May 21, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with verbal orders from the general commanding I left San Isidro at 5.15 a. m. of yesterday with the column of battalions of the Second Oregon under Lieutenant-Colonel Yoran and the scouts under Lieutenant Thornton, Second Oregon. The scouts crossed the river at San Isidro and worked southwest toward San Antonio. The column crossed the river opposite San Isidro and proceeded up the road to the town. The enemy opened fire 8.05 from a position in the outside of the town, and the First Battalion under Major Willis was deployed and advanced, actively engaging the insurgents. The scouts had reached a point on the enemy's left and rear, and as soon as the enemy opened they poured in a destructive fire which threw the insurgents back in great disorder. I find that Colonel Tecson with 6 companies (about 550 men) comprised his force and, as they left 5 dead on the field, I estimate their total loss at 25. We had no casualties. Leaving San Isidro the column moved down the river without other event to a point opposite Cabiao where we recrossed and rejoined the command at 3.45 p. m.

Respectfully,

J. F. CASE,
Captain, Acting Engineer Officer.

This detachment was from Colonel Summers's command. Attention is invited to a number of important engagements that Colonel Summers has had with the enemy indicated by the dead and wounded found on the field and small loss on our side. Captain Case, who practically directed the affair here reported, is entitled to great credit and consideration.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *Manila, May 21, 1899.*

COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

All enlisted men of First California Regiment under your control in any way will be relieved from any duty and directed to report individually to Major Buxton, of that regiment, preparatory to embarking for Negros.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 21, 1899.*

COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

All enlisted men of Eighteenth Infantry, First Tennessee, Twenty-third Infantry, and Battery G, Sixth Artillery, under your control in any way, will be immediately sent to report to the commanding officer, Arsenal, Manila, preparatory to embarking for Iloilo.

By command General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, 22, 1899.

General LAWTON, *Candaba*:

Instructions will be sent you at Candaba this evening. Now awaiting information from General MacArthur. The Oregon troops can be returned to Manila at once, as they are first on list to proceed to United States. Troops at San Miguel ordered to proceed to Baliuag to-morrow. Quiet in that section of country, but inhabitants fearful of return of insurgents.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, May 22, 1899.

General LAWTON:

As soon as troops can be designated for the line extending from San Fernando to Baliuag instructions will be given. You will return to Manila with certain organizations to be mentioned as soon as determined upon. The Oregon and Minnesota troops and Andrews's battery can proceed to south side of river at Calumpit as soon as you think best to send them on.

OTIS.

OPPOSITE CANDABA, P. I., ON RIO GRANDE LA PAMPANGA, May 22, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, in the Field.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, on the 18th instant, pursuant to memorandum instructions of the division commander, I joined Colonel French, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, commanding provisional brigade, and remained with that command until it arrived at Arayat, during its advance from San Isidro, P. I., where I again joined headquarters staff this morning.

In advancing from San Isidro, Captain Hodges, Twenty-second Infantry, commanded the advance guard on the 18th instant, sending 1 platoon to the river between Entablado and San Antonio, the main column pursuing the road Entablado-Cabais, by way of San Fernando.

Captain Hodges performed his duty with intelligence and professional skill. His men were properly distributed and did their work as advance guard properly. I particularly noticed the absence of indiscriminate shooting—sometimes occurring at any animate object—by flankers. It was noticed that the houses were generally deserted. Several intrenchments, built with the usual Filipino care, were passed, but all to meet an enemy approaching from the opposite direction.

At length, as San Fernando was approached, a single shot from one of the right flankers indicated that the enemy was discovered. This was soon followed by a volley from the enemy down the road, and from intrenchments on both sides of the road, the Filipinos having very hastily remodeled a line of earthworks originally constructed to face in the opposite direction.

The main body of the advance guard was just turning a bend in the road where stood the commander, Colonel French, when this volley was fired. Looking backward from the advance party I saw that this volley had done no injury. Colonel French at once called out to the men to seek cover, and proceeded to dispose his troops in line of battle to the right and left of the road. To the right this was difficult to do, the bushes being exceedingly dense. The commander of that flank reported that it would take him a half hour to properly form his men in this tangle, when the colonel ordered him to advance without this, but permitting his men gradually to get their assigned places. On the left the ground was clearer, and here the troops were comparatively quickly formed, advancing promptly against the enemy's intrenched line. I could not but admire the coolness and military bearing of Captain Hodges, as, with great precision, he formed his men for attack as if upon parade, although from 600 yards distance the enemy was delivering a heavy, and as it proved, dangerous fire.

Soon 1 gun of Lieutenant Scott's 4-gun battery was brought up, the protected position of the enemy in a house was fired on for a few rounds, and then the whole line advanced only to find the enemy had fallen back on the south (our) side of the river, to reappear (but it's doubtful if they were the same men at all) very well

renched and concealed in cornfields on the opposite side (north). Here a duel, more or less desultory, was maintained between the opposing forces until darkness put a stop to it. In this, 2 of Scott's guns took part. The result of the artillery only demonstrated the untrustworthiness of our shrapnel. The range of the enemy's works was accurately found with shells; then shrapnel being resorted to in an attempt to enfilade them, as there was fair prospect of doing, every shrapnel shot in the gun. It is deplorable that the army should be compelled to haul ammunition around the country, the use of which can only excite the derision of the enemy. The bad character of our shrapnel has long been known from our peace practice. It was hoped, and, as now appears, vainly hoped, that war would find the defect corrected.

Four were wounded on our side, 3 dangerously, 2 of whom have since died. The enemy's loss is not known; 2 dead were left in the trench near the road, and there is every reason to believe, from information subsequently obtained, that their loss was considerable in both killed and wounded.

The brigade bivouacked that night on the field. The next day, 19th, the command moved into Cabiao, moving far enough from our bank of the river to be out of sight of the enemy, who were still in their position of the evening before on the opposite bank. As the troops moved out a singular and unexpected spectacle was presented. The enemy knew that we were moving, and, regardless, apparently, of personal danger, emerged from their cover, climbed over their parapets, although not more than 500 yards distant, and immovably watched, with great apparent interest, the troops starting out. Neither side fired a shot. The march to Cabiao was made in the presence of a respectable force of the enemy. Major Fraine, North Dakota, commanded the advance, dividing and directing the forces with skill. There was no position worth mentioning, although the enemy occasionally delivered shots from covered places along the road.

On the 20th and 21st the brigade moved to Arayat, bivouacking enroute. The advance guard under Captain Ballance, Twenty-second Infantry, was conducted with skill. The crossing of the Rio Grande la Pampang being effected, as it was, in the presence of the division commander, I do not feel called upon to remark concerning.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. BIRKHIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Acting Judge-Advocate.

[First indorsement.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Opposite Candaba, May 22, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific, inviting particular attention to the remarks of Captain Birkhimer concerning shrapnel.

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Telegram.]

OPPOSITE CANDABA, *May 22, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Capt. J. F. Case, Company F, Second Oregon, desires to be excepted from telegraphic order relieving that regiment. I not only approve this request, but urge that Captain Case be retained in the service as engineer officer on my staff. He has not only shown special fitness for such detail, but most marked ability and courage as a soldier.

LAWTON.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 23, 1899.*

General LAWTON, care Captain Grant:

Captain Case should enter some volunteer organization to be raised here in Manila under instructions which are now being prepared at these headquarters. In that way his services could be retained without difficulty.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 23, 1899.

General LAWTON, care Captain Grant:

A redistribution of troops into divisions and brigades contemplated. General MacArthur to command troops north of Caloocan, you the troops in and about city, with exception of provost guard and others especially attached to these headquarters. MacArthur will have 2 troops mounted cavalry, the Third and Utah Artillery, the Third, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second Infantry, the Fifty-first Iowa, and Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers. The troops to guard railway line between Calumpit and Caloocan, the Third Artillery and Thirteenth Minnesota; Minnesotas to guard line from Bocaue to Caloocan, where 1 battalion Minnesota now stationed. The Third Artillery to remain practically in present positions. MacArthur's headquarters at San Fernando, with detachment in vicinity and other detachments at Candaba, San Luis, Baliuag, and Quingua. General MacArthur desires you to direct disposing of troops to positions in your vicinity. You should leave a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry at Candaba and San Luis, and 1 of the Utah guns at Candaba, sending remaining battalion Twenty-second Infantry to San Fernando. Send entire Seventeenth Infantry to San Fernando. Five companies Third Infantry will remain at Baliuag, and for the present the 2 guns of Hawthorne's battery. One company of the Third Infantry will be placed at Quingua and the remaining 4 companies Third Infantry and the 4 companies Twenty-second Infantry, now at Baliuag, will proceed to San Fernando. The 2 battalions of the Minnesota regiment will relieve the Oregon and Nebraska battalions now on line of railway from Bocaue to Caloocan. Send in all your other troops, though scouts with the San Miguel and Baliuag forces should be left at Baliuag until the mounted troop of the Fourth Cavalry, now at San Fernando, can arrive there. Will furnish copy of this dispatch to General MacArthur. Train now running through to San Fernando. It might be well for you to go in person to Malolos, after supervising the placing of the Candaba and San Luis detachments of the Twenty-second Infantry, where you will be in wire communication with all points of the line.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

CANDABA, May 23, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps:

In view of the remarkably successful engagement of Maasin, Bulac, bridge near San Roque, and San Isidro, participated in by the troops under Colonel Summers's immediate command, I recommend Colonel Summers for promotion to the grade of brigadier-general of volunteers. At least, I believe him entitled to the corresponding brevet. I make this recommendation in advance, instead of in my final report, on account of his relief from this command and the probability of immediate return to the United States. My report will contain recommendations of other officers.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Candaba, May 23, 1899.

General MACARTHUR, San Fernando:

I have just received a long message regarding disposition of troops, and a suggestion that you desire me to order the disposition of some of these assigned to you. Please inform me exactly what you wish me to do.

LAWTON,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

CANDABA, May 23, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Long message regarding disposition of troops received.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Candaba, May 23, 1899.

ING OFFICER UNITED STATES FORCES,
Baliuag and San Miguel:

Commanding general directs that you send immediately all men of your command belonging to the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry and the Second Infantry to Manila, there to join their respective commands.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 23, 1899.*

GENERAL, LAWTON'S COMMAND:

Mr. Otis says have Major Kobbé issue from the cascos 4,000 rations to the command, to be left at Candaba and San Luis, and no other supplies will be needed at Calumpit. I will return to-morrow p. m. unless you direct otherwise.

BOOTES.

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 23, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Troops sent you to San Miguel took march for Baliuag this morning. Near Baliuag attacked by insurgents, whom they drove a mile beyond the city. Known loss, 8 killed, 6 wounded; 9 guns, and 1 horse. Our casualties, 2 men killed. Troops now resting at Ildefonso. Expect to continue march soon.

BARRY.

[Telegram.]

ILDEFONSO, *May 23, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Attacked near Ildefonso by insurgents. Drove them with 6 companies for a mile. Recaptured Ildefonso, and am resting, preparatory to moving for Wagon train guarded by a battalion was attacked, front action, but repulsed. Two casualties, men wounded, on our side. Enemy's loss, so far as known, 3 wounded; 9 guns, and 1 horse.

HANNAY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, Candaba, May 23, 1899.

San Ildefonso:

Have been down all day; your message just received. Heard your firing. Troops and battalion, under Ballance, in your direction. Could not cross swamp. Congratulate you and your command on your brilliant success. Let us have more news.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 23, 1899.*

GENERAL, *Candaba:*

Just received news of Hannay's fight at Ildefonso. Shall I move out a force to meet insurgents?

GALE, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Candaba, May 23, 1899—6.30 p. m.

Captain GALE, *Baliuag*:

Wires have been down all day; your message just received. Exercise your own judgment as to disposition of your command.

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 23, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Got here at 8.05 p. m. Our losses, 1 killed, 14 wounded, including Lieutenant McArthur, in foot. Fought at Ildefonso, Maasin, and about 1½ miles this side Maasin, and some 2 miles this side of that. We did nothing but march and fight all day. Insurgent losses must have been quite heavy, judging from the dead found. So far I know of, 24 rifles captured. We have 2 captains prisoners. Complete details can hardly be had before to-morrow morning, as we are all played out. A battalion of Twenty-second Infantry reached us after the last little fight. Thanks for congratulations. I feel that the old Third has done well.

HANNAY, *Commanding*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, May 23, 1899

Major-General MACARTHUR, *San Fernando*:

Ten companies Third Infantry at San Miguel were ordered to Baliuag. The following, just received from Captain Hannay, will explain itself: "Adjutant-General First Division: Got here at 8.05. Our losses, 1 killed, 14 wounded, including Lieutenant McArthur, in foot. Fought at Ildefonso, Maasin, and about 1½ miles this side of Maasin, and some 2 miles this side of that. We did nothing but march and fight all day. Insurgent losses must have been quite heavy, judging from the dead found. So far I know of, 24 rifles captured. We have 2 captains prisoners. Complete details can hardly be had before to-morrow morning, as we are all played out. A battalion of Twenty-second Infantry reached us just after the last little fight. Thanks for congratulations. I feel that the old Third has done well.—Hannay, commanding"

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding*

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, *May 23, 1899*

Major-General LAWTON:

This morning I received instructions in regard to rearrangement of troops, in order to announce assignment thereof as quickly as possible, as all the organizations referred to were in your field command; and as I have no definite information as to their whereabouts, I suggested to department headquarters that you make the necessary orders for distributing the same as desired by the department commander. I understand, 5 companies Third Infantry are to be located at Baliuag, at which place 2 of Hawthorne's guns remain for the present, and to which place I am to send 1 troop Fourth Cavalry from this point; 1 company Third Infantry to be located at Quingua; 3 companies of Twenty-second Infantry to be located at Candaba, with 1 Utah gun; 1 company Twenty-second Infantry to be located at San Luis. The other companies Third, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second, under your command, come to San Fernando. The 2 battalions Minnesotas with you in the field relieve company 1 battalion of Oregon and 1 battalion of Nebraska on the railroad from Bocaue to Calocan. Precisely how the companies of the Oregon and Nebraska battalions are arranged at present I do not know, but you can ascertain by wire, or I will ascertain for you if you wish. Come over here for a while before you go to the city; two trains per day on railroad. How are you and what the news?

MACARTHUR, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

CANDABA, *May 23, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Wires have been down all day. Your message just received. Firing from Hannay's command heard. Sent scouts and battalion Twenty-second Infantry, under Captain Ballance, in direction of firing. They could not cross swamp. Hannay, it seems, has done beautifully. Oregons, Minnesotas, and Andrews's battery started for Calumpit.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, *May 23, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

In view of determined attacks of insurgents upon the troops returning to Baliuag from San Miguel to-day, it is considered prudent to leave at Baliuag for the present the 10 companies Third Infantry, the 2 Hawthorne guns, and the mounted scouts, withdrawing the 4 companies of the Twenty-second Infantry and the 3 troops of cavalry. Two companies of the Twenty-second might be left at Quingua for a few days. There are rations for all these troops at Malolos, and the wagon train is there. The train of the San Miguel troops should go to Quingua to receive their rations to be sent up to Quingua. The river is not fordable, and some way of crossing must be devised.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Candaba, May 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

I will leave here at 9 o'clock a. m. to-day on tugboat *Oceania* for Malolos, via Calumpit. Will catch up train and run up to San Fernando to see MacArthur, returning on same train. My horses, baggage, etc., will come around by road, under escort of troops. Troops will move to their stations as indicated in your message to-day. Message concerning Third and Twenty-second Infantry at Baliuag and Quingua received.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 24, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Just arrived here at 11.55 a. m. Find train does not go up to San Fernando. Will go directly to Malolos. Orders making disposition of troops all given and all except those at Baliuag under way.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

General MACARTHUR, *San Fernando:*

I intended to go up to see you this morning, but find train comes down before up train reaches you; will therefore go directly to Malolos. Orders have been given for distribution of troops as you directed, and all are moving, with exception of those at Baliuag. A modification of the order in their case has been temporarily made, of which you are doubtless notified.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

270 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 24, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Have just arrived at Malolos. Everything seems to be going all right.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 24, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Barry directs that no supplies be taken out, as we come in in two or three days. I return to Calumpit on morning train to take boat to you. Have you any further orders?

PENROSE

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 24, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, LAWTON'S COMMAND:

P. m. train taken off. Will return in the morning. Have you any commands?

BOOTH

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

Captain HANNAY, *Commanding, Baliuag:*

Commanding general directs that Hawthorne's 2 guns remain at Baliuag until further orders. Find here that these directions were omitted from message this morning by operator at Candaba.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

Major DEVOL,

Transportation Quartermaster:

Two battalions Thirteenth Minnesota now at Calumpit. They are ordered to relieve Oregons and Nebraskas between Bocaue and Caloocan. Can't you furnish train to distribute Minnesotas between these points? Otherwise it will take three days.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 24, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Will send special train for 7 companies Oregon and battery this p. m. Also train to distribute Minnesotas and bring in remainder of Oregons to-morrow.

DEVOL

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 24, 1899.*

Colonel SUMMERS, *Calumpit.*

Major Devol telegraphs that he will send special train for 7 companies of your regiment and Andrews's battery. The division commander directs, therefore, that you take first train with these troops to Malolos. If you or Andrews need rations, draw them at Calumpit.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General:*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 24, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Colonel Summers reports that Oregon and Minnesota regiments are rationed to include to-morrow; that Andrews's Battery has no rations. Andrews's battery and Summers, with his 2 battalions of Oregons, can be sent to the city by first train down. Minnesota should be distributed as follows: Two companies at Bigaa, 2 at Bocaue, 2 at Marilao, 2 at Meycanayan, 2 at Palo, and 2 at Tinajeros Bridge, relieving the battalion of Oregon now on that line, which will be sent to the city. This places the whole Minnesota regiment on railway line. The movement can be made at any time when cars are available. All transportation with Kobbé's column can be retained for the present at Malolos. Look after rations sent out to Malolos for the Baliuag and San Miguel detachments. What other rations will you wish to carry you and where delivered? All troops going to San Fernando will be retained there.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

All my command proper were rationed to include 25th. The following was received this morning: "General Otis says have Major Kobbé issue from the cascoes 5,000 rations to the command to be left at Candaba and San Luis, and no other supplies will be needed before reaching Calumpit. (Signed) Bootes." Colonel Summers with the Oregons, Minnesotas, and Andrews's battery are now at Calumpit and can draw rations there if they need them. Colonel Summers and Andrews's battery will be ordered to proceed to city by first train as directed. Your message of last evening says: "The 2 battalions of the Minnesota regiment will relieve the Oregon and Nebraska battalions now on line of railway from Bocaue to Caloocan," and MacArthur wired me, "The 2 battalions, Minnesotas, with you (me) in the field to relieve company for company, 1 battalion of Oregons and 1 battalion of Nebraskas, on the railway from Bocaue to Caloocan." Orders to that effect have been issued the Minnesotas. Those orders will be revoked and they will be ordered as indicated in yours just received. Orders are given troops at Baliuag to arrange for rations at Malolos and to send transportation to Quingua to meet trains from Malolos with rations. I find, however, no transportation at Malolos. The following instructions were sent the commanding officer, Baliuag, this morning: "Under instructions from the general commanding the department, you will remain temporarily with your regiment, 10 companies, and Hawthorne's battery, 2 guns, at Baliuag, and send 2 companies Twenty-second temporarily to Quingua, other 2 to San Fernando to report to General MacArthur. Send Captain Gale's squadron to Manila." I will look after rations sent here for San Miguel and Baliuag detachments. If rations are required for other troops, will wire you.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 24, 1899.

General LAWTON:

The entire Minnesota regiment guards railroad from and including Bocaue to Caloocan. There are now on that line 1 battalion of the Minnesotas, 1 battalion of the Oregons, and 2 companies Nebraskas at Polo. Either of orders you issued, or those sent you last to leave 2 companies at Bocaue, Malolos, etc., will answer all purposes. The intention is to bring into city all Oregons and the 2 companies Nebraskas, and to leave on the railroad line the entire Minnesota. If adjustments not correct they can be made hereafter. Your instructions given to commanding officer at Baliuag to keep 10 companies and guns there is correct. Report here that the Baliuag transportation is at Malolos.

By command of Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

272 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, May 24, 1899.

Captain MASTERMAN,
Commanding Thirteenth Minnesotas.

Following telegram just received from corps headquarters: "Minnesotas should be distributed as follows: Two companies at Bigaa, 2 at Bocaue, 2 at Marilao, 2 at Meycanayan, 2 at Polo, and 2 at Tinajeros Bridge for the present, relieving the battalion of Oregons now on that line, which will be sent to the city." Orders given you this morning conflicting are revoked. You are charged with carrying the above directions into effect. Major Devol wires me he will send train to-morrow to distribute Minnesotas.

By command of Major-General Lawton:

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 24, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

All organizations marching and which have marched from Candaba should remain at Calumpit until they receive their property which appears to be up Rio Grande River. What disposition have you made for Baliuag?

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 24, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Am ordered to conduct commissioners to General MacArthur's headquarters to-morrow a. m. Will report to you. Leave here on 9 a. m. train.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 24, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Following from Candaba: "Colonel Barry, adjutant-general: Myself and 6 of the Seventeenth Infantry with 2 cascoes left at this point to await further orders from department headquarters. Have just issued 4,000 rations to battalion Twenty-second Infantry remaining at this place. Have remaining on casco about 2,000 rations without onions or bacon. Other casco still loaded with company property and extra ammunition belonging to battalion Seventeenth, Third Battalion, Ninth Infantry, Light Battery E, First Artillery, and hospital corps connected with these organizations. Blanket rolls and surplus baggage of these organizations were stored by me at Calumpit, where they still remain. All of the above organizations have left for new stations. Request instructions as to remaining commissary stores and disposition of company property. (Signed) Lieutenant Kreps, commissary." General Lawton will give the necessary instructions to Lieutenant Kreps to pull him out of the troubles under which he seems to be laboring. Instructions given from here may conflict with those already given by General Lawton. Answer.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, May 24, 1899.

Captain GRANT,
Commanding Gunboats, Candaba.

Commanding general directs, under instructions corps commander, you will have cascoes in charge of Lieutenant Kreps towed to Calumpit as soon as possible.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

Lieutenant KREPS,
Commissary, Candaba:

Cascoes have been ordered towed to Calumpit, where Ninth Infantry battalion will receive their baggage, etc. The balance of property, etc., will be disposed under instructions General MacArthur.

By command Major-General Lawton:

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 24, 1899.*

Captain MASTERMAN,
Thirteenth Minnesota, Calumpit:

If you need rations draw same Calumpit.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 24, 1899.*

Colonel TREUMANN,
First North Dakota:

Commanding general directs that you stop the Ninth Infantry at Calumpit until they receive their baggage from cascoes up the river.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

Captain HANNAY, *Commanding, Baliuag:*

General desires to know to what day you are rationed. When and how did you last draw? Congratulate you on your beautiful work.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, May 24, 1899.

Colonel SUMMERS, *Calumpit:*

General directs that you order transportation delivered to Walcutt, chief quartermaster, who should be in Calumpit to-night.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

General MACARTHUR, *San Fernando:*

Considerable amount of baggage of Seventeenth Infantry, rations, and other property on cascoes, in charge of Lieutenant Kreps, now at Candaba, have been ordered towed to Calumpit, to be disposed of under your instructions.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 24, 1899.*
(Received at Malolos, 7.53 p. m.)

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Six companies rationed to include the 26th instant, four to include the 25th inst. Six companies received one day's rations at Gapan, sent to them from San Isidro. The rations to include the 25th were sent back for to Quingua, and were received at Maasin. The 2 companies of the Third that joined at San Miguel brought rations with them.

COOKE, *Captain, Third Infantry*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 24, 1899*

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Captain Hannay is temporarily indisposed, and will render report of engagement of yesterday en route from San Miguel to this place.

COOKE, *Captain*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899

Captain Gale, *Quingua*:

Were the Baliuag troops not rationed from here since we left? It is understood you were rationed from here. If so, how many, when sent, and where did they come from? Captain Cooke wires the Third are only rationed to include the 25th inst. The General anxious to know at once. Rush answer.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899

Captain KREPS, *Twenty-second Infantry*:

Am looking into ration question. To when are your 4 companies rationed? When did you receive them? How many, and from where? Pursuant to instructions from corps headquarters, General Lawton desires to know at once. Please answer.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 24, 1899*

Major EDWARDS:

Five days' rations for cavalry and battalion Twenty-second Infantry hard brought which we had more than sufficient, received at Baliuag yesterday. I bring with me rations for only one of them, leaving all else in hands of Twenty-second. Four carts of Third Infantry are here with signal detachment, which will reach Malolos to-morrow.

GALE, *Captain*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 24, 1899*

EDWARDS, *Acting Adjutant-General*:

Received no rations at Baliuag. Previous telegram as to status of rations correct.

COOKE, *Captain, Third Infantry*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 24, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Baliuag*:

The commanding general directs that you send your commissary in here to Malolos to take charge of rations your troops.

EDWARDS, *Acting Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 25, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Is it the intention that troops coming into Manila should march or come by rail after striking the railroad? North Dakotas and Ninth Infantry have arrived at Calumpit, and Gale's squadron, Fourth Cavalry, have arrived here. The troops are leg weary and efficient in shoes. Could rail transportation be furnished I would be much gratified.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, *May 25, 1899.*

GENERAL LAWTON:

Troops returning to city will be transported by railway rapidly as possible. The North Dakota regiment and Gale's squadron, Fourth Cavalry, will upon arrival here proceed to their barracks. The Ninth Infantry battalion to join remainder of regiment. Two sections of train sent up this morning to transport troops. Your wagon transportation will also be transported by rail. It will require a couple of days to transport everything coming in.

BARRY, *Acting Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, *May 25, 1899.*

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have 2 prisoners, captains, captured at Maasin in the fight of the 23d instant. Shall send them on to you? The General may be able to obtain information from them.

COOKE, *Captain, Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 25, 1899.*

CAPTAIN COOKE, *Commanding, Baliuag*:

The commanding general directs that you send the captain prisoners in to Manila and deliver them to provost-marshal-general.

EDWARDS, *Acting Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 25, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Palace*:

I understand that a train is on the way out here with forage. We have none. Feed some badly. Request authority to take some from train as it goes through.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 25, 1899.*

GENERAL LAWTON:

Train with forage for San Fernando passed through Calumpit at 12 o'clock. Forage will be sent you this evening or early to-morrow morning.

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *May 25, 1899.*

Major DEVOL:

We are camped here and can't get any distilled water. Won't you please have a couple of cans sent out on next train for General Lawton, with orders to give it to no one else?

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 25, 1899.*

Captain WALCUTT,

Chief Quartermaster, Calumpit:

Following just received by General Lawton from corps headquarters: "Troops returning to city will be transported by railroad rapidly as possible. The North Dakota regiment and Gale's squadron, Fourth Cavalry, will, upon arrival here, proceed to their barracks. The Ninth Infantry Battalion to join remainder of regiment. Two sections of train sent up this morning to transport troops. Your wagon transportation will also be transported by rail. It will require a couple of days to transport everything coming in. (Signed) Barry, Assistant Adjutant-General." Give the matter your personal attention.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 25, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS:

Arrived here with my command at 6.30 this morning. Am I to proceed to Manila by rail or on road? If by road, would like permission to relieve my men of all but 50 rounds of ammunition and load all ammunition on train, to lighten the loads of my bull carts.

TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, *May 25, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Train intended to bring the Oregons and battery yesterday ran off the track; left here this morning at 7. Will try and furnish transportation for Thirteenth Minnesotas and balance of Oregons this afternoon.

DEVOL, *Quartermaster.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
*In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.*Colonel TREUMANN, *Calumpit:*

All transportation, as well as troops, etc., will have to go in by rail, according to this morning's orders, corps headquarters.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
*In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.*COMMANDING OFFICER, *Baliuag:*

Commanding general desires immediate information as to what steps have been taken to comply with orders sending transportation to Quingua. Inquiry made last night; no answer. There are about 4,000 now here in store for your troops.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 25, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Lieutenant Burr, in charge of nine 4-mule teams, with suitable escort, left here this a. m. for Malolos, via Quingua, for rations. Wired you last night that he would leave this a. m. Captain Hannay still ill.

COOKE, Captain.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, May 25, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Quingua:

General Lawton desires that you direct Third Infantry transportation from Baliuag to stop at ford and help Lieutenant Burr to come on here. We have enough transportation now here to haul Third Infantry rations to Quingua. Answer.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 25, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, Malolos:

I have found the following commissary stores left by Captain Gale: Five barrels vinegar, 4½ boxes bacon, 1 box pepper, 13 cases tomatoes, 2 sacks sugar, 12 boxes soap, 78 boxes canned beef, 2½ sacks beans, 2 sacks coffee, 6 crates potatoes, 10 crates onions, 2 cases baked beans, 14 boxes hard bread, 20 baskets potatoes, 3 boxes salmon, 2 boxes candles, 9 boxes salt.

COOKE, Captain Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.

Captain COOKE,

Commanding, Baliuag:

Yours received. General says utilize these rations and wire here what stuff you need to make these supplies at Baliuag complete rations. There are 4 bull carts now here with signal stuff which can go back with whatever you want.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.

Captain COOKE, Baliuag:

The rations you speak of were issued before we left. It is reported that you have received rations since. Is that not a fact? If you have received any rations at Baliuag, how many, and when did they come, and from where? General desires a hurry answer. Please rush.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 25, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Rations Captain Gale left here will ration the command to include the 27th. Is this command to have the entire 45,000 rations mentioned in your telegram of this a. m.? Is it intended that this detachment will continue to be supplied with rations from Malolos, using our own transportation?

COOKE, Captain Commanding.

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 25, 1899

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Third Infantry transportation all on this side. Lieutenant Burr will be in Malolos with our wagon soon.

BOUTELLE, Commanding

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 25, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Stewart's, formerly Boyd's, troop here with me. Shall it be marched in at once sent by rail? It should go in to refit, anyway. Clothes, equipment, etc., worn and deficient.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteer

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 25, 1899

General LAWTON:

Stewart's troops can be brought in by rail as soon as infantry of your command designated for city is brought in. It can precede the volunteers now at San Fernando and which have been ordered in. It can be brought by rail in two or three days.

By command Major-General Otis:

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, In Field

Captain COOKE, Baliuag:

Error in sending dispatch. There are about 4,000 rations here only. Burr will be here soon, also Captain Bootes, commissary. Fancy for the present anyway will be supplied from Malolos and haul from Quingua. You will belong to General MacArthur's command. Trust Hannay is improving.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, May 25, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have you any instructions for me?

CASE, Captain

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899

Captain CASE, Palace:

No need your coming here. You had better call on General Otis to inquire about that matter in which you are interested. He wires here about it. The General is staying here under orders to see about rationing the troops at Baliuag and return others. Hope we will be in soon.

EDWARDS, Adjutant-General

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.

TREUMANN,
First North Dakota, Calumpit:

Just received from corps headquarters: "Troops returning to this city transported by railway rapidly as possible. The North Dakota regiment on arrival here (Manila) proceed to their barracks. * * * Your transportation will also be transported by rail. It will require a couple of days to transport everything coming in." General Lawton directs you supervise the transport of battalion Ninth Infantry and Scott's platoon, as well as your own regiment. Instruct commanding officer of battalion Ninth Infantry to join remainder of regiment and Scott to join his battery on arrival at Manila.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 25, 1899.*

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General:*

Send Scott's battery for Manila this afternoon and give him an escort of 20 men of my companies mounted on officers' horses if it meets your approval.

TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota.

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, *May 25, 1899.*

GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Require 4 flat cars for battery besides boxes for 21 animals. No facilities existing. Can you send on train some planks or ramp of some sort?

SCOTT, *Sixth Artillery.*

(to Major Devol.)

[Telegram.]

THE PALACE, *May 25, 1899.*

LAWTON:

Received. Will provide for Scott's battery.

DEVOL, *Quartermaster.*

(to Lieutenant Scott through Colonel Treumann.)

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 26, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Forward the captain prisoners, as directed in your telegram of yesterday, by express.

COOKE, *Captain Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

It seems to be nothing for me to do here, if there is no objection I will go to Manila to see MacArthur on passenger to-day, returning on same train this afternoon. Adjutant-general will remain here.

LAWTON, *Major-General, Volunteers.*

254) REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

HQs. First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY CORPS:

Request authority to allow the mounted troop Fourth Cavalry, with their pack mules and my headquarters horses, and transportation, to march in. They can easily make it in two days. Otherwise 21 cars will be necessary, and as troop horses are all stallions they are liable to injury.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 26, 1899.

General LAWTON:

You may send in the mounted troops, Fourth Cavalry, as suggested in your telegram received.

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, May 26, 1899.

General LAWTON:

The following just received:

"Five twenty-six. Adjutant-General. Following just received from Baliuag: 'Adjutant-General Second Division: I am informed by Señor Francisco Guerra at Baliuag, and captain municipal announced in General Field Orders, No. 8, dated headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, May 7, 1899, also others that live here, that there is a large force of the enemy in the woods just west of Balaton, about 4½ miles west of Baliuag; that others of the enemy are gathering at Maquinakon and San Rafael, and that I am to be attacked. Yesterday quite a number of men, natives, left town. My outposts stop all going out now. There is a general uneasiness among all classes of natives here. (Signed) Cooke, captain, Third Infantry, commanding.' MacArthur, major-general."

You will at once inquire into this reported situation, and take such measures as may be at hand to relieve Baliuag. Report at once what you can do. Answer.

By command of General Otis:

BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May 26, 1899.

General LAWTON:

MacArthur ordered to send you at once by p. m. railway train strong battalion troops, with two days' rations, for use in connection with Baliuag, if found necessary.

BARRY, Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, May 26, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Roach's battalion, Seventeenth Infantry, just leaving for Malolos to report to you—8 officers and 370 men.

MACARTHUR.

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, May 26, 1899.

Major-General LAWTON:

Have just started (4.25) with Third Battalion, Seventeenth Infantry, to report to you at Malolos.

ROACH,
Commanding Battalion, Seventeenth Infantry.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 26, 1899.

Companies C and H were left at Marilao, and M Company, of the Oregons, picked up; Malacanan, D and E were left, and C Company, Oregons, were taken up; at Polo M and G companies were left, and at Tinajeros Bridge K and L companies were left, thus disposing of the 8 companies at Calumpit. Two companies of Oregons were sent to Manila. The other 2 Oregon and 2 Nebraska companies will be sent to Manila as soon as they can get train. The commanding officer Minnesotas will post remaining companies at Bigaa and Bocaue.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Antonio Gonzales's wife has just come from near Sabang, and saw native soldiers there and heard an officer say he would fortify Sabang to-night. I think the forks of the road near here, one leading to San Miguel and the other to San Rafael. She also heard that there were 1,500 of the enemy at Maasin, commanded by General Sairo. The soldiers she saw near Sabang are strangers, and Gonzalez says they came from Montalban or San Mateo.

COOKE, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Baliuag:

Why do you not send reconnoissance and ascertain facts?

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have sent out company of scouts on Quingua road till my train is met. Will occupy Bustos with 1 company. Will send 1 company in the morning to find out what is at Balaton; another to San Rafael for similar purposes. Situation unchanged.

COOKE, Captain.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Baliuag:

It is not necessary to send a company toward Quingua to meet your train. Send, as I have ordered, a reconnoissance in direction enemy reported at once.

LAWTON, Major-General Volunteers.

[Telegram.]

BALIUG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

I have sent and will know all about the Sabang in a few hours at most. I am now going in person to locate a company across the river at Bustos.

COOKE, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Have just returned from posting a company at Bustos. I dislike the situation there. An enemy could get very close. If all my command were on Baliuag side enemy in Bustos could do me no harm. They could not stay there thirty minutes if I chose to drive them out. Even with a ferry or raft there will soon be a stage of water that can not be met successfully with anything I can make here in the shape of raft or ferry. Found the town well peopled. My coming caused a small exodus.

COOKE, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Will send company to scout Balaton and 1 to scout San Rafael. Both will start in half an hour.

COOKE, *Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Quingua:*

Hold your command in readiness to reenforce troops at Baliuag at a moment's notice. In case wires are cut to that place send at least one-half your force up on reconnoissance to ascertain cause. Mounted troop cavalry and 2 companies Twenty-second Infantry are held here in readiness to move to Quingua or Baliuag if necessary.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

Reported all quiet at Baliuag. Have held 2 companies Twenty-second Infantry and mounted troop cavalry here ready to march at moment's notice to Quingua or Baliuag if necessary. Have ordered troops at Quingua to hold themselves in readiness to move to support of Baliuag at moment's notice if necessary. This is all the force I have here. Have ordered commanding officer at Baliuag to reconnoiter in direction enemy reported and ascertain positively the facts.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 26, 1899.

General MACARTHUR:

Reported all quiet at Baliuag. Have ordered reconnoissance in direction enemy reported to ascertain facts. Troops at Quingua to be in readiness to march to support of Baliuag if necessary. Hold here 2 companies Twenty-second Infantry and troop mounted cavalry ready at moment's notice to move to Quingua or Baliuag if necessary.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

From scouts sent out on San Rafael road report just received that the company sent some time in advance of them is fighting. I have sent 2 companies of his (Moore's) support and to bring him back. The man who brought the report thought the firing was 4 miles from here. I hardly think it is so far away.

COOKE, *Captain Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Baliuag*:

Direct companies to proceed with great caution. Be careful not to be drawn into ambush, nor to proceed so far that they can not return this evening.

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

General MACARTHUR:

Can not go up to-day. Your message from Baliuag has been referred to me to look after. You had best come down here, as Baliuag is now in your command.

LAWTON.

[Telegram.]

SAN FERNANDO, *May 26, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Sorry you can not come up. Try to come before you go to the city. Can't look after Baliuag end of line just now. All I can attend to here. Three fights in three days, and more coming. Recommended three days ago a general officer to command that part of line with headquarters at Malolos; no action yet upon recommendation, which I have renewed to-day. In the meantime, until such an arrangement is made, I have asked department headquarters to look out for safety of Baliuag, which seems to me very much exposed.

MACARTHUR.

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 26, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

One man in from Moore. This man says they struck large force about 3 miles from here, on San Rafael road—first an outpost, which was driven back about 500 yards, when they met the main force and were compelled to retire to cover, and when he left they were being fired on from their front and both flanks. Two had been wounded. Day, with 2 companies, must have reached him by this time. I have sent Captain Buttler with 1 company and an ambulance as additional support. This makes 4 companies in all. Hope to have something more definite soon.

COOKE, *Captain, Third Infantry.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

Captain COOKE, *Baliuag*:

Report just as soon as company returns. Keep the general frequently advised, that he may make proper disposition.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

BALIUAG, *May 26, 1899.*

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

By reference to map, a company leaving here to scout Balaton will have to go via Quingua. Can't a company be sent from Quingua to scout Balaton?

COOKE, *Captain.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Quingua:

Hold your command (2 companies infantry) with mounted troop cavalry ready to march at daylight to-morrow a. m. to reconnoiter Balaton. Lieutenant Stewart will explain details.

LAWTON, *General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, *May 26, 1899.*

COMMANDING OFFICER, Baliuag:

The major-general commanding directs that mounted troop be sent from here to scout Balaton. You need not send company there.

KING, *Aid.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 25, 1899.

Captain COOKE,
Commanding Baliuag:

A staff officer of General MacArthur's reports here this morning that there is a mounted troop on the way to you now. Those fellows will be getting enough of the Third pretty soon. Wish you would fully report your San Miguel road fight. The regiment should get the credit it deserves.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Quingua:

I think you had best take both companies of infantry out with party to repair line, and when break is found, cut in and report for instructions.

LAWTON, *Major-General Commanding.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, *May 26, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Telegraphic communications between Quingua and Baliuag all right. Have sent couriers to halt first company sent out, and await orders with second company.

WASSELL,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, Quingua:

Commanding general says not necessary to make reconnoissance to-morrow morning in direction previously indicated. Tell Lieutenant Stewart mounted troop can return here.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Wassell reports his command recalled. Any further instructions?

STEWART.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In Field, Malolos, May 26, 1899.

Lieutenant STEWART,

Commanding Mounted Troop:

Commanding general directs that you return here.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

MALOLOS, May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT PACIFIC:

The following report of reconnoissance made at Baliuag to ascertain correctness of reports submitted, as follows:

"BALIUAG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, *Malolos:*

"The troops returned at 10.15 p. m. Lieutenant Moore struck the enemy about 4 miles out on and one-half mile to the left of San Rafael road at 6 p. m. He thinks there were not more than 100 of them. He beat them off, and would have returned for his 2 wounded. The 2 companies reached him at 8 p. m. The company and balance sent in command of Captain Buttler reached them as they had drawn in post. Lieutenant Moore reports enemy fought as they did on our march from Miguel. They stayed close for some time. I should have mounted troop cavalry for scouting purposes and more ammunition for battery.

"COOKE, *Captain.*

"BALIUAG, May 26, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, *Malolos:*

"Captain Day, with company, had proceeded about 2 miles toward Balatan before I could overtake him, as per your message about mounted troop. He reported all houses occupied; men, women, and children quietly at home; also that he could see men, women, and children on road to Maasin 2 or more miles out, as the road he followed was parallel to the Maasin road. This strong indication of absence of enemy at and northwest. Company toward San Rafael not in yet.

"COOKE, *Captain.*"

From which it will be seen that no alarming conditions prevail there. Baliuag is an important point, and the enemy will doubtless try to recover it if possible. I think the force now there sufficient. The troop of cavalry should be sent as soon as possible, and a field officer should, if possible, be in command. Under the circumstances I suggest that Quingua and Baliuag be placed under command of Major Kobbé. There is now a battalion of Twenty-second Infantry at Quingua and a battalion of Seventh at this place. General MacArthur has sent a staff officer down here (Major Allory) to look after the situation, and I will now turn the whole matter over to him. In the meantime all my command will have left for Manila, and I therefore omit instructions.

LAWTON, *Major-General Volunteers.*

[Telegram.]

CALUMPIT, May 26, 1899.

Major EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General:*

Major Devol writes that no arrangements have been made for transportation of my troops. Can't I load my regiment on train returning from San Fernando this afternoon?

TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota.

288 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 27, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER NINTH INFANTRY, *Calumpit*:

In accordance with telegraphic instructions from corps headquarters this a. m. the commanding general directs that you disembark from your train at Caloocan and join battalion of Ninth Infantry on line at or near La Loma.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

GUIGUINTO, May 27, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

There is a detachment of 33 men, Thirteenth Minnesota, here who report they have no rations. They were left here last night rationed to include breakfast tomorrow. The sergeant says detachment was to have been relieved this a. m., but have not been. The men are from Companies A and B.

WALCUTT, *Chief Quartermaster*.

[Telegram.]

CALOOCAN, May 27, 1899

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Companies Thirteenth are posted as ordered except that General Hale this a. m. directed that 1 company at Tinajeros Bridge relieve the Third United States Cavalry, Malabon, and the other relieved company, Third, at Tinajeros Bridge. He wired General MacArthur this a. m. as to disposition of my regiment. Late in the day I took my troops that I am almost positive were Oregons and Nebraskas. Major B. assumes command of Thirteenth now.

MASTERMAN

[Telegram.]

QUINGUA, May 27, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Lieutenant Stewart and troop left this place at 8.10 a. m.

KREPS, *Captain Commanding*

[Telegram.]

MALolos, May 27, 1899

General MACARTHUR:

Will make another effort to see you to-day.

LAWTON, *Major-General*

[Telegram.]

PALACE, May, 27, 1899

General LAWTON:

Your request to march train to Malolos approved. Transportation quartermaster having trouble by your troops seizing teams. See that Ninth Infantry comes down this a. m. on special, and that Minnesota is distributed on line of railway as ordered.

By command Major-General Otis:

BARRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*

**REPORT OF AN EXPEDITION, TO THE PROVINCE OF MORONG,
WITH OBJECTIVES, ANTIPOLLO, CAINTA, TAYTAY, AND MORONG,
JUNE 2 TO 8, 1899, WITH APPENDIX CONTAINING COPIES OF
ALL RECORDS PERTAINING THERETO.—MAJ. GEN. H. W.
LAWTON, U. S. V., COMMANDING.**

JUNE 2 TO JUNE 8, 1899.—Expedition to the Province of Morong, Luzon, P. I.

REPORTS.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., October 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of an expedition for the purpose of driving the insurgents from Cainta, Taytay, and Antipolo into the Morong Peninsula and then either capturing or destroying them. (Appendix, p. 292.)

For the purpose of the expedition the following troops were ordered to concentrate at the pumping station: Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry (mounted), Lieut. Cecil Stewart, commanding; the dismounted squadron, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Capt. G. H. G. Gale, commanding; 2 battalions Fourth U. S. Infantry, Lieut. Col. J. M. Sanno, commanding; battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, Capt. T. S. McCaleb, commanding; companies First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, Col. H. B. McCoy, commanding; 11 companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Col. O. Summers, commanding; the Wyoming Volunteer Infantry Battalion, Maj. F. M. Foote, commanding; and a provisional battery consisting of 1 platoon of Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, caliber .65 inches, Lieut. Alston Hamilton, and 1 platoon of Hawthorne's

mountain battery, caliber 3 inches, all under the command of Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, Sixth U. S. Artillery. The total force numbered 102 commissioned officers and 2,474 men. (Appendix, pp. 293, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310.)

The command of this part of the expedition was given to Brig. G. Robert H. Hall, U. S. V.

To act in conjunction with the above command, the following troops were ordered to proceed to Pasig and report to Col. John W. Wholley: First Washington Volunteer Infantry; First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. W. C. Treumann commanding; 8 companies First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, commanding; 1 battalion Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Maj. H. L. Haskell, commanding; 1 platoon Dyer's (D) battery, Sixth U. S. Artillery, Lieut. E. D. Scott commanding. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.)

The plan of the expedition was as follows: Hall's column was to start from the pumping station, moving across the Mariquina Valley, clearing the country of insurgents, and marching with the view of placing the head of the column east of Antipolo and toward Terate. Here line was to be formed, facing west or south of west. An advance in line was then to be made for the purpose of capturing Morong and Taytay, and driving the insurgents into the Morong Peninsula. (Appendix, pp. 292, 293.)

In the meantime the force under Colonel Wholley was to make a demonstration against Cainta, and later, if the insurgents were driven into the peninsula, the First Washington Regiment was to proceed by cascoes from Pasig to Morong to complete the victory. (Appendix, p. 307.)

The gunboats in the lake were to silence the enemy's batteries at Angono. (Appendix, p. 307.)

The movement commenced at 5 o'clock a. m., June 3, 1899. (Appendix, p. 293.) As it was known that the country to be traversed was rough and hilly and unfit for wagons, the troops were ordered to carry two days' rations in their haversacks.

Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, supported by the dismounted squad of the same regiment, was sent down the San Mateo River to capture the enemy's outpost. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The Colorado regiment was sent up the river to advance on Mariquina. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) Neither force encountered any enemy, and joined the main column which was marching across the valley under the guidance of native guides. These guides professed a complete knowledge of all trails across the mountains, but their information was of little value, as recent rains had changed the face of the country so that ravines and trails that were reported practicable were found to be impassable for footmen or the small-wheeled vehicles. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) Much time was lost building bridges. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The ambulances that it was intended should accompany this column were sent back. (Appendix, pp. 293, 294.) The column advanced with much difficulty and finally, at 11.20 a. m., encountered a small force of the enemy. (Appendix, pp. 294, 296.) The cavalry soon cleared the country, as the enemy was seen to be concentrating in considerable force. The Second Oregon Regiment and the Fourth United States Infantry (Appendix, pp. 294, 296, 299, 300) were deployed with battery in rear. No serious resistance was encountered during the remainder of the day's march until 4 o'clock p. m., when the enemy made a *decisive stand, being so placed as to bring to bear a fire from three directions*



F RING L - HE ADVANCEING ON ANY PHOTO JUNE 1 1899

The Second Oregon and Fourth Infantry and the cavalry were deployed, and after a brisk engagement of an hour and a half the enemy was driven off. (Appendix, pp. 294, 297, 303, 304.) While this engagement was in progress the Ninth Infantry, acting as a rear guard, was also engaged. (Appendix, pp. 294, 298, 300, 305.)

Casualties: Killed—2 enlisted men Fourth Cavalry, 1 enlisted man Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; wounded—4 enlisted men Fourth Cavalry, 6 enlisted men Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. (Appendix, pp. 293, 295, 296, 300, 303.)

The column bivouacked on the scene of this last engagement. (Appendix, pp. 294, 297.)

Meanwhile, at 1.30 p. m., the command under Colonel Wholley moved out from Pasig (Appendix, pp. 307, 308), the First North Dakota Infantry moving on the right of Cainta, the Washington Infantry moving on the left, and the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry having the center. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.) One gun went with the North Dakotas and one with the Washingtons. (Appendix, p. 307.) Cainta was captured without serious resistance. (Appendix, pp. 307, 308.) The gunboats, under command of Captain Grant, participated in the movement by shelling the insurgent lines at Taytay and Cainta, and later at Angono. (Appendix, pp. 295, 307, 309.)

The North Dakotas, Scott's guns, and the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry was left to cover this line, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann. For a time a sharp fire was encountered, darkness putting an end to the conflict.

The Washington regiment was in the meantime withdrawn to Pasig, where they were placed on cascós. (Appendix, pp. 295, 307.)

The next morning Hall's column entered the town of Antipolo with little resistance. (Appendix, pp. 294, 308.) The town was found to be practically deserted. (Appendix, p. 294.) About 1,000 Mauser and 2,500 Remington cartridges were found; also a small number of 3.2-inch shells, and some improvised canister of same caliber. (Appendix, p. 294.)

About 10 o'clock a. m. General Hall's column set out for Taytay, and about 2 miles from Antipolo the other column under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann was met. (Appendix, pp. 294, 309.) This latter column had entered Taytay about 7.30 a. m. without resistance. (Appendix, p. 294.) The insurgents, upon leaving Taytay, had fired the church at this place.

The troops in both columns were suffering greatly from the heat, and many had fallen out exhausted. (Appendix, p. 294.)

A halt was ordered and rations were issued. (Appendix, p. 294.)

At about 3 o'clock p. m. the march was resumed. General Hall's column was ordered back to Antipolo and thence to Morong. Colonel Treumann's column was ordered to Morong via the west side of the peninsula. (Appendix, p. 295.)

Meanwhile the Washington regiment had gone to Morong in cascós, where they had landed under the protecting fire of the gunboats, and after a short but sharp fight had taken the town. The enemy's loss was 9 killed and 5 wounded. Ours, none. (Appendix, p. 307.)

Hall's column reached Morong at 11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th of June after an exceedingly hot and exhausting march, many of the men being overcome by the excessive heat. (Appendix, p. 308.) The same afternoon the Washington regiment was embarked on cascós and returned to its original stations. (Appendix, pp. 295, 308.)

The Second Oregon returned to Manila on cascos on June (Appendix, p. 295.)

At 1 o'clock p. m. on June 6 General Hall's column took up return march via Binangonan, the dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry being left at Morong as a garrison.

This latter organization was later reenforced by the First North Dakota Regiment. (Appendix, p. 295.)

The remainder of Colonel Treumann's column, consisting of a battalion of the Twelfth Infantry and the platoon of artillery, joined General Hall's column at Binangonan. At Angono it was found the Krupp gun which had fired on and hit the gunboat *Napin* (Appendix, p. 295) had been removed, probably to Santa Maria Bulacan. (Appendix, p. 295.) The whole command then proceeded to the pumping station and thence to their original positions on the lake (Appendix, p. 295.)

The difficulties experienced in this expedition in the way of roads and excessive heat were very great, and all the troops engaged deserve special credit for the splendid way in which these difficulties were overcome.

The sharp and decisive manner in which the Washington regiment under Colonel Wholley, captured Morong without the loss of a man is worthy of especial mention, as is also the efficient manner in which a battalion of the Twelfth Infantry, Major Haskell commanding, consisting of 4 companies, relieved at Cainta the 8 companies of the Washington regiment. The manner in which the artillery under Lieutenants Hawthorne, Hamilton, and Scott was handled, with great and insufficient transportation, reflects great credit on these young officers.

Maj. C. R. Edwards, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. V., adjutant general of the division at Pasig, kept the division commander informed of the situation and superintended the movement of the gunboats, Colonel Wholley's command contributed in no small degree to the success of this portion of the expedition.

An appendix embodying copies of brief reports rendered to the department commander; reports of subordinate commanders which were at the time forwarded; of correspondence, orders, in fact every available record pertaining to the expedition, is hereto attached and should be read in connection with the text of this report.

Attention is invited to final reports of subordinate commanders which are, as a rule, so complete and lucid as to merit especial commendation.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding

No. 1.

[Report.]

BETWEEN ANTIPOLLO AND TAYTAY, June 4, 1898
ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila*.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance to the division commander's instructions, I marched from pumping station with 1 mounted troop Fourth Cavalry, 3 dismounted troops same regiment, 8 companies Fourth Infantry, 4 companies N

Infantry, 6 companies First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, 11 companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, 4 companies Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, 2 guns mountain battery, and 2 mountain Hotchkiss guns, to capture Antipolo, attacking it from the east and north, and then move to Taytay.

The route followed and recommended by Filipino guides was across the Mariquina Valley, due east to the hills and then by trail over these to a secondary valley, in which they said there could be found a practicable trail to the objective point. The road across the valley was found to be in places impracticable for even footmen, and the column was delayed while the bridges were constructed over which these and the artillery carriages with ammunition could be crossed. The ambulances were returned to the pumping station by direction of the division commander.

The column was fired upon while constructing the second of these bridges, and thereafter almost constantly until dark.

The mountain trail was found to be in such condition as to require labor from the troops to make it passable for infantry and the artillery. As a result of all these delays and of an attack lasting from about 4 until 5.30 p. m. night overtook the column while it was still several miles from Antipolo. Bivouac was then made and the march resumed this morning at 5 o'clock. The trail was found to be even more difficult than that followed the day before, although the insurgent fire was not so frequent or so persistent. At 9 a. m. we came in sight of Antipolo church and entered it simultaneously from the east, north, and west. It was found to have been evacuated by the insurgents a few hours earlier. Very few inhabitants were found there. After a halt of about an hour the march for Taytay was taken up and continued for about 2 miles, when I met the division commander, who instructed me to halt the column and wait for the wagons and ambulances. then en route to meet us, after which I was to return to Antipolo and then march to Morong.

There was lost in action on the 3d instant 2 noncommissioned officers Fourth Cavalry and 1 private Second Oregon killed; and wounded, Fourth Cavalry 4, and Second Oregon 5. Wounds, except in one case, reported slight, but there were very many cases of exhaustion from excessive heat and the very trying march, with little or no food.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT H. HALL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

No. 2.

[Report.]

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Deposito, Manila, P. I., June 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from the commanding general, First Division, I have the honor to report on the operations of my command in its movement to the east and south, from the 2d to the 8th instant.

The purpose of the movement was the capture of Antipolo and Taytay and the driving of the insurgents at those places into the Morong Peninsula, where they were to be assailed by a force which would be landed below them and advanced on their rear from the south. It was believed that Antipolo, although regarded by the insurgents with particular sanctity, was not prepared to resist attack from either the east or north, and the march of the troops under my command was to be so conducted as to approach the town on those sides.

After dark on the 2d instant I concentrated in bivouac, near the pumping station, the following-named organizations which had been directed to report to me for active field duty: Fourth Infantry (8 companies); Ninth Infantry (4 companies); First Colorado Volunteer Infantry (6 companies); Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry (11 companies); First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry (4 companies); Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, mounted (1 company); Troops C, G, and L, Fourth Cavalry, dismounted (3 companies); detachment Light Battery E, First Artillery (2 Hotchkiss mountain guns); detachment Hawthorne's mountain battery (2 guns). Total force numbering 102 commissioned officers, and 2,474 enlisted men.

The advance across the San Mateo River was begun at 5 a. m. on the 3d instant. The mounted troop, supported by the dismounted squadron, was sent down the river with the view of capturing the enemy's outposts, which had been reported as being of late numerous and enterprising. At the same time the battalion of Colorado infantry was sent up the river to advance on Mariquina from the east and north, in the hope that the enemy in the town might be thus captured or destroyed. Neither of these detachments found any force with which to deal.

In the meantime the remainder of the column was marching across the San Mateo Valley conducted, after the mounted troop rejoined, by 2 native guides who professed an accurate knowledge of the country. Ravines which were dry only a few days before were found, two of them, to be impassable by footmen or wheeled vehicles. Much time was lost in crossing these ravines, and the commanding general ordered from the pumping station that the ambulances be sent there. The 4 gun carriages, several flimsy carts, which had been furnished for the transportation of artillery ammunition, and which proved to be utterly worthless for such purposes, besides escort wagon for the ammunition and supplies of Light Battery E, First Artillery, now comprised the wheeled vehicles with the column.

While endeavoring to effect the crossing of the second ravine the head of the column was fired upon at 11.20 a. m., from the left and front, by a small party of insurgents. The cavalry was sent against them and speedily brushed them away. In the meantime the enemy, in considerable force, was concentrating on the hills through which led the trail we were following, and as their firing increased the Second Oregon Infantry was deployed against their position, with the Fourth Infantry on its right. The guns went into action in rear of the Oregon regiment. The enemy made a stand worthy of the name either here or elsewhere during the day, until late in the evening, although the advance guard and flankers were continually under fire. The mountain trail, now leading in a southerly direction, was in many places in such condition as to require much and severe labor to render it passable, and this again delayed the march. At length, at 4 p. m., as the head of the column debouched from a difficult and sunken road east of the hills overlooking Taytay, it was fired upon by bodies of insurgents who were so placed on hills as to concentrate their fire from three directions upon the troops as they appeared at the mouth of the ravine. The Second Oregon Infantry, the Fourth Infantry, and the dismounted cavalry squadron were at once thrown against the insurgent position, and the enemy, after a sharp action for an hour and a half, retired and was no more seen or heard from on this day. While this action was in progress in front, the battalion of the Ninth Infantry acting as rear guard was engaged with a body of the enemy in rear, and was also successful.

The command bivouacked for the night on the site of this engagement. The hope I had formed of reaching Antipolo by 1 o'clock of this day was not realized, solely because of the unanticipated condition of the trails by which the command was obliged to move and the delay thus experienced.

At 5 a. m. on the 4th instant the march was resumed. The Second Oregon regiment, with the battalion of the Ninth Infantry on its left, was deployed on the hill extending east from the rear of Taytay, to prevent advance of the enemy from the latter place, while the remainder of the column continued on the trail. The killed and wounded and the considerable number of men otherwise disabled were transported by litters by Chinese coolies and insurgent prisoners, following the Oregon regiment over the hills, with a view of thus reaching the main road between Antipolo and Taytay, upon which the ambulances were to reach us. The escort wagon with the battery ammunition also followed the Oregon regiment.

Small parties of insurgents were encountered, and fired on the column at long ranges from the south of the trail, but were easily driven away without impeding the march. No serious resistance was encountered, although a force to the number of some 500 was observed on hills to the northeast. At 9.10 a. m. the church of Antipolo was sighted a mile away. The Colorado and Wyoming battalions were sent to the north and east of the town, and the dismounted squadron and the Fourth Infantry battalion to the west, and all advanced in extended order simultaneously. No enemy was met, and indeed the town was found to be unoccupied by combatants and almost by civilians. In the church was found about 1,000 Mauser cartridge and about 2,500 Remington cartridges, a small number of 3.2-inch shell, and improvised canister of the same caliber. All these were thrown into a well, and this was I believe, all the destruction wrought by the command in Antipolo.

After occupying the town for about an hour the march to Taytay was taken up in accordance with the plan prepared before the movement began. The division commander was met about 2 miles from Antipolo, and he ordered that the column be marched to Morong and thence by the road on the east side of the peninsula to Taytay and Cainta and so to its starting point. As many of the men had been without food since 4 a. m. of the previous day, I was authorized to halt the column in the road and await the arrival of the wagons then en route to us. The dead and wounded and the physically exhausted were sent to Pasig by the ambulances which accompanied the wagon train. The escort wagon it had been deemed necessary to destroy because of the impracticability of the trail it was compelled to follow. The artillery ammunition was distributed among the carts.

At 3 p. m. the return march to Antipolo was taken up. On reaching the place

was found that several hundred natives had already returned since we had left it in the morning, and between this and Teresa many more were met going in. By many of them I was told that the insurgent garrison, numbering some 500, with Pio del Pilar in command, had abandoned Antipolo between 3 and 4 o'clock on the morning of that day, and gone toward Bosoboso. I had no means of verifying this statement.

Teresa was reached and bivouac made at 7 a. m., but the difficulties of the road were such that the wagons did not arrive until the following morning, the 5th instant. Many of the people remaining in Teresa informed me that the garrison of about 200 men precipitately vacated when our advance guard appeared, and stated that they were to go to Santa Maria de Bulacan. After the men had breakfasted, the road to Morong was taken and that place reached at 11.30 a. m. The First Washington Volunteer Infantry was found in possession of the town, but were relieved and embarked on cascoes later in the day to return to Pasig, the station from which they came.

On reaching the town, and for an hour or more thereafter, the outposts of this regiment were engaged with those of the insurgents at long-range firing. Lieutenant Franklin of the gunboat *Napindan*, which was lying off the place, signaled me of the presence of a small body of the enemy within easy range of him, but hidden by hills from view from the town, and at my request he drove them away.

I was here again visited by the division commander, who informed me that rations for the command would arrive by water on the following morning, when I was to replenish the supplies and resume the march.

At 1 p. m., on the 6th instant, after the issue of three days' rations to each organization, except the dismounted squadron, which by order of the division commander was left at Morong, and the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, which, by the same authority, was embarked on cascoes to return to Manila, the route for Binangonan, by the way of Cardova, was taken. The division commander was again at Morong during the unloading of the rations.

The remainder of the march was uneventful. At Cardova the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry was found, and in compliance with the division commander's instructions the colonel was directed to move it to Morong and there take station.

At the entrance of the town of Angono two battery emplacements were found judiciously placed to flank the Krupp gun which the enemy formerly had in position there. Both of these were burned. I was given much gossip but no definite information as to the disposition which had been made of this gun. There were no traces of its having been buried nor any trail to indicate that it had been dragged away, although the prevailing talk indicated that it had been so removed to Santa Maria de Bulacan. Bivouac was made at Binangonan, where the command was joined by a battalion of the Twelfth Infantry and a platoon of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery. At 5 a. m. of the 7th instant the column was put in motion, and, marching by the way of Taytay and Cainta, reached the San Mateo River, where it was divided, the battalion of the Twelfth Infantry and the platoon of the Sixth Artillery marching to Pasig, the mounted troop of the Fourth Cavalry and the battalion of the Colorado regiment continuing the march to their respective stations, and the remaining organizations bivouacking for the night at Santalon. Before noon of the following day, the 8th instant, all the organizations had been returned to the positions from which they had been drawn.

Our losses in action during the expedition numbered: Killed—Fourth Cavalry, 2 sergeants; Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, 1 private. Wounded: Fourth Cavalry, 4 privates; First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, 1 private; Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, 5 privates. Total, 3 killed and 10 wounded. Eighty-four men were reported disabled from other causes, principally exhaustion. A nominal list of the casualties is attached. The heat was oppressive while we were absent, the roads were exceptionally difficult, and the men had but little to eat. These are the probable reasons why so many men are reported to have been physically exhausted during the march. The losses sustained by the insurgents can only be approximated. Ten of their dead were found in our front in various places, and of the 40 prisoners taken 1 had been wounded.

In action the troops in general behaved admirably. The gallantry and dash with which the Fourth Infantry battalion and the Second Oregon regiment assaulted and drove the enemy from the hills on the afternoon of the 3d instant were especially commendable.

Instances of zeal and energy coming under my own observation are remarked in the cases of First Lieut. G. B. Duncan, Fourth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. H. W. French, Seventeenth Infantry, and Second Lieut. Halstead Dorey, Fourth Infantry, aids-de-camp; Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and Capt. G. H. G. Gale and First Lieut. Cecil Stewart, Fourth Cavalry.

A copy of the report of each of the subordinate commanders is herewith transmitted.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT H. HALL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

CASUALTIES OCCURRING IN ACTION ON MARCH FROM PUMPING STATION TO ANTIPOLLO,
MORONG, AND TAYTAY, JUNE 2-8, 1899.

June 3, 1899; action near Taytay.

Killed.—Sergt. Seth Lovell, Troop C, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound through heart.

Sergt. Benjamin Craig, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound on neck.

Private William McIlwain, Company H, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound through head.

Wounded.—Private Patrick Branigan, Troop C, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound left leg, causing compound complicated fracture of both bones of leg; severe.

Private Robert B. Miles, Troop C, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound of head; severe.

Private Melvin L. Daily, Troop G, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound through abdomen and left thigh, causing compound complicated fracture of latter; severe.

Private Maurice Coffield, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, gunshot wound left shoulder and chest; severe.

Private Henry Wagner, Company B, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound of abdomen; severe.

Private Elmer H. Doolittle, Company C, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound left arm; severe.

Private Charles Doty, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound first finger right hand; slight.

Private Ezra Kurtz, Company H, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound right wrist; slight.

Private Clayton L. Ransom, Company L, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound left side of head; slight.

Private Arthur J. Salisbury, Company H, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound left shoulder and chest; severe.

June 4, 1899, in action near Antipollo.

Private Charles T. Hickman, Company A, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, gunshot wound left foot; severe.

No. 3.

[Report.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH INFANTRY,
La Loma Church, near Manila, P. I., June 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my regiment from June 2 to 8, 1899, inclusive:

On June 2, at sunset, the headquarters and the First and Third battalions of the Fourth Infantry left the trenches near La Loma Church and marched to Deposito reporting to the brigade commander with 16 officers and 644 enlisted men. The regiment bivouacked with other troops of the command near the pumping station, and at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 3d instant the command moved across the San Mateo River and proceeded beyond Mariquina toward San Mateo. Encountering opposition in that direction, the command turned to the southeast, crossing the San Mateo Valley, and at 11 o'clock, when approaching the foothills on the east side of the valley, the enemy was developed and made considerable opposition. All the troops of the command were deployed, the Fourth Infantry being on the extreme right, with the Third Battalion on the right of the First. The enemy was pushed back into the hills and dispersed, when the command was assembled and moved on the trail southeastward through the hills toward Antipollo. At about 5 o'clock p. m.

the enemy was again met, and the entire command was deployed on the adjacent hills.

No further advance was made on that day, the command bivouacking at this place, about 4 miles from Antipolo. Casualties during that day: From wounds, none; from heat and exhaustion, officers, 1; enlisted men, 47. Distance traveled, about 9 miles.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 4th instant advance was resumed and Antipolo was reached at about 10 o'clock without serious opposition. Leaving Antipolo at 11 o'clock the command marched 2 miles westward toward Taytay and was halted there. At 2 o'clock p. m. the return march was taken up, the command passing through Antipolo and southeastward to Santa Teresa, reaching that place at sundown. Distance traveled during the day, about 13 miles. Casualties during the day: From wounds, none; from heat and exhaustion, officers, none; enlisted men, 17.

At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 5th instant march was resumed toward Morong, reaching that place without opposition at 11 o'clock a. m. Distance traveled during the day, 5 miles. Casualties during the day: Officers, 1; enlisted men, 7; all from sickness.

On the 6th instant at noon the command marched toward Binangonan, reaching the place at 4 p. m. Distance traveled, 6 miles. Casualties from sickness, 11 enlisted men.

At 5 o'clock on the 7th instant the command marched through Angono, Taytay, and Cainta to Santalon, reaching there at 2.30 p. m., where the command was disbanded. Distance marched on the 7th instant, 14 miles. Casualties from sickness, 7 enlisted men.

On the morning of the 8th instant the regiment with the battalion of the Ninth Infantry, the Wyoming battalion, and the platoons of artillery left Santalon, and the regiment marched to trenches near La Loma Church. Distance traveled from trenches to return, 67 miles. Total casualties: From sickness, 91; from wounds, none.

Four of the 8 companies of this expedition were commanded by young men of no experience, and in my judgment needed as much instruction in their duties as the major portion of their respective companies. During the first deployment, 2 of these officers came particularly under my observation, and I regarded it as fortunate that the enemy did not make a stubborn resistance or present themselves in any great number, as the men were led to believe that they were when the firing on the left opened up. Again at Antipolo another one came under my personal observation, and utterly failed to place his company as directed. I am clearly of the opinion it is unwise to intrust the command of such large companies, averaging 80 enlisted men, to a single officer of such limited experience. In fact, 80 men are more than one experienced officer can well look after in action in this close country, particularly when advancing in extended order and over such ground as was encountered on our march.

Very respectfully,

J. M. SANNO,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fourth Infantry, Commanding.

No. 4.

[Report.]

HDQRS. THIRD BATTALION, NINTH INFANTRY,
Caloocan, June —, 1899.

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL GENERAL HALL'S BRIGADE,
San Pedro Macati.

SIR: In response to your telegraphic instructions of the 11th instant, I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of the 4 companies of the Ninth Infantry (A, L, G, H) under my command during the march of Gen. R. H. Hall's column through Antipolo to Morong and return from June 2 to 8, 1899, to wit:

On May 31 I received orders to report at 8.30 a. m. the following day to General Hall at his headquarters, Deposito, and on reporting, as directed, I was furnished with memorandum instructions to send at dark on the evening of the 2d instant to the pumping station 4 companies of the Ninth Infantry from the 2 battalions of that regiment posted near Caloocan, and extend the remaining companies to outpost and protect the lines from Caloocan to La Loma Church, the command leaving to be provided with 200 rounds of ammunition per man, three days' rations, and no blankets or ponchos to be taken. I received permission from the brigade commander to accompany the expedition. As the absence of the companies from the lines at

Caloocan was expected to be but temporary, 2 companies were taken from the Third Battalion, on the right, and 2 from the First Battalion, on the left; this arrangement best facilitating covering the extent of lines from Caloocan to La Loma Church with the least derangement of the permanent position of the companies.

The command selected left camp at dark, June 2, with a strength of 8 officers and 362 men, and marched by road in rear of the trenches, reaching the pumping station about 1 o'clock a. m., June 3, where bivouac was made. Two mountain howitzers, pertaining to Battery E, First Artillery, under command of First Lieut. Alston Hamilton, First Artillery, accompanied the Ninth Infantry battalion from Caloocan.

At 4 a. m., June 3, the battalion crossed the Mariquina as rear guard to the column. During the forenoon it was relieved from this duty and moved up to the remainder of the command. Subsequently, at about 1 p. m., I received orders to support the mountain battery under Lieutenant Hawthorne. With the battery I moved with 2 companies in advance and 2 in rear over the trail through the hills to the small native village of Boosa Boosa, making but slow progress owing to obstacles to the advance of the artillery. Nothing unusual occurred until about 4 o'clock p. m., when the battery was suddenly fired upon while in action by a small number of the enemy in close proximity on the left of the trail. The company in advance was quickly faced about and rapidly deployed by Lieut. H. D. Wise, the commander, who advanced and promptly cleared the neighborhood of the enemy. The battalion with the battery then proceeded to Boosa Boosa without further molestation, where it bivouacked for the night.

On the morning of the 4th the battalion moved at 5 a. m., with orders to follow the Wyoming volunteer battalion, and information that its right on deploying would connect with the Oregon regiment, which brought up the rear. Shortly after the advance began I found the Oregon regiment deploying to the right of the line of march and connecting with 1 battalion of that regiment moving in my rear and in column as rear guard. Shortly before reaching the point where the trail to Antipolo leaves the road to Taytay, on which we were moving, firing was observed coming from the left front. Company G, Ninth Infantry, under authorization from the adjutant-general of the command, was sent to the left, and quickly moving up a ravine deployed in rear of the position from which the shots were supposed to come. In the locality Lieutenant Connell captured 2 Filipino men, who were accompanied by some women, and on examining the neighborhood discovered the bodies of 4 natives, 3 of whom were dead and 1 wounded; also 1 Remington rifle.

Immediately after taking the trail to Antipolo, following the Wyoming battalion in accordance with instructions, orders were received to deploy on the left of the Oregon regiment, which was promptly done. After waiting in this position for several hours, information at last reached me that some of our troops had been seen farther to our front. I rode forward to investigate, and on reaching the Taytay-Antipolo road discovered the dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry and Colorado volunteer regiment marching in column toward Taytay. I returned and sent information to this effect to Colonel Summers, commanding the Oregon regiment.

This regiment shortly thereafter disappeared from my right, and I advanced to the Antipolo-Taytay road, where I found the Wyoming battalion and took position in the rear. At this point our wagons, which we had not seen since leaving the pumping station, came up, and the company commanders were directed to supply me with food. About 3 o'clock p. m. I received verbal orders from the brigade commander to proceed with the column toward Morong. That night the column bivouacked at Teresa, and Morong was reached the following day. The remaining part of the march from Morong to Benangonan, and the latter point to Santalon and finally to camp at Caloocan, was without unusual incident.

The sick report exhibits an increase of 1 officer and 16 enlisted men between the 3d and 8th instant, due, doubtless, to unusual exertion and exposure to the trying tropical conditions. Officers and men performed their duty throughout with cheerfulness and promptitude.

On the 3d my attention was frequently arrested by the strenuous efforts of Lieutenants Hawthorne and Hamilton in getting their battery forward.

Very respectfully,

T. S. McCaleb,
Captain, Ninth Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

No. 5.

[Report.]

HDQRS. FIRST COLORADO INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Camp Alva, P. I., June 16, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: By your direction I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the movement against Antipolo and Morong on June 3 to 7, inclusive:

On the morning of June 3 I left my station at the pumping station with 2 battalions of 3 companies each, the battalions being under command of Majors Anderson and Grove. We moved out of the pumping station at 4 o'clock in the morning, ahead of the remainder of the column and crossing the Mariquina River. From here we moved around to the east and north of Mariquina and entered this village from both of these directions. This movement was made for the purpose of capturing or killing any insurgents who might have been in the village. We found absolutely no one here, as everybody had apparently moved out during the night to the north.

According to instructions I then halted my battalions and waited for the rear of the line to pass, as I had been assigned as rear guard.

Some considerable delay was had at Mariquina on account of the failure of the guides to properly locate the trail and the necessity of building bridges to cross several ditches where it was found impossible to take the artillery. It was somewhat past 9 o'clock in the morning before I was able to take my position in column. We then proceeded slowly across the Mariquina Valley to the foothills, where the advance guard of the column was engaged in a lively skirmish with the insurgents, who had intercepted their progress at this point. This opposition soon ceased, and the column proceeded along the trail over the foothills. No more serious opposition was met until late in the afternoon, when again heavy opposition was met by the advance guard and heavy skirmishing ensued, in which this regiment took no part except the 2 leading companies, which were sent forward and arrived just in time to assist in driving the insurgents off from our right. The brigade camped here for the night. The next morning (June 4) our regiment was assigned to the head of the column.

We broke camp at 5 o'clock, and the march was taken up. After advancing about a mile some serious opposition was met by the advance guard, but the fire was quickly silenced and the insurgents driven off by the dismounted troops of the Fourth Cavalry and two companies of this regiment. March was then again resumed, and no further opposition was met which was not handled by the advance guard until we reached Antipolo. On our arrival at Antipolo, about 10 o'clock in the morning, we anticipated heavy resistance, and immediately upon arrival within sight of the town I threw my regiment in line of skirmishers to the north and east of the town and immediately moved on it. We entered the town with no opposition whatever. After allowing a short stop for rest the line was again formed and we marched to the west over the Camina Real toward Taytay. After about half of this distance had been traveled the column was halted and the men were allowed to eat their noonday meal, when orders were given that we were to return to Antipolo, going from there to Morong. This march was again taken up. We passed through Antipolo, which was rapidly filling up again with natives, and at 7 o'clock in the evening reached the town of Teresa, where the brigade camped for the night. Orders were issued that the column should move at 5 o'clock the next morning, and although this regiment was ready and waiting, the advance movement did not commence until 9.30 o'clock, this being accounted for by the fact that the commanding officer of the Second Oregon Infantry had failed to provide his men with the traveling rations as directed and was obliged to await the arrival of the wagon train. At 9.30 the march was again resumed, and about 12 o'clock this regiment reached Morong. This place was also entered without opposition. The next day, after a long delay for provisions, which came from Manila by cascoes, the march was resumed from Morong at precisely 12 o'clock, the line going through Cardona on to Binangonan, where the column camped for the night, no opposition being met at this point. The column left Binangonan on the morning of June 7 at 5 o'clock and followed a well-made road, the first town we entered being Angono. We remained around about this town for about an hour and a half searching for arms and ammunition, when the forward march was again taken up. We passed through Taytay and Cainta and on to the pumping station, which was reached at 12.15 p. m.

When this regiment started out on this expedition each man carried 200 rounds of ammunition and one day's traveling rations in his haversack, and this one day's ration was kept constantly in the haversack, so that the march of the column was never delayed by this regiment.

The four days spent on this march proved conclusively that troops can not stand a hard march during the heat of the day. The march from Morong to Binangonan on the 6th instant was particularly hard, large numbers of men being obliged to fall out of line on account of the heat. One man—Charles T. Hickman—was slightly wounded in the left foot during the second day's march and was returned to the hospital.

Very respectfully,

HENRY B. MCCOY,
Colonel First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.

No. 6.

[Report.]

HDQRS. SECOND OREGON INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Cuartel de Espana, Manila, P. I., June 11, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command during the campaign from pumping station to Morong:

In compliance with instructions from the commanding officer of the First Division, and further instructions from the brigade commander, 11 companies of the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V. (32 officers, 577 enlisted men), left these barracks at 3.30 p. m. on June 2, 1899, with wagon train carrying three days' rations, and proceeded to the Desposito, and on arrival reported to the brigade commander at 5.30 o'clock p. m. After a short rest command marched to a point about 1 mile this side of pumping station, and in compliance with instructions bivouacked for the night at 7.25 o'clock p. m. Distance traveled, about 9 miles.

The following morning, June 3, left camp at 4 a. m. and advanced on road to pumping station, crossing river at that point, and took position in column in rear of troop of mounted cavalry, and advanced beyond Mariquina, then turned back part way, and after erection of a temporary bridge, crossed same. At this point a detachment of the cavalry was sent to the front and left to reconnoiter and develop the fire of a small force of the enemy. The Third Battalion, Captain Heath commanding, was deployed in line of skirmishers, with left resting on road, and advanced to the front and engaged the enemy, who occupied a strong position in the hills in our front. The Second Battalion, Major Eastwick commanding, advanced on the left of Third Battalion and was deployed to their left, the First Battalion following as support, and with the assistance of the battery drove the enemy from their position over the mountains. Private Ezra Kirk, Company H, slight wound in left wrist.

After a short rest the column then advanced toward Antipolo, the Fourth Cavalry in advance. After marching about 2½ miles the advance guard of the cavalry was fired upon by the enemy, who held strong position on mountain on left; also from position in our front and from our right. First Battalion, Major Willis commanding, advanced in column of files and formed line of skirmishers and advanced to the right. The Second Battalion, Major Eastwick commanding, deployed and formed line of skirmishers to the left. The Third Battalion, Captain Heath commanding, advanced and formed line of skirmishers to the front.

After engagement lasting three quarters of an hour, the enemy was driven from their position, the First Battalion advancing over the mountain on the right to a point about 1½ miles east of Taytay. The Third Battalion advanced over the mountain on the left, driving the enemy from their position, and held position gained until dark, then retired to village at foot of hill and camped for the night. Distance traveled, about 15 miles. William McElwain, private Company H, killed; Austin J. Saulsbury, private Company H, wounded in head, slight; Clayton Ranson, private Company L, wounded in head, slight; Henry M. Wagner, private Company B, wounded in back, serious; Elmer L. Doolittle, private Company C, wounded in right arm, severe.

The enemy's force was estimated to be about 300. Was unable to estimate their loss, which was severe. Eight prisoners were captured, together with 6 rifles.

The following morning, June 4, left camp at 5 a. m., the lines formed with the Second Oregon on the right, and took position on top of mountain east of Taytay and

exchanged few shots with the enemy fleeing over the mountains toward Antipolo. At 3.30 p. m. the column was again formed and crossed over mountain on the Calle Real, passing through Antipolo and marched down to Teresa, arriving at 8.30 p. m., and camped for the night. Distance traveled, about 14 miles.

The following morning, June 5, column left Teresa at 8.45 and marched to Morong, arriving at that point at 12 o'clock noon, and embarked on cascoes for Manila, the First Battalion arriving at barracks at 6.30 p. m., the Third Battalion and 2 companies of the Second arriving at 10.20. Companies C and G, Second Battalion, arrived the following morning, June 7, at 11 a. m. Distance traveled, about 30 miles.

Very respectfully,

O. SUMMERS,

Brevet Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

No. 7.

[Report.]

HDQRS. FIRST WYOMING INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Felipe Convent, June 9, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of movement of the First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry in the Antipolo-Morong expedition, between June 2 and June 8, 1899:

June 2, in obedience to instructions from the brigade commander, the battalion, under Maj. Frank M. Foote, left this point at 6 o'clock p. m. and marched to a field near the pumping station, arriving at 8 o'clock p. m. The command then bivouacked for the night. Distance traveled, 4 miles.

The battalion had been much depleted by sickness, until its strength at starting was as follows:

Maj. Frank M. Foote, commanding.

First Lieut. Harol D. Coburn, adjutant; First Lieut. John S. Morrison, assistant surgeon, U. S. V.

Company C, Capt. Thomas Maller; Second Lieut. Loren Cheever; 40 enlisted men.

Company F, Capt. John D. O'Brien; Second Lieut. W. H. Rouse; 42 enlisted men.

Company G, Capt. D. C. Wrighter; 58 enlisted men.

Company H, Capt. E. P. Holtenhouse; First Lieut. H. A. Ohlenkamp; 42 enlisted men.

One commanding officer's orderly; 4 hospital corps men attached.

Making a total strength: 10 officers, 183 enlisted men, and 4 hospital corps men attached.

June 3, at 3 o'clock a. m., the battalion took position in column behind the Fourth Infantry and marched into San Mateo Valley. Here Captain Wrighter became exhausted and had to return, and Major Foote placed the adjutant in charge of Company G. At Mariquina we found the Colorado troops in possession, and a long halt was made in the valley, during which the Colorados engaged the insurgents beyond Mariquina. At noon we started toward the foothills, and Major Foote and Captain O'Brien, who were suffering from heat exhaustion, were sent back in an ambulance. Lieutenant Rouse immediately took command of Company F, and I assumed command of the battalion.

The Oregons and Fourth Infantry ascended the hills and engaged the enemy and was ordered to hold the battalion in reserve.

At 1 o'clock the battalion moved forward, followed by the Ninth Infantry. The insurgents made an often feeble, but sometimes lively, resistance to the advance as we moved along the mountain road, until sundown, when the command was ordered to camp for the night, and the battalion bivouacked on a small knoll and furnished pickets for the night of camp. The enemy having fired upon the sick and wounded, I furnished a guard for the hospital train during the night.

Requiring the services of the adjutant, I relieved him from command of Company G and placed Lieutenant Ohlenkamp in charge of that company. Strength of the battalion, 7 officers, 172 enlisted men, with 4 hospital men attached.

Dr. Morrison reported 3 officers and 11 enlisted men overcome by heat exhaustion, and 2 enlisted men dropped out and unfit for duty on account of diarrhea during the march. Distance traveled, 8 miles.

June 4, at 4.30 a. m., the command moved on and the battalion took position behind the Fourth Infantry, in skirmish formation, marching by the flank. As we approached Antipolo, Hawthorne's battery got stuck on an almost impassable uphill road, and Lieutenant Rouse was ordered with Company F to the battery's assistance. Receiving orders to send 1 more company to help Lieutenant Hawthorne, I sent Captain Holtenhouse back with Company H for that purpose.

Soon the church of Antipolo appeared in view, and I received orders from the brigade commander to strike off to the left and support the Colorados or extend their line to the left in an attack on the town.

I sent word to Lieutenant Rouse to remain with the battery and directed Captain Holtenhouse to follow the battalion. The men took up a buoyant step and we pushed forward and participated in the capture of Antipolo, entering the left of town and arriving there at 10 o'clock a. m. No casualties.

At 1.30 a. m. the march was resumed in the direction of Taytay, but the command was halted about 2 miles beyond Antipolo, where we were joined by the wagon train, which had come by another route. Here we had dinner, after a long fast, and the command was ordered back through Antipolo to Morong. At this point the sick were sent to Manila in an ambulance. The march was resumed at 3 o'clock p. m. and we descended into a valley and reached Teresa at 8 p. m., where we camped for the night. Strength of the command: 7 officers, 144 enlisted men, with 3 hospital men attached.

The surgeon reported 1 case of epilepsy and 15 cases of heat exhaustion during the march. Other men who fell behind came on with the wagon train next morning. Distance traveled, 16 miles.

June 5, at 9 a. m., the battalion left Teresa, following Hawthorne's battery, and after marching 3 miles the battery broke down; on leaving which I pushed on to Morong, which is situated on the shores of Laguna de Bay, and arrived there at 11.45 a. m. Here we camped for the rest of the day, occupying nipa huts and furnishing guards for the street in which the battalion was stationed. Eight men having joined their companies from Manila and the wagon train, the strength of the battalion was 7 officers, 152 enlisted men, and 3 hospital men attached. Distance traveled, 6 miles.

June 6 we left Morong at 9 a. m. as advance guard, immediately behind the Fourth Cavalry scouts, and after marching 1 mile halted until three days' rations were taken from a casco on the lake close by and issued to the entire brigade. Here the Oregons left by cascoes for Manila. The march was resumed at 1 o'clock, but after marching, with occasional rests, for two hours and passing the Twelfth Infantry and North Dakota troops on the lake road, the heat became so intense that the brigade commander ordered his command in the shade until 4 o'clock, at which hour we proceeded to Binangonan, reaching that point at 5 o'clock p. m. Strength, 7 officers, 152 enlisted men, and 3 hospital men attached. Two men present with the command were reported suffering from malarial fever. Distance traveled, 6 miles. At Binangonan the battalion furnished guards and pickets for the brigade. Captain Holtenhouse, with Company H and a portion of Company G, and Lieutenant Cheever, with Company C, performed these duties. I acted as field officer of the day. It rained a good deal during the night, but the men performed their duties cheerfully.

June 7 we left this point at 5 a. m. as rear guard for the column. Lieutenant Rouse, with Company F, marched in rear of the wagon train. Finding the bridges along the route in wretched condition, I ordered all men of Company G not on guard the previous night to repair the bridges. There were long delays at Angona and other points on account of bad bridges. It rained most of the day and the road, which skirted the lake, was good but very muddy, so the march was not so fatiguing as on the previous days, when the men had to climb in the heat of the sun. We passed through Taytay and Cainta and crossed the valley to Santalon, and reached there with the wagon train at 7 o'clock p. m. Here we found the Fourth and Ninth Infantry quartered, with Colonel Sanno, Fourth Infantry, in command, on reporting to whom quarters were immediately assigned to the battalion, and we took possession at a street of nipa huts, furnishing street guards. Strength, 7 officers, 152 enlisted men, and 3 Hospital Corps men attached. No sickness on the march. Distance traveled, 17 miles.

June 8 the battalion followed the Fourth Infantry out of Santalon at 5 a. m. and marched to deposito, where we left the column and proceeded to our present line, arriving here at 10 a. m. Strength, 7 officers and 152 enlisted men, with 3 hospital men attached. Distance traveled, 7 miles. Total distance traveled, 64 miles.

Taking into consideration the fact that six days' continuous marching was a new experience for the Wyoming Infantry, and also considering the fact that most of the men were much weakened by the tropical sickness when the battalion was ordered

out, the enlisted men are entitled to a good deal of credit for plowing so pluckily through and performing all their duties in such a cheerful spirit.

Much credit for this, however, is due to Captain Holtenhouse, Lieutenants Ohlenkamp, Cheever, and Rouse, all of whom were sick at starting, but who kept up their own spirits, and the spirits of their men. The adjutant attended well to his duties and rendered me valuable assistance on the trip.

I can not pay too high a compliment to Dr. Morrison and his hospital corps for the care and attention given at all times to the large number of sick men during the march and in our various camps.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS MILLAR,
Captain, First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

No. 8.

[Report.]

LAS PINAS, P. I., June 16, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, 2 commissioned officers and 56 enlisted men (mounted), joined your command near Mariquina about 10 p. m. June 2, 1899.

June 3, supported by Captain Gale's dismounted squadron Fourth Cavalry, left at 4 a. m., crossed river at ford $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below pumping station. Finding no outposts of the enemy, joined head of column as advance guard. About noon, while the column was halted, a patrol developed enemy in direction of San Mateo. The troop went to its support; the other troops deployed on left, driving the enemy back. Advance was resumed, and from about 2.30 p. m. until 4.30 p. m. the troop pushed aside small parties of the enemy who were firing upon advance guard. About 4.30 p. m. the advance party developed several bodies. The troop came up as support, encountering hot fire from the right and front and left and front, and was advanced to about 500 yards from hill on left front. Gale's dismounted squadron deployed to the left. The engagement lasted about one hour, until the enemy were driven back by the deployment of the column. Q. M. Sergt. Benjamin Craig was killed and Private Coffield severely wounded.

June 4.—Resumed the advance, supported as before, gradually pushing small parties of enemy until about 10 a. m., when Antipolo was taken by the cavalry and First Colorado after skirmish, the troop supporting the dismounted squadron. During the afternoon's marching Privates Dodd and Anderson became delirious from heat exhaustion and were sent in by ambulances. Arrived at Teresa 7.30 a. m.

June 5.—Resumed advance, arriving at Morong 11.30 a. m. Going into camp, fired on at long range by party of enemy, who were soon driven off.

June 6.—Advanced to Binangonan.

June 7.—Advanced from Binangonan, by way of Angono, to Taytay and Cainta; then to Manila.

Second Lieutenant Boyd, Fourth Cavalry, showed skill and coolness under fire in handling the advance party; First Sergeant Arndt, Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, coolness and good judgment, especially in the engagement of June 3.

Very respectfully,

CECIL STEWART,
First Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding Troop I.

No. 9.

SECOND SQUADRON CAVALRY COMMAND,
Morong, Luzon Island, June 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of this squadron since the 2d instant:

The squadron left its barrack at Manila, in pursuance of orders from the division commander, at 8 p. m. on June 2, the men carrying no blankets and one meal. The wagons had already left, carrying three days' rations and 100 rounds reserve ammunition per man. The command reached the vicinity of Mariquina, where it bivouacked for the night, at 11.30 p. m.

On June 3 the squadron, after a hasty and incomplete breakfast, accompanied by

Troop I, Fourth Cavalry, mounted and carrying 100 rounds reserve ammunition per man in the haversacks, proceeded, at 4 a. m., down the right bank of the Mariquina River, with orders to cut off an outpost of the enemy supposed to be on the left bank of the river and then to rejoin the brigade.

The column marched a mile or a mile and a half down the river when the mounted troop was crossed and the squadron returned up the right bank, intending to intercept the enemy should they retreat to the river. The mounted troop was promptly lost, being unable to keep up communications from across the river, and after slowly working back up the river I crossed at the waterworks and rejoined the brigade.

On rejoining the command the squadron was temporarily assigned to duty as rear guard, but later, with the mounted troop, was detailed as advance guard, and remained as such while it was an integral part of the command. On nearing the east border of the rice fields east of the Mariquina River, the advance being fired on, I was ordered to deploy the squadron to the left to disperse a small squad of the enemy who were harassing the point. This was done, the enemy apparently not numbering more than half a dozen. The ground they occupied was gone over by a scouting party, but they immediately returned after my men withdrew. The advance toward Antipolo was then resumed and conducted very slowly, due to the conditions of the country and the heat, which was most exhausting on the men.

When between 2 and 3 miles from Antipolo the point came upon unmistakable signs of the enemy, presumably in force, but for a long time was unable to tease them into opening fire and revealing their position. At last these efforts were successful and a hot fire was opened on the head of the advance column. The enemy occupied two hills on the left and one on the right of the line of march, and were armed with both Mausers and Remingtons. Two troops were deployed on the left and center, and one platoon of the third troop and the mounted troop, dismounted, on the right, the hills on the right being subsequently cared for by the Oregon regiment. The line was first formed on the low ridge facing the enemy, and after forming the center and right, owing to the front across the intervening low land, receiving a heavy cross fire.

This fire was continued for some time after the advance into low land, but gradually slackened and was practically over when support arrived and occupied the crest behind me. When the support arrived the "cease firing" was sounded from behind the line, and being under the impression that a senior officer had arrived to take command, and in the confusion of the moment I mistook it for the "recall," and moved my squadron back to the crest where they remained, the second line advancing and going up the hill without resistance.

The squadron bivouacked on the line that night, the men making coffee and eating what little they had with them and what the country afforded.

The next morning the squadron was practically without food, and the march to Antipolo was resumed.

The enemy were encountered in small forces in several places, but the march was conducted with practically no delay and the advance guard was halted in front of Antipolo only long enough for the column to close up, when it entered the town with no difficulty. The enemy's trumpets were heard in the town before the entrance was attempted, but there were apparently not over 20 or 30 of the enemy in the town when the deployment was commenced, and they promptly withdrew.

After resting in the town the march was resumed, but beyond the fact that the command retained the duty of advance guard until it reached Morong, nothing of interest occurred during the remainder of the march. Officers and men conducted themselves with zeal and efficiency and were ready and anxious for anything in the line of duty which the circumstances would allow. All were badly worn out with the heat, which completely prostrated a goodly number of the command.

The casualties of this squadron in the fight near Antipolo were 1 killed and 3 wounded, all of whom have subsequently died. Troop I lost 1 killed and 1 wounded.

Very respectfully,

G. H. G. GALE,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding.

No. 10.

[Report.]

SAN PEDRO MACATI, June 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *San Pedro Macati*.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herein an account of the part taken in the expedition beginning June 2, under the command of General Hall, and ending on June 8 by my platoon of Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery.

Under orders from General Hall, the platoon left Caloocan at 6.30 p. m., on June 2, arriving at the pumping station about midnight.

On June 3 (having been joined with 1 platoon of Hawthorne's mountain battery, it formed part of a provisional battery under the command of First Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, Sixth U. S. Artillery), the battery left the pumping station at 4 a. m. and reached the vicinity of Mariquina about noon.

Firing began on our near approach to the foot of the mountains. The battery was brought into action as soon as the development of the insurgent's fire showed their position, and this occurred when the battery was near the first house of the village. The firing was directed mainly on a work almost above the village, from our point of view, and the observed results of the artillery fire were satisfactory.

The battery, on the cessation of fire in that vicinity, moved forward, following as rapidly as was possible the trail taken by the other troops. The roads as we found them were impassable in places, and considerable delay resulted while repairs were being made. About half a mile farther on the trail than our first position the platoon was overtaken by a battalion of the Ninth Infantry, who acted as the escort of the battery for the remainder of that day (June 3).

From that point the route was uneventful (except as to bad places in the roads), until reaching a point in the vicinity of a narrow sunken road (near the point where the brigade went into camp for the night), when the battery came into action to the right and fired on a point where the insurgents had been pointed out, and where black smoke could be seen. During its fire in this position, the battery was fired on from the rear, but the prompt action of Captain McCaleb of the Ninth Infantry in sending Lieutenant Wise's company to that point put an end to the firing spoken of. The battery went into camp that night next to the Ninth Infantry.

On June 4 the battery moved at 5 o'clock a. m. On approaching the first very steep slope of the trail leading to Antipolo, difficulty was found in getting all guns and vehicles up that were drawn by ponies. The mules that drew my 2 guns experienced no difficulty at this point. This inclination of the trail proved too steep for the escort wagon which had been assigned to me as a means of transportation of rations, forage, and ammunition. The wagon was, by order of First Lieutenant Hawthorne, Sixth Artillery, destroyed by fire, it having appeared that it could not, by repeated efforts of the animals, assisted by men, be gotten further. The ammunition was removed, and the wagon and contents then burned. The mules were used to assist in getting the pony carts (to which the ammunition from the wagon had been transferred) over the trail. It proved impossible to reach Antipolo in time to take part in the firing that occurred there.

The 4 guns under my charge advanced along the road to Taytay from Antipolo, but the command had halted about a mile and a half from Antipolo. Shortly before 3 o'clock in the afternoon Lieutenant Hawthorne, with the remainder of the battery, joined us. Shortly afterwards the command marched in the direction of Morong, camping at Teresa for the night. On the 5th the march was resumed to Morong, where the command went into quarters for the night. On the 6th three days' rations were issued, and the march continued to Binangonan. On the 7th a village across the river from the pumping station was reached, and the command remained there for the night. On June 8 the platoon separated from Lieutenant Hawthorne's platoon at the San Leobastian Church, continuing our march to Caloocan.

Lieutenant Hawthorne was sent into Manila from Morong on one of the boats on account of sickness. From that point until the separation of the platoons, I was in command of the battery.

One point has been omitted; when the slope was encountered where the wagon was burned the two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss guns of my platoon, being drawn by mules, first reached the summit of the slope, and came into action against a trench on the opposite mountain side, from which firing was seen to proceed. After about 10 shots were fired the firing ceased temporarily, and when the other guns came up, firing having begun again from that vicinity, it was stopped by fire from both platoons. The battery had no occasion to fire further during the expedition.

Very respectfully,

ALSTON HAMILTON,
First Lieutenant, First Artillery,
Commanding Platoon of Light Battery E, First Artillery.

No. 11.

MANILA. P. I., *June 12, 1899.*

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my battery in the movement to Antipolo and Morong:

Under orders of the commanding officer First Brigade, First Division, I left barracks at Paco at 7 o'clock p. m. June 3, marched to the pumping station, and went into bivouac.

Here I was joined by a platoon of Light Battery E, First Artillery, under command of First Lieut. Alston Hamilton, First Artillery. My battery then consisted of two 3-inch mountain howitzers, two 1.65-inch mountain guns, 4 native carts for the transportation of the 3-inch howitzer ammunition, 1 native cart for supplies for same, and 1 escort wagon containing supplies and ammunition for the platoon of mountain guns. The howitzers and carts were hauled by native ponies, while the guns and escort wagon were hauled by American mules.

We broke camp at 4 a. m. June 4, crossed the Mariquina River about a quarter of a mile below the pumping station, and rejoined the column on the Mariquina road. The battery moved slowly and laboriously across the plain, east of the river, the surface being a network of paddy field ridges and quite soft.

After several hours the head of the column reached the hills, and just as the battery was about to leave the plain fire began in front. I went into battery at once to the right, located considerable fire on the hills directly in front, and opened fire. I fired about 25 rounds, getting the range (1,600 yards) quickly, and driving away the enemy. The march was then resumed and some hours later the head of the column again came in touch with the enemy. I was able to get into battery against their left at about 1,400 yards. While in battery at this position a party of the enemy opened on us from the rear at close range, but were soon driven away by 2 companies of the Ninth Infantry then supporting the battery.

The battery bivouacked that night near where this attack took place, and the next morning, June 5, took up the march with the command. About an hour after starting the enemy again showed on our front, and I obtained a good position halfway up the first mountain, and at 1,550 yards soon shelled them out and followed them with shrapnel fire beyond the hills where they had appeared. The country had now become so difficult for my transportation that for fear the battery would fall too much to the rear I equipped a cart with a small supply of ammunition for the two kinds of guns and sent it on under Lieutenant Hamilton, while I used every effort to bring up the remainder of my ammunition column. The road was but a trail and unutterably bad. The carts were in no sense adapted to such work, while the presence of the escort wagon on such a road was an absurdity. The first hill was too steep and the trail too narrow—full of ruts, and so closely bordered by trees and bushes that much time was consumed in getting up the ammunition, which had to be carried up by hand, the ponies led, and the carts hauled up by the men, all under a scorching sun. In the meantime the column had passed on, and before noon was miles ahead, leaving me with 1 company of the Ninth Infantry as escort. Word came back from the brigade commander to destroy the escort wagon if it could not be got through. I used every effort to get it through, with men and mules and by unloading it, but our efforts were futile. Its driver, an excellent one, said it was impossible, and, seeing that it was so, I ordered its destruction, bringing away everything that my already overloaded carts would carry. Later we went over a trail that in a dozen places would have prevented the passage of this wagon. In one place there was a stretch of more than half a mile where the ammunition was carried by the infantrymen, the ponies unhitched, and the carts dragged by hand.

I reached Antipolo to find that the column had passed on to Taytay, where I joined it just as it was moving out for Teresa. My men had had nothing to eat since morning, and got nothing until we reached Teresa, about 7 p. m. With the wagon were destroyed the rations for Lieutenant Hamilton's platoon of the First Artillery and the forage for the mules, but this deficiency I supplied from my own cart, which met me at Taytay. A delay of the train on the morning of June 6 prevented us breaking camp before 9 o'clock, and that morning we marched to Morong, reaching there about noon, where I went into battery in front of the church, prepared to shell out the enemy who had been firing from the hills. No enemy appeared. At this place I fell sick from heat exhaustion, and was compelled to turn the battery over to Lieutenant Hamilton and proceed to quarters by steamer. This I did on the morning of June 7. On this last march two carts broke down and were abandoned, the ammunition being brought in by the train. Many of my men were exhausted by the time we reached Morong.

the battery is equipped, and has been ever since its organization, it is wholly fitted to do duty as a "mountain" battery, and yet all of its service has been performed in country in which only mountain artillery can be used with full effect. Its limited equipment has been the source of breaking down many of the men, the cause of much delay to the columns with which it had marched, a source of irritation to commanders of troops because of its slowness in getting into position, and of humiliation to me in being unable to answer every call made on its service. It does appear to have been impossible to have equipped this mountain battery properly because of want of needful animals, for the platoon of the First Artillery joined me with guns weighing (with carriages) 360 pounds drawn by mules, while my guns, weighing 570 pounds, were drawn by poor native ponies, and with an escort wagon drawn by mules, while my ammunition carts were drawn by native ponies. The two classes of mountain guns were fired side by side, and I have no hesitancy in saying that the 3-inch howitzer is in every respect far superior to the 1.65-inch mountain gun for any work in the Philippines. If those 6 mules wasted on the light battery could have been given to 1 platoon of howitzers drawn by ponies in tandem, pack animals for ammunition, all the difficulties and troubles of my battery would vanish. To properly equip my battery of four 3-inch howitzers, I need 4 mules, 12 pack mules for ammunition, and 4 mules for supplies. I have full complement of pack saddles.

Very respectfully,

H. L. HAWTHORNE,
First Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery, Commanding Mountain Battery.

No. 12.

[Report.]

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Pedro Macati, P. I., June 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from my division commander, Major-General Lawton, 2 battalions North Dakota regiment under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, 8 companies First Washington regiment under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fife, 1 battalion Twelfth Infantry under command of Major Haskell, and their guns proceeded to and joined at Pasig on June 3, where I proceeded also with staff, the above troops having been placed under my command.

At about 1 o'clock p. m. the same day orders were received from General Lawton to move cautiously on Cainta. The North Dakotas at once with 1 gun advanced northward to a point on the Pasig side and opposite Cainta. The remainder of the command at the same time advanced on the Mariquina road until we came to a road running easterly to Cainta, upon which we advanced. When within a mile of Cainta the First Washingtons were advancing in column of files toward the north until it reached the ridge.

In the meantime the Twelfth Infantry formed a line of skirmishers to the front and on right of the road.

When the ridge was reached the whole line moved forward onto Cainta. The left flank of the line met considerable resistance from the enemy and many shots were exchanged. No one injured on our side and none that we know of on the side of the enemy. This line entered and captured Cainta at about 5.15 in the evening without casualties. In the meantime the North Dakotas moved to their front and entered the south of Cainta, making a continuous line around Taytay on the west and north sides.

The battalion of the Twelfth, the North Dakotas, and Scott's guns were left to guard this line, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, and the Washingtons were withdrawn and marched back to Pasig. The troops left at Cainta were to remain thereafter with General Hall's command.

At about 2 o'clock Sunday morning, June 4, 8 companies of the First Washington regiment, all under my command, were embarked in cascoes, the last of the cascoes leaving Pasig about 7 o'clock in the morning. All proceeded to Morong, arriving at Morong at about 10.30 a. m. All troops immediately disembarked and landed ashore, the landing being covered by firing from Captain Grant's gunboats. We immediately prepared a movement on Morong, receiving instantly a heavy fire from the town and entrenchments around it.

Line was formed of the whole 8 companies and immediate advance was made upon the town, and after a sharp engagement of about thirty minutes captured the town, killing 9 insurgents and wounding 5. No casualties on our side. We immediately occupied the town, putting out necessary scouts and detachments to guard incoming roads.

The command was allowed to rest during the afternoon and night, and early in the morning scouts were sent out to make observations, gain information, and, if possible, locate General Hall's command. One company was posted at the junction of the roads leading to Antipolo and up the lake. One squad of scouts in dislodging a strong outpost of the enemy had 1 man killed, they killing 1 officer and 3 men of the enemy.

General Hall's command was observed advancing toward Morong about 11 o'clock a. m., and a few minutes thereafter this advance was in Morong, his whole command occupying the town a little later. General Hall, seeing that he had no further use for my command, advised that I return in compliance with his instructions from division commander.

At 1 o'clock p. m., June 5, my command embarked on cascoes and started to return, meeting the division commander about a mile out from Morong. We were ordered to halt and remain at anchor where we were for about two hours, when we again moved at the command of General Lawton.

Considerable delay was caused by pilot's failure to keep the course and find the channel. We arrived at Pasig where the whole command disembarked about 6 o'clock a. m., June 7, the different companies returning to their original stations.

The instructions and advice from my division commander were followed throughout.

I wish to especially mention for conspicuous service Lieut. William L. Luhn, first lieutenant and adjutant First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., acting assistant adjutant-general of the expedition; Principal Musician William E. Nickerson, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.; Sergt. W. E. Miller, Company M, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Edward C. Hanford, Company K, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Laurin L. Lawson, Company D, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.; and Private A. R. Porter, Company L, First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. WHOLLEY,
Colonel First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.

No. 13.

[Report.]

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command, 1 platoon (2 guns) of Light Battery D (Dyer's), Sixth Artillery, in the expedition against Morong in the early part of June, 1899.

Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, June 3, 1899, I reported to Colonel Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, at Pasig about noon on the 4th of June. He directed me to send 1 gun to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, to assist him in the front attack on Cainta, the other gun, under my personal direction, to accompany him to Mariquina road, to the Cainta crossroad, thence toward Cainta. The gun under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann got into action early and bombarded Cainta at ranges of upward of 2,000 yards, it being impossible to get nearer. I was in such a position as to observe the effects of the fire at an angle of about 60 degrees with the plane of fire and a distance of less than 1,000 yards. The shrapnel with a single exception burst in good positions, and as all the trenches and barricades in the town were found to be parallel to the plane of fire, I have no doubt that the fire of that 1 gun was responsible for the fact that the trenches and barricades of Cainta were deserted when our scouts reached there, the enemy having withdrawn to Taytay without firing a shot. This gun was under the command of Corporal Ramsey, Fourteenth Infantry, attached for duty to the battery. He acted as gunner, also, as there was no other man in his section available. The enemy was found to be strongly intrenched in front of Taytay and the only bridge across an otherwise impracticable (for artillery) stream was broken down. I repaired the bridge, and about 6 p. m. got the gun across and opened on the enemy's breastwork at 600 yards. For a time their fire was very fierce and well directed, but after a few shots from the gun they became apparently totally demoralized, their number seemed to decrease, and their fire became wild.

It was soon too dark to see the sights and I directed a few shots into the town, using the white wall of the church as an auxiliary target.

The other gun reported about 8 p. m., and I put it in position to open on the enemy at daylight. Before that time, however, I received orders to send it back across the river to be used against Taytay from a point further south. It was not used. At daylight I again opened on the trenches, but the enemy soon disappeared entirely, and I advanced with the line of the Twelfth United States Infantry (Major Haskell) to find the town evacuated. From the yard in front of the church I had several shots at a small force of the enemy about a mile to the southward, moving toward Angono. I then went on toward Antipolo and was well up to the head of the column, which was rapidly disintegrating on account of the heat and the steep road, when General Hall was met and the column ordered to return to Tattay.

Arrived there, Corporal Ramsey reported, and at 3 p. m. the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, 1 battalion Twelfth United States Infantry (Major Haskell), and my command, under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, started for Angono. At this place a small force of the enemy was discovered moving south and the artillery opened on it for a few minutes, scattering it.

The command camped at Angono and at 5.30 a. m. on the 6th moved on Binangonan, which town was entered without opposition about midday. At 3 p. m. the march was resumed and Cardina was reached about 6 p. m. Here the column rested until the arrival of General Hall's command from Morong on the afternoon of the 7th of June, when I received verbal orders from the division commander, through General Hall, to return to my former position at San Pedro Macati with the Twelfth Infantry. Accordingly the command marched to Binangonan that afternoon, arriving there about 8 p. m.

At 5.30 a. m. on the 8th the march was resumed, and by a misunderstanding of my instructions the first sergeant got the platoon on the road ahead of General Hall's wagon train and just in the rear of his column, the Twelfth Infantry being in rear of the wagon train.

There are two bamboo bridges between Binangonan and Angono, which I crossed by unhitching and hauling over by hand limber and gun separately, but which I felt morally certain the loaded wagons of the train could not cross, nor did they, the first loaded wagon going through into the river.

This being the case, I continued on with General Hall's column, which did not wait for its train, to the Mariquina road, whence I came into Pasig alone about 2 p. m. I rested the command here for two hours, and then proceeded to San Pedro Macati, arriving there about 7 p. m. June 8.

There were no casualties in the command on this expedition and the men stood the work well. With a few exceptions they were recruits, but their behavior under fire was good.

Transportation was limited, only 2 mules being allowed per gun, and on the return trip I was forced to ask the transportation quartermaster of General Hall's command for 2 pairs of mules to use as leaders, the other mules being too much weakened by heavy hauling and insufficient food to haul the guns up even slight declivities. One of them died. After returning the extra pair were returned to the quartermaster (Lieutenant McLean, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry).

All the roads traversed were solid and well made, but in bad repair. A stone bridge is broken down between Pasig and Cainta and another in Cainta. These, with the two bamboo bridges before mentioned, are the only ones between Pasig and Morong via Binangonan and Cardina. But in going from Cardina to Binangonan the road rises in one place about 500 feet in a quarter of a mile, an extremely difficult grade for wagons, requiring 6 mules to each, and they were obliged to make frequent halts.

Very respectfully,

E. D. Scott,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

No. 14.

GENERAL HALL'S PROJECT.

Mounted troop moves down the river, crosses below insurgent outpost, which they will capture or destroy; then lead the column across the valley and by trail over bridge to next valley, and then south; guides will be with this troop.

Dismounted cavalry moves down the river in support of mounted troop, and then serves as advance guard and flankers for infantry column.

Colorado battalion will cross at pumping station, and move east and north of

Mariquina, advance on town and capture or destroy garrison, probably 100, and then follow column.

Oregon regiment cross at pumping station and follow dismounted cavalry.

Battery follows Oregon regiment.

Fourth Infantry battalion follows battery.

Wyoming battalion follows Fourth Infantry.

• Ninth Infantry battalion follows Wyomings and furnishes rear guard.

The march will be conducted with a view of placing head of column east of Antipolo and toward Teresa, where line will be formed facing west or south of west from left to right, as follows: Mounted troop, dismounted cavalry, Oregon regiment, battery, Fourth Infantry battalion, Wyoming battalion, Ninth Infantry battalion, Colorado battalion.

• The object will now be the capture of Antipolo and of Taytay, and driving the enemy into the Morong peninsula. To this end the mounted and dismounted troops will extend well to the left, to prevent the enemy's escape to the east. During the advance, demonstration against Cainta will be made by First Washingtons and enemy's battery south of Taytay will be silenced by gunboat.

A second gunboat will be in the bay south of town of Morong. If the enemy is forced into peninsula General Lawton will cross a force on cascoes from Pasig to complete victory.

The enemy's escape being impossible, the south line will engage enemy actively during the day. In the event of the success of our advance, troops under Colonel Wholley will join the right of the Colorado battalion and assist driving the enemy into peninsula.

ROBERT H. HALL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS SENT AND RECEIVED.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 3, 1899.*

Lieutenant Scott, *Sixth Artillery*:

Commanding general directs that you report your 2 guns to Colonel Wholley. Colonel Wholley will be out and explain details.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 30, 1899.*

Major EDWARDS, *Paco*:

I wish you would go to Pasig at once and keep me posted as to the situation there. See if Wholley's command is in readiness, if gunboats are in position, and also report when cascoes and launches will arrive. Tell Starr to come out and inspect the north line, and ask Ovenshine if the south line, particularly at Taguig, is satisfactory. Everything at this end apparently progressing smoothly. Staff and orderlies, mounted, should be ready to start when called. Have my mounted orderlies with my horse also ready, and order a horse equipped from cavalry for Senator Beveridge, who is also with me.

LAWTON,
Major-General Commanding.

[Telegram.]

PACO, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Am just starting for Pasig; Starr notified Ovenshine. Ovenshine notifies that he will be at San Pedro; Staff and orderlies notified.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

SAN PEDRO, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Southern line is all right. Sage just started to Taguig to see how it is there.

OVENSHINE.

[Telegram.]

DEPOSITO, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

I am at Deposito, and report for instructions as to inspection of north line.

STARR.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 3, 1899.*

Major STARR, *Deposito:*

Ride over the line and see how the troops are distributed and that all parts are equally protected. Make any necessary changes and give necessary orders.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

EAST OF MARIQUINA, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Have been looking for a crossing over difficult wet ravine. Guides have at last found one which, with a little labor, can be made practicable for artillery and ambulances. Shall move on as soon as this can be effected, in a few minutes.

HALL, *Brigadier-General.*

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 3, 1899.*

General HALL:

Glad to hear of your successful progress. Ambulances must not be allowed to impede progress. If necessary, they must be turned back and join later over more favorable route.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 3, 1899.*

General HALL:

Your column seems to be in the same position for more than hour. What is the trouble? General Otis is inquiring as to your progress. Ambulances have arrived back.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

FIELD, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Column has crossed wet ravine previously reported and is stopped by another still worse than the first. This was reported by guides to have been dry three days ago. Am now attempting to bridge it for passage of men with means at hand. Am making no unnecessary delay, but am experiencing much bad luck.

HALL, *Brigadier-General.*

312 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Reported to headquarters of department with following remark: "I doubt possibility of making attack before to-morrow morning. I am sure Hall can not reach his position before night. Will come in to see the General this p. m."

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, *June 3, 1899.*

General HALL:

I doubt possibility of your reaching position to attack before to-morrow a. m. If you are of that opinion, make dispositions accordingly. You will have to arrange for another day's rations. Let me know.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

This ravine nearly ready for crossing. Guides report rough mountain road between here and Antipolo, but I think that I can make the attack as ordered before night. Men's rations are with wagons at pumping station, and I had contemplated bringing them over to Cainta this afternoon.

HALL, *Brigadier-General*.

Reported to palace (department headquarters) with following remark: "I have instructed Hall to push on. I shall go to Pasig soon."

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, *Luzon, June 3, 1899.*

General HALL:

All right. Go ahead. That's the kind of talk I like. Let me know when you are ready for us to strike from our end and we will have Cainta open for your wagons.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

General LAWTON:

Shall begin crossing infantry in a few minutes. Insurgents on left have opened slight fire on cavalry skirmish.

HALL, *Brigadier-General*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON:

Just arrived. Wholley reports his scouts went within 300 yards of Cainta yesterday. Only small force there but large force in Taytay. All troops here. Twelfth Infantry crossing ferry. All over but one company. Major Weisenburger, with Tagnig companies, just entering town. Gun reported at mouth of river. Grant just arrived; says last casco left at 10.45 a. m. Will be here in an hour and a-half.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, *Luzon*, June 3, 1899.

ALL:

Just received from Major Edwards, at Pasig: "Wholley reports his within 300 yards of Cainta yesterday; only small force of insurgents there, force at Taytay." I think best to take Cainta at once. What do you

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, *Luzon*, June 3 1899.

WELL, *Aid-de-Camp*,

Headquarters First Division, Paco:

and King, with my horse, horse for Beveridge, my mounted orderlies, I, report to me at pumping station.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

WTON,

Alva, also at Headquarters First Division, Paco:

ready eating their dinners. No indications of anything taking place to is viewed from church tower here. Gunboats in position, with signal land to communicate with church tower. Colonel Wholley anxious to her he shall move out at 1 o'clock in the event of not hearing from you time.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899—12.30 p. m.

WTON:

Suerte and *Norte*, with six cascoes, just arrived. Have been stationed at . Other expected here shortly.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899—1 p. m.

WTON, *Camp Alva:*

ly reported, six cascoes with launches *Suerte* and *Norte* here; two more and another launch expected. Captain *Norte* reports that the sergeant in ila ordered him to report back; also that he understands *The Captain* was it couldn't get under bridge, so he brought up four cascoes. I told him te here. Brought water. Now 1 o'clock.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

FRONT, June 3, 1899.

WTON:

pretty strong forces in hills in front, probably several hundred. It would be a good thing for you to take Cainta as proposed.

HALL, *Brigadier-General*.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, Luzon, June 3, 1899.

General HALL:

I observe fires in your vicinity. Orders should be given that no property shall be destroyed, except by your order. Press forward as speedily as possible.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Major Weisenburger, just from Taguig, reports many single shots all night; firing from 9, continuing at intervals all night long; was unusual. Lookout reported quiet movement on the lake from Taguig left across the lake. Lookout interpreted this movement in a boat as a change of enemy's southern troops to north. Weisenburger says he noticed much less force of enemy in his front this morning than has been there the last three weeks.

EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, June 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Hall's advance engaged with two or three hundred insurgents in foothills west of Antipolo. Weisenburger, from Taguig, reports enemy moving across lake last night in boats to the north, and that force in front of Taguig smaller apparently than heretofore. Wholley reports his scouts went within 300 yards of Cainta; only small force there, but large force at Taytay. I have ordered Wholley to advance cautiously on Cainta, and gunboats to make demonstration. I will remain here for the present.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, June 3, 1899.

Major EDWARDS, Pasig:

Direct Colonel Wholley to advance cautiously on Cainta. Also, direct Captain Grant to make demonstration with gunboat. Hall engaged with about 300 enemy in foothills. Acknowledge and report.

LAWTON, Major-General.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Yours received. Have directed Wholley to advance cautiously on Cainta, and will signal Grant on gunboats immediately.

EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Signaled.]

JUNE 3, 1899.

Captain GRANT, Gunboat:

Make demonstration with gunboat. General Lawton reports General Hall engaged with about 300 insurgents in foothills.

EDWARDS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, *June 3, 1899—2.15 p. m.*

Major EDWARDS, *Pasig*:

Orders telegraphed more than an hour since to move on Cainta; acknowledgment requested, but not received.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PASIG, *June 3, 1899—2.15 p. m.*

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Your message received at 1.12 immediately answered. Troops on march now. Last of them left here at 1.30 p. m. Gunboats just pulling out.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, *June 3, 1899.*

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER:

I am having great delays in sending important messages to Pasig. It will be impossible to conduct the work unless I can get quick communication.

LAWTON, *Major-General.*

[Telegram.]

PASIG, *June 3, 1899—2.15 p. m.*

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Sage, just returned from Taguig, says everything quiet; very few insurgents in sight. Napidan shelling Taytay.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram. Sent 3.10 p. m.; received 3.36 p. m.]

PASIG, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Scott's gun, with Colonel Treumann, opened on Cainta. One North Dakota volley just heard. Washingtons look from here as though they had very nearly reached left of insurgent trenches at Cainta; began to deploy ten minutes ago. Glasses reveal an exodus of native women and children northeast of Taytay. Gunboat out of mouth of river. No resistance as yet.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram. Sent 3.55 p. m.; received 4.17.]

PASIG, *June 3, 1899.*

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Grant signals from lake: "Have been shelling Cainta. Our troops near there. Let us know when you are ready to shell shore." Not hearing from you soon, will direct him to carry out yesterday's programme. Wholley's column about 1 mile from Cainta. Wind in wrong direction; little firing can be heard.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899—4.35 p. m.

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

From top of church can be seen what appears heavy skirmish line on the right of Taytay, and on continuation of line drawn on map through Pasig and Taytay, one-third of way from Taytay to Angona road, Sage and other officers on steeple report insurgents in numbers—one to two thousand. Courier from Wholley reports his right wing engaged enemy at 4.15. No casualties.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram. Sent 4.19 p. m.: received 4.44 p. m.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Grant shelling Angona. Inhabitants running around in great confusion; large numbers going over hill, east, and others running toward Taytay. Great exodus over the hill from Taytay, northeast. A panic seems to have struck them all around the country; gunboat going east and firing rapidly. Company of insurgents can be seen going from Angono to Taytay.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, June 3, 1899.

Major EDWARDS, *Pasig*:

Cainta and Wholley's command are in full view from here. Do not think gunboats have reached Cainta or Taytay with their shells; will try to go to Pasig via Cainta to-night. In the meantime let affairs remain in statu quo.

LAWTON, *Major-General*.

[Telegram. Sent 4.30 p. m.: received 4.47 p. m.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

General LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Eight cascoes arrived; last two brought by quartermaster's supply boat, which has returned. Hospital boat *New York* still here. We need it.

EDWARDS.

[Telegram.]

General LAWTON:

Colonel Wholley states that the enemy has been driven to Taytay, and his regiment is now relieved by 1 battalion of the Twelfth Infantry. He says everything is all right, and I therefore directed him to embark his command in cascoes. The road is all right except at the river, which is up to the hubs of an ambulance. Better not bring ladies, as there is still firing here and a few stray bullets. Colonel Wholley has not yet heard from Colonel Hall; he states that everybody from here (insurgents) has gone to the peninsula. Will await you here.

KING, *Aid*.

[Telegram.]

FRONT, June 3, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Enemy just opened fire on our left flank; not heavy as yet. Our lines advancing in skirmish line.

GIBBS.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

LAWTON, *Camp Alva*:

Ensign Webb of the *Covadonga* just reported, says Grant sent him here; that ~~indan~~ silenced 1 gun in Augono battery that fired on them. Then sent to other side of peninsula and returned here. On return hit by shell from stern. No damage done.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *Camp Alva*:

Anything yet been heard from General Hall?

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

CAMP ALVA, LUZON, June 3, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Report from General Hall at 4 p. m. said he had met large force of enemy and asked Lawton to advance on Taytay about 5 p. m.

TAYLER, *Captain, Commanding Camp*.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 3, 1899.

HALL, *via Camp Alva*:

Report yet received from you of to-day's operations. Commanding general wishes each report early as possible.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, June 4, 1899.

LAWTON:

Instructions issued to go over line beyond pumping station if necessary. An escort will be needed in this event and Captain McKenna will ask for it.

THOMPSON.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, June 4, 1899.

LAWTON:

Started men from here to go over wire beyond pumping station and fix trouble. Please instruct commanding officer at pumping station to furnish an escort.

McKENNA, *Captain*.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, June 4, 1899.

LAWTON:

Retrieved about 100 yards of wire taken out of line 5 miles from pumping station; am repairing it.

McKENNA, *Captain*.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, June 4, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General First Division*:

Regarding the General's message reference to wire between Mariquina and Cainta, I am not permitted to do any work north of Pasig River except by special order.

McKENNA, *Captain*.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, June 4, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Found the wire cut in many places and wire carried away; also found Lieutenant Gibbs had not attempted to string any wire this morning. I went to Antipolo, found General Hall's forces had taken the town this a. m. without resistance, and left there for Taytay at 10.30 a. m.

McKENNA, *Captain*.

[Telegram.]

DEPOSITO, June 4, 1899.

General LAWTON:

Following just received from Captain McKenna: "Field, June 4.—Regarding the General's message reference to wire between Mariquina and Cainta, I am not permitted to do any work north of Pasig River except by special order." I told him to take up present wire and string one from Pasig to Cainta, Taytay, etc.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General*.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, June 4, 1899.

Major EDWARDS:

I am going to Taytay and will communicate the General's wishes to Lieutenant Gibbs, who is with General Hall.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

FIELD, June 4, 1899.

EDWARDS:

I have received orders from Colonel Thompson to run whatever line General Lawton wishes; will attend to it at once.

McKENNA.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, June 4, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

General Hall had left Taytay one hour before my arrival there, so did not communicate to him the General's wishes regarding Scott's guns. Shall I send messenger to him in the morning with information as above?

McKENNA.

[Letter.]

MORONG, June 4, 1899—12.30 p. m.

Major EDWARDS,

Assistant Adjutant-General First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Arrived with my command off Morong at 11 a. m. Disembarked at once and surgeons immediately opened fire on us. We drove the enemy from their cover and from immediate vicinity of Morong. The enemy left 9 dead and 5 wounded in the field. No casualties on our side, but several men overcome by the heat. My future movements will be governed by circumstances or further orders from you. Will remain here temporarily, as a little rest is absolutely necessary for the men.

JOHN H. WHOLLEY,
Colonel First Washington Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Telegram.]

PASIG, June 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION:

Thirty-eight men here belonging to different organizations sent in from front by surgeon, but not tagged. Hospital boat refuses to take them. Please advise what shall be done with them.

A. H. OTIS, *Captain, Commanding.*

Major Edwards's compliments; wishes to know what can be done with them. Referred to chief surgeon for action.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, June 5, 1899.

Captain OTIS, *Pasig*:

If hospital boat is not gone, put the sick men aboard; if necessary by guard. If boat is gone, can you care for them till we can get boat or ambulances? How many wounded? How many sick?

CARDWELL, *Chief Surgeon.*

[Telegram.]

MANILA, June 5, 1899.

Major CROSBY, *Hospital*:

Captain Otis wires from Pasig that hospital boat refused to take 38 sick men from Pasig sent in from front; presumably because not tagged. The surgeon's failure to tag can not be allowed to prevent proper care of the men. If the boat comes back without them please send her back for them.

CARDWELL, *Chief Surgeon.*

[Telegram.]

FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, June 5, 1899.

EDWARDS, *Adjutant-General First Division*:

The private in charge of launch personally interviewed each one of these men at Pasig. They did not have any transfer slip to hospital or authority to come to hospital. Do you want the launch to bring in anyone who wants to come in without any authority?

CROSBY.

**REPORT OF R. P. HUGHES, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V., COM-
MANDING VISAYAN MILITARY DISTRICT.**

HDQRS. VISAYAN MILITARY DISTRICT
AND FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Iloilo, P. I., August 5, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL
*Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.*

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions of July 24, I submit the following report of operations of this command from its origin to June 30, 1899.

The First Separate Brigade was organized December 24, 1898, as per paragraph 1, General Orders, No. 39, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. As then organized, it consisted of Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery; Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry.

The same order directed that this brigade, under the command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. V., should proceed to Iloilo, island of Panay, by transports *Newport, Arizona, and Pennsylvania*, and execute special instructions of the department commander. The special instructions were as follows:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR,
AND HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 24, 1899.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In obedience to the instructions of the President of the United States, dated the 22d instant, directing that troops be sent to Iloilo, island of Panay, there "to preserve the peace and protect life and property," your command has been selected for this duty and has been ordered to depart therefor on Monday next, the 26th instant.

Those instructions contain the following cautionary language:

"It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm."

When they were given it was supposed that the Spanish forces in Iloilo, and in conflict with the insurgent inhabitants of the island, would retain their hold of the city until the arrival of the United States troops, when they would transfer all authority to the latter and peaceably evacuate.

From cable dispatches received this morning from northern Panay it is feared that the Spanish troops may surrender the city to the insurgents before your arrival, in which event your duties will become more complicated and will require delicate and skillful action for their successful prosecution. However, every possible precautionary measure has been taken to retain the Spanish forces at Iloilo until your arrival. Yesterday a cablegram was sent to northern Panay, the limit of telegraphic communication with Iloilo, advising the commanding general of those forces of your early departure from this port, and this evening a fast vessel will be dispatched carrying the same information, but it is possible that these measures may fail to accomplish desired results.

In the event of your arrival at Iloilo prior to the departure of the Spanish troops therefrom you will communicate with their commanding general, inviting him, in accordance with an existing mutual understanding, to remove his forces, to permit

you to take formal possession of the city, and thereupon, with his consent, proceed to occupy the same with your command. If, on the contrary, you find the city to be in the possession of the insurgents, you will proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestations of meditated forcible action and undue display of force. You will place yourself in communication with the insurgent authorities through the representative men of Iloilo, whom you will take from Manila with you on your voyage and who will use their best endeavors to bring to a successful determination any difficulties which may present themselves. You will make known to the inhabitants the purpose of the United States, which, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands under treaty stipulations following conquest in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, intends to establish among them an efficient and most able form of government which shall fully protect them in all their private interests and liberties, in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity. As a slight proof of your declared intention you will release unto them the Spanish-native soldiers sent here by the Spanish authorities, whom, through the efforts of the United States authorities, will be turned to their former home in Panay, who will accompany you and who are grateful for the supervision which those authorities have exercised over them. You will send the representative people of Iloilo a superior class and amenable to reason, and it is believed that they will place confidence in the faith and good intentions of the United States and will accord you a most favorable reception. No undue haste will be made, and the rights of your Government will be made known and insisted upon. Conflict between troops will be avoided unless it becomes necessary for defense. Should you be able to effect a landing as a result of your negotiations you will disembark only a sufficient portion of your command to subserve present purposes, the remainder being held on transports awaiting further instructions. Should you not be able to effect a landing without conflict you will hold your forces on your transports in the vicinity of Iloilo and await further instructions from these headquarters. In all these matters you must be governed to a great extent by your own good judgment, after a careful deliberation upon conditions, having in view the instructions of the President of the United States to avoid armed repression.

The government which you are called upon to establish in Iloilo will be one of military occupation. Upon taking possession it will be your duty to issue an order proclaiming such a government within the territory occupied or controlled by the United States forces under your command.

The municipal laws of the territory occupied or controlled as aforesaid, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the new order of things, unless suspended or superseded by proper military authorities. The judges and other officials connected with the administration of these laws may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man, but under the supervision of the said military authorities.

The local courts thus continued in power shall not, however, exercise jurisdiction over any crime or offense committed by any person belonging to the Army of the United States, or any retainer of the Army, or person serving with it, or any person furnishing or transporting supplies for the Army, or over any crime or offense committed on either of the same by any inhabitant or temporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except when courts-martial have cognizance, jurisdiction to try and punish is vested in military commissions and provost courts, which will be convened (by you) from time to time, as occasion may require.

For the purpose of providing for the prompt punishment of crime in cases where the civil courts may fail, from whatever cause, the military commission and provost courts will, in addition to the exercise of powers above indicated, be vested with jurisdiction concurrent with the civil courts to hear and determine all crimes and offenses committed by inhabitants or temporary residents within the limits of United States occupation. Of these crimes and offenses, those which are capital, and such others as you may desire to refer to it, will be brought to trial before a military commission, and those which are not capital, which may be adequately punished within the punishing power of provost courts, may be referred to them for trial. Trials by civil courts, however, will be preferred where there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done.

In all sentences imposed by military commissions and provost courts the punishments awarded shall conform as far as possible, in character and degree, to the laws of the United States, or of either of the States, or the customs of war. The proceedings of military commissions, after being acted upon by you, will be forwarded to these headquarters for the action of the commanding general. The punishment

awarded by provost courts shall not exceed confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of one year, or fine of \$1,000, or both. The sentences of these courts do not require approval, but may be mitigated or remitted by you. Copies of orders on these subjects, the provisions of which control the action of the military courts established in this city, will be furnished you for your information and guidance and for application under conditions similar to those prevailing here.

It will be necessary for you to create a government for the determination of city affairs under the direct supervision of a provost marshal, and to appoint officers and assistants for the collection and care of revenue, and to conduct postal affairs. The customs regulations in force here will be applied by you at Iloilo, and an officer connected therewith has been directed to report to you for appointment as collector of customs, who will be provided with copies of all customs regulations and all necessary blanks. You will be furnished with the requisite assistants, thoroughly supplied, to establish upon your arrival all necessary mail facilities, and you will apply in this department the postal laws of the United States Government.

Iloilo is an important port of entry, and to secure competent aid for duty in connection with the port you will consult Captain Dyer, of the Navy, commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, which escorts your transports, who has a thorough practical acquaintance with such matters.

In establishing your administration you will consult various orders and regulations governing all these subjects at this port, making your actions conform thereto in all essential particulars. No further instructions can be given you. Much must depend upon your tact and discretion and your ability to meet varying circumstances as they arise. However, should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Miller and command sailed out of Manila Bay on the night of December 26, 1898.

It appears that General Rios, then commanding the Spanish forces in this district of the Visayas, received instructions from Madrid December 21 to evacuate Iloilo and transfer himself and troops to Zamboango, Mindanao Island. On these instructions he, on the 22d, sent for the mayor of the city and some of the prominent citizens of the town, together with the foreign consuls, and informed them of his intention to abandon the city on the 24th instant, and that he would transfer the care of the city to the mayor, Señor Vincente Gay. He recommended the care of the Spanish citizens to the German consul. General Rios then proceeded to execute his plan of abandoning the city and the garrisons of Molo and Iloilo, together with the civil officers, and General Rios himself embarked on the 24th and sailed for Zamboango, Mindanao. The mayor, finding the city on his hands without any means of defense, immediately sought the mammon. He succeeded in arranging for a meeting with some of the insurgent leaders at Jaro and arranging with them that they would not enter Iloilo until the Spaniards had gone. Molo was occupied on the 24th, but Iloilo was not occupied by the insurgents until the 26th. Mayor Gay, to whom General Rios had turned over the city, met the incoming insurgents at the city line, conducted them to the ayuntamiento, and then, being a Spaniard, transferred his charge into their hands.

On his voyage down General Miller met Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, U. S. V., off Mindora Island on the 27th. Colonel Potter was returning to Manila to report the situation at Iloilo to the department commander. He handed General Miller the following report of the situation:

The situation at Iloilo is about this:

General Rios left the city Saturday afternoon after an agreement with the *insurgents* that they were not to come in until this morning (Monday). They marched

quietly and took charge about 10 o'clock, as my vessel was steaming into the harbor. No disorder is reported except in one or two cases of personal vengeance. They report that they have left 800 men in the town to do police duty, and have drawn the rest to Jaro and Molo, 2 to 2½ miles out, which are the points they held before.

Most of the English-speaking people think that the troops will have no trouble in displacing their forces, but the more conservative are doubtful, some thinking we will.

Some time ago General Rios is rumored to have proposed to them to join with him against us and they spurned the offer saying that they were "Americanos," but since new blood has come down from Manila, they have changed their sentiments and say that they will agree to a protectorate, but not to annexation.

No one seems to think that there will be much trouble in landing, if force is to be used.

The "president of the state of the Visayas" told an Englishman to-day that they were not going to offer any resistance to the Americans, as they were simply holding the place for them.

The Spanish removed all arms and ammunition, as far as is known, and the insurgents are estimated to have from one to three thousand rifles of various makes—a great many being in the hands of Spanish deserters and the old Guardia Civil, who probably know how to use them.

The insurgents have never had a pitched battle with the Spanish, and their ability to stand fire seems to be very much doubted in the town.

Aguinaldo is recognized as chief.

In addition to the stone fort there are sandbag revetments behind the fort and one at the entrance of the river, with a loose stone wall farther up. Most of these were built as a last stand for the Spanish, and face inland.

Seven guns (reported by a woman to be obsolete) passed through town toward the fort this afternoon.

I saw sentinels in and around the stone fort as I came out of the river.

American consul says he will board you when you arrive, as will also the stevedore of the town.

I inclose two maps—a general one of the island and one of Iloilo, both of which belong to our consul, and I promised him he should have them back again. As will be seen by the map, there are several streets in the town which can be swept by gunboats in the river.

The stevedore will sound the river to-morrow from the bridge down and will be posted as to the available boats and lighters.

Am sorry information is so limited—my stay was short.

CHAS. L. POTTER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Chief Engineer.

General Miller's command arrived in the roads off Iloilo at 10 a. m. December 28. Shortly after arrival General Miller sent the following letter to the commanding officer of the insurgent troops at Iloilo:

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898.

To the commanding officer of the troops at Iloilo, island of Panay, and the people of Iloilo and the island of Panay:

The troops under my command appear here under an order of the President of the United States of America, promulgated by Major-General Otis, commanding all the troops of the United States in the Philippine Islands.

It is accompanied by the United States naval ship *Baltimore*, sent by Admiral Dewey, commanding the United States squadron in these Asiatic waters.

When these orders were communicated to me it was supposed that the troops of Spain were still in possession at Iloilo and that the transfer of possession and governmental authority would be by them to representatives of the Government of the United States, which has succeeded, by virtue of conquest supplemented by treaty stipulations, to all the rights heretofore exercised by Spain in these islands.

Upon arrival I find that the city of Iloilo is in the reported possession of native troops. The intention of this letter is to place myself in communication with those now exercising authority at Iloilo, with the view to the accomplishment of my mission to this place, as above indicated.

This communication will be handed you by my aid, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, who is accompanied by four gentlemen, former residents of Iloilo, who

will make known to you more in detail the purpose of the presence of my command at this point.

There accompanies my command, upon the steamship *Union*, certain Spanish soldiers, natives of the island of Panay, whom it is my purpose at a later date to release, with the privilege of returning to their homes, an act which it is hoped will be interpreted as an evidence of the good will of the major-general commanding in the Philippines, under whose orders I am acting.

I shall be pleased to receive a call from representatives of those to whom this communication is addressed on board the transport *Newport* at as early an hour as your convenience will allow.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

This letter was considered by a subcommittee of the junta, General Delgado, the military commander, being present. This subcommittee, of which Don R. Lopez was chairman, stated that they had no power to act in cases affecting their federal government, but that they would meet General Miller on the transport on the following afternoon—December 29—which they did at 6 p. m., and again asserted their inability to act, and asked to be given time to consult Aguinaldo, which was denied.

General Miller asked this committee: "Should we land would you meet us with armed resistance?" The committee could not answer. He asked: "If they would not have their troops move out of the city and permit us, their friends, to move in without resistance?" They requested time for consultation, promising to return a definite reply at noon of the 30th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter arrived from Manila on the evening of the 29th with the following new instructions from the department commander—based on the new information Colonel Potter had presented.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: Lieutenant-Colonel Potter has just arrived and reported the situation at Iloilo. He reports the evacuation of the city by the Spanish forces, and that the insurgents are in full possession. He further reports that those authorities were anticipating your arrival, and that there was a widely-prevailing sentiment in the city in favor of receiving your forces without resistance. All of this, Colonel Potter informed me, he made known to you when he consulted you yesterday, on his return trip.

To meet this state of affairs your instructions need modification, although it is believed that you will grasp the situation as presented and be governed by conditions. Your instructions bid you be "conciliatory, but firm," and further, that you will not make any great display of force, but seek to gain possession of the city through peaceable negotiations, not exercising undue haste; that "should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city, you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions."

By firmness and conciliatory action it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict; but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly, if more pacific measures are without avail. It is, of course, necessary now, in this stage of the proceedings, to occupy Iloilo, and the manner of doing so must be left to your discretion, avoiding conflict if possible, but accepting it if necessary to accomplish the object.

Information received here is to the effect that the insurgent forces are weak in strength, even when united; that they are not united, but are divided in their sentiments toward the United States Government, the majority being friendly disposed.

No further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action. Conduct affairs in accordance with the demands of the situation, having in view always the necessity of occupying the city with your troops.

Colonel Potter will return as soon as you report to him the situation, unless you

wish to retain him for a short time to acquaint him with results of action already taken or action which you meditate.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

LATER.

Since writing the above I am in receipt of information from the Malolos government which was gathered yesterday. Its former cabinet resigned a few days ago, because of its inability to agree with Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers. A new provisional cabinet has been appointed, consisting of men hostile to American annexation, among whom are a number of army officers. These men are closely watching the results of your expedition and greatly hope that you will be obliged to use force to gain Iloilo. They think that conflict there would inspire the people here to take up arms against the Americans. It is, therefore, still quite necessary to avoid force if you can do so and still succeed.

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

On the afternoon of December 30 the president of the Estado Federal de Visayas, R. Lopez, wrote to General Miller in the following terms:

[Translation of the letter from President Lopez, of the federal government of Bisayas, to General Miller.]

GENERAL:

Upon the return of our commissioners we discussed and determined in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this region of Bisayas in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government of Luzon, and, in view of what these commissioners have manifested, I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and the committee, we insist upon our pretention not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon, upon which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now, in sacrifices.

Therefore, if you insist, on your side, upon disembarking your forces, this is our final attitude.

May God give you——

Iloilo, December 30, 1898.

The President,

R. LOPEZ.

Vice-Secretary,

To General MILLER.

To which General Miller replied on same date as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.

MR. ROQUE LOPEZ,

President Estado Federal de Bisayas, Iloilo.

SIR: I have the honor to express my regret that your committee has concluded to offer armed resistance to the occupancy of Iloilo by the United States forces at this time. I shall wait for the present in a spirit of friendship, hoping that your opinions may change after reconsideration. I will give you timely notice of my intentions.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

On the 31st of December the president, R. Lopez, wrote a second letter couched in the following language:

General MILLER.

GENERAL: I heartily concur in your wishes which is also ours, to arrange matters in a spirit of good friendship, but not having the power to surrender the city and the port of Iloilo which, having been taken by our forces in the name of the Filipino

republic, whose central government resides in Malolos, I regret finding myself in the position of persisting in not consenting to the landing of your forces without the direct orders of the central government.

I trust that you will see the justice of our claim compacted by the will of the people explicitly declared last night at the great meeting called for the purpose.

May God give you——.

The President,

R. LOPEZ

PRESIDENT'S HOUSE IN THE CITY OF JARO, *December 31, 1898.*

December 31 a petition signed by the leading merchants of Iloilo was presented to General Miller, but the petition itself was forwarded to the department commander and its contents is not known at this office, but on the same date letters were written the United States vice-consul by vice-consul of Great Britain and vice-consul of the German Empire, stating to them that it was understood that the revolutionary forces intended to set fire to the whole of the city if the United States troops attempted to land.

The effect of these letters and the petition was to delay action on the department commander's instructions of the 28th until further instructed.

On January 1, General Miller transmitted to Señor Lopez the instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States of December 28, relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands. In transmitting this proclamation General Miller wrote as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, January 1, 1899.

Mr. ROQUE LOPEZ, *President.*

SIR: The within cablegram from the President of the United States to the United States military governor in the Philippines, transmitted by the latter to me yesterday, is inclosed herewith for the information of your committee and of the people of Iloilo and Panay Island. Its more important statements are:

I. That the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to forces of the United States, followed by the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris on the 10th instant, operate to give the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands to the United States.

II. It authorizes and directs the military commander in the Philippines to extend, *with all possible dispatch*, the military government heretofore maintained in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila, to the whole of the Philippine group.

III. It directs that the military government to be established among you shall be exerted for the security of persons and property of the people of the island and for the conformation of their private rights and relations. It announces to you that the army does not come among you as invaders and conquerors, but as friends to establish and maintain a government which will accord to the people what is the heritage of all free peoples—the full measure of individual rights and liberty.

The forces here under my command have been sent to this point for the purpose of executing the above orders. Although fully conscious of my power to occupy the city at any moment, I have, nevertheless, waited, that you might have ample time to fully deliberate upon the questions presented. As indicated in the President's cablegram, under existing conditions, the people of Panay Island owe obedience to the political authority of the United States, and grave responsibilities will be incurred if, after deliberation, it is decided to resist that authority. In obedience to my instructions, and in the belief that the highest interests of the people will be served by immediate occupation by the troops under my command and the establishment of the authority of the United States, I again express the desire that the native troops be withdrawn, thus assuring the entry of the forces under my command without unusual incident or menace to life and property interests in Iloilo.

I am, very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

In transmitting the President's instructions to General Miller, the department commander wrote as follows:

Should there be strong and very decided opposition to your entry, backed by considerable force, do not be in haste. It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the natives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions there and a great deal of money in the banks. You can remain in the harbor with your force. If you meet with decided and strong opposition, await, then, further instructions, and, if necessary, I can direct a portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet much, if any, opposition. I trust in your discretion.

On January 6 General Miller received the following copy of cablegram:

Oms, Manila:

The President considers it of importance that a conflict brought on by you be avoided at this time if possible. Can not Miller get in communication with insurgents? Give them the President's proclamation and inform them of the promises of the Government, assuring them that while it will assert its sovereignty its purpose is to give them a good government and security in their personal rights. It is most desirable that Miller should hold his ground; and, as health of soldiers will not permit of remaining on transports, could not a landing on some healthful place be effected without conflict?

On January 9 General Miller received the following letter from Señor R. Lopez, in reply to his of January 1:

General MILLER.

GENERAL: We have the high honor of having received your message dated January 1, of this year, inclosing letter of President McKinley. We have deliberated about these points and as a result of our deliberation we deduce an answer to one of its clauses. We are not able to enter into discussion respecting the others because it is not in the power of this council of state.

You say in one clause of your message: "As indicated in the President's cablegram, under these conditions the inhabitants of the island of Panay ought to obey the political authority of the United States, and they will incur a grave responsibility if, after deliberating, they decide to resist said authority."

So the council of state of this region of Visayas are, at this present moment, between the authority of the United States, that you try to impose on us, and the authority of the central revolutionary government at Malolos. The supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris on the 10th of December, 1898. The authority of the central government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc. It is also founded principally on our political constitution, which began with the insurrection and has been manifested in all its doings, so that the authority of the government of Malolos over us began at a date long before the treaty of Paris.

Now, after consideration, please tell us with sincerity, General, what authority we should obey, whether the authority of the United States, which began with the treaty of Paris on the 10th of December, 1898, of which we do not know officially, because the revolutionary government of Malolos has not been notified; which government is based on previous conquest, anterior to the said treaty, and the natural bonds created by politics and the constitution established since the first moment of the rebellion, on the 11th of August, 1896.

After all has been said we insist in not giving our consent to the disembarkation of your troops, without an express order from our central government of Malolos.

The President,

R. LOPEZ.

JARO, January 9, 1899.

On January 6 General Miller submitted the following report to the department commander:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival here this morning of Colonel Potter, with the instructions of the President on a small slip of paper which he brought, and oral instructions from the commanding general to me.

I have been careful not to do anything to bring on conflict. For three days I have had no interview with the insurgents. Three days ago I sent to the governing committee, R. Lopez, president, a copy of the letter of instructions of the President, and asked that they permit the entry of my troops. No answer has been received, and I expect none. I had copies of the President's instructions translated into Spanish, distributed to the people in different ways, and am informed that the people laughed at it. The insurgents call us cowards and are fortifying the old fort at point of peninsula, and are mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards—2 of them are said to be 8-inch guns. They are intrenching everywhere. They are bent upon having one fight and are confident of victory. As I informed you in my letter yesterday, I believe now we can capture the city with our forces now present, and with the assistance of the Navy, without the loss of much life and without much destruction of property, and should we destroy it all I believe it would be of advantage to the city, as a newer city would be built up soon. The character of the natives, having been under the subjugation of Spain so long, is such that once well punished they will submit to fate. The people are superstitious, believing in fate, and now believe that fate will give them victory.

We are entirely shut off from intercourse, and can make no purchases. I have seized upon a water vessel, a large scow, and a small steamer. The insurgents have not protested. My difficulty is in manning these vessels, as we can not trust natives. I am making details of enlisted men, which depletes the strength of the command. Boatmen should be sent out from the United States to run steam tugs and launches, and the natives sent adrift. There is no trusting them. With them employed the guard has to be larger than the crew.

My recommendation is to attack them here, take possession of the city, then bring down the necessary force to whip them well at Molo and Jaro, their two strongholds, both within 3 miles of Iloilo. With our artillery machine guns properly supported it can be done with but a little loss of life.

The insurgents have sent a party to Cebu to raise there a military organization to frighten us away from there. They believe a show of force is enough to stand the American cowards off. For the present I shall remain on the defensive, but ask permission to attack this place at the earliest moment. If we are successful it will relieve Manila. The strength of the insurgents is about as given in my letter of yesterday—4,000 armed with rifles and twelve or fifteen thousand with bolos and other weapons.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Another report was submitted January 8, as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., Sunday, January 8, 1899—2 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of major-general commanding, that the situation here is not improving since my last report. I have not landed the Fifty-first Iowa on the island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the Fifty-first Iowa landed on the 5th instant and were met by over 75 to 100 natives armed with various weapons—rifles, shotguns, and knives—who asked them their business and warned them off with threats of bringing out more troops if they did not go away. The men of the regiment are well, and the colonel does not desire to land under such circumstances of hostility. The insurgents are still at work fortifying. Last night they sunk four mud scows at the mouth of the Iloilo River to prevent passage of our navy. This did not annoy us, as the *Petrel's* place for action, if we have one, is undisturbed. The city is so completely under control of the war ships of the Navy that we are indifferent as to what the insurgents do. When the time comes nothing can save insurgents in the city but flight. The subject most disturbing to our American minds is the fact that a Dutch ship is loading with sugar. Who shall collect the duty is a question. Captain Evans and I discussed the question last evening without conclusion. The duties will amount to \$5,000 (quite a snug sum) with which the insurgents will be able to buy machine guns, etc., if we leave them alone. Other ships arriving will add more and more to their revenues.

The port ought to be closed, if it is a practicable thing, after due notice to foreign governments. We need here two good steam launches capable of towing a line of rowboats rapidly for landing purposes. We can not get them here without seizing them, and the good ones are under the protection of foreign flags.

As to the insurgents yielding to the order of the President and allowing occupation, will not be done unless the central government at Malolos directs them to do so. If we have to fight at Manila and here, I should think it better to strike the first blow here, as, with the assistance of the navy, result in our favor can scarcely be doubted.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

On January 11 General Miller replied to the letter of Señor R. Lopez of the 9th, as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 11, 1899.

Mr. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas.*

SIR: I have the honor and pleasure to acknowledge receipt of your communication of January 9, and regret very much your final conclusion does not conform to the order of the President of the United States, which announces sovereignty over all these islands. You must rest assured in the end that the sovereignty will be maintained, whatever obstructions may temporarily intervene. The President is very desirous for the people of the Philippine Islands to accept the authority of the United States as friends and without compulsion. You asked me in your letter to tell you, in sincerity, why your people should acknowledge authority of the United States now, rather than the authority of your central government. The President's order tells why you should acknowledge the authority of the United States; that is because of the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. The United States, in naval and land battles, in Cuba, Porto Rico, and Manila, compelled Spain to relinquish authority over the Philippine Islands to the United States. To this end she expended millions of dollars and thousands of lives, causing first the adoption of the protocol and finally the treaty. Every nation in the world recognizes the treaty as giving to the United States the same rights in the Philippine Islands as Spain formerly possessed. These rights of our Government were duly considered at Washington prior to the President issuing his order, and, no doubt, on the best legal advice in accordance with international law. I might say that the confederation of which you claim to be a part is not now acknowledged by any nation, and its existence is only accidental as a result of the war between Spain and the United States.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Also as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 11, 1899.

Mr. R. LOPEZ, *President Federal State of Bisayas.*

SIR: I would be glad at any time to receive any of your people, and especially yourself, who wish to consult me, on board the *Newport*. They will be safe and can return at their pleasure. We are making no seizures of boats or property except that necessary to maintain our existence here on transports.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

On the same date Acting Asst. Surg. Henry Du R. Phelan appeared before the general committee of the so-called Estado Federal de Bisayas, Iloilo, and concerning which he submits the following report:

Report of an interview between Lieut. Henry Du R. Phelan, acting assistant surgeon, Sixth Artillery, with the government of the Federal State of Bisayas.

ILOILO, January 11, 1899.

At the meeting were present: President Roque Lopez and Generals Martin Delgado, Mariano Diocno, Pablo Araneta, chief of expeditionary forces from Manila, and various other military chiefs; Lawyer Raymundo Melliza, Francisco Soriano, and others.

General Miller's letter was presented and handed over to the interpreter, and also the letter of Major-General Otis, which was given by General Miller to Lieutenant Woodward to be read before the meeting. Both these letters were then read and the discussion opened. Lawyer Raymundo Melliza did most of the talking on behalf of the government, and he said in effect, replying to General Miller's letter, that all

that the Americans owned was Manila. I said: "Without us you would not have accomplished any results. When the war commenced there was actually no rebellion in these islands, and you took advantage of our war and again rose in revolt. At the beginning of it your chiefs were not here, having fled the country. The president and the lawyer denied this, saying that their chiefs had gone abroad to purchase arms, and that although they were not in actual warfare, their government was still in existence, and in fact they had been in constant rebellion since 1896, since Spain had never lived up to her agreement with Aguinaldo at the time of his withdrawal from the country. Referring to the sacrifices of lives and money which the United States had made in conquering this country, the lawyer said that they also had made great sacrifices in lives, and that they had a right to this country which they had fought for, and that we are here now to take from them what they had won by fighting; that they had been our allies, and we had used them as such; and that now we are not showing them any gratitude for the help they gave us. I replied that we both worked together and had driven the Spanish out, and that they are now getting their liberty as a result. They felt hurt about the words "the sovereignty of Spain and of the United States," which appeared in our communications, and said it was simply changing from one to another, and, while they knew the Spaniards, they did not know us. I told them that we are different from any European nation, and of an entirely different character from the Spaniards; that the people of Manila like us; that we spent a great deal of money in their city, and that business was thriving there as it had not been before.

Mr. Melliza said it would take two years for them to know us, and meanwhile we would establish a military government here, taking charge of all their offices. I replied that military occupation was a necessity for a time, and that it was customary to establish one in new possessions, and that as soon as order was assured, it would be withdrawn. All that we wish now is to control the custom-house, the post-office, the captaincy of the port, and to establish good order in the city. They smiled at this and remarked: "We have fought for independence and feel that we have the power of governing and need no assistance; we are showing it now. You might inquire of the foreigners if it were not so." They inquired the meaning of the word "Territory" as differing from State. I explained to them what a Territorial and a State government was, and assured them that their liberty would be practically as great under such Territorial or State government as if they were independent, and, moreover, that they would be free from any foreign interference. Mr. Melliza replied, smilingly: "Since you say you are so friendly and wish to grant us so much liberty, why not have us a protectorate?" I told him that I had no power to discuss that, that our order was to occupy all the islands. They stated that their orders were not to allow us to disembark, and that they were powerless to allow us to come in without express orders from their government. I asked them why they had not communicated with Aguinaldo, adding that we had waited patiently for ten days for a reply. They said it was partly our fault, because they wanted us to give them a vessel to take their commission back to Manila. I told them that we had no vessels to spare.

Mr. Francisco Soriano, one of the commissioners on the transport *Newport* with us, took the floor and said: "On Wednesday evening before Christmas General Otis promised the commission sent by him on the *Newport* that they should ask the North Americans for a steamer in case they would be unable to solve some urgent questions regarding the government of the Bisayas, in order that they might consult the central government." This promise was made known to them, according to Francisco Soriano, by Mr. John Macleod on the morning of December 25, 1898.

I asked what proof he had to offer, as I knew nothing of this promise. He replied that he had no written proof, as the promises were made verbally. I told him that the city was in our power, and that we could destroy it at any time, but we did not wish to commit a hostile act but wanted to land as friends. Lawyer Melliza replied that he cared nothing about the city; that we could destroy it if we wished; that it was not theirs, as the foreigners owned about all the property. "We will withdraw to the mountains and repeat the North American Indian warfare. You must not forget that."

In regard to the claim that we made of the Philippine Islands by right of conquest and treaty stipulations, Lawyer Melliza said: "International law forbids a nation to make a contract in regard to taking the liberty from its colonies. Iloilo was never surrendered to you; you have no right to it. It was ceded to us by General Rios, who, upon retiring, granted us our liberty and thus recognized our independence." I replied, that whatever agreement General Rios might have made with them at the time of his withdrawal from Iloilo was illegal, as it was posterior to the treaty of Paris. Lawyer Melliza replied, that they knew nothing of the treaty of Paris, as they had

not received any information concerning it; that they were bound by the central government of Luzon only. I told them that their government was not recognized by any nation; that all the world was aware of the cession of the Philippines to the United States by the treaty of Paris. He replied that it mattered not, as they now had agents in Europe seeking recognition for their government. Upon inquiring when they had last heard of Aguinaldo, Lawyer Melliza replied that they had heard from him about January 5, 1899, via Capiz; that the message had been brought by Gen. Ananio Diocno and Gen. Pable Araneta to the effect that Aguinaldo wanted the Visayas government not to allow the landing of American forces until an agreement had been made with him.

They then requested once more that commissioners be sent to Malolos to obtain the orders of Aguinaldo, and desired them to be sent at once. I asked Lawyer Melliza if Aguinaldo said we could occupy the city would they agree to it. He replied emphatically they would.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was said that, as this question involved the integrity of the entire Republic, it could not be further discussed here, but must be referred to the Malolos government.

On the 15th of January the following letter was sent by the department commander:

MANILA, P. I., *January 15, 1899.*

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I am somewhat exercised, fearing that your correspondence with the Iloilo people may result in bringing about grave complications. I sent you the President's proclamation, not for publication, but for your information, simply. It came just before Colonel Potter sailed for Iloilo and I did not have time to consider its probable effect. As soon as I could do so I cabled Washington that it would not be published, as the time was not opportune. After some deliberation we put out one of our own which it was believed would suit the temper of the people. I also fear that your conversations and letters to the Iloilo insurgent authorities on the intention of the United States Government will also breed trouble.

I have concluded to send Major Mallory to you; he can represent my views and give you full information as to the policy which we have pursued here. He can give you a correct report of affairs in this section and show you how necessary it is to proceed with great caution.

The revolutionary government is very anxious for peaceful relations, and knows the value of United States protection; but unfortunately some of their radical representatives have raised a flood of excitement which they can not control and which they confess their inability to direct. We have had several conferences, and they plead with us to make some concession which they may publish to their people in order that they can get out of the dilemma in which they have placed themselves. They have little idea of constitutional government and their people have none. They cry for "independence" and "protection," not knowing the true meaning of the terms, and grow enraged over the words "sovereignty," "United States control," etc. For several days we have been passing through, and are still in, a rather critical condition. Had you fired a gun at Iloilo the mob and insurgent troops were ready to make demonstration against the United States authorities. This would have been most disappointing to the President of the United States, who continually urges extreme caution and no conflict. Conditions are improving, the city is very quiet, the Malolos government slowly disintegrating, I think, and the Philippine people of the city and surrounding provinces having a better understanding of the United States' intentions.

Major Mallory will remain with you, and I desire that you consult him upon all matters affecting our relationship with the insurgent authorities. The policy to be pursued by the United States is to keep as quiet as possible, permitting the insurgent authorities to work out their own protection, if possible. Please do not attempt any radical action without consulting us here.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS.

Brig. Gen. M. P. MILLER,

*Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps,
Iloilo, Island of Panay.*

On the 20th of January the commanding officer Fifty-first Iowa Volunteers reported that his regiment had then been on board ship for seventy-six days, and sanitary considerations demanded that it

should be landed. It was ordered to Cavite, and left the roads of Iloilo on January 29.

On February 8 the General sent the following letter to General Miller:

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 8, 1899.

Brig. Gen. M. P. MILLER, U. S. V.,

Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you occupy Iloilo with your troops as soon as practicable, having a care for the lives and property of the inhabitants of that city and giving to citizens the necessary notice to withdraw therefrom in case resistance is anticipated.

The admiral commanding the United States naval forces of the Asiatic Squadron will direct the commanding officers of naval vessels in the harbor of Iloilo to support you in your operations.

Avoid destruction of property in so far as may be possible with successful operations, and endeavor to prevent destruction of the same by native troops.

The First Tennessee Regiment will sail for Iloilo to-morrow morning, the 9th instant, and upon its arrival you will be able to make your dispositions.

The commanding general trusts to your ability and discretion, and does not desire to give you more specific instructions, permitting full latitude of action on your part. These instructions will be handed you by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who leaves this evening by steamer *Butuan*. He will remain with you until you are able to report the results of your action in executing these instructions, when you will dispatch him to these headquarters with report of same.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, which was withdrawn from Manila and Cavite to replace the Fifty-first Iowa, arrived off Iloilo during the night of the 10th of February and morning of the 11th.

On the 10th of February the following communications were sent by General Miller and delivered at their addresses on the same day:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

COMMANDING GENERAL NATIVE FORCES, *Iloilo.*

SIR: In a communication from Gen. Roque Lopez, dated December 31, 1898, it was stated that armed resistance would be offered to the forces of the United States in case they attempted to occupy Iloilo without the consent of General Aguinaldo. This communication was referred, for instructions, to Major-General Otis, commanding the United States forces in the Philippine Islands. After a long delay orders have arrived, and I am now directed by him to occupy Iloilo with my troops as soon as practicable. I therefore call on you to deliver up the city of Iloilo and adjacent territory, and to surrender the armed forces occupying the same before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant, or I shall proceed with my troops to occupy the city by force. It is requested that you give warning to all noncombatants in Iloilo, Jaro, and Molo, that in case of resistance their city and villages will be exposed to bombardment. Any attempt on your part in the interim to close the Iloilo River, or to throw up or improve any defensive works, will at once be met by fire from the United States warships and my troops. Free ingress and egress to boats going to and coming from Iloilo will be permitted until sunset Saturday, the 11th instant. After this time all communications must be under flag of truce.

Official communication has been received by the S. S. *Butuan* of the complete defeat and scattering of the insurgent forces in the neighborhood of Manila.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

To the British, German, and American Vice-Consulates:

In view of the anticipated hostilities, notice is hereby given you to cause all persons who are under your protection to seek a place of safety before 5 a. m. Sunday, the 12th instant. Hostilities may commence at any time after that hour and date.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Official copy also respectfully furnished commanding officers H. M. S. *Pigmy* and U. S. S. *Boston* and U. S. S. *Petrel*.

By command of Brigadier-General Miller:

CHAS. G. WOODWARD,
First Lieutenant, Third U. S. Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Upon receipt of this information ways and means were taken by the insurgents, then in occupation and control, for burning the city. Large quantities of petroleum were secured and stored in the ayuntamiento, Calle Rosario, Calle San Pedro, etc. In the early morning of February 11, before any shots had been fired or any immediate action was evident, these supplies of oil were distributed about the city and placed in dwellings, shops, stores, etc., so as to make the work of the incendiaries easy, swift, and sure. The statement is made that the local president and other officials in uniform assisted in the distribution of the petroleum, and the mayor of the city, Señor Leon, is said to have followed the example of the mayor of Moscow, by setting fire to his own house before abandoning the city which had been confided to his care.

On the morning of the 11th the insurgents were discovered putting guns in position on the beach for defense, and as this was in violation of the conditions specified by General Miller in granting time for non-combatants, etc., to make their dispositions for what might occur, the naval gunboat *Petrel* fired two warning shots, upon which the land battery, being put in position, opened fire on the *Petrel*, which opened in action that had not been contemplated or expected, on the part of either the troops or their commands, until the following morning.

Firing having opened between the hostile forces, the incendiaries in the city immediately began their assigned work and the city was soon in flames. Meanwhile the troops were being landed on the beach and right bank of the river, and working their way through and around the fire succeeded in reaching and securing possession of the bridge across the Iloilo River leading to Jaro, and also the bridge across the estuary on the road to Molo. Possession of these points assured General Miller's possession of the city. In submitting the fact to the department commander, General Miller remarks:

It was not contemplated to make an attack before the hour named to the consuls, but the insurgent forces having begun acts of hostility, military necessity required that action should be taken and followed up. Such action certainly made no difference regarding the destruction of property, as it was a matter of common report that every preparation had been made by the forces of the insurgents at Iloilo to set fire to the city at the first hostile shot.

In another letter written by General Miller on the 21st of February, the following remark occurs:

I have no doubt it is owing to the premature attack that any of the buildings are saved. The plan was one of total destruction by fire.

On the following day the suburb of Jaro was taken by Major Keller with a battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry and a battery of machine guns. General Miller reported as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Iloilo, February 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the military situation as very vexatious. We have captured Iloilo, as before reported, but the position of the insurgents has been such that all the time that we are exposed to sharpshooters' fire with the Mauser rifle no one knows when he is safe. Jaro and Molo occupied would relieve us from this trouble, but I should have a battalion of 4 companies more to hold Molo. To-day, at 2 p. m., I sent a reconnoissance to both Molo and Jaro—a battalion of the Tennessee to Molo and one of the Eighteenth Infantry to Jaro. At Molo no enemy was found. At Jaro the enemy was encountered, and skirmishing commenced at once. The insurgents were about 1,000 strong. They threw an accurate, concentrated fire. They fought well, but finally retreated to Jaro and were driven beyond it. I reinforced the First battalion with the Second, and we hold Jaro to-night. Second Lieut. F. C. Bolles, Eighteenth Infantry, attached to the machine battery, was wounded through the left leg below the knee, and one private through the lung and another through the leg. Will send specific report as soon as possible. Our troops of the Eighteenth were under the command of Major Keller, and afterwards the 2 battalions were under the command of Colonel Van Valzah. Major Keller's battalion, assisted by the machine-gun battery, under Lieutenant Ostheim, did the work. Major Keller is an able, fearless, and brave officer. Also Lieutenant Ostheim. I shall make recommendation about them later.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

On the 14th of February, Major Keller made a reconnoissance in the direction of Santa Barbara, and four miles from Jaro he encountered the enemy—about 500 strong—and drove them back some distance. His loss was 1 noncommissioned officer killed and 1 wounded.

On the 19th of February a reconnoissance was made to Oton by a battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers, but no enemy found.

A battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers made a reconnoissance in the direction of San Miguel via Mandurriao on the 25th of February. The enemy was found a short distance beyond Mandurriao and driven back without loss to our troops.

On the 1st of March a "military district," comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, and such other Visayan islands as may be hereafter named, was formed and designated as the Visayan Military District.

The city of Cebu, island of Cebu, was at that time occupied without resistance by a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry under the command of Major Goodale.

The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry was ordered to the island of Negros. Col. (now Brig. Gen.) James F. Smith, First California Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the sub-district of Negros and supplied with necessary material and means to organize a corps of 200 native police for the island of Negros. The troops landed in Negros without resistance and the native corps of police was duly organized.

On the 14th of March the island of Cebu was created a subdistrict of the Visayan district, and Lieut. Col. T. R. Hamer, First Idaho Volunteers, was assigned to that command.

On the 16th of March the enemy was discovered advancing on Jaro from the direction of Pavia along the left bank of the Jaro River. Colonel Van Valzah took measures to meet him, and General Miller

lly assembled 7 companies of the Eighteenth Infantry, 1 battalion of the Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, and 4 guns, with which force the enemy was driven back with loss, our losses being 1 killed and 14 wounded.

owing to a state of uneasiness in Negros, a second battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry was ordered to that island on the 1st of March.

General Miller was retired on the 27th of March and the control of military affairs was left to Colonel Van Valzah, Eighteenth Infantry, the senior in command, who maintained command until the 5th of May, when Brig. Gen. James F. Smith (lately promoted) assumed temporary command of the district.

On the 5th of May, Capt. George H. Tilly, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, was killed by natives at Escalante Bay while engaged in the work of taking up the old cable in order to secure the material for use elsewhere. A company (Captain Shanks's) of the Eighteenth Infantry immediately proceeded to the site of the scene and pursued the criminals into the mountains, and succeeded in killing some of them and in destroying their village.

On the 21st of May the final battalion of the First California Volunteer Regiment was ordered to the island of Negros, where it took station on the east side of the island at Dumaguete, Bais, Tanjay, and San Carlos. The undersigned was assigned to the command of the Visayan district by 25, per General Orders, No. 29, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, and assumed command on the 4th day of June.

On the 19th of June the suburb of Molo was occupied by a battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, and a light bridge thrown across the Iloilo River connecting Molo with Jaro via Mandurriao.

On the 9th of June telegraphic information was received here of the assassination of Señor Pablo Mejia in Cebu and stating that the civil government was liable to go to pieces if a stronger military force was provided. On the 12th a battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry and a platoon of G Battery, Sixth Artillery, were sent from here to strengthen the garrison in Cebu.

On June 16 the town of San Nicholas was occupied, and on June 26 Zamboanga was taken possession of without incident.

No further changes occurred up to and including the 30th of June last. The reports of the subdistrict commanders are forwarded in a separate enclosure.

Respectfully submitted.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT A.

Report of commanding general, subdistrict of Negros.

BACOLOD, April 5, 1899.

MAJOR-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have to report that the inclosed draft of a constitution for the island of Negros has been prepared by the committee appointed by the local congress for that

purpose. The committee is composed of Señor Jose R. Luzuriaga, president of the congress; Señor Estaurislas Yusay, of Talisay, vice-president of the congress; Señor Manuel Jaime, delegate from Bacolod; Señor Manuel Ledesma, delegate from Pontevedra; Señor Manuel Reglado, delegate from Binalbagan.

Luzuriaga and Yusay are very intelligent, fair-minded men and understand well the purpose of modern government, and have some definite idea of the means by which those purposes can be obtained. The other members of the committee seem to be bright men, but evidently have not had the same opportunity of acquiring information which has fallen to the lot of the first two. Yusay and Jaime are both lawyers. Yusay is evidently an honest, straightforward man, while Jaime represents the shifty type which, added to the fact that he is characteristically Spanish, does not make him a man entirely to be depended upon.

I have, of course, been questioned by the committee upon many subjects touching the attitude of the United States toward the islands, which I have been unable to answer. I have been only able to say to the committee and such people as have spoken to me on the subject that the policy of the United States is not one of oppression toward the native races, and I felt that I could assure them that it would be the principal aim and purpose of our Government to lift them to a higher plane and, as far as possible, give to them such local self-government as their capacities and experience in governing themselves would permit; that the full measure of government to be given to them depended largely on the people themselves, and to a great extent would be determined by the result of just such experiments as had been inaugurated in the island of Negros. When questioned upon the subject of control of ports of entry, customs duties and internal revenue, post-offices, telegraphs, trade regulations, and foreign relations, I have taken the stand that those affairs should be wholly and exclusively under the direct management and absolute control of the United States, as well as all other exterior and internal affairs which might affect the Government of the United States or involve her in complications by reason of her connection with the island. So far as I am able to judge from conversations had with representatives of the government, this policy would be agreeable to them and to the people of Negros. About all they seem to wish here is a guaranty that they shall have a very large measure of control in their purely local affairs.

These opinions, however, are the opinions of the intelligent and educated class and the property-holding class, who have something at stake in the islands, and who wish to see security of life and property guaranteed by a stable form of government. Besides the intelligent educated class and property-holding class, there is what might be properly called a middle class of industrious hard workers who are householders and heads of families, many of whom, after understanding our purposes, could be relied upon for countenance and support. When this has been said all persons who can be depended upon to bring about local self-government have been enumerated and classified, as I firmly believe. Underneath these lies the lower class composed of irresponsibles, of shiftless people who live from hand to mouth, idlers whose hope of happiness lies in disorder, and of savages. The capacity of the lower class for self-government is microscopical at present.

Many of these idlers and irresponsibles might be used in creating a constabulary and military force to aid American troops in maintaining order, and in course of time by education and discipline might be brought to a realization of the duty a citizen owes to his government.

Having this in view, I advised the committee to limit the right of suffrage and to confer it only upon those who at this time are capable of using it with some conception of its responsibilities. How this provision will be received by the great mass of people of Negros when submitted to them I do not venture to predict, but, nevertheless, it is my honest judgment that to give the right of suffrage indiscriminately to all would, at this time, absolutely destroy all hope of any permanent or desirable self-government. The lower classes are a strange mixture of childlike simplicity and animal cunning; of trusting confidence, which is easily gained, and unbounded suspicion, which is just as easily excited. If they had a vote the changes in government and methods would be as kaleidoscopic as their characters.

On the 18th of March rumors began to arrive of the disposition to create trouble in Carlota district. The movement at that time seemed to be against both the Americans and Spanish, and was incited to a great extent by relatives of the Panay leaders and insurgents who had emigrated from Iloilo to Negros. Papa Isio, a religious fanatic, who had control of 1,500 to 2,000 of the persons residing in the small pueblos and vicinity of Isabela, was evidently called into counsel and an offensive disposition was immediately manifested toward the Spanish planters having haciendas in the neighborhood of Isabela, Carlota, and Candeguit.

The Spanish at once picked up their movable effects and departed from Iloilo. The

provisional government at first was disposed to look upon the alarm of the planters as groundless, but within twenty-four hours some of the government officials changed their mind, and upon my advice 50 of the native police force were at once sent by way of Murcia to Antipolo, which was then the headquarters of Papa Isio. At the same time I communicated with General Miller on the subject, and stated that if there was no objection would send 2 companies of Third Battalion to the affected district. General Miller, who had met the Spanish planters and received from them detailed information as to the nature and strength of the movement, was of the opinion that a small force should not be sent into the threatened district, and that sufficient American troops should be placed there immediately, so as to crush at once any demonstration that might take place. The First Battalion of the California volunteers was sent to Carlota, at which place it arrived on the morning of the 27th of March, and took up its quarters in the abandoned convent in the town. The quarters were not sufficient, and I directed Colonel Duboce to hire an additional building. Senor Araneta and myself devoted the 27th and 28th of March to visiting the leaders of the disaffected element in San Enrique, Carlota, Candeguit, Valladolid, Pulupandon, and Bago. The men interviewed were men of property and intelligence, and after some talking seemed disposed to alter their opinions as to the object of our mission here. In fact, in nearly every instance, we left them in a much more friendly spirit than we expected, but whether this desirable result was brought about by the presence of the First Battalion or appeals to reason, I am unable to say. The members of the Montillo family, who are very strong in Mahayo, San Enrique, Valladolid, and Pulupandon did not receive us very cordially, and it was only after some three hours' talk that we were able to make even the slightest headway in convincing them as to the policy which was the best to be pursued by the islands. I explained that I wished the most thorough understanding with the prominent people of the island as to the attitude of the United States toward the people of Negros; that I was personally taking the pains of interviewing many people who possibly might misunderstand our object, and that I had taken that course for the express purpose of leaving no excuse whatever for any person of intelligence to assume a hostile attitude toward us; that we had come to the island with the desire of aiding the people to establish, if possible, local self-government, and to protect all citizens and residents in their lives, property, and homes; that there was no war in the island of Negros, and that if any person, no matter how high or how low he might be, attempted in any way to disturb good order or unlawfully interfere with the peace or quiet of any person, I would not treat him as a prisoner of war, but as a plain, ordinary, every-day criminal, and that if his acts were followed by the shedding of blood or destruction of property, I should have him tried as a rioter and to the best of my ability endeavor to have him properly punished.

I returned here on the night of the 28th, where I found Senor Singuenza and one Tetong Custodia, whom I ordered to be seized. Singuenza, a rich planter of Binalagan, had been holding meetings in his house for the purpose of inaugurating a movement against the Americans, while Tetong Custodia, military chief of San Enrique, had been doing some talking against the Spanish. Major Sime, who had seized both of these men, had had long talks with them, and I think had honestly convinced Singuenza that he had been mistaken in his attitude, and that he ought to give his hearty support to the Government of the United States in the good work which it was endeavoring to do. Tetong Custodia said he was convinced, but I place no dependence upon him. After consultation with Luzuriaga and others it was thought best to allow both these men to return to their homes, with the caution that while we would go to any pains to convince reasonable people of our pacific attitude, we would deal very firmly with those who afterwards attempted to cause disturbance.

In a few days after my return to Bacolod many of the malcontents from the south rallied on me at Bacolod, expressed themselves as having been deceived as to the position of the Americans, and offered their services to bring about the most perfect harmony of action.

On the 3d of April the delegates to the congress began to arrive at Bacolod, and in the evening of the same day we tendered them a reception at headquarters. At this reception, at which General Miller and his daughter were present, three of the Montillo family appeared, together with Dionicio Mapa, a brother of Victorino Mapa, the insurgent general of Panay. General Miller had a long talk with the Montillos, also with Mapa, and, as far as we are able to judge from the reports of the government officials, the impression has been favorable; but, whether the Panay export has changed its opinion or not, I think I can safely assure you that not only the government but the great majority of the intelligent class and property holders are our supporters and friends.

On the 28th of March Dionicio Mapa had gathered some 800 men at Labjid and was adding to his force daily by accretion of idlers, criminals, and irresponsibles generally. Marcario Sido, military chief of the south, and Pedro Ramos, local military chief of Jimamaylan, with a force of some 10 men (not our police) went to Labjid for the purpose of determining whether Papa intended hostilities or whether his mission was a peaceful one. Isio decoyed the military chiefs, with their force, into a conference, and while Papa and Sido were shaking hands, Rupo, a noted bandit, struck Sido on the neck with a bolo. This was the signal for the whole band of some 800 or more to begin their attack. Ramos was killed, his eyes gouged out, and his body mutilated. Sido was wounded four times, but in the general scrimmage managed to escape with 3 of his men. The others were either captured or killed. I received news on the evening of the 29th of the attack at Labjid, and immediately telegraphed to Iloilo for lorchas, which were promptly sent, arriving on the night of the 30th. On the afternoon of the 31st Major Sime, with 2 companies, was dispatched for Jimamaylan, with instructions to prevent Papa from escaping to Oriental Negros by way of the pass from Cabancalan, and to capture and destroy, if possible, Papa Isio and his bandit element. The same day Colonel Duboce was ordered to go south, overland, with 2 companies, by way of Antipolo and Isabela, for the purpose of preventing Isio from returning to the Carlota district and plantations. He was instructed to connect with Sime, if possible, and to take with him native guides and such commissary supplies and transportation as might be necessary. Twenty-five of the native police were sent with Sime's detachment, and 50 native police went along the shore south to Jimamaylan.

Isio has issued a proclamation from "Paradise," calling upon the various towns to rise and destroy the Americans and Spaniards. I inclose you a copy of the proclamation. Since the arrival of Sime three of the retainers of Isio, who were found distributing these proclamations, have been captured. Twenty-eight others were captured in and about the town of Labjid, which had been evacuated by the bandit leader.

The advance of Duboce will be necessarily slow, as he will be compelled to cross about sixteen rivers in a distance of some 33 marine miles between Carlota and Jimamaylan.

Notwithstanding the little disturbance created by this bandit chieftain, I have every hope that the tranquillity of Negros will be maintained.

I have sent a secret agent into Oriental Negros for the purpose of reporting the disposition toward us in each of the towns of that province. He will return in about twenty days by way of the pass from Ayuigan on the oriental coast to Cabancalan on the occidental coast. I am paying him \$90 (Mexican) per month. Owing to the difficulties of travel and the expense necessary to be incurred for horses and other transportation, I have allowed him \$10 (Mexican) per month for expenses. I paid him \$90 a month because the government would not recognize him in the native police. He would very soon have begun to make trouble, and I thought it better to secure his faithfulness by putting him to work, even if it cost a few dollars extra per month. He is shrewd and sharp, and has the reputation of being unprincipled. As he believes, however, that I have other men covering the same districts I have no doubt but what I will get as true reports in the future as I have received from him in the past. Not having any secret-service fund I have paid him his salary and expenses out of my private funds.

Out of the moneys sent Lieutenant West for quartermaster's purposes I have set over the sum of \$500 to the quartermaster of Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce, who is located at Carlota, to meet rent of buildings to be hired and contingent expenses of transportation.

There is some complaint in Negros over our charges for postal service. The complaint seems reasonable, at least in so far as local postage rates are concerned. Under the Spanish rule, postage to points within the island was only 2 cents (Mexican), while our rates amount to really 5 cents (Mexican) because for 10 cents (Mexican) the purchaser only gets two 2-cent stamps. As the wages on the island are only 20 cents a day it is easy to see that at this rate of postage poor people can not indulge in the luxury of letter writing.

I do not know what the powers of the major-general commanding Eighth Army Corps are in this matter, but if possible I would like to have it remedied.

I have sent you a copy of the constitution in English and in Spanish. I am anxious that the Spanish translation should be carefully supervised by some Spanish attorney who is acquainted with English, and who thoroughly understands the Spanish legal terminology. I suggest Judge Godinez, who is connected, I understand, with Colonel Crowder's department. The constitution will be submitted to the congress in a few days for discussion, and I should like a corrected translation

turned here as soon as possible, together with such corrections and amendments may be made or suggested by the general commanding.

The senate has been made the appellate tribunal owing to the deficiency of judicial material on the island.

I inclose you report of Major Sime's operations in the south up to date.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Colonel First Regiment California U. S. V. Infantry,
Commanding Submilitary District of Negros.

EXHIBIT B.

Report of commanding general subdistrict of Negros.

BACOLOD, P. I., June 13, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the herewith' inclosed draft of a constitution for the island of Negros has been finally approved by the congress, which was duly assembled for the purpose of considering the formation of an organic law for the island. On the 5th of April I sent you the draft of the constitution prepared by the committee for submission to the congress. It will be noted that the congress has made several amendments to the draft proposed by the committee, but, so far as I am advised from a rough translation, there is no deviation from the plan originally proposed, except probably in the judicial department. So difficult has been the question of creating a satisfactory judiciary that I am of the opinion that the establishment of a mixed Filipino and American appellate tribunal, or even a wholly American appellate tribunal, would be hailed with delight by everyone, and give a sense of security to the people and a permanence to the government which nothing else could afford.

The masses have lost confidence completely not only in the Spanish tribunals of justice, but also in all who were connected with them, whether as lawyers, clerks, or judges, and their suspicion and lack of confidence has found voice in the expressed wish to make laymen eligible to judicial office. Many prominent citizens have spoken to me upon the subject and asked if it were not possible to establish American tribunals or mixed American and Filipino tribunals for the administration of public justice. I have been slow to coincide with such views, feeling that they would rather gain strength from seeming reluctance than ready acquiescence. Yet I feel that the creation of an all-American appellate tribunal, or one composed of Americans and Filipinos, would give the best guaranty of stability to the government, and the best security that just laws would be properly enforced without bribe or price. I am certain that no native government, no matter how good, will ever inspire confidence or give satisfaction unless there be some tribunal of last resort to which the people may confidently appeal for justice and an honest enforcement of the laws. The attitude of the government and the responsible classes toward the United States has not changed. If anything, the people who have something at stake in the islands are to-day warmer in their friendship for our government and more strongly welded to it than ever. In fact, there are not a few who say that they would prefer that the United States should assume the entire burden of government, and so from the beginning give security to the people in their lives and property.

As you are aware, no missionary work was done in oriental Negros and, as a consequence, when the congress met at Bacolod, oriental Negros was not at first represented. Feeling that this would be a mistake, I consulted with the local provisional government, and Señor Araneta was sent to Dumaguete for the purpose of consulting with the president and congress of that province. Señor Araneta arrived just in time. The emissaries of Aguinaldo had been busy endeavoring to persuade the congress to raise the Filipino flag in oriental Negros and declare for the Malolos government. Misrepresentation as to what was being done in occidental Negros by the Americans, and as to the condition of affairs in Luzon, was skillfully used for the purpose of affecting the judgment of the people and their representatives from the east coast.

Señor Araneta immediately stated the true facts of the case, presented the draft of a constitution which had been prepared by the committee, asked them to compare

it with the constitution which he had been furnished by the agents of Aguinaldo, and to declare which was better adapted to the government of a free people. Larena, president of oriental Negros, and his congress, though originally strongly anti-American, at once decided to send delegates to the congress at Bacolod, and the delegates elected were immediately taken on board the *Lee Fat* and brought to occidental Negros. During the absence of Larena, who was one of the delegates, the agents of Aguinaldo managed to create some feeling against the Americans, and on return of President Larena and his delegates to Dumaguete both Bais and Tanjay had declared against the Bacolod government and refused to hoist the American flag. Larena immediately returned to occidental Negros and notified me of what had happened, and as a result the Second Battalion of the First California Volunteers was sent to Dumaguete. Upon its arrival the American flag was raised at Bais and Tanjay without opposition. Both towns submitted to the Bacolod government, and all prisoners taken were at once released. The leaders, abandoned by the people, fled to Cebu and to the mountains. They have asked for amnesty, but their request has been refused, for, without conditions to justify them, they took up arms, so, without conditions must they lay them down. This disturbance at Bais and Tanjay may be said to be the only commotion of grave political significance which has arisen since our arrival in the island, and may be considered as definitely concluded.

For seven years past, in Negros, as far as I can gather, there have existed bands of marauders and robbers who lived in the mountains and defied authority, under the name of Babaylanes in the south and Tulisanes in the North. These Babaylanes and Tulisanes under the Spanish rule exacted tribute from the haciendas and pueblos in the vicinity of the mountains, and the prospect that the source of revenue would be cut off under the new régime has not served to make them warm friends of the United States. For the purpose of giving protection to the hacendados and pueblos in the vicinity of the mountains on the west coast troops and native police were stationed at Jimamaylan, Binalbagan, Isabela, Castellana, and La Carlota, and afterwards the same plan was followed in the northwest.

Expeditions against these outlaws have almost uniformly proven to be futile, inasmuch as they sought refuge in the mountain jungles as soon as an expedition started, and, there separating, became indistinguishable from those engaged in lawful pursuits. Owing to their knowledge of the country, their familiarity with the language, and their acquaintanceship in the mountain villages the native police have been able on two or three occasions to encounter the outlaws, after they had gathered for a raid, and to inflict serious loss upon them; notably, about ten days ago, when the police surprised a body of Babaylanes and killed about 40 and wounded some 30 others. The native police have, up to this time, rendered substantial service, and though many inducements have been offered to them to desert, the pay received and the ration given have been sufficient to keep them steadfast in the service of the United States. I am of the opinion that further work in the same direction would create an efficient constabulary, save expense to the Government, and in the end probably prove the most effective means of suppressing the outlaws of the mountains. The government's police, however, composed largely of Tayallos and members of the former Guardia de Civil, have almost uniformly proven unfaithful to their trust, and their unfaithfulness, apart from the nature of the animal, has been largely brought about by insufficiency of pay, jealousy of the police in the service of the United States, and the machinations of the emissaries from Panay and Luzon. Eighteen of these police in Talisay and 28 in Silay deserted their posts at about the same time, expecting to raise a small insurrection and to create a nucleus around which a great body of the people would rally in opposition to the Americans. The deserters were promptly pursued. A portion sought refuge in Panay, while the others, being closely pressed, joined the Tulisanes in the mountains, from which place they made raids into the villages of Sagay, Escalante, and Danao for the purpose of obtaining supplies and plundering. It was during one of these raids that the attack was made on the cable ship *Recorder*, in which poor Captain Tilly lost his life.

From the evidence so far obtainable it appears that between 80 and 100 of these Tulisanes, some 20 or 30 armed with rifles and the balance with bolos and spears, raided Escalante the night before the arrival of the *Recorder*, and left in the early morning, going toward Danao, about a mile and a half distant, where the vessel had anchored preparatory to taking up the whole cable laid between Negros and Cebu. These Tulisanes lay concealed on the bluffs about 50 yards distant from the beach, awaiting the coming ashore of Captain Tilly. The captain and the first officer of the cable ship and some of the crew landed, all unarmed. The white flag had been raised by the inhabitants of the town, and on the arrival of the boat from the *Recorder* the visitors were kindly received and with no demonstration whatever of hostilities. Hardly, however, had the captain of the *Recorder* attempted to make an

rance to the cable house before fire was opened on them from the bluff. The captain of the *Recorder* ran toward his launch, up the river, and Captain Tilly, the first officer, and 3 of the crew ran away from the boat down the river, toward the *Recorder*, exposing as little of a target as possible to the flying bullets. The captain of the *Recorder* succeeded in cutting his boat loose, getting out into the stream, and rescuing his mate and 1 of his crew. Captain Tilly, unfortunately, being no swimmer, or at an indifferent one, turned toward the native boat which had put out in pursuit on shore, preferring the chances of capture to the certainty of death by drowning. He grasped the side of the boat and was struck into insensibility with an oar, and so drowned.

News was brought back to Iloilo that Captain Tilly and 2 of the crew were missing. Not knowing whether they had been captured, killed, or wounded, Captain Shanks's company of the Eighteenth Infantry was sent at once to Danao to take such action as the circumstances of the case required. Captain Tilly's body was found floating in the river, and was sent immediately to Iloilo by the *Lee Fat* for burial. The expedition then took up the pursuit of the Tulisanes who had committed the depredations. The companies struck Junip Junip, a resort of these thieves, at 6 o'clock in the evening of the 29th of May, but found the place deserted. At about 10 o'clock the next morning their intrenched position was encountered at Vista Alegre, about 10 miles in the mountains. Some 25 of the bandits were taken by surprise and made dash for their arms in the cuartel and houses, but were so promptly fired on that they reconsidered and took refuge in the jungle, where pursuit was impossible. The cuartel, ammunition, and supplies were destroyed, and 1 horse and saddle, stolen from the Swiss, recovered. From Vista Alegre the expedition went to Sagay, where the outlaws made an attempt to surprise Captain Shanks's company. The Tulisanes died at the first fire, 1 of their number being killed and probably others wounded, as indicated by the blood on the bushes. I returned from Sagay to Iloilo on the 31st of May, but left Captain Shanks's company at Sagay for the protection of the place and inhabitants. On the 2d of June I sent Company H, of the Californias, for the purpose of relieving Captain Shanks's company, but on arrival of the relieving company it was found that the smallpox had broken out violently, and that the town had been practically abandoned by all except three or four families, for which reason all the troops were withdrawn.

The hacendados possessing property in the immediate vicinity of the mountains have repeatedly asked me to arm them and some of their employees. This I have persistently refused to recommend. First, because upon their own showing their employees can not be trusted, and, second, because in almost every case where the hacendados have had arms of their own they have practically given them up without even a show of resistance. I have told them, however, that if they would organize a company of hacendados I would endeavor to procure from the department commander sufficient arms and ammunition to fit them out. I have always said that I would recommend to the department commander the issuance of arms and ammunition to a constabulary composed of persons of good character, recommended by the government, if suitable security were given for their good conduct and the return of their arms. If these recommendations meet with the approval of the department commander I will be happy to receive the arms and ammunition necessary to carry out the plan. Probably 200 rifles and suitable ammunition will be sufficient. I intend, in the near future, to visit the towns on the east coast and as many of the prior villages as possible, for the purpose of meeting the principal men and explaining to them the attitude of the Government of the United States toward them. Hitherto I have found that this method of dealing with the people has been effective, and I feel certain that had it been possible for me to have visited all the towns and pueblos we would have had even less trouble than has fallen to our portion, small as it has been.

About the 7th of May, Claudio Lopez was invited by the government to make a statement concerning the desertion of the government's police at Silay. Claudio Lopez refused to call at Bacolod or give the government any satisfaction whatever, saying that he was the vice-consul of Portugal, and if the government wished to see him they could call at Silay. The government asked my advice on the subject, fearing that they might get the Government of the United States into some complication. I told the government to send up a squad of policemen and seize him and bring him down to Bacolod. They did so, and Mr. Lopez was very indignant and protested in the name of His Majesty the King of Portugal, claiming that his person was sacred from arrest. He was told that on his own statement he was a mere commercial agent, if he amounted to that much, and that we were aware of no law which gave him in such capacity the right to violate the laws of the land and claim immunity because he happened to be a commercial agent for the Kingdom of Portugal.

Moreover, it was pointed out to Mr. Lopez that neither the United States Government nor its representatives had any official knowledge of his existence as vice-consul or consular agent, and that, though he also claimed to be accredited to the province of Iloilo, in the island of Panay, he had not seen fit, although many months had elapsed, to present his credentials to the proper authorities. Mr. Lopez was very much disturbed over his neglect of that little formality, was very profuse in his apologies, and offered to present his credentials to me. I told him that I would be very happy to receive his credentials if he would present them to me at the place to which he was accredited, and that I would forward them to the department commander for such action as he might deem proper, but that I could not receive them in Bacolod, and that he must submit himself to an examination by the government of the charges against him.

The evidence against Lopez showed that his house had been a secret resort of the dissatisfied elements of Panay; many meetings of people dissatisfied with the government had been held in his house, and that four of his near relatives—nephews, I believe—were leaders of the police who deserted at Silay for the purpose of inaugurating an insurrection against the Americans. This evidence was hardly sufficient to authorize the incarceration of Lopez. It seemed to me, however, to be sufficient to warrant the Government in demanding from him a sufficient bond to keep the peace. He was placed under \$20,000 bond for his good behavior, and was profoundly grateful that he was not imprisoned. In fact, this gratitude took the shape of offering me a very valuable diamond ring for what he deemed to be my services in his behalf. I was compelled to decline the gift, as I did not think I deserved his gratitude, and for other reasons created by the regulations.

The people here are very anxious to hold elections under the constitution as proposed, and to begin work under it as a provisional organic law. I do not suppose there will be any serious objections to their adopting that course; at least, none presents itself to me. The matter is submitted to the department commander for such action as he may deem proper. Living under a government having no organic law is in many ways unsatisfactory, and serves simply to continue in operation many Spanish methods hitherto complained of.

This report has been made much longer than I intended, and my excuse for its length is simply my desire to give as minute a knowledge of the situation as the circumstances will permit. I have just received a telegram from Major Sime, who has followed Papa Isio's people into the mountains. It appears that he has had a fight with them on their native heath, killed 4, wounded 6, and captured 5, and recovered a lot of carabao stolen from haciendas.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT C.

Report of commanding general, subdistrict of Negros.

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT, ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P. I., July 31, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Visayan Military District, Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the entire First Regiment California U. S. V. Infantry has been finally relieved from duty in the island of Negros (except the quarantined men and Major Sime) by 2 battalions of the Sixth Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Miner, U. S. A., commanding. The debarkation of the relieving troops and the embarkation of those relieved was much hampered and delayed by the very severe storm which, for days at a time, rendered all transportation by small boats or lorchas absolutely impossible.

The stations now occupied by the Sixth Infantry, U. S. A., are practically the same as those previously occupied by the California volunteers.

Pursuant to your telegram of the 8th of June, I notified the commanding officer of the First California that he might expect to have his command relieved from duty in the island about the 20th of the month, and to have such preliminary preparations made to board transport at that time as the case would permit before the actual arrival of the relief. Unfortunately, part of the preparations made in the Carlota district, of which Captain Miller had charge, consisted in a premature concentration of troops and the cessation of practically all vigorous pursuit of the Babaylanes in

at zone. This action could not fail to produce bad results by giving the impression the lawless element that the American troops were withdrawing. The Babaylanes came down to the outlying haciendas, and by specious representations that the lands would be repartitioned among the people, that machinery would no longer be permitted in the island, and that nothing but palay would thenceforth be planted, succeeded in persuading the ignorant laborers of about fifty haciendas to join them and destroy by fire the places which had given them employment. This destruction began about the 20th of June, but reports of what was occurring only reached these headquarters on the 25th of June, and then only through the officials of the provisional government. In consequence a communication attached hereto, and marked closure 1, was addressed to the commanding officer of the First California Regiment, calling attention to what was occurring and directing that the officers in the vicinity take energetic measures to meet the situation.

This letter was followed two days later by a verbal order to the commanding officer of the regiment to station troops at La Granja for the protection of the "Spanish del farm," which was property of the United States under the treaty of Paris, and an advantageous strategic point. He was also directed to bring about more aggressiveness on the part of the troops in the neighborhood of Carlota.

On June 28, 10 mounted men of Company E, under Lieutenant Howard, were sent away from Murcia into the disturbed zone, and the rest of the company, under Captain Robertson, was ordered to proceed by water to Canisi, thence by land to Carlota, where to report to Captain Miller. Lieutenant Howard and the mounted men on the way to Carlota visited every hacienda in the district and finally struck the marauders between Bonbong and Dos Marias, on the 1st day of July, 1899. They were closely concealed and were developed by Privates Sweeny and Huff, who were thrown well to the front of Howard's small detachment. Fire was opened on Sweeny and Huff about 20 Babaylane riflemen at a distance of about 75 yards. Both men returned the fire, but at the third volley from the Babaylanes Sweeny was killed and Huff wounded by a Remington ball through the arm, cutting the artery. Pratt, of the hospital corps, advanced under fire, dressed the wounded man, and finally brought back the injured and dead to the detachment, which in the meantime had kept up a sharp fire, checking the advance of the enemy, who were endeavoring to advance on the men who had been struck. After twenty minutes' firing Howard dislodged the Babaylanes, but did not pursue them into the thick country, as the wounded men operatively required surgical attention, and such an advance with so small a party involved grave danger of being cut off.

Captain Robertson and Lieutenant Howard both reported at Carlota, but no effective action was taken or permitted by the officer in charge, as I have since been advised. On June 30 some of the buildings at Hacienda Granja were burned and additional haciendas destroyed, whereupon the letter attached hereto and marked "Inclosure 2" was at once sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce condemning the indifference which seemed to prevail, and directing investigation and effective action.

On July 2 Capt. B. A. Byrne's company (H) and 29 men of Company K, all of the 16th Infantry, accompanied by Major Sims, First California Volunteer Infantry, were ordered to proceed at once to Canisi by lancha, thence overland to Carlota. Unfortunately the entire force so ordered to Carlota was storm bound for six days under the lee of Guimaras Island, and did not reach Carlota until the 10th of July. Pending its arrival, notice having been received from Señor Montillo that the Babaylanes were intrenched on his hacienda called Trinidad, where a lot of rice was stored, this information, together with instructions to drive them out, was immediately telegraphed on July 3 to Captain Miller direct (Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce having embarked on the *Sherman*). On the same day (July 3) Captain Miller telegraphed that the hacienda had already been burned. Five days later it was learned through the police that the hacienda had not been burned, and that the Babaylanes were still intrenched there. The letter attached hereto, and marked "Inclosure 3," was then dispatched to Captain Miller, to which no answer was received until after he had boarded the *Sherman*, when his reply (Inclosure 4), hereto attached, arrived at the headquarters, to which answer was made that not being on the ground I might have done him some injustice.

On the 4th day of July news came from a reliable source that a large party of Babaylanes was intrenched at Salupitan, beyond Bonbong, and after consultation with Colonel Miner, the written instructions attached hereto, and marked "Inclosure 4" were forwarded to the commanding officer at Carlota.

On the 10th of July Captain Byrne's command arrived at Carlota and relieved Captain Miller's troops, and on July 19, with Lieutenant Nesbitt and a force of 70 men, after a forced night march, he surprised the enemy to the number of 450 at Bonbong, southwest of Salupitan, and, with only 55 effectives, killed in practically a

hand-to-hand conflict, 115 of the enemy, with only 1 killed (Private David S. Anderson, Company K), and 1 wounded (Private Albert C. Jenks, Company K). Captain Byrne captured 3 rifles, 3 revolvers, and a large supply of bows, arrows, bolos, and spears, and also about 48 carabaos and 8 horses and saddles and 3 carts, all stolen property.

Lieutenant Evans with 35 men who left Carlota at the same time as Captain Byrne to cut off fugitives, in case Captain Byrne was successful, encountered a party of the enemy in the vicinity of Canalaon, killed 3, and captured 60 carabaos, 20 horses, and 20 goats, almost all stolen.

This stroke in the Carlota district has for the present reduced it to a state of complete tranquillity. Some of the laborers who joined the Babaylanes are now seeking refuge in the villages, but are being taken prisoners as rapidly as their connection with any criminal enterprise can be shown. I can not commend too highly the energy, vigor, and judgment shown by Capt. B. A. Byrne and the officers under him in so promptly suppressing a lawlessness which promised complications for the future if not speedily and summarily checked.

In the Carlota and Isabela districts there is another band of these outlaws which is still to be reckoned with. The band is located in the very fastnesses of the mountains to the east of Isabela, at a place called Palali, which is the present rendezvous of Papa Isio. It has been arranged with Colonel Miner that a force of say 100 men under Capt. B. A. Byrne will be sent from Isabela as a base to operate against this mountain stronghold, sufficient supplies carried by native bearers being taken for a ten or twelve days' campaign. Capt. Charles Byrne, of Dumaguete, was to move westward with a similar force similarly supplied over either the Guijolgan or Ayan-gan Pass to Isabela, to intercept any retreat over the mountains toward the east. Upon the completion of the operation Capt. Charles Byrne, for the purpose of investigation and information, was to return to Dumaguete via the Cabancalon-Bais Pass. The work which it was intended should fall to Capt. Charles Byrne had to be abandoned, inasmuch as he had troubles of his own in and about Tolon, to which he has been compelled to proceed against a lot of bow-and-arrow and bolo men. We have not heard from him since he started for Tolon. The operations against Palali from this side are now going on independent of any action from the east coast.

In the north, in the vicinity of Escalante and San Carlos and Sagay, there is an aggregation of Tulisanes numbering some three or four hundred who, some six weeks ago, attempted to surprise 19 men of Company C, First California, Lieut. Charles Goodell commanding, at the Hacienda Refugio, but failed, with a loss of 11 killed—counted on the field. Mr. Kappeler informs me that some 43 altogether were killed, including those that died of their wounds. These Tulisanes are now intrenched on a small mountain near Calatrava, between the Gilubang and Patunang rivers. An expedition leaves to-day for the purpose of endeavoring to round them up.

In the Carlota district the cry of disturbers against the Americans seems to have been abandoned as the excuse for plundering, and new ones of "equal division of the lands," "no sugar cane," "no machinery," have been taken up. The depredations committed in that district have not in a single instance, to my knowledge, involved the property of any Americans. Quite the contrary, inasmuch as some of the most valuable haciendas destroyed have been the property of well-known sympathizers of the insurgents, such as the Montillos, the Aranetas, the Mapas, and the Siguenzas, all of whom were concerned in the uprising planned against the Americans when they first arrived in March last.

I should like very much to have 250 miles of wire with insulators to establish telegraphic communication from Escalante to Jimamaylan, and ultimately across the mountains with Dumaguete. To connect Escalante with Dumaguete would require about 160 miles of wire, and to bring Dumaguete on the line 90 miles additional would be needed. To connect Carlota with Jimamaylan and renew wire from Bago to Bacolod would require 15 miles of wire.

Whenever, in the good judgment of the general commanding the district, it may be thought advisable to hold elections here I will be glad to submit such data as I may have concerning that matter, and to consult with him touching the best means to be adopted for holding them.

I herewith forward copies of all previous reports from the subdistrict, together with a copy in Spanish of the constitution and of the proposed election laws.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 1.]

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT, ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P. I., June 25, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
First Regiment California U. S. V.

SIR: Advices have just reached this office that burnings in the vicinity of Isabela and Castellana still continue. In fact, Bulad, Camansi, and Colopi, three villages within an hour and a half of Isabela, have been destroyed, and no steps have been taken by the companies in the vicinity to either punish the marauders or prevent further destruction, as we are advised. Livao and Patieni are threatened with destruction. The attention of officers in that vicinity should be called to the fact that energetic measures on their part will alone meet the situation, and, for their own credit, every effort ought to be made to protect the districts in their immediate neighborhood.

Intierres, at Castellana, should be used as a guide. I fear that the prospect of going home has induced a certain amount of indifference. I hope that this is not so.

Very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 2.]

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT, ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P. I., July 1, 1899.

COL. V. D. DUBOCE,
Commanding First California Volunteers.

SIR: Seven additional haciendas in the jurisdiction of La Carlota have been burned, inclusive of La Granje. If this be so there has been the most flagrant negligence on the part of those charged with the protection of that district. A verbal order was given that a station should be established at La Granje some three or four days ago, not more. I understood from you that you had telegraphed to Captain Miller to occupy a station there. La Granje has been burned and Murcia is now threatened, and La Carlota, according to reports, is practically deserted.

This calls for the most rigid inquiry, and if negligence has been shown further steps ought to follow. The situation demands action, and effective action at that.

Very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 3.]

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT, ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P. I., July 8, 1899.

LT. J. A. MILLER,
First California Volunteer Infantry, La Carlota, P. I.

SIR: I telegraphed you on the 3d that Hacienda Trinidad was in the hands of the enemy, and that there was a large store of rice on hand, and instructed you to take steps to protect that hacienda. You answered on same day that information was "Hacienda burned." This hacienda is not burned yet. You have let five days pass without doing anything. This, taken in conjunction with your willful disobedience of the order to establish a station at La Granje, does not give satisfaction. Your entire district has been practically burned out and you seem to have no information of what is going on in your vicinity. The native police stationed at Payao marched into your district at Pontevedra, fought with the people, and killed 9 yesterday, and you know nothing of it. Such are the facts as they present themselves to these headquarters. I shall be glad to have your explanation, if you can give a satisfactory one. Had you done your duty and investigated the Hacienda Trinidad, Sime and the 1st Infantry could have been informed as to the condition; your neglect has put me beyond my power, and you must take steps to inform him.

Your work in Luzon was satisfactory—I wish I could say the same of it in Negros.

Very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 4.]

LA CARLOTA, P. I., July 12, 1899.

Brigadier-General SMITH.

MY DEAR SIR: I am just at this moment in receipt of your communication of the 8th inst., in which you express your dissatisfaction with my conduct of affairs in this district.

To say that I am very much grieved that you seem to feel the necessity of thus writing to me would be to say very little of what I feel, that I, who have tried so hard to accomplish the wishes of yourself and Colonel Duboce, should so signally fail, as indicated in yours before me. I have been so harassed by the general situation here, and my inability, owing to various causes, to cope with it, that though I may have seemed unsoldierly, still I feel that I have done the very best I could.

With regard to the Hacienda Trinidad, I did try to keep the same from being burned, and had the sergeant in charge of Pontevedra visit it and report. He had a fight there and killed and wounded some of the enemy, capturing a number of horses. The enemy were reported to be in force at or near Miranda, and I told Sergeant Hawks to remain in Pontevedra, only making show of force when enemy was in sight.

Hacienda Trinidad is not burned—only a portion of it—and Sergeant Hawks at my direction reported the situation of this place to Major Sime, who did not arrive at Pontevedra until last Saturday and his troops on Sunday. Major Sime did not go to Hacienda Trinidad, though I sent him your directions and copies of your telegrams to me. Major Sime probably did not go to Hacienda Trinidad for the same reason that I did not, the police having an outpost near the place which gave it protection.

This was all I could do, and reported this by wire to you, though I regret that I have no copy of the message to send you. With regard to the order, as you state, to send men to La Granca, by the time I received Howard's troops, which arrived very late, all the instruments had been removed here and afterwards part of La Granca had been burned, but not the observatory. Colonel Duboce told me to always act on my own judgment, and I felt that the best course was to keep Howard moving about the country with his horses, and protect the numerous haciendas in this vicinity with infantry proper, feeling that you would advise me to do this if you had been here. I have been able to protect a great deal of property, though I regret that so much has been destroyed; I could not do any more, and so represented the situation to Major Sime, who seemed to agree with me. I had no intimation that any troops had left for here for my relief, or any news of the whereabouts of Major Sime, until I heard it through native sources.

The fight that the police from Payao had was not reported to me by my men at Pontevedra, and though I knew of some affair of the kind, could get no actual news, as people here and below made light of any such number killed as you indicate, and I do not now believe it. I have always been on the alert to preserve property in my district and have done the best I could, making every move with the idea of following out what you would require of me were you present. I know of every hacienda that has been burned, though I did not wire the names, as I did not think that you would know the names. I have disposed my men to what I thought was the best possible advantage, guarding a great number of places, which have not been burned, but which will be soon if no more troops are sent here.

Infantry can not operate here, and there are very few horses to be had. Captain Byrne has doubtless been informed by Major Sime of the condition of Hacienda Trinidad. If Major Sime had arrived here at the time you expected he would, all of your views could have been carried out.

I sincerely trust that you will not allow me to go out of the service with your condemnation hanging over me, for I have tried to be a good officer and do what I thought would please you and be honorable to myself. As you know, the wires have been down very often and I have not been able to keep in communication with you as I would have done had the line been working. All information in my power has been given to Major Sime and he is now in command, though he left to-day for San Enrique, Pontevedra, and Bacolod.

Now, my dear General, please send me a letter either confirming the one I have, or stating that there were some extenuating circumstances, but do not let me go home with such last words from you. Please write me at Iloilo or San Francisco, as I leave here in the morning, as Sparrowe has just arrived, and if the weather is good will sail to Iloilo. The *Lee Fat* is injured, so will have to get along without tow.

Very respectfully,

JOHN A. MILLER,
Captain, First California Volunteers.

[Inclosure 5.]

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT OF THE ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P I., July —, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER, *La Carlota.*

(Through Headquarters Sixth Infantry).

SIR: Jose Sarmiento arrived at the headquarters this morning and furnished information (that seems creditable) that the Babaylanes, to the number of 300, are entrenched at Salupitan, northeast of La Carlota and La Granje. This is evidently the same party encountered by Howard, and who have, according to his estimate, about 100 rifles—Mauers and Remingtons.

You will consult with Major Sime, of the First California, and Captain Byrne, of the Sixth Infantry, for the purpose of operating against these people, upon the basis of the following information:

There is what is called a camino real, or royal road, from La Carlota to Salupitan. The road is not straight. There is also, according to our information, a road which leads direct from La Carlota to La Granje, from La Granje to Aginit, and from Aginit to a point called Gustillos.

The direct attack, according to our information, which in no way binds you, should be made along the camino real leading direct from La Carlota to Salupitan. When this attack is made there are, according to our information, two points of escape for these people—one to the northeast and thence southwest to Gustillo's hacienda, which is called Canlaon, and the other by way of a very difficult path to Aginit. The main force, therefore, if this information is correct, in my opinion should be sent along the camino real to make the attack upon Salupitan.

Another force should be sent to La Granje and from thence to Aginit, where some 50 men should be left, keeping concealed as much as possible, to prevent the escape of these people at that point. The rest of that force, not less than 30 men, should be sent to Gustillo's hacienda, called Canlaon, who should also keep concealed and endeavor to prevent escape in that direction. There are no houses in Aginit nor in Gustillo's hacienda, called Canlaon.

There should be time given for the forces established at Aginit and Gustillo's hacienda, called Canlaon, to get into position before the main advance has proceeded beyond Dos Marias, and so give notice to the Babaylanes of an attack from that direction.

Sarmiento, the bearer of this, will act as a guide for the main advance from Carlota toward Salupitan. Villa Lobos, if no better can be procured, will act as a guide for the forces sent by way of La Granje to Aginit and Gustillo's hacienda, called Canlaon. My own opinion is that not less than three days' rations should be carried, and transportation by cart avoided as much as possible, as it will only hamper your movements. However, if you think you can use the carts, by all means take more provisions; but better, as is suggested by Colonel Miner, send your extra provisions with carts after you, providing, of course, a suitable guard.

It is not to be understood that the suggestions which have been made here are to be followed without change if in your judgment such change is advisable. In other words, you will be upon the ground, and you are left largely to the use of your own judgment with this information before you.

This communication is absolutely confidential, and its contents will not be made known to other than those in command of troops at the designated points of operation and those second in command.

You will leave La Carlota and all other points without communicating information to anyone as to your real destination.

Inclosed you will find a rough diagram, which will be explained by the bearer. Be careful of surprises, taking all the usual military precautions.

The attack on Salupitan should be made early in the morning, and the advance should be so timed that the attack will not begin later than, say, 5 o'clock.

We are informed that the trenches at Salupitan are between Salupitan and Aral, which is nearer La Carlota than Salupitan. The trenches may be seen from the road with a glass, we are informed.

All care should be taken to conceal your approach as long as possible.

Very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT D.

Report of commanding officer subdistrict of Cebu.

HQRS. SUBDISTRICT OF CEBU, VISAYAN MILITARY DISTRICT,
AND FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cebu, P. I., July 28, 1899.

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Visayan Military District, Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from April 5, 1899, the day upon which I assumed command of this subdistrict, in compliance with, General Orders, No. 13, current series, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, up to and including June 30, 1899.

The situation at the time of assuming command was unsettled, possibly threatening. Although there had been no open hostilities, yet the general appearance was one of sullen defiance. In fact, all concessions that had been made up to that time declared Aguinaldo as the only recognized chief of state in the Philippine Archipelago, and although the junta popular had submitted to the occupation of the city without armed resistance, yet they did so under protest. The native government was permitted to have full charge of affairs of the city and island of Cebu, and to a native police force, organized, sustained, and directed by local native authority, was intrusted the duty of guarding property and preserving order in all that part of the city not occupied by American troops.

On April 5 the troops composing this command consisted of 1 battalion of 4 companies (A, I, K, and M) of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Maj. G. A. Goodale, commanding. Three companies (A, I, and M) were quartered in the cuartel de infanteria, and 1 company (K) in Fort San Pedro, all in the city of Cebu proper and on the bay front, and engaged in performing guard duty in and about the place in which they were quartered. All the members of the command, in obedience to orders of the battalion commander, being prohibited from going beyond the limits of the city of Cebu.

On April 16 the junta popular, consisting of one representative (called headman) from each town of the island, met at Cebu for the purpose of electing new officers for the native government here. Forty out of fifty-eight towns on the island were represented and Julio Llorente was elected president, vice Louis Flores, retired. The new administration showed every indication of friendship to the Americans, and only withheld an open and full recognition of the sovereignty of the United States on the ground that we had not sufficient force on the island to occupy the principal towns, and thus protect the person and property of our friends from the lawless element, which would be sure to attack those who declared for American sovereignty. I then renewed the recommendation heretofore made that additional troops be sent here for the occupation of the principal towns of this island, but the condition of affairs on Luzon and at Iloilo were such that none could be spared at that time.

No scouting parties had been permitted to leave the city and the condition of the surrounding country was unknown. Only a few enlisted men were allowed out of the barracks each day, and they were forbidden to leave the limits of the city of Cebu, being especially warned against visiting the town of San Nicolas, which adjoins Cebu on the south, the towns being separated by the Guadaloupe River only, and connected with two well constructed bridges built of iron and stone. Shortly after taking command I permitted officers to go where they pleased, on condition only that the liberty thus granted should not absent them from or interfere with their official duties in any way. Several availed themselves of the opportunity, visiting adjacent towns and immediate surrounding country, and reporting upon their return that they were not molested in any way, but were rather viewed in the light of curiosities whom the people were all anxious to see. In every case the second visit by the officers was invariably met with little attention, that indicated, to my mind, a desire on the part of the people to be friendly with us when once they become acquainted, and certainly a total lack of hostile feeling of any kind.

The native residents of this city, misunderstanding the inactivity of our troops here, and some attempted robberies having been reported, which clearly indicated the inability of the native police force to preserve law and order in the city, especially at night, it was considered advisable to patrol the city at night as thoroughly as possible with the small force then present for duty, and on or about May 14 a system of patrols was instituted under the personal supervision of Major Goodale, with instructions to preserve law and order in the city, without interfering or conflicting with the local police authority, if such a thing was possible. The patrolling was continued with apparently good effect, but made the duty such that no men could be spared for other purposes.

On May 24 the several companies then stationed here were directed, in daily rotation, Saturday and Sunday excepted, to make short practice marches, in light marching order, out of Cebu; the marches, so far as practicable, to cover the several roads leading out of Cebu, with a view to reconnoitering as much of the adjacent country as possible. An officer was designated to accompany each expedition, to whom was intrusted the special duty of making field notes, sketches, etc., required in the preparation of a map of the route traversed. The route sketches so prepared were consolidated into one map by First Lieut. George D. Moore, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, a copy of which is hereto attached.

On June 11, at 8 o'clock p. m., Pablo Mejia, a prominent American sympathizer, was assassinated in front of his own door. It was alleged that this was due to his friendliness to the Americans and that his name headed a "blacklist" of sixty who were to be assassinated, all of whom had received warning to that effect. Those of the natives who had been avowedly friendly to the occupation of the United States were much wrought up over this occurrence and felt that the force here was insufficient for their protection, which facts were transmitted to the commanding officer of this district by cable, and on June 14 this command was increased by the arrival of 4 companies (A, C, H, and K) of the First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, and 1 platoon of Battery G, Sixth Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Bayless, of the former organization, commanding. The several organizations composing this command were quartered in different parts of the city, and the night patrol increased and the territory theretofore covered extended. With this additional force it was considered desirable and practicable to extend our occupation to other parts of the island. This with a view of exploding certain absurd reports in circulation among the credulous natives as to the manner of people the Americans are, as well as to carry out the general instructions to be followed in the occupation of the towns of this island, which were in each case given, and are as follows:

"Take down and keep down the insurgent flag wherever found; respect the rights of person and property in the territory occupied; treat the inhabitants thereof with equal and exact justice, at all times tempered with kindness, with a view to establishing friendly relations between the people of this island and the United States; set a good example for the natives by enforcing strict discipline in your own command; preserve law and order (but in so doing avoid bloodshed or trouble of any kind) if possible; and meet such other and future emergencies as may unexpectedly arise (and which it is impossible to anticipate and, therefore, cover by specific orders) by the exercise of that God-given intelligence that an officer is presumed to possess as a prerequisite to holding a commission in the Army of the United States."

On June 16 Company I, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, under command of First Lieut. F. G. Stritzinger, jr., occupied the town of San Nicolas, taking quarters in the public tribunal. The occupation of San Nicolas was consummated without trouble or disagreeable incident of any kind, and the tribunal was taken as quarters with the consent of the president of the junta popular, given at a conference with the commanding officer of this subdistrict, the former at the same time expressing the pleasure and security our occupation would give the people of his town.

On June 17 I was surprised at receiving a communication, written in Spanish, from this self-same president of San Nicolas, a translated copy of which is as follows:

"The president of this town of San Nicolas, representing all its junta popular and neighborhood, whose opinion, expressed in a mass meeting held to-day, protests to the troops of the army of occupation and before the civilized world, against the act taking place to-day—of the said army placing its flag on the tribunal of this town—which (act) is coupled in no wise with those boastings of civilization in this century, called the enlightened one. Then, according to the protest on the occupation of the place and the city of Cebu before the intimation made by the commander of the gunboat *Petrel*, of his nation, on the 22d of February last, and by lack of elements of resistance only, there was understood in said delivery the boundary of the city, pending the events in Manila, where resides Señor Emilio Aguinaldo, only chief of state (recognized?) in this archipelago, to whose dispositions in everything these inhabitants give heed. If the necessity of lodging is that which has obliged said forces to occupy this town, as their commander has intimated to the undersigned president, this town, obeying the hospitable sentiments of its inhabitants, gives up its dwellings, but there being no jurisdiction of the ground occupied and given as a principle they (the forces) can not fly thereon the flag of their nation; whereby it protests against said act, contrary to international right, against the integrity of the territory.

"SANTIAGO FERRARIS.

SAN NICOLAS, June 16, 1899."

[Seal of Junta Popular.]

The day following the receipt of this communication the President and his minister of justice called to advise me that the protest was filed for the sole purpose of protecting a small and lawless element of the people of the island, who are opposed to American occupation, but whom they feared would assassinate them (the junta popular) in case they did not thus openly protest; but that, in fact, the better elements of the town and island were glad of our occupation and the security it guaranteed the people in the town, and that they were delegated by the better citizens of the community to supplement the protest filed with these assurances.

On June 26 Capt. W. H. Allaire, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, in command of Company M of that regiment, and Company H, First Tennessee U. S. Vols., was ordered to proceed to El Pardo, occupy that town and thoroughly scout the surrounding country, including the towns of Talisay and Minglanilla, with a view of extending occupation to the latter, as well as other towns farther south, at the earliest practicable moment. El Pardo was occupied without incident or opposition, save receipt at these headquarters of a protest, almost identical with that sent from Nicolas. It has not up to this time been supplemented with explanation or removal of any kind whatever. El Pardo is close to the mountains and thought to be largely dominated by the influence of the lawless element that make their headquarters the mountains adjacent thereto. The country about El Pardo has been scouted without particular incident, and it is hoped that Talisay and Minglanilla can be so occupied within the next two or three days.

Very respectfully,

THOS. R. HAMER,
Lieutenant-Colonel First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, Commanding

REPORT OF CAPT. B. A. BYRNE, SIXTH INFANTRY, OF ENGAGEMENT AT BOBONG, ISLAND OF NEGROS, JULY 19, 1899.

LA CARLOTA, ISLAND OF NEGROS, P. I., *August 12, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Bacolod.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of an engagement between the forces under my command and about 450 bandits at the bandit stronghold of Bobong, in the mountains about 12 miles from La Carlota, island of Negros, P. I.

The delay in not making this report sooner is due to the fact that I have been almost continually in the field or on the road since the affair.

I landed on the island at Pontrevadra on the 9th of July and immediately proceeded to procure the information necessary to carry out the design of the military governor of the island, and the regimental commander communicated to me on the steamer *Sherman* to attack and destroy, if possible, the large and formidable band of murderers and robbers whose depredations had for some months past made life uncertain and to a great extent paralyzed farming and other industries in the La Carlota district.

I at first found great difficulty in getting information from the natives, who alone could assist me, on account of their fear of these people, whom they believed would soon be supreme in this part of the island. I, however, after a little while succeeded, through the information obtained from spies, in locating the position of the band, and gained all necessary information about the situation of their town and its approaches, etc.

I later received a letter from General Smith, in which the General gave his views about the manner of conducting the campaign, but at the same time leaving it to me to do as I might see best, according to circumstances as they presented themselves to me on the ground.

My plan was in general on the lines suggested by General Smith and Colonel Miner.

I discovered that the bandits were always in considerable force at Bobong, which made it possible to attack Salupitan (the designed objective) by way of the Camino Real without first capturing Bobong, which would enable the main body, if at Salupitan, to receive timely warning and escape, or if at Bobong, to give me a hot fight there, and then fall back on the fortified town of Salupitan and make that place second line of defense. (See sketch herewith. *) I was also informed that they had an observation tower and signal station on the mountain top, from which they could observe our movements from the time we would be 4 miles from La Carlota, moving in their direction.

After a consideration of the condition mentioned I decided on a night march. I was well aware that the odds were very much against making a success of a night march of 15 miles, which distance it would

* Not furnished.

be by the route I contemplated, part of the way being through a trackless jungle; but it was that or nothing, if the bandits were to be surprised, and in that event only could they be delivered a blow with fatal effect.

Not having sufficient men for the undertaking I was compelled to await the arrival of Company K, from Bacolod, under command of First Lieut. W. F. Nesbitt, Sixth Infantry, which did not reach La Carlota until the evening of July 17. This gave me, after leaving sufficient men for the protection of the district, 105 men for a working column.

My plan was to go in command of 70 men and land them, if possible, in such position on the mountain side as to command both Salupitan and Bobong, the attack to be on the place where the enemy happened to be strongest at the time; another column of 35 men was to march by the Camino Cementerio via Granja to the vicinity of Sanguinit (according to original plan) and hold the mountain pass there by which the bandits might escape should they elude my column.

Another consideration which influenced me in my decision to leave the main road was the fact that the band was in the habit of sending marauding parties into the valley after dark, and by traveling the main road we would be sure to meet one or more of these, thus making surprise impossible.

The objective of the expedition was kept a secret except to the officers, and the time of departure not announced until just before starting. The men of course knew that something was going to happen, as preparation was necessarily commenced during the morning of the day upon which we started; every canteen was filled with coffee and the haversacks were stocked with one cooked meal of bacon and the necessary sugar and hard bread; each man carried 115 rounds of ammunition, 5 being carried in the magazine and 110 in the haversack; no blankets were taken, but each man had a poncho. The officers were equipped the same as the men, except as to arms; each had a horse, but rode very little, as riding was about impossible after leaving the road.

The start was not made until 8 p. m., as the people of the town are pretty generally in bed by that time, and to start before would have created a great stir among them. A guard was placed on the several roads leading to the mountains, and about 3 miles out, just after dark, to intercept spies which might possibly carry word of the movement. The guides were not taken from the town, but under charge of their employer met us about 3 miles out on the road. The guides had not been spoken to until the day before, and had been kept close and carefully watched since that time; they had also been shown a sketch of the route, and understood just where they were to leave the road and where the column was to land. The men were required to remain in quarters during the afternoon, and cautioned to rest and sleep.

Three days' rations for 70 men and the same for 35 men were placed in separate piles and turned over, each to a noncommissioned officer with sealed orders, to be opened at reveille the following morning; the orders directed each to go to the president of the town of La Carlota and get sufficient carts to carry the rations—the rations for 70 men to be taken on the road to Bobong and the other on the road to Sanguinit, both to push on until they found their proper column.

At 7.30 o'clock the men were notified to be in ranks at 8. Exactly

the column started. It had been raining most of the after-
the night was as dark as night could be; the rain came down as
the heavens had opened, as it only can in this country; all were
as possible in about one minute; ponchos were as nothing to
t one against such a downpour; the regular road for long
ies at a time was covered with water ankle deep and in places
deep; the men could not see the holes, familiar to those who have
d in this country, and plunged and splashed into water and deep
Notwithstanding all these difficulties splendid progress was made
first 6 or 7 miles, until we left the road, where we first encoun-
series of flooded rice fields, through which the men waded in
of almost any depth, from knee to waist deep, scrambling over
kments, only to plunge into the ditch on the other side, or fall in
stances, going entirely under. Then long stretches of wild cane
encountered, with deep mud, which, being partially packed by
who had gone before, was almost as slippery as ice for those
ollowed.

ing into the foothills of the mountains another variety of diffi-
was met with. The ordinarily small rivulets had become mad
ts. Many of these were crossed, or the same one crossed I
say, about fifteen times, in water waist deep, with current so
that it was with difficulty that the men could at times maintain
hold. At other times the underbrush was impenetrable, making
ssary to follow the bed of a swollen stream, sometimes in water
deep, then the next instant bumping up against a rock to be
d over, then a slide down on the other side, not knowing where
d would be.

or entering the jungle the night was as black as ink; the hand one
om the face could not be seen at times. The rule was that each
ould hold onto the man in his front as constantly as possible,
ch man was required to keep in communication with the man in
r by touch or voice, not speaking louder than a whisper. In
anner the men were with difficulty kept together. Lieutenant
t marched at the head of the column and Acting Asst. Surg.
m L. Whittington at the rear, with instructions to let no man
hind him, so when he was at the end of the column it was known
l were present. Communication from the head to the rear of the
a was had by passing the word in a whisper, and worked very
ter some practice. In this way, with an occasional halt to close
column, we marched until 3 o'clock, when the guide informed
t we were near the base of the mountain, which it would be
ible to climb until daylight. We therefore rested until 4 o'clock,
y commencing to dawn at that hour. The men in the meantime
their coffee and ate the bacon. Hard bread, being saturated
ater, was in about the same condition as before it was baked and
slimy mass of dough.

t o'clock we commenced the ascent of the mountain, steep at
nd then, getting almost perpendicular, it ceased to be marching
is only climbing instead. Foot by foot the men pulled them-
up by grasping roots, small trees; anything to hold onto or
which the foot could rest was taken advantage of, and moving
way for 10 or 15 yards all would stop and rest. Not a word
oken, the men seeming to appreciate that the most trifling,
rable incident might cause all our hard work to go for nothing,

and it seemed almost incredible that so many men could climb a mountain side so quietly. Slowly but surely going up, we came to within about 20 yards of the summit at about 6.15 o'clock. I was at the head of the column and Lieutenant Nesbitt was with me, and, after stopping for a few minutes to get our wind, we started, accompanied by about 4 or 5 men to reconnoiter ahead of us, the guide indicating by a significant motion of the hand that the object of our search was not far distant.

I desire to here state that as the commander of a small force in action to properly perform his duty and hope for success must lead as well direct his men. It would be impossible for him to make the necessary report in detail of what transpired without referring to himself and his own acts. I hope, therefore, that I may be pardoned for being guilty of the necessity for doing so in my account of what follows.

We climbed to the top of the hill and, looking cautiously over, were astonished to find one of their blockhouses and observation towers not over 15 or 20 yards away. It had a commanding view of the valley and all the trails in that vicinity, but not of the route we came. Some of the bandits were cooking breakfast, in perfect ignorance of our presence. We instantly rushed upon them and before those in and around the house had realized what had happened 7 out of the 9 had been shot down not far from the house, the 2 who escaped zigzagging so quickly in their marvelously rapid flight that they could not be hit before reaching some high grass into which they fell, as is their custom, and disappeared as quickly as would a snake.

Knowing that our presence was now discovered, we ran back, and I rushed Lieutenant Nesbitt forward with about 20 men, who, hearing the firing, had struggled to the top of the hill. The lieutenant went forward with his men, deployed as skirmishers, in the direction of the fleeing bandits, to attack anything he found, as it was thought that the main body would be found in the direction the bandits had fled.

I remained back for a while and sent the men as fast as they could be gotten up the hill to join the advanced line.

I soon heard continuous firing in the direction Lieutenant Nesbitt had taken, and, leaving the battalion sergeant-major to gather up the remainder of the men, I started in the direction of the firing. I had proceeded but a few hundred yards when I came in plain view of the village about 300 yards distant. It was an ideal beautiful place for a bandit stronghold, defended by blockhouses and stockade, neither bullet proof, against any enemy that might be expected, except on the side of the mountain, where it was not expected apparently that an enemy would appear. The mountain side was pretty well cleared of timber for a distance of about 300 yards from the village. The mountain did not descend directly to the village, but its slope continued to a point some distance below the level of the town, where it was met by the slope of the elevation upon which the village was situated. At the lowest point, where the slopes from the mountain and village would have met, there was a chasm of such depth as to make it impassable except by a single footbridge; a clear beautiful stream of water ran through the chasm. After crossing the creek the slope was quite precipitous for a distance of about 50 or 60 feet and terminated in a perfectly level plateau of just sufficient dimensions to hold the village, which was built around a plaza; the blockhouses were on the corners, commanding the view of the slope from the creek; there were two

roads or trails entering the village, one to the valley below, and another to Salupitan, another bandit stronghold not over 800 yards distant; these were defended by a bamboo stockade. When I first sighted the town it was filled with seemingly crazy men. It reminded me of an ant hill just stirred up with a stick. They were running in every direction, not leaving the town but charging back and forth in wild confusion; horses were running around loose among the men, some saddled and in all stages of preparation for mounting. I found that Lieutenant Nesbitt had taken a very advantageous position, which afforded him the opportunity to both fire into the confused mass of bandits with terrible effect and at the same time to cut off their escape to Salupitan by the only trail in that direction.

Sergeant Bennett soon arrived with the remainder of the men who were able to travel, making in all 55 tired men for the work ahead, the remainder being too much exhausted to join the command.

I sent Sergeant Bennett to the right to fire into the village, also at the same time to be so posted that he could cut off their escape to the hills on that side and cover the road to the valley. This duty he well performed. I remained between the detachments with Trumpeter Steele, of Company K. I felt quite sure that notwithstanding the distance between they would not try to come in the direction in which they had first seen my men.

Our fire was vigorously replied to by a party of about 15 riflemen located behind wood piles in the village. They used black powder, as their fire made a great deal of smoke.

Shortly after we opened fire the village seemed to be deserted with the same suddenness that it had but a short time before been swarming with men, the riflemen alone remaining at their posts. They did not, however, leave the place, but, much to my surprise, went into the houses, which afforded no protection except to screen them from view, and, stranger still, the deadly fire of our men could not dislodge them, as volley after volley failed to bring any of them out.

It occurred to me then that at this rate our supply of ammunition would become exhausted and the village still remain in possession possibly of a considerable force of the enemy, so I concluded they would have to be attacked at close quarters and poked out of the houses. My force was too small for me to retain a reserve under my immediate command, and I sorely felt the need of it now. I could not take the force from the hills for fear the bandits would avail themselves of the opportunity to escape, so, having 2 men with me, I sent 1 to each of the detachments for 15 men, and then with Trumpeter Steele ran down the hill toward the village, the riflemen taking several shots at us before we got below their line of sight. In the dead space, under the hill, the trumpeter sounded the assembly repeatedly, so the men sent for would know where to assemble.

My going to the foot of the hill—a movement to which I attached no particular importance at the time—was the most fortunate accident which ever befell me, and I believe saved the lives of some of my men.

When near the creek, in the deep cut spoken of, I noticed the foot-bridge before mentioned and went in that direction with the intention of waiting for the men sent for, intending after their arrival to cross and attack the bandits in their houses. I had hardly reached the bridge when much to my surprise about 12 or 14 of my men came rushing down the hill on the other side, the leader of the panic-stricken squad

being ready to step off the bridge just as I got to it, and the others pushing behind to get over. I was quite taken back by the occurrence, as I was not aware that any of my men were over the river or near the village. I exclaimed: "My God, men, what does this mean?" Several shouted at once, "Captain, we must get away; there are thousand of them, and we will be killed." I told the men we would all be killed if we ran, but would be all right if we faced them. I got the men back over the bridge as rapidly as possible. This condition of affairs was brought about as follows:

After firing for some time and being unable to dislodge the riflemen from the woodpiles in the village, both detachment commanders conceived the idea of sending some sharpshooters to cross the creek, sneak up to the edge of the village, and flank them out. Several of our enterprising soldiers had thought of the same thing and unknown to their superiors had gone independently on the same mission; they had all met at the one place of crossing, the footbridge, and proceeded to get after the riflemen. The bandits, quickly taking advantage of the situation, came out of the houses to the number of about 200 (Lieutenant Nesbitt, who saw this affair from the hill, states "if there was one bandit in this attack there were 200"), and attacked this party just about the time I reached the bridge, or a little before, of which I was not aware at the time.

In this attack Private David S. Anderson, Company K, was shot and killed, receiving in addition 33 bolo cuts, the bandits getting his rifle and about 50 rounds of ammunition. Private Albert C. Jenks, Company K, was shot through the neck, but had sufficient vitality to get over the bank, where he came rolling down near to where we were, groaning with pain and his face covered with blood, an unfortunate incident in its influence upon the men at this time. First Sergt. William Shuch, Company K, and Corpl. Frank S. Swan, Company K, heroically stood their ground in the face of what seemed to be certain death. Corporal Swan fired 3 shots from his magazine, bringing down a bandit at each shot. He could not fire more, as they were right on him. He then clubbed his gun, mashing in the head of the first man, killing him instantly; reversing his gun, he ran the next through with his bayonet, killing him. Sergeant Shuch also stood his ground, firing into them with deadly effect. The other men stampeded and made a break for the bridge. This was the crowd that I met on the bridge.

After getting the men over the bridge I attempted to deploy them, but they were too much demoralized to obey commands. I then pushed some of them into place, it being hard to keep them where put. They were finally and quickly gotten into skirmish order after a fashion. Just at this time about 6 men—probably those sent for—came over the bridge and joined the party, making my detachment number about 20 men. I took the position of center skirmisher of the party and directed Trumpeter Steele to sound the charge, telling the men that at the last note I was going forward and expected them to go with me. At the last note of the trumpet we sprang up over the bank into the village. A few men were a little slow, but soon sprang into place; 2 fell down behind a log, but, on being shouted at, got up and joined the line. All had now recovered their self-possession and would have gone into anything; they were brave, good men, but had only become temporarily rattled. This sudden countercharge by the men *whom the bandits had a few minutes before probably regarded as their*

victims completely demoralized them. They fell back across the village with our men still after them, when they became panic-stricken and dispersed, fleeing down the hill, while our men poured a deadly fire into them at close range so long as they were in sight.

Lieutenant Nesbitt, who had witnessed our predicament from the hill, had started with all haste for the village and arrived shortly after the bandits had disappeared in the woods; he continued the pursuit so long as they could be found; they had scattered in every direction and quite a number were killed by his men.

A notable incident of the fight, and one of great importance as affecting the peace and quiet of this vicinity, was the killing of the chief of the band, a tall, handsome man who looked like a Spaniard. He was apparently a man of great importance and influence; was equipped with a good Winchester rifle, revolver, and fine talabong, or kind of broad sword; he also had a fine pair of field glasses of French make (now in my possession); a man of superb courage; he used his Winchester from his horse; he died as hard as he fought; when pierced by two bullets through the breast he fell from his horse, rolled, plunged, and scrambled over the ground like a chicken beheaded. Of all the bandits killed I did not see a wounded man except in the struggle of death on the field; they always got away to die off the battlefield; they would hop, scramble, roll, or drag themselves until picked up by some comrade, who would run and carry another man with comparative ease.

It was now 8.30 a. m., the affair having lasted in its various phases for two hours and fifteen minutes.

The men were now afforded an opportunity to get breakfast, but expressed a desire to go elsewhere. The surroundings were certainly enough to paralyze the appetite of even hungry men; the dead bodies of bandits, mingled with the carcasses of carabao and horses, were on every side, so we decided to move at once; the stock, carabao, horses, and bulls, etc., were driven in from the grazing grounds; chickens, pigs, and goats were killed to be brought in for food for the soldiers; such as could not be packed were destroyed; great quantities of rice and various kinds of provisions were also destroyed; also household goods of great variety, the accumulation, probably, of years of plunder and robbery, this after each man had helped himself to all he could carry. We burned the town (31 houses), also about 50 outlying houses in the neighborhood.

One bandit was taken prisoner just as the houses were being burned. He jumped from one and, rolled in a cloth, threw himself on the ground, he dropped on the ground, covered by several rifles, just in time to save his life.

With a rear guard, and skirmishers around the herd and three carts drawn by carabao, on one of which was the body of our dead comrade, on another the wounded man, we moved out of the mountains into the valley, where each man was then permitted to mount one of the captured animals and ride the remainder of the way. The command presented a remarkable sight, such as was never seen before and probably never will be again. Almost every man carried one or more of some sort of bandit weapon—spear, bolo, etc.—and the man who did not have a bunch of chickens, a young pig, kid, or some such thing, was the exception. In this manner, riding all day, the command reached La Carlota at 4.30 p. m.

The combat resulted in the killing of 115 of the bandits, according to count. This, however, is a very low estimate according to my opinion as well as that of my officers. I believe 150 would be nearer the correct number. Within the past few days a scouting party entered Salupitan and found the place deserted.

This party reports a large number of skeletons and decomposed bodies some distance from where the fight took place. These are undoubtedly the remains of wounded men who died after leaving the battlefield. The natives report the killed to be in excess of any figures mentioned in this report.

The following were captured and brought in: One Winchester rifle, 3 revolvers, 48 carabao, 8 horses and saddles, 2 driving bulls, and 3 carabao carts. Five horses and 13 carabao were killed on account of being unmanageable.

In looking for a reason for the apparent success of this expedition, too much credit can not be given to the officers and men under my command. Each and every one of them acted as though he was personally responsible for the success of the whole affair, and as though any shortcoming on his part would spoil it all. Not a growl or grumble was heard during the entire night. The men maintained silence, although they had many temptations and much provocation to do otherwise, but each seemed to appreciate that one bad break might spoil it all, and acted as though his life depended upon success. Lieutenant Nesbett marched on foot with the guide the entire distance, and by his energy and good judgment kept the column moving and contributed much toward success. He also engaged the enemy with energy and courage, inflicting great damage upon them, and posted his command with good judgment, to prevent escape.

Acting Asst. Surg. William L. Whittington, who marched at the rear of the column by my order, by his physical efforts and words of encouragement, did much to prevent straggling, which might otherwise have seriously delayed the march. He used his horse to assist tired men to the front after the fight began.

Battalion Sergeant Major Bennett commanded a detachment of the command with courage and efficiency.

The work of the guide was a most remarkable feat of its kind. He seemed to be possessed of the instinct and power, to see at night, of the wild beast, which roams the forest and jungle on the darkest night with unerring certainty.

I recommend First Sergt. William J. Schuck, Company K, Sixth Infantry, and Corpl. Frank S. Swan, Company K, Sixth Infantry, for such recognition as their conduct reported herein deserves. Their courage and coolness did much toward saving life while engaged with the enemy.

Lieutenant Evans's report is inclosed herewith. He captured a large amount of stock, which seriously damaged the enemy.

Very respectfully,

B. A. BYRNE,
*Captain, Sixth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion,
Sixth Infantry, and La Carlota District, Negros, P. I.*

LA CARLOTA, *Negros, P. I.*

personally appeared before me the undersigned, Sergt. L. J. Butterfield, Company Sixth Infantry, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: that he was a member of the command under Capt. Bernard A. Byrne, Sixth Infantry, at the battle with bandits at Bobong, Negros, P. I., July 18, 1899; that he was with Captain Byrne at the time he went down the hill toward the footbridge which led to the town, over a deep cut, through which ran a stream of water; that as we got to the bridge a dozen or so men came rushing over the bridge. Captain Byrne ordered them to stop, and stood at the end of the bridge to block their passage over the bridge, and ordered me to help him keep them back. I grabbed one man and pushed him back, and they stopped. The Captain asked them what this meant, and a number of them shouted: "There are a thousand of them, Captain, and they will kill us all;" and one man shouted, "They have got Anderson, and they will get us," and they repeated these calls and begged to get over the bridge. The Captain told them that we could whip the bandits, and we would all be killed if we ran, and tried to encourage them and get them on the other side of the bridge. The Captain ordered them into line of skirmishers, but they were too much demoralized to obey commands. He then called upon the noncommissioned officers to assist him in organizing the men deployed. The captain took hold of some of them and I took hold of others and put them in place, but they would not stay, but kept huddling together asking the captain to wait for more men before attacking the bandits. The captain, with drawn revolver, said that he would shoot any man who talked that way, and ordered me to put my bayonet into any who did not stay in place. They were finally gotten into skirmish line. About 6 other men came over the bridge and joined us at this time. The captain placed himself in the center of the line and told Trumpeter James T. Steele, Company K, to sound the "charge;" that he was going forward at the last note, and expected every man to follow him. At the last note we all went up the bank into the village. Two men dodged behind a log; the captain shouted for them, and I beat them out with a stick. We went into the village at a charge bayonet. The bandits became demoralized at this sudden change of affairs and fled to the rear side of the village and scattered in the bushes. Our men followed them as long as they could be found, and many were killed by their rifle fire. It was a case of men fighting before vastly superior numbers being rallied and led to victory. Further saith not.

LAWRENCE J. BUTTERFIELD,
Sergeant, Company K, Sixth Infantry.

sworn and subscribed to before me this the 21st day of September, 1899.

H. G. YOUNG,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Infantry, Summary Court.

LA CARLOTA, *Negros, P. I.*

personally appeared before me, the undersigned, Trumpeter James T. Steele, Company K, Sixth Infantry, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: that he was with Capt. B. A. Byrne, Sixth Infantry, in the battle with bandits at Bobong, Negros, P. I., July 18, 1899; that he performed the duties of orderly and trumpeter to the captain on that occasion; that he was with Captain Byrne when he ordered the panic-stricken soldiers at the footbridge to the town; that the men came rushing over the bridge shouting, "Captain, there are a thousand of them, and they will kill us all." The captain kept them back from getting off the bridge. The captain said, "The more the better; we have come to find them and I am glad we have. We will whip them easy if we stand, but will all be killed if we run." The men all kept shouting, "There are too many of them." The captain told them that they must stand back; that it was a disgrace for a soldier to turn his back to the enemy. The men were finally gotten back over the bridge. We were under the bank and out of sight of the bandits all this time. The men were so frightened they could hardly be managed. The captain took hold of them and put them in place, and then they would stay. He said he would shoot any man who moved, and told the noncommissioned officers to stick any man who moved with a bayonet. The men were all the while asking the captain to wait for more men. The captain said there was no time to be lost, and he would shoot any man who talked that way. He told the men to stay with him at the last note of the charge, and placed himself on the skirmish line. He told me to sound the charge and draw my revolver and come with him. As I sounded the charge the captain shouted, "Men, I am going at the last note. Do not

let me go alone." At the last note we jumped up over the bank into the village. This was a great surprise to the bandits, who broke and ran; their riflemen also ran without firing another shot. We pursued them across the village and into the woods on the other side, with great slaughter from the rifle fire of our men, who followed them as long as they could be found.

Further deponent saith not.

JAMES STEELE,
Trumpeter, Company K, Sixth Infantry.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this the 21st day of September, 1899.

H. G. YOUNG,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Infantry, Summary Court.

LA CARLOTA, *Negros, P. I.*

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, Private Thomas J. Peterson, Company K, Sixth Infantry, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he was a member of Capt. B. A. Byrne's command in the fight at Bobong, Negros, P. I., July 18, 1899; that he was one of a party who crossed the footbridge to the side of the village for the purpose of attacking the bandits; that while on the village side of the stream they were attacked by a large force of bandits; 1 man was killed, 1 wounded, and another had a narrow escape from death; the village seemed to be full of them; some of the men came running back shouting, "For God's sake, run for your lives, they are getting ready to come after us, and there are a thousand of them." We all ran for the bridge, never expecting to get out alive; when on the bridge we were stopped by Captain Byrne; the men all shouted to the captain to run, that the bandits were getting ready to come after us; they thought the captain did not know the danger and they kept shouting to him about it; the captain would not let us over the bridge; the captain told us for God's sake to turn back and not turn our back on the enemy and we could whip them; that if we did not fight we would all be killed, and said we had better be killed fighting than standing on the bridge, as we could not cross; we came back over the bridge and the captain put the men in their places in the skirmish line and told Steele to sound the "charge;" at the last note the captain led us into the town; we went in at a charge with bayonets; this unexpected attack on the bandits seemed to frighten them, and they became demoralized and fled to the other side of the village, but we were after them and they scattered in the thicket; great numbers of them were killed; I did not expect to get out of that place alive until after we had won our great victory, and I do not think anyone else did.

Further deponent saith not.

THOMAS J. PETERSON,
Private, Company K, Sixth Infantry.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this the 22d day of September, 1899.

H. G. YOUNG,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Infantry, Summary Court.

[First indorsement.]

HDQRS. SIXTH INFANTRY,
Bacolod, P. I., August 25, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the commanding officer military sub-district, island of Negros. I call especial attention to the inclosed report of Capt. B. A. Byrne, Sixth U. S. Infantry, of late operation in the Carlota district of the island of Negros, as I consider it a remarkable performance on his part, and that of his command, in the way of endurance, perseverance, and cool courage under the most trying circumstances. For Captain Byrne I strongly recommend, for most distinguished gallantry and rallying the men on the bridge, a medal of honor; for Lieutenant Nesbitt, a brevet of captain for coolness and

courage displayed; and for Sergt. William J. Schuck and Corpl. Frank S. Swan, certificate of merit.

Three affidavits attached in support of recommendation of Captain Byrne.

C. W. MINER,
Lieutenant-Colonel Sixth Infantry, Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HDQRS. MILITARY SUBDISTRICT,
ISLAND OF NEGROS,
Bacolod, P. I., September 30, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the assistant adjutant-general, Visayan military district, Iloilo, P. I.

Recommendations contained in first indorsement approved.

JAMES F. SMITH,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Third indorsement.]

HDQRS. VISAYAN MILITARY DISTRICT AND
FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Iloilo, P. I., October 4, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the assistant adjutant-general, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. Recommendation contained in first indorsement approved.

R. P. HUGHES,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Fourth indorsement.]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., October 11, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

This report contains a graphic description of a perilous undertaking most successfully executed, entitling those participating to all the honors herein recommended.

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

**REPORTS OF BRIG. GEN. LOYD WHEATON, U. S. V., OF OPERATIONS
ALONG THE PASIG RIVER, MARCH 13-19, AND IN THE PROVINCE
OF CAVITE, JUNE 8-30, 1899.**

MANILA, P. I., *March 21, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: By General Orders, No. 11, current series, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, I was assigned to the command of "a provisional brigade" composed of the Twentieth and Twenty-second Regiments, U. S. Infantry, two battalions of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, seven companies of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, a platoon of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, and a squadron of three troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

My instructions were to clear the enemy from the country to Pasig and to strike him wherever found. The brigade was formed on the night of the 12th instant and bivouacked in line in rear of the intrenched position extending from San Pedro Macati on the Pasig 1 mile in the direction of Passay from right to left in the following order:

Squadron Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Major Rucker; Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Colonel Egbert; Twentieth U. S. Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel McCaskey; seven companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Summers; one platoon (2 guns) Sixth U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Scott; two battalions First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Wholley.

Soon after daylight on the morning of March 13 the brigade moved under my instructions, by echelon, from the right, the Fourth U. S. Cavalry and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry moving first; then the Twentieth U. S. Infantry, followed by the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. When the cavalry and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry had advanced $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles the line wheeled to the left and marched toward the river road along the Pasig. Scott's guns had now opened upon the position of the enemy at Guadalupe, and the left of the line advancing forced him out, the Twentieth U. S. Infantry and First Washington Volunteer Infantry reaching the church at Guadalupe at nearly the same time. The right of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry struck the enemy as he was retreating in the direction of Pasig, inflicting heavy loss. The whole line moved on and occupied the Pasig road and then marching east along the road soon came under fire of the enemy from his intrenched position at Pasig, on the north side of the river. Opened fire upon his intrenchments from 1 gun on the road and placed the other upon a cliff or ridge extending at right angle to the Pasig; occupied the ridge with infantry and extended the Twentieth and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to the right on the high ground in the direction of Pateros. One battalion of the Twenty-second



FIRING LINE NEAR PASO, MARCH 4, 1877





TWENTY SECOND UNITED STATES INFANTRY IN ACTION NEAR PASIG MARCH 13 1899



SECOND OREGON REGIMENT FIRING ON PASIG MARCH 14, 1899.

J. S. Infantry, under Captain Lockwood, and the squadron of Fourth J. S. Cavalry, under Major Rucker, attacked a force of the enemy in the direction of Pateros and drove him beyond Taghuig. The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, under command of Captain Grant, came up, and fight closed with the enemy driven to the north side of Pasig.

March 14.—Extended my line to the south and west of Pateros and reconnoitered the country to the west and south. The cavalry engaged the enemy in force in the direction of Taghuig, and drove him beyond that place. The enemy being intrenched in the bamboo thickets across the channel, near Pateros, the First Washington Volunteer Infantry—one battalion, under Maj. J. J. Weisenburger—crossed the channel in wascos and by swimming, stormed the intrenchments, and captured or killed all the rebels there. The town of Pateros took fire and burned.

March 15.—I sent one battalion of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry, under Major Rogers, across the river at Pasig, brought up a gun, and shelled the intrenchments in front of Pasig and to the left. The battalion of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry carried the city by storm. I crossed a part of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry below Pasig, and when the rebels fled from Pasig they were exposed to a heavy musk fire from this detachment. Sent the whole of the Twentieth U. S. Infantry over to Pasig, the regiment being taken across upon the steam launch *Maritime*. Advanced the First Washington Volunteer Infantry on my right to Taghuig and captured about 500 prisoners. Fight came on with the enemy in my front and on my right killed, captured, or dispersed. The enemy lost at least 1,000 men this day.

March 16.—Instructed Lieutenant-Colonel McCaskey, commanding Twentieth U. S. Infantry, at Pasig, to clear the country in his immediate vicinity of any of the insurgents who might be lurking near, and soon after received a dispatch from him that he had sent out two battalions to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon after, heavy and long-continued firing was heard to the east and north of Pasig. At 12 m., learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding Third Battalion Twentieth U. S. Infantry, had come upon the enemy, intrenched 1,000 strong at the village of Cienta, and that he had carried the intrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in the direction of Tay-Tay. Major Rogers returned with his battalion to Pasig. In this affair he lost 2 killed and 14 wounded.

On the 17th of March, by direction of the corps commander, I returned the Twentieth U. S. Infantry to Manila, relieving the regiment at Pasig by a part of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry.

On the afternoon of March 18 a force of the enemy appeared in the vicinity of Taghuig, which was held by one company of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry. Reenforced the place with two companies of infantry and directed the colonel of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to send one battalion of his regiment south of the position held by his regiment and to the west of Taghuig to ascertain the force of the enemy. The enemy was found about 800 strong occupying the crests of the ridges, and a spirited combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness. The Twenty-second had 20 men killed and wounded in this affair. Among the wounded was Capt. Frank B. Jones, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding the battalion. The enemy fell back toward the south.

The morning of the 19th instant soon after daylight I formed line, deployed in the extended order facing to the south, as follows: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry and 1 gun Sixth Artillery on the right; Second

Oregon Volunteer Infantry (six companies), center; First Washington Volunteer Infantry (six companies), left. Advanced the line and struck the enemy 4 miles south of Taghuig. My line, wheeling to the left, partly inclosed him toward the lake, and he was completely routed, with great loss. My left pursued him down the lake 15 miles from Taghuig as far as San Pedro Tamisan, all the houses along the lake to that point being burned. The enemy's intrenchments on our left and in front of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry were carried, the enemy leaving more than 200 dead upon the field. Returned to the vicinity of Pateros and there bivouacked, receiving orders to return the command to former encampments near Manila, excepting that the First Washington Volunteer Infantry was designated to hold Pasig, Pateros, and Taghuig and adjacent country.

This ended the operations of the provisional brigade. In one week all his positions that were attacked taken and his troops killed, captured, or dispersed; the towns from where he brought over troops or in which he resisted us burned or destroyed. He burned them himself. His loss in killed, wounded, and captured was not less than 2,500 men.

I was ably supported and assisted by the several regimental commanders through the series of operations. I desire to call attention to the energetic conduct of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and the gallant conduct in action of Maj. William P. Rogers, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, and Maj. J. J. Weisenburger, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and to the gallant and meritorious services of Capt. Frank B. Jones, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry. Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth U. S. Artillery, rendered most efficient service with his guns, showing skill and intrepidity. I desire to call attention to the very gallant conduct of Capts. Herbert S. Foster, James A. Irons, and Benjamin Alvord, Twentieth Infantry, in the storming of Pasig and in the combat at Cienta. I am indebted to Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, and to Lieut. Charles R. Howland, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, acting assistant adjutant-general, for valuable assistance; also to First Lieut. William D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, acting aid.

Service both gallant and efficient was rendered by Capt. Elmore McKenna and Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, Volunteer Signal Corps.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

MANILA, P. I., *June 30, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

(Through headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.)

SIR: Relating to recent operations in the province of Cavite in which I have taken part, I have to report that by direction of Major General Otis, commanding Eighth Army Corps and Department of the Pacific, I reported for temporary duty to Major-General Lawton commanding First Division, Eighth Army Corps, on the 8th instant and was ordered to proceed to San Pedro Macati and assume command

f a provisional brigade, consisting of 1 company Nevada Cavalry (unmounted), First Colorado Volunteer Infantry (6 companies), Col. J. B. McCoy; Ninth U. S. Infantry (8 companies), Capt. John A. Baldwin; Twenty-first U. S. Infantry (8 companies), Maj. William H. Boyle; 2 field guns (3.2-inch), Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, 1 Hotchkiss (1.65-inch), Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, under command of Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery; the brigade in all numbering about 2,000 men effective for duty.

June 9 the several detachments composing the brigade reported to me at San Pedro Macati and were placed in bivouac, with instructions to be ready to march at daylight on the 10th instant, the men to carry two days' rations and 150 rounds of ammunition.

I passed the greater part of the 9th instant in reconnoitering the position of the enemy southeast of San Pedro Macati. At dawn on the 10th instant the brigade marched in the following order: Company First Nevada Cavalry, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, artillery, Ninth U. S. Infantry, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry. The command was preceded by a detachment of sharpshooters from the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, of Ovenshine's brigade, that brigade following mine as we marched out.

Upon arriving at Guadalupe Ridge, 2 miles south and east of San Pedro Macati, I found the sharpshooters of the Fourteenth Infantry, under direction of Major-General Lawton, deployed at about 1,000 yards in front of Guadalupe Ridge, the ridge marking our line of outposts and held by companies of the Twelfth U. S. Infantry. I immediately deployed the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry in the extended order in front of the ridge and directed it to advance. The company of Nevada Cavalry was directed to deploy in the extended order on the right of the First Colorado and to keep connection with that regiment, but soon after this company was directed by a staff officer of the division commander to move to the right, and the company remained with Ovenshine's brigade until night.

My instructions were to attack and break through the intrenched position of the enemy and march southeast, endeavoring to turn the enemy in toward the lake and inflict all possible damage upon him, then to march south along the lake to Montelupe. I was informed that Ovenshine's brigade would at the same time break through the enemy's intrenched line and, turning to the right, march to some point below Paranaque and cut the enemy's line of retreat. About 2 miles south of Guadalupe Ridge the first Colorado struck the enemy's intrenched line, and a spirited combat ensued, the artillery coming into position and delivering a heavy fire upon the enemy, who soon abandoned his works, a part of his force retreating south and east toward the lake and a part to the south and west. Two miles farther south the enemy endeavored to resist our farther advance. Fire was opened upon him with the 3.2-inch guns, and the infantry all coming up and going into action, his fire was silenced and a part of his force retired yet farther south. I now discovered that at about 600 yards distant and to my right the enemy were in considerable force behind a ridge running nearly parallel to my line of advance. Directing the first Colorado to pursue the enemy retreating south, I changed front to the right, placing the Twenty-first Infantry on the right, Ninth Infantry on the left, the artillery on the left of the Ninth Infantry, and advancing firing, soon drove the enemy from his positions, his

routed troops being subjected to long-range fire until he disappeared in the direction of Paranaque. Major-General Lawton, who was present during these movements, now directed that I remain with my command in its position until he could ascertain the progress made by Ovenshine's brigade, when he would send me further instructions.

Within an hour I received an order from Major-General Lawton to advance in line, my center to move on the church tower at Paranaque, which was done with the Twenty-first Infantry on the right, Ninth Infantry on the left, First Colorado to march in column and cover my left flank, the artillery to march near the center. After advancing about 2 miles, by direction of Major-General Lawton my artillery was brought to the right of my line and opened fire upon the enemy, who were resisting Ovenshine's troops. The flank fire of the artillery soon drove the enemy in confusion on Paranaque. About 12 m., by direction of Major-General Lawton, I halted my line and assembled the troops in the shade of a wood. A well was found and the canteens refilled.

The march to this point had been one of great fatigue. The temperature was from 100° to 110° in the sun, no wind blowing, and the country passed over destitute of wells or springs, and covered by high grass. The men were carrying about 30 pounds each and there was much suffering from the excessive heat, but nearly all men who had fallen out joined while my command was halted at the well.

At 2.30 p. m., by direction of Major-General Lawton, the march was resumed and the direction to Las Pinas taken, the first Colorado taking the head of the column, followed by the artillery and the Ninth and Twenty-first infantry. About 4 p. m. the enemy was found in considerable force on the west side of the estero, between Paranaque and Las Pinas. This force was attacked with great spirit by the First Colorado, its fire silenced, and a part of the regiment, crossing the estero on cascals, drove the enemy in flight on Las Pinas. Soon after the enemy appeared in some strength on our left and front at about 1,000 yards distance, and was attacked by the Ninth Infantry and the Twenty-first Infantry and the artillery, and driven off, and the march resumed. Several esterros were found which caused considerable detours, so that when darkness came we were more than a mile from the road leading south from Las Pinas, and the enemy apparently occupying the jungle in front, and an estero to cross over which a ford could not be found in the dark. I brought up all my artillery and shelled the supposed position of the enemy, and the command bivouacked in a rice field. No wood or water was to be had, but, it raining hard during the night the men were able to fill their canteens from rain water on the ground.

At daylight on the 11th instant the march on Las Pinas was resumed which place was occupied at an early hour and without further resistance. I was directed to return the First Colorado to Manila.

At 8 a. m., the 13th instant, I was directed by Major-General Lawton to send 2 companies of the Twenty-first Infantry on the Bacoor road and in the direction of the bridge across the Zapote. The enemy was found in force intrenched on the south side of the Zapote, with a heavy smooth-bore gun in position near the bridge. By direction of Major-General Lawton these 2 companies (I and F, under command of First Lieut. Joseph L. Donovan, Twenty-first Infantry) were placed on the extreme right, near the bay, and, after wading a number of channels, reached a position near the north bank of the Zapote and within

short distance of the enemy, on the south bank. Lieutenant Donovan and First Lieut. Patrick Connolly were wounded and 2 men killed and 11 men wounded. Their ammunition being exhausted, they were relieved at noon by a battalion of the Ninth Infantry. The remainder of the Ninth and Twenty-first Infantry were sent forward at 2.30 p. m. The troops of Owenshine were by this time heavily engaged, attacking the enemy's intrenched position from the left of the Bacoor road, the artillery attacking from the road. Between 4 and 4.30 p. m. the enemy gave way, abandoning his intrenchments and falling back.

By direction of Major-General Lawton I crossed to the south bank of the Zapote and immediately sent forward a company of the Twenty-first Infantry, under First Lieut. William M. Morrow, to ascertain the position of the enemy, and formed line, with the Ninth Infantry on the right, Twenty-first Infantry on the left, and 4 guns in the center. Lieutenant Morrow soon drew the fire of the enemy, who were found about a mile south of the Zapote, occupying the bamboo thickets and the outskirts of a village. Attacked him at once, and within twenty minutes he fled in confusion in the direction of Imus.

The command bivouacked the night of the 13th one-half mile south of the Zapote.

On the 14th instant sent a battalion of the Ninth Infantry to occupy Bacoor and made reconnoissance toward Imus.

June 15 it was learned the enemy had evacuated Imus and abandoned all points on the shore of Manila Bay. Ninth and Twenty-first Infantry ordered to Manila. I returned to Manila same day.

June 18 I was directed to report to and confer with Major-General Lawton relative to threatened attack of the enemy from direction of Dasmarinas upon Imus. Proceeded to Imus, arriving there in the afternoon, and reconnoitered vicinity. The force concentrated for proposed operations was 2 battalions Fourteenth U. S. Infantry (Maj. L. A. Matile), the Fourth U. S. Infantry (Lieut. Col. J. M. Sanno), 1 troop Nevada Cavalry, dismounted, and 8 guns (First Lieut. William L. Kenly, First Artillery).

June 19, sent the Nevada Cavalry on road to the east to make reconnoissance. No indications of the enemy discovered. Sent 1 battalion of the Fourth U. S. Infantry with one 3.2-inch gun on the Dasmarinas road to make a reconnoissance. The battalion was under command of Maj. John W. Bubb. Soon after noon heard heavy firing on the Dasmarinas road, and ordered the other two battalions of the Fourth U. S. Infantry and three guns to reenforce Major Bubb, and proceeded in person to the place of combat. When within a half mile of Major Bubb's battalion the enemy opened a heavy infantry fire upon me from a line of bamboo thickets parallel to the road. This fire having disclosed to me the enemy's main position, I placed a 3.2-inch gun on that part of the Dasmarinas road that was perpendicular to this position and enfiladed their line for more than a mile. The fire on Major Bubb's battalion at once ceased, and bringing up the other two battalions of the Fourth U. S. Infantry, the enemy were driven, with heavy loss and in great confusion, off the field.

The whole line was advanced to within 4 miles of the Dasmarinas and the four guns and the Fourth Infantry went into bivouac on the Dasmarinas road.

It appeared that the reconnoissance had, at about 3 or 4 miles from Dasmarinas, struck the enemy advancing in force, estimated at 2,500

strong. In compliance with instructions Major Bubb had fallen back slowly until reenforced, when the combat terminated with the enemy completely routed. From reports of officers who counted the enemy's dead on various portions of the field over which we marched, and from reports of prisoners and refugees, their loss in killed was between 100 and 200, with the usual proportion of wounded.

By direction of Major-General Lawton I was reenforced during the night of the 19th instant by one battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry, and as soon as practicable the morning of the 20th marched on Dasmarinas.

Moving in line in the extended order, one 3.2-inch gun, 1 troop Nevada Cavalry, dismounted, on the road, the Fourth U. S. Infantry on the right (west) of the road; 1 battalion Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, under Capt. F. Taylor, on the left (east) of the road; two 1.65-inch guns marched with the Fourth Infantry on the right, the remainder of the artillery 400 yards in rear, followed immediately by battalion of Ninth Infantry, to cover flank and rear. Soon after movement commenced a feeble resistance was made by the enemy on our front and right and left front. His fire was at extreme range, although he made an attempt to work toward our rear and right. His movement in that direction was turned into flight by two battalions of the Fourth Infantry on the extreme right and two 1.65-inch guns.

About noon I occupied Dasmarinas, dispersing and driving out of sight all of the enemy. During the afternoon the country was reconnoitered in the direction of Buena Vista, a place 3 miles west of Dasmarinas, and supposed to contain an arsenal for reloading ammunition, etc. It was found that to reach Buena Vista an unfordable river must be crossed, and all trails impracticable for artillery. Fire with a 3.2-inch gun was directed on the buildings at Buena Vista from Dasmarinas, and 6 shells exploded within the buildings supposed to have been used as an arsenal. I have since learned that all material was moved south from Buena Vista the night of the 19th instant.

The night of the 20th the command was disposed as follows: Nevada Cavalry, the artillery, 1 battalion Fourth U. S. Infantry, 1 battalion Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and brigade headquarters, Dasmarinas; 2 battalions Fourth U. S. Infantry 1 mile north of Dasmarinas on the Imus road; battalion Ninth U. S. Infantry on Imus road 4 miles north to protect train coming up with rations.

On the 21st instant, soon after daylight, marched for Imus. I remained with the rear guard during the march. The enemy had disappeared and not a shot was fired during the day. It had rained the night of the 20th and the road was difficult, the indications being that after the heavy rains begin it will be impassable for artillery and wheeled vehicles. I returned to Manila June 22.

I desire to commend the conduct of Col. J. B. McCoy, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry; Maj. William H. Boyle, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry, and Capt. John A. Baldwin, Ninth U. S. Infantry. Maj. John W. Bubb, Fourth U. S. Infantry, is worthy of special mention for gallant conduct on the 19th instant. I am indebted for efficient service and cooperation to Lieut. Col. J. M. J. Sanno, Fourth U. S. Infantry. The services rendered by First Lieut. William L. Kenly, First Artillery, Second Lieut. B. M. Koehler, Sixth Artillery, and Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery, were valuable. I am indebted to Capt. H. C. Cabell, Third U. S. Infantry, assistant adjutant-general, for gallant and efficient services. I desire to specially men-

the conduct and services of Maj. George F. Shields, brigade major, who rendered the greatest assistance to the wounded under fire. First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth Infantry, aid-de-camp; First Lieut. Charles R. Howland, Twentieth Infantry, aid-de-camp; Second Lieut. Russell T. Hazzard, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, acting aid-de-camp, and Second Lieut. A. P. Hayne, California Heavy Artillery, acting aid-de-camp, rendered me valuable assistance, carrying my orders under fire to all parts of the field. I wish to call attention to the very efficient service rendered by the Signal Corps in a series of operations. Capt. Edgar Russell, U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, rendered most valuable aid, and the services of Lieutenant Cunningham, Volunteer Signal Corps, in the movement to the marinas and return to Imus, were most praiseworthy. The telegraph line advanced with the firing line and upon occasion for the withdrawal of the line it was accomplished without delay to the command.

While the operations in the province of Cavite since the 10th instant have resulted in great damage and loss to the enemy, clearing the vicinity of Manila of his presence and driving the remnants of his army into the southern part of the province, this has been accomplished with comparatively slight loss on our part and in the face of obstacles of climate and great difficulties by the nature of the country marched through.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, U. S. V., COMMAND- ING SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, COVERING OPERATIONS OF HIS DIVISION DURING THE MONTHS OF MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 1899.

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HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., November 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of field operations of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, for March, April, and May, 1899, by Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding.

Very respectfully,
E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., July 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I respectfully send herewith duplicate copies of report of operations, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, for March, April, and May, 1899, two maps, and one set of subreports. The latter are so numerous it would be impossible to make duplicates of each without devoting thereto the entire time of the clerical force at these headquarters for an indefinite period.

Very respectfully,
ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In a former report the narrative of field operations of the division was brought down to February 28, 1899. In continuation of that report a record of events is herewith respectfully submitted to include May 31, 1899.

The distribution of the troops of the division, from the pumping station near Santolan on the right to Caloocan on the left, was maintained until March 25 substantially as indicated on the map which accompanied the February report, during which time minor operations were numerous and conducted with much skill. The useful effect of this experience was very apparent in the progressive improvement of all concerned, in reconnoissance, patrol, outpost, and fire discipline. Practical instruction, under the pressure of hostile resistance, soon resulted in a high degree of efficiency in these important duties.

g the period covered by this report the following changes in
nnel of the division staff have occurred:

Charles McClure, Eighteenth Infantry, U. S. A., relieved
ty as acting judge-advocate and mustering officer, and left
nand en route to Washington, D. C., March 10, 1899.

J. F. Bell, chief engineer, U. S. V., joined March 18, 1899,
eafter announced as engineer officer, acting judge-advocate,
tering officer of the division.

Lieut. Peyton C. March, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A., joined
ounced as aid May 22, 1899.

suance of General Orders, No. 14, headquarters Department
Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated March 17, 1899, the
was reorganized as follows:

Regiment.	Commanding officer.	Effective strength.	
		Officers.	Men.
<i>Cavalry.</i>			
Fourth U. S. Cavalry.....	Maj. L. H. Rucker.....	6	196
<i>Artillery.</i>			
Massachusetts Light Artillery.....	Maj. R. W. Young.....	7	293
<i>Brigade—Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, commanding.</i>			
Second U. S. Artillery.....	Maj. W. A. Kobbé.....	14	620
Kansas Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. F. Funston.....	41	960
Alabama Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. H. C. Kessler.....	42	796
First Brigade.....		97	2,376
<i>Brigade—Brig. Gen. Irving Hale, commanding.</i>			
Ohio Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. H. B. McCoy.....	43	1,063
Indiana Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. J. M. Stotsenburg.....	31	808
Dakota Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. A. S. Frost.....	40	838
Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. A. L. Hawkins.....	31	707
Second Brigade.....		145	3,416
<i>Brigade—Brig. Gen. R. H. Hall, commanding.</i>			
Infantry.....	Lieut. Col. J. M. J. Sanno.....	42	1,182
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry.....	Lieut. Col. Chas. F. Robe.....	6	381
Minnesota Volunteer Infantry.....	Col. Fred. W. Ames.....	49	1,067
Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry.....	Maj. Frank M. Foote.....	10	266
Third Brigade.....		107	2,896
State of division.....		362	9,177

he purpose of contemplated operations the division was
ened on March 22 by the Third Brigade, First Division,
Army Corps, Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V., command-
ch was composed of one battalion Third U. S. Infantry,
second U. S. Infantry, and eleven companies Second Oregon
, U. S. V., in all 2,241 for duty, thus making the available
the division for field operations 11,780.

olt automatic gun, furnished by the Navy and taken from the
Helena, in charge of Lieut. Cleland Davis, U. S. N., and three
men of the Marine Corps, continued to serve with the division
ril 5.

achment of engineers, under Capt. Francis P. Shunk, Corps of
s, consisting of 2 noncommissioned officers and 22 men, joined

378 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

March 22, the command thereof being transferred to Second Lieut. William P. Wooten, Corps of Engineers, on April 3.

An armored train, consisting of three flat cars, upon which were mounted a Hotchkiss 6-pounder navy gun, two Gatling guns, and a Hotchkiss revolving cannon, joined March 31. It was guarded by a detachment of 20 men of Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, Second Lieut. C. H. Bridges, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, being in command.

In pursuance of verbal instructions, the division was prepared for field operations, the military movements of which were conducted in accordance with the following order, which was formulated at these headquarters and thereafter submitted to and approved by the department commander:

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 23, 1899.

I. From information received, the enemy appears to be in position on a line somewhat south of Polo to Novaliches, thence to the mouth of the Rio Nanca, with strong outposts on a line from Caloocan through San Francisco del Monte to the neighborhood of Mariquina.

II. The enemy's lines, as above described, will be attacked by the division, reinforced by the Third Brigade of the First Division. For this purpose the troops of the division will be distributed as follows, and all positions as designated will be occupied before or during the night of March 24:

Third Brigade, First Division (Wheaton), extended in one line, will replace the Twentieth Kansas, First Montana, and Third U. S. Artillery.

First Brigade, Second Division, from left of position now occupied by Tenth Pennsylvania to the right, as far as may be necessary, in the following order and formation:

Third Artillery, one and a half battalions on fighting line, one-half battalion in reserve.

Twentieth Kansas, two battalions on fighting line, one in reserve.

First Montana, two battalions on fighting line, one in reserve.

Second Brigade, Second Division (Hale), extended to the right in continuation of First Brigade, in following order and formation from left to right:

Tenth Pennsylvania, four companies on fighting line, two companies in reserve.

South Dakota, two battalions on fighting line, one in reserve.

First Nebraska, two battalions on fighting line, one in reserve.

Third Brigade, Second Division (Hall), Fourth Infantry, less two companies, and one battalion Seventeenth Infantry, to be arranged with a view to occupying, as soon as vacated, the line now held by Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Nebraska regiments.

One platoon Battery G, Sixth Artillery, one platoon Utah Light Artillery, one squadron (mounted) Fourth Cavalry, signal detachment, at La Loma Church.

Two companies Fourth Infantry, under Captain Robinson, to remain as now posted, for protection of water front of present position.

III. At an hour to be stated precisely in subsequent orders, the First and Second brigades will advance and occupy the Caloocan-Balintasag road; the Nebraska Regiment on the right near San Juan River, the Third Artillery on the left at Balintasag, the other regiments at suitable intermediate points. From thence the advance will continue to the next parallel road, the Third Artillery touching the Tuliahan River to the west of Cabatuhan and extending east along road toward Banlac. From this position the purpose will be to throw the Second Brigade into Novaliches, using as far as possible the road Cabatuhan-Talipapa-Bagbag. At the same time the First Brigade will, if possible, pass the Tuliahan by the left flank and advance on the village of Bibaua. The successful conclusion of these movements would find the two brigades in line along the road Novaliches-Bibaua. From this position further progress will be determined by the result and character of the antecedent contest; but the present intention is to execute a change of front to the left, so that the right of the Second Brigade shall be opposite Polo, the maneuver to conclude with the occupation of Polo.

IV. During the progress of the foregoing movements the Third Brigade, First Division, will maintain a watchful attitude toward Malabon and the occupied line to which it is opposed in its immediate front, and follow quickly if the enemy undertakes a retrograde movement. The right of this brigade will observe closely the left

flank of the First Brigade, Second Division, and if necessary to the latter's safety will advance in prolongation thereof to the Balintasag road.

V. That part of the Third Brigade, Second Division, between La Loma Church and San Juan River will maintain the attitude of a general reserve, and will not leave its position unless specially ordered to do so.

VI. The troops at the pumping station and intermediate points between that place and the Deposito will, during the progress of the movement, be attached to the Third Brigade, the commanding general of which will give the necessary orders in the premises, to defend the various positions at all hazards and to the last extremity, and to conduct demonstrations against the enemy north of the Mariquina road, with the Thirteenth Minnesota, now in the vicinity of the Deposito; and if in his judgment the conditions are propitious, to turn the demonstrations into real attacks with a view to connecting with the operations of the Second Brigade in the direction of Novaliches, to the extent of occupying the Balintasag and parallel road north thereof, for the protection of the right flank of the operating brigades.

VII. Brigade and regimental commanders are requested to give special attention to the hospital service in their organizations, with the view to insuring quick and safe delivery of wounded men to dressing station.

VIII. Unnecessary impedimenta will be piled by regiments at suitable places within the present lines and left in charge of a small guard.

Three days' field rations will be provided for the movements of the First and Second brigades, Second Division, to be carried by the men and on such pack animals and wagons as may be provided for the purpose.

At least 300 rounds of ammunition per man will be available in the regiments, the distribution thereof to be arranged for by regimental commanders by means of pack animals and Chinese coolies, assigned to the regiments.

IX. The division commander will be with the First Brigade, and an effort will be made to maintain wire communication with the commanding generals of the Third Brigade, First Division, and the Third Brigade, Second Division.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The scope and purpose of the movement as outlined in the foregoing order was carried out in its early stages in nearly every particular. As the long line—quite 8 miles—over which operations were simultaneously conducted was covered by dense bamboo jungles or other impeding obstacles, and the advance was vigorously opposed from the start, the fighting assumed the aspect of a series of detached combats, which are described with interesting detail in the various subreports, from which, for the purpose of illustrating distinct phases of the battle, extracts are compiled herewith:

For example, Colonel Stotsenburg, commanding First Nebraska, which regiment started the movement at about 5.40 a. m., remarks in connection with the opening movements as follows:

We moved to our left and occupied the trenches of the South Dakota regiment at 5 a. m., and remained in position until 5.30 a. m., the hour designated for our advance. We moved so that our right flank was directed on San Francisco del Monte. About fifteen minutes after leaving this position we engaged the enemy. In trying to clear San Francisco del Monte, Company C, Lieutenant Storch; Company A, Captain Taylor, and Company B, Lieutenant Wadsworth, became detached, and, in a hand to hand conflict in the town, killed 19 insurgents. In this engagement Capt. W. C. Taylor and 9 men were wounded.

In the meantime our front had become heavily engaged with the enemy, who had occupied the trenches in front of San Francisco del Monte. In this charge, which was a most spirited one, Capt. Lee Forby and Sergt. Walter Poor were killed and 3 men were wounded. We inflicted a very heavy loss on the enemy, over 50 dead and wounded being found by our hospital corps on the field.

Colonel Funston, commanding Twentieth Kansas, U. S. V., in reference to the opening stages of the battle, writes as follows:

On approaching the Tuliahan River, however, we were subject to a severe fire from the enemy intrenched at several points on the opposite bank. Reaching the south

bank of the stream, which was about 40 feet wide and nearly 5 feet deep, it became evident that we must force the passage at once or suffer heavy loss. Accordingly I directed three companies to concentrate their fire on the opposite bank at a point where about 60 of the enemy were sheltering themselves behind dikes and intrenchments and ordered a few men near me to attempt to ford the river. Without a moment's hesitation, Capt. William J. Watson, of Company E, with about a dozen men, plunged into the river directly in front of the enemy and, although the water was armpit deep, succeeded in reaching the opposite bank and in flanking the enemy out of their position. All who had not been killed or disabled fled and the regiment crossed the river and deployed on the right of the Third Artillery, which, after a desperate fight, had forced another passage about 400 yards down the stream.

The following is quoted from the report of Major Kobbé, commanding Third U. S. Artillery:

At about 6 a. m. the command left the trenches in line of squads, Battery L (Kessler), Battery K (England), and Battery H (Abernethy) from right to left, Battery G (Randolph) in reserve in rear of left, and deployed on reaching the open. The advance was over an open space nearly a mile and subjected to fire from front and both flanks, and our loss in the first fifteen or twenty minutes was 30 or 31 killed and wounded, including one officer (Overton).

The fire from the left was partially checked by an advance of the Twenty-second Infantry, under General Wheaton, and by delaying the command until the Twentieth Kansas had entered the woods on the right that fire also ceased. The front fire continued until short range, when the enemy broke and a running fight was kept up to the Tuliahan River. Here the insurgents had strong intrenchments, but were flanked out of them by Battery H on the left and by the Twentieth Kansas and Battery L on the right, and about 7.30 a. m. Abernethy crossed the river, the rest of the command following, wading to the armpits and sometimes swimming for a short distance.

In description of the work on the extreme left the following is extracted from the report of Brigadier-General Loyd Wheaton:

March 25, soon after daylight, Major-General MacArthur commenced his movement by advancing his right brigade to attack the enemy in the trenches in his front and to advance his right on Polo. Soon after his left took up the movement and advanced to the front and left, his artillery near the center, advancing with the line.

As soon as his left brigade moved, I advanced one battalion Twenty-second U. S. Infantry on my right to cover the movement of the Third U. S. Artillery (foot) on General MacArthur's left. The turning movement having sufficiently developed to threaten the rebel intrenchments on their left flank, I directed that fire be opened on rebels' intrenchments in my front by the guns of the Utah Volunteer Light Artillery (First Lieut. George W. Gibbs), and at 8.30 a. m. directed my whole line to advance in the following order: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Col. H. C. Egbert, on the right, to endeavor to keep touch and communication with the Third U. S. Artillery on the left of Otis's brigade, MacArthur's division; one battalion Third U. S. Infantry, Captain Cook, center, two companies on the east side of the railroad track and two on the west side; Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Col. O. Summers, left, extending to near the channel separating Malabon from the mainland.

The rebels were found in their intrenchments in great force, and line after line of their works was carried with the utmost gallantry. The row of infantry fire was now continuous and intense, the heaviest fighting at this time falling on the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry and two companies of the Third U. S. Infantry.

By 11.30 a. m. the enemy was thrown to the line of intrenchments in my front along the Tuliahan River, he having been driven from his successive line of intrenchments with great slaughter. I now brought two guns of the Utah Light Artillery, under Lieut. Geo. A. Seaman, from our line of works in front of Caloocan to a point on the railroad track 900 yards from the bridge across the Tuliahan; sent a Hotchkiss revolving cannon to my extreme left to keep down the fire of the enemy coming across the channel near Malabon; shelled his blockhouse and intrenchments along the river on the north bank.

The artillery, cavalry, ambulances, and wagon trains of the division approached the Tuliahan by the Novaliches-Malinta road, the defile of which was apparently obstructed. For the purpose of ascertaining the extent and character of resistance likely to be encountered in

forcing the passage, Major Bell, of the division staff, under escort of half of Troop E, Fourth Cavalry, Capt. Fred Wheeler and Lieut. J. A. Batson, reconnoitered the premises.

While advancing down the road the enemy was discovered when some 200 yards distant on the farther bank of the river, and when enveloped proved to be intrenched behind three strong fieldworks constructed on the bank of the river at intervals of about 50 yards. After a few moments' sharp skirmish, in which 7 men were wounded, Major Bell, realizing that his escort was not strong enough to force a passage at this point, which was an excellent ford, asked for reinforcements. A fieldpiece, under the command of Lieutenant Critchlow, Utah Light Artillery, and a Colt's rapid-fire gun, commanded by Lieutenant Davis, U. S. N., were sent in charge of Maj. R. W. Young, chief of artillery. The guns were run by hand, with great gallantry, to a position less than 200 yards from the enemy's line, and an alternate fire between fieldpiece and rapid-fire gun was opened, which, together with the sustained and accurate fire of the cavalry under Captain Wheeler, soon dislodged the enemy. For further details of this brilliant affair reference is respectfully invited to the report of Maj. J. F. Bell inclosed herewith.

Under Paragraph VI of the foregoing field order, the protection of the right flank of the operating line fell to General Hall, commanding Third Brigade of the division. This important and essential duty was effectually accomplished, as set forth in the following extract taken from the report of General Hall:

The orders of the division commander required me to form the Minnesota regiment on the Mariquina road and move it northward at 5 a. m. on the 25th of March until reaching the Baulac road, and then make dispositions to cover the right and rear of the Second Brigade of the division, which would be advancing through San Francisco del Monte toward Talipapa. * * * The regiment went forward in good order, notwithstanding the difficult ground over which it moved—rice fields and bamboo thickets—for about a mile before meeting opposition. Then fire came on the Third and a portion of the Second Battalion, followed almost immediately by like existence in front of the First.

The division commander had authorized me to call for assistance, if necessary, on the Colorado regiment, a portion of which was on the Mariquina road; and presently, when the enemy's fire became energetic enough to indicate determined opposition to our further advance, I dispatched a staff officer to the colonel of that regiment with a request that he send a company to turn the left flank of the intrenchments on our right, in which a considerable body of the enemy seemed to be established. The insurgent fire having almost entirely ceased in front of the First Battalion, the two right companies were now turned to the right, and under the very gallant direction of Capt. Charles D. Clay, Seventeenth Infantry, adjutant-general of the brigade, and of First Lieut. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry, aid-de-camp, assailed the intrenchments in front, while Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, of the Colorado regiment, attacked their left. This soon routed the enemy, and the line was restored to its normal condition. The left companies of the regiment had fallen somewhat to the rear and the intervals between battalions had grown during the advance, and advantage was taken of the lull in the engagement to rectify these errors.

Further advance was now made to secure position on a ridge in our front, where, at 8 a. m., the line, now pretty well exhausted, was halted.

Reconnoissance showed that we were on the Baulac road, east of the town and of the stream which crosses the road, and as I had thus accomplished the limit of the march, no further attempt was made to advance. From the left of the regiment could be seen the right of the Second brigade of the division and what was believed to be the Novaliches road, on which that brigade was understood to be required to move.

At the conclusion of the fighting, March 25, the troops bivouacked as indicated on the accompanying map of the military operations of

the division—Wheaton's Brigade, south of the Tuliahan River, in the vicinity of Tinajeros; Otis and Hale, north of the river; and Hall admirably located to protect the exposed right flank of the division.

The tactical work of the day was satisfactory in every particular. The enemy had been dislodged, with exemplary loss to him, from numerous strong positions, fully manned and protected by formidable works, whereas the loss in the American force was comparatively small.

The movement outlined in Field Orders, No. 1, was based upon the idea of advancing rapidly through the center of the opposing army, with a view thereafter to envelop to the west the fraction thus cut off by gaining a position on the insurgent line of retreat in the vicinity of Polo.

The terrain upon which these operations were to be conducted was unknown, but it was understood to be very difficult for tactical execution, in view of which it was from the start regarded as doubtful if it would be possible to attain the celerity of movement essential to the success of such a long turning movement. In other words, the strategical possibility of enveloping the insurgent right was viewed simply in the light of hope and not in the expectation of success.

In reality the ground was found to be in every respect quite equal to the worst anticipations. The density of the jungle, which prevented seeing any distance, made it impossible to keep the troops together, and thereby embarrassed, impeded, and at times entirely interrupted their movement. As a consequence, it became apparent very early in the day that the purpose of striking the line of communication far enough to the rear to intercept the insurgent retreat was almost impossible of accomplishment.

The early morning of March 26 was devoted to exploration and reconnoissance by officers' patrols and the cavalry squadron with a view to the execution of the second stage of the operation, which contemplated an advance in extended order to the Novaliches road and thereafter a wheel into Polo. (Vide Paragraph III, Field Order No. 1.) By these means it was ascertained that the country was impassable for artillery and wagons, and that the only available road for vehicles passed through Malinta, which was still in the hands of the enemy. The difficulties encountered and the conclusion reached in the premises are set forth in the following telegraphic correspondence, which explains itself:

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Tuliahan Bridge, Novaliches Road, March 26—8.40 a. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

I am in line, ready to advance to the Novaliches road, with the intention of, when I reach that road, changing front, so that my line, when thus changed, will face to the left. I have just ascertained that by advancing to the Novaliches road my artillery and wagons can not follow me. The only road by which they can reach me is not shown by the map. It runs almost directly west to Malinta and thence north to Polo. Under these circumstances I propose to change front at once and advance so as to cover the Malinta road. This will threaten the insurgent left, but somewhat further south than intended. This movement, which is the only feasible one in view of the character of the country, I propose to carry out at once. If Wheaton was on the north bank of the river of course it would not be necessary, and I could carry out my original plan; but as long as Malinta is in possession of the enemy this seems to be the only movement possible. If you desire to make any suggestion in the premises, please answer as quickly as possible.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Manila, The Palace, March 26—9.25 a. m.

General MACARTHUR:

Have no suggestions. Have directed Wheaton to cross river if he can assure himself that enemy is not in heavy force north of same. I think the only practical route for your artillery and wagons is the road you name, but which strikes about 1 mile north of Malinta. You had best take that road with entire force.

(OTIS.)

As on the previous day, the tactical operations extended over a front of several miles, which, as a necessary consequence, resulted in another series of detached combats, the best reference to which may be found in the various subreports herewith, from which the following excerpts are reproduced:

General Wheaton:

March 26.—At daylight the indications were that the enemy was preparing for retreat. The city of Malabon on my left was on fire and a stream of fugitive soldiers of the enemy and inhabitants was pouring from the city toward the north. I directed Colonel Egbert with his regiment—the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry—to ford the Tuliahan near my right and form line perpendicular to the river, his right to the north, the left of the Twenty-second to be supported by the battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry. By 11 a. m. all intrenchments near the river were carried, the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry on the left meeting with an obstinate resistance. I crossed the river in person at this time near the railroad bridge, and the rebels opened fire from an intrenchment halfway from Malinta from walls loop-holed for musketry about the church, and from intrenchments at Malinta. I directed the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to form line facing the intrenchments and to charge and carry them, which the regiment did with great gallantry. Col. H. C. Egbert was mortally wounded in this charge and died soon after.

At the same time the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry on my left carried everything before it. The Third U. S. Artillery now—about 12 m.—entered Malinta; my right and the Second Oregon, my left, entering about the same time. The enemy fled north, pursued by Major-General MacArthur's center and right. Went into camp at Malinta with the whole brigade, the two remaining battalions of the Third U. S. Infantry having joined from the transport about dark.

Maj. W. A. Kobbé, commanding Third U. S. Artillery:

As the Second Brigade had apparently not been able to execute the swinging movement originally contemplated through Novaliches on account of the difficult nature of the country, the plan was changed; the First Brigade moved out to the Malinta road and this command ordered to take the advance against that town in conjunction with General Wheaton's force, then coming up on the left. This we did about noon, occupying the town and joining Wheaton's force simultaneously, about the time Colonel Egbert was killed. The insurgents moving northward along the railroad came in contact during the afternoon with troops of the Second Brigade.

The pursuit of the insurgents, as referred to by General Wheaton, and the effort to intercept them at Polo, is thus described by General Hale:

1.15 p. m.—Overtook division commander on road some 2 miles east of Malinta, and was directed to move brigade northwesterly across field, deploy to north of first brigade, and take such action against enemy or town of Polo as circumstances might render advisable.

* * * * *

4.06 p. m.—South Dakota and Pennsylvania advanced, Nebraska following as reserve. South Dakota right flanked insurgents' left as planned and enemy was driven back all along the line.

When movement was properly under way, I proceeded with staff, overtook Pennsylvania as they were approaching main road running northeast of Meycauyan, and supposing that main body of enemy was west of road in vicinity of Polo, halted Pennsylvania on this road, sent Captain Brooks to left to see if any of the First Brigade troops were in that locality (he found they were not), sent Lieutenant Perry to South Dakota left battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Stover) to swing it slightly to left on Pennsylvania right, and went with Captain Krayenbuhl and orderly to South

On arriving within 700 yards of the line of trees a sudden and heavy fire was received from the enemy. I ordered the men to lie down and sent the adjutant back with orders to the support and reserve to deploy and extend my line on the right.

I hoped the mountain gun on my left would open fire, but as it did not and the fire was unendurable, I ordered the advance. We advanced by rushes and the enemy remained in position until we had approached to within 75 paces of the line of trees. He then evacuated the line of trees and the trenches to the left of the track on the opposite bank. Our men charged to the brink of the river, when I ordered Companies D and E to cross the bridge and flank some heavy intrenchments up the stream, which were strongly held by the enemy. I then moved to the right and the supports and reserves coming up, directed their fire on these intrenchments, from which we were receiving a terrible fire, and then ordered a charge. The men waded the river up to the armpits in water and took the trenches. In all of these movements the regiment was not assisted by a single shot from mountain gun or by any other organization; the other troops coming up after the enemy was put to flight. The Filipinos retreated to the right front.

Our losses in this engagement were: Killed, 3 officers and 4 enlisted men; wounded, 1 officer and 24 enlisted men.

The Third Artillery, covering the advance of the first brigade, was forced by the nature of the ground considerably to the right of the wagon road, and thereafter in effect formed a part of the second brigade, and acted in conjunction therewith, and as a consequence left the Kansas regiment at the head of the column on the wagon road. The progress of the artillery is thus described by the commanding officer, Major Kobbé:

March 27.—Moved out in advance of brigade through Meycauayan, a large place, mostly burned or burning, to railroad beyond, where Batteries L and K were deployed on the left, under Captain Hobbs, Batteries G and H being in the rear in support. L and K made a most difficult advance over a broken and marshy country, under fire, while G and H advanced up the railroad, dodging the fire as it came alternately from right or left by using the embankment accordingly. The advance of all four batteries was generally in column, often in column of files, and most difficult, and the small loss is due to skillful leading on the part of battery commanders. This advance was kept up to the Marilao River, where the advance batteries drove the enemy from the opposite bank, and the whole command finally crossed the railroad bridge over the cross-ties, forming a line, right resting on railroad.

The left column was soon involved. Some of the incidents which arose therefrom are described as follows by Colonel Funston, commanding Twentieth Kansas:

The next morning, the 27th, the division marched to Meycauayan, this regiment acting as reserve for the Third U. S. Artillery, which constituted the firing line of the brigade. At Meycauayan there was a delay of four hours, and we left the place at noon, with instructions to march up the road in column of fours, keeping 500 yards behind the supports of the Third Artillery. We heard the sound of firing on our front just after leaving Meycauayan, the Third Artillery having encountered the enemy, and shortly after became subject to a fire from the enemy intrenched on our left flank across the Marilao River. It became necessary to deal with the situation at once, and I accordingly ordered Major Metcalf to deploy H and I Companies of his battalion and advance to the river bank. This move was most gallantly executed, the two companies advancing to the river bank by alternate rushes.

Arriving at the river the men sheltered themselves as well as they could behind dikes, and kept up a terrific fire on the enemy intrenched on the opposite side, distant about 80 yards. In about ten minutes the field pieces under Major Young and the Colt's automatic gun under Lieutenant Davis, U. S. N., came up and took position on our right, directly opposite the most formidable intrenchment of the enemy, and opened fire. Company D of my regiment supported the artillery, while Company C was deployed between I and H. The river was about 10 feet deep, and the only practicable method of crossing it was to obtain possession of one of several rafts moored on the other bank within a few rods of the enemy's intrenchments. Not being willing to order men to undertake such a hazardous enterprise, I called for volunteers, and a number offered themselves, from whom I selected Second Lieut. E. J. Hardy, of Company H, Chief Trumpeter Barshfield, and Corporal Drysdale, and Privates Huntsman and Willey, of Company H. Disrobing and leaving their arms

behind, they plunged into the stream and swam to a bamboo raft on the opposite side, which, after much difficulty, they succeeded in shoving to the south side of the river. During this time we kept the enemy down by sweeping the top of their trenches with such a constant fire that it was impossible for them to prevent the moving of the raft. Once getting the raft on our side of the river, I got on board with Second Lieutenant Hopkins and 21 men of Company C, and crossed to the other side, getting in rear of the enemy. The most of them had fled, but we got 22 uninjured prisoners and found 12 disabled by very severe wounds. There were also in the trenches 24 killed.

We destroyed and threw into the river 31 Remington rifles and about 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Our loss in this affair was two enlisted men killed and one mortally wounded.

Lieutenant Critchlow, commanding Battery B, Utah Light Artillery:

On March 27 we broke camp at 6.45 a. m., and proceeded north to Meycauayan, where several hours' delay was experienced.

Shortly after the advance from this point began my platoon was halted on the Marilao road, as the infantry had developed a strong fire a few hundred yards beyond, the enemy being intrenched on the right bank of the Marilao River. The infantry had been attempting to dislodge the enemy for nearly two hours, but so well had the insurgents disguised their trenches and so commanding was their position that our lines had been temporarily pretty effectually checked. I was ordered to bring one gun forward, which, with the support of one platoon of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry and the Colt's automatic gun, was placed within 50 yards of the enemy. Five shrapnel and three shell were fired among them. Then my other gun was brought up, and the two guns, standing on the open bank, placed three shell directly into their trenches. Immediately a white flag was raised by the enemy, and resulted in the capture of some 25 insurgents with their arms. We were compelled to wait some two hours at this point, until the bridge across a small tributary to the river could be repaired.

While the Twentieth Kansas and the Utah Artillery were engaged as described above, an important diversion, of which the commanding officer of the Kansas regiment and the artillery officers were not aware, was made by a small detachment of the Third United States Artillery and a company of the Tenth Pennsylvania, a narrative of which is set forth in the following extracts from reports of Major Bell, of the division staff, and Colonel Hawkins, commanding the Pennsylvania regiment:

Major Bell:

The commanding officer of Battery G, Third Artillery, kindly loaned me 5 sharpshooters from his battery, a noncommissioned officer, and 4 men. We carefully reconnoitered the approach to the trench from that direction, but it was so well concealed that we could not locate it until the insurgents opened on us at a range of about 150 yards. No damage was done. Under cover of rice banks and bamboo hedges we then crept forward to within about 50 yards of the trench behind the stone wing walls at the northern approach of the destroyed bridge. From this point we opened such an accurately aimed fire that several insurgents were soon shot through the head. We were so close that we could see the effects of our shots. Several others jumped out of the trench and started to run for their lives, but were killed by the detachment. Another, who fired from a casco moored on the farther bank of the river, was killed in the boat. This so frightened the insurgents that they no longer took accurate aim, but would jump up and fire and immediately crouch behind the trench, or else stick their guns up over the top of their heads and pull the triggers without aim. * * * Realizing the impossibility of driving the insurgents away with 6 men, I returned to the railroad and secured the services of Company I, Tenth Pennsylvania. We approached the river opposite the insurgents who were farthest upstream, and soon had them fleeing for their lives; then, working our way down to the broken bridge, the company lined the bank of the river, cheering lustily and pouring in a hot fire upon the trench. The insurgents became demoralized and would stick up the muzzles of their guns and fire in the air.

For further particulars of this interesting combat attention is invited to the full report of Major Bell and map attached thereto.

Colonel Hawkins, commanding Tenth Pennsylvania :

On the morning of March 27 this command was assigned to a position in the reserve. After advancing to the north about three-fourths of a mile, this command was halted by the division commander, and Company I thereof, under command of Major Bell, of the Engineer Corps, was ordered to the assistance of a small detachment of the Third U. S. Artillery, who had engaged a considerable number of insurgents and were in a very dangerous position. Company I attacked the enemy in this intrenched position and, after a very spirited engagement, succeeded in compelling a surrender of the entire force, with a loss to the insurgents of about 25 killed and 40 prisoners with arms, the prisoners having been turned over to Colonel Funston, of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry; the loss of Company I being 2 men wounded.

The Nebraska, South Dakota, and Third U. S. Artillery regiments, having passed the Marilao River at the railroad bridge above the town some time before the First Brigade had arranged matters on the left, were, pending the passage of the river by the artillery and train, disposed with reference to the general defense. Late in the afternoon they became engaged under peculiar conditions, which are thus described by the various commanding officers.

Major Kobbé, commanding Third Artillery:

In front of this position there was a long, open stretch of country, 2 miles long at the immediate front, and many insurgents could be seen during the early afternoon taking position along the ridges and forming apparently for attack or defense. Toward 5 o'clock General MacArthur, with Major Strong, rode up, and while discussing the situation a strong insurgent skirmish line advanced over the widest open country to a line which at one time was about 1,000 yards in our front and which brought them on a line with their troops, which had been placed along the ridges to their right and left during the afternoon. They soon opened a hot fire from Mausers and Remingtons, which we replied to. The fire was kept up steadily for half an hour or until troops (Stotsenburg), well over to the left, had charged over their front and occupied the ridge, when the whole insurgent line retired. The fire was very hot in spite of the long range and we lost several men, including 2 sergeants killed. The division commander rectified the alignment, which had been disturbed by Stotsenburg's advance, and the command bivouacked about 500 yards in advance of river.

General Hale:

About 5 p. m.—Large bodies of insurgents, apparently brought from north on trains, formed and deployed along north edge of plain some 2,000 yards away, covering the entire front of our division, and opened fire.

The Third Artillery (First Brigade), on west of track, replied with their Krag-Jorgensens.

Proceeded with Lieutenant Perry along our line east of track; found it exposed to a galling enfilading fire down the river from the right, and instructed the troops to lie low behind the intrenchments until the insurgents were within 600 yards before returning their fire. Found Nebraska closing in on South Dakota (in accordance with order sent before the attack began) and was placing their left companies in advantageous positions with similar instructions to those given South Dakota, when the Nebraska right (which it seems was being close pressed by the insurgents on right flank, who advanced in probable ignorance of the presence of our troops at that point) charged the enemy and the entire regiment took it up, driving the insurgents across the plain in disorder and pursuing them about 2 miles to wooded ridge. In sympathy with this repulse on their left, the entire insurgent line withdrew. I moved South Dakota forward about halfway across plain to support Nebraska in case of necessity.

After consultation with the division commander it was decided that it was too late to move entire division forward to ridge occupied by Nebraska on right. The latter regiment was therefore withdrawn to right of South Dakota, with right refused on river, and Pennsylvania was moved up on South Dakota left, with left on railroad, connecting with First Brigade, which was correspondingly advanced.

Colonel Stotsenburg, commanding First Nebraska:

After crossing the Marilao River we went into line of battle along that stream on the right of the line. During the contraction of the lines, after 3 South Dakota men had been severely wounded by the enemy firing at long range, we were attacked by the enemy in force. They charged up to a village about 100 yards from our front,

The regiment was ordered to lie down and fire volleys when they passed the village. We then charged the natives, killing 35 and driving them beyond the hills to the northeast. Our losses were Captain Jens and 15 men wounded, none seriously. We occupied this position until 10.30 p. m., when we were recalled to the right of the line, where we remained until the morning of the 29th.

Colonel Funston, commanding Twentieth Kansas:

After an hour spent on the north side of the river, I recrossed at 4 p. m. and the regiment resumed its march to the north, reaching the railroad bridge across the Marilao River in half an hour. A part of the division was already across and deployed to meet a threatened attack. Acting under orders received from the adjutant-general of the division, I hastened the regiment across and deployed the First and Second battalions on the left of the Third Artillery, holding the Third Battalion in reserve. The attack came before we had finished deploying, the enemy directing a furious fire from behind natural cover distant about 1,000 yards. After half an hour they withdrew. The regiment's loss was 2 enlisted men killed and 3 wounded.

The approach to the ferry crossing of the Marilao River, from the position of the Kansas combat, was impeded by a broken bridge over a small tributary thereof, the restoration of which required several hours. Thereafter, at the main crossing of the river, a bridge had to be improvised to replace the ferry, from which all the appurtenances had been removed. The difficulties were considerable and, as the passage of the artillery and all the wagons was involved, a substantial structure was indispensable. In defiance of all precautions, however, the stability of the bridge was not sufficient, and as a last resort it became necessary to plank the railroad bridge. The engineering operations in the premises are thus described by Captain Shunk, Corps of Engineers, commanding Company A, Battalion of Engineers:

On March 27 the detachment replaced a number of loose rails, fish plates, etc., on the railroad between Meycauyan and Marilao. In the afternoon it was found that a stone arched bridge over a small stream crossing the main road south of Marilao had been destroyed. Suitable lumber being found in the village of Saloysoy, a wooden bridge was built resting on the old abutments. The abutments appeared to be somewhat unstable and were braced with heavy timbers. This work began about 4 and was finished at about 5.15 p. m.

The detachment then moved up to a point opposite the church of Marilao, where it was necessary to build a bridge, work on which was begun at 9 p. m. Some cascos were found in the river and lumber was obtained from the church. This lumber was very hard and heavy. Much of it had to be sawed into suitable lengths, and we were very much delayed by having only one saw.

The bridge was supported by two cascos, one transverse to the length of the bridge, the other longitudinal. The bridge was finished at 7.30 a. m., March 28. The engineers were assisted by details from the infantry of 60 men at a time for periods of two hours.

Under the stresses due to heavy rolling loads the seams of the longitudinal casco opened, and she sank when the train was about half over. The railroad bridge in the vicinity had by this time been secured, and, as it was easy of access, it was deemed expedient to floor it with plank rather than repair the pontoon bridge. This was done by the engineer detachment of the Third Brigade, First Division.

The railroad bridge was planked at 4.10 p. m. on March 28, and the subsistence cars put across at once. The wagon train and cavalry escort were all over by half past 4, and, as the artillery had crossed the improvised bridge early in the morning, the division was concentrated and well in hand before 5 p. m., but as many indispensable details in regard to ammunition and rations remained to be worked out, it was decided to arrange at this favorable point everything appertaining to administration in such manner as to insure, if otherwise possible, at least three consecutive days for military operations, and thus permit rapidity and continuity of tactical action independent of railroad connections.

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Accordingly, at 6 a. m., March 29, the advance was resumed, and at 7.35 a. m. the wagon and railroad bridges over the Arroyo Togogon were occupied, very little opposition having been encountered, excepting by the right and left regiments, the attending events in either case being described by the respective colonels as follows:

Colonel Stotsenburg, commanding First Nebraska—

At 5.30 a. m. on the 29th this regiment moved out with orders to clear the hills over which we had advanced on the night of the 27th. We encountered the enemy just beyond the hill and had a severe engagement, the enemy being in a strong position in a sunken road. We drove them out, and advancing crossed the Rio de Santa Maria, reconnoitered Santa Maria and Santa Clara, and formed line facing northwest. During the latter part of this movement the retreating insurgents fired into our rear guard. They were driven off after about twenty minutes' fighting, retreating from a strong position. After a fatiguing march this regiment camped in grove east of Guiguinto.

Colonel Funston, commanding Twentieth Kansas—

We remained encamped in this place until the morning of the 29th, when we advanced up the railroad with the remainder of the division. The First and Second battalions were on the fighting line, the Third in support 500 yards behind. Our right was on the railroad, guiding on the left of the Tenth Pennsylvania just across the track, while on the left was the First Montana. At the first river north of the Marilao, we encountered a brisk fire from the enemy, intrenched on the opposite bank. The advancing troops replied with spirit, but did not check their advance. When we reached the railroad bridge the enemy fled up the track in disorder toward Bocaue. The regiment crossed on the railroad bridge and deployed. Our loss in this affair was Maj. Wilder S. Metcalf and 6 enlisted men wounded.

As the following telegraph messages embody a connected narrative to include 5.30 p. m. March 30, they are respectfully submitted as the best attainable record of events during the period covered thereby:

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Bocaue, March 29, 1899—10.02 a. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

Have just passed the Bocaue; bridge intact; about 103 yards track gone at the railroad station of Bocaue; in addition, track unbolted 300 yards, but rails left. Am assembling command; probably will have to cross artillery and train over railway bridge.

The work was done in splendid style, and with small loss, as far as I am able to judge at present; but have meager returns from extreme ends of line. The entire insurgent force seems to have been present, but the actual resistance not very vigorous.

MACARTHUR.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Bocaue, March 29, 1899—10.46 a. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

The insurgents continue to destroy towns. Bocaue is partially destroyed, and Bigaa is now burning. As soon as I can re-form my line I shall advance on Bigaa. Everything is very satisfactory, and the outlook favorable for more progress to-day. The insurgents have commenced to remove telegraph poles and wire. Up to to-day the telegraph line has been found intact, but to-day for a considerable distance poles are down and wires cut. The burning of towns seems to be a great admission of weakness, and looks as though they hardly expected to recover lost ground, either by direct or flank attack.

MACARTHUR.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Bocaue, March 29, 1899—11.40 a. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

Am just commencing advance on Bigaa.

MACARTHUR.



BURNING OF BOCAUE ADVANCE ON MALOLOS.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Malacanan, March 30, 1899—6.25 a. m.

General MACARTHUR:

Last telegraphic communication with you at noon yesterday. I tried to secure it entire night, but without success. Train came about 11 last night, but could not get information. You advanced farther than I supposed. Captain Grant, with *Laguna de Bay* and the war vessel *Helena*, trying to find entrance to Malolos. On 28th our two gunboats forced passage of the Bulacan River and had severe engagement, and were obliged to retire with outgoing tide on account of low water. Was obliged to withdraw small boat yesterday and send her to Laguna de Bay, where enemy are again active. Large force on Lawton's front and at Taytay and Antipolo. Am now going to office and will telegraph you upon reaching there. Congratulations for you and troops. Washington watching eagerly. Must have no reverse now. Think you can secure water base at Malolos for future movement.

OTIS.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Guiguinto, March 30, 1899—6.30 a. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

We have wire connection for first time since advancing from Bocaue at 11.40 yesterday. Command arrived at Bigaa at 12.20 p. m. and secured railroad bridge without opposition. Advance was resumed from Bigaa at 3.15 p. m. and arrived at Guiguinto at 5.05 p. m. and secured bridge, which, like all the others, was intact, although some efforts had been made to burn the ties. A few hundred yards on the opposite side of the river, however, strong resistance was encountered, which developed into quite a fierce combat. The Twentieth Kansas and Tenth Pennsylvania made the crossing first, losing 5 men killed and 39 wounded, which, added to the losses at the Togogon, make an aggregate of about 60 for the day. I was enabled to make this rapid advance by leaving my entire train under Wheaton's protection. I brought forward all the artillery by dragging the guns over the railroad bridges by hand and swimming the mules. By this means I have practically gained two days, perhaps three, as otherwise it would have been necessary for the entire command to wait at each river for the passage of the entire train. The railroad train has reached a point within 500 yards of the station, and sometime during the morning will bring rations and ammunition, after distribution of which I propose to move immediately on Malolos, which is less than 4 miles distant, and with only one intervening river. If the gunboats are in the vicinity, now would be a most excellent time for effective cooperation.

MACARTHUR.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
March 30, 1899—5.30 p. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

Command left Guiguinto at 2.20 p. m. Delay arose from distribution of rations and ammunition, which was absolutely essential. Encountered moderate opposition on right, which was easily overcome. I now occupy a position just in advance of kilometer 33, on the railroad, which in effect is in the suburbs of Santa Isabel, and is exactly 3 kilometers from the railroad station of Malolos. From a favorable point where the wagon road crosses the railroad I have observed a strong position, with the railroad in the center, quite heavily intrenched. This is what I expected from my advices in the premises, and in view of the late hour I have determined to defer attack until to-morrow morning. The tactical conditions, as far as I can discover, are all favorable. The losses to-day have not yet been reported, but I believe they are very much smaller than they were yesterday. As soon as I enter Malolos, if such shall be my good fortune, I will secure the position carefully, and do everything possible to establish a water base, either directly at Malolos or through Bulacan.

MACARTHUR.

The general impression which existed, to the effect that a desperate resistance would be made at Malolos, was confirmed by reports brought in by natives who entered the American lines from time to time during the day of the 30th. The idea obtained that Malolos was a capital, and as such must be defended, regardless of strategic or tactical considerations of expediency; in other words, that a battle was a political

necessity. These generalizations were considerably strengthened by exploration and reconnoissance, which disclosed formidable fieldworks, well filled with men.

Preparations were accordingly made for a premeditated battle of considerable proportions. The relative positions of organizations prescribed in Field Orders, No. 1, for the advance of March 25, had been maintained, and the places of regiments as specified therein remained unchanged; that is to say, from right to left the following was the order of battle:

Nebraska, with one 1.65 Hotchkiss mountain gun; South Dakota; Pennsylvania; one platoon Battery B, Utah Light Artillery; one platoon Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery; one Colt's automatic gun, U. S. N.; Kansas; Montana, and Third U. S. Artillery.

The line of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad bisected the division, Hale being to the right and Otis to the left thereof, and extending therefrom something more than a mile in either direction.

By conference with General Wheaton, who now commanded the line of communication, it was decided that his five battalions of regular troops should be placed in support. At this time General Wheaton was not under my authority; his action, suggested by himself, was entirely spontaneous and without solicitation, and as such furnishes a splendid practical demonstration of what effective results may be expected from voluntary cooperation when all concerned are actuated exclusively by solicitude for public interests.

General Wheaton's troops formed a second line, with 600 yards interval, so arranged that the center of two battalions of the Third U. S. Infantry should be opposite the right of the Nebraska regiment, thus overlapping the right of the fighting line by a battalion, in extended order, and also affording a good fighting front to the right, should such action become necessary. These battalions of the Third were accompanied by General Wheaton in person, and were further strengthened by one Hotchkiss revolving cannon. The remaining battalion of the Third was placed behind the interval between South Dakota and Pennsylvania. The two battalions of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry were placed respectively behind the interval between Kansas and Montana; and behind left of the Third U. S. Artillery, and overlapping that command to the left, with a view to the possible exigency of fighting to the left. The total force deployed was in the neighborhood of 6,000 men.

The order of attack prescribed an artillery preparation of twenty-five minutes, to commence at 7 a. m. on the morning of the 31st; fifteen minutes after the first shot, the Nebraska regiment to move from the right, and thereafter, at intervals of five minutes, to be followed successively by South Dakota and Pennsylvania. The artillery and entire first brigade to move straight to the front, simultaneously with movement of Pennsylvania. The effect of this manœuver was intended to give a crescent-shaped formation to the line, concave toward the enemy, with a view to enveloping his left, and thus force him toward Malolos.

The first shot was fired precisely at 7 a. m., as intended; and thereafter the prearranged plan was carried out in every particular as it had been originally ordered. Subsequently, under the pressure of incidents of the fight, Hale's enveloping movement was considerably *emphasized* by a wheel of his entire brigade to the left, pivoting on

Pennsylvania, with a view to the occupation of the railroad embankment north of the town. This movement was successfully executed, and was concluded about 10 a. m. In the meantime Otis's brigade had advanced as ordered and occupied the city of Malolos.

Although a large force of the insurgents was present, these results were accomplished with little opposition and very small loss. Some of the incidents of the execution are described as follows:

Colonel Stotsenburg:

In fifteen minutes the Nebraska regiment advanced and encountered the enemy posted in a strongly intrenched position. We outflanked and carried these fortifications and pursued the enemy. We then got into line of the right and, making a turning movement, came out on the plain beyond Malolos. Here we were under a front and flank fire, until the railroad track was reached. We lost 1 man killed and 7 wounded.

Colonel Frost:

On the 31st of March the regiment moved, in the same formation, five minutes after the advance of the Nebraska regiment. I directed the march of the firing line in person, using the compass and moving on a line 70 degrees west of north. On reaching Malolos Creek the enemy was discovered in skirmish line along the railroad bank and across the open space to its right. He had evidently not observed our approach. We opened a sudden fire by volley and drove him across the embankment. The regiment then advanced, executing a left wheel in accordance with brigade orders, and drove the enemy from the embankment into the woods beyond. In this engagement the regiment lost 4 enlisted men, wounded.

Lieutenant Fleming, commanding platoon Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery:

No attack was made upon them that day, but just after dark my platoon was assigned to a position just southwest of the railroad, and under cover of the darkness the cannoneers, assisted by a detail of 20 men from the Tenth Pennsylvania, constructed a strong screened emplacement for two guns, which was completed shortly after midnight. The guns were placed in position just before daylight the next morning. Exactly at 7 a. m. I opened fire on the enemy at 1,000 yards. In a very few moments the fire from my platoon, Lieutenant Critchlow's, and Lieutenant Davis's Colt automatic gun (these being located just across the railroad), drove the insurgents from their position. They were fired on with shrapnel whenever they appeared in sight, retreating along the railroad, and their line of retreat was as thoroughly covered by our fire as circumstances would permit. A few projectiles were also fired into Malolos (the range and direction being taken from maps), some fragments of which were afterwards found in the city.

Colonel Funston:

When the advance was resumed on the morning of the 31st, the regiment occupied the same relative position in the brigade, and was disposed as on the preceding day, the right resting on the railroad during the entire advance.

The first trenches reached were found deserted, the occupants having fled during the shelling of their position by the field battery.

An extensive trench near the railroad, less than a quarter of a mile from the suburbs of Malolos, was found deserted, and here the regiment, in common with the whole division, halted. I received orders from the division commander to send a small reconnoitering party into the town, and accordingly took Second Lieut. Collin H. Ball and two squads from Company E, and taking charge of these in person, advanced cautiously up one of the principal streets. We found the convent occupied by Aguinaldo as a residence in flames, and were fired on by a dozen men behind a street barricade of stones. My detachment returned the fire with two volleys and charged, the enemy seeking safety in flight, and we entered the plaza, being the first American troops in the enemy's capital. We were immediately followed by two guns under Major Young and shortly afterwards by several companies of the First Montana. In the meantime the regiment had been advancing along the railroad and was in the city about fifteen minutes after the detachment from Company E occupied the square. One man of the command was slightly wounded during the day.

Major Kobbe:

The march against Malolos, which began about 6.30, twenty-five minutes after the first gun, found the command on the extreme left again and endeavoring, with some success, to retain a semblance of line formation in the face of much almost impassable terrain. The march was practically unopposed, though Batteries H and K dislodged a considerable force of insurgents who were apparently posted to advance on the left. The command entered the city about 10.30 or 11, and was ordered into camp southwest of the place, about half a mile out, with left on the estero and right toward railroad—one battalion on outpost 500 yards in advance.

General Wheaton:

March 31.—Soon after daylight the five battalions mentioned were placed, deployed in two lines of skirmishers closed to two and one-half paces interval; distance between lines 500 yards. The right and left battalions to lap over or beyond the line of battle of the division.

Action commenced about 7 a. m., the left occupying Malolos, the enemy's capital, early in the day. I was with the right and opened fire on an intrenchment of the enemy—with Hotchkiss revolving cannon—soon after the line was formed. After some maneuvering Hale's brigade in my front carried the enemy's work and pursued him in the direction of Calumpit.

In the absence of a pontoon train and in view of the network of unfordable tide-water streams between Manila and Malolos, the seizure of the substantial iron railroad bridges thereover, before they could be destroyed, became a matter of commanding importance. The rapidity of action, essential to this end, was impossible while encumbered with the wagon transportation, as the necessary preparation of each bridge, and the approaches thereto from the wagon road, and the actual passage of the vehicles, involved a delay of one day.

It therefore became apparent that an arrangement whereby the wagons could be safely abandoned for the time being would in effect amount to expediting the tactical speed to the extent of twenty-four hours for every bridge passed daily, in excess of one. In this light, the voluntary action of General Wheaton in reenforcing the cavalry squadron so as to make the train guard independently strong assumes the aspect of an important event, for which he is entitled to the highest appreciation. As a matter of fact, on March 30, when this action was taken, four large bridges were captured, viz: At the Togogon, Bocaue, Bigaa, and Guiguinto; and this with such rapidity as not only to insure their safety but also to preclude the enemy from making any preparation for serious defense.

Up to March 25 a definite objective for the campaign had not been announced. As understood at these headquarters, the purpose was to make a rapid advance, secure every possible advantage arising therefrom, and establish as quickly as possible a secondary base, easily protected by a comparatively small force, from which to conduct future operations, as might be suggested by expediency. Upon the full accomplishment of these results, it was understood that all available troops and transportation with this command were to be transferred south of the Pasig, to strengthen the First Division for like action on that side of the river.

In this view, and in consideration of the fact that Malolos was not in itself a point easily protected by a small force, the following telegraphic correspondence was initiated immediately after the occupancy of the town:

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Malolos, March 31, 1899—1.30 p. m.

Gen. E. S. Otis:

Please examine location of Calumpit on the map. It is on the Rio Grande, at which point the river receives several large tributaries. The Rio Grande forms the



PUBLIC SQUARE IN MALOLOS AFTER TROOPS ENTERED CITY MARCH 31 1899

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natural strategic line of defense for all that portion of the province of Bulacan which lies west thereof. A force stationed at Calumpit, with an outpost line extending through San Isidro and Baliuag toward Norzagaray, to the south, and by Cabdugal to Macabebe, to the north, would insure perfect security of everything between the river and bay as far south as the Pasig. Calumpit is therefore a strategic point of importance which, in my opinion, should be secured at once as the natural limit of the first stage of the campaign. With this territory in our possession, protected by a comparatively small force, we might view with considerable complacency the disintegration of the Malolos junta, which is almost sure to occur at a very early day. Besides the strategic advantages herein referred to, the longest bridge, and, I understand, the only water between here and Manila on the railway line, is at Calumpit, and it had better be secured at once and held permanently. I therefore recommend further progress to that point, which is only about 5 miles distant. Investigations are being made to determine line of communication to the bay, and also as to the condition of Bulacan. Information in both instances will be transitted as soon as definitely ascertained. The injury to the town by fire was not as great as was reported, but the prevalence of a high wind is spreading the flames to substantial part of the city. I have not yet ascertained losses, but am satisfied they were small.

MACARTHUR.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Manila, March 31, 1899—4.25 p. m.

General MACARTHUR:

Aguinaldo will never retreat in province of Tarlac. If forced strenuously he will retire along the edge of the province of Bulacan into Nuevo Ecija, where Tagalos inhabit. This for political reasons. If you can secure coast base at Malolos and abandon railroad, you are in better strategic position, all things considered, than at Calumpit. Was informed several days ago that insurgents would retire on Baliuag, which is the intersection of several important roads connecting with nearly all the Tagalo country north of Manila. You are now defending long line of railroad, and the movement of your column requires nearly half of the force of the army here and all of its transportation, while a large part of the insurgent forces is around Manila, which city must be kept down. No hasty movement from Malolos will be attempted, but careful reconnoissances will be made to-morrow morning to the east and north to discover where insurgent forces are, if possible. Captain Grant has found mouth of Malolos estuary; not much water there. He is pulling out bamboo obstructions and will continue to work at it until cleared. He may be able to reach you near Malolos. Make preparations for careful reconnoissance to-morrow. Wheaton will make reconnoissance east from Guiguinto and Malinta.

OTIS.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Malolos, April 1, 1899—12.27 p. m.

Gen. E. S. OTIS:

Your message of 4.25 p. m. of yesterday indicated a misunderstanding of suggestions contained in my message of 1.30 p. m. of same day. My idea was to occupy the Rio Grande as a natural and secure line of defense for everything this side of the river, with a force not to exceed 1,500 men, and probably less. All important points to the right and left of Calumpit could be securely held, including Baliuag, and all important roads leading therefrom. With this line firmly held by troops of all arms, 1,000 men would be sufficient for Malolos, which, as a matter of course, I intended to retain for water base and political effect. With this arrangement completed all other troops and all transportation could be withdrawn for operations elsewhere. A command of 2,500 men distributed as indicated above, I am satisfied could sustain itself against anything the insurgents could bring against it, and, with the assistance of an armored train organized with constructing facilities, could with considerable certainty keep the railroad open. Railroad service, however, would not be indispensable, if water communication can be established.

MACARTHUR.

To quickly regain the contact, which was necessarily temporarily suspended during the battle and occupation of Malolos, and to ascertain the true line of retreat of the defeated adversary, was a matter

of considerable difficulty, as his movements were sedulously concealed by the extensive cooperation of a dense mass of semicivilized people, speaking a dialect of which few white men, and no American, had any knowledge.

For a time it was apprehended that he might have moved east of Baliuag, and thence south on the Novaliches road, with a view to operating on the right flank of the American Army. It was soon definitely ascertained, however, that the entire opposing force retreated along the railroad to Calumpit, as it did thereafter on all subsequent retrogressions, first to San Fernando and then to Tarlac, from which point it returned to San Fernando, as soon as certain strategic pressure was removed, in consequence of the withdrawal of General Lawton's force from San Isidro.

It may be stated here as a matter of fact, that the insurgent army which retired from Caloocan and La Loma, never departed from the railroad, and never sent detachments to the east or northeast from the railroad; but, on the other hand, ultimately received considerable reinforcements therefrom.

The casualties for the month, in the division, and troops operating therewith under orders from these headquarters, were as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Killed	8	48	56
Wounded.....	25	453	478
Total	33	501	534

On April 2, Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V., was assigned to temporary command of the First Brigade, vice Otis, resigned from the Army. This assignment of General Wheaton had the important effect of unifying the command, by bringing the troops on the line of communication, consisting of the Second Oregon and Thirteenth Minnesota, under the authority of these headquarters.

The systemization of the service, of security and information in the immediate front and on the line of communication, now engaged the earnest attention of all concerned; in which connection nothing of importance occurred until 12.30 a. m. April 11, when the insurgents made a determined and simultaneous attack on all points of the line, between Marilao and Guiguinto, and which is thus described by General Wheaton:

In compliance with instructions from Major-General MacArthur, commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I immediately proceeded (on foot) in the direction of points attacked, taking with me a detachment of 25 men of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry (dismounted), under command of Lieut. Charles Boyd, Fourth U. S. Cavalry. Upon reaching a company of the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, encamped 2½ miles south of Malolos and along the railroad track, I found an additional company had been sent there from Guiguinto. I directed the company to follow me, and also one platoon of the other company. Upon arriving at the bridge 1 mile or less from Guiguinto, I ordered the company there to follow me.

I arrived at Guiguinto as the enemy attacked the outposts. The commanding officer seemed to have made no adequate preparations for combat. I immediately deployed the whole force, amounting to about 400 men, along the railroad track, and pushed by hand the armored train lying there into position to command the ground east and north of Guiguinto.

The enemy now attacked by firing from all the bamboo thickets and timber near the station and north and east of the depot. I opened fire from the 6-pounder rifle

and Hotchkiss revolving cannon and two machine guns on the armored train. The whole infantry line opened fire and before daylight the enemy was driven off and dispersed.

I then proceeded to Bigaa, taking the troops at Guiguinto with me and leaving the detachment Fourth U. S. Cavalry to guard the station until relieved by troops sent from Malolos by the division commander. The armored train I had pushed by hand.

Drove the enemy from the vicinity of Bigaa and, taking the troops there, excepting detachment left as guard, proceeded to Bocaue. Upon arriving within a mile of that place I found troops yet engaged. Opened on the enemy with machine guns and attacked him with infantry, deployed in the extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue.

Found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue, and that the four companies of infantry in the vicinity had preserved the railroad intact and had inflicted loss upon the enemy.

Learned that the three companies of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry at Marilao had been attacked by about 400 rebels, who were driven off. The telegraph line between Bocaue and Marilao had been cut in several places, and it was not until afternoon that the line was restored. The enemy had attacked in considerable force all the places held by troops from Marilao to Guiguinto, inclusive. He was beaten off everywhere by daylight and driven from the vicinity of all stations before 6.30 a. m.

It has since been ascertained that Aguinaldo was present at Santa Maria on the 10th and organized and supervised this night attack, which, as a premeditated affair of great importance, was intended to be decisive in result. As a matter of fact, however, the railroad was not injured, no bridge or position was given up, and the removal of 4 miles of telegraph wire in the vicinity of Bocaue was the only inconvenience arising from the operation.

General Wheaton displayed on this occasion a splendid warlike ferocity, the practical results of which can not be overestimated in classifying officers for honorable mention or substantial reward, as it is probable that his emphatic methods had a great deal to do with inspiring the pertinacious and rapid action which was manifested by the commands engaged, and which was indispensable to the situation.

As the town of Santa Maria, from which this blow was delivered, and which is only a few miles from Bocaue, continued to manifest signs of activity, it was determined to attack the place in sufficient force to disperse any insurgent concentration thereat. Accordingly, on the 12th, General Wheaton moved from Bocaue with the Thirteenth Minnesota, two battalions of Oregon, one field gun, and one revolving cannon, with the result reported by himself as follows:

At daylight the morning of the 12th instant I moved upon Santa Maria with this force. Opened upon the position and intrenchments of the enemy at that place with artillery and advanced the infantry in the extended order.

The enemy—11 companies of infantry—offered a feeble resistance and fled north and east of Santa Maria. Sent strong detachments on all north and east roads. They pursued the enemy in every direction, but were unable to come up with him, as he had dispersed. Returned to Bocaue during the afternoon, and from there sent troops to the several stations they occupied before the enemy's attack upon the points held by our troops along the railroad.

Since these operations no demonstration has been made by insurgents against the railroad.

An attack was made on the Third Artillery outposts on April 13, which, as illustrating a certain capacity of the insurgents for minor offensive warfare, is described at some length by means of the following extracts from the report of Major Kobbé:

Malolos extends westward from a bridge at the plaza, in a single street, for half a mile, where, crossing another bridge, an open space for a like distance is reached;

then, by still another bridge, the town of Paombon, also consisting of a single half-mile street. These streets and roads run practically in the same direction. Beyond Paombon is an unbridged stream, and beyond it the open delta country toward Hagonoy. The streams are 200 to 300 feet wide, unfordable, and connected one with another after the manner of estuaries or lagoons, are navigable for large cascos, and the inclosed tracts of land are, technically, low-lying islands. For purposes of this report, the streams at bridges 1, 2, and 3 and the stream beyond Paombon may be considered to divide the country into three equal island tracts.

Battery K, about 130 men, under Capt. C. W. Hobbs, was stationed near bridge No. 2, furnishing outposts for the open country on its front and left, but really as a support for Battery H, under Captain O'Hara (about 130 men), stationed in Paombon, with 40 men at the outlying church and other important outposts, which connected on their right with the general outpost line of the Second Division. The main body of the battery had been placed at bridge No. 3.

The position, therefore, was the extreme left of the general outpost line, extended well into the delta country, and was naturally difficult and exposed.

This position was attacked shortly after 4 a. m., April 13, while it was still very dark, by (as has been learned since) between three and four hundred insurgents, and from the front and left. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and began with volleys delivered at short ranges, which the enemy had been able to attain by means of the rivers, and was simultaneous along the line extending from north of Paombon church south and east beyond bridge No. 2.

The division commander ordered me to send 50 men from Battery L, then in readiness on the plaza, as reinforcements, to summon Battery G to the plaza, and to personally await further orders. The firing continuing, he ordered me to go to the front and assume charge.

I found bridge No. 3 burning, and as the main body of Battery H had been placed there, supposed it had been driven away or withdrawn; in any event the battery was cut off from support for the time being. Firing was also being kept up, but at long range. The 50 men from Battery L were in a good position, and Captain Hobbs had posted his command advantageously.

I sent back for the rest of Battery L, also for all of Battery G, for one gun, and for a detachment of engineers to repair the bridge, also sent Lieutenant Abernethy to communicate with Captain O'Hara in Paombon. He returned and reported that Captain O'Hara had had no difficulty in holding his own. As soon as bridge was partially restored I sent Battery G to reenforce O'Hara, and the rest of Battery L up the second river to cover the retreat of a small reconnoitering party which I had dispatched in a boat and which had been promptly fired on. As this indicated a body of insurgents still on the Paombon tract, I ordered O'Hara to take Batteries H and G, deployed across the tract to the north, which was done, clearing that part of the line; then consolidated Battery L on the open tract, and as I had before this designated a position for the gun near bridge No. 2 and had advanced Battery K well to the front, the command offered a very strong line, before the fire of which the insurgents, already at a distance, finally withdrew. * * * Seven of the enemy's dead were left on the field.

This command lost 1 sergeant and 1 private killed and 1 officer (Lieutenant Lanza) and 4 privates wounded; also 1 private captured by the enemy and still a prisoner.

As a further means of developing and perfecting the service of security and information, the following order was issued:

FIELD ORDERS, }	HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 18. }	Malolos, P. I., April 14, 1899.

I. To facilitate scouting and reconnoissance work in connection with the operations of this division, there will be organized at these headquarters a permanent detachment, consisting of the following-named especially selected officers and enlisted men:

First Lieut. Charles W. Mead, Company D, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
 Second Lieut. E. J. Hardy, Company H, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
 Corpl. D. W. Vickers, Company D, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private W. Chatelle, Company E, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Willy, Company H, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Huntsman, Company H, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Oscar Orchard, Company K, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Amos Weaver, Company F, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Frank Augustine, Company B, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
 Sergt. William L. Baehre, Company L, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
 Private Charles O. Sandstrom, Company L, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

Private Willard D. Mason, Company L, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
 Sergt. C. M. Condon, Battery G, Third U. S. Artillery.
 Private Frank Clarke, Battery L, Third U. S. Artillery.
 Private John Vargin, Battery L, Third U. S. Artillery.
 Sergt. John L. Sheldon, Troop E, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Private Berny F. Weed, Troop E, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Private Turner, Troop K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Private Jackson, Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Private Skinner, Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Private Meng, Troop K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

These officers and men will report at once to Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, chief engineer of the division, who will organize and take charge of their work.

They will be rationed separately as a detachment, but will be mustered and draw pay, clothing, and other supplies with their respective commands.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The immediate and remote consequences of this action can not be too highly commended, as it insured constant and careful exploration, intelligent reports, and reliable maps.

The Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V., was relieved from duty with the division to date April 14, and was replaced on that date by the Fifty-first Iowa, which regiment was assigned to the Second Brigade.

The general movement contemplated north of the Pasig embraced the idea of cooperation between the column advancing from La Loma and this division. In this light the following orders were issued for the concentration of troops intended to strengthen General Lawton, and which reached him at Norzagaray and thereafter rendered conspicuous services with that column, in consequence of which the commanding officer thereof—Colonel Summers, of the Oregon regiment—was reported for special distinction and reward by General Lawton:

FIELD ORDERS, }
 No. 21. }

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 20, 1899.

I. Two battalions Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., and two battalions Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., to be designated by the commanding general Third Brigade, First Division, will be concentrated at Bocaue, on the north side of the river, on Friday, the 21st instant.

II. The commands ordered to concentrate at Bocaue in the preceding paragraph will be prepared to march as may hereafter be directed, and to that end each company will be provided with 2 buffalo carts from the number now on hand in the respective regiments, which will be assembled at the designated point on or before the day specified for the assembling of the troops. Sufficient transportation for officers will be furnished and assembled in like manner.

III. Ten days' rations will be placed on the carts, to commence April 23, made up of the following components: Hard bread, bacon, baked beans, coffee, sugar, salt, vinegar, and three days' rations of tomatoes.

IV. Each soldier will carry on his person 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition or 150 rounds of caliber .30 ammunition, while 200 rounds of each per man will be placed on the carts.

V. The battalions thus assembled will be under the command of Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDERS, }
 No. 22. }

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 20, 1899.

I. Troop I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and one section of the Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V., will proceed to Bocaue by marching so as to arrive at destination April 22, reporting to the commanding officer United States troops at that point.

400 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

II. Each organization will be provided with ten days' rations, to commence April 23, made up of the following components: Hard bread, bacon, baked beans, coffee, sugar, salt, vinegar, and three days' rations of tomatoes.

III. Each organization will be provided with one 4-mule escort wagon and such buffalo carts as may be necessary.

IV. Each cavalry soldier will carry 150 rounds of ammunition on his person and in saddle pockets, while 200 rounds per man will be placed in the wagon. The section of artillery will carry 150 rounds of ammunition, to be placed in limber and wagon.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

With a view to combining still more effectively with General Lawton, and at the same time prolonging the advance on this line, a combined tactical movement was initiated in accordance with prescriptions set forth as follows:

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 26. }

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 22, 1899.

I. It is believed that the enemy in considerable force intends to defend the town of Calumpit, the center of the first line of resistance being the railroad track crossing the Bagbag River, and extending to the right and left along the thither banks of the Quingua, Calumpit, and Bagbag rivers. A second line is undoubtedly located along the Rio Grande.

II. The enemy's position, as above described, will be attacked on Monday, the 24th instant, for which purpose the distribution of troops for tactical operations will be as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE.

Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
One battalion Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V.
One squadron Fourth Cavalry, U. S. A.
Three field guns, Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.
Armored train.

SECOND BRIGADE.

First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., minus one battalion.
Two field guns, Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
One Hotchkiss revolving cannon.

The battalion Third Artillery, U. S. A., will take post at or in the vicinity of the railroad station as guard for transportation, stores, and impedimenta, all of which, appertaining to the command, will be assembled on the 23d instant at that point and so arranged under the advice of the chief quartermaster and the commanding officer of the guard as to insure the most complete protection.

III. The infantry of the First Brigade, in connection with the armored train, will operate directly along the railroad track against the enemy's first line of resistance at the Bagbag bridge. The artillery, under the escort of the cavalry squadron and battalion of Iowa, will pass by the Pulilan road to the intersection of the Quingua road, and thereafter by that road to a junction with the infantry in the vicinity of the intersection of the railroad. The artillery and escort will follow the Second Brigade to the Quingua road and thereafter conform to the movement of that brigade, although on opposite sides of the Quingua River, with a view to all possible immunity from the fire action of the enemy, and also with a view to rendering such assistance to that brigade as may be possible.

IV. The Second Brigade will move directly north by the Pulilan road and pass the Quingua River at the ford, or fords, contiguous thereto, and then change direction so as to take the Quingua defenses of the enemy in reverse, and to continue the movement in the direction of the town of Calumpit.

V. One day's rations and 200 rounds of Springfield and 250 rounds of caliber .30 ammunition will be carried by the men or such pack animals or vehicles as regimental commanders may designate for the purpose. Reserve ammunition for all arms will be available in cars placed well to the front.

VI. The chief surgeon is charged with hospital arrangements and will make suitable provision for the service of both brigades.

VII. The purpose of the United States in these islands is beneficent. It is therefore one of the most important duties of American soldiers to assist in establishing friendly relations with the natives by kind and considerate treatment in all matters arising from personal contact. To exasperate individuals or to burn or loot unprotected and abandoned houses or property is not only criminal in itself, but tends to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose which the Army is here to accomplish. All concerned are accordingly strictly charged to practice becoming self-restraint in the premises, and it is made the special duty of all officers to prevent thoughtless and ignorant men from indulging in any of the practices enumerated, and to take necessary action to insure adequate punishment, as prescribed by the Articles of War, in the event of overt acts being committed by any member of the command, either during the contemplated actions against Calumpit or thereafter throughout the campaign.

VIII. When in hostile contact with the enemy, an adversary with arms in his hands must be killed, if possible; but a wounded or surrendered opponent, who is incapable of doing any injury, is entitled to the most cordial courtesy and kindness. Any departure from the well-established amenities of the battlefield or the laws of war must and will be punished, according to the nature of the case, to the full extent of the law.

IX. The commanding officer of the engineer company, U. S. A., will make all necessary arrangements to mend roads, repair railroad track and bridges, and to render general assistance in emergencies likely to arise in battle.

X. The commanding officer Eighteenth Company, Signal Corps, U. S. V., will, if possible, connect the division headquarters by wire with the operations of the Second Brigade, and to that end will be given all necessary assistance by troops of the line.

XI. The division commander will accompany the First Brigade.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As preliminary to this move, Major Bell, of the division staff, under the escort of Troop K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, was instructed April 23 to make reconnoissance of Quingua, and also to explore the road leading from Quingua down the river, and incidentally to examine the insurgent trenches on the north bank of the river.

This party got into contact early in the day, which resulted in a combat that reached considerable proportions, as both sides were built up by successive reinforcements. The operations of the 23d, therefore, became blended into the general plan, with the effect of modifying the field orders in the premises to the extent of the movement commencing at Quingua instead of at the ford several miles farther down the river, as originally contemplated, and the diversion from the artillery escort of a battalion of Iowa and its return to normal relations with its own regiment and brigade. Otherwise the programme was carried out precisely as planned, and the execution is described as follows by the respective brigade commanders:

General Hale:

The original plan of division commander was for the Second Brigade to move north from Malolos on morning of April 24, effect a crossing of the Quingua River, and move westward on north bank of Quingua against Calumpit in cooperation with the First Brigade, which would advance along railroad track. This move was modified by an unexpected engagement at Quingua on Sunday, April 23.

April 23.—Heard heavy firing in direction of Quingua (6.05 a. m.), where Major Bell had gone with a cavalry troop to reconnoiter road along river.

The fire continuing (6.13 a. m.), I sent order to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., to send two companies to Major Bell's support.

*Sent instructions (6.25 a. m.) to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller to send two more companies.

Soon afterwards a cavalryman came in with information that, in compliance with request from Major Bell, a Nebraska battalion had gone out.

Subsequently another battalion of each regiment (Iowa and Nebraska) went forward.

Captain Lockett, of division commander's staff, returned from front with information that the enemy was in strong force and position, and that artillery was needed. General MacArthur sent out 4 guns.

10.35 a. m.—I immediately started for the front, passing the artillery on the road, and on arrival at the firing line, found that the Nebraska troops were deployed behind a slight ridge in open field, about 200 yards beyond point where road leaves woods, with Iowa farther to right. Cavalry reported to be some distance to left of road. The insurgents were delivering a lively fire on our line. As soon as guns arrived, I placed them in edge of woods at left of road, and as the Nebraska troops masked the enemy's line to right of road, directed Major Mulford, who had been in command, to send an officer to instruct the Nebraska line to withdraw by alternate rushes to edge of woods as soon as artillery began firing at intrenchments on left, thus enabling it also to fire on right, in front of Nebraska, preparatory to the infantry advance. Lieutenant Moore, who was already wounded in the leg, took this message forward.

11.45 a. m.—Artillery opened fire against intrenchments on left. At same time the Nebraska line on right began to advance under heavy fire. I ran to right of road to investigate, and found that Colonel Stotsenburg, who had just come out, had taken command of his troops and given order to advance, leading them in person. Within a few hundred yards Colonel Stotsenburg, Lieutenant Sisson, and 2 enlisted men were killed and 31 enlisted men wounded; but the insurgents were driven from their position and on through the town, making a few brief stands behind street barricades.

When the Nebraska line began advancing, Captain Brooks was sent to Iowa to insure their simultaneous advance on the right. They came up on southwest and south side of town, meeting considerable resistance, which was overcome without serious difficulty.

Having captured Quingua, it was evidently better to hold it and make it the starting point for movement against Calumpit, instead of returning to Malolos and moving due north across the Quingua River at a point about 3 miles west of Quingua. My recommendation to that effect receiving the approval of the division commander, the South Dakota regiment and remaining companies of Nebraska and Iowa were ordered to Quingua, and during the night rations, ammunition, and such accouterments as the men did not take in their hurried movement to support the patrol, were brought out, and preparations made for forcing the passage of the Quingua River at daybreak. Our troops were disposed along the river and around east and south sides of town, with strong outposts on west side also. During the night the insurgents on north bank fired at intervals, especially when our men attempted to reconnoiter the ford and bamboo footbridge, and also endeavored to destroy the latter, but on account of the vigilance of our outposts, they did no damage beyond breaking down the farther end. About 4 a. m. Sergeant-Major Coleman, of Nebraska, succeeded in getting into the ford about 300 yards below the footbridge and found it practicable for troops.

April 24, 5 a. m.—Troops and guns placed along south bank of river to force passage—one 3.2-inch gun opposite footbridge, one 3.2-inch and Hotchkiss revolving cannon opposite ford 300 yards below bridge, from which point the enemy's intrenchments opposite bridge could be partially enfiladed.

5.35 a. m.—Began artillery and infantry firing. Insurgents replied briskly.

After twenty minutes' firing, the bank opposite ford appearing to be practically clear, I directed Major Mulford, Nebraska, to put a company across ford.

5.56 a. m.—Lieutenant Osborne, leading Company B, started across ford. Companies I, K, and M followed. At practically same time Colonel Frost, whom I had instructed to put a detachment across footbridge as soon as conditions justified, sent Captain Brockway and his company (F) across in single file. The remaining insurgents appeared paralyzed by the movement and did not fire on our troops crossing the river, but in a few moments abandoned their trenches and ran.

On account of rickety condition of footbridge, and especially the depth, soft bottom, and steep approaches of the ford, it took until half past 9 with the hardest possible work to cross the brigade and transportation, the latter requiring the most time.

9.40 a. m.—Brigade advanced northwesterly from Quingua River toward Pulilan, Nebraska line on left with its left on river; South Dakota with two battalions in line (center near road) and one battalion in support in column on road, and Iowa in reserve in column on road. It had been intended to deploy Iowa on South Dakota's right, but the thick jungle made this impossible. The artillery marched about 100 yards behind the firing line for prompt use against intrenchments whenever encountered.

10.20 a. m.—Insurgents opened heavy fire from line of detached earthworks across woods and in bamboo thickets through which we were marching. Infantry replied and one of the 3.2-inch guns got into action on road quickly and with good effect.

Infantry then advanced. A body of insurgents appeared in woods to our right and rear and began firing into right of South Dakota line. The two remaining guns on road were turned on this party and after a few shots they disappeared in woods. Our troops charged the earthworks and, as the insurgents remained in them longer than usual, killed a large number. Thirty-eight dead were actually counted in one barricade across road from Pulilan to Baliuag, 28 in another, and 15 in another, while many more were seen through the woods and lanes.

11 a. m.—The country to right and front being comparatively open, the Iowa regiment was directed to follow South Dakota's right in column of fours and deploy to right in case resistance was met or the line halted for any reason.

At this point Major Bell, of the division staff, who had come across the Quingua River from Malolos, met us and after a short conference returned to General MacArthur with report of movements up to that time.

12.10 p. m.—Halted at Pulilan (which is a long straggling village) for rest and dinner, and to allow Iowa to deploy and come up on right of line. They were considerably delayed by engagement with a body of the enemy on right and also by the nature of the country, and when they arrived on line were exhausted and required time to eat and rest.

3 p. m.—Advance resumed in line, each regiment having one battalion in reserve.

About 4.30 p. m.—As the line emerged from woods into an open field about 2 miles west of Pulilan and just west of the ford on road north of Malolos, the enemy opened fire from a continuous line of trench three-fourths of a mile long at right angles to river and about 600 yards to our front. I placed the guns and one of the left companies of Nebraska in an earthwork which happened to be at right side of road exactly where required, and they opened fire. After a few minutes' firing South Dakota and the right battalion of Nebraska advanced across field, and I sent the company in earthwork with them and another company up the road to try to flank the enemy's trench. When our line had advanced about halfway across the open field, the insurgents left their trenches and retreated. Our men picked off a number as they ran. Twenty to 25 of their dead were found along the trenches.

As over 100 insurgent dead were actually counted during the day in four distinct groups, without attempting to scour the woods and fields, it is believed that 200 is a conservative estimate of the total killed, including those carried off by the enemy.

Our casualties in the three fights of the day were 6 killed and 14 wounded, of which one subsequently died.

The brigade camped here for the night, during which supplies were brought out from Malolos and carried across the river by the men, and the dead, wounded, and exhausted were taken across on litters and sent back to Malolos.

April 25, 6.45 a. m.—Resumed march westward in extended line, one battalion of each regiment in reserve.

When within about a mile of Calumpit River (as estimated from map and distance marched), I halted left of line and established a new line by compass 40 degrees west of north, wheeling brigade to left onto this line to make it parallel to Calumpit River, before advancing on latter.

While this movement was in progress, Major Mulford, of Nebraska, reconnoitered to front and located the Bagbag River bridge, meeting me as I was returning from the right of the line.

10.05 a. m.—We went forward and examined the ground together, after which the line was brought forward to within a short distance of the point from which the bridge could be seen. Major Mulford, with a patrol, then made a reconnoissance farther to the front.

After waiting some time to be sure that the First Brigade was up on the south side of the Quingua River, I placed one 3.2-inch field piece on sand bar at edge of river to fire on earthworks near bridge, and the other field gun and Hotchkiss revolving cannon on the bank a short distance in advance to cover the enemy's lines along the Calumpit River. The command to load had been given, when a gun on the other side of the river (probably in the armored car) was fired, showing that they were ready to begin operations. We commenced firing at once, drawing a lively reply from the insurgents.

After considerable artillery fire the infantry line was ordered forward and proceeded, firing as it advanced, to the east bank of the Calumpit River (a narrow, deep stream), where it engaged in a very hot short-range fight with the enemy intrenched on the opposite bank, 30 to 50 yards distant. The brigade staff and artillery followed the infantry line (Lieutenant Fuller, aid, riding back under heavy fire to hurry up the last piece) and Lieutenant Fleming fearlessly placed his guns on the bank and delivered an effective fire on the trenches, both in front of our position and on the left (toward railroad bridge) and right, enfilading the trenches

toward the bridge and partially enfilading those to right. Captain Brooks, acting assistant adjutant-general, assisted in carrying ammunition from limber to piece, thus encouraging the cannoneers in their dangerous work. The fire of our troops was so heavy and accurate (the interior bamboo framework of covered and loop-holed earthworks was afterwards found to be cut to shreds in places by bullets through loopholes) that the insurgents were afraid to put anything but their guns and hands above the parapets, which accounts for their high fire and moderate amount of our casualties. After about half an hour's work the enemy's fire in front of our left and toward the railroad bridge was practically silenced and it appeared possible to get a line of troops across on extreme left, near junction of Calumpit and Quingua rivers, the latter being apparently shallower. I therefore ran to left of line and told Major Mulford, commanding First Nebraska, to make the attempt, swinging well out into the Quingua. He immediately formed a line of men from Company K, under Lieutenant Weber, and, leading it in person, they waded in, but were soon over their depth. A second attempt, farther out into the Quingua, was successful, the line getting across through water shoulder deep. The remaining companies of the battalion were then hurried across and formed in line to sweep up through Calumpit along west bank of river, taking the river trenches in flank. While the line was forming for this purpose, I went to northwest end of railroad bridge and reported across the broken span to General MacArthur, who was on the main portion of the bridge, explaining the intention to clear Calumpit, which he approved. In accordance with his instructions, Captain Brooks, acting assistant adjutant-general, was sent up railroad with a patrol of 10 men to ascertain condition of track and bridge over the Rio Grande.

We immediately proceeded with the Nebraska battalion through Calumpit, right on river, first sending word to remainder of Nebraska to come across and cooperate on left, and to South Dakota and Iowa not to fire across the river into Nebraska. Several parties of insurgents who had remained in trenches were routed out and many were killed as they left the trenches and ran across the front of the line. We counted 17 in one bunch. A subsequent count discovered a total of 40 dead and 14 wounded in trenches and adjoining lanes and brush, all of which were probably the result of this movement through the town, as they doubtless carried off their dead and wounded in the main retreat before and just after our troops forded the river.

When within about 200 yards of Calumpit church (at north end of town), which was burning, I halted the line and forwarded two reconnoitering parties, one along Calumpit River and one near church. They got within sight of the Rio Grande and reported all insurgents out of the district south of that river, but strongly intrenched on north bank. Just before they returned, the enemy opened fire upon us with both infantry and artillery, firing several shots from latter. One shell or shrapnel appeared to burst just over our line. We made no reply and the firing soon ceased.

General Wheaton:

Pursuant to the order of Major-General MacArthur, I moved my brigade out of Malolos on the morning of April 24, with the intention of attacking the enemy on the north bank of the river Bagbag, but the brigade of General Hale, with which it was desired I should cooperate, not having advanced from the direction of Quingua on Calumpit sufficiently to attack at that point that day, I was directed by Major-General MacArthur to hold my brigade in the vicinity of the railroad at Barasin until Hale had fought his way to the vicinity of a ford across the Quingua, not far from the river Calumpit.

About 8.30 a. m. on the morning of the 25th of April, by direction of the division commander, I marched on the enemy's position, moving the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry on the left of the railroad and the First Montana Volunteer Infantry on the right. The battalion of the Third U. S. Artillery, Major Kobbé, was left at Malolos and Barasin to guard the line of road. I directed the armored train to follow up the track after the brigade was well on the march. Our movements being well screened from the enemy by extensive lines of bamboo jungle, I moved both regiments of infantry into a well-protected position about 1,200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments along the Bagbag. The armored train having reached at this time a point on the road near the infantry, I directed that fire be opened from the rifled 6-pounder and the three machine guns on the train, and at this minute Hale's artillery to our front and right, across the Quingua, opened fire, and the guns of the Utah Artillery on our right commenced firing.

Soon after, I moved the armored train to the front and advanced several companies of infantry from both regiments to seize all places near the river from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy's intrenchments. The converging fire of the two brigades of the division and the artillery now began to shake the enemy.

Colonel Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, with Lieut. C. M. Warner, First Sergt. Raymond E. Enston and Sergt. C. B. Barshfield, Company K, Twentieth Kansas, endeavored to rush across the railroad bridge. A span of the bridge being broken, Colonel Funston, Lieutenant Ball, and Sergeants Enston and Barshfield swam across the river and drove the enemy out of the intrenchments near the bridge. At the same time Hale's infantry on our right forded the Calumpit to our front and right, turned the enemy out of his intrenchments along the Calumpit, and pursued him to the vicinity of the Rio Grande near the town of Calumpit, which the enemy burned. The two regiments of my brigade bivouacked near the Bagbag.

April 26 the enemy was in force on the north bank of the Rio Grande de la Pam-panga, a broad and deep river. He was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications, and had near the railroad bridge 3 pieces of artillery and 1 rapid-fire Maxim. The most important strategic position of Calumpit would be untenable until he was driven off. I was directed by Major-General MacArthur to do this, my force to be the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana, 5 guns Utah Light Artillery, and 3 machine guns. It was effected in thirty-six hours, as follows:

I advanced the infantry in deployed lines, in the extended order, from the Bagbag to an intrenched position about 600 yards from the Rio Grande, which position had been abandoned by the enemy, placing the Twentieth Kansas on the left of the railroad and the First Montana on the right. The main body now being screened from the enemy's fire, detachments and small parties of skirmishers were advanced and seized all sheltered places near the river and within long rifle range of the railroad bridge. Two brick and stone buildings near the river were seized and loopholed for musketry. The machine guns and a part of the artillery were placed in position for fire upon the enemy's intrenchments. The river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the purpose of ascertaining any place possible to cross. A constant and continued fire of sharpshooters was kept up, and slow but continued fire from the 3.2-inch guns during the 26th.

On the night of the 26th the railroad bridge was found to be in such condition that to rush it with men carrying arms would be impracticable. A reconnoissance at night by Colonel Funston made it apparent that the enemy was intrenched in force at all points for a considerable distance down the river.

The morning of the 27th of April I had a 3.2-inch gun brought to the brick house near the bridge, and opened fire at short range upon the enemy's works. Upon consultation with Colonel Funston, a point about 900 yards below the railroad bridge was selected as the place that he would endeavor to cross a part of his regiment. The enemy's intrenchments opposite this point were well screened by bamboo thickets, but I directed a fire from the brick house near the bridge to be kept up from the 3.2-inch gun and by two companies of infantry. Colonel Funston also advanced to the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire at a short distance. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive a part of the enemy's force from his works, and Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly, of Company B, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, swam the river with a rope and fastened it to a stake on the enemy's intrenchments while yet occupied. Rafts were pulled over by means of this rope, Colonel Funston going over on the first raft. Our artillery had during this time kept up a heavy fire from positions selected by Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery.

Under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, First Montana Volunteer Infantry, a heavy and continuous fire was directed upon the enemy near the bridge, the machine guns also being directed upon the same place. When Colonel Funston had crossed 45 officers and men, he attacked the enemy, turning him out of his works near the bridge. I then crossed the bridge with my staff, followed by Twentieth Kansas and First Montana as fast as they could push over such framework as the enemy had not destroyed. Upon reaching the north bank of the river, two bodies of the enemy, each about 1,500 strong, were observed, one about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to our left, which had evidently been guarding the river below. He moved in a deployed line, extended order, and advanced upon us, but after being subjected to fire about twenty minutes he fell back in disorder and retreated out of range. The other body was in front and along the railroad. I deployed the Twentieth Kansas on the left of the railroad and the First Montana on the right, and drove them beyond Apalit Station, in the direction of Santo Tomas, the whole force of the enemy disappearing in that direction, the nature of the country being such that they were compelled to march along the embankment. I estimated the whole force visible at 4,000. We captured 1 piece of artillery.

The notable features of the operations from Malolos to Calumpit were the precision of execution which characterized all the tactical

movements and the crossing of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga. The progress of the Second Brigade by the way of Quingua and Pulilan to a junction with the First Brigade in the vicinity of Calumpit, which may be traced on the accompanying map of the military operations of the division, was most skillfully conducted by General Hale, and the execution inflicted upon the adversary in the various encounters en route was exemplary—probably more severe than on any other single occasion during the campaign.

The Rio Grande is a broad, deep stream, from which all boats had been carefully removed by the defending army, and which, in the absence of a pontoon train, was passable only at the railroad bridge. The defense was made by something more than 4,000 men in chosen and carefully prepared positions. The successful passage of the river, as narrated by General Wheaton, must therefore be regarded as a remarkable military achievement, well calculated to fix the attention of the most careless observer and to stimulate the fancy of the most indifferent.

On a subsequent occasion, when Colonel Aguelles, chief of staff to General Luna, the insurgent commander in the premises, presented himself with credentials looking to a suspension of hostilities, his first greeting was to the effect that before presenting his official note he was directed to present the compliments of his chief, who had charged him to express the warmest admiration of the valor of the American soldiers in forcing the Rio Grande, a feat which theretofore had been considered impossible. How far this message is to be regarded as sincere is open to grave doubt; but even in the light of suspicion it is quite apparent that the incident was esteemed sufficiently important to be seized upon for the purpose of diplomatic amiability, a motive which in itself may be regarded as, in effect, an involuntary and unconscious expression of sincere appreciation.

The death of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska, was deplored by the entire division as an irreparable loss. He was not only a fearless and skillful leader, but he was generously endowed with that warlike spirit which lies at the root of all virile and dominant nationality. Colonel Stotsenburg was killed at the head of his regiment, leading a charge, the successful result of which was largely determined by his own personality.

The casualties for the month of April in the division were as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Killed	2	24	26
Wounded.....	12	143	155
Total	14	167	181

On May 1, 1899, the following order issued, which explains itself:

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 30.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Calumpit Bridge, P. I., May 1, 1899.

Information having been received to the effect that certain prisoners of the Army and Navy of the United States now in the hands of the Filipino insurgents are inadequately supplied with food, the subsistence department will issue ten days' rations, composed of such articles of sale and issue stores as are most suitable for the purpose, for one commissioned officer of the Navy and 15 men of the Army and Navy.

The insurgent authorities having signified willingness to take charge of the distribution of these stores, they will be sent to the line of the insurgent army, under a flag of truce, for delivery to their proper destination.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In order to assist, if necessary, the advancing column under General Lawton, which was expected to meet with resistance in the vicinity of Baliuag, a strong command was organized for special service, as indicated in the following order:

FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 31. } *Calumpit, P. I., May 1, 1899.*

I. The following organizations will proceed to Pulilan to-morrow, the 2d instant, under the command of Brigadier-General Hale, U. S. V.:

First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V.

Two field guns and one Gatling gun, to be designated by chief of artillery.

One officer and 25 men, Fourth Cavalry, U. S. A.

II. The commands above designated will be rationed for three days, commencing the 2d instant, and each infantry and cavalry soldier will carry on his person 100 rounds of Springfield, or 150 rounds of caliber .30, ammunition, while a sufficient supply to raise the total amount to 300 rounds per man will be carried on the wagons or pack animals at the disposal of the regimental commanders.

III. The chief surgeon will designate two ambulances to accompany the command and necessary Hospital Corps men to attend thereon.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

For the details of this expedition, reference is made to the report of General Hale, of the march from Calumpit to Pulilan and return, which is inclosed herewith, as an appendix.

The advance of the division was resumed in accordance with the following order:

FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
No. 33. } *Bagbag Bridge, P. I., May 3, 1899.*

I. It is believed that the enemy, in considerable force, is located between Calumpit and San Fernando. His position, wherever found, will be attacked on Thursday, the 4th instant, for which purpose the First Brigade will advance directly along the railroad; the Second Brigade will be concentrated on the right bank of the Rio Grande by the night of the 3d instant, and together with the artillery, cavalry, ambulances, and transportation, will follow the wagon road. The artillery, cavalry, and wagons will pass the Rio Grande on the 3d instant and be ready to march early on the morning of the 4th.

The troops will be supplied with three days' rations, to be carried by the men and such vehicles and pack animals as may be at the disposal of the regimental commanders. Three hundred rounds of ammunition will be carried; 100 Springfield, and 150 caliber .30 on person, the balance on pack animals and wagons.

II. One battalion Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., will be designated by the commanding general Second Brigade, for the defense of the Bagbag and Rio Grande bridges, the distribution of which will be announced in subsequent verbal instructions.

III. The subsistence department will establish a temporary depot in a suitable house in Calumpit, supplied with ten days' rations from the 4th instant.

IV. The ordnance department will place a reserve supply of ammunition of 65,000 Springfield and 35,000 caliber .30 in Calumpit in some convenient place for the use of the division.

V. The chief surgeon is charged with hospital arrangements, and will make provision accordingly.

VI. The commanding officers of the engineer and signal companies will make all necessary arrangements for the efficient performance of their respective duties.

VII. The division commander will accompany the First Brigade.

By command of Major-General MacArthur:

PUTNAM BRADLEE STRONG,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

408 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

The operations arising from the foregoing order are set forth in the following telegraphic reports sent from the front to the department commander during the progress of the events referred to :

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
May 4, 1899—10.22 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila* :

In contact with enemy at Santo Tomas. The contest now is for the possession of the three-span bridge. The insurgents have fired the town, which is now burning. If they follow their usual methods, they will probably soon leave the bridge.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General*.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
May 4, 1899—12 m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila* :

At 11.30 we have possession of the Santo Tomas Bridge, a six-span affair with the third span broken. The town destroyed by the natives. Hale had a sharp fight on the right. He drove the enemy, of course, as usual, but what his casualties were, I do not know. I am not sure of the losses in Wheaton's brigade, but I think they are small. Captain Albright, Company C, Twentieth Kansas, wounded; at least 1 man killed and 6 wounded. If we have good luck in crossing the river, I hope to be in San Fernando to-night.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General*.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
May 4, 1899—3 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila* :

After passing the bridge, the First Brigade advanced along the railroad to Santo Tomas Station, at which point a considerable number of the enemy were found strongly intrenched and delivering a very annoying fire. General Wheaton was on the ground in person, and concentrated five companies of the Twentieth Kansas. After getting them well in hand, he led them personally in one of the most brilliant charges of the campaign. The result was entirely successful. The enemy was driven from the works with heavy loss, which will be reported later, and the capture of 20 or more prisoners. Our own loss was Lieutenant McTaggart, Twentieth Kansas, mortally wounded, and 3 men wounded, and Colonel Funston was shot through the hand; not dangerous. Colonel Funston accompanied General Wheaton in his usual gallant manner. Captain Dillon, First Montana, was seriously wounded by the fire, which was silenced by General Wheaton's charge. I find it impossible to cross my trains before dark; therefore, very much to my disappointment, we shall not be able to continue our advance this afternoon.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General*.

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Santo Tomas, May 4, 1899—5.59 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila* :

The work of my command to-day has been the most exhausting of the campaign, but the results have been very satisfactory. In the first place, the country was intersected with swamps and rivers, and the heat was something indescribable and disabled many men. The enemy was dislodged from his position at Santo Tomas after a determined resistance and probably a considerable loss, as he was exposed in large groups to a direct fire. Both brigades did splendid work and the day closed with Wheaton's charge, the result of which was a loss to the insurgents of 15 killed, including 1 officer and 1 soldier mortally wounded, 11 wounded and 15 captured. The situation to-night, however, is not encouraging for an early start to-morrow morning, as all of the field artillery and one Gatling gun, and the entire wagon train are now on the other side of two rivers, one of which must be bridged and the other passed by ferry. The two machine guns brought along the railroad by the First Brigade on trucks are now on the other side of the bridge at Santo Tomas crossing.

Santo Tomas is absolutely destroyed and San Fernando has been burning for several hours. A reconnoitering officer reports that the cathedral is burned and the

fire has embraced all of the large business buildings, and it now looks as though the entire town was doomed. If it is necessary to fight for the place, I shall not be able to get things in hand before to-morrow noon; possibly, however, I may enter without opposition, as the extent of the fires seem to indicate evacuation. We have something more than 30 prisoners, who are a great nuisance. How would it do to turn them loose?

Our casualties will probably number 6 or 7 killed and the wounded possibly 12 or 15. An accurate list will be wired later in the evening. Two of Young's guns are disabled and out of the fight for the present. If we are to do more work on this line, they should be replaced, as they are indispensable, in view of the rapidly diminishing effective strength of the infantry. Altogether, it was a fine day's work and everybody has done splendidly.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Santo Tomas, May 5, 1899—2.43 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila:*

San Fernando is now in our possession. The insurgents evacuated the place last night, leaving a small detachment in the town, which was easily driven out this morning without loss to us. The damage by fire was not as extensive as I supposed. The retreat was directly along the railroad and made on the cars. It is reported with considerable certainty that Luna was wounded. I have two battalions in the city, and shall not move the balance of the command till my line of communication is open and in operation, which will be more difficult to accomplish than I expected last night. I will not be able to bring the field artillery or wagons over intervening streams before to-morrow. In the meantime everything must be brought forward by hand for several miles over a difficult road, and our present position is 2 miles nearer the wagon train than the town. The two machine guns with the First Brigade on the railroad passed the river at Santo Tomas on a raft made of cascoes, and the guns, together with the railroad trucks, are now up with the fighting line. * * *

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
Santo Tomas, May 5, 1899—6.25 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila:*

I find that Major Young's guns are not as badly disabled as I understood from the first report, and he hopes to have them in serviceable condition by to-morrow. I also find upon investigation that the enemy suffered considerably more yesterday than I supposed. About 50 Mausers and 75 Remington guns were fished out of the river where the engineers are constructing a bridge, and 25 or 30 dead insurgents were found in the same vicinity, quite a number floating in the river. I think it a conservative estimate to say that they lost more than 250 small arms and nearly 100 killed. The engineers have rendered splendid service on this campaign. The detachment now consists of only 35 men. If it could be increased to 50 or 60, or even doubled, it would be very desirable. I have examined the town of San Fernando carefully and find it by far the most attractive town that we have yet taken, and not very much damaged by fire. The place was almost entirely deserted, but I have given encouragement to the people I have met and I think it likely many of the fugitives will return. Message in regard to gunboat very encouraging. If we can reach Guagua by water I feel sure we can get a fine line of communication to San Fernando, possibly bring cascoes up to the town itself. I will reconnoiter to Bacolor to-morrow or next day and toward Mexico later.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

The force that occupied San Fernando consisted of the remnants of 5 regiments of infantry, 5 field guns, 3 machine guns, and 2 troops of cavalry, representing an aggregate of something like 4,800 men, but on May 10 yielding only 2,640 infantry for duty on the firing line.

Since the opening of the campaign the entire command, when not engaged in the actual execution of strategical and tactical movements, has been in close contact with the enemy, and thereby subjected to almost nightly alarms and frequently recurring minor conflicts, and as

410 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

a consequence it has been necessary to maintain an extended order fighting formation at all times. The division camped in extended order, occupied towns in extended order, lived, marched, fought, and slept in extended order, with a view to sudden attack or defense at any time during the day or night. That is to say, the entire command has in effect, aside from the period of actual marching and fighting, been on outpost duty, without reserve, respite, or relief, for nearly 90 days. The effect of this prolonged strain, which is almost, if not quite, unexampled in field operations, is quite apparent, not only in a rapidly increasing sick list, but in the appearance of the men themselves.

The conclusion therefore arises naturally that, for prolonged field operations in this climate, a sufficient force must be maintained to afford frequent relief to troops at the front, otherwise the complete collapse of entire regiments may be expected to follow exposure and exertions such as have attended the operations of the movable column of this division since February 4, 1899.

As a consequence of close contact, outpost affairs have been of frequent occurrence, some of which have reached the proportions of combats, the incidents of which have been carefully preserved in accompanying subreports, but which, for the continuity of this narrative, are sufficiently described in the following telegraphic reports, made on the ground at the time of action:

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
San Fernando, May 24, 1899—1.45 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

About 3 a. m. this morning some 500 insurgents, possibly Mascardo's entire command, occupied their old line between here and Bacolor. I attacked both flanks simultaneously, two battalions on right, commanded by Major Whitman, and conducted by Major Bell as guide; two battalions Montana on left, conducted by Lieutenant Mead, of Bell's scouts, as guide, commanded by Colonel Wallace; 2 field guns and 2 machine guns, commanded by Captain Wedgwood; one battalion of each infantry regiment in reserve and the cavalry squadron in reserve. The result was a complete success. Our loss, 1 killed and 9 wounded; enemy's loss, 40 killed, by count, with probably more to hear from; wounded in our possession, 30 or more; prisoners, 25; rifles, 50. Complete details not yet at hand, but numbers increasing with every report. It was a splendid affair and gallantly executed and reflects the greatest possible credit on all concerned. The physical effort in passing rice fields filled with water was indescribably exhausting, so that I could not push pursuit to Santa Rita as I desired. I shall have Santa Rita reconnoitered to-morrow, and if Mascardo is still there I hope to finish his command so it will not trouble us again for some time.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
San Fernando, May 25, 1899—4.20 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC:

Final reports of to-day's fight show 50 dead Filipinos, 38 wounded (33 of whom are now on way to Manila, 5 in hospital here to be sent in in morning), 28 prisoners, all of whom I shall keep to bury their own dead and afterwards send in to Manila. Our own casualties, revised, show Lieutenant Parker, Kansas regiment, slightly wounded, 1 soldier killed, 1 mortally wounded, and 10 wounded. Names will be transmitted in course of an hour.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
San Fernando, May 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Manila:*

General Funston and Major Bell reconnoitered Santa Rita this morning with three companies, and the remnants of Mascardo's command vacated the place after a few

shots, but without any substantial resistance. I shall not undertake any further operations in that direction for the present. This afternoon an insurgent command of considerable strength appeared on my right. A collision resulted between South Dakota outpost and insurgents, which gradually involved all of that regiment, Iowa, Kansas, one battalion each of the Seventeenth and Twenty-second, the two latter in reserve. The result, 1 killed and 6 wounded, all in South Dakota. One dead officer and 20 dead insurgents are in our possession. One officer and 5 soldiers prisoners. No wounded fell into our hands. Captured officer says troops came from San Miguel de Mayumo and were going to Angeles; that one battalion was engaged, but that two more battalions were in the command.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

In the combat of the 24th of May a leather pouch was captured, which contained official papers belonging to Colonel Arce, the commanding officer of the insurgent troops engaged, from which it was discovered that for the time being an extensive series of minor operations was in contemplation, such as ambuscades, surprises, capture of detachments, and incessant harassing of the American lines.

The insurgent army seems to be specially instructed in respect of all duties involving stratagem and deception, as may be seen from the following extract from a letter of advice found among the papers of Colonel Arce, the original of which, together with English translation, is inclosed as an appendix to this report:

Col. RUPERTO ARCE:

* * * * *

You, as well as the chiefs and officers under your orders, will give military instructions to the soldiers, inculcating in them subordination and discipline, reading to them at least twice a day the penal laws, making them understand their duties as defenders of the country, and inflicting upon them the disciplinary punishments which they may deserve.

And, in order that the enemy may not be able to distinguish from a distance our soldiers when, for instance, a plan is being made to surprise or ambush him, make them dress as country people, not permitting all, including the officers, to wear uniforms.

In all movements you may make with the command you will always observe much prudence, employing every kind of artifice to defeat the plans of the enemy.

May God preserve you many years.

Headquarters at Porac, the 21st of May, 1899.

The General in Chief of Operations.

[SEAL.]

TOMAS MASCARDO.

The practice of discarding the uniform has enabled the insurgents to appear and disappear, almost at their convenience. At one time they appear in the ranks of their own army as soldiers; and immediately thereafter they may be, and frequently are, within the American lines in the attitude of peaceful natives. This peculiarity of the war has placed in the hands of the insurgent leaders a perfect system of espionage and spy service, in illustration of which the following incident is cited:

Some time after dark on the evening of May 22, orders issued from these headquarters for a squadron of cavalry at San Fernando to reconnoiter Santa Rita early the next morning. The order was verbal and communicated only to the necessary officers and the command concerned. Information of this movement, however, was in the hands of General Mascardo, at Porac, 10 miles distant, within a few hours; and shortly after midnight he had transmitted it to the proper commanding officer at Santa Rita for necessary action, by means of the follow-

ing note, the original of which, with translation, is inclosed as an appendix to this report:

Col. RUPERTO ARCE,
Santa Rita:

I am just informed reliably that our enemy intends to attack your town to-day with a force of 300 cavalry. I hope, therefore, that you, in your bravery and patriotism, will prepare a defense which shall give him exemplary chastisement.

Just now I am directing a communication to Major Jajard, so that, should he hear shots in the direction of your lines, he will go to lend you aid immediately and foil the plans of the enemy.

May God preserve you many years.
Headquarters at Porac, the 23d of May, 1899.
The general in chief of operations,
[SEAL.]

TOMAS MASCARDO.

As a matter of fact, the cavalry employed consisted of two troops of something less than 200 men, instead of 300, as stated by Mascardo to his subordinate; otherwise the information was correct. It is hardly necessary to state that the purpose of the reconnaissance was defeated.

The casualties for the month of May were as follows:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
Killed	1	5	6
Wounded	4	60	64
Total	5	65	70

The services of the artillery, under the skillful command of Maj. R. W. Young, have been of superlative importance throughout the operations described in this report. The efficiency of this arm has been conspicuously illustrated in every engagement, and the uniform success attending the tactical work of the division, must be largely ascribed thereto.

The duties of the engineer detachment have been both arduous and important, and have been executed with commendable intelligence and zeal. The quick restoration of the Bagbag railroad bridge, so as to make it passable for troops and wagons was, under the conditions, and in view of the meager facilities at command, a notable achievement, and reflects great credit upon Second Lieut. W. P. Wooten, Corps of Engineers the young engineer officer who devised the scheme and who supervised the work, and who, on a subsequent occasion at the bridge of Santo Tomas, accomplished another important improvisation in quickly repairing a broken span so that the bridge could be utilized for regular railroad service.

The splendid service of the Volunteer Signal Corps detachment, as set forth at some length in a former report, dated February 28, 1899, has been maintained at the high standard therein described, and all favorable remarks contained in that report are herewith renewed and emphasized.

Attention is respectfully invited to the accompanying report of the chief quartermaster of the division, with especial reference to remarks contained therein in connection with the employment of Chinese as litter bearers, and the organization of buffalo pack trains for campaigning during the rainy season.

The uniform experience of American armies in the field, in respect of details from the fighting personnel for detached duty, has been repeated during the present field work. Calls for men, for all kinds of miscellaneous duties, have multiplied with appalling rapidity, which, in the absence of a special corps, organized with this end in view, have been supplied by regiments in the field, with the effect that many of the most efficient men in the ranks have been removed from the fighting line.

A service corps, devoted exclusively to the performance of all non-combatant duties, is absolutely essential to the maintenance of the fighting strength of the army. American experience in this war and former wars confirms this view. Economy and efficiency corroborate each other in this behalf, and both urge careful and systematic consideration of this important subject.

The services of the Subistence Department have been very satisfactory, and are well described by the chief commissary of the division in report inclosed herewith.

The excellent service of the Medical Department, as previously reported, has been continued throughout the campaign. The chief surgeon, Maj. H. F. Hoyt, displayed skill and ingenuity in providing for the wounded, under the exceptional conditions which arose in consequence of the ambulances being unable to cross streams over which all the bridges had been destroyed, and the substitution therefor of hand cars, improvised into practical vehicles, for the conveyance of the wounded.

The chief surgeon, in his report for March, inclosed herewith, remarks, "that the employment for the first time, of the Chinese 'coolie,' as a litterbearer on the battlefield, by the American Army, has been a great success. To his brave and faithful service, from the firing line to the rear, is largely due the fact that very little delay occurred in getting wounded to the dressing station. From the nature of the country, this was often several miles in extent, where any sort of wheeled vehicle would have been impossible." These views are indorsed by all concerned, and as a consequence, the litter-bearing "coolie" is quite a favorite with the army.

The hospital treatment of the sick and wounded, has been excellent, as may be seen by reference to the reports of Major Mallory, inspector-general of the division, inclosed herewith, and dated March 17, and April 19, 1899.

The rapid advance of the division when in the actual solution of tactical problems almost entirely precluded the examination of the fields of conflict to determine the extent of punishment inflicted upon the adversary; but from ascertained data submitted by the most reliable officers, it may be assumed that the number of insurgents killed in all the contests since March 25 was probably not far from 1,000.

As in former instances, during the month of February, the insurgent wounded were, as a general rule, successfully removed, and also many of the killed; so that it is impossible to speak with any certainty in the premises, but probably the normal ratio of wounded to dead was maintained.

Of the military ardor of the American troops, it is impossible to speak too warmly. The entire personnel, including officers of all grades, and soldiers, fought and worked with unwearied constancy.



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of La Loma church; the First Montana Infantry (twelve companies) on the right of the Twentieth Kansas, and the Third U. S. Artillery (four batteries) on the left of that regiment.

The brigade advanced from its position in front of the church de la Loma at 6 o'clock a. m., March 25. The positions of the regiments taken up the night before were substantially at right angles to the Caloocan-Balintasig dirt road running northward, the First Montana to the right of that road and the Twentieth Kansas and the Third Artillery to the left, the latter regiment being entirely to the left of the ravine and in the intrenched position occupied by it since the action of February 10. The advance was made with two battalions each of the First Montana and the Twentieth Kansas on the firing line and one battalion of each regiment in support; one and one-half battalions of the Third Artillery on the firing line and half a battalion in support. The advance was made simultaneously, with some modifications of the prearranged plan, rendered necessary by features of the situation developing during the advance. Two parallel roads were passed during the first hour, and before 8 o'clock the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas regiments had passed the river Tuliahan, wading, and even swimming, the stream at points where the water was too deep to be fordable. The river was passed by the advance of these regiments under sharp fire from the enemy. The Third Artillery crossed the stream in the face of a blockhouse and intrenched fire from the insurgents posted on the north bank and sustained considerable losses, but inflicted severe damage on the enemy, driving his troops away from the river bank in confusion. In the advance of the Twentieth Kansas Company E encountered a similar fire from the enemy's intrenched position on the north bank. The men of the company, with those of other regiments, rushed into the stream, waded it under a severe fire, which resulted in the loss of 8 men in Company E. The rush was so sudden that the enemy were unable to escape and nearly the entire detachment, numbering 30 men, died where they fought, having been taken in both front and flank.

During the day's movements through the difficult country, interspersed as it was with thickets, timber belts, streams, and morasses, regiments and battalions of the brigade necessarily became somewhat separated, especially the First Montana, which was delayed so much that but one battalion succeeded in crossing the Tuliahan River early in the day. Later, and just before night, another battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, crossed, while the remaining battalion, under Colonel Kessler, had swerved to the right so much that, by direction of the division commander, it was temporarily detached and operated with the Second Brigade during the latter portion of the day. It crossed to the north bank of the Tuliahan before dark. The day's casualties of the brigade were reported at 68.

The advance was again resumed at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 27th, and the troops passed through Meycauayan, which had been fired by the enemy. The Marilao River was reached at 12 o'clock. Colonel Funston, of the Twentieth Kansas, had a sharp fight on the left, along the south bank of an arm of this river. He drove the enemy from their intrenched positions on the north bank, capturing a number of prisoners and arms by crossing a small detachment to an island, which was later withdrawn, when it was discovered that he had not struck the main stream. Later in the afternoon his regiment was ordered to the right, with instructions to cross the main stream.

The Second Brigade had already crossed higher up, at the railroad bridge; also the Third U. S. Artillery, of the First Brigade, which had been heavily engaged during the afternoon, sustaining 18 casualties. The First Montana, which had been marching during the day in the rear on the dirt road in column of fours, was ordered up late in the afternoon to furnish details for bridge building. This regiment encamped for the night on the south bank of the Marilao. It sustained 4 casualties while getting in position near the bridge.

The division remained in bivouac during the day of the 28th on the north bank of the Marilao in order to resupply with rations and ammunition.

On March 29 the rivers Bocaue and Bigaa were passed. The troops marched across on the railroad bridge and flanked the town of Bulacan, lying to the westward near the bay, reaching the river Guiguinto in the evening. The Twentieth Kansas, of the First Brigade, and the Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Second Brigade, crossed the river at the railroad bridge. The Third Artillery and the First Montana bivouacked on the south bank. A severe engagement was fought just before dark on the north bank, the insurgents being driven off, with a loss of 29 in the Kansas regiment. The First Montana Regiment sustained 7 casualties while the regiment marched in the rear on the dirt road.

On the afternoon of March 30 the troops marched from Guiguinto station to the rebel trenches, a couple of miles from Malolos, meeting a small party of the enemy

intrenched across the railroad, who suddenly opened with rifle fire upon a small group who had collected upon the railroad track during a temporary halt of the line. A company from the Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Second Brigade, advancing on the right of the railroad track, and a company of the Twentieth Kansas abreast of it on the left of the track, were ordered forward to drive out the enemy and occupy the trenches. The enemy was quickly driven off, without loss on either side, so far as could be discovered. The brigade bivouacked at that point, the formation of the line being substantially as on previous days.

On the morning of March 31 the advance was taken up directly against Malolos, the brigade advancing in substantially the same relative order as on previous days, its right (the Twentieth Kansas) touching the railway line; the First Montana next to the left; the Third Artillery on the extreme left; the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana regiments, with two battalions each on the firing line and one battalion in support; the Third Artillery, with a battalion and a half on the firing line and half a battalion in support. The advance was slow on account of the difficult character of the country, being full of swamps, lagoons, and bamboo thickets, necessitating frequent changes from marching to the front in line of battle to flank movements toward the right, followed by successive deployments again into line of skirmishers to the left, after having passed the numerous obstacles encountered. The advance continued against the town until the second battalion of the First Montana (Major Cook) had reached a point within 150 or 200 yards of the outskirts of the town on the southerly and westerly sides. Here it was halted and Major Miller's battalion ordered to its near support. At this juncture instructions were given by the division commander to enter the town. Accordingly the order was transmitted to one battalion of the First Montana, under command of Major Cook, and at the same time that the Third Battalion (Major Miller) should follow in close support.

The remaining battalion of the First Montana, under command of Colonel Kessler, entered in a few minutes, followed closely by the Third U. S. Artillery, which had a long and difficult march in closing to the right from the extreme left, which it had formed in the advance.

Colonel Funston, with the Twentieth Kansas, entered at about the same time, coming in at a point near the railroad which had been his right guide during the advance. At 10 a. m. the whole brigade was at the public square.

The division commander then directed that the brigade be marched through the town to the railway track a half mile north and west of the city limits, there to take possession of the line extending from the railway to the left and at right angles, substantially, to the track, the Third Artillery on the extreme left, as before, with one battalion from each regiment deployed 500 yards in front to constitute a strong outpost line. These movements were perfected as soon as possible, the order being subsequently changed, however, so as to leave one battalion of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment available for patrol duty on the Bulacan road to the left and rear.

Since March 25 the brigade has sustained 139 casualties; 7 officers and 116 men being wounded and 17 men killed.

Very respectfully,


PHIL. W. RUSSELL,
Second Lieutenant, First Nebraska, U. S. V., and
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX 3.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Pursuant to the orders of Major-General MacArthur, I moved my brigade out of Malolos on the morning of April 24, with the intention of attacking the enemy on the north bank of the river Bagbag, but the brigade of General Hale, with which it was desired I should cooperate, not having advanced from the direction of Quinga on Calumpit sufficiently to attack at that point that day, I was directed by Major-General MacArthur to hold my brigade in the vicinity of the railroad at Baraosin until Hale had fought his way to the vicinity of a ford across the Quinga, not far from the river Calumpit. About 8.30 a. m. on the morning of the 25th of April, by the direction of the division commander, I marched on the enemy's position, moving the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry on the left of the railroad and the First Montana on the right. The battalion of the Third U. S. Artillery, Major Kobbé, was



left at Malolos and Baraosin to guard the line of road. I directed the armored train to follow up the track after the brigade was well on the march.

Our movements being well screened from the enemy by extensive lines of bamboo jungle, I moved both regiments of infantry into a well-protected position about 1,200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments along the Bagbag. The armored train having reached at this time a point on the road near the infantry, I directed that fire be opened from the rifled 6-pounder and the 3 machine guns on the train, and at this minute Hale's artillery to our front and right across the Quinga opened fire and the guns of the Utah Artillery on our right commenced firing.

Soon after I moved the armored train to the front and advanced several companies of infantry from both regiments to seize all places near the river from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy's intrenchments. The converging fire of the two brigades of the division and the artillery now began to shake the enemy. Colonel Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, with Lieut C. M. Warner, First Sergt. Raymond E. Enston, and Sergt. C. P. Barshfield, Company K, Twentieth Kansas, endeavored to rush across the railroad bridge. A span of the bridge being broken, Colonel Funston, Lieutenant Pall, and Sergeants Enston and Barshfield swam the river and drove the enemy out of the intrenchments near the bridge. At the same time Hale's infantry on our right forded the Calumpit to our front and right, turned the enemy out of his intrenchments near the bridge along the Calumpit, and pursued him to the vicinity of the Rio Grande, near the town of Calumpit, which the enemy burned. The two regiments of my brigade bivouacked near the Bagbag.

April 26 the enemy was in force on the north bank of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, a broad and deep river. He was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications and had near the railroad bridge 3 pieces of artillery and 1 rapid-fire Maxim. The important strategic position of Calumpit would be untenable until he was driven off. I was directed by Major-General MacArthur to do this, my force to be the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana Volunteer Infantry, 5 guns Utah Light Artillery and 3 machine guns. It was effected in thirty-six hours, as follows:

I advanced the infantry in deployed lines, in the extended order, from the Bagbag to an intrenched position about 600 yards from the Rio Grande, which position had been abandoned by the enemy, placing the Twentieth Kansas on the left of the railroad and the First Montana on the right. The main body now being screened from the enemy's fire, detachments and small parties of skirmishers were advanced and seized all sheltered places near the river and within long rifle range of the railroad bridge; two brick and stone buildings near the river were seized and loopholed for musketry; the machine guns and part of the artillery placed in position for fire upon the enemy's intrenchments; the river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the purpose of ascertaining any place possible to cross; a constant and continued fire of sharpshooters was kept up and a slow but continued fire from the 3.2-inch guns during the 26th. On the night of the 26th the railroad bridge was found to be in such condition that to rush it with men carrying arms would be impracticable. A reconnoissance at night by Colonel Funston made it apparent that the enemy was intrenched in force at all points for a considerable distance down the river. The morning of the 27th I had a 3.2-inch gun brought to the brick house near the bridge and opened fire at short range upon the enemy's works. Upon consultation with Colonel Funston a point about 900 yards below the railroad bridge was selected as the place that he would endeavor to cross a part of his regiment. The enemy's intrenchments opposite this point were well screened by bamboo thickets, but I directed a fire from the brick house near the bridge to be kept up from the 3.2-inch gun and by two companies of infantry. Colonel Funston also advanced to the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire of great volume. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive part of the enemy's force from his works and Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly, of Company B, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, swam the river with a rope and fastened it to a stake on the enemy's intrenchments while yet occupied. Rafts were pulled over by means of this rope, Colonel Funston going over on the first raft. Our artillery had during this time kept up a heavy fire from positions selected by Maj. Richard Young, Utah Light Artillery. Under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, First Montana Volunteer Infantry, a heavy and continuous fire was directed upon the enemy near the railroad bridge, the machine guns also being directed toward the same place. When Colonel Funston had crossed 45 officers and men he attacked the enemy, turning him out of his works near the bridge. I then crossed the bridge with my staff, followed by the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana Volunteer Infantry as fast as they could pass over such framework as the enemy had not

destroyed. Upon reaching the north bank two bodies of the enemy, each about 1,500 strong, were observed, one about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to our left, which had evidently been guarding the river below. They moved in a deploy line—extended order—and advanced upon us, but after being subjected to fire about twenty minutes they fell back in confusion and retreated out of range. The other body was in front and along the railroad. I deployed the Twentieth Kansas on the left of the railroad and the First Montana on the right and drove them beyond Apolit station in the direction of St. Thomas; the whole force of the enemy disappearing in that direction, the nature of the country being such that they were compelled to march along the embankment. I estimated the whole force visible at 4,000.

The night of the 27th the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana bivouacked in the town north of the railroad bridge. The next morning 2 commissioned officers came in from the rebels under a flag of truce and asked for an armistice, saying they "wished to acknowledge the valor of the American soldier." They were sent to the division commander.

I respectfully invite attention to the gallant conduct of Col. Frederick Funston, now brigadier-general, U. S. V., during these operations; also the very efficient services and meritorious conduct of Lieut. Col. Robert B. Wallace, commanding First Montana Volunteer Infantry, and of Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, for the courage and skill with which he directed the operations of his guns. The extraordinary and most gallant conduct of Private Edward White, Company B, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, and that of W. B. Trembly, same company and regiment, in swimming the Rio Grande in face of the enemy's fire and fastening a rope to a stake in his occupied works is worthy of high commendation and reward. The conduct of Lieut. C. H. Ball and of Sergeants Enston and Barshfield and Corpl. A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, in swimming the Bagbag with Colonel Funston under the fire of the enemy is worthy of regard and of great praise.

I am indebted for efficient assistance to Maj. G. F. Shiels, brigade surgeon of Volunteers; to Capt. Henry C. Cabell, Third U. S. Infantry; to First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, and to Second Lieut. A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Heavy Artillery.

Lieut. Philip P. Russell, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, assistant adjutant-general, rendered gallant and efficient service during these operations.

Lists of killed and wounded have heretofore been forwarded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX No. 4.

HQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: The morning of the 4th instant, in compliance with instructions of Major-General MacArthur, I advanced from the vicinity of Calumpit to attack the enemy in position near St. Thomas. My force consisted of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry and First Montana Volunteer Infantry, with 2 machine guns in small cars pushed by hand. My march was directed along the railroad track, while that of Brigadier-General Hale with his brigade and the artillery was directed along the wagon road, a mile or 2 miles upon my right. The country along each side of the railroad embankment was found to be cut up with tidewater channels or "esteros," and marshy ground was so continuous that all the command kept on the railroad. Upon approaching St. Thomas, about 5 miles from Calumpit, the enemy was found intrenched upon the north bank of a considerable river, deep and unfordable, and the bridge broken down. Hale upon my right became engaged in a spirited combat with the enemy, and I opened upon his intrenchments with both my Gatling gun and Hotchkiss revolving cannon. Three companies of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry were advanced and seized all points from which an effective fire might be opened upon the intrenchments to the right of the railroad bridge and 1 company First Montana was deployed to the left. A fire was also kept up from points along the embankment upon the enemy's works near St. Thomas. After some time, Hale

continuing to advance on the right and our fire increasing in intensity, the enemy set fire to St. Thomas and soon after was driven from his intrenchments near the bridge. I went over the bridge with the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, and a heavy fire was opened on the enemy as he evacuated the intrenchments on our left and fled beyond St. Thomas. The Twentieth Kansas was then advanced to the railroad station a half mile or more north of the bridge and at once became engaged with a large force of the enemy occupying two lines of intrenchments. With my staff I immediately proceeded to the place of combat, and taking 5 companies of the Twentieth Kansas in person led a charge upon the enemy's intrenchments, which were all carried, and he fled in the direction of San Fernando. Colonel Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, was wounded at this time. Captain Cabell, Third U. S. Infantry; First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp; Lieut. Philip P. Russell, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general; and Lieut. Edward S. Kimmel, Third U. S. Artillery, acting assistant quartermaster, all of my staff, accompanied me in this charge. On the 5th instant we occupied San Fernando, the enemy having burned the public buildings and fled on the night of the 4th. Lists of killed and wounded have heretofore been forwarded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 5.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., June 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of May 24, in which the two regiments of my brigade, assisted by two field pieces and a Hotchkiss gun of the Utah Light Artillery, drove the enemy from an intrenched position between San Fernando and Bacolor.

The outpost of the First Montana on the Bacolor road had been sending out a small patrol at 6 o'clock each morning for the purpose of ascertaining whether the enemy had occupied the deep dry ditch which crosses the San Fernando-Bacolor road at right angles 1,700 yards from our outpost. When the patrol was about halfway to the ditch on the morning of May 24 it was heavily fired on and retired to the outpost. It was at once evident that the enemy had occupied the ditch in considerable force and that it would be necessary to dislodge him. I at once ordered both regiments of the brigade under arms and notified the division commander, who, with his staff, repaired to the front where the line of outposts crosses the Bacolor road.

As a direct attack on the enemy's position would result in unnecessary loss, it was determined to flank him out of both ends of the ditch, which was about a mile long.

Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace, with two battalions of the First Montana Volunteer Infantry, was instructed to attack the right flank, and Maj. F. H. Whitman, with two battalions of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, the left flank of the enemy. One battalion of each regiment was held in support under Colonel Kessler, of the First Montana. Colonel Metcalf, of the Twentieth Kansas, still being on crutches from his wound, was unable to take active part in the fight.

Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. V., of the division staff, being thoroughly familiar with the ground, conducted the battalions of the Twentieth Kansas into position, and did it so well that they were not discovered until they had approached within 200 yards of the enemy's left flank. The Kansas regiment on being discovered made as rapid an advance as the densely tangled growing rice allowed, and poured in an extremely effective fire before which the enemy broke in disorder and fled, leaving 48 killed, 28 severely wounded, and 25 uninjured prisoners.

Within a few moments after Majors Bell and Whitman had attacked the enemy's left flank, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace vigorously attacked his right, having gotten into position without being discovered. The enemy fled here, also, leaving 5 killed in our hands.

In the meantime the detachment of Utah Light Artillery, under Captain Wedgwood, had been vigorously shelling the enemy's center, adding materially to his loss and discomfiture.

One battalion of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment followed the enemy into Bacolor, but a further pursuit was considered useless, and by noon the brigade had returned quarters.

420 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

The casualties of the brigade were as follows: Twentieth Kansas: Killed, 2 enlisted men; wounded, 1 officer (Second Lieut. R. S. Parker) and 5 enlisted men. First Montana: Wounded, 4 enlisted men.

I wish to call especial attention to the gallantry of the medical officers: Maj. F. J. Adams, of the First Montana, and Capts. C. H. Huffman and H. D. Smith, of the Twentieth Kansas, all of whom accompanied the firing line and cared for the wounded under fire.

Respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH KANSAS INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., June 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT GENERAL,

First Brigade, Second Div., Department of Pac. and Eighth Army Corps:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations participated in by the Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V., since May 23, 1899:

Early on the morning of May 24, the Montana outpost near the Bacolor Road was fired upon by the insurgents, who had come down in force during the night into the large waterway some 1,700 yards in front of the outpost. At 8.30 a. m. the Kansas regiment was put under arms, Companies C, D, and H, of the Third Battalion under Major Bishop were sheltered near the Montana outpost as support, Company I of this battalion being on outpost on the Kansas line. The Second Battalion, Companies E, G, K, and M, under Captain Boltwood, and Companies A, B, and L, of the First Battalion (Company F being on outpost), under Capt. G. N. Watson, all under command of Major Whitman, moved out from San Fernando in a westerly direction toward the north end of the waterway occupied by the insurgents, who had not discovered our approach until our line was within about 150 yards of them. The insurgents immediately opened a brisk fire, which was replied to by our companies as fast as they arrived in position. Companies A, B, and L, having passed beyond the insurgent left, the entire line moved by the left flank, overlapping and flanking the insurgent position. Our line then moved toward the Bacolor road, driving the insurgents across the rice fields toward the town of Bacolor and also toward the Bacolor road. The Second Battalion halted on the Bacolor road. The three companies of the First Battalion under Captain Watson, changing direction to the right, followed the insurgents into and through Bacolor. The engagement lasted about two hours. Our casualties were 8 (2 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 5 enlisted men wounded). Forty-eight insurgent dead were buried and 28 wounded brought in with some 25 uninjured prisoners. In this engagement all the officers and men of the regiment acted with gallantry. The medical officers, Captains Smith and Huffman, with the Hospital-Corps men, were especially gallant and diligent, in several instances caring for the wounded under heavy fire. On account of the impaired physical condition a number of the regiment fell out, overcome by heat or fatigue.

On the morning of May 25, Major Bishop, with Companies H, D, and a part of I, accompanied General Funston on a reconnoissance through Bacolor to Santa Rita. The insurgents withdrew from Bacolor in front of the party, and after a slight skirmish withdrew also from Santa Rita. No casualties.

On the afternoon of May 25 the South Dakota outpost was attacked in force. The attack developed toward the Kansas outpost; the Kansas regiment was put under arms and moved to the north in the sunken roadway leading to the Kansas outpost. The insurgent fire began before the column reached the outpost line. The regiment was at once deployed and moved toward the insurgent position. The First Battalion was halted at the first timber and the Second and Third Battalions continued the advance to the north for about a mile, when they moved by the right flank to the railroad and returned to camp. The firing lasted about ten or fifteen minutes; four enlisted men were hit, but so slightly as not to amount to a casualty. Three insurgent dead were found.

About daylight on the morning of May 26 Company L, on outpost, was fired upon heavily, and Captain Martin, with Companies F and B, was sent to reenforce the outpost. The insurgent fire for a few minutes was very heavy and included, for a few seconds only, the use of a rapid-fire gun. The Kansas line replied to the fire with a few volleys and the insurgents soon retired. No casualties.

Respectfully,

WILDER S. METCALF,
Colonel Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 6.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH KANSAS INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Malolos, P. I., April 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Malolos, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part played by this regiment in the operations beginning with the advance from the trenches on the north side of Manila on March 25 and ending with the capture of Malolos on the 31st of the same month.

Since February 11 the regiment had been occupying the trenches on the north side of Caloocan, subject from time to time to desultory fire from the enemy intrenched on its left flank and front, but on March 24 orders were received to take position near La Loma church, about a mile and a half southeast of Caloocan. The regiment left Caloocan just after nightfall, its place being taken by the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and marched to La Loma, where it bivouacked for the night and before daybreak was in position for the proposed advance, its left resting on Third Artillery and its right on the First Montana Volunteer Infantry. The Second and Third battalions, commanded by Majrs. F. H. Whitman and Wilder S. Metcalf, constituted the regiment's firing line, while the First Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Little, had orders to remain stationary until the fighting line had advanced 500 yards and then follow at that distance as a reserve.

At 6.30 a. m., Hale's brigade having already begun to advance, we moved forward in conjunction with the First Montana and Third Artillery. The ground for 1,500 yards was perfectly level and open, and beyond that distance more wooded and broken.

From the first we were subject to a moderate and not very well directed fire from the enemy intrenched in the margin of the woods, but did not reply until we were halfway across the open, when we commenced firing by volleys, still continuing to advance.

The greater part of the enemy fled as soon as we opened fire, but a few of the more courageous stood until we were within a hundred yards before they fled, several dead and badly wounded and a few arms being abandoned. We also took 2 insurgent prisoners. I personally saw 7 killed and 4 wounded, and ordered 9 Remington rifles destroyed, there being no means of transporting them. The regiment was now in a partially wooded and quite broken country, and continued the advance, meeting with feeble resistance for the next half mile. On approaching the Tuliahan River, however, we were subject to a severe fire from the enemy intrenched at several points on the opposite bank. Reaching the south bank of the stream, which was about 40 feet wide and nearly 5 feet deep, it became evident that we must force the passage at once or suffer heavy loss. Accordingly I directed three companies to concentrate their fire on the opposite bank at a point where about 60 of the enemy were sheltering themselves behind dikes and intrenchments, and ordered a few men near me to attempt to ford the river. Without a moment's hesitation Capt. William J. Watson, of Company E, with about a dozen men, plunged into the river directly in front of the enemy, and although the water was armpit deep succeeded in reaching the opposite bank and flanking the enemy out of their position. All who had not been killed or disabled fled, and the regiment crossed the river and deployed on the right of the Third Artillery, which, after a desperate fight, had forced another passage about 400 yards down the stream.

In the trenches and behind the dikes where we forced the passage, we found 24 of the enemy—including 1 first lieutenant—killed and 5 very badly wounded. We also recovered 29 Remington rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition, all of which we threw into the river, first breaking the stocks off from the former. The regiment was in its new position across the river by 8.30 a. m., two hours after leaving La Loma church. Our loss in the morning's fighting was 3 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded, and 1 officer (Capt. A. G. Clarke, of Company H) and 12 enlisted men wounded.

We remained on the north bank of the river all day, and the next morning, the 26th, received orders to move by the right flank for half a mile in order to bring our right onto the left of the Tenth Pennsylvania. The Third U. S. Artillery was on our left, and when the division moved by the left flank in column of fours along the road toward Malinta we did not play an important part, having only two companies on the firing line. Our loss was 1 enlisted man killed.

Reaching Polo, we, along with the remainder of the brigade, remained in reserve while the Second Brigade was engaged with the enemy. Before night the regiment

went into camp in the center of the brigade at right angles with the railroad in rear of the Second Brigade.

The next morning, the 27th, the division marched to Meycauayan, this regiment acting as reserve for the Third U. S. Artillery, which constituted the firing line of the brigade. At Meycauayan there was a delay of four hours, and we left the place at noon with instructions to march up the road in column of fours, keeping 500 yards behind the supports of the Third Artillery. We heard the sound of firing on our front just after leaving Meycauayan, the Third Artillery having encountered the enemy, and shortly after became subject to a fire from the enemy intrenched on our left flank across the Marilao River. It became necessary to deal with the situation at once, and I accordingly ordered Major Metcalf to deploy Companies H and I of his battalion and advance to the river bank. This move was most gallantly executed, the two companies advancing to the river bank by alternate rushes. Arriving at the river the men sheltered themselves as well as they could behind dikes and kept up a terrific fire on the enemy intrenched on the opposite side, distant about 80 yards. In about ten minutes the field pieces, under Major Young, and the Colt's automatic gun, under Lieutenant Davis, U. S. N., came up and took position on our right directly opposite the most formidable intrenchment of the enemy and opened fire. Company D of my regiment supported the artillery, while Company C was deployed between I and H.

The river was about 10 feet deep, and the only practicable method for crossing it was to obtain possession of one of several rafts moored on the other bank within a few rods of the enemy's intrenchments. Not being willing to order men to undertake such a hazardous enterprise, I called for volunteers, and a number offered themselves, from whom I selected Second Lieut. E. J. Hardy, of Company H, Chief Trumpeter Barshfield, and Corporal Drysdale, and Privates Huntsman and Willey, of Company H. Disrobing and leaving their arms behind, they plunged into the stream and swam to a bamboo raft on the opposite side, which, after much difficulty, they succeeded in shoving to the south side of the river. During this time we kept the enemy down by sweeping the top of their trenches with such a constant fire that it was impossible for them to prevent the moving of the raft. Once getting the raft on our side of the river, I got on board, with Second Lieutenant Hopkins and 21 men of Company C, and crossed to the other side, getting in rear of enemy. The most of them had fled, but we got 22 uninjured prisoners and found 12 disabled by very severe wounds. There were also in the trenches 24 killed.

We destroyed and threw into the river 31 Remington rifles and about 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Our loss in this affair was 2 enlisted men killed and 1 mortally wounded.

After an hour spent on the north side of the river, I recrossed at 4 p. m., and the regiment resumed its march to the north, reaching the railroad bridge across the Marilao River in half an hour. A part of the division was already across and deployed to meet a threatened attack. Acting under orders received from the adjutant-general of the division, I hastened the regiment across and deployed the First and Second battalions on the left of the Third Artillery, holding the Third Battalion in reserve. The attack came before we had finished deploying, the enemy directing a furious fire from behind natural cover, distant about 1,000 yards. After half an hour they withdrew. The regiment's loss was 2 enlisted men killed and 3 wounded.

We remained encamped in this place until the morning of the 29th, when we advanced up the railroad with the remainder of the division. The First and Second battalions were on the fighting line, the Third in support, 500 yards behind. Our right was on the railroad guiding on the left of the Tenth Pennsylvania just across the track, while on the left was the First Montana. At the first river north of the Marilao we encountered a brisk fire from the enemy intrenched on the opposite bank. The advancing troops replied with spirit, but did not check their advance. When we reached the railroad bridge the enemy fled up the track in disorder toward Bocaue. The regiment crossed on the railroad bridge and deployed. Our loss in this affair was Maj. Wilder S. Metcalf and 6 enlisted men wounded.

At 11.30 a. m. the regiment marched with the remainder of the division to Bigaa, meeting with no opposition, and after a rest of a couple of hours resumed the march to Guiginto, where we found the enemy's trenches deserted and the town and railroad bridge burning. The fire on the railroad bridge was extinguished by Company B carrying water from the river in jars and pots taken from the houses. The fire having been extinguished, the regiment, along with the regiments of the Second Brigade and 2 field guns, crossed the river and deployed. While crossing, the enemy opened a hot and effective fire of Mausers from the woods on our front. The First and Second battalions of the regiment were on the fighting line, the Third in support. We



COMPANY E, TWENTIETH KANSAS REGIMENT, CROSSING TULIAHAN RIVER UNDER FIRE,
MARCH 25, 1899.





FIRING LINE OF TWENTIETH KANSAS REGIMENT JUST BEFORE SURRENDER OF ENEMY



TWENTIETH KANSAS REGIMENT ENTERING MALOLOS MARCH 31 1899



TWENTIETH KANSAS REGIMENT IN ACTION AT BIGAA

answered the enemy's fire vigorously, advancing by alternate rushes for 500 yards. After more than 20 minutes the enemy withdrew. The regiment's loss was 3 enlisted men killed and 1 officer (Capt. William J. Watson, of Company E) and 18 enlisted men wounded. Before dark our lines were contracted and all preparations made for defense, but no attack was made.

The next afternoon, March 30, the entire division advanced a mile and a half, the Twentieth Kansas being on the left-hand or west side of the railroad, with two battalions on the fighting line and one in support. Strong intrenchments of the enemy were found deserted. When the division bivouacked for the night the right of the regiment occupied one of these trenches.

When the advance was resumed on the morning of the 31st the regiment occupied the same relative position in the brigade and was disposed as on the preceding day, the right resting on the railroad during the entire advance.

The first trenches reached were found deserted, the occupants having fled during the shelling of their position by the field battery.

An extensive trench near the railroad, less than a quarter of a mile from the suburbs of Malolos, was found deserted, and here the regiment, in common with the whole division, halted.

I received orders from the division commander to send a small reconnoitering party into the town, and accordingly took Second Lieut. Collin H. Ball and two squads from Company E, and taking charge of these in person advanced cautiously up one of the principal streets. We found the convent occupied by Aguinaldo as a residence in flames, and were fired on by about a dozen men behind a street barricade of stones. My detachment returned the fire with two volleys and charged, the enemy seeking safety in flight, and we entered the plaza, being the first American troops in the enemy's capital. We were immediately followed by 2 guns under Major Young, and shortly afterwards by several companies of the First Montana. In the meantime the regiment had been advanced along the railroad and was in the city about fifteen minutes after the detachment from Company E occupied the square. One man of the command was slightly wounded during the day.

During the arduous seven days' campaign ending with the fall of Malolos there were several cases of unusual daring and splendid conduct under fire, especially in forcing the passages of the Tuliahan and Marilao rivers, and these I expect to make the subject of an official report later. Throughout the campaign the conduct of officers and men was all that could be asked. There may have been a few cases of flinching or shirking, but they have not come to my notice. The conduct of the enlisted men of the regiment in the various towns that we have occupied has been an especial source of gratification to me.

Very respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON,
Colonel Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.

APPENDIX 7.

MANILA, P. I., May 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part played by the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry from April 25, the day of the advance northward from Malolos, until to-day, when I gave up command of the regiment, being wounded.

At the time of the advance the regiment had for duty 870 enlisted men. There were present but two field officers, Major Whitman and myself, Lieutenant-Colonel Little being ill in Manila and Major Metcalf being in the hospital wounded. At 9 a. m. April 25, in accordance with orders received from the brigade commander, the regiment moved in column north along the road which runs parallel with the railway and on its west side. After a march of about 2 miles, which brought us within 800 yards of the enemy's intrenchments at the farther end of the railway bridge across the Bagbag River, we halted in a ravine. The First Montana Regiment was across the railroad track on our right, while on the track was the armored train, with machine guns and a naval 6-pounder.

After a heavy preliminary bombardment of the trenches by the armored train, Company K, of the Twentieth Kansas, under Capt. Edmund Boltwood, deployed and advanced rapidly across the open field toward the bridge. The company was exceedingly well handled by Captain Boltwood, who sheltered his men as well as possible

when he had reached the river bank and engaged in a hot fight with the enemy, who were strongly intrenched on the opposite side, scarcely 70 yards distant.

I had advanced with Company K, and saw that the farther span of the railway bridge had been let down to the water, a distance of about 12 feet. After a furious fight of about ten minutes the enemy's fire began to slacken and some of them were seen to be running. Second Lieut. Collin H. Ball, with a small detachment from Company E, had just reported from a short exploring tour along the river bank, and when I called for volunteers to join me in a rush on the bridge, these men, with Sergt. Maj. (now Second Lieut.) Cassius M. Warner, Acting Chief Trumpeter Sergt. C. P. Barshfield, and First Sergt. Raymond S. Enston of Company K, responded. We found all the ties and rails gone from the bridge, with nothing remaining to walk on except a few steel stringers about 4 inches wide. Company K covered us well with their fire while we were working our way slowly along the dismantled bridge. The enemy fired some shots at us until we were halfway across. Reaching the broken-out span, Lieutenant Ball, Sergeants Enslow and Barshfield, Corpl. A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, and myself descended to the river on the ironwork of the bridge and swam the remaining distance to the bank. The few of the enemy who had remained fled as soon as we had reached the bank within a few yards of their trenches. The first one of our party to reach the opposite bank was Lieutenant Ball. I wish to call special attention to signal gallantry of this officer, as well as of the above-named enlisted men, who volunteered for this extra hazardous piece of work and carried it through to a successful conclusion.

The regiment's loss in this affair was 3 enlisted men wounded, all members of Company K.

The regiment, in common with the remainder of the brigade, camped for the night on the south bank of the river. The next morning, a footbridge having been made over the broken bridge, the regiment crossed the Bagbag. Two battalions were deployed on the left-hand side of the track, the third coming up in support 500 yards in rear of the firing line. The First Montana Regiment was on the opposite side of the track and the two regiments moved forward together. Elaborate intrenchments of the enemy were found deserted, and after an advance of about 2 miles the regiment occupied a part of the town of Calumpit, on the north bank of the Rio Grande de Pampanga, one of the largest streams on Luzon Island. The First Montana occupied a corresponding place on the opposite side of the railway. Company I, of the Twentieth Kansas, was placed in a brick warehouse within 80 yards of the end of the bridge, and had a good view of the enemy's intrenchments on the opposite bank. Our men loopholed the walls and kept up an almost incessant fire on such of the trenches as were exposed.

The enemy had several small guns and discharged about 20 shells at this building, but without scoring a hit.

When darkness came I asked Corpl. A. M. Ferguson, of Company E, who has been previously mentioned in this report and who has on numerous occasions shown himself to be a fearless and reliable man, if he were willing to attempt a reconnoissance of the railroad bridge, telling him that the work was so hazardous that I would not order him to undertake it. He consented to go at once. Under cover of darkness, Captain Flanders, of Company I, and myself accompanied him to the end of the bridge. Ferguson took off his shoes and, armed only with a revolver, crawled along through the network of iron braces underneath where the floor had been, and then inch by inch worked his way, hand over hand, until he was underneath the insurgent outpost, stationed on the other end of the bridge, and returned with a complete description of the condition of the bridge, which was afterwards verified in every particular. He was gone two hours. A single misstep would have meant a fall of 40 feet into the river, while the chances were greatly in favor of discovery by the enemy, which would have meant certain death or capture. I can not too strongly recommend this gallant soldier for the medal of honor. His action was purely voluntary and of greatest possible danger. He reported that all of the ties, rails, and planks were gone from the bridge, and at its farther end all but one of the steel girders. This utterly precluded a plan that I had for carrying the bridge by assault.

During the night I took a force of 120 men a mile down the river with the intention of attempting a crossing by means of rafts, but we were discovered and fired upon and so returned to camp at 1 o'clock in the morning.

The next day, the 27th, at noon, I determined to make an attempt to force a passage about 600 yards below the railroad bridge.

A hundred picked riflemen were posted, with instructions to cover the enemy's trenches on the opposite bank, so that they would not be able to interfere with our operations. A raft, which the enemy had unsuccessfully attempted to burn, was moored on our side of the river. A rope 300 feet long had been obtained, and it was

necessary to get this fastened on the opposite bank before the operations could proceed further. A dozen men volunteered to swim the river, although they would be under fire. From these men I selected Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly, of Company B. These men, naked and unarmed, swam the river with the end of the rope, although fired on repeatedly, and landed within 20 feet of a small work containing several of the enemy, who did not run out until the men actually crawled up on all fours and tied the rope to one of the uprights of the trench, whereupon 3 armed Filipinos ran out, but we could not hit them for fear of killing our own 2 men. I got on the raft with 8 men and we hauled ourselves over by hand. The raft was at once returned and made several trips. As soon as I had with me 3 officers, Capt. H. B. Orwig and Lieuts. J. R. Whisner and S. C. Hopkins, and 41 enlisted men, I attacked the enemy's strong intrenchments at the end of the bridge in flank. After a sharp fight, in which the enemy turned a Maxim gun on us, they fled in disorder, abandoning the most elaborate fortifications I have seen in this war, with a rifled bronze howitzer, numerous Mauser and Remington rifles, and thousands of rounds of ammunition, which were found scattered everywhere.

As soon as I was able to reach the end of the bridge, I found that the brigade commander, General Wheaton, with his staff, were already across and were bringing over the troop.

An advance by a considerable force of the enemy a short time afterwards was easily repulsed, and the regiment went into camp in the town of Apalit.

In closing the account of the strange events of this memorable day I wish to bear testimony to the gallant conduct of all the officers and men of my regiment. I earnestly recommend that the two men, White and Trembly, be granted the medal of honor.

I also wish to acknowledge the splendid support given the flanking movement by the artillery under Maj. R. W. Young.

The regiment's losses during the day were 2 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 5 enlisted men wounded.

The regiment remained at Apalit until the morning of May 4, when, with the remainder of the brigade, it advanced up the railroad to San Tomas, meeting considerable resistance at a dismantled bridge near the town. In the evening, four companies of the regiment had a hot fight at San Tomas railway station with a force of the enemy, who were dispersed by a charge led by the brigade commander in person. Our loss during the day was 1 officer (Second Lieut. W. A. MacTaggart) and 1 private killed and 2 officers (Capt. W. S. Albright and myself) and 8 enlisted men wounded.

Being wounded, I returned to Manila, leaving the regiment in charge of Maj. F. H. Whitman.

Very respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON, *Colonel.*

APPENDIX 8.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MONTANA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., June 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movement and actions in which the First Montana Regiment participated from March 24 to March 31:

On the night of March 24 the entire regiment (with the exception of Company A, which was guarding quarters in Manila) left its trenches at Caloocan and moved about 3 miles easterly to La Loma church.

At 6 a. m. March 25, with the Tenth Pennsylvania on its right, and the Twentieth Kansas on its left, the command moved forward and drove the enemy from its intrenched position. At the Tuliahan River the enemy was again met, strongly intrenched, from which intrenchments it was driven. The First and Second Battalions forded the river at 2 p. m. The Third Battalion marched up Polo road, crossed the river at Malabon pump station, where the entire command camped for the night. Casualties: 4 enlisted men killed, and 1 officer and 16 enlisted men wounded.

On March 26 the command marched toward Polo, being placed in support; camped in trenches formerly occupied by the enemy, about 1½ miles north of Polo. Casualties: 1 officer and 1 enlisted man wounded.

On the morning of the 25th Company A left Manila, and proceeded by rail to Caloocan, where they were assigned to the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., and

participated with them in their advance until beyond Polo, when they joined their own command on the morning of the 27th.

On the 27th the regiment moved north in column along the road, passed through the village of Obando, arriving at Meycauayan about 10.30 a. m., where a rest was taken; at 5 p. m. an advance of about a mile was made to the Marilao River, and the regiment camped for the night. Furnished detail to build pontoon bridge across the Marilao River. Casualties: 8 enlisted men wounded.

March 28, crossed the Marilao River, and, advancing about a mile, camped for the night.

March 29, advanced on Bocaue and Bigaa, crossed the Bigaa River on railway bridge, and camped near Guiguinto. Casualties: 10 enlisted men wounded, 2 of whom have since died.

March 30, advanced on Santa Isabella and camped for the night.

March 31, advanced and entered Malolos at 10.30 a. m., meeting with no resistance, and camped just north of the city.

Very respectfully,

HARRY C. KESSLER,
Colonel First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 9.

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., May 22, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

(Through Headquarters First Brigade.)

SIR: By direction of the commanding general Second Division, I have the honor to submit the following report as commanding officer of the First Montana Infantry, U. S. V., from April 24 to May 1, 1899:

April 24.—At 6 a. m. the entire regiment moved from its camp at Malolos and took up position on the left of the railroad track, about 2 miles beyond the Malolos station, and remained there until 10.30 o'clock the next morning, when the brigade commander ordered me to move the regiment to the right of the track and immediately advance on the Bagbag bridge. Without being fired upon the regiment was placed in a well-sheltered dry ravine, which ran perpendicular to the railroad and about 1,100 yards from the bridge.

Two field pieces having opened fire from a point where the Malolos wagon road reaches the river bank, Capt. T. S. Dillon was directed to take his battalion—Companies C, H, K, and L—and from the river bank on either side of the artillery keep down such fire as was directed against the field pieces, and in addition flank with his fire the trenches occupied by insurgents who were opposing the advance of General Hale's brigade across the river. Captain Dillon was able to place his entire battalion and to accomplish the desired results.

As the armored car advanced on the bridge, 50 picked men, armed with the magazine rifle, and under the command of Major Miller, moved abreast on the right of the track and under cover of the trees. The heavy fire from the Kansas regiment on the left, the car on the track, and the Montana regiment on the right drove the insurgents out of the trenches covering the bridge, and in retreating they were for over 100 yards under the fire of the 50 men under Major Miller.

The regiment camped that night on the south side of the river. Shortly after going into camp Private Kennedy, Company K, was drowned in the river. Two men were slightly wounded as a result of the day's engagement.

April 26.—At 6 a. m. General Wheaton crossed the brigade over the Bagbag River, the bridge having been repaired during the night, and advanced on Calumpit, the regiment on the right of the railroad track. No resistance was offered until the advanced line was well into the town of Calumpit and in sight of the trenches across the Rio Grande. Companies A, B, D, F, H, and I were quickly placed under the cover nearest to the river, and selected sharpshooters from each were cautiously advanced to any shelter nearer the river; these sharpshooters throughout the day delivered a well-directed fire on any target which showed itself. The other six companies were sheltered in railroad culverts. A reconnoissance showed that to the right of the track it was impracticable to effect a crossing of the river, primarily because there was no boat, raft, or other means of crossing in sight, and secondarily the junction of the Rio Grande and Rio Chico limited our frontage on the river to less



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than 300 yards, all well covered by occupied trenches on the other side. An admirable location for field pieces and rapid-fire guns was found, but not utilized that day. The regiment camped in Calumpit that night under fire. Our loss that day was 2 killed and 6 wounded. During the day and night the insurgents used artillery on us. I saw 3 shells fired from their lines. One exploded and 2 partially buried themselves in the ground.

April 27.—The morning found our situation practically unchanged. In view of Colonel Funston's intention to cross the river below the bridge by means of rafts, our line along the river was materially strengthened and the fire about doubled. Major Young selected positions for 3 field pieces and a gatling gun and had them in position just in time to catch the insurgents as they retreated upon finding themselves flanked by part of the Kansas regiment. This was about noon, and the sharpshooters were hurried across the bridge and orders sent for the balance of the regiment to follow at once. I reached the other side in time to see a heavy insurgent line appear about 1,800 yards to the left. About 80 Montana and Kansas men were lined up on the track, and the volleys from their magazine rifles sufficed to send this line on a run to the rear. At this time another strong line appeared on either side of the railroad track at the Apalit station. Companies D, E, G, and M, under Major Cook, and C, H, K, and L, under Captain Dillon, were now across, and forming line on the right of the track advanced under the insurgent fire before the 8 companies were on the line. The insurgents retired, but held the railroad train so long at Apalit that several volleys were fired into it. I believe this train was held to receive killed and wounded. Undoubtedly our volley firing did great damage, as from Apalit station, to which point I accompanied General Wheaton with 20 men, they could be seen trooping up the track, a mere mob, our bullets dropping among them for twenty minutes. They simply carried off their killed and wounded and apparently had not heart enough to run, at which feat the Filipino soldier, in normal condition, is unequalled. Captain Reif was sent to occupy Apalit with Company D, and outside of a half dozen straggling shots he met with no resistance. The regiment camped in Apalit. Our loss for the day was 1 killed and 7 wounded, among the latter Maj. J. R. Miller, in the shoulder, and Captain Andrew Jensen, in the forearm, both slight.

April 28, 29, 30, and May 1, the regiment was in camp at Apalit. On the night of April 28, bearing a message from Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur to the insurgent General Luna, I entered the insurgent lines under a flag of truce and visited the latter's headquarters at Santo Tomás. Maj. G. F. Shiels, brigade surgeon, and Maj. F. J. Adams, surgeon First Montana, accompanied me to Santo Tomás.

The following recommendations are made for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign:

To be brevet lieutenant-colonels, U. S. V., Maj. B. H. Cook and Maj. John R. Miller.

To be brevet majors, U. S. V., Capts. George W. Reif, E. W. Wynne, J. E. Moran, Frank E. Green, Thomas S. Dillon.

To be brevet captains, U. S. V., First Lieuts. W. J. Bradshaw, Charles French, W. B. Knowlton, J. F. Mercer, Philip Greenan, C. L. Boardman.

To be brevet first lieutenants, U. S. V., Second Lieuts. E. J. Gainnan, Joseph Corby, J. F. Croft, E. V. D. Murphy, Miles Kelly, F. S. Yaeger.

To be brevet second lieutenants, U. S. V., First Serpts. P. T. A. Howe, Company A.; Albert J. Erickson, Company G.; E. K. Chradle, Company I; Sergt. C. L. Moore, Company L, all of the First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

To be brevet lieutenant-colonel and surgeon, U. S. V., Maj. F. J. Adams, surgeon First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

To be brevet captain and assistant surgeon, U. S. V., First Lieut. L. C. Bruning, assistant surgeon, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.; First Lieut. Leroy Southmayd, assistant surgeon, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

The above-named medical officers deserve special mention for continually keeping on the firing line, and thereby enabling our soldiers to receive medical attention immediately after being shot.

In the conduct of the officers and men of this regiment, whether under the withering rays of the midday sun or the hot fire of the enemy's rifles, I observed much that was commendable and nothing that merited censure.

Very respectfully,

R. B. WALLACE,
Lieutenant-Colonel First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 10.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MONTANA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., May 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report regarding movements from Apalit to San Fernando, P. I.:

We left Apalit on the morning of May 4, at 4.15 o'clock, and moved to railway track near the station, where we were joined by balance of General Wheaton's brigade—Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V., a Hotchkiss cannon, and two Gatling guns mounted on push cars. Company C, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V., officered by First Lieut. J. F. Mercer and Second Lieut. Homer L. Rickards, and Company K, commanded by Second Lieut. Miles Kelly, both in command of Capt. Thomas S. Dillon, were placed on firing line on left of railway track. The balance of the regiment marched in column along the track. The country was very swampy, and several streams were crossed, making progress necessarily slow.

The advance line encountered the enemy about 10 a. m., intrenched on opposite bank of the Santo Tomas River about 1 mile from the village of that name. After considerable resistance they were driven from their position, and we crossed on the railway bridge, a span of which had been dropped, making the crossing extremely difficult until a temporary footbridge was put in by the engineer corps. We reached the village of Santo Tomas at 2 p. m., and quarters were assigned the regiment.

During this movement Capt. Thomas S. Dillon was wounded in the left side severely, 1 enlisted man was killed, and 2 wounded slightly.

On May 6 the Second and Third battalions, commanded by Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace, made a reconnoissance to the west, starting at 5.30 a. m. and returning at 11.30 a. m., but found no enemy.

At 11.30 a. m. the entire regiment started for San Fernando, which movement was made without incident, as the town was occupied by General Hale's brigade.

The regiment was assigned quarters, where they have since remained.

Very respectfully,

HARRY C. KESSLER,
Colonel First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 11.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALIONS THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., April 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to forward in duplicate herewith my report (with report of battery commanders inclosed) of the operations of the battalions of the Third Artillery from March 25 to April 1, 1899, inclusive.

Very respectfully,

W. A. KOBBE,
Major, Third Artillery, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALIONS THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,
In the Field, Malolos, P. I., April 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report herewith the operations of this command from March 25 to 31, both dates inclusive.

The command formed the extreme left of the division as formed in line to advance against the insurgents in the movement against them which culminated in the occupation of Malolos. The Twentieth Kansas Regiment was on the right—10 officers, 1 medical officer, and 490 men.

25th.—At about 6 a. m. the command left the trenches in line of squads—Battery L (Kessler), Battery K (England), and Battery H (Abernethy), from right to left; Battery G (Randolph) in reserve in rear of left—and deployed on reaching the open. The advance was over an open space nearly a mile and subjected to fire from front and

both flanks, and our loss in the first fifteen or twenty minutes was 30 or 31 killed and wounded, including 1 officer (Overton).

The fire from the left was partially checked by an advance of the Twenty-second Infantry, under General Wheaton, and by delaying the command until the Twentieth Kansas had entered the woods on the right that fire also ceased. The front fire continued until short range, when the enemy broke and a running fight was kept up to the Tuliahan River. There the insurgents had strong intrenchments, but were flanked out of them by Battery H on the left and by the Twentieth Kansas and Battery L on the right, and about 7.30 a. m. Abernethy crossed the river, the rest of the command following, wading to the armpits, and sometimes swimming for a short distance. Bivouacked where we crossed.

26th.—As the Second Brigade had apparently not been able to execute the swinging movement originally contemplated through Novaliches on account of the difficult nature of the country, etc., the plan was changed, the First Brigade moved out to the Malinta road, and this command ordered to take the advance against that town in conjunction with General Wheaton's force, then coming up on the left. This we did about noon, occupying the town and joining Wheaton's force simultaneously, about the time General Egbert was killed. The insurgents moving northward along the railroad came in contact during the afternoon with troops of the Second Brigade, and the command watched the sharp fight from the partial shelter of the railroad embankment, losing 1 man while doing so from shots fired more than a mile away. In evening moved up to beyond the (Polo) station and bivouacked on extreme left.

27th.—Moved out in advance of brigade through Meycauayan, a large place, mostly burned or burning, to railroad beyond, where Batteries L and K were deployed on the left under Captain Hobbs, Batteries G and H being in rear in support. L and K made a most difficult advance over a broken and marshy country under fire (see report inclosed), while G and H advanced up the railroad, dodging the fire as it came alternately from right or left by using the embankment accordingly.

The advance of all four batteries was generally in column, often in column of files, was most difficult, and the small loss is due to skillful leading on the part of battery commanders. This advance was kept up to the Marilao River, where the advance batteries drove the enemy from the opposite bank and the whole command finally crossed the railroad bridge over the cross-ties, forming a line, right resting on railroad. In front of this position there was a long open stretch of country, 2 miles long at the immediate front, and many insurgents could be seen during the early afternoon taking position along the ridges and forming, apparently, for attack or defense. Toward 5 o'clock General MacArthur, with Major Strong, rode up and while discussing the situation a strong insurgent skirmish line advanced over the widest open country to a line which at one time was about 1,000 yards in our front and which brought them on a line with their troops, which had been placed along their ridges to their right and left during the afternoon. They soon opened a hot fire from Mausers and Remingtons, which we replied to. The fire was kept up steadily for half an hour, or until troops (Stotsenburg's) well over to the left had charged over their front and occupied the ridge, when the whole insurgent line retired. The fire was very hot in spite of the long range, and we lost several men, including 2 sergeants, killed. The division commander rectified the alignment, which had been disturbed by Stotsenburg's advance, and the command bivouacked about 500 yards in advance of the river.

28th.—Remained in bivouac, but advanced 300 yards on a contracted front. Asst. Surg. J. S. Chaffee, U. S. N., reported for duty.

29th.—Command was ordered back at daylight to escort wagon train during day's march, as it would be possibly exposed to flank fire from individual insurgents hidden in the estuaries, etc., on the left. No opposition developing, the command was summoned forward, crossed railroad bridges at Bocaue and Bigaa, and thence about 2 p. m. in rear of brigade on a road toward Bulacan, but leaving that town well to the left, to protect forward movement of the rest of the forces from an attack from that side. A halt was made when again nearing the railroad at Guiguinto, the passage being apparently disputed against other troops, and command was deployed in readiness to assist. Bivouac near station south of bridge.

30th.—Moved forward in line early afternoon on left of brigade, but over so difficult a terrain (being a succession of marsh lands and savannas) that the line could not be retained, and the batteries were forced to cross, if at all, in disconnected columns or in single file, often cutting their way through the undergrowth. The command was, however, finally assembled by dark on or near a road at right angles to the railroad, the battalions even then being separated in bivouac by a stream.

31st.—The march against Malolos, which began about 6.30, twenty-five minutes after the first gun, found the command on the extreme left again and endeavoring with some success to retain a semblance of line formation in the face of much almost

impassable terrain. The march was practically unopposed, though H and K Batteries dislodged a considerable force of insurgents who were apparently posted to watch the advance on the left. The command entered the city about 10.30 or 11, and was ordered into camp southwest of the place about one-half mile out, with left on the estero and right toward the railroad, one battalion on outpost 500 yards in advance.

The losses in the command during the time specified were 7 killed outright and 44 wounded, including 2 officers. The regimental supply system inaugurated prior to February 4 worked admirably, thanks to the untiring work, day or night, of Sergt. Fred Meinecke, Battery G, Third Artillery, in charge, and we were never without an abundant supply of ammunition and rations.

Very respectfully,

W. A. KOBBE,
Major, Third Artillery, Commanding.

BATTERY G, THIRD ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., April 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report covering the period from March 25 to April 1, 1899:

The battery (G) was detailed as reserve for the Third Artillery battalions and followed in rear of center when the advance was made from the trenches at Caloocan about 6.40 a. m., March 25. It conformed to the subsequent flank movement to the left and hastened to place itself on the left of the battalion. I was hardly in position when the insurgents opened an enfilading fire from the woods. This fire forced me to refuse my second platoon. About this time I ordered advance by platoon rushes.

Lieutenant Overton, in command of the first platoon, in the first rush advanced beyond the left of the main battalion line, farther than I intended he should go. Lieutenant Overton was wounded at this point. Soon after the second platoon joined the first, the fire of the insurgents weakened and I ordered a rush of the battery for the edge of the woods. The enemy turned and fled. By this time I was way ahead of Battery H, and I had lost sight of the battalion line, so I obliqued to the right to find it, and in this way got in front of Battery H without knowing the fact myself.

The first platoon advanced until, through an opening, it encountered a kind of intrenchment covered and revetted with bamboo of a semicircular shape. I fired into it and very soon received a reply. The river was between the battery and the field-work. While G Battery kept up the fire in front, joined later by K, Lieutenant Abernethy succeeded in crossing the river and attacking the intrenchment in flank. The work was evacuated and the battery forded the river and went into camp. The next day, March 26, the battery acted as reserve on the left in the advance on Polo.

On the 27th the advance was continued to Marilao. One man was wounded on this advance on the railroad embankment. In the engagement on the afternoon of the 27th, when attacked by the insurgents, the battery lost 2 killed and 1 wounded. At this point several prisoners were captured by scouting parties from the battery. The battery marched with the battalions on the 29th to Guiguinto.

On the 30th the battery advanced to a point 3 miles southeast of Malolos.

On the 31st the battery acted as reserve on the left of the battalion, reaching Malolos about 11 a. m. Camped that night west of railroad.

The strength of the battery present on leaving Caloocan, March 25, was 2 officers and 108 men. On reaching Malolos, March 31, it was 1 officer and 105 enlisted men.

The men of the command acted with great bravery and coolness, always eager to rush forward against the enemy.

Very respectfully,

B. H. RANDOLPH,
Captain, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery G.

BATTERY H, THIRD ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., April 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I.:

In compliance with instructions, from your office I have the honor to make the following report of the action of Battery H, Third Artillery, from March 25 to March 31, inclusive.

On March 25 Battery H moved out of the trenches at about 6 a. m., on the extreme left flank of the battalions, with its left unprotected. Almost immediately after

leaving the trenches battery was exposed to a hot fire and moved in good order by the left flank under this fire. Moving out into open, battery was fired on from front, left oblique, and left flank, but continued to advance, occupying enemy's trenches and moving forward through dense jungle to Tuliahan River, where crossing was made by swimming about half of the battery, when a deep crossing was found which could be waded with difficulty. As soon as a section had crossed, volley firing was opened on flank and reverse of blockhouse guarding ford, and the insurgents driven quickly out. This crossing was held until remainder of the batteries and the Kansas regiment had crossed and battery bivouacked there. Loss, 2 killed, 4 wounded, 4 heat exhaustion.

On March 26 moved out at 8 a. m. to Biman and Novaliches road, where battery formed part of advance guard, moving into Biman without loss, and late in the afternoon to place of bivouac between Polo station and Meycauayan. No casualties.

On March 27 battery moved out in reserve to Meycauayan and in support to near Marilao. Crossing Marilao River in firing line, position was taken just outside Marilao, upon which position insurgents advanced. During their attack firing was by sections and was perfectly directed and controlled by chiefs of sections. There was no promiscuous firing, and I found by experiment that fire of any section could be stopped by signal. I noticed some volleys so well directed that the projectiles seemed all to strike within a very small radius. Bivouac was made here. Casualties, 4 wounded.

On March 28 no considerable move was made.

On March 29 battery took up guard of wagon train from Marilao to Bocaue, went forward to fighting line near Bigaa and then to Guiguinto, where battery bivouacked in line of support.

On March 30 battery moved from Guiguinto to position in front of Malolos, occupying extreme left. This day's march was through deep swamps, and as day was unusually hot, battery had three cases of heat exhaustion.

On March 31 battery went forward on left of line through sloughs and swamps to Malolos, being under fire twice, once at very close range, but experiencing no loss. Position was then taken on outpost line beyond Malolos.

Strength of battery: March 25—One officer, 16 noncommissioned officers, 113 privates; total, 130. March 31—One officer, 13 noncommissioned officers, 96 privates; total, 110.

List of killed and wounded: March 25—Killed, Privates William T. Patten, James A. O'Neil; wounded, Corpl. Timothy Fitzpatrick, privates Chauncey Tesh and Julius C. Buhlert, seriously; Richard King, slightly. March 27—Wounded seriously, Sergt. Benjamin H. Hiatt, Musician Henry J. Rath, and Private John McCandless; slightly, Artificer Albert E. Vesly.

Special mention is made of First Sergt. Dennis P. Quinlan for his fearlessness, coolness, his perfect fire control of his platoon, and his untiring energy, both as a chief of platoon and first sergeant, his unfailing cheerfulness, and his exactness in the execution of orders.

Sergt. Fred Bell handled his platoon well under fire, controlled its fire, always carried out his orders, and exposed himself fearlessly. He continued with the battery even though his state of health should have forbidden, and apparently lost none of his efficiency. During his absence, March 30, his platoon was well handled by Sergt. John Braeuninger.

The chiefs of sections, Sergts. Benjamin H. Hiatt, John Braeuninger, John Twohil, Fred Steinert, Eddie L. Hatcher, and Philip Sauer, did excellent work, especially on March 27, at Marilao, in controlling and directing the fire.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT S. ABERNETHY,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery H.

BATTERY K, THIRD ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., April 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALION THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of actions in which Battery K, Third Artillery, was engaged between the dates March 25, 1899, and April 1, 1899, inclusive:

Battery K left the trenches near La Loma Church on March 25, 1899, about 6 a. m., and took position on the left of L Battery, facing north. The battery maintained connection with this battery, in accordance with orders from the commanding officer, until it entered the woods in front of La Loma Church; here, on account of the thick bamboo, the battery dropped in rear of the advancing line. Battery H, which had been on its left, closed into the right, making contact with L Battery. After passing

the thick bamboo, Battery K moved forward and took position on the left of H Battery and continued the advance until it arrived near the Tuliahan River. Here the enemy had taken a position on the north side of the river in a strong earthwork. The battery opened fire on this work and advanced to the bank of the river. The enemy withdrew from their position under heavy fire and with losses. The battery then forded the river and took position (under the orders from the commanding officer) so as to hold the ford. This position afforded many opportunities for firing on the enemy as they retreated across the front of the battery. The losses for the day were 3 killed and 8 wounded.

The night of the 25th was passed here with G Battery on the immediate right and a battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry on the left.

On the morning of the 26th the battery took a position on the right of the Malinta road, forming a part of the advance guard. The enemy opened fire from the front and right about three-fourths of a mile from Malinta, while the battery was marching across an open space. Lieutenant Lanza took charge of the right section and replied to the party on the right, while the rest of the battery advanced. Lieutenant Lanza's skillful management of the section silenced the fire from the right and enabled the battery to advance without any loss other than that inflicted by the enemy's first volley. After the battery had advanced, the rear section advanced by squads, the remaining squads covering their advance by their fire. The enemy soon began to retreat from Malinta. Lieutenant Lanza took charge of his platoon and placed it in a position favorable for firing on the enemy as they left the town.

Orders were received from the commanding officer to go into Malinta and hold it. This was done. After a delay at Malinta for an hour or two the battery marched in column toward Polo and went into bivouac for the night. The losses for the day were 2 wounded, none killed. Prisoners taken, 4.

On the morning of the 27th Battery K formed a part of the advance on the left of Battery L. The line advanced within 300 yards of the Marilao railway bridge when it came under heavy fire of the enemy, who were intrenched on the north and west side of the river. The enemy's fire was soon silenced, and the two batteries moved across the Marilao and took a position facing north. The loss in this engagement was 2 wounded, none killed.

On the afternoon of the 27th the enemy began an attack. Firing was begun at long range, apparently with good moral effect at least. The advance of the enemy lasted only a short while. The losses of this engagement were 1 killed and 3 wounded.

The nights of the 27th and 28th were spent near the Marilao and were not marked by any engagement.

The 29th the battery formed a part of the guard for the wagon train. The night was spent near Guiguinto.

The 30th the battery formed part of the advance line—L Battery on the right and H Battery on the left. There was no engagement in our part of the line. The night was spent near Santa Isabela.

The 31st of March the battery remained in the same position as the day before, and advanced into Malolos. There was very little firing. A small party of the enemy opened fire at close range as the battery was fording a stream. A sufficient number had crossed, however, to put the enemy to flight. There were no casualties in the battery. The battery marched through the city, taking a position on the line east of Malolos.

April 1, the battery was ordered into Malolos as part of the provost guard,

Total killed, March 25 to April 1, inclusive, 4; wounded, 15; heat exhaustion, 4.

The strength of the battery March 25 was 2 officers and 129 enlisted men. On April 1 the strength was 2 officers and 101 enlisted men, 5 men with wagon and pack train.

Respectfully submitted.

LLOYD ENGLAND,
Second Lieutenant, Third U. S. Artillery,
In Command of Battery K, March 25 to April 1, 1899.

BATTERY L, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., April 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALION THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY.

SIR: In compliance with instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Battery L, Third U. S. Artillery, in operations against Philippine insurgents from March 25, 1899, to March 31, 1899, inclusive.

At 6 a. m., March 25, 1899, the battery left the trenches near La Loma on the right of the Third Artillery line. The advance was across open country for over a mile, during which time the resistance of the enemy was very strong. Owing to the crowding of troops on the right, we were compelled to move, much of the time, by the left flank, or by a left oblique, making it impossible to effectively return the fire of the insurgents. This was greatly to be regretted, as, doubtless, if a strong fire could have been kept up during the advance some of our casualties might have been prevented as well as more damage done to the insurgents. During the advance across the open the following men were wounded: Sergt. James Barrett, shot in left leg below knee; Sergt. Frank A. Ernsberger, shot in left thigh; Corpl. Thomas A. Galvin, shot in breast; Private Edward Stockton, shot in right shoulder; Private Ollie Miller, slight wound in breast; Private Herman Warner, shot in left leg and left thumb; Private Oscar Gustafson, shot in right foot.

After the woods were entered no further casualties occurred. The insurgents had retreated from their strong line at the edge of the woods, and, as it turned out, a little later had fallen back to a second line just beyond the Tuliahan River. When this river was reached a considerable fire was met with, coming from a line of well-constructed earthworks. Previous orders had said "halt" when this river was reached, but shortly after coming to the river orders were received from Major Kobbé to cross. We had hastily constructed a bridge by placing two bamboo rafts end to end, and laying some loose bamboo poles to a stone about 15 feet from shore. Over the improvised bridge a part of the battery crossed. Others waded or swam, but the enemy made but a feeble resistance at this line in comparison with their resistance at their first line. Bivouacked near the Tuliahan River.

The following men wounded themselves on this day: Sergt. Herbert A. McKenzie shot off one finger of left hand with revolver which he was cleaning. The accident, if such it were, was the result of gross stupidity. Private Herbert W. Ogilvie shot himself through the foot at the beginning of the advance from La Loma, and Private Fred J. A. John shot himself through left hand about 10 p. m. These accidents, if such they were, were the result of direct disobedience of orders in that the men had their pieces loaded, contrary to oft-repeated orders.

On March 26, moved from bivouack about 6.30 a. m. A position was taken on what I believe was called the Novaliches road, Battery L being on the right of the Third Artillery. Column was then formed, with Battery L at rear of battalion. After a forward movement of about 1 mile along this road the Third Artillery was formed perpendicular to the road, Major Kobbé directing me to place my battery on the right and just at the edge of some woods, the country in our front being open. As soon as we emerged from the woody screen the fire of the insurgents began. Battery L was receiving both a front and flank fire, and I detached the right section to attend to the fire coming from the right. The rest of the battery was started forward, keeping, as far as practicable, perpendicular to the woods. This involved a considerable turning movement to the left, and I was soon relieved from anxiety as to my flank and rear by seeing Colonel Funston and his regiment moving into position on my right. The movement was continued against more or less resistance until the enemy had been driven through and beyond Malinta. Quite a number of dead insurgents were passed in the advance. They had been driven from a hill on my left by Battery K, and while attempting to escape were shot down by fire from my right platoon. Bivouacked near Polo Station. The following casualty occurred: Private Mason Calloway, wounded, shot through the right side.

On March 27 left bivouac at 8 a. m. and took position beyond Meycauayan. About noon an advance was ordered, and it fell to the lot of Battery L to be just to the left of the railroad. Before we had gone 500 yards our advance in line of skirmishers was stopped by impassable swamps. The battery was moved by the right flank and then by a column left, which brought it in column of files parallel to the line of railroad. The village of Marilao in our front was on fire, which lent color to the theory that the enemy had set it on fire and then abandoned it. Most of the battery was moving along a dike, a few, including myself, for the purpose of better observation, being on the railroad. All were within 500 yards of the railroad bridge at Marilao when a terrific fire opened up down the railroad. All sought cover and endeavored to locate the position of the enemy. It was impossible to fire on them from our position, so the column quickly waded several intervening sloughs, got on a line, and began firing. The battery advanced, firing, and literally drove the enemy from those works in our front, notwithstanding the fact that a deep and fairly wide stream was between us. As soon as the stream was reached a gradual movement by the right flank was begun so as to take advantage of the railroad bridge in crossing. It seems to me worthy of remark that after this advance of 500 yards or more, during which we were under a continuous fire and passed through three sloughs, one of which was

● nearly waist deep with slimy mud, that the men were formed in an unbroken line along the river and each man with the squad to which he belonged. I walked along the line to straighten it out, and as well as I know the excellent material among the noncommissioned officers and squad leaders, I was surprised at the result.

The enemy's position at Marilao was beyond doubt the strongest one encountered at any time between Manila and Malolos. With good troops it should have been held against overwhelming odds, but it was taken by an infantry charge, unsupported by artillery. My entire battery had crossed and was formed in close order before I heard a single artillery shot, and that was far to the left of the position from which we had driven the enemy. Light artillery would have been very useful where we were, but the fact remains it was not there. The fire from the retreating enemy was still quite severe, but the right section, having worked its way across the bridge, soon awakened such a lively interest in getting away among the enemy that their fire perceptibly slackened and soon died out altogether. After the battery had crossed the bridge we halted and re-formed our lines. No further advance was made during the day. Toward evening a semblance of an attack was made by the insurgents, who advanced in force. We did not move from our position, but fired at them at ranges varying from 1,000 to 1,500 yards. During the advance against Marilao the following casualties occurred: Alexander C. Pike, private, wounded through the groin; Tom Culbeson, private, wounded in abdomen; Clarence E. Chappell, private, wounded in thigh.

I inspected one particular work on the river bank which Battery L silenced, and found the following interesting results: It was made of a slight amount of earth thrown up, crowned with a single line of logs about 2 feet in diameter. It was about 50 feet long and about 75 yards from the opposite bank of the stream. Behind this work there were 5 dead insurgents, with the most awful wounds I have seen during the campaign, the effect of the Krag-Jorgenson bullet at close range. I counted over one hundred bullet holes through the logs, which, I think, was pretty accurate shooting under the circumstances.

On March 28 we remained at Marilao.

On March 29 took position with wagon train, Battery L being in rear of Third Artillery Battalion. At Bocaue we left the train, crossed the bridge, and took up our position on the left of firing line, Battery L being now on the right of Third Artillery Battalion. The advance was continued to Bigaa. Here the men were given a rest and permitted to bathe, which greatly refreshed them. About 3 p. m. the advance was again taken up and continued without resistance. A halt was made for the night near Guiguinto.

On March 30 we moved forward a few miles and took our position on left of line. Battery L was on the right of Third Artillery, and my orders from Major Kobbé were to keep touch with the Montana regiment on my right. The country was dense and almost impassable, except for footpaths. We kept touch with the regiment on our right, but discovered after we had moved by the right flank for a mile or more that the left battalion of the Montana had lost touch with the remainder of their regiment. Scouting parties sent out by them discovered a way out, but in the meantime word came from Major Kobbé to move on to the railroad, where he would put us on the right track. We finally reached open country, took our position on the firing line, and bivouacked for the night within a few miles of Malolos.

About 7.30 a. m., March 31, took position on left of line and the advance began. No insurgents were encountered, but the advance was very difficult on account of the many sloughs encountered.

Entered Malolos about noon and detailed 3 men at once to act as provost guard, pursuant to previous instructions. Remained for about two hours in Malolos and then, with the rest of the Third Artillery Battalion, marched to a position just outside of Malolos, where we bivouacked for the night. Remained here until April 2, when battery was marched to Malolos and took up position on plaza, where it is now stationed and forms part of the provost guard of Malolos.

Throughout the campaign the men of the battery have displayed the greatest fortitude, both in attacking the enemy in intrenched positions and in enduring, uncomplainingly, the numerous hardships due to the climate and nature of the country passed through. Due to the previous arrangements of Major Kobbé and the extraordinary diligence of Sergeant Meinecke, of Battery G, Third U. S. Artillery, in carrying out his orders, Battery L was never without its rations and an abundance of ammunition.

Very respectfully,

P. M. KESSLER,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery L.

IN CAMP NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., *March 18, 1899.*

ADJUTANT BATTALION THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report on an engagement with the insurgents on the afternoon of March 17, 1899, in which an attack on the Third Artillery lines was repulsed.

The lines being subjected to a galling fire and knowing the ground very well over which the enemy was advancing, I thought I could drive them back. I asked to make the attempt, and was given the following men, all from Battery G, Third Artillery: Sergts. James H. Ball and Robert Kelly, and Privates Robert M. Gillespie, William T. Purdue, William Kelly, Thomas F. Lynch, Frank C. Manuel, Edward Wessel, and Robert Layman.

With this detachment I cautiously advanced through the ravines and across the open space toward a clump of trees, in which could be seen several Filipinos. When we were about 400 yards away from them they discovered us and began firing. We returned the fire and continued advancing. They retreated from the bushes, leaving 1 man dead.

We now were under a heavy fire from the left, where the enemy was intrenched and in considerable force. They were firing volleys, and we easily protected ourselves by lying flat on observing the smoke of the discharge. One of our men, who had become too much exhausted to advance further, was stationed where he could observe any movement intended to cut off our retreat. We advanced obliquely toward a ravine on our right. The insurgents were concealed behind a ridge, and as we could not do effective shooting in front, I sent 4 men around on their left flank. This movement was noticed by them and they resumed the retreat. On leaving the ravine, they were obliged to cross a ridge and were for some time exposed to our fire. We saw many of them falling, some being carried away by their comrades; others were left, and only their arms taken away.

We advanced over the ridge and across a road which leads from the Pennsylvania's lines. On our left was a large field, and we could see an officer, mounted, riding along, trying to rally his men.

The Filipinos evidently overestimated our force, as they retreated all along their line. They were without discipline or organization, and were firing over each other for a long distance back of their advance line.

Some of the men of the Montana regiment came up on our right and offered their services. They wanted me to charge a force, which was still fighting behind brush about 200 yards in our front. I should have done so and dislodged the enemy but for the fact that my ammunition supply was giving out, and I wanted to save at least 5 rounds per man for our falling back.

We counted 10 Filipinos lying dead, and there is no question that more were killed and wounded. We took 2 Remington rifles and some cartridge boxes from the nearest dead men, but I did not deem it advisable to remain there longer, as, being short of ammunition and our men being exhausted, we were in imminent danger of being cut off.

We accordingly fell back, firing to prevent their advance. All of our firing was from the magazine, and with the exception of three volleys into some bushes, the firing was individual. We also fired standing, as in a lying or kneeling position nothing could be seen in the tall grass. We had 100 rounds of ammunition per man when we went out, and returned with about 100 rounds in the whole squad, thus firing about 900 rounds.

On our way back we met a company of the Montana regiment waiting in rear of us in the event of an effort on the part of the enemy to cut off our retreat. There were at least 150 insurgents directly in our front. They were aided by a cross fire from the trenches on the left.

There were no casualties on our side.

Very respectfully,

CLARENCE M. COUDON,
Sergeant, Battery G, Third Artillery.

APPENDIX 12.

Report of an Attack on a Battalion, Third U. S. Artillery (heavy), by Insurgents near Paombon April 13, 1899.

Malolos extends westward from a bridge at the plaza, on a single street, for half a mile, where, crossing another bridge, an open space for a like distance is reached, then, by still another bridge, the town of Paombon, also consisting of a single half-

mile street. These streets and roads run practically in the same direction. Beyond Paombon is an unbridged stream and beyond it the open delta country toward Hagonoy. The streams are 200 to 300 feet wide, unfordable, and connected one with another after the manner of estuaries or lagoons, are navigable for large cascoes, and the inclosed tracts of land are, technically, low-lying islands. For purposes of this report the streams at Bridges 1, 2, and 3, and the stream beyond Paombon, may be considered to divide the country into three equal island tracts.

Battery K, about 130 men, under Captain C. W. Hobbs, was stationed near Bridge No. 2, furnishing outposts for the open country on its front and left, but really as a support for Battery H, under Captain O'Hara (about 130 men), stationed in Paombon, with 40 men at the outlying church and other important outposts which connected on their right with the general outpost line of the Second Division. The main body of the battery had been placed at Bridge No. 3.

The position, therefore, was the extreme left of the general outpost line, extended well into the delta country, and was naturally difficult and exposed.

This position was attacked shortly after 4 a. m., April 13, while it was still very dark, by (as has been learned since) between 300 and 400 insurgents, and from the front and left. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and began with volleys delivered at short ranges, which the enemy had been able to attain by means of the rivers, and was simultaneous along the line extending from north of Paombon Church south and east beyond Bridge No. 2.

The division commander ordered me to send 50 men from Battery L, then in readiness on the plaza as reinforcements; to summon Battery G to the plaza, and to personally await further orders. The firing continuing, he ordered me to go to the front and assume charge.

I found Bridge No. 3 burning, and as the main body of H Battery had been placed there, supposed it had been driven away or withdrawn; in any event the battery was cut off from support for the time being. Firing was also being kept up, but at long range. The 50 men from L Battery were in a good position and Captain Hobbs had posted his command advantageously.

I sent back for the rest of Battery L, also for all of G Battery, for 1 gun, and for a detachment of engineers to repair the bridge; also sent Lieutenant Abernethy to communicate with Captain O'Hara in Paombon. He returned and reported that Captain O'Hara had had no difficulty in holding his own. As soon as bridge was partially restored, I sent G Battery to reinforce O'Hara and the rest of L Battery up the second river to cover the retreat of a small reconnoitering party which I had dispatched in a boat, and which had been promptly fired on. As this indicated a body of insurgents still on the Paombon tract, I ordered O'Hara to take H and G Batteries, deployed across the tract to the north, which was done, clearing that part of the line; then consolidated L Battery on the open tract, and as I had, before this, designated a position for the gun near Bridge No. 2, and had advanced K Battery well to the front, the command offered a very strong line, before the fire of which the insurgents, already at a distance, finally withdrew.

It had transpired before this that Captain O'Hara had the day before withdrawn the main body of his battery from Bridge No. 3, leaving a sergeant and 10 or 15 men there, and placing the main body in the center of Paombon. The result of this was the masking of the main body by the houses, and the withdrawal, if not the retreat, of the guard at the bridge. Whether this withdrawal was necessary or not has not been established, as the sergeant in command is under untried charges for abandoning his post. He claims that volley after volley was fired through the building in which he had been placed.

The attack, though very determined and unexpected, was nowhere successful, led to no confusion or panic, and, with the exception noted, no part of the command gave ground, but acted throughout as an efficient outpost. Seven of the enemy's dead were left on the field.

This command lost 1 sergeant and 1 private killed, and 1 officer (Lieutenant Lanza) and 4 privates wounded. Also 1 private captured by the enemy and still a prisoner. He appears to have lost his bearings in the dark, and the fact of his capture, with other circumstances, indicate that at the first attack the insurgents were within 150 yards of our lines.

The reports of subordinate commanders are inclosed.

W. A. KOBBE,
Major Third Artillery, Commanding.

BATTERY H, THIRD ARTILLERY,
June 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT THIRD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS,
Malolos, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from your office, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this battery in the action at Paombon on the 13th of April, 1899.

The battery took station at Paombon, April 9, 1899, on the extreme left of the line, separated by the river from the Montana regiment. The inhabitants of the town appeared very friendly, but there were no women or children in the town. About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 13th of April, Mauser and Remington bullets began to patter about the church near our outpost of 40 men and some few near the camp some two or three hundred yards in the rear, occupied by the main part of the battery. The men were formed promptly inside the stone-wall inclosure selected in advance and a few volleys fired, when the flashes of their rifles showed the position of the insurgents. About this same time the houses of the village near the bridge were seen to be in flames, and as no firing was heard on the part of the rear guard left there (2 noncommissioned officers and 10 men), a party was called for to go back and investigate, 3 men, Privates Amie, Sullivan, and Oden volunteering at once. They returned about 4.15 o'clock and reported the guard as missing and the houses on both sides evidently set on fire by their occupants. About daybreak the scouting party under Sergeant Higby reported a line of insurgents in the rice field on our left which could be enfiladed. Sergeant White with two squads was sent and the insurgents began to fall back in disorder through the rice field, fired upon as they retreated. There seemed to be four or five hundred men extending as far as the position occupied by Captain Hobb's command. A body of some 200 began to withdraw at about the same time between our outpost and the Montana left, where we had an outpost of some 10 men of K Battery. We did not fire on them lest our own and the Montana outposts might suffer from our fire.

Seven dead Filipinos were found on that day and 2 more later. A Spanish prisoner released afterwards reported 40 wounded as taken into Hagonoy. Our loss was 1 killed (Sergeant Lang, of the guard which fell back from the bridge), and 1 private (Bishop, of the outpost), who seems to have lost his wits and run out into the rice field on the right when there was no firing, and was captured by the Filipinos in ambush there. The hat badges of the dead men showed detachments from the Regto. Infa. No. 2, the Tarlac Battalion, and a Bulacan regiment, No. 4, I think. There were two companies of Paombon militia, but no badges were found to denote their presence.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES O'HARA,
Captain Third Artillery, Commanding Battalion.

MALOLOS STATION, Luzon, P. I., June 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT THIRD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS.

SIR: In compliance with instructions I have the honor to render the following report of the part taken by Battery K, Third Artillery, in the affair of April 13, last, in the locality extending from Santiago (suburb of Malolos) to the church at the southwestward extremity of Paombon. While still on duty as a battalion commander I had been placed in temporary, tactical command of Battery K, which from April 2 was encamped near the bridge at Santiago on the road between that place and Paombon. Second Lieut. Conrad H. Lanza, Third Artillery, was also with me on duty with the battery. From April 8, Batteries H and K conjointly occupied the extended and exposed line first above described, on the left and rear of the division, Battery K being in charge of that part between Malolos and the Paombon bridge and H guarding the rest of the line from and including this bridge, through Paombon, outward to the church. An outpost on the stream to the north of Paombon, in communication with an outpost of the Montanas on the other side of the stream, was also conjointly maintained by these two batteries.

On April 13, between 3 and 4 o'clock a. m., in the darkness, the enemy made a sudden and serious attack in considerable force along the line held by Batteries H and K, Third Artillery. Communication with Battery H was cut off and the bridge between the batteries was partly destroyed by fire. Dispositions were speedily made, and the enemy, close to our position, on the opposite side of the stream, to the left (southeastward) of the road, beyond our bridge, was confronted by a detachment

under Lieutenant Lanza, on the road. Other detachments were so placed as to obtain a flank fire on the enemy, and the attack was quickly held in check.

Lieutenant Lanza, early in the engagement, was severely wounded in the ankle and disabled for further duty for the time being. Command of the detachment then devolved upon Sergt. John Montgomery, since drowned, who, with his detachment sheltered by the embankment of the road, kept up a well-controlled volley fire on the enemy, whose position was indicated by the flashes of their guns.

Later Batteries G and L came forward as reinforcements, also a 3.2-inch Utah gun, commanded by Lieutenant Critchlow. By daylight the attack was completely checked and the enemy was retreating. Firing by the enemy continued after daylight, but in a short time he was completely driven off.

Second Lieut. Conrad H. Lanza, Third Artillery, suffered the only casualty in Battery K.

On April 21 Sergeant Montgomery was accidentally drowned while bathing in the river near camp. He was an exceedingly brave and efficient noncommissioned officer and worthy of the highest commendation. Wounded at Marilao, with his right hand in a splint and his arm in a sling, he continued to lead his section through all the hard campaigning and fighting until after Malolos was captured.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES W. HOBBS,
Captain, Third U. S. Artillery, Commanding Second Battalion.

MALolos, P. I., June 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of an engagement, in which L Battery, Third Artillery, took part on a river this side of Paoinbon on April 13, 1899:

The insurgents attacked the outposts of H and K batteries shortly before 4 a. m. L Battery was formed under arms on the plaza at Malolos at 4 a. m., when the battalion commander directed Second Lieut. P. M. Kessler, Third Artillery, to take a detachment of 50 men of the battery to reenforce the outposts attacked. The report of this detachment is made separately by Lieutenant Kessler.

About daylight bullets were falling in and passing over Malolos. Shortly before 7 o'clock a. m. the remainder of the battery was ordered down the Paombon road. It was first ordered to a position on the left and rear of the K Battery outposts, but on gaining this position it was directed to take a position on the right and in advance of the detachment first sent out. This position was at a bridge crossing the second river on the Paombon road, which bridge was destroyed by the insurgents during the night. A reconnoitering party was sent down the river by the battalion commander, in a small boat, to find out whether a K Battery outpost and a Montana outpost had held their positions on opposite sides of the river and about half a mile from the bridge away from Malolos. L Battery was ordered to take position to support this party and proceeded down the river to a point some 300 or 500 yards from the outposts, where a broad stream flowed into the one they were following. Here a brisk fire was opened up on them from the direction of these outposts. A few sharpshooters were detailed to pick off any insurgents that were seen, but some Americans being seen shortly after near where the sharpshooters were firing, all further firing was stopped and the men were directed to lie down behind a convenient rice ridge. The firing increased in intensity and one man of this battery was killed at this place, though apparently well sheltered. As H Battery was operating across the river in the general direction of the insurgents, but its exact whereabouts unknown, it was deemed dangerous to return the fire of the insurgents, especially as there was no well-defined target to shoot at.

The reconnoitering party having returned soon after the firing began, word was sent to the battalion commander reporting the facts and requesting further instructions. Word was received back to hold the bridge from either side of the river. As the bridge had been repaired by this time, the battery crossed to the same side as H Battery, and scouting parties were sent from it down the river to the former outpost of K Battery. The firing of the insurgents stopped at this time—about 10 o'clock a. m. Shortly afterwards a strong detachment from H Battery reestablished the outpost formerly held by K Battery. The battery then recrossed the bridge and with the detachment first sent out guarded the river from the bridge toward Malolos up to the K Battery outposts.

At 5 p. m. the battery returned to quarters.

Casualties: Killed—Private Ernest Seifert, gunshot back of head, no exit. Wounded—Henry V. Tjarnel, private, junction middle and upper left thigh; Private

Robert Moles, right hand, slight, did not leave firing line; Private George C. Wampler, over right eyebrow, slight, did not leave firing line.

First Sergt. William C. Read deserves mention for the absolutely fearless exposure of himself to a hot fire, when not required to do so, in his endeavors to gain a sight of the enemy. The conduct of all the noncommissioned officers and men of the battery under fire was most excellent. They were so eager it was difficult to make them remain behind cover. Acting Asst. Surg. G. W. Mathews was on the firing line with the battery and gave prompt assistance under fire to the man who was mortally wounded near him. The conduct of the Chinese litter bearers under fire was worthy of the highest praise.

Very respectfully,

MORRIS K. BARROLL,
First Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery L on April 13, 1899.


BATTERY L, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,
Malolos, P. I., June 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: In obedience to instructions received this day, I have the honor to submit the following report:

Firing having been heard in the direction of Paombon early on the morning of April 13, 1899, I was directed by Major Kobbé, Third Artillery, to take 50 men of Battery L and go out the road leading in that direction. I submit herewith a rough sketch showing the road from Malolos to Paombon. Reference to it may make clearer this report. When we arrived where Battery K was stationed most of the firing had ceased. We crossed the bridge at K Battery and started to go to the town of Paombon, escorting two bull carts loaded with ammunition. Acting Assistant Surgeon Mathews was with me also, on his way to H Battery. We did not know at this time that the bridge between us and Paombon had been partially destroyed by the insurgents. The road between the two bridges (the one at K Battery and the one at Paombon) lies between two rivers, and the country between the rivers is cleared so that anyone passing along the road is visible for a mile or more during the day, and at the hour of the morning when we started along its objects could be faintly seen about 200 yards away. Besides sending our squads about 100 yards in advance, as a further precaution against being surprised and thrown into confusion in the darkness I started each squad off in charge of its squad leader, with sufficient distance between it and the following squad to permit line to be formed with squads properly deployed. This was a fortunate precaution, for we had advanced only about 100 yards when a scattering fire opened up on our left. The squads without command took their position on the right of the road, which was elevated about 1 foot, thereby affording some slight cover. The movement was executed in remarkably short time, but it was done just in time to escape the fusilade that followed the first few shots. No one was hit. After returning the fire for a few rounds I stopped it, as it was impossible to see the effect of such shooting in the dark. I knew the enemy's fire was going wild, and suspected that ours was doing likewise. An occasional squad would be directed to rise and, after very deliberate aim at the faint outline of the opposite river bank, fire a volley.

Our position was one that in daylight would have been very much exposed, as the enemy's position was several feet above us on the opposite bank of the river. I determined to get as close as possible to the river bank and, if practicable, cross and get on their flank. I sent Sergeant Fuller to examine the ground in front. Most of it was swampy, but there was one dry place that would afford more protection than the place we were in. A few men at a time were moved up while there was a lull in the fire of the enemy, but they soon discovered what we were doing and continued their firing. As it grew lighter their aim improved very much, and they were now getting their fire down so that it was apt to be effective. From this second position I sent Sergeant Barrows and Corporal Barber with his squad off to the left to see if they could discover a means of crossing. There were no rafts or boats to be found, and Sergeant Barrows ascertained to a certainty by wading in that the stream was not fordable. Private Henry V. Tjarnel severely wounded through the left thigh while with this party. Finding no means of crossing, these men got as close as possible to the river bank, and standing up boldly on a dyke between two swamps, without any protecting cover and with but slight concealment, proceeded to pour an oblique fire into the enemy, who was now hastily retreating, evidently fearing to wait for broad daylight. Shortly after getting into my second position I had written





FIRST NEBRASKA VOLUNTEERS EN ROUTE TO OUTPOST CAMP M (GOLD MOUNTAIN) FEBRUARY 1899

a note to Major Kobbé, asking that Captain O'Hara at Paombon be notified of the enemy in my front, that he might take them in flank and rear, but the wire having been cut this could not be done. About 6 a. m. Sergeant Lang, of H Battery, was shot through the head and mortally wounded. He was with a detachment of H Battery, which Sergeant Steinert of that battery had reported to me. They had been driven away from a bridge where they were acting as an outpost. About the same time Privates George C. Wampler and Robert Moles, both of Battery L, were slightly wounded, the former having his right eyebrow shot off and the latter being struck on the hand. During the retreat of the enemy a constant fire was kept up by them, which was returned whenever they offered a fair target.

After those immediately across the river from us had retreated a few hundred yards we began to receive volleys from our front and well to the right. The enemy were no doubt posted so as to cover the retreat if that should be necessary. When there was no longer any firing I crossed the river, a boat having been secured somewhere down the stream, and examined the ground where the enemy had been. I went over it again later on in company with Major Mallory, and I believe from the evidence existing in the way of little bunches of shells and the marks of powder smoke on the ground that there were about 150 rifles firing from the position across the river. The total number of men, from their appearance as they moved off, I believe to have been at least twice this. No dead, wounded, or rifles were found. Considerable ammunition was picked up and thrown in the river. Most of it was Remington. It was new and had not been reloaded.

The bullets were apparently lead, that portion of the bullet in the shell being surrounded with paper. This engagement was unique in that it seems to have been a desperate and determined attack by Filipinos, a rather rare occurrence. I have been told that the enemy suffered severely before reaching a position out of range.

Very respectfully,

P. M. KESSLER,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery L.

APPENDIX 13.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., on an expedition to search for arms supposed to be concealed by insurgents in rice stacks in the field near Mariquina, it having been reported by a previous reconnoitering party, which was attacked by insurgents and natives in white, that many of the latter ran out from the village toward these stacks in the field, and it was thought they obtained arms concealed there.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

PUMPING STATION, *February 27, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this afternoon I sent Company L, Captain Taylor, across the river to search the rice stacks for arms. When they arrived about 1,000 yards from Mariquina, half the company was detailed from the left for that purpose and the other half was deployed to cover them. Immediately a fire was opened from the town of Mariquina, and insurgent skirmishers also began to rush over from the foothills. Another company was sent over with orders not to interfere until necessary, and the enemy advancing from the foothills was driven back by the artillery. Company L drove back the insurgents from Mariquina, killing a sergeant and a private and securing 1 Remington rifle. Nothing was found in the stacks, but Mariquina seemed to be garrisoned with insurgents and numbers in uniform were seen along the edge of the foothills to the east. We had no casualties.

442 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

The outpost north of the Mariquina road is still occupied by insurgent sharpshooters whom we have not disturbed.

In a reconnoissance $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of the Pumping Station, Deposito road, no armed insurgents were seen nor are they in force a mile north of the Mariquina road.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

DEPOSITO, *February 27, 1899—10.38 a. m.*

Captain TAYLOR:

General Hale thinks it a good idea to search stacks across river for rifles. Do you think you could do it this p. m. with your company? Would you require any more help? Don't burn anything.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 27, 1899—10.45 a. m.*

Colonel STOTSENBURG:

Will go about 1.30. I think one company can do it, unless you desire to cover a considerable territory.

TAYLOR.

PUMPING STATION, *February 27, 1899.*

Colonel STOTSENBURG:

Searched stacks directly north of Mariquina Church around to pumping house, but found nothing. Were engaged by 20 or 25 soldados. Killed 2 and think 1 wounded. Carried off. Captured 1 Remington and sergeant's note book. Our loss none.

TAYLOR.

APPENDIX 14.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copies of reports Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., and Major Eastwick, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., on an engagement on March 5 between an Oregon detachment and three Nebraska companies, under command of Major Eastwick, with a body of insurgents, who had taken up an intrenched position across the Mariquina road, thus cutting off communication along the road between the Deposito and Mariquina outposts.

On receipt of telegram from Colonel Stotsenburg that these insurgents had been discovered between the Mariquina and waterworks roads, and stating that he considered it desirable to send an Oregon platoon to patrol road to our outposts, I telegraphed him: "Important to keep country between Mariquina and waterworks roads clear of insurgents and also at least half a mile north of Mariquina road, but do not want Oregon platoon to get seriously engaged with any large force."

I proceeded to the Deposito and found that the patrol had come upon the insurgents intrenched across road in too strong a force and position to be driven out, and had sent across country for the Nebraska companies on waterworks road as support, that Major Eastwick had gone out in charge and that they were engaged in routing the insurgents from their position and driving them north of the Mariquina road, all of which was very proper and creditable, under the circumstances, as it would be extremely undesirable to allow the enemy to maintain a position on this road.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA, U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station Near Manila, March 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to state that Sunday morning, at 9 o'clock, First Sergeant Robbins, Company B, First Nebraska, reported to me that there was about one company of Filipinos between the Manila-Mariquina road and the Deposito-Pumping Station road. I telegraphed the facts to the brigade commander, and also issued an order in accordance with it for a reconnoissance from the Deposito to the outpost on the Mariquina road. A copy of which is herewith inclosed.

It became evident to the commander of the patrol, Captain Moon, that the insurgents were too strong for him, besides being strongly intrenched on the Mariquina road between the Deposito and our outpost; so he sent word over to B Company (Captain Ough), E Company (Captain Zeilinger), and H Company (Captain Eager), all of whom are on outpost on the waterworks road. As the firing was very heavy and increasing, I sent Maj. P. G. Eastwick, Second Oregon, with one company from the Deposito and a Hotchkiss gun, to the front, with orders to Major Eastwick to open up the road. This was done. The report of Major Eastwick is inclosed. There were no casualties on our side. Six insurgents were known to have been killed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

HDQRS. THIRD BATTALION, SECOND OREGON VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
In the Field Near San Juan del Monte, March 5, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

(Through Col. J. M. Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.)

SIR: In compliance with orders from Colonel Stotsenburg, Captain Moon, with 24 men, was sent out with instructions to proceed in line of skirmishers south of Mariquina road, and to proceed as far as Nebraska outpost and to return on north side of Mariquina road to locate insurgents, but not to bring on a general engagement. Captain Moon proceeded as directed, and about $1\frac{1}{2}$ or $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles out encountered the insurgents behind a barricade across Mariquina road and in the bottom of a dry creek running through a native village. The insurgents opened up a heavy fire on his left. He placed his men in position and they replied to their fire. However, the number of insurgents seemed to be too large for him to dislodge with his detachment; he therefore fell back and awaited reinforcements. Colonel Stotsenburg hearing the heavy firing sent word to me to take command, I already having gone out to find out the cause of the heavy firing and to see that Captain Moon was not cut off. Upon arrival I found that Companies B and H, First Nebraska, had just arrived, and that Company E was then moving from its camp to a position on our right. I ordered Company B and detachment from Third Battalion, Second Oregon, to proceed toward position occupied by insurgents, and sent Company H, First Nebraska, to the left to flank them. As soon as we came in sight of the enemy they opened up a heavy fire which was replied to. After reconnoitering ground I found the insurgents were probably from 50 to 60 strong and well intrenched, and our fire from front had little effect in dislodging them. One platoon from Company B, Captain Ough, was sent to right to flank them. Company E, First Nebraska, was then instructed to take a position flanking insurgents' intrenchments and in rear of them, and when in position to open fire in their rear. Company H, First Nebraska, reported back from left and was held in reserve. The ground being very rough and covered with thick undergrowth of brush, it was somewhat difficult for troops on flank to get their positions. Nevertheless, the platoon of Company B worked its way about 30 yards from the intrenchments and to their left. Company E, First Nebraska, moved across Mariquina road to the north of road in rear of insurgents and took up position; the entire line opened up a cross fire on enemy's position, driving them to the right with a loss to them of 4 men known to have been killed, and presumably a number of others were killed and wounded; however, we did not stop to investigate. I only saw 1 gun that was taken from dead insurgents, and that was a Remington, and was in the hands of a soldier of Company B, First Nebraska.

Company H, First Nebraska, was then ordered to camp. A skirmish line was formed with detachment Oregon battalion on left, left resting on Mariquina road.

444 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Company B, First Nebraska, on right of Oregon detachment, and Company E, First Nebraska, on the right of Company B. The Hotchkiss gun, which had been sent for, arrived a few minutes after insurgents had been driven from their position, and took its position on Mariquina road on left of skirmish line. Company E, First Nebraska, continued to drive insurgents to right and drive them to a position some 2,500 yards to right. Company E was then recalled, the insurgents firing several volleys at them as they retired.

The line then proceed west, and when about half a mile from bamboo bridge, on Mariquina road, some insurgents on our right, concealed in brush, opened fire on our flank; the entire line swung to right, taking shelter behind rice ridge, and began firing at insurgents from about 1,000 to 1,500 yards distance. The order "cease firing" was immediately given and orders were given to retire to road, this being in compliance with instructions received by me from Colonel Stotsenburg. The several different companies and Hotchkiss gun were then ordered to respective camps. At this point Springfield-rifle reports could be heard near the position we had just left. Sending out to inquire cause of it, I found 20 men, under Captain Warrick, Company K, Second Oregon, had been ordered by Colonel Stotsenburg to protect our left. As there was no further necessity for this detachment it was ordered in. Captain Warrick reports that he arrived on top of a ridge, the course of which is east and west and about 1,000 yards north of Mariquina road, and at this point struck the enemy squarely on his right flank, with a range of 400 yards. Two volleys were fired at insurgents and they retired in disorder; he then paid attention to company of insurgents on his left, which held their position some 500 or 600 yards distant. At this point he was ordered to retire. He estimates the number of insurgents in the company on his left and detachment on his front to be about 100 all told, and that several insurgents were seen to fall, one of them being a sharpshooter concealed in a tree.

Very respectfully,

P. G. EASTWICK, Jr.,
Major, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

APPENDIX 15.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., with reports of Captain Barber, Captain Warrick, and Lieutenant Murphy, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., on operations, March 6, against insurgents who surrounded the Nebraska outpost on Mariquina road and other bodies of insurgents encountered along the Mariquina road by the Oregon companies and Hotchkiss revolving-cannon detachment, sent from the deposito to support the outpost; also subsequent repulse, by Nebraska companies, of insurgents, who attacked the camp at pumping station from the south while the engagement on Mariquina road was in progress.

After the engagement of the day before, in which a party of insurgents intrenched on the Mariquina road was driven off, I spent the night with Colonel Stotsenburg at the deposito, where advice was received during the night that the insurgents were threatening the Mariquina outpost. Support was sent from camp at pumping station. Early next morning an Oregon detachment, under Captain Barber, with Hotchkiss revolving cannon, under Lieutenant Murphy, were dispatched along the Mariquina road, and later Colonel Stotsenburg went out the waterworks road to investigate and take charge, if necessary. I remained at the deposito, from the roof of which the movements on both waterworks and Mariquina roads and vicinity can be observed. In accordance with telegraphic request from Colonel Stotsenburg another Oregon company (Captain Warrick) was sent out as reenforcement. Both of these commands encountered considerable resistance along the road, as detailed in reports, before reaching the Nebraska outpost. The subsequent proceedings are explained in Colonel Stotsenburg's report.

These operations effectually cleared the district surrounding the pumping station and Mariquina road.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station near Manila, March 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at about 8 p. m. Sunday our outpost, consisting of Company I, which was on the Mariquina road, was cut off by a superior force of insurgents and completely surrounded. They sent for assistance (I inclose a copy of the telegram received by me) and Company D was sent to their support with orders not to open fire, unless absolutely necessary, until morning. I ordered 40 men, under Captain Barber, of the Second Oregon, to return to the Mariquina road at reveille, at 7 a. m. Monday. I proceeded to the Mariquina road and found that companies A, D, I, and F, and 2 guns of Utah Battery were about to contest the ground in vicinity of the outpost, and that the insurgents were strongly intrenched, both to the east and north of our position, and flanking us on both sides. I ordered the Utah Battery to open fire on their position, and sent for Hotchkiss guns, and they were sent out with Captain Warrick's company on the Mariquina road. In the meantime I changed front, facing from north to the northeast, and after the Utah Artillery had shelled their intrenchments I ordered A and I companies to charge them, and then made a turning movement with A, I, and F around the enemy's left flank. While the Hotchkiss guns were opened up on the Mariquina road, supported by Company D and the Oregon companies, we charged a very strong position of the insurgents in the rocks and killed quite a number of them there, as they could not leave their position without being shot in the open. We pursued this body until they scattered beyond the San Juan River, north of San Francisco del Monte.

Our casualties were 3 First Nebraska and 2 Oregon men wounded; none serious.

On our return to camp I found that we were surrounded on the south and south-east by insurgents and sharpshooters. We drove them off with artillery and after a severe infantry fight by companies K, L, and M. Two of the Hospital-Corps men were wounded in camp.

Very respectfully

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

[Telegram.]

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Camp Stotsenburg, March 5, 1899.

Colonel STOTSENBURG:

Part of I in breastworks south of Mariquina road and balance up behind rocks on ridge near stone fortification south of and joining Mariquina road. Company D has gone to breastworks occupied by Company I. Did not send any guns up until, seeing from what point attack would be concentrated from their present position they, Company I, reports driven back from Mariquina road, which has been occupied by insurgents. I am sending Company D to reinforce them and moving 2 guns back of camp to gun pit on Deposito road to control both flanks.

MULFORD, Major.

[Telegram.]

MARCH 6, 1899.

Colonel STOTSENBURG:

Company K (Captain Warrick), Second Oregon, 17 men and Gatling, have just started out Mariquina road to connect with your line. Gatling was sent by order General Hale.

EASTWICK, Major.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, *March 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT,

Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report: That on March 6, at 10 a. m., I was ordered to move out east on Mariquina road and place my company in action on the left of Nebraska companies.

At a point about 2 miles east of crossroads I moved north about 300 yards, where I came in full view of the enemy and facing his right flank. After firing about 30 volleys at about 800 yards the enemy retreated in disorder to the hills north and west. The company then came back to Mariquina road and assisted a Nebraska company in burning a native village. I awaited orders at this place until 3.30 p. m. Was then ordered by Major Eastwick to move on out Mariquina road to Nebraska outposts, and arrived there at 5 p. m.

The company did outpost duty during the night.

March 7.—Company did outpost duty during the entire day.

March 8.—At 10 a. m. was ordered by Major Mulford to take a platoon and burn native village below outposts near San Mateo River. We were fired upon by insurgents from the timber and brush on right of village. The entire place was destroyed. There were no casualties during the last three days.

At 5 p. m. the company was brought back to the trenches at crossroads, after having been relieved by a Nebraska company.

Estimated distance traveled, 12 miles.

Very respectfully,

ELMER O. WARRICK,

Captain, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Company K.

IN THE FIELD, March 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Battalion, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.,

in the field, near San Juan del Monte.

SIR: I have the honor to report the movements of detachment of my command, consisting of 40 men, and detachment of Hotchkiss gun under command of Lieutenant Murphy.

March 6, 1899.—Detachment of Company G left Pulverin and reported at crossroads at 5.45 a. m., where was joined by Hotchkiss gun detachment, under command of Lieutenant Murphy. Proceeded up Mariquina road, throwing out skirmishers on each side of road to a distance of 300 yards on either side of road. On reaching village east of barricade the left flank was fired on (volley) from the ridge opposite. The enemy were distant about 1,600 yards and scattered, and the Hotchkiss gun could not be placed in position. Proceeded along road, and on other side of village firing commenced. We advanced and placed gun in position and fired. The enemy retreated and we advanced from this point. The firing was practically continuous along our front and left flanks. At a distance of about 600 yards from Nebraska outpost the firing was heaviest. We were then encircled on two sides. The gun was placed in position and some rounds fired. We maintained our position, withdrawing to the road so as to bring the enemy on front. Here we were joined by a Nebraska company, and firing was resumed all along the line. Reported to the captain of the company and also to Major Mulford, of the Nebraskas.

As the Americans were advancing along our front at a distance of about a mile, we moved by the left flank, and then moved with the enemy, who were now flanked.

The gun did good work and finally we got into position on the flank of the American troops with enemy on our left front. Here we planted a few shells, and the enemy having retreated we returned to the Nebraska outpost, and took over the guard from the officer in command. After some time we were joined by Company K of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, with a Gatling gun. Under direction of Colonel Stotsenburg we threw out Cossack posts and dug trenches. The night passed quietly.

March 7, 1899.—No change all day; very quiet. Guards and Cossack posts as before. No disturbance at all.

March 8, 1899.—Usual guards. A platoon was sent to village to set it on fire, by command of Major Mulford, of the Nebraska Volunteers.

Relieved by a company of Nebraska Volunteers and returned to Pulverin, leaving Hotchkiss gun on crossroads. The gun did good work, only jamming once and that from bad ammunition. The direction and elevation were good.

On the way along the road some men got separated from the detachment and joined some Nebraska companies, afterwards reporting to their company. While with a Nebraska company Private Eide, of Company G, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., was wounded, how severely I was not able to learn. Private Stanton (H. L.), Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, was wounded while endeavoring to join his company.

Very respectfully,

R. H. BARBER,

Captain, Commanding Company G, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, *March 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT,

Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I beg to report as follows:

In compliance with order of Colonel Stotsenburg, 1 Hotchkiss gun, under command of Sergeant Bachman, was ordered to San Juan del Monte church at 7.30 p. m. 5th.

March 6.—In compliance with verbal orders from Major Eastwick, jr., commanding Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, I reported to Captain Barber, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, at 5.30 a. m., with Hotchkiss gun and crew ready to move out Mariquina road under his command.

Took up the march at 6.05 a. m. and moved along Mariquina road toward Nebraska outpost. Advanced along road to the end of native village about 2½ miles from crossroads, where a scattering fire from the enemy was encountered. Skirmish line, under Captain Barber, had no trouble in driving them back some 500 yards, where they made a stand, and I was directed to put gun in action, which was done under heavy fire. The enemy were found to be intrenched some 300 yards to the left of the road, at a point which commanded road in an open place. After firing some 10 or 15 shots they were dislodged and I advanced along road about 500 yards. We were again successful in driving them from intrenched position commanding road.

I placed gun in action some seven or eight times at different places along road where it could be used to advantage, always controlling fire with view to saving ammunition, as per directions of Major Eastwick. I could have used more shells to advantage in sweeping line of smoke of enemy's fire if I had had plenty of shells.

At last place of action we were unusually successful in placing shells among the enemy, forcing them from their position at 1,200-yard range, having to fire over left of line of skirmishers (Nebraskas). We were doing fine execution when I was compelled to cease firing owing to lack of ammunition, having fired 190 rounds, leaving 10, which I considered necessary for the defense of the place itself.

Proceeded to Nebraska outpost. On arrival of Colonel Stotsenburg he ordered gun to be placed on brow of hill overlooking Mariquina River.

Received 96 rounds ammunition at 5.30 p. m.

Three shells stuck in gun during the day, but on account of having hollow rammer mentioned in a previous report, I had no difficulty in freeing the gun, with very little delay.

I wish to call attention to the fine gun practice of Corporal McDonald, who placed shells where directed with great skill.

Gun was struck three times by bullets.

March 7.—Everything quiet all day.

March 8.—Received orders at 5 p. m. to return to crossroads. Arrived at crossroads 7 p. m.

Distance traveled, about 10 miles.

No casualties.

Respectfully submitted.

CHAS. A. MURPHY,

Second Lieutenant, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry,

Commanding H and G Batteries.

APPENDIX 16.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

Manila, P. I., March 11, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a combined movement by Nebraska, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, and Wyoming troops, Utah guns, and gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, undertaken in accordance with the wishes of the department and division commanders to clear out a considerable force of insurgents who had occupied the ridge south of waterworks road extending southwesterly toward Guadalupe, and who had been threatening and annoying the Nebraska companies on waterworks road, Wyoming battalion from Deposito south to Pasig River, and left flank of First Brigade, Second Division, at San Pedro Macati. Copies of reports of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Captain Reynolds, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, and Captain Miller, First Battalion Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V., are inclosed.

Monday night, March 6, the officers were assembled at Deposito and instructed as to the details of the proposed movement, which were embodied in the following memoranda:

“Colonel STOTSENBERG, *First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.*;

“Lieutenant-Colonel McCASKEY, *Twentieth U. S. Infantry*:

“At daylight Companies B, E, G, Nebraska, extending from Deposito about 600 yards east along pumping station road, will move southeast, swinging around to south, against north flank of insurgents located east of Wyoming position, and, if possible, drive them south toward San Pedro Macati and Pasig River, destroying or capturing them, if possible.

“Two companies Twentieth will follow left wing at about 300 yards as reserve and attack and clear out any parties of enemy on ridge south of road who may fire on Nebraska line as it turns to right and south, after which these companies of Twentieth will swing to south as the left of the Nebraska line.

“Wyoming is to cooperate by containing enemy in front and join in the movement, if practicable, later.

“The Utah guns and gunboat will fire on enemy’s position at beginning of movement, latter continuing twenty minutes, former as long as practicable.

“Company H, Nebraska, and one company Twentieth on road about a mile east of Deposito will move south against insurgents in their front.”

“WYOMING BATTALION:

“F company will move to C company’s position before 6 a. m. F and C will form extended line on high ground occupied by C company’s outposts by 6 a. m., and when artillery fire begins¹ will open a slow, deliberate fire with about 10 sharpshooters from each company at visible enemy, holding his attention while Nebraska and Twentieth swing to south against enemy’s flank, and will advance in general harmony with the Nebraska and Twentieth attack, but not too soon or rapidly, so as to mask their fire or fire into them. H and G companies will advance in line and general touch with F and C.”

“Captain GRANT, *Commanding Laguna de Bay*:

“Beginning about 6 a. m. to-morrow, we propose to make a combined movement against insurgents in Wyoming front, opening with artillery from hill east of San Juan church. As soon as this fire begins, but not before, please fire on the ridge opposite your position (Captain Wrighter will explain) for 20 minutes only, and then cease and do not fire again, as you would fire into Nebraska and Twentieth, who will swing around on the insurgents’ north flank.”

I telegraphed Captain Wedgwood, Utah Light Battery, at pumping station, to bring 2 guns, with 10 shell and 40 shrapnel each, to Deposito to take position on hill east of San Juan del Monte church, to cooperate in the movement, and on his arrival gave him detailed instructions.

At 6.50 a. m., the Nebraska and Twentieth Infantry troops being ready, I signaled, as prearranged, from roof of Deposito to Wyoming companies on hill east of San Felipe, and they promptly began firing, as specified in the memorandum.

An orderly was sent to Colonel Stotsenburg directing him to proceed with his command, which was immediately put in march across fields to south.

The insurgents soon began firing in reply to Wyoming, as expected, and the gunboat and Utah guns opened up on their positions. The gunboat continued twenty minutes, in accordance with instructions, and ceased. The Utah guns continued until the Nebraska and Twentieth troops approached the vicinity of the insurgents, when I sent word to Captain Wedgwood to cease firing and move his guns to the hill east of San Felipe convent, occupied by Wyoming.

About this time General McArthur and staff arrived and witnessed the engagement from the roof of the Deposito.

Colonel Stotsenburg’s command engaged the insurgents on the ridge southeast of Deposito, partially surrounded them, and after quite a stubborn resistance drove them from the hill toward the Pasig River, across which at least a part of them made their way.

As soon as the enemy’s right was turned and driven back, I proceeded to our right and found that the Wyoming battalion was advancing, accompanied by Major Bell, of the information department, who rendered valuable assistance, and was driving the insurgents from their strong position in quarry and ravine on ridge opposite Guadalupe. Overtaking the two right companies, who were occupying the high ground

¹Afterwards instructed them to commence firing at signal from Deposito, to develop insurgent position for artillery.

Manila Bay

aced in M. I. D., A. G.

opposite San Pedro Macati, while the two left companies, with Major Bell, were swinging to the right toward the Pasig River, I took the right company forward into the pottery kilns opposite Guadalupe church, where they could cooperate better with the left wing and also cover the ground around church, from which the insurgents had been annoying the left of the First Division and kept up a scattering fire on us.

After this movement was completed and the ground cleared of the enemy, I placed the Wyoming battalion to hold the position, sent an orderly with message (11 a. m.) to San Felipe to be telegraphed to General MacArthur, and crossed the Pasig to General Wheaton's headquarters to confer with him as to the advisability of taking advantage of the routing of insurgents from vicinity of Guadalupe to advance his left to the high ground at that place, our right to be correspondingly advanced to the position then held by Wyoming. After visiting his intrenchments I recrossed the river and reconnoitered the ground for half a mile in front of Wyoming, found a good position, returned to General Wheaton's headquarters, and telegraphed General MacArthur as follows (4.50 p. m.):

"Reconnoitered country opposite Guadalupe and found good position opposite high ground beyond Guadalupe church, which Wheaton's brigade would occupy if it advanced. Can hold this position with Wyoming to-night if decided to advance, Wheaton's left to correspond. If latter is to remain in present position, better withdraw Wyoming to old position. Awaiting answer."

At 5.15 p. m. a message was received from General MacArthur stating that the department commander did not favor advancing the line to Guadalupe, and that it was therefore not necessary to further consider the expediency of advancing on our side. I therefore directed the Wyoming battalion to retire to its former intrenched position and returned to the Deposito.

All of the troops engaged in the operations behaved admirably and did hard and courageous work in driving the insurgents from their exceedingly strong positions in quarries, ravines, rocks, and earthworks.

Our casualties were as follows: First Nebraska Infantry, 1 officer and 1 enlisted man wounded, 2 enlisted men killed; Twentieth United States Infantry, 2 enlisted men wounded; First Battalion Wyoming, 1 officer and 3 enlisted men wounded, of which 1 enlisted man subsequently died. Maj. J. F. Bell, information department, was wounded in the side, but pluckily continued throughout the action.

Information has been obtained from natives that the insurgents were assembling with a view of making a determined attack on our lines in the vicinity of San Juan del Monte, in the hope of breaking through and entering Manila. Whether this is true or not, there is no doubt that they were congregating in considerable force, and if not interfered with would have made serious trouble along our extremely thin line on waterworks road and from Deposito south to Pasig River. Since driving them out of this district and vicinity of pumping station and Mariquina road the day before, that part of the country has been practically free from insurgents and gratifyingly quiet.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, near Manila, March 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I received the following order,¹ and as the gunboat on the river had not opened fire, we were ordered to proceed at once with our part of the movement.

My command consisted of a part of the Second Battalion (Captain Reynolds), H (Captain Greene), A (Lieutenant Mearns), M (Lieut. M. F. Smith), all of the Twentieth Infantry; E company (Captain Zeilinger), B (Captain Ough), H (Captain Eager), G (Captain Forby)—B, E, and G companies, First Nebraska, constituting the right wing and Companies A and H, of the Twentieth Infantry, constituting the left wing. Companies H (Captain Eager), First Nebraska, and M (Lieut. M. F. Smith), Twentieth Infantry covered our left flank. After proceeding about 600 yards to the southeast we encountered the enemy, and also got into contact with Companies H, First Nebraska, and M, Twentieth Infantry. After some severe firing

¹ Refers to memorandum embodied in brigade commander's report.

we continued the movement and Eager's and Smith's companies were directed more to the east to protect our flanks. The rest of the command moved south to complete the movement, and surrounded these companies of the enemy, which was done almost in exact accordance with the inclosed¹ order of the brigade commander, but they swam the Pasig River and began firing on us from the other side, near Guadalupe. We killed 20 men in this affair. As there was nothing further to be accomplished, and as our right was under fire of artillery and infantry, I ordered the troops to withdraw. We had returned to within a mile of the Deposito, when we were again attacked by insurgents, who returned from east after H and M companies had withdrawn, Companies E, B, and part of G acting as rear guard. I then ordered two companies and H of the Twentieth Infantry to reenforce the Nebraska companies, and we drove the insurgents back to the Santalon River, killing 8. There were three or four insurgents wounded that we attended to and left on the field.

All the men acted with their usual calmness and bravery.

We lost two men of the Nebraska, killed, 1 officer (Captain Ough) and 4 men wounded.

The report of Capt. Alfred Reynolds and the order¹ of Brigadier-General Hale herewith submitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. STOTSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. I.

CAMP SECOND BATTALION, TWENTIETH INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I., March 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT TWENTIETH INFANTRY, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this battalion left its camp Monday, the 6th, at about 1 p. m., with one day's rations, armed and equipped for active operations. Under the direction of the regimental commander, the battalion marched to the Deposito and there went into bivouac at about 4.45 p. m. same day. At dusk, by direction of General Hale, the following disposition was made:

Company A remained at the Deposito, relieving the two outposts of Company G, First Nebraska Volunteers, posted in the vicinity; Company H, Twentieth Infantry, proceeded along pump-house road about one-half mile from Deposito and relieved the outposts of Company E, First Nebraska Volunteers, with orders to occupy the trenches of that company the next morning, while it participated in a projected offensive movement. The outposts were four in number—two of cordon and two of patrol. Company M, Twentieth Infantry, proceeded along pump-house road beyond Company H, about three-fourths of a mile, and in a similar way relieved Company B, First Nebraska Volunteers; Company I, Twentieth Infantry, similarly relieved Company K, Second Oregon Volunteers, on the Mariquina road, about 250 yards from its junction with the Deposito road and toward Mariquina. This disposition was made with the intention of relieving the volunteers that they might participate in an offensive movement against the insurgent Filipinos the following morning. During the night it was decided that the battalion, save Company I, 1 noncommissioned officer and 12 enlisted men of which supports the Utah Battery, should take part in the contemplated attack (see memorandum² herewith). The operation, as directed in this memorandum, was successfully performed, save that no insurgents were captured. Their organization, such as it was, was completely destroyed and the fugitives driven across the Pasig River. The action was over about 9.45 a. m. and the troops withdrew. About 10.30 a. m., as Companies A and H, Twentieth Infantry, were continuing their withdrawal, after a rest, the action was resumed by the insurgents, who in the meantime had returned. These companies were faced about, and, with the assistance of a Nebraska company, forced the insurgents again across the river. This repulse seemed to be final, for after occupying the position for some time these companies withdrew to their respective positions without further molestation; nor, as far as known, had any of the insurgents returned up to the time the battalion started to return to the city of Manila. In obedience to instructions, the companies of the battalion were assembled at the junction of the Mariquina and Deposito roads at 7.20 a. m., March 8, and at that time the battalion started for Manila, reaching its camp at 9.45 a. m. same day. On the 7th the companies engaged fought over about 5 miles of the roughest kind of ground, and Companies A and H went over part of it a second time; but in spite of the ground and excessive

¹ Refers to memorandum embodied in brigade commander's report.

² Memorandum ordered embodied in brigade commander's report.

heat the men behaved admirably. Two men were overcome by heat and 2 men wounded. The small loss from fire we owe to the bad marksmanship of the enemy. I have nothing but praise to say regarding the officers and men.

Dr. Kirkpatrick was at all times up with the firing line, and rendered service both to our injured and those of the insurgents.

Very respectfully,

ALFRED REYNOLDS,
Captain, Twentieth Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

HDQRS. FIRST WYOMING INFANTRY, U. S. V., *March 10, 1899.*

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the First Battalion Wyoming Infantry in the engagement between the San Juan and Pasig rivers north of Guadalupe on Tuesday, March 7, 1899:

In obedience to memorandum of instructions from brigade commander dated Deposito, March 6, 1899, the battalion took position at 6 o'clock a. m., March 7, 1899, facing the enemy's front, Company F (Capt. John D. O'Brien commanding) to the left of the high ground occupied by Company C's outpost, Company C (Second Lieut. Loren Cheever commanding) to the right of said outpost, Company H (Capt. E. P. Holtenhouse commanding) to the right of C, and Company G (Capt. D. C. Wrighter commanding) to the right of H.

I sent 10 sharpshooters from Company C and the same number from Company F to occupy the hill between C and F. At a signal from the Deposito at 6.30 a. m. I ordered the sharpshooters to open fire. The insurgents replied from a distance of about 1,000 yards to our left and front and then from another point 800 yards in our front. The artillery on our left and the gunboat *Laguna de Bay* on our right opened fire. The Nebraska and Twentieth Infantry appeared in the distance attacking the enemy's flank near the Pasig River opposite the Deposito, and I immediately ordered an advance. The battalion halted within 400 yards of the insurgent breastworks and poured a heavy fire on the enemy, to which the insurgents replied very stubbornly. At this point Capt. John D. O'Brien was wounded in the right wrist, and his company being without an officer, I ordered the adjutant, First Lieut. H. D. Coburn, to take charge of Company F. Major Bell, of the information bureau, who was present, rendering me gallant assistance received a slight flesh wound, and Private Joseph M. Spoeth, of Company C, fell wounded in the abdomen. Company C then charged on the enemy's breastworks, Company F took up the charge on the left, and Company H on the right. The insurgents made a brief stand and then fled toward the brush, pursued by the battalion. Captain Holtenhouse, Lieutenant Coburn, and Lieutenant Cheever led their respective companies in the charge.

I sent word to Captain Wrighter to cover our right flank and prevent the enemy from escaping in that direction. The advance was continued through almost impenetrable brush, a constant fire coming from the retreating enemy. The battalion reached the Pasig River, in front of Guadalupe Church, at 11 o'clock a. m., and fired across the river at the insurgents who had waded or swam the Pasig. The brigade commander ordered me to hold C, F, and H near the river and await orders. At the same time he directed Company G to take position in line with General Wheaton's outposts across the river and fire on the enemy from that point. Company G fired several volleys and kept up a desultory fire at enemy until 7 o'clock p. m.

Corpl. John A. McConnell, Company C, was wounded in the right ankle and Musician George E. Small, Company G, was wounded in the right leg after we reached the river.

At 7 o'clock p. m. the battalion returned to camp by order of the brigade commander. The men behaved with admirable courage. Their charge on the insurgent breastworks was brilliant and picturesque.

I estimate the insurgent killed and wounded at about 60.

Total distance traveled, 9 miles.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS MILLAR,
*Captain, First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding Battalion, March 7, 1899.*

APPENDIX 17.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Malolos, P. I.

SIR: In accordance with instructions from division commander, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this brigade during the month of March, 1899. Regimental reports inclosed.

From March 1 to 24, inclusive, the brigade held line from La Loma church southeasterly to San Juan Bridge, thence easterly past Deposito to pumping station, with detachment on Mariquina road 1 mile north of pumping station, and a branch line from Deposito south to Pasig River opposite San Pedro Macati. Total length of line, 10½ miles.

ENGAGEMENTS MARCH 1-24.

[Detailed reports previously submitted.]

March 5.—Engagement of Companies B, E, and H, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., and detachment of Companies C and K, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., under Major Eastwick, Second Oregon, to drive out a body of insurgents intrenched across the Mariquina road, northeast of Deposito, which was successfully accomplished with considerable loss on the part of the insurgents. No casualties on our side.

March 6.—Engagement of Companies A, D, F, and I, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., Companies G and K, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., with Hotchkiss gun and detachment of Utah Light Artillery with 2 guns, all under Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska, against a force of insurgents who had surrounded the Nebraska outpost on Mariquina road north of pumping station. The insurgents were driven several miles and scattered, with considerable loss. Our casualties, 3 Nebraska and 2 Oregon men wounded.

Companies K, L, and M, First Nebraska, with Utah Artillery, also drove off insurgents attacking pumping-station camp from south.

March 7.—Engagement of Companies B, E, G, and H, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., Companies A, H, M, and part of I, Twentieth U. S. Infantry (under Captain Reynolds), all under Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska, and First Battalion Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V., under Captain Millar, against a body of insurgents along ridge south of Deposito pumping-station road, extending southwesterly toward Guadalupe, who were threatening and annoying the Wyoming Battalion and the left of First Division at San Pedro Macati. The object was to turn the insurgents' right flank with Nebraska and Twentieth Infantry troops, attacking their left in front with Wyoming, driving them toward the Pasig River above Guadalupe. This was accomplished and the entire district between the Pasig River, Mariquina River, and Deposito pumping-station road thoroughly cleared of insurgents. Insurgent loss believed to be quite heavy. Our casualties were: First Nebraska Infantry—Two enlisted men killed, 1 officer, and 1 enlisted man wounded. Twentieth U. S. Infantry—Two enlisted men wounded. First Wyoming Infantry—One officer and 3 enlisted men wounded, of which latter 1 died.

March 16.—Companies B and K and one platoon of I, First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V., crossed Mariquina River from pumping station for the purpose of intercepting parties of insurgents retreating north from Cainta; were attacked by insurgents from Mariquina, and drove them out of the town and into the hills to northeast.

March 17.—A skirmish line of about 50 men from the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V., advanced from trenches southeast of La Loma church and repulsed a body of insurgents who attacked our line.

CHANGES MARCH 1-24.

March 14 and 15.—Colorado and Nebraska regiments exchanged places, former taking waterworks and road and latter the line in front of blockhouses 5, 6, and 7.

March 20.—A battalion of Thirteenth Minnesota relieved battalion of First Colorado on Deposito Pumping Station road. The Colorado battalion was placed on Mariquina road 1 mile north of pumping station, where a company had previously been kept on outpost.

March 22.—Another battalion of Thirteenth Minnesota relieved battalion (three companies) of Second Oregon near Deposito.

March 24.—The Fourth and Seventeenth U. S. Infantry of Third Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hall, occupied line from La Loma church to San Juan Bridge, and General Hall took command of troops east of San Juan River (Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming). This released Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Nebraska from the La Loma-San Juan line to take part in movement to north.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALOLAS.

March 25, 1899.—This brigade moved in accordance with General Orders, No. 13, March 24, 1899 (copy attached).

5.33 a. m.—Received message from division commander to start as soon as light enough.

5.37 a. m. to 5.42 a. m.—Sent orders to regimental commanders to proceed with movement as directed, beginning on right (Nebraska) and progressing toward left (South Dakota and Pennsylvania).

5.44 a. m.—Started two Nordenfeldt guns with detachment Utah Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Naylor, and accompanied by Lieutenant Perry, aid, to advance up Masambong sunken road under cover ahead of firing line to point where road comes to surface.

5.50 a. m.—Left of South Dakota, near sunken road, advanced, and Pennsylvania on left of sunken road, followed immediately. Brigade commander and staff accompanied South Dakota left wing and artillery.

5.52 a. m.—Insurgents opened lively fire on infantry and artillery, which latter was just coming into action where sunken road reaches surface and advanced gallantly with the infantry line. Our troops drove the insurgents from their intrenched positions—Nebraska along San Juan River at San Francisco del Monte, where Companies B, C, and L had a hand-to-hand fight with enemy, South Dakota in vicinity of sunken road and Masambong, and Pennsylvania on the left (west) of the sunken (Masambong) road.

6.10 a. m.—Passed barricade on Masambong road.

6.15 a. m.—Arrived Masambong. As artillery could not proceed farther along trail, it was directed to return if not called for within thirty minutes.

6.55 a. m.—Arrived at Caloocan-Balantasag road—east of Balantasag. Montana, in advancing, had obliqued to left (west) of La Loma-Balantasag road, and Pennsylvania and South Dakota, in accordance with instructions, had closed in to left on Montana, bringing Pennsylvania to La Loma-Balantasag road, and South Dakota west of trail leading north from Masambong. Nebraska, in capturing San Francisco del Monte and rough wooded country around San Juan River, had become somewhat separated. Leaving orders for South Dakota and Nebraska to form on Caloocan-Balantasag road, north of San Francisco del Monte, I proceeded westward on this road to Balantasag, sent Captain Brooks to form Pennsylvania on left of South Dakota, and then conduct it to next position on Cabatukan-Banlac road, reported to General MacArthur at Balantasag, and then (8.06 a. m., started) took South Dakota and Nebraska northeasterly across country, by compass, towards Cabatukan-Banlac road. During this advance we encountered an insurgent force on hill southwest of Banlac, and had to swing Nebraska somewhat to right to drive them out, after which the march was continued.

9.45 a. m.—Arrived with Nebraska on Cabatukan road, directed them to throw out outposts, and proceeded westward, finding South Dakota in position on road and Pennsylvania in contact on South Dakota's left, with their left on Cabatukan-Talipapa-Novaliches road, near Talipapa. An order was sent to Nebraska to close in to left on South Dakota, thus bringing the brigade into the exact position specified by the division commander as end of second movement.

10.36 a. m.—Reported to General MacArthur at Cabatukan.

10.50 a. m.—By direction of General MacArthur, sent order to regiments to move by left flank, closing brigade on Montana battalion in front of Cabatukan.

12.30 p. m.—In compliance with instructions from General MacArthur the brigade was ordered to advance in line northwesterly against insurgents along and beyond the Tuliahan River. (See Field Orders, No. 1, attached.) Captain Krayenbuhl accompanied Nebraska on the right.

1.30 p. m.—After completing this movement the brigade took position on northwest side of river, extending northerly along a commanding ridge and facing west, with left connecting with the battalion of Montana, which had crossed the river. I then returned to south bank of the river, reporting to division commander at church on road to Tuliahan ford (uncompleted bridge), and by his directions recrossed river (2.15 p. m.), sent Montana battalion back to south side, and extended Pennsylvania (left of Second Brigade) to cover ground vacated by Montana, placing left

on hill commanding river. After inspecting entire brigade, and finding it in good position (the right commanding a broad plain extending toward Polo), I returned to church and thence to Tuliahan Bridge, which had in the meantime been captured by a detachment of the Fourth Cavalry and Utah Artillery and crossed by the division commander and staff and part of the First Brigade.

4.45 p. m.—By direction of division commander, the brigade closed in to the left on Montana, opposite Tuliahan Bridge, and Pennsylvania moved to left to fill gap between Montana and Kansas. Outposts were placed on ridge north of line, and Major Allison's battalion of South Dakota was sent back across river to junction of Tuliahan and Novaliches roads, near Talipapa, to guard woods against insurgents reported to be coming in on rear from Novaliches.

March 26, 3.20 a. m.—Sent order to Major Allison to bring in his battalion at daylight.

5.30 a. m.—Major Allison's battalion reported.

6 a. m.—Meeting of division, brigade, and regimental commanders.

7 a. m.—Issued Field Orders, No. 2 (copy attached), for movement in line northwesterly across country toward Polo. Regiments advanced to preparatory position on ridge north of river.

10.25 a. m.—Issued Field Orders, No. 3 (copy attached), for modified movement in column westward along road, changing direction to north and then on left into line, facing toward Polo, thus retaining possession of Tuliahan-Melinta road.

11.20 a. m.—Joined division commander at head of column on road.

11.30 a. m.—By direction of division commander, sent Lieutenant Perry to rear of column to bring up a platoon of Utah Artillery.

11.45 a. m.—Lieutenant Perry returned with artillery. Part of Third Artillery and Twentieth Kansas (First Brigade), with Utah Artillery, were then moved to front (west) and engaged enemy east of Melinta, near railroad.

12.30 p. m. (about).—Firing began. Second Brigade closed up on First Brigade.

1.15 p. m.—Overtook division commander on road some 2 miles east of Melinta, and was directed to move brigade northwesterly across field, deploy to north of First Brigade, and take such action against enemy or town of Polo as circumstances might render advisable.

1.32 p. m.—Head of Second Brigade (Pennsylvania) left road, marching northwesterly.

1.49 p. m.—Crossed Novaliches-Bemon road.

2.07 p. m.—Crossed east-and-west road and began deployment on left into line north of Montana, extending north and south and facing west toward Polo. When Pennsylvania was partially deployed, insurgents opened fire from north, to meet which the Pennsylvania right was refused 45 degrees, facing northwest, and South Dakota was directed to deploy east and west, facing north. More insurgent fire developing to our right (east), the right battalion of South Dakota was refused, facing east, giving a semicircular formation around crest of hill, convex side to north, with two companies Pennsylvania and one battalion South Dakota in reserve within the semicircle under cover of hill, and Nebraska as general reserve farther to rear. (See sketch on next page.)

2.40 p. m.—Deployment completed.

2.50 p. m.—Colonel Frost, South Dakota, was directed to send his right battalion, Major Howard, to east to drive off the insurgents attacking our right flank, and then return it to right of line, facing north. This was successfully accomplished. There being no fire from the west, Pennsylvania made a right half wheel, forming in extension of South Dakota's line, facing north. In meantime Captain Brooks was sent to division commander with request for Utah Artillery to open attack on the enemy's strong intrenchments to north, preparatory to the infantry advance, but as it was considered impracticable for the guns to reach our position on hill, they prepared to fire from the left, near railroad, against such intrenchments as they could reach. The small Hotchkiss gun with Nebraska Regiment was brought forward to hill and did effective work on eastern intrenchments.

3.23 p. m.—Utah Artillery began firing on west.


3.24 p. m.—Insurgents replied.

3.30 p. m.—Verbal order given for infantry attack after preliminary artillery fire.

3.35 p. m.—Verbal order confirmed by Field Orders, No. 4 (copy attached), specifying flank attack by right battalion of South Dakota (Allison's reserve battalion put in place of Howard's, which was exhausted by movement to east), and front attack by South Dakota left, and all of Pennsylvania. Nebraska in reserve.

3.50 p. m.—Hotchkiss gun began firing on right. Lively reply from insurgents.

4.06 p. m.—South Dakota and Pennsylvania advanced, Nebraska following as



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ADVANCE ON MALOLOS. FIRST MONTANA AND TENTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS ON FIRING LINE

reserve. South Dakota right flanked insurgents' left, as planned, and enemy was driven back along the line.

When movement was properly under way, I proceeded with staff, overtook Pennsylvania as they were approaching main road running northeast to Meycauayan, and supposing that main body of enemy was west of road in vicinity of Polo, halted Pennsylvania on this road, sent Captain Brooks to left to see if any of the First Brigade troops were in that locality (he found they were not), sent Lieutenant Perry to South Dakota left battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Stover) to swing it slightly to left on Pennsylvania right, and went with Captain Krayenbuhl and orderly to South Dakota extreme right (Major Allison) to bring them around to left in same way, intending then to swing entire brigade to left (west) and if possible cut off the insurgents' retreat northward from Polo. On reaching South Dakota right, found it under a hot fire from intrenchments across railroad bridge and woods and village near Meycauayan railroad station north of bridge. While locating position of enemy, I was hit below the knee by a shot which glanced from the bone without serious injury. Seeing that it would be necessary to flank the insurgent trenches across the river, I directed the right companies to wheel to right behind railway embankment and sent Captain Krayenbuhl to countermand previous order to Lieutenant-Colonel Stover's left battalion and swing it to right toward river, from which location they could partially enfilade the enemy's position. Captain Krayenbuhl (accompanied by Lieutenant Perry, who had delivered previous order) brought up the battalion under heavy fire, and had just reached the river bank (4.50 p. m.) when he (Captain Krayenbuhl) was fatally shot through both arms and body, expiring about 45 minutes later. While this movement was in progress Colonel Stotsenburg came up with part of his Nebraska troops and reported that it was impossible to cross river on our right to turn enemy's left, and that the only way was to flank the right of their intrenchment from the railroad bridge, which agreed with orders just given to South Dakota. I therefore told him to cooperate with South Dakota in this attack, which he did very effectively. After gaining the railroad embankment, river bank, and bridge, we drove the insurgents from their earthworks (5.10 p. m.), and killed many of them as they ran across the plain. Colonel Stotsenburg, whose regiment occupied this ground that night, reports that they counted 96 dead insurgents.

5.30 to 5.45 p. m.—I then directed Nebraska to take possession of Meycauayan railroad station about 400 yards north of bridge, extending westward to river and eastward about 500 yards into plain; sent Captain Brooks to instruct South Dakota to deploy across plain on Nebraska's right with their own right refused on river; and returned with Lieutenant Perry across river and placed Pennsylvania with right at Meycauayan church and stone bridge, connecting with Nebraska left (6 p. m.), and left on large estero. This put brigade in a crescent, with left flank on estero and right flank on river.

8 p. m.—Reported to General MacArthur at division headquarters one-half mile south of railroad bridge.

March 27, 11.18 a. m.—Brigade advanced from Meycauayan, on east side of railroad track, in accordance with Field Order No. 5, South Dakota as advance guard, Nebraska and Pennsylvania as main body.

12 m.—Insurgents opened fire from intrenchments in woods south of Marilao River. South Dakota support and reserve deployed and reenforced advance battalion and the regiment drove insurgents from their positions, forcing them back across river into a strong line of intrenchments on north bank, from which they again routed them, wading the stream waist deep and capturing the intrenchments. Two companies of the advance battalion were thrown across railroad bridge on left to turn enemy's right.

On reaching and crossing bridge, I found South Dakota extended along north bank, with insurgents still threatening their right flank, so ordered Nebraska, which had come up, to move to right along south bank, cross on boat and bamboo-raft bridge near South Dakota right, and extend line to right.

Pennsylvania was kept in reserve south of river. By direction of division commander Company I was sent to west of railroad to reenforce a detachment of Third Artillery which had become engaged with a body of insurgents.

During the afternoon the insurgents kept up a desultory fire from woods across plain to north and an annoying enfilading fire along north bank of river from our right, during which several men were wounded.

4.30 p. m.—Private Kerr, brigade orderly, was seriously wounded through chest at brigade headquarters west of and near railroad track.

About 5 p. m.—Large bodies of insurgents, apparently brought from north on trains, formed and deployed along north edge of plain some 2,000 yards away, covering the entire front of our division, and opened fire.

The Third Artillery (First Brigade) on west of track replied with their Krag-Jorgensens.

Proceeded with Lieutenant Perry along our line east of track, found it exposed to a galling enfilading fire down the river from the right, and instructed the troops to lie low behind the intrenchments until the insurgents were within 600 yards before returning their fire. Found Nebraska closing in on South Dakota (in accordance with order sent before the attack began) and was placing their left companies in advantageous positions, with similar instructions to those given South Dakota, when the Nebraska right (which it seems was being close pressed by the insurgents on right flank, who advanced in probable ignorance of the presence of our troops at that point) charged the enemy and the entire regiment took it up, driving the insurgents across the plain in disorder and pursuing them about 2 miles to wooded ridge. In sympathy with this repulse on their left, the entire insurgent line withdrew. I moved South Dakota forward about halfway across plain, to support Nebraska in case of necessity.

After consultation with the division commander it was decided that it was too late to move entire division forward to ridge occupied by Nebraska on right. The latter regiment was therefore withdrawn to right of South Dakota with right refused on river, and Pennsylvania was moved up on South Dakota left with left on railroad, connecting with First Brigade, which was correspondingly advanced.

March 28.—Division remained at Marilao, recuperating, bringing up supply train, and issuing rations and ammunition. Reconnoitering patrols found ridge captured by Nebraska day before still unoccupied, but some insurgents nearer railroad. Little firing during day.

March 29.—The brigade advanced in line on east of track, in accordance with Field Order No. 7 (copy attached)—Nebraska on right, moving first against ridge, which they captured on the night of March 27, and then swinging to left, flanking the enemy in front of South Dakota and Pennsylvania, which advanced straight to front.

6 a. m.—Nebraska started.

6.31 a. m.—Nebraska began firing in woods on ridge.

6.32 a. m.—Pennsylvania and South Dakota advanced.

7 a. m.—Line crossed ridge.

7.15 a. m.—Troops crossed the Tigogon Arroyo (branch of Bocaue or Santa Maria River) and formed line near 21-kilometer post.

7.30 a. m.—Proceeded with Captain Brooks to right of brigade, found Nebraska engaged with enemy, whom they drove across the Bocaue River, conducted them by the right flank across the arroyo, near its junction with the Bocaue, changed direction to left (8.55 a. m.), forded the Bocaue, and formed line on north bank with right about 400 yards west of Santa Maria, through which the rear of a body of insurgents was seen retreating (9.15 a. m.). Our men fired on them, killing and wounding several. A company was then sent to reconnoiter and clear town, after which the regiment was moved westerly along north bank of Bocaue to flank the enemy in front of South Dakota and Pennsylvania, who had been ordered to advance as soon as satisfied that Nebraska was across the river and in the flanking position. Little resistance was encountered, and the Nebraska regiment was brought up in line on right of South Dakota and Pennsylvania, who had also crossed the Bocaue without serious opposition.

10.45 a. m.—Reported to General MacArthur at Bocaue.

11.50 a. m.—Advanced from Bocaue (23-kilometer post) in line; same formation as before.

12.15 p. m.—Line arrived at Bigaa River. About 100 feet of track had been torn up at south end of bridge, which latter was uninjured excepting an incipient fire, which was extinguished. Strong intrenchments on north side of bridge, unoccupied. Brigade moved by left flank, crossed bridge in single file, and deployed on north side in original formation, except that Nebraska was placed behind South Dakota, to contract front and save marching.

1.15 p. m.—Deployment completed.

3.25 p. m.—Resumed advance from Bigaa.

About 5 p. m.—Line arrived at Guiginto River. There being no sign of insurgents on other bank, Pennsylvania began moving by left flank and crossing bridge as usual. When part of regiment had crossed and about 15 men were deployed several hundred yards beyond bridge the insurgents opened a lively fire from ridge beyond our troops and the railroad track and bridge. I hurried the remainder of Pennsylvania and Major Howard's battalion of South Dakota across the bridge and they deployed rapidly on the right. Kansas (of First Brigade) also crossed and

deployed to left. Two Utah guns and the Colt rapid-fire gun were taken across the bridge and rendered valuable assistance, especially against a barricade across railroad track. Although the insurgents with their Mausers were delivering a destructive fire from intrenchments and woods beyond the effective range of our Springfields, our troops, with the aid of the artillery, succeeded in silencing and driving them off. Lieutenant Perry, of the brigade staff, was slightly wounded during the engagement.

6 p. m.—Fight practically over. The remainder of South Dakota was put across bridge and deployed on right. Nebraska camped on east side of river, near Guiguinto railroad station. Division and brigade headquarters at railroad station.

March 30.—Spent forenoon bringing up train and issuing rations and ammunition.

2.15 p. m.—Advanced in line from near 30-kilometer post west of Guiguinto River in accordance with Field Order No. 8, attached.

2.20 p. m.—Insurgents opened fire on our right.

2.40 p. m.—Passed 31-kilometer post.

3 p. m.—Passed arroyo and strong insurgent intrenchment 100 yards east of 32-kilometer post.

3.20 p. m.—Small party of natives came down track to surrender, but ran back when we sent out a man to meet them.

3.49 p. m.—Halted near 33-kilometer post. Another party of natives had appeared on track, but made some excuse to a Filipino whom we sent to interview them, and disappeared. Possibly a ruse.

3.55 p. m.—Advanced one company Pennsylvania and one company Kansas to take possession of intrenchments 250 yards beyond 33-kilometer post, supposed to be unoccupied. As soon as they started, enemy opened fire from intrenchments and vicinity.

4 p. m.—Companies charged and captured trenches without loss. Camped here for night. Reconnoitered to edge of woods and crossing of railroad track and wagon road, from which insurgent trenches near railroad east of Santa Isabel (eastern suburb of Malolos) can be seen. Outposts placed along edge of woods. Utah Battery, assisted by infantry detachments, built gun emplacements on each side of railroad at wagon-road crossing. Preparations made for attack on Malolos next morning. (See Field Order No. 9, attached.)

March 31.—Advanced on Malolos in accordance with Field Order No. 10, attached, Nebraska on right moving fifteen minutes after first artillery fire, South Dakota five minutes later, Pennsylvania five minutes after South Dakota, giving a crescent formation, concave toward enemy, enveloping his left (north) flank and driving him from intrenchments toward Malolos.

6.25 to 6.35 a. m.—Insurgents opened fire. Our troops on right and Hotchkiss gun replied with a few shots. Firing lasted only a few minutes.

7.03 a. m.—Utah Artillery began firing. Infantry advanced as specified in order.

7.38 a. m.—Artillery on right (north) of road ceased firing.

7.50 a. m.—Artillery on left (south) of road ceased firing.

7.55 a. m.—Infantry firing on right (Nebraska).

8.40 a. m.—Rode from left to right of brigade instructing regiments to cooperate in a brigade wheel to left, pivoting on Pennsylvania left on railroad track, after crossing Malolos Creek and Malolos-Quingua road, thus coming in on north side of Barasoain (northwest suburb of Malolos).

9 a. m.—Reached right of line, closed it in and lined it up.

9.12 a. m.—Line moved forward.

9.32 a. m.—Crossed Malolos Creek and road and began wheel to left through open field under lively Mauser fire from railroad embankment and woods, beyond effective range of our guns.

10 a. m.—Brigade completed wheel and lined up on railroad track, right just beyond 38-kilometer post. Fired three shots from Hotchkiss (all ammunition left) at insurgents retreating up railroad track about 2,000 yards away. Shots appeared to strike in their midst.

10.25 a. m.—Reported to division commander at Barasoain Station (near left of this brigade), and by his direction swung brigade back onto Malolos-Quingua road, where it has since remained. Outposts are thrown out to front (west) and one company at forks of road three-fourths mile north of our right and 1½ miles north of railroad.

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The following table shows casualties by organizations and days, and the distance covered by marching flank, Nebraska regiment:

		Brigade staff and orderies.					Tenth Pennsylvania.					First South Dakota.					
		Killed.		Wounded.			Killed.		Wounded.			Killed.		Wounded.			
Date		Officers.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
March 25							1	1			4						
26		1	1	1	1	1									1	1	1
27					1	1											
28																	
29				1	1	2	2	2	2	15	17				11	1	12
30						1	1	1		2	3				3	3	6
31																	
Total		1	1	2	1	3	4	4	2	32	34	3	4	7	2	58	58
Total casualties		4										62					

		First Nebraska.					Total.								
		Killed		Wounded			Killed		Wounded.						
Date		Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Total casualties.	Miles marched by marching flank.	
March 25		1	1	3	12	15		2	2	3	17	20	22	12	
26					14	14	1	4	5	3	28	35	26	10	
27				1	1	15	8	4	12	2	41	45	50	8	
28					1	1					4	4	4		
29		1	1		15	16		3	3	3	41	44	44	22	
30		3	3		18	21		4	4		23	23	27	6	
31		1	1		10	11		1	1		14	14	15	6	
Total		6	6	4	77	81	4	14	18	10	163	173	191	66	
Total casualties		87					191								

a1 man cut his foot with an ax.
b1 man accidentally shot.
c2 enlisted men have since died.
d1 man since died.

e1 enlisted man has since died.
f Exclusive of maneuvering, reconnoissances, etc.
g Captain Forby died March 29.
h1 man since died.

Every regiment performed arduous and heroic service, marching and fighting through difficult country under oppressive heat without complaint, and driving the enemy from strong intrenched positions, wherever encountered, with vigor and unwavering courage. As each organization has done well all that fell to its lot, comparisons would be out of place. The following actions, however, are worthy of special mention.

First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.—Capture of San Francisco del Monte and strong intrenchments in vicinity in hand-to-hand conflict, on March 25, in which Captain Forby and Sergeant Poor were killed and Captain Taylor, Lieutenant Storch, and 12 enlisted men wounded.

Prompt and effective cooperation by Colonel Stotsenburg and part of his command (which was in reserve), with South Dakota Regiment, in the capture of Meycauayan railroad bridge and intrenchments on March 26.

Gallant charge against a large force of insurgents, who attacked our position on the north bank of Marilao River, on March 27, and were advancing on and partially turning our right flank, where Nebraska was located. The enemy routed in great disorder and pursued for 2 miles.

Exhausting work on the marching flank in effective turning movements throughout the campaign.

First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.—Courageous advance against strong insurgent intrenchments south of Meycauayan, and subsequent capture of Meycauayan railroad bridge under hot fire from earthwork, village, and woods on northern bank, March 26.

Gallant charge on formidable intrenched position south of Marilao River, from which insurgents were driven across river and routed from equally strong trenches on northern bank, the South Dakota men fording the stream waist deep under fire. Losses in this charge, 3 officers (Adjutant Lien and Lieutenants Adams and Morrison) and 6 enlisted men killed and 25 wounded. March 27.

Crossing of Guiguinto railroad bridge by Major Howard's battalion under heavy fire to reenforce Pennsylvania regiment, and effective cooperation in the defense of the position. March 29.

Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V.—Courageous advance against strong insurgent intrenchments south of Meycauayan and capture of the town. March 26.

Cool and determined defense of position on west side of Guiguinto River, on which the enemy opened a galling cross fire while the regiment was crossing the railroad bridge and when only 15 men were deployed on farther side. The crossing and deployment were completed and the position held until additional troops and artillery were brought up and the insurgents routed. Colonel Hawkins, Lieutenant Aiken, and 13 enlisted men were wounded. March 29.

Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.—(Cooperating with brigade.) Gallant advance of detachment with 2 guns under Lieutenant Naylor, accompanied by Lieutenant Perry, of the brigade staff, which kept abreast and at times ahead of the infantry line from our trenches to Masambong, and rendered valuable aid in driving the insurgents from their intrenchments between that village and San Francisco del Monte. March 25.

Crossing of Guiguinto railroad bridge by detachment and 2 guns under Lieutenant Critchlow, and in general charge of Major Young, and effective service in support of infantry exposed to severe attack while forcing the passage.

Ensign Davis, U. S. N., with Colt rapid-fire gun, did courageous and excellent work on this and numerous other occasions during the campaign.

The brigade staff, Capt. A. McD. Brooks (acting assistant adjutant-general), Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl (commissary subsistence, acting as aid), and Lieut. F. L. Perry (aid) performed their arduous and dangerous duties in a highly satisfactory manner, rendering valuable assistance in handling the brigade on extended lines through difficult country and carrying orders fearlessly under heavy fire.

Captain Krayenbuhl was a remarkably efficient aid, quick to comprehend an order or grasp a situation, accurate and intelligent in carrying out instructions, and possessed of a cheerful courage that was an inspiration to all around him. He lost his life in the engagement at Meycauayan railroad bridge just after bringing up the left of the line in a flanking movement which resulted in the capture of the bridge and earthwork—one of the hottest fights and most productive victories of the campaign.

Recommendations for rewards of officers and enlisted men for distinguished individual services will be made the subject of a later communication.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 13. } *Manila, P. I., March 24, 1899.*

1. In accordance with instructions from division commander for general movement to north to-morrow, the following is prescribed for troops of this brigade:

2. Baggage not to be taken will be stored near camp to-night as far as practicable, remainder to-morrow morning. Proper guard will be left over it, preferably men incapacitated for field duty.

3. Men will carry gun, with strap and bayonet, belt, haversack, mess kit, canteen full of water or coffee, one day's field rations, 100 rounds ammunition, poncho hung in belt. They will wear brown canvas uniform, including blouse, without blue shirt. Those not provided with blouses will wear blue shirts.

4. All available intrenching tools, axes, mattocks, brush hooks, and wire cutters will be taken. All the wire cutters and at least four axes, two shovels, and two brush hooks will be carried by men of each company, preferably by noncommissioned officers not firing.

5. Two days' additional field rations, 200 rounds additional ammunition, one blanket for each two men, and necessary cooking utensils, tools, etc., will be transported in wagon and pack train.

6. Troops will be moved to starting positions to-night if relieving troops are in place in time; otherwise immediately after breakfast.

7. Pennsylvania, with four companies in firing line and two in reserve, will occupy line from sunken road 350 yards to northwest, connecting with right of Montana and will move northeasterly with right on sunken road and left maintaining contact with Montana, extending as the sunken road and La Loma road (parallel to which Montana moves) diverge. The guide will be on South Dakota on the right.

8. South Dakota, with six companies in firing line and four in reserve, will occupy line from sunken road 800 yards to southeast, to west edge of valley extending north from Blockhouse 4, and move northeasterly with left on sunken road. The guide will be on Nebraska on right.

9. Nebraska, with eight companies in firing line and four in reserve, will occupy line from South Dakota right 800 yards southeasterly and move northeasterly, its left maintaining contact with South Dakota and its center advancing on San Francisco del Monte Church.

10. Two Utah guns will be placed where sunken road comes to surface, about 700 yards northeast of present line and will cooperate in attack on Masambong and San Francisco del Monte, after which they will move as directed.

11. Brigade headquarters at beginning of operations will be on South Dakota line east of sunken road.

12. The brigade as a whole will move northeasterly on Masambong and San Francisco del Monte, maintaining contact to left and guide to right, and refusing the right (all or part of Nebraska) as much as may be necessary on account of San Juan River and fire from east bank of same near San Francisco del Monte. After capturing these two places, the brigade will make a partial turn to left and proceed in a northerly direction to its first objective position.

13. First objective position will be on Caloocan-Balantasag road with left about half a mile east of Balantasag.

14. Second objective position will be on Cabatukan-Banlac road with left near road to Novaliches.

15. Third objective position will be Novaliches.

16. From Novaliches it is intended to change front to left and move toward Polo.

17. Regiments will remain in each objective position until they receive orders to move therefrom.

18. Reveille will be at 3 a. m., breakfast 4 a. m., and troops will be in assigned positions ready to start by 5 a. m., when each regimental commander will send a messenger to brigade commander to that effect. There will be no bugle calls, loud commands, or shouting.

19. South Dakota will move forward slowly when directed by brigade commander. Pennsylvania and Nebraska will take up the advance at once. The left Nebraska company, which is to occupy valley northeast of Blockhouse 4, will be kept under cover at east edge of valley until South Dakota (which is farther in rear) starts, when it will be thrown out promptly.

20. The firing line will move in a single line without supports, unless otherwise directed. The reserve will, as a rule, move in line of companies in columns of fours, but commanders will use whatever formation is best adapted to the ground and will give best protection. Whenever firing begins, reserves will lie down under best cover obtainable.

21. Officers and noncommissioned officers will prevent men from throwing away or wasting accouterments, rations, water, and ammunition.

22. Controlled volley firing by company, platoon, or squad will be used except where enemy is scattered and retreating, and individual firing, when necessary, will be closely regulated. Economize ammunition. Adjust sights to range. Aim low. Watch for dust and modify range accordingly. As a rule fire only at visible enemy or smoke.

23. The advance will be pushed with energy and the insurgents driven from their positions without unnecessary hesitation. When under fire, advance by alternate rushes of companies or platoons, thus keeping the enemy down, by a practically continuous fire, to proper distance, and then charge. Impress upon the men that, against the present enemy the charge is the safest form of attack.

24. Commanding officers will issue and enforce stringent orders against burning, looting, and abuse of inhabitants or prisoners. Offenses of this nature will be severely punished.

By command of Brigadier-General Hale:

A. McD. BROOKS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 1. } *Cabatukan, March 25, 1899—12.15 p. m.*

Next move will be to north and slightly to west against river. Start with guide on and maintain contact with regiment on your left. Don't extend to right.

Avoid firing much to west of north, as part of Montana is west of river.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 2. } *Tuliahah Ford, March 26, 1899—7 a. m.*

The brigade will move forward in line, northwesterly, toward Novaliches-Bemon road, halting on that road and awaiting orders.

South Dakota will connect with and guide left on Montana.

Nebraska will connect with and guide left on South Dakota.

Pennsylvania will connect with and guide right on Montana.

Do not lose connection.

All regiments will take position immediately in above order on ridge on line established by Montana, and move forward when Montana advances.

Firing line and reserve same as yesterday.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 3. } *Tuliahah Ford, March 26, 1899—10.25 a. m.*

Movement changed. Division will move by left flank in column along road west toward Malinta, changing direction to right (north) and then on left into line, facing west. Follow the organization now on your left at short interval, except that Pennsylvania will wait at place where column changes direction to north, and will fall in behind Montana and ahead of South Dakota in original position.

If you receive no further orders, start as soon as regiment on your left moves.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 4. } *East of Polo, March 26, 1899—3.35 p. m.*

South Dakota will move north with two battalions in firing line. Right battalion will turn left (east) flank of enemy's trenches, while left attacks in front. Third battalion in reserve, rear of right battalion. South Dakota, after flanking east trenches, will flank enemy in front of Pennsylvania.

Pennsylvania will advance on left of South Dakota line against enemy's position in field, six companies in firing line.

Nebraska will move forward behind hill which we now occupy and act as general reserve.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 5. } *Meycauayan, March 27, 1899—5.40 a. m.*

The brigade will move north on railroad track in following order:

South Dakota (advanced guard), Nebraska, Pennsylvania.

South Dakota will employ as advance party one 4-company battalion deployed, if practicable, in line of skirmishers east of railroad track; one battalion as support 400 yards in rear of advance party; one battalion as reserve 500 yards in rear of support.

Main body (Nebraska and Pennsylvania) will follow 600 yards in rear of advance guard.

The First Brigade will march on road west of railroad track and cover ground west of track.

When advance party meets enemy in small force it will drive him out, enveloping his flank, preferably his left (east), if possible. If in larger force, support and reserve (if necessary) of advance guard will turn flank. If in very strong force and position, advance guard will hold front and main body will be used as may be most desirable.

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The Hotchkiss 1.65-inch gun, ammunition, and crew will accompany advance guard (in rear of advance party) regardless of which regiment is advance guard.

Firing at pigs, chickens, etc., will be strictly prohibited at all times.

Notify brigade headquarters when ready to start.

Take rations for one day and 100 rounds ammunition per man.

By command of Brigadier-General Hale:

BROOKS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 7. } *Marilao, P. I., March 28, 1899.*

The brigade will move forward to-morrow morning in the following formation. Troops and trains will be ready to move by 5.30 a. m.:

Pennsylvania, with four companies in extended order in firing line and two companies in reserve, will move with left near railroad guiding on First Brigade, the right of which rests on railroad.

South Dakota, with two battalions in extended order in firing line and one battalion in reserve, will move with left, maintaining contact (50 yards interval) with and guiding on Pennsylvania.

Nebraska, with two battalions in firing line and one in reserve, using formations best adapted to circumstances, will move northeasterly, envelop enemy's left flank on ridge occupied yesterday p. m. when driving the insurgents (if they are found in possession), and will then advance westward, flanking the enemy wherever found along the ridge.

When the turning movement by Nebraska is sufficiently under way Pennsylvania and South Dakota will be ordered to advance parallel to railroad against ridge. If they encounter serious resistance they will lie down under cover and fire slowly to hold the attention of the insurgents while Nebraska flanks them.

Individual regiments will not pursue the enemy more than a few hundred yards beyond top of ridge unless the entire brigade is in position to continue the advance, and is ordered to do so, but will halt and resume their formations preparatory to another general advance if such is ordered.

Attention is again called to the importance of fire discipline and the necessity of impressing on the men the value of adjustment of sights to range, deliberate aiming and firing, and economy of ammunition until such time as rapid firing is necessary and effective.

By command of Brigadier-General Hale:

A. McD. BROOKS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDER, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 8. } *Guiguinto, March 30, 1899—11.40 a. m.*

The brigade will move forward in line with same formation as usual, two-thirds of each regiment on firing line, one-third in reserve. Do not move until ordered.

The Nebraska regiment on right will refuse two companies, and its reserve will march in column of fours in rear of right of line, so as to form line to the right quickly in case of flank attack.

Regimental commanders will call all their officers together and instruct them to give the most stringent orders against burning, looting, and abuse of inhabitants, especially after the capture of Malolos. Offenders will be severely punished.

By command of Brigadier-General Hale:

BROOKS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 9. } *East of Malolos, March 30, 1899—6.05 p. m.*

Post a strong line of outposts along or in front of edge of woods, as nearly as practicable in prolongation of Pennsylvania outpost line.

Draw one day's rations and ammunition to-night and be ready to move by 6 a. m. Do not move until ordered.

Colonels report to me near railroad at 8 p. m.

Send to Major Young, Utah Artillery, near division headquarters, at 8 p. m., 20 men from each regiment with 10 picks and 20 shovels.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV., EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 10. } *East of Malolos, March 30, 1899—8 p. m.*

The following is the disposition of troops of this brigade for the attack on Malolos:
Two Utah guns will be on northeast side of railroad track at junction with road behind hedge. Emplacements will be built during the night and the guns placed before daybreak.

Pennsylvania, with four companies in firing line and two in reserve, will be on the left of the line. The two reserve companies will take position in road behind guns as support as soon as guns are placed. Absolute quiet will be preserved and the men will lie down.

On receipt of order, just before guns open fire, the Pennsylvania firing line will move forward on line with the gun support, obliquing to the right so as to bring its left about 200 yards northeast of railroad track, and will remain there until time for advance, when it will move forward with left directed on west end of woods east of railroad track, leaving a clear space between its left and the track for the artillery to continue its fire on intrenchments east of track.

South Dakota, with two battalions in firing line and one in reserve, will be on right of Pennsylvania, and in advancing to the attack will be obliqued to the right to clear Pennsylvania. This regiment will not make any preliminary advance to line of guns.

Nebraska, with two battalions in firing line and one in reserve, will be on the right of South Dakota and will move in a similar manner.

The artillery will direct its first fire on the enemy's left, opposite Nebraska and South Dakota, and will work toward our left, continuing to fire on intrenchments east of track after the infantry line advances.

When the artillery has fired fifteen minutes Nebraska will advance, obliquing well to the right, and after crossing the stream will swing slightly to left, turning enemy's flank.

South Dakota will advance five minutes after Nebraska, obliquing to right and turning to left after crossing stream, same as Nebraska.

Both South Dakota and Nebraska will be very careful not to crowd in to left against Pennsylvania, which would force latter into clear space in front of artillery.

Pennsylvania will advance five minutes after South Dakota, and will move parallel to the railroad track. The two reserve companies acting as gun support will follow the firing line at 500 yards distance.

Commanding officers will impress on their officers and noncommissioned officers, and they will personally explain to the men, the vital importance of avoiding looting, burning, and abuse of inhabitants.

The reputation of the United States depends on their actions.

By command of Brigadier-General Hale:

BROOKS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. TENTH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Malolos, P. I., April 3, 1899.

Capt. A. McD. BROOKS,
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.*

SIR: I have the honor to make report of the part taken by the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V., in the operations against the insurgents from March 1 to March 31, 1899, as follows:

This command continued to occupy the line of trenches extending from De La Loma in an easterly direction, slightly inclining to the south, to line occupied by the First South Dakota, during which time, until March 17, nothing of importance took place, excepting occasional sharpshooting from the enemy. On March 17 the insurgents advanced a line directly in our front and opened an annoying fire, which lasted for about two hours and which was finally checked by a few shots from the Utah Light Artillery and a line of skirmishers of some 50 men thrown out by this command. In this engagement the following men were wounded: Second Lieut. John G. Thompson, Company E; Private John McVay, Company E; and Q. M. Sergt. Alexander McCauch, Company C.

From the 17th to the 25th of March the attitude of the insurgents in our front was comparatively quiet.

On March 25, by order of Major-General MacArthur, the Second Division, occupying the line to the north of the city of Manila, P. I., was ordered to advance against the insurgents, and this command was assigned to a position on the extreme left of Second Brigade and with the right resting on sunken road. At 5.30 a. m. of said day,

the hour fixed for said advance, this command moved in a northeasterly direction, and after proceeding some three or four hundred yards was met by a heavy fire from the insurgents occupying the trenches along the line of woods in our front. The regiment continued to advance, driving the enemy from their position. The insurgents' loss at this place was 18 killed and 12 taken prisoners. Continuing its advance in a northerly direction, this command pursued the enemy until dusk, when it was ordered to camp on Tuliaban River.

On the morning of March 26 the division was ordered to advance to a position on Tuliaban-Melinta road south of and nearly parallel to Bemon-Novaliches road. After a delay of some two hours at this point the division was moved by the left flank along said road and formed a line facing to the west. At this point the regiment was again halted. The enemy formed a line along line of woods at some 1,000 yards in our front and opened a heavy fire. After some firing by the Utah Light Artillery this command advanced and drove the enemy from their line, capturing the village west of Meycauayan.

Four companies of this command were halted at this place and camped for the night. The headquarters and two companies were stationed in church at Meycauayan, which town they patrolled and guarded. The insurgents occupying this town left same in such a hurry that they left their colors floating on the church, which was captured and in possession of this command.

On morning of March 27 this command was assigned to a position in the reserve. After advancing to the north about three-fourths of a mile this command was halted by the division commander, and Company I thereof, under command of Major Bell of the Engineer Corps, was ordered to the assistance of a small detachment of the Third U. S. Artillery, who had engaged a considerable number of insurgents and were in a very dangerous position. Company I attacked the enemy in this intrenched position and after a very spirited engagement succeeded in compelling a surrender of the entire force with a loss to the insurgents of about 25 killed and 40 prisoners with arms, the prisoners having been turned over to Colonel Funston of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry. The loss of Company I was 2 men wounded.

At dark this command was placed on the advance line with left resting on the railroad and right connecting with the First South Dakota Infantry, some few hundred yards above Marilao station, where a stop was made until the morning of the 29th.

On morning of the 29th an advance was made which resulted in an engagement with the enemy, after which the line advanced all day without meeting any resistance until near dusk. The advance line of this command, which occupied the line to the left of the railroad, was consequently the first of the troops to touch rivers that could not be forded. At this place, a distance of some 5 miles south of Malolos, P. I., our advance line was compelled to move by the left flank and cross the railroad culvert bridge, which line had scarcely reached the north end of said bridge when the enemy in heavy force opened a galling fire in our front and from the left and right flank, centering same on bridge and railroad, with an avowed purpose of checking the advance. After some little time I succeeded in getting my entire command over, and after about one hour's fighting and firing from the artillery the enemy's fire was checked. We were here ordered to establish a new line and encamp for the night.

On morning of the 30th the advance was again taken up and was prosecuted without much resistance. At early evening the line was again halted for the night.

At 6.30 the morning of the 31st the line continued to move forward in its original position and at about noon reached the station at Malolos, P. I., and formed line on railroad, facing to the southwest, and later was ordered to establish a new line facing to the north, which position it still occupies, without instance or casualties.

I desire to speak in the highest terms of the gallant and courageous conduct of every officer and man of this command during the recent campaign. Every order was cheerfully obeyed and every position of the enemy was taken by direct assault without any wavering, halting, or indecision.

I desire to speak in the highest terms of Capt. H. J. Watson, whose company (B) is on duty at Corregidor Island, P. I. On account of sickness and wounds Company E of this command was left entirely without a commissioned officer, and since the first movement against the insurgents, early in February, Captain Watson was by special detail placed in command of Company E and has performed very efficient service.

After the death of Captain Krayenbuhl, Lieut. James Harkins, acting quartermaster and commissary of this command, was, by order of the brigade commander, detached from the regiment and assigned as brigade commissary.

In the process of this advance the troops of this command suffered greatly from the heat and marches and by reason of the scarcity of and the impure water they were com-

pelled to drink. A large number were compelled to drop from the ranks by reason of exhaustion, stomach and bowel trouble. On the 28th this command lost 14 men from these causes.

List of casualties.

	Wounded.	Killed.
March 25	4	1
26	4	1
27	2
28	2
29	14	2
30	2	1
Total	28	5

March 29.—Private George A. Taylor, Company H, one of the fourteen wounded, has since died at the hospital. In addition to the above, Col. A. L. Hawkins and First Lieut. Blaine Aiken, Company H, were slightly wounded on the 29th. Still remaining on duty.

Very respectfully,

A. L. HAWKINS,
Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Malolos, P. I., April 2, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this regiment from March 1 to 31, inclusive.

From March 1 to 24, inclusive, the regiment held the trenches in front of Block Houses Nos. 3 and 4, near Manila, P. I. On the morning of the 25th of March the regiment formed for attack, two battalions extended in the firing line and one battalion extended in reserve, and advanced against the enemy's intrenchments to the left of San Francisco del Monte. The enemy received us with a heavy fire, but moving steadily forward we drove him out and dispersed his force.

The regiment then made a slight change of direction to the left, and moved to the first Caloocan road, encountering small bodies of Filipinos, who fired and fell back. At this road the brigade was re-formed and the advance was continued to the second Caloocan road.

Here the regiment changed direction to the left, moved forward under a heavy long-range fire, and crossed the Tuliahan River, halting about 3 p. m. on a high ridge, front facing the west.

About sundown the regiment moved by the left flank, changed direction to the right, and halted, facing north on the right bank of the Tuliahan. During the day the regiment lost one enlisted man, wounded.

On the morning of March 26 the regiment moved by the left flank, changed direction to the right, marched several miles, and deployed in two lines in extended order, facing north. We attacked the enemy posted to the south of Meycauayan, driving him across the river, where we found him strongly intrenched.

As Major Allison's battalion arrived at the ridge he found the enemy debarking troops from a railway train, and, opening fire, dispersed the troops and caused the train to withdraw. Lieutenant-Colonel Stover, coming up on the left, cleared the left front of the enemy, who was pouring a flanking fire upon the railroad embankment, and enabled Major Allison to swing his battalion against the embankment, flanking the enemy's works on the opposite bank. Just before this movement the bridge was discovered to be on fire, and Q. M. Sergt. John Holman, Company C, voluntarily rushed upon the bridge and put out the flames by water from his canteen.

Major Allison then moved his battalion across the bridge, waded the muddy slough to the right of the railroad, and drove the enemy before him up the right bank of the stream. Lieutenant-Colonel Stover followed and cooperated. Major Allison's battalion was the first body of troops to cross the bridge.

Major Howard had moved against a body of troops threatening our right, and effectually silenced his fire and drove him out.

Our losses during this engagement were 1 officer and 9 enlisted men, wounded.

On the morning of March 27 the regiment acted as advance guard for the brigade. Major Howard's battalion, consisting of companies D, E, H, and M, was extended in line of skirmishers, its left resting on the track. Lieutenant-Colonel Stover's battalion, companies F, I, and K, was in column of fours on the track, about 500 yards in the rear, acting as support, and Major Allison's battalion, companies C, G, and L, as reserves in column of fours 500 yards in the rear of the support.

My orders were to move on the line of trees marking the south side of Marilao River, where I was to halt if I met no opposition. If I encountered opposition I was to act according to circumstances.

On arriving within 700 yards of the line of trees, a sudden and heavy fire was received from the enemy. I ordered the men to lie down and sent the adjutant back with orders to the support and reserve to deploy and extend my line on the right.

I hoped the mountain gun on my left would open fire, but as it did not and the fire was unendurable, I ordered the advance; we advanced by rushes, and the enemy remained in position until we had approached to within 75 paces of the line of trees. He then evacuated the line of trees and the trenches to the left of the track on the opposite bank. Our men charged to the brink of the river, when I ordered companies D and E to cross the bridge and flank some heavy intrenchments up the stream, which were strongly held by the enemy. I then moved to the right, and the supports and reserves coming up, directed their fire on these intrenchments, from which we were receiving a terrible fire, and then ordered a charge. The men waded the river up to the armpits in water and took the trenches. In all of these movements the regiment was not assisted by a single shot from mountain gun or by any other organization, the other troops coming up after enemy was put to flight. The Filipinos retreated to the right front.

Our losses in this engagement were: Killed—three officers and four enlisted men. Wounded—one officer and 24 enlisted men.

About sundown, when the enemy made a long-range attack, the regiment was moved several hundred yards to the front and took up a position which it held during the night and the following day.

On the 29th of March we moved forward, two battalions in the firing line and one in the reserve. The first part of the advance was very trying on the men, who moved over $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles through flooded rice fields, where the mud and water was never less than knee-deep and often up to the hips.

Crossing the Santa Maria River the regiment put to flight a battalion of Filipinos on the north bank. After a rest at this point the march was resumed to a point a few miles from Guiguinto, where the regiment marched upon the railroad track, 500 yards in the rear of the Pennsylvania reserve.

When the enemy attacked the Guiguinto bridge, Major Howard's battalion was extended on Pennsylvania's right and the other two battalions were held in readiness south of the bridge. These were later thrown across the bridge and extended on the right of the firing line with the right resting on the river. During this engagement the regiment lost 10 enlisted men, wounded.

On the 30th the regiment moved forward, two battalions in firing line and one in reserve, to a point near Santa Isabel. During the advance the right of the regiment was under a heavy fire. Our losses were 3 enlisted men, wounded.

On the 31st of March the regiment moved in the same formation, five minutes after the advance of the Nebraska regiment. I directed the march of the firing line in person, using the compass and moving on a line 70 degrees west of north. On reaching Malolos Creek, the enemy was discovered in skirmish line along the railroad bank and across the open space to its right. He had evidently not observed our approach. We opened a sudden fire by volleys and drove him across the embankment. The regiment then advanced, executed a left wheel in accordance with brigade orders, and drove the enemy from the embankment into the woods beyond. In this engagement the regiment lost 4 enlisted men, wounded.

After holding the embankment about an hour the regiment moved to the line of Malolos Creek, which it still occupies.

During these operations the heat has been intense and many men have succumbed to it and been ordered to Manila by the surgeons. Otherwise the health of the regiment has been excellent.

Many of the officers of this regiment deserve brevets for conspicuous gallantry, but this will be covered by a special report later.

During the month Malacanan Palace has been guarded by two companies of this regiment.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, United States Volunteers.

HDQRS. FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,
Malolos, P. I., April 13, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following additional report of an incident in the battle of Marilao, which has just come to my notice:

Captain Van Houten, this regiment, in command of Company D (which company was the first to cross the railroad bridge, where he shot a Filipino colonel with his revolver), went back to hurry forward the mountain gun which I had ordered up by my sergeant-major. He found it across the bridge. He asked why was it not taken over. The reply was that they couldn't do it. He told them to dismount it and take it over. They replied that two men could not carry the piece. Enraged at this answer he ordered the piece dismounted, had it placed upon his shoulders, and carried it over alone, while four men of his company carried over the carriage. Because of his energy the mountain gun was gotten over in time for a few parting shots at the retreating enemy, although it was of no use in dislodging him.

Captain Van Houten strained himself by his great effort of strength and has to-day been ordered to Manila by the surgeon.

These facts have not been brought to my notice before because of the captain's extreme modesty.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, United States Volunteers.

MALolos, P. I., April 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Malolos, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of this regiment since the beginning of this expedition, March 25:

We moved to our left and occupied the trenches of the South Dakota Regiment at 3 a. m. and remained in position until 5.30 a. m., the hour designated for an advance. We moved so that our right flank was directed on San Francisco del Monte. About fifteen minutes after leaving this position we engaged the enemy. In trying to clear San Francisco del Monte Company C (Lieutenant Storch), Company L (Captain Taylor), and Company B (Lieutenant Wadsworth) became detached and in a hand-to-hand conflict in the town killed 19 insurgents. In this engagement Capt. W. C. Taylor and 9 men were wounded.

In the meantime our front had become heavily engaged with the enemy who had occupied the trenches in front of San Francisco del Monte. In this charge, which was a most spirited one, Capt. Lee Forby and Sergt. Walter Poor were killed and 3 men were wounded. We inflicted a very heavy loss on the enemy; over 50 dead and wounded were found by our hospital corps on the field. Our first stop was made on the Caloocan-Balintasag road at 10.20 a. m. We then closed in toward the northwest and crossed the Tuliahan River, on which stream we camped that night.

The next day we moved northwest in column until about 1 p. m., following in rear of South Dakota. About 3.30 p. m. the regiment was ordered on the firing line to fill the gap between the Tenth Pennsylvania and South Dakota, which regiment had become heavily engaged. Part of the Second Battalion under Captain Holderman reenforced a company of South Dakota east of railroad track, and part of the Third Battalion under Captain Kilian reenforced the line on the west side of the track, with orders to both to fire volleys on the insurgents in the trenches on the river and in the town of Meycauayan until the bridge was captured. The losses of the insurgents here were very heavy. The bridge was crossed by the South Dakota and Nebraska regiments and the insurgents were put to flight, many being killed as they retreated from their intrenchments. Ninety-six were left dead on the field. On the night of the 26th the regiment occupied Meycauayan. We also repaired the track where it was torn up and fitted up a hand car with a shade for the transportation of the wounded to the dressing station. This worked admirably. We had 8 men wounded in this action.

March 27.—We were in the main body and marched along the railroad track until the First South Dakota encountered the enemy at Marilao. Five men were wounded in this advance. After crossing the Marilao River we went into line of battle along that stream on the right of the line. During the contraction of the lines, after three South Dakota men had been severely wounded by the enemy firing at long range, we were attacked by the enemy in force. They charged up to a village about 100

yards from our front. The regiment was ordered to lie down and fire volleys when they passed the village. We then charged the natives, killing 35 and driving them beyond the hills to the northeast. Our losses were Captain Jens and 15 men wounded; none seriously. We occupied this position until 10.30 p. m., when we were recalled to the right of the line, where we remained until the morning of the 29th.

At 5.30 a. m. on the 29th this regiment moved out with orders to clear the hills over which we had advanced on the night of the 27th. We encountered the enemy just beyond the hill and had a severe engagement, the enemy being in a strong position in a sunken road. We drove them out, and advancing crossed the Rio de Santa Maria, reconnoitered Santa Maria and Santa Clara, and formed line facing northwest. During the latter part of this movement the retreating insurgents fired into our rear guard. They were driven off after about 20 minutes' fighting, retreating from a strong position. After a fatiguing march this regiment camped in a grove east of Guiguinto.

The next morning the regiment crossed the river at Guiguinto and camped in line of battle on the right of the line, where it remained until about 2.30 p. m., when a general advance was ordered. We had not marched to the outpost before we encountered a very heavy fire from the front and flank. We forced the enemy to retire after hard fighting, and with South Dakota followed them to their retreat, halting that night about 3 miles east of Malolos. Our losses were 1 man killed and 18 wounded.

On the morning of the 31st at 6 a. m. this regiment got into position and was fired on by the enemy, 2 men being wounded. At 7.12 a. m. artillery opened up from the railroad track in front of our position. In 15 minutes the Nebraska regiment advanced and encountered the enemy posted in a strongly intrenched position. We outflanked and carried these fortifications and pursued the enemy. We then got into line on the right, and making a turning movement came out on the plain beyond Malolos; here we were under a heavy front and flank fire until the railroad track was reached. We lost 1 man killed and 7 wounded.

The Hotchkiss mountain 1.65-inch gun was of the greatest service to us in this campaign. We drew 300 rounds of ammunition and the last two shots were fired at the retreating insurgents about 2½ miles west of Malolos. We then were withdrawn and placed in the position we now occupy north of town.

Our losses during the entire campaign were 8 killed and 82 wounded, and have marched a distance of 65 miles, approximately, over very difficult country. The Chinese coolies worked well in this regiment.

The officers and men stood their fatigue and hardships with the greatest fortitude and deserve great credit. Every one of those who has continued to the end of this campaign has really done more than could be expected of them.

We have in this regiment only 15 line officers for duty, 1 field, and no staff officers except Major Snyder, surgeon.

First Lieut. Willis E. Talbot, assistant surgeon, deserves special mention, as he accompanied the regiment through the entire campaign, although detailed on detached service. It is impossible to say what we would have done without him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 18.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Calumpit, P. I., April 30, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL


Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Calumpit, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the brigade in advance from Malolos to Calumpit.

The original plan of the division commander was for the Second Brigade to move north from Malolos on morning of April 24, effect a crossing of the Quingua River, and move westward on north bank of Quingua against Calumpit in cooperation with the First Brigade, which would advance along railroad track. This movement was modified by an unexpected engagement at Quingua on Sunday, April 23.

April 23, 6.05 a. m.—Heard heavy firing in direction of Quingua, where Major Bell had gone with a cavalry troop to reconnoiter road along river.

6.13 a. m.—The firing continuing, I sent order to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., to send two companies to Major Bell's support.



Traced in M.I.D. A 6.0, War Department.

right, but the thick jungle made this impossible. The artillery marched about 100 yards behind the firing line for prompt use against intrenchments whenever encountered.

10.20 a. m.—Insurgents opened heavy fire from line of detached earthworks across woods and in bamboo thickets through which we were marching. Infantry replied, and one of the 3.2-inch guns got into action on road quickly and with good effect. Infantry then advanced. A body of insurgents appeared in woods to our right and rear, and began firing into right of South Dakota line. The two remaining guns on road were turned on this party and after a few shots they disappeared in woods. Our troops charged the earthworks, and, as the insurgents remained in them longer than usual, killed a large number. Thirty-eight dead were actually counted in one barricade across road from Pulilan to Baliuag, 28 in another, and 15 in another, while many more were seen through the woods and lanes.

11 a. m.—The country to right and front being comparatively open the Iowa regiment was directed to follow South Dakota's right in column of fours, and deploy to right in case resistance was met or the line halted for any reason. At this point Major Bell, of the division staff, who had come across the Quingua River from Malolos, met us, and after a short conference returned to General MacArthur with report of movements up to that time.

12.10 p. m.—Halted at Pulilan (which is a long straggling village) for rest and dinner, and to allow Iowa to deploy and come up on right of line. They were considerably delayed by engagement with a body of the enemy on right, and also by the nature of the country, and when they arrived on line were exhausted and required time to eat and rest.

3 p. m.—Advance resumed in line, each regiment having one battalion in reserve.

About 4.30 p. m.—As the line emerged from woods into an open field about 2 miles west of Pulilan and just west of the ford on road north of Malolos, the enemy opened fire from a continuous line of trench three-quarters of a mile long, at right angles to river and about 600 yards to our front. I placed the guns and one of the left companies of Nebraska in an earthwork which happened to be at right side of road exactly where required, and they opened fire. After a few minutes firing South Dakota and the right battalion of Nebraska advanced across field and I sent the company in earthwork with them, and another company up the road to try to flank the enemy's trench. When our line had advanced halfway across the open field, the insurgents left their trenches and retreated. Our men picked off a number as they ran. Twenty to 25 of their dead were found along the trenches.

As over 100 insurgent dead were actually counted during the day in four distinct groups, without attempting to scour the woods and fields, it is believed that 200 is a conservative estimate of the total number killed, including those carried off by the enemy.¹ Our casualties in the 3 fights of the day were 6 killed and 14 wounded, of which 1 subsequently died. The brigade camped here for the night, during which supplies were brought out from Malolos and carried across the river by the men, and the dead, wounded, and exhausted were taken across on litters and sent back to Malolos.

April 25, 6.45 a. m.—Resumed march westward in extended line, one battalion of each regiment in reserve. When within about a mile of the Calumpit River (as estimated from map and distance marched) I halted left of line and established a new line by compass 40 degrees west of north, wheeling brigade to left on to this line to make it parallel to Calumpit River before advancing on latter. While this movement was in progress Major Mulford, of Nebraska, reconnoitered to front and located the Bagbag River bridge, meeting me as I was returning from the right of the line.

10.05 a. m.—We went forward and examined the ground together, after which the line was brought forward to within a short distance of the point from which the bridge could be seen. Major Mulford with a patrol then made a reconnoissance farther to the front. After waiting some time to be sure that the First Brigade was up on the south side of the Quingua River, I placed one 3.2-inch fieldpiece on sand bar at edge of river to fire on earthworks near bridge, and the other field gun and Hotchkiss revolving cannon on the bank a short distance in advance to cover the enemy's lines along the Calumpit River. The command to load had been given, when a gun on the other side of the river (probably in the armored car) was fired, showing that they were ready to begin operations. We commenced firing at once, drawing a lively reply from the insurgents.

¹ This estimate has since been corroborated by a Spanish prisoner left at Pulilan by insurgents and picked up by us a few days later. In discussing the Pulilan fight he volunteered the information that 38 killed (agreeing exactly with our count and indicating that he spoke advisedly) were found in one trench, and over 200 were buried altogether.

After considerable artillery fire the infantry line was ordered forward, and proceeded, firing as it advanced, to the east bank of the Calumpit River (a narrow deep stream), where it engaged in a very hot short-range fight with the enemy intrenched on opposite bank 30 to 50 yards distant. The brigade staff and artillery followed the infantry line (Lieutenant Fuller, aid, riding back under heavy fire to hurry up the last piece), and Lieutenant Fleming fearlessly placed his guns on the bank and delivered an effective fire on the trenches, both in front of our position and on the left (toward railroad bridge) and right, enfilading the trenches toward the bridge and partially enfilading those to the right. Captain Brooks, acting assistant adjutant-general, assisted in carrying ammunition from limber to piece, thus encouraging the cannoneers in their dangerous work. The fire of our troops was so heavy and accurate (the interior bamboo framework of covered and loopholed earthworks was afterwards found to be cut to shreds in places by bullets through loopholes) that the insurgents were afraid to put anything but their guns and hands above the parapets, which accounts for their high fire and moderate amount of our casualties. After about half an hour's work the enemy's fire in front of our left and toward the railroad bridge was practically silenced, and it appeared possible to get a line of troops across on extreme left near junction of Calumpit and Quingua rivers, the latter being apparently shallower. I therefore ran to left of line and told Major Mulford, commanding First Nebraska, to make the attempt, swinging well out into the Quingua. He immediately formed a line of men from Company K, under Lieutenant Weber, and leading it in person they waded in but were soon over their depth. A second attempt, farther out into the Quingua, was successful, the line getting across through water shoulder deep. The remaining companies of the battalions then hurried across and formed in line to sweep up through Calumpit along west bank of river, taking the river trenches in flank. While the line was forming for this purpose, I went to northwest end of railroad bridge and reported across the broken span to General MacArthur, who was on the main portion of the bridge, explaining the intention to clear Calumpit, which he approved. In accordance with his instructions, Captain Brooks, acting assistant adjutant-general, was sent up railroad with a patrol of 10 men to ascertain condition of track and bridge over the Rio Grande.

We immediately proceeded with the Nebraska battalion through Calumpit, right on river, first sending word to remainder of Nebraska to come across and cooperate on left, and to South Dakota and Iowa not to fire across river into Nebraska. Several parties of insurgents who had remained in trenches were routed out and many were killed as they left the trenches and ran across the front of the line. We counted 17 in one bunch. A subsequent count discovered a total of 40 dead and 14 wounded in trenches and adjoining lanes and brush, all of which were probably the result of this movement through the town, as they doubtless carried off their dead and wounded in the main retreat before and just after our troops forded the river.

When within about 200 yards of Calumpit Church (at north end of town) which was burning, I halted the line and sent forward two reconnoitering parties, one along Calumpit River and one near church. They got within sight of the Rio Grande and reported all insurgents out of the district south of that river but strongly intrenched on north bank. Just before they returned, the enemy opened fire upon us with both infantry and artillery, firing several shots from the latter. One shell or shrapnel appeared to burst just over our line. We made no reply and the firing soon ceased.

2.15 p. m.—Nebraska line was withdrawn and bivouacked along west and north banks of Calumpit and Bagbag rivers (latter formed by Quingua and Calumpit rivers) with left on railroad track.

Captain Brooks soon afterwards returned and reported that he had reached a point on railroad about a mile northwest of Bagbag Bridge, and 400 yards southeast of Rio Grande Bridge, when the enemy fired on his party with infantry and artillery; that the rails and ties were removed from entire roadbed, which was considerably cut up by trenches; that the trusses of railroad bridge were apparently intact; and that the bridge could be guarded, with fair cover for the protecting party, from the place reached by his patrol.

A battalion of Nebraska was placed at this point as outpost and after dark was somewhat withdrawn.

The South Dakota and Iowa regiments remained on east side of Calumpit River.

Total casualties in brigade on April 25 (Calumpit River engagement), 3 killed and 33 wounded, of which 1 subsequently died. Distance marched, 5 miles.

April 26.—Reconnoitered with Captain Davidson, adjutant Fifty-first Iowa, and Lieutenant Fuller, aid, the east side of Calumpit River to open field on southeast bank of the Rio Grande, finding a good position for artillery to enfilade the enemy's intrenchments on farther bank and east of railroad. This position was not used, however, as it was found to be possible to do the work from positions near railroad.

472 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

The South Dakota regiment forded river and bivouacked on north bank of the Bagbag, west of railroad.

April 27.—The Iowa regiment forded river and took place of South Dakota, placing one battalion on south side of Bagbag River to guard division headquarters and train. South Dakota and Nebraska went forward to the Rio Grande Bridge as support to First Brigade after crossing Rio Grande. Nebraska afterwards returned to former position on Calumpit and Bagbag rivers. South Dakota remained to guard Rio Grande Bridge. Distance marched, 3 miles.

April 28-30.—The brigade has occupied the positions specified above.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Calumpit, P. I., April 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Calumpit, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of this regiment since the morning of April 23, 1899:

About 6 o'clock on the morning of the 23d I heard heavy firing in the direction of the Iowa outpost north of Malolos, and while riding up toward said post I met a mounted orderly, who reported that Major Bell, with a scouting party of the Fourth Cavalry, was hard pressed and needed reinforcements.

Just at this time Company C, Captain Steepy, of the Fifty-first Iowa, marched up to relieve their outpost, and I at once ordered the captain to continue up the road to reenforce Major Bell, at the same time sending back for a battalion of the First Nebraska and sending word to brigade headquarters of my action.

About 500 yards north of the Iowa outpost Major Bell and his party were met. Reporting to him my action, he decided to halt and await the arrival of the Nebraska battalion before again advancing, he having been so hard pressed that he was compelled to leave 1 of his men behind dead.

About 8 o'clock a battalion of the First Nebraska, Captain Holderman, consisting of Company H (Lieutenant Van Valin), Company F (Lieutenant Gegner), Company A (Lieutenant Fisher), and Company D (Lieutenant Burr), arrived and the Iowa company was then sent back to relieve their outpost. We then advanced to where the dead cavalryman had been left, but found that he had been dragged off and up the road toward Quingua by the insurgents. Major Bell then decided to follow and endeavor to recover the body, and we again advanced until within about 1,000 yards of Quingua, when the enemy was discovered in force strongly intrenched, and by reason of the heavy fire developed our troops halted at the edge of the timber, between which and the enemy the country was flat and entirely without cover, except a few rice ridges on right of road. I suggested to Major Bell that our 1.65-inch Hotchkiss and another battalion of our regiment be sent for, as well as some artillery, which met with his approval.

A battalion of the Fifty-first Iowa had in the meantime come up about 1,000 yards to our right and had opened fire upon the enemy, but our regiment held their fire pending arrival of reinforcements.

About 10 o'clock, another battalion of the First Nebraska, Captain Kilian, consisting of Company K (Lieutenant Sisson), Company M (Captain Wilson), Company I (Lieutenant Smith), and Company B (Lieutenant Wadsworth), and Hotchkiss gun detachment (Lieutenant Moore), having arrived, the Hotchkiss gun was placed in edge of timber on the left of the road and the latter battalion, with Company H (Lieutenant Van Valin) and Company D (Lieutenant Burr), deployed in line of skirmishers on the right of road behind a rice ridge about 50 yards in advance of the timber.

The Hotchkiss gun opened fire upon the enemy in their trenches on the left of road with good effect, keeping up the fire until the arrival, about half past 10 o'clock, of General Hale and a battery of Utah artillery, Major Young, and General Hale having assumed command directed the artillery put in position in edge of timber on left of road and Hotchkiss gun withdrawn.

Shortly after 11 o'clock Colonel Stotsenburg (who had been to Manila) arrived and assumed command of the regiment, and the artillery having been in action about ten minutes, we advanced and charged across the open upon the enemy, driving them out of their position and across the Quingua River to their trenches on the opposite bank and inflicting considerable loss upon them. During this charge Colonel Stotsenburg and Lieutenant Sisson were killed and Lieutenant Moore and Lieutenant

Wadsworth were wounded; our losses being 2 officers and 2 men killed and 2 officers and 28 men wounded.

Our regiment next advanced into Quingua up to the church and took possession of the trenches on all the streets radiating from the church, about 100 yards from same, firing upon the retreating insurgents, and a third battalion, Major Eager, consisting of Company C (Lieutenant Storch), Company L (Lieutenant Richards), Company G (Captain Talbot), having arrived, the regiment then deployed along near the edge of the Quingua River from the ford to the bamboo bridge and about 200 yards to the right of the bridge, while position was maintained during the night with a loss of 2 men wounded, Company M (Captain Wilson), Company F (Lieutenant Gegner), and Company E (Lieutenant White) occupying trenches south of the town formerly held by the insurgents.

Just before daybreak, April 24, 1899, the Nebraska regiment was moved into position on the firing line along the bank with a loss of 1 man killed, a battalion of the Fifty-first Iowa being on our right.

The artillery having opened fire at daybreak upon the enemy intrenched upon the opposite bank and driving part of them back, Company B (Lieutenant Osborne) forded the river under fire, quickly followed by Company I (Lieutenant Smith) and Company M (Captain Wilson), and these companies deployed along the opposite bank of the river and immediately opened with volley fire upon the enemy, flanking them in their trenches in front of bamboo bridge and soon driving them out. Under cover of this fire the remainder of the regiment crossed the river, deploying along the opposite bank and covering the passage of South Dakota and Iowa regiments across the bamboo bridge. After ambulance and ammunition train were gotten across at the ford (with much difficulty) the regiment about 10 o'clock advanced, left resting on Quingua River. After proceeding about 1,000 yards the enemy were seen intrenched along river bank about 500 yards in advance.

Company M (Captain Wilson) advanced under cover and through thickets and surprised about 50 of the enemy strongly intrenched; advanced to within about 50 yards, flanking them and killing and wounding 45. During the advance of the regiment up to this point Lieutenant Dungan and 1 man were wounded.

No further resistance was encountered before reaching the town of Pulilan, when a halt for dinner was ordered and a two hours' rest taken.

About 3 o'clock our regiment again advanced in line of skirmishers, left resting on river, the South Dakota regiment on our right, and met no resistance until reaching Lagundi, where the enemy were again found strongly intrenched, their position extending from river to road and half a mile beyond same.

When about 500 yards from the enemy the Nebraska regiment halted and opened fire by volleys, supported by a platoon of the Sixth Artillery (Lieutenant Fleming), which did very effective work. After about ten minutes of firing our regiment, together with the First South Dakota, charged and drove the enemy from their works, killing many as they retreated, Company K (Lieutenant Weber) advancing up the road, killing several and cutting off their retreat toward the river. During this charge 1 man was mortally wounded. The Nebraska regiment camped for the night in the insurgent trenches.

At 6.30 a. m. April 25 our regiment again advanced, two battalions (Major Eager and Captain Holderman) on the firing line and one battalion (Lieutenant Gegner), Companies D, F, A, and H, in reserve, meeting no resistance until within about 700 yards of the Calumpit River, at which point the artillery opened fire upon the enemy, who were heavily intrenched on the west side of the Calumpit River and on the north side of the Bagbag River (a continuation of the Quingua River), and who at once opened a very heavy fire upon the entire line. Our regiment promptly returned the fire, and after firing a few volleys advanced until it reached a position on the east bank of the Calumpit River at about 50 yards from the works of the enemy, and with practically no cover. From this position, although much exposed, we poured a heavy fire into the insurgent trenches, continuing about an hour, our loss being 1 man killed and Major Eager and 8 men wounded.

Company K (Lieutenant Weber), together with Hotchkiss gun (Private Van Buren, Company G, in charge, who deserves special mention for the efficient manner in which he handled the gun detachment), had secured a position on the point at the junction of the Calumpit and Bagbag rivers, from which position a flanking fire was obtained upon the enemy in the trenches along the opposite side of both rivers. The artillery (Lieutenant Fleming) had also advanced to the firing line, and the combined fire of artillery and infantry finally caused the fire of the enemy to slacken and compelled the enemy to partly retire from their trenches on the opposite point. Company K (Lieutenant Weber) then forded the river under fire, followed by Company I (Lieutenant Smith), Company B (Lieutenant Osborne), and Company M (Captain Wilson), quickly deployed a line of skirmishers, right resting on the

Calumpit River, and we advanced rapidly through the town, flanking the insurgents, driving them from their trenches, killing and wounding over 50, and taking several prisoners.

The remaining two battalions having also followed, deployed on the left of the first line, extending the line to the railroad track, and the regiment then continued through the village for about a mile until all the insurgents had been driven out of the town across the Rio Grande, when General Hale, who had also crossed the river with our regiment, ordered us to return and camp upon the north bank of the Bagbag River.

During all of the engagements of the three days all officers and men of the regiment present displayed great gallantry and performed their various duties in the most thorough and enthusiastic manner. The platoon of the Sixth Artillery (Lieutenant Fleming) supported the regiment upon all occasions in a most admirable manner.

Very respectfully,

H. B. MCLFORD.

Major, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding Regiment.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,

SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

Calumpit, P. I., April 30, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of part taken by the Fifty-first Iowa, U. S. V., in the advance from Malolos to Calumpit:

Pursuant to orders from division headquarters, the regiment was prepared to move on April 24. About 6 a. m. April 23 heavy firing was heard to my left. I sent Captain Davidson, regimental adjutant, to learn the cause. Before his return at 6.30 a. m. I received orders from the brigade commander to send forward a battalion to support a reconnoitering party of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry under Maj. J. F. Bell. Major Hume, with four companies (E, G, I, and L), was sent out and reported to Major Bell, who placed him on the right of the Quingua road, with orders to advance against the enemy's intrenchments.

Captain Davidson reported to me at 7 a. m. that he had met Captain Lockett, of the division staff, who informed him that Major Bell, with a reconnoitering party, had been attacked and needed assistance, and that Major Hume was then in position on the right of the Quingua road and engaged with the enemy, who was intrenched in his front. I then sent Captain Davidson to report the conditions to the brigade commander. At 10.45 a. m. I received orders to take the remainder of my command forward to reinforce the firing line. I took Major Moore and three companies (B, M, and K) and moved up and formed to the right of Major Hume, whose left connected with the right of the First Nebraska, U. S. V. At 12.30 p. m. an order was received from the brigade commander to attack the enemy's intrenchments. The line was moved forward, meeting with slight resistance, into the town of Quingua, where the troops were bivouacked for the night. Captain Davidson was sent back from Quingua to the Malolos camp for an additional supply of ammunition, the four companies with Major Hume having expended the greater portion carried by the men (150 rounds) in the action against Quingua. He returned at 10.30 p. m., bringing up 25,000 rounds, caliber .45, and rations that had been left at camp.

During the night the balance of the regiment (five companies) was brought up, joining the command at 2 a. m., April 24. Company C was on outpost duty on the 23d. Companies A and F were stationed south of Malolos on the railroad. Companies D and H were acting as provost guard at Malolos. April 24 the regiment crossed the Quingua River and acted as reserve to the brigade until near Pulilan, when I received orders from the brigade commander to deploy my regiment on the right of the First South Dakota, U. S. V., keeping in touch with and conforming to their movements, and if we should meet the enemy to swing around on his left flank and drive him from his intrenchments. While deploying, the right of my regiment was fired upon by the enemy located in the timber on my right flank. I ordered Major Moore to take his battalion and drive the enemy out of his position; after which, he acted as support until west of Pulilan, when he was ordered up on the right of my line. The entire line then advanced against the enemy located west of Pulilan. Major Duggan was wounded in right arm at this point. The regiment bivouacked for the night, occupying part of the intrenched line of the enemy captured west of Pulilan.

April 25 the regiment advanced westward against Calumpit, conforming to the movements of the First South Dakota, U. S. V., which was on my left. On coming within 300 yards of the Calumpit River, my command was fired on by the enemy from the west bank of the river. We continued the advance into the line of woods on the river. At about 200 yards from the river 2 of my men were wounded by shrapnel; shortly after which I received orders to cease firing.

The regiment camped on the east bank of the Calumpit River until April 27, when it was moved across the Calumpit River, the First and Second battalions camping on the north bank of the Bagbag River, right on the railroad. The Third Battalion was placed on the south bank of the Bagbag River as guard to division headquarters and train.

The conduct of the men of my command in the several actions was commendable. Quite a number were compelled to fall out on the 23d and 24th on account of heat exhaustion, the majority of whom rejoined their companies during the night of April 24.

Very respectfully,

M. MILLER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.
Calumpit, P. I., April 29, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, on the Bagbag River.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations in which this regiment was engaged from April 23 to 25, inclusive:

At 5 o'clock p. m., April 23, Capt. James Lockett, 4th U. S. Cavalry, brought an order from the division commander to move my regiment to Quingua at once. The regiment was assembled and marched to Quingua, which it reached just before dark. It bivouacked for the night behind the walls of the church.

At daybreak, April 24, the regiment was formed in single rank, and moved by the left flank up the road leading to the bamboo footbridge, where it awaited the result of the artillery fire upon the intrenched enemy on the opposite bank. After some minutes of this fire, I ordered the column to cross the river and form skirmish line on the right of the road. This passage was led by Capt. Charles L. Brockway, this regiment. After crossing, the line was advanced about 500 yards to cover the passage of the other troops and wagon train.

At about 10 o'clock a. m. the regiment advanced, with the First and Third battalions in skirmish line, the left connecting with the First Nebraska Regiment, and the Second Battalion following as reserve in column of fours on the road. The First Battalion was on the left of the wagon road and the Third Battalion on its right.

After advancing about a mile, the enemy was encountered in a trench on the right of the road and in a redan on its left; also in skirmish line on the left of the redan. After a few minutes' rapid fire, I ordered the attack, but at that moment I received word that the artillery was about to open fire upon the redan. I checked the advance of the troops on the left of the road, where I was stationed, but the right continued the assault and carried the works, killing 38 Filipinos, and capturing 1 Remington and 38 Mauser rifles in the trenches. The artillery fired several shots with excellent effect. The left of the regiment then advanced over the ground which had just previously been occupied by the Filipinos, where a number of dead bodies were found. Our loss was 3 enlisted men killed, and 1 enlisted man wounded.

On reaching the Pulilan road the regiment changed front to the left and continued the advance. Major Howard immediately deployed the reserve, and followed behind the center in skirmish line. The country passed over was covered with bamboo jungle, which was penetrated with difficulty, and at points some distance apart, necessitating frequent halts to reform the line.

At about 5 o'clock p. m., in emerging from a jungle such as has been described, we had barely formed the line when a heavy fire was received from the front. I ordered the men to lie down and commence firing, and tried to locate the position of the enemy. After a few minutes' firing, I ordered it ceased; but not considering the enemy sufficiently shaken, ordered it renewed. I again ceased firing, and, noticing that the enemy's fire was sensibly lessened, ordered an assault.

Our advance no sooner commenced than the enemy began leaving the trenches, offering fair targets to our men, who shot them as they ran. About 15 were killed and wounded, and the others escaped in the jungle. Twelve Remington rifles were taken and destroyed. One of the Filipino wounded stated that the trenches, which in length were equal to our regimental front, had been occupied by 600 men under command of a lieutenant-colonel. Our loss was 2 killed and 4 wounded.

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At 6 a. m., April 25, the regiment advanced in the same formation, the Third Battalion in reserve. About 11.30 a. m., when about 600 yards from the Calumpit River, the enemy opened fire upon our lines. The men were ordered to lie down, and volleys were fired by platoon from our entire regiment, with frequent stops to observe the effect.

A general advance being ordered, the regiment advanced to the brink of the river, where it directed a heavy and effective fire upon the enemy, who was found strongly intrenched upon the opposite bank.

Upon being informed that our troops had crossed the river and were advancing up the right bank of the Calumpit to attack the enemy on the flank, I sounded "cease firing." In the interval between the cessation of our fire and the advance of the flanking party we suffered severely from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, who became bolder. But we attracted their attention and soon had the satisfaction of seeing them slaughtered by the First Nebraska Regiment, which had taken them by surprise. Our loss was 1 officer wounded, 3 enlisted men killed, and 18 enlisted men wounded.

Total distance marched for the three days was 26 miles.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 19.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Calumpit, P. I., May 3. 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of a march, in accordance with instructions from department commander, of a portion of this brigade (First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., and Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., with a platoon of Fourth U. S. Cavalry under Captain Wheeler, and two 3.2-inch guns and Gatling gun under Lieutenant Fleming, Sixth U. S. Artillery, and Lieutenant Naylor, Utah Light Artillery) to point about 1 mile east of Pulilan for the purpose of supporting Major-General Lawton at Baliuag in case he should encounter an insurgent force requiring additional troops.

May 2, 5.30 a. m.—Troops and transportation began fording Calumpit River.

6.35 a. m.—Advance guard started. Major Bell, with platoon of cavalry, who was starting on a reconnoissance to Quingua, preceded column. Loaned him the other platoon of cavalry as support.

7.10 a. m.—Rear of wagon train under escort of one battalion South Dakota left ford.

9. a. m.—Arrived at Pulilan Church and found Major Bell in conference with an insurgent captain, whose party had refrained from returning the fire of Major Bell's detachment and apparently wanted to surrender, but on investigation stated that they had received orders not to fire on American troops, as hostilities were suspended. Major Bell had explained that an armistice had been requested by the Filipinos, but declined by the Americans; and had told him that, as he had come in good faith and under promise of not being fired upon, our fire would be suspended thirty minutes, after which they must be prepared for our advance. This was evidently the only fair course under the circumstances. After a few minutes conversation with the captain he said he would like to have me talk with his commandante, who was a short distance down the road with 500 men, and went to get him. As he did not return within a reasonable time, and a native came back with the information that it would require an hour for the commandante to arrive, we assumed that they had taken advantage of the opportunity to retire gracefully. We therefore proceeded with a skirmish line through Pulilan to the forks of the road (the scene of our engagement of April 24), about a mile east of the center of town (church), which is a much better position than the town itself.

10.55 a. m.—Arrived at forks of road. There was a party of insurgents and unarmed natives in road to Baliuag, where it enters woods half a mile east. An insurgent officer on horseback remained watching us until Major Bell's party started and then disappeared. Sent 2 cavalrymen with report to General MacArthur at Calumpit.

12 m.—Major Bell and party being ready to start, I requested him to go along road toward Baliuag, proceeding about a mile to junction with road from Quingua to Baliuag, and thence back on latter road to Quingua, thus ascertaining whether this

triangular district was free from insurgents. Lieutenant Weber, acting aid on brigade staff, accompanied him to bring back report from Quingua. They encountered no hostiles, but found a Spanish prisoner, left by the insurgents, whom we brought in in an ambulance. He gave considerable information. That previous to our advance from Malolos to Calumpit there had been 5,000 insurgents at the three towns (Quingua, Pulilan, and Baliuag); that after the battle of Quingua they retreated, partly to Baliuag and partly to the north of Pulilan, and after the engagement at Pulilan they went to the north and to Calumpit; that as a result of latter fight they found 38 dead in one trench (corresponding exactly to our count), and buried over 200 altogether, agreeing with estimate in previous report; that especially since the capture of Calumpit the insurgents' soldiers have been discouraged and tired of fighting, and there have been many desertions; that there was a comparatively small force at Baliuag, and that Aguinaldo and the Spanish prisoners are at Biacnabato, east of San Miguel.

Sent telegram to Major-General Lawton by Major Bell, informing him of arrival and specifying troops; message to be wired from Quingua if telegraph station there, but it had not been established. Hearing late in the afternoon that the office had been set up, sent it again. Received reply about 10 p. m. to effect that he had captured Bustas and Baliuag, and that insurgents had retreated toward San Miguel in confusion; also a similar message from Colonel Barry, adjutant-general department.

About 10 p. m.—At same time received telegrams from Colonel Barry and from General MacArthur to return to Calumpit early next morning.

May 3, 5.30 a. m.—Advance guard started for Calumpit.

5.36 a. m.—After column was under way I started with cavalry detachment and proceeded ahead of infantry, in accordance with instructions from General MacArthur, arriving at Calumpit Ford at 6.50 a. m. and reporting to General MacArthur.

8.10 a. m.—Head of infantry column arrived. Troops were sent to north side of Rio Grande River to be in readiness for movement against San Fernando next day. Total distance marched two days, 21 miles, including two fords, for which men had to strip.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

APPENDIX 20.

HQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this brigade in the advance from Calumpit to San Fernando, May 4 to 6, 1899.

In accordance with orders from the division commander the brigade was moved on the night of May 3 to the north bank of the Rio Grande, and camped on the road from the railroad bridge toward Apalit, left near railroad, with instructions to be ready to march by 5 a. m., and to proceed north to Apalit and thence northwesterly on wagon road toward Santo Tomas and San Fernando, cooperating with the First Brigade, which was to move up the railroad. The divisional artillery (Utah and Sixth U. S., under Major Young) accompanied, and the wagon train, under escort of the squadron of Fourth U. S. Cavalry, followed the Second Brigade. The Third Battalion Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., was left at Rio Grande Bridge to guard stores and bridge.

May 4, 5 a. m.—Column formed on road in the following order, head about a mile north of Rio Grande Bridge:

Second Battalion, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., advance guard.

Two field guns and 1 Gatling behind advance party (one company) of advance guard, for prompt action if resistance was encountered.

First Battalion, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V.

Remainder of artillery.

First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

Wagon train, escorted by squadron Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

5.10 a. m.—Point of advance guard started.

5.45 a. m.—Turned to northwest at forks of road in Apalit.

6.07 a. m.—Halt for rest.

6.20 a. m.—March resumed.

7.14 a. m.—Advance guard arrived at recently constructed but unoccupied trench across road.

Major Bell, who had been in advance, reported a party of natives, apparently insurgents, in road half a mile to front.

Directed advance guard battalion to deploy, placed guns near road out of sight, and went forward with Major Bell to reconnoiter. The party, which consisted of some insurgents in uniform, and more natives in white (apparently a working party) were evidently engaged in some defensive or obstructive work, and on discovering us began to get out of sight. We opened fire on them with a gun, which brought a reply from a body of the enemy in woods to our right, against whom we turned another gun and the Gatling with quieting effect. The deployed battalion advanced, driving out the insurgents on the road.

8.20 a. m.—On reaching the place where they had been working we found a series of conical pits in the road, with sharpened bamboo stakes in bottom and covered with light bamboo lattice and mats on which they were spreading earth. They were located in front of a stone bridge across an estero, with swampy ground on each side, requiring a little time and work to build a road to take the artillery around the pits. While this was being done the artillery again got into action on the same party who had halted about half a mile farther on and appeared very slow in getting out. On arriving at the place we found a deep estero with a destroyed bamboo footbridge. Both battalions of Iowa had in the meantime been deployed one on each side of the road, but the troops on left, getting into a deep swamp, were obliged to close in on the road.

About 9 a. m.—On our arrival at estero mentioned above the insurgents in strong force opened a heavy fire from a line 800 to 1,000 yards to our front and right. We replied with all the artillery that could be advantageously placed on the road and with the Iowa battalion deployed on right of road and along the near bank of estero. I directed Nebraska to move to right and front and deploy on right of Iowa, with a view to crossing the stream farther up, if possible, and flanking the enemy. They encountered deep swamps, which seriously impeded their progress. It becoming apparent, after a considerable amount of artillery and infantry fire, that the insurgents could not be driven from their positions without an advance, I had the estero tested and found that the troops could barely wade it neck deep in places, including a foot or two of mud; so pushed Iowa across and proceeding to right of line, where Nebraska was arriving at the stream, sent them through also, with instructions to proceed on the right and ahead of the Iowa line enveloping the enemy's flank, if possible. As they advanced through the swamps on the other side they developed a lively fire in their front and right, the latter showing signs of a serious flank attack, to meet which South Dakota was ordered to follow Nebraska's right. When Nebraska was about 300 yards in advance of Iowa the latter was ordered forward. All three regiments floundered on through the swamps and streams, firing as they went and driving the insurgents from their strong positions.

10.50 a. m.—Crossing the estero and requesting Major Bell to look after the left and not let it get away from the right, I followed Nebraska until they succeeded in crossing the first branch of the Santo Tomas River (which forks east of the road), and then went to left of line (11.15 a. m.) and found Iowa on the bank of the river near destroyed stone bridge firing with good effect on the fleeing insurgents on the farther side, of whom many were killed. In escaping across the river they threw a large number of guns into the stream, many of which were afterwards fished out near the bridge.

Finding that the insurgents appeared to be making for a strong line of intrenchments between the wagon road and railroad, I sent word to that effect to Colonel Mulford, of Nebraska, telling him to flank them out. He soon reported in person that his command had kept on, wading altogether eleven streams, had flanked these trenches, and was then in possession.

This advance of the Iowa, Nebraska and South Dakota regiments (especially Nebraska, which, on account of its position and orders, traveled farther than the others) through swamps knee to waist deep and numerous stagnant, mud-bottomed esteros waist to neck deep, under oppressive heat and in the face of a galling fire, driving the enemy from intrenched positions, which would have been strong without these natural obstacles, and with them would have been impregnable if held by American troops, may fairly be considered the most remarkable exhibition of persevering pluck and endurance during the campaign.

12.15 p. m.—Major Bell left to report to General MacArthur with First Brigade on railroad track.

12.45 p. m.—Iowa, having constructed a floating bamboo footbridge across river at the broken stone bridge, began to cross and move forward, deploying on Nebraska's left in trenches. South Dakota was brought in from the swamp on right and took position near the road. I returned to the first river to see what progress was being made in bridging it and getting the artillery across. Found that the engineers were

obliged to send back a considerable distance for bamboo to make a raft, and that it was doubtful whether a crossing could be effected before night. The pack horses were unloaded and swam across, the packs being carried over by men.

While here I interviewed an insurgent prisoner (of which 5 had been captured), who said, among other things: "General Luna told us that our position could not be taken because the Americans could not cross the swamps; but they caught me when I was trying to run away through the swamp."

Returning to the Santo Tomas River, found Major Bell with a message from General MacArthur to move forward and take possession east of the main road on crossroad running northeast of railroad station and on the right of the First Brigade.

The South Dakota regiment, with the exception of one battalion which was sent back as guard for artillery and wagon train, crossed on the footbridge and deployed on the right of Nebraska. The brigade then advanced in line, obliquing to the right, and bivouacked on road specified above, South Dakota on the right being refused to protect right flank. Outposts were thrown out to front, rear, and right.

4.15 p. m.—Above movement completed.

4.30 p. m.—Reported to division commander at his headquarters near railroad station. During the night, although exhausted by their terrific day's work, large details went back about 3 miles to the wagon train, which could not cross the streams, and carried up rations and ammunition. Distance marched by marching flank (not counting trip to wagon train), 11 miles, including about 2 miles through swamps and esteros.

Casualties.—First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., 2 enlisted men killed, 5 wounded. Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., 3 enlisted men wounded. First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., 1 enlisted man wounded.

May 5, 9.55 a. m.—General MacArthur, having received report from Major Bell that San Fernando appeared to be held by only a small force of the enemy, directed me to take two battalions and occupy the town. Iowa was immediately formed and moved to corner of main San Fernando road.

10.05 a. m.—Advance guard started. Column marched northwest on road to point near intrenchments about half a mile southeast of river and town, changed direction half-right and proceeded north across open fields, forded a muddy estero (after laying some bamboo fish nets on bottom to prevent sinking so deep in mud), advanced beyond bend in river until opposite part where it runs south, and deployed parallel to river facing west, so as to enter town on east side.

12 m.—Line advanced westward toward river. I accompanied right battalion, and Major Bell the left battalion. On reaching bank of river, a lively fire opened on the left. Seeing no insurgents opposite the right battalion, I rushed it across the river, which was about chest deep, and swung it to left to flank enemy in front of left battalion. The latter kept on, however, without serious resistance, and the entire line, wheeling to the left through field north of town, reached the railroad near the station, discovering and firing on some parties of insurgents escaping on the roads to the west toward Bacolor. From here companies were sent out these roads and up the railroad, and others through the town, all finally assembling at the church. Distance marched by marching flank, 5 miles. One enlisted man wounded. Several insurgents were killed. Sentinels were promptly posted throughout town to protect property, and a line of outposts established in semicircle from river southwest of town toward Bacolor around through railroad station and fields to river northeast toward Mexico. The Iowa troops were quartered on roads radiating from town to west, northwest, and north. Strict orders were issued against looting. It is believed that the behavior of the troops in this respect was very exemplary.

4 p. m.—In accordance with instructions from division commander, sent order to Colonel Frost to bring South Dakota Regiment from Santo Tomas crossroad to San Fernando.

5.30 p. m.—South Dakota Regiment arrived and was quartered temporarily in houses along southeast side of river near bridge, and relieved Iowa of interior provost-guard duty. The railroad station, church, and a number of buildings in its vicinity had been burned by the insurgents, but the greater part of the town was uninjured. There are numerous warehouses containing large quantities of sugar. Several Spanish prisoners were found in the town, including the former secretary of the province, a captain, and other officers and noncommissioned officers. They stated that 1,200 to 1,500 insurgents had passed through to the north on the previous afternoon, after the fight at Santo Tomas, and that General Luna was wounded in the arm or chest and was carried on a couch.

May 6, 10.10 a. m.—The Nebraska regiment was ordered from Santo Tomas to San Fernando; reported at 10.10 a. m. and was quartered on main road, running northwest parallel to railroad, guarding the front from railroad northeasterly about 1,400 yards.

11.50 a. m.—The Third Battalion South Dakota, which had been guarding wagon train, reported. The South Dakota regiment was quartered in main town on north-west side of river. The Iowa regiment, after being relieved in the district southwest of railroad track by the First Brigade, which came up during the day, was concentrated on roads leading northeast along river toward Mexico, guarding this front from the river west to the Nebraska right and also maintaining an outpost of a platoon in the trenches across main road on southeast side of river, about 1,000 yards from San Fernando Bridge, toward Santo Tomas. The insurgents were located around our entire front on northwest side of river, across Bacolor road to west and southwest, railroad and wagon road to northwest, and Mexico road to northeast, and have been intrenching, especially across the Mexico road and adjoining country.

May 11.—One company of the Iowa regiment was placed as a permanent outpost at the cross roads, near and northeast of Santo Tomas railroad station, to guard against possible raids from vicinity of Mexico on our wagon trains.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 8, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Fifty-first Iowa participated in the advance from Calumpit to San Fernando. About 9.30 p. m., May 3, orders were received from brigade headquarters to be ready to march at 5 a. m., May 4. My command (eight companies) was formed in column of fours, right at General MacArthur's headquarters, at 4.55 a. m. (Major Moore with Third Battalion was left as guard at Calumpit Bridge.) The column marched up the road about 1 mile—was deployed to the right and left of the road. Advancing through a swamp for about 1,000 yards, when a considerable size stream was forded. Soon after crossing this stream the swamp became impassable and the men to the left of the road had to be called in and formed in column on the road. Those to the right continued to advance in line (meeting considerable resistance from the enemy in their front), coming to a river (name unknown), which was forded. The column on the road was then deployed to the right. The advance continued to a second river (name not known), on opposite bank of which the enemy was posted in strong earthworks. The entire line opened fire on the works, driving the enemy out. In the meantime a footbridge was constructed by Major Hume across the river, on which the command crossed, occupying the line of intrenchments of the enemy. The regiment camped for the night in the village of Santo Tomas.

May 5 the regiment moved forward, deploying to the right of the wagon road, advanced against San Fernando. Crossing the San Fernando River, under fire from the enemy; moving forward and driving the enemy out of the town. The command was then assembled in the town, outposts posted, and quarters assigned to the men. While crossing the river 10 rifles were lost, the men having to drop them to prevent drowning. Casualties: May 4, John Cushing, corporal, Company C, scalp wound, slight; Charles L. Border, private, Company H, gunshot wound above left heel; Everett Bronson, private, Company E, spent ball striking abdomen; May 5, George Shannon, private, Company C, gunshot wound left hip.

M. MILLER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA, U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
San Fernando, P. I., May 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL
Second Brigade, Second Division, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this regiment during the movement from Calumpit to San Fernando.

At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of May 3 the regiment moved from its position on the north side of the Bagbag River to a position on the north side of the Rio Grande, with the Iowa regiment on its right and the South Dakota regiment on its left.

By 4 o'clock on the morning of May 4, all the bull and wagon trains having been ferried across, breakfast was eaten, and at 4.45 the regiment moved in column north on the road, closing up to the Iowa regiment, and at 5 a. m. the column moved. With the exception of three short rests the regiment moved steadily, meeting no resistance, being in support, with the Iowa regiment about 600 yards in advance deployed on both sides of the road as skirmishers, until about 8.30 a. m., when the regiment halted, the enemy having been discovered.

The artillery having fired a few shots quickly dispersed the enemy and the advance was again begun, the regiment keeping in column up the road.

About 9.30, the Iowa regiment having engaged the enemy, the First Battalion (Captain Holderman), consisting of Company A (Sergeant Oviatt), Company F (Captain Jens), Company L (Sergeant Taylor), Company E (Lieutenant White), was ordered to support right flank of the Iowa line, followed shortly by the Second Battalion (Captain Kilian), consisting of Company K (Lieutenant Weber), Company G (Captain Talbot), Company C (Lieutenant Storch), and Company I (Lieutenant Robbins); the Third Battalion (Captain Wilson), consisting of Company M (Lieutenant Osborne), Company H (Lieutenant Van Valin), Company D (Lieutenant Burr), and Company B (Lieutenant Smith), remaining in column on the road in the reserve.

Company F (Captain Jens) and Company A (Sergeant Oviatt) deployed on firing line on the right of the Iowas, followed by the remaining companies of the First Battalion, and the Second Battalion deployed about 400 yards in rear and protecting our right flank.

We waded through mud nearly waist deep and forded eleven streams, varying from 10 to 30 yards wide, over a country almost impassable, constantly under fire and returning same with volley firing from time to time.

The support was also advanced on firing line, and the whole line having advanced about 400 yards beyond the line of the Iowa regiment, made a half turn to the left, advancing in the new direction until reaching the edge of the dry open country about 800 yards from the trenches of the enemy outside of Santo Tomas, located across the road and extending several hundred yards to the left of the road. With the left keeping up volley firing, the right of the line again made a half turn to the left, enabling the line to get a flank fire in the enemy's trenches, driving them out; and we then advanced and took possession of same about 11.30 a. m., remaining there for dinner.

Our loss during the advance were 2 killed and 5 wounded.

The Iowa regiment was then brought up and also occupied the trenches on our left; and our reserve and the South Dakota regiment having been brought up and deployed, the Nebraska regiment in line of skirmishers, with the Iowa regiment on our left and the South Dakota on our right, advanced into Santo Tomas and went into camp along the road.

The regiment remained in camp in the same position during May 5, and at 9.15 a. m. May 6, being ordered to report to the brigade commander at San Fernando, at 9.30 a. m. the regiment was found and marched into San Fernando, meeting no resistance, reporting to the brigade commander about 10.30 a. m., after which the regiment was placed in quarters at the northwest edge of the town.

Very respectfully,

H. B. MULFORD,
Colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., May 11, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this regiment on the 4th day of May, 1899.

At 5 o'clock a. m. the regiment formed, in column of fours, along the Calumpit-San Tomas wagon road, and marched on the road in column of fours, acting as reserve for the Second Brigade.

When the firing line went into action the reserve halted near the first stone bridge, north of the insurgent pits on said road. After the firing line became engaged I received orders to take the regiment to the right front, to meet an anticipated attack of the enemy on the right flank.

The regiment moved in the direction indicated, crossing a muddy stream, the bottom of which was covered with ooze in which the men sank up to their knees.

On the farther bank a swamp, crossed by numerous malodorous ditches and streams, was encountered. The mud was from ankle to knee deep, and the swamp was covered by a rank swamp grass extending above the men's heads. The regiment reached this swamp at 12 m. The heat was intense and in the midst of the swamp grass the air was stifling.

After struggling through this swamp and across eight or nine of the ditches and streams described, the regiment emerged upon firm ground near the Santo Tomas River, to the right rear of the Nebraska regiment, which had crossed the river. The regiment was here formed with one battalion extended to the front, the Second Battalion brought facing the right, and the Third Battalion in the rear in column of four.

I here reconnoitered the ground through my glass and saw that the Nebraska regiment had taken the trenches on the opposite bank and that the fighting at that point had ceased. I examined the right flank and found that the swamp, which was almost impassable, extended for nearly a mile in that direction. Upon the farther bank I saw groups of natives along the line of trees, but could not tell whether they were soldiers or peasants. Anticipating no danger from that locality in either event, I allowed the men to rest, and afterwards moved the regiment by the left flank to the road and across the river by an extemporized bridge immediately in the rear of the Nebraska reserve.

The regiment then took position for the night in the firing line on the right of the Nebraska regiment.

Our loss for the day was 1 man wounded (Musician Robert J. Van Hook, Company K), at the first stone bridge.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 21.

HQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engagement of this brigade (South Dakota and Iowa regiments and two Utah guns) this afternoon with a body of insurgents who came down from Angeles and attacked our outpost lines. Regimental reports attached.

At about 1 p. m. Colonel Frost, First South Dakota, sent word that his outposts reported that the insurgents were forming to attack and that he was taking his regiment to their support.

After instructing Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, commanding Fifty-first Iowa, to put his regiment under arms and put two battalions in supporting distance of his two principal outposts (Mexico road on right and group of buildings in field on left, latter connecting with South Dakota right), I went to the South Dakota outpost line, finding Colonel Frost and his troops near right flank of same. The outposts reported having seen numerous parties of insurgents, during previous hour, passing about 1,000 yards in our front, from right to left (east to west), toward sugar mill near railroad, about 1,400 yards in front of outpost line. While we were inspecting front from advance post, we saw two insurgents—mounted officers in khaki uniforms and white helmets—about where troops had passed, apparently reconnoitering ground and locating a position for their line. They rode some distance toward us and then disappeared in bamboo to right. On returning to our right (at forks of road), we saw from outlook in roof of house a large party of insurgents moving in single file from our right to left, along a fringe of bamboo about 300 yards to front, and on looking up road to northwest saw them crossing road not over 200 yards away. They immediately opened fire on us and the South Dakota right replied by volleys into the bamboo in which the insurgents had just been seen and from which they were firing, although no longer visible. Thinking that the right of this insurgent line could not have moved very far to our left and that a quick movement on our left might envelop the enemy's right flank, I directed Colonel Frost to advance his center and left as rapidly as possible with this object, which he did with great promptness. The center had not advanced more than 200 yards through a field of high corn, from which a heavy fire was coming, when a line of insurgents

sprang up in the corn, and after making a short stand under the exhortation of their major, who displayed considerable bravery, broke and fled, the South Dakota men killing the major and 20 men, who were afterwards counted. Most of them ran down a bamboo-fringed creek, which gave them cover, and joined their other line in vicinity of sugar mill.

A few hundred yards farther on I halted the South Dakota line, with instructions to merely hold the position, but not advance on the insurgent line extending northeast from sugar mill, in order to get up the artillery, for which request had been sent to division commander, and also to enable the two Iowa battalions to move forward on right of South Dakota and wheel to left to flank enemy's position, if possible, before they were scared off, for which instructions had been sent by a staff officer soon after firing began. I also sent recommendation to General MacArthur for Kansas on our left, to similarly turn enemy's right flank, and in order to save time, sent a staff officer direct across to Kansas to suggest this movement, if consistent with their force and general instructions. A staff officer was sent to the Third Battalion, Iowa, to direct it to move forward and occupy abandoned trenches on Mexico road, if possible, before the enemy could reoccupy them, and to cut off any movements along that road, which instructions were carried out.

On the arrival of the guns they were placed at about the middle of the South Dakota outpost line, which commands a fine view of the sugar mill, and opened fire on latter, doing accurate work, as found by subsequent examination. At about this time the Kansas line advanced on the left, and one of our guns was directed on the enemy, firing from bamboo in their front as long as practicable without danger to the Kansas troops. I then followed Iowa, overtaking it as it reached the South Dakota right in its flanking movement, and directed South Dakota to move by the left flank, advancing the two lines, forming an L with the sugar mill in the angle toward the mill. The insurgents had, however, retreated, probably due to the advance of the Kansas line, or to knowledge of Iowa's flanking movement, or both. The troops then returned to quarters. We had about 700 men engaged—300 in South Dakota and 400 in Iowa. Our casualties were 1 enlisted man killed, 6 wounded, all in First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V. Twenty-one insurgents dead, including a major, were found in the cornfield and 5 prisoners were taken.

One of the prisoners, a sergeant, stated that their party came down from Angeles this forenoon, and consisted of three battalions of six companies each, nominal strength of companies 120, actual strength 50 to 60 (these troops are called tiradores, of which there are two more battalions at San Miguel de Mayumo); that the force at Angeles is under command of General Concepcion, General Luna being wounded; that the railroad is all right north of Angeles; that the rails are taken up in places between Angeles and Calulat, but bridges are uninjured, and that he does not know the condition of track south of Calulat, as they came from there via wagon road. (We observed, however, that the rails and ties were removed north of sugar mill as far as could be seen, probably a mile.) Like most of the prisoners taken, he represents that the Filipino soldiers are poorly fed and paid, have insufficient ammunition, and that not only the privates but most of the officers, excepting the generals, are tired of the war and would gladly come in with their guns and surrender if they dared.

The Third Battalion, Iowa, which, as previously stated, took possession of abandoned trenches on the Mexico road, placed an outpost about half a mile beyond (northeast of) trenches on this road and near road which branches to northwest, leading toward the front of Iowa left and South Dakota, and in general direction of Calulat and Angeles. They saw a body of insurgents advancing in skirmish line on southeast side of river, and soon afterwards saw them cross the Mexico road rapidly in single file and pass up the road to northwest. Later they saw another insurgent skirmish line in single file moving across country from the Mexico road to the northwest road, north of junction. A little later this line returned, apparently afraid to proceed on account of engagement then in progress on our left (northwest and west) front. These incidents, together with the fact that all the insurgents noticed by our outposts early in the afternoon were moving toward the west, would imply a movement of insurgent troops down the San Fernando River from above Mexico (presumably Arayat or San Isidro) westerly across to the railroad and thence northwest to Angeles, and that the demonstration by the troops which came down from Angeles might have been for the purpose of covering this movement across our front.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

484 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., May 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this regiment on the 25th day of May, 1899:

At about 1 o'clock p. m. the officer in command of outpost number 2 reported that the enemy had thrown out a skirmish line in front of the outpost and was preparing to attack. I assembled the regiment, marched it to the threatened point and deployed it as skirmishers behind the fringe of trees. I reconnoitered the ground, and while so engaged was joined by the brigade commander. While General Hale and I were reconnoitering the road leading to the front, we were seen by the enemy, who opened fire at less than 200 yards from where we were. The Second Battalion and part of the First were then advanced, taking the enemy by surprise. He was found extended in skirmish line and lying down across the cane field. He opened a heavy fire, but our line was soon upon him, killing 11, one of whom was a major, upon the original line, and about 20 others who sought to escape along the creek and fringe of bamboo to the left. Our loss was 2 men wounded. Soon after the first encounter a heavy fire was opened upon our left front, taking our line obliquely, from a strong force, killing 1 man and wounding 4 others, who belonged to the Third Battalion, just as it commenced its advance. This fire was replied to by the Second and Third battalions and by the piece of artillery on the road, which put the enemy to flight. During this time the First Battalion and right of the Second had continued the advance sufficiently to see the enemy retreating, and several volleys were fired, which hastened his movements. The line then halted and waited for the Iowa regiment, and afterwards moved by the left flank and column half left so as to cooperate with the turning movement of that regiment. The turning movement was completed without further incident. Distance marched about 6 miles. Prisoners taken, 6.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry,

HDQRS. FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 31, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., in the turning movement on the 25th instant. Under orders of the brigade commander received at 1.30 p. m., the First and Second battalions were sent to the outpost. The Second Battalion was deployed as skirmishers, connecting on left with First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V. The First Battalion was formed in column of files with orders to protect the flank, and if the enemy was found, to flank him if possible. The entire line was wheeled to the left, advancing to the railroad track, thence back to quarters. The Third Battalion was sent at 1.30 p. m. to occupy abandoned trenches of the enemy on the Mexico road. They were fired on by small party coming from the left front at about 4.30 p. m. A few volleys were fired by Company K, when the enemy retired.

Very respectfully,

M. MILLER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

APPENDIX 22.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engagement of troops of this brigade (First South Dakota and Fifty-first Iowa) this morning with insurgents who came down from Angeles during the night, deploying across the greater part of our front, and beginning demonstrations against the South Dakota outposts (left or west half of line) before daylight. Regimental reports attached.

On receipt of information to above effect from Colonel Frost, First South Dakota, who was going to the front with his regiment to support the outpost line, I directed the Iowa regiment to breakfast immediately and get under arms, and soon afterwards went to the front, sending Lieutenant Fuller, aide, to conduct two battalions Iowa to South Dakota's right to turn the enemy's left flank, same as yesterday. The Third Battalion was directed to occupy abandoned insurgent trenches on Mexico road, as was done the day before, to prevent enemy from reoccupying them or flanking Iowa's extreme right.

On reaching South Dakota outpost line, was informed that insurgents were occupying sugar mill on railroad, 1,400 yards north, their line extending some distance to the east, and had thrown forward a skirmish line, which, however, had retired. Proceeding to South Dakota right with Colonel Frost, found Iowa's two battalions coming up on right, and directed them to move forward, driving out any insurgent force in their front (some had been seen there), and then swing to left, flanking enemy in front of South Dakota. After advancing some 400 yards they met quite a heavy fire, and Lieutenant Fuller, who accompanied them, reported that enemy was apparently in their front, moving toward their (Iowa's) right, and did not extend far to their left. I therefore told them, in case they found this to be correct, to wheel to right instead of left, and drive the insurgents eastward toward the Mexico road, where the Third Battalion might be able to catch them, at the same time directing the South Dakota to advance right and center battalion on Iowa's left, to cooperate if necessary. The left battalion of South Dakota remained to watch the sugar mill front.

When line arrived about abreast of the sugar mill, and Iowa was beginning to turn to right, South Dakota was attacked sharply from the sugar mill on their left. Changing front promptly to left, they advanced on sugar mill, taking insurgents partially in flank and rear. Fearing that Colonel Frost's two small battalions (about 200 men altogether) might meet a larger force than they could conveniently handle, and require support from Iowa, I sent Captain Brooks to stop Iowa's movement, and followed South Dakota. They were driving the insurgents, who, however, made a couple of stands behind a hedge and at the railroad embankment. Lieutenant Mentzer, aide, was sent back to bring Major Hume's Second Battalion of Iowa up on the right (north) of South Dakota, in the hope of getting across the railroad and on to the main wagon road, running north, in time to cut off the enemy, who, on being driven from the railroad, had retreated toward this wagon road, and it was hoped might make another stand on reaching it. Although Major Hume's battalion (especially Captain Clark's company, which had already started to support South Dakota) came up with commendable promptness, they found on reaching the wagon road and moving south along it that the insurgents had escaped to the north. They, however, captured one prisoner and found one wounded and four dead insurgents in the road, and numerous articles of clothing and accouterments, showing that the enemy fled in such haste and confusion as to be unable to carry off all their killed and wounded, as they usually do. Many hats and coats, some blood-stained, and some guns, were also seen in the field in rear of sugar mill. Directing South Dakota and the Iowa Second Battalion to go in, I returned to the First Battalion on the right, and finding that the enemy had apparently retired from their front, told Lieutenant-Colonel Miller to return it, and also the Third Battalion on Mexico road, to quarters. The outpost of Third Battalion, as on the previous day, saw parties of insurgents passing from Mexico road westward, indicating that they must have come down the San Fernando River. It is possible, however, that they came from Angeles by the road which joins the San Fernando River road at Mexico, and thence south along the river road.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Fernando, P. I., May 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this regiment on the 26th day of May, 1899:

At 3 o'clock a. m. a report came from outpost No. 1, stating that the enemy were gathering in force in front of the line of outposts. At the same time heavy firing was heard. I assembled the regiment and moved to the line of outposts, placing the First and Third battalions along the road to the right and holding the Second Battalion at the crossroad.

At daylight the enemy opened a heavy fire from the sugar mill, and at the same time about 200 shots were fired on our extreme right (outpost No. 2). About 5.45 I was joined by General Hale, and went with him to the right, taking two companies of the Second Battalion and extending them along the road in the center of the line of outposts.

On the arrival of the Iowa regiment the First and Third battalions were advanced across the cane field. The left of the Third Battalion (Company A) followed in column of files along the right, to be prepared for a flank fire from the direction of the mill, where the enemy was known to be in some force.

The line had passed beyond the sugar mill, when a heavy fire was opened from the left, as had been foreseen. Company A faced left and fired in volleys and the balance of the line executed a left wheel in double time. The enemy was soon routed and was pursued to the railroad track, from which line he was followed by fire. Upon completion of the turning movement the regiment returned to quarters. The regiment suffered no losses in this engagement. Distance traveled, about 7 miles. Filipinos killed, 4; wounded, 1.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,
Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 31, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Fifty-first Iowa Infantry, U. S. V., in the turning movement on the 26th instant.

Orders were received from brigade commander at 9.30 p. m., 25th instant, to serve an early breakfast to the men and send two battalions to the sugar mill in the field where the outpost was located, and to send the Third Battalion to occupy same position in trenches on Mexico road, as on the 25th instant. The First and Second battalions moved out from quarters at 5.50 a. m., Third Battalion at 6 a. m. Upon arrival at sugar mill, Second Battalion was deployed as skirmishers, First Battalion formed in column of files. The order from brigade commander was to move forward to a point designated, then to wheel to the left, moving forward in new direction to the railroad grade. The line advanced from outpost three-fourths of a mile, when it was fired on by a small party in front of Second Battalion. Major Duggan deployed First Battalion to the front. The entire line advanced 50 yards and fired two or three volleys, when the enemy retired. The Second Battalion continued to advance, wheeling to the left. The major commanding First Battalion failed to advance his line as directed, and orders were sent to Major Hume to halt and wait until the First Battalion could be brought up to connect with his right flank. Major Hume, after waiting a considerable time, put his battalion in motion, continuing the wheel to the left, when I sent Captain Davidson to order him to wait for the First Battalion, and to inform him that the enemy, in some force, was in front and to the right flank of the First Battalion, and that a messenger had been sent to brigade commander to inform him of the situation. In the meantime, First Battalion had been advanced about 200 yards, and halted. Captain Brooks came to me with orders for my Second Battalion. He being unable to locate them, I sent Captain Davidson with him to find Major Hume. Upon coming up with Major Hume he was found to be moving forward, under orders from brigade commander communicated by Lieutenant Mentzer.

Captain Brooks then requested Captain Davidson to go with him to General Hale, which he did. About this time I received orders for First Battalion to remain where it was and wait for orders. The Second Battalion advanced, passing across the railroad to a point about one-half mile to the left, then wheeled to the left, and returned to quarters. An insurgent officer was captured by First Sergeant Hawkins, Company M, and sent to brigade commander. The First Battalion remained in place, where it halted until brigade commander personally gave orders for it to return to quarters. The Third Battalion occupied trenches on Mexico road, as directed, placing outposts on either flank, with scouts to the front. A scouting party under Corporal Krell, Company K, wounded an insurgent officer and captured two horses, with accouterments.

Casualties: Private Joseph I. Markey, Company M, gunshot in right thigh.

Very respectfully,

M. MILLER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

APPENDIX 23.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH CORPS,
Deposito, Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Corps.

SIR: Complying with division commander's instructions of the 4th instant, I have the honor to report the operations of this brigade to include the 31st ultimo.

The brigade was organized by General Orders, No. 14, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, March 17, 1899, to be composed of the Fourth U. S. Infantry, the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, and the First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, and the same orders assigned me to the command.

The brigade was at this date much scattered, and was not assembled until, under oral instructions from the division commander on the evening of March 24, the Fourth Infantry and the two battalions Seventeenth Infantry, no more of the regiment being present, were placed in rear of the troops occupying the intrenchments from La Loma Church to the powder magazine, with instructions to move into the works on the following morning when the troops there should advance.

The battalion of Wyoming Volunteer Infantry was already in position between San Juan del Monte and the Pasig River. One battalion of the Minnesota regiment was on the road between the reservoir and the pumping station, another on the Mariquina road, and the third at the reservoir.

The orders of the division commander required me to join the Minnesota regiment on the Mariquina road and move it northward at 5 a. m. on the 25th of March until reaching the Banlac road, and then make dispositions to cover the right and rear of the Second Brigade of the division, which would be advancing through San Francisco del Monte toward Talipapa. (It was not, however, until 5.30 a. m. that the regiment began to advance, the delay being caused by the commander of the Second Battalion of the regiment, which, for some inexplicable cause, failed to reach in time the left of the First Battalion.) The regiment went forward, however, in good order, notwithstanding the difficult ground over which it moved—rice fields and bamboo thickets—for about a mile before meeting opposition. Then fire came on the Third and portion of the Second Battalion, followed almost immediately by like resistance in front of the First.

The division commander had authorized me to call for assistance, if necessary, on the Colorado regiment, a portion of which was on the Mariquina road; and presently, when the enemy's fire became energetic enough to indicate determined opposition to our further advance, I dispatched a staff officer to the colonel of that regiment with a request that he send a company to turn the left flank of the intrenchments on our right, in which a considerable body of the enemy seemed to be established. The insurgent fire having almost entirely ceased in front of the First Battalion, the two right companies were now turned to the right, and under the very gallant direction of Capt. Charles D. Clay, Seventeenth Infantry, adjutant-general of the brigade, and of First Lieut. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry, aid-de-camp, assailed the intrenchments in front, while Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, of the Colorado regiment, attacked their left. This soon routed the enemy, and the line was restored to its normal condition. The left companies of the regiment had fallen somewhat to the rear and the intervals between battalions had grown too great during the advance, and advantage was taken of the lull in the engagement to rectify these errors.

Further advance was now made to secure position on a ridge in our front, where at 8 p. m. the line, now pretty well exhausted, was halted.

Reconnaissance showed that we were on the Banlac road, east of the town and of the stream which crossed the road; and as I had thus accomplished the limit of the march, no further attempt was made to advance. From the left of the regiment could be seen the right of the Second Brigade of the division and what was believed to be the Novaliches road, on which that brigade was understood to be required to move.

At 4 o'clock p. m. the Minnesota regiment was prepared for bivouac in a position advantageous for resisting attack, and the two Colorado companies were established for the night on an elevated mesa about 500 yards to its right. At 11 p. m. heavy firing was heard from the direction of the Colorado companies, and the First Battalion of the Minnesota regiment was at once sent to the mesa, but there was no occasion for their services. The firing proved to be a threat, rather than an attack, on the Colorado position, and the enemy was speedily driven away.

The command remained in this position until 6 a. m. of the 26th March, when

the Minnesota battalion was recalled, and in obedience to telegraphic instructions from the division commander of 10 p. m. of the previous day the command was put in motion for its former positions on the Mariquina and Santolan roads, which were reached without any noteworthy incidents.

In this engagement of the 25th March near Banlac both officers and men behaved well. As coming under my own observation, I especially commend for coolness and gallantry Capt. Charles D. Clay, Seventeenth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general, who was seriously wounded in the neck; First Lieut. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry, aid-de-camp, who killed one of the enemy in a personal encounter, and Second Lieut. Halstead Dorey, Fourth Infantry, aid-de-camp. They were untiring in their efforts to assist me at all times in bringing about the defeat of the enemy. Lieut. Col. Cassius M. Moses, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, deserves commendation for the skill and determination with which he advanced on the enemy's intrenchments in the morning and repulsed their threatened attack in the evening of that day. Capt. E. A. McKenna, Signal Corps, U. S. V., rendered valuable service. He established telegraphic communication with department headquarters as soon as the halt was made on the Banlac road, and thereafter accompanied the lines in every change of position.

Possibly because of a change made late in the evening, before the advance, in the position of brigade surgeon, the medical attendance on the field was faulty in the extreme. There were no litters or litter bearers, nor did I see any medical officers giving attention to the wounded on the field, although I was told that a station was established on the Mariquina road to the rear.

Our casualties on the 25th instant were 1 officer killed and 1 officer and 15 enlisted men wounded.

The casualties of the enemy could not be accurately ascertained, as many of their dead and wounded were removed as they retired, but signs indicated a loss much greater than that sustained by us.

On resuming the positions in the trenches I was instructed by the department commander on the 27th of March to take charge of the entire line from La Loma Church to the Pasig River, including the pumping station.

March 28 the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry was detached from my command and sent to Caloocan in compliance with instructions from the department commander.

On the 30th of March the commanding general of the department gave me oral instructions to demonstrate on the following morning against Mariquina, and then up the San Mateo Valley towards the Rio Nanca, with the view of developing the force held by the enemy in that direction. The force assigned to me for this purpose was composed of one battalion Fourth Infantry, one battalion Twenty-third Infantry, one battalion First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, and one 3.2-inch rifle and one Nordenfeldt gun from Battery A, Utah Light Artillery. Each of the infantry battalions was composed of four companies.

The battalions of the Fourth and Twenty-third Infantry were bivouacked that night on the Santolan road, in the rear of the blockhouse. The advance was ordered to begin at 5 a. m. on the 31st of March, the Colorado battalion to cross the San Mateo at that hour at Mariquina, while the other two battalions would, at the same time, cross with the guns at the pumping station and move on the town from the south and southeast.

At the time noted everything was in motion. One company of the Twenty-third Infantry was detached from the battalion to serve as support of the guns, while the other three moved immediately across the river and deployed on the road south of the town, the left resting on the river. The battalion of the Fourth Infantry, with the guns and their support, crossed half a mile below and came into line to the right of the Twenty-third Infantry. When all was in readiness the advance up the valley began, we being still seemingly undiscovered, as it was, even then, barely daylight. When the Twenty-third Infantry skirmishers reached the bend of the river south of the town, they first received the enemy's fire, but dashed gallantly over, twice crossing the river. In the meantime the Colorado battalion had crossed the river above the town and entered it from that direction. The enemy, thus pressed, abandoned the place and fled to the hills on the east, a few shells from the guns hastening his flight.

The march up the valley was then resumed in the following order: Two companies of the Colorado regiment in extended order across the road; another company of the regiment extended along the river, flanking the left of the advance; the fourth company on the road, as reserve for the advance; the three companies of the Twenty-third Infantry flanking the right of the advance, and the Fourth Infantry battalion in column of fours on the road, followed by the guns and their support. The advance

was resisted by small parties of the enemy firing from cover in front of our flanks, but they were brushed away without difficulty and the march continued until, after moving about 3 miles, a more determined resistance was met. The enemy was found in an intrenched position, well chosen, on the north side of what I took to be the Rio Nanca, with his right resting in the thickets on the San Mateo and his left protected by swamps and thickets at the foot of the hills on the east. From this position volleys, seemingly by companies, were frequently fired. Nevertheless, the Colorado line continued to move forward, and were strengthened by the companies of the Twenty-third Infantry and one company of the Fourth Infantry, which came into action on their right. Later another company of the Fourth Infantry was added to this flank of the firing line.

The enemy's fire was speedily subdued or came only spasmodically, and reports came to me that he was retiring.

At 9.25 a. m. I received a message from the department commander to the effect that the demonstration had been successful and directing me to return to the lines about the city as soon as practicable. The firing line was advised of this order, directed to cease firing gradually, and notified that we would remain in our then position one hour and withdraw on a signal from me. Because of a misinterpretation of this signal the line began to fall back almost immediately, and the insurgent fire again increased, but the error was soon remedied, and the line returned to its former position and suppressed the enemy. It was while he was restoring the right of our line that First Lieut. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry, aid-de-camp, was shot by an insurgent sharpshooter and instantly killed.

At 10 a. m. I received the department commander's orders to move the command to La Loma church. The men were now pretty well exhausted and were permitted to remain pretty quiet in their positions for about an hour and while the wounded were being removed, and were then put in march. As directed, the Colorado battalion recrossed the San Mateo at its place of passage in the morning, and after having stopped at its camp to dine and to replenish its ammunition, moved on to La Loma via the Mariquina road. The other battalions and the guns crossed at the pumping station, and after resting and dining for an hour or more, marched for La Loma by the Santalon road. All were in position, as directed, by 10 p. m. Not a shot was fired by the enemy after our own fire ceased, nor were we followed, so far as could be discovered, as we retired.

In the two engagements of this day, Mariquina and Rio Nanca, we suffered a loss of 1 officer killed and 17 enlisted men wounded—1 mortally. The enemy's loss it was impossible to determine; but as he was driven from every stand he made, and his fire subdued whenever encountered, he is believed to have suffered considerably.

I invite attention to the accompanying reports in duplicate of the subordinate commanders. To the mention made by them of conspicuously good conduct on the part of members of their commands I add, as coming under my personal observation, that of First Lieut. John C. Gregg, Fourth Infantry, who was killed, and Second Lieut. Halstead Dorey, my aids-de-camp, who were both distinguished for their coolness and gallantry under severe fire; Capt. E. A. McKenna, Signal Corps, U. S. V., for his energy and efficiency in maintaining telegraphic communication between the advance and the stations in rear; Capt. Edward B. Pratt, Twenty-third Infantry, for the intrepidity and skill with which he conducted his battalion, particularly in the advance on and engagement at Mariquina, and Col. Henry B. McCoy, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, for the truly admirable manner in which he pushed the enemy before him from Mariquina to the Rio Nanca.

Very respectfully,

R. H. HALL, *Brigadier-General, U. S. V.*

APPENDIX 24.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Deposito, Manila, P. I., May 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the reports of the commanding officers of the organizations of this brigade.¹ There is no report from the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, which has remained detached during the month of April, whereabouts unknown.

¹ Published elsewhere.

There were no brigade movements during the month, only a few minor changes of companies in the trenches being made.

In addition to my duties as brigade commander, I have been in command of all the troops on the north line of defense of Manila, extending from Malabon to the Pasig River and also to the pumping station.

Detachments of the Third Infantry, Ninth Infantry, and First Colorado Volunteer Infantry have been serving in the trenches, although not assigned to the brigade.

Very respectfully

ROBERT H. HALL,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 25.

THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH INFANTRY,
Camp near La Loma Church, Manila, P. I., April 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT FOURTH INFANTRY.

SIR: In compliance with orders I have the honor to submit the following report of operation of the Third Battalion, Fourth Infantry, in the engagement of Mariquina and Rio Nanca of the 31st ultimo.

About 10 o'clock p. m., on the night of the 30th ultimo, I received an order from the regimental commander to proceed with my battalion to the Deposito and there report to the adjutant-general of the brigade for orders, the command to be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition and two days rations per man. At 11.15 p. m. the battalion consisting of Companies C (Captain Lovering), H (Lieut. E. V. Smith), F (Lieut. G. B. Duncan), and I (Captain Cowles) was en route and reached its destination, where it was directed to report to General Hall, at the waterworks, which place it reached at 3 a. m., and went into bivouac with orders to be prepared to move at 5 a. m. At that time the battalion was put in motion, and, conducted by Lieutenant Gregg, Fourth Infantry, aid to General Hall, proceeded down to the river, which was forded, and then deployed as skirmishers across an open plain in rear of Mariquina. A steady advance was made toward the town, the left wing acting as an echelon support to the Twenty-third Infantry, and later entered the town of Mariquina without resistance in our own front. The town was found to be entirely deserted. The enemy was encountered in considerable force, deployed and intrenched, at the further end of the town, on an open plain, backed and surrounded by woods and brushwood, which was finally occupied by them for a time after they were driven from the field. In the demonstration against the insurgents here, Company C was deployed upon the extreme right of the advance, Company H was deployed in support of the right wing, while Companies F and I were held in reserve on the edge of the town. The action continued until 12 m., the enemy being driven from their intrenchments and positions beyond the wood, when the battalion was withdrawn and ordered to return to its old camp near La Loma Church, which was reached about 7 p. m. The only casualty was that of Corpl. Richard Schmidt, Company H, Fourth Infantry, who was shot in the right forearm.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. O. WEBSTER,
Captain, Fourth Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion, Fourth Infantry.

APPENDIX 26.

IN THE FIELD NEAR MANILA, P. I., *March 27, 1899.*

Col. HENRY B. MCCOY,

Commanding First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with verbal orders from yourself on the morning of March 25, 1899, about 6 a. m., the writer, in command of Companies A and M, advanced against the enemy in order to protect the right flank of the Minnesota regiment. While quite severely engaged we succeeded in brushing the "niggers" from our front. During this engagement, unfortunately, we lost Capt. John S. Stewart, Company A, First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V., killed; Privates Pitts, Company A. MacCoe and Brill, Company M, were seriously

wounded at the same time. After receiving a fresh supply of ammunition I connected with Minnesota's right flank, reporting in person to General Hall. Shortly after I engaged the enemy with the Krags and Mausers in my command, succeeding in driving them from our front. At 4 p. m. I received orders from General Hall to occupy a table-land to the right and front of the Minnesota regiment. At 11.15 p. m. we were quite severely engaged by the "niggers," who attempted to capture our position. It is needless to say that the attempt was a complete failure, although the enemy was under the command of an American, and succeeded in approaching within 30 paces of our position. As soon as the firing commenced General Hall dispatched a battalion to reenforce me.

On the morning of March 26 I received orders to return to the Mariquina road, protecting the left flank and rear of the Minnesota regiment. It is impossible to state the exact number of the enemy killed and wounded. The writer believes that at least 75 went to their happy hunting grounds in our first engagement. In the night attack, while we did not succeed in finding any of the enemy, when the morning dawned the ground looked as if someone had been running a slaughter-house for a week.

I desire to thank Captain Rucker, commanding Company E, First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V., for the gallant manner in which he succeeded in capturing and holding the hill to his right and front. This hill is in such position that had it not been held by our troops my advance would have been materially hindered.

I wish to extend to each and every man of Companies A and M my heartfelt thanks for their gallant conduct.

Very respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

CASSIUS M. MOSES,
Lieutenant Colonel, First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.

A true copy:

HALSTEAD DOREY,
Second Lieutenant, Fourth Infantry, Aid-de-camp.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT COLORADO INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
PUMPING STATION, *March 29, 1899.*

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Moses was in command of the companies of this regiment that were on the fighting line, and his report is herein submitted.

HENRY B. MCCOY,
Colonel Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT COLORADO INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
CAMP ALVA, P. I., *April 5, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the following report to submit regarding the operations of this regiment in the demonstration against Mariquina, in the Mariquina Valley, on March 31, 1899:

At 4.15 a. m. on the morning of this day I left the headquarters of this regiment at Camp Alva, near the pumping station, with Companies C (Captain Booth), D (Captain Taylor), G (Captain Howard), and proceeded to the Mariquina road, along which four companies of my regiment are located. Here the column was joined by Companies E (Captain Rucker) and A (Lieutenant Doertenbach). The battalion was then formed in column in line of skirmishers and moved forward with the right of the companies towards the bluffs which overlook the Mariquina Valley. I proceeded to a point along the bluffs about one mile north of the Mariquina church. Here Company A, under Lieutenant Doertenbach, which was the second company in the column, was thrown forward and took a position on the high hill which overlooked the Mariquina Valley and the town of Mariquina. This company was stationed here for the purpose of protecting the left flank and the rear of the battalion which was to be moved on to Mariquina. Company D was sent over the hill in column of files with direction to form in the valley at right angle to the river for the purpose of protecting the left flank of the battalion which was to be sent forward into the town. The other companies were quickly moved into position and formed in line of battle at right angles with Company D and facing the town. As soon as this formation had been effected the line was sent forward and reached the left bank of the Mariquina River before any opposition was encountered.

Company D had also been sent forward at the same time to clear out any insurgents who might be on that flank of the battalion. This company was then gradually thrown around to the north of the town, crossing the Mariquina River, where some opposition was encountered, and swept on through the town until they reached the flat plain on the other side. Such insurgents as were encountered retreated in haste, going either north up the valley or crossing the valley to the foothills. The other three companies met some opposition, which was quickly silenced, and Company G was sent across the river into the town and joined Company D, the other two companies remaining in position on the west bank of the river to protect the rear. After assuring myself that there was no danger on that portion of the line, these other two companies were thrown across the river and joined Companies D and G. Here the line was halted and we awaited further instructions from the brigade commander. The battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry and the Fourth U. S. Infantry having accomplished their portion of the demonstration, joined us on the right, and, under directions of the brigade commander, three companies of this regiment, G, C, and E, were formed in line of battle across a portion of the valley, Company G being on the right of the main road and Companies C and E on the left, with Company D in reserve in our center, with the companies of the Twenty-third and the Fourth U. S. Infantry as flankers on the right. The line was then sent forward and had advanced only about 100 yards when sharp opposition was met by all three companies. The order to charge was given and the companies went quickly forward, and after a sharp fight drove the insurgents from their position in the undergrowth, brush, and trenches. The advantage was followed up and the line was swung around to the left, the insurgents being followed up the valley for a distance of about 4 miles, it being necessary to fight almost every foot of the way.

Upon reaching this point, we found the insurgents in a very strong position to our front, where they had intrenchments built along the front of the dense growth of underbrush and bushes. They were driven from here by sharp, rapid volley firing, and their fire ceased entirely.

At this time I was informed by the brigade commander that the effect of the demonstration had been fully completed and that the troops were to be withdrawn to Mariquina, to retain the position which was then occupied for one hour, and at the expiration of that time to withdraw as quickly as possible. Within a few minutes thereafter directions were received from the brigade commander that the line should be withdrawn at once and the troops immediately instructed to retire. A delay of about thirty minutes in withdrawing the troops was occasioned by failure to remove a wounded man of one of the companies of the Twenty-third Infantry. The company to which he belonged was withdrawn, leaving him in charge of one or two enlisted men; but as we were very close to the point where the insurgents had been in force I did not feel justified in withdrawing the entire line, leaving this man in this exposed position.

The troops were withdrawn in good order, and upon reaching the town of Mariquina I was directed by the brigade commander to cross the river at the same point it was crossed by these companies in the morning and to proceed to La Loma church by the Mariquina road. I at once sent directions to Captain Rucker, who was on the left of the firing line, to withdraw his company and return to his camp on the Mariquina road; also to Lieutenant Doertenbach, who was on the hill in the same position which he had taken up in the morning, to withdraw his company and return to camp. Upon investigation I found that the four companies of this regiment who had been engaged were practically out of ammunition, and as no additional supplies over the 200 rounds which had been carried with us was on hand, it became necessary for me to return with these four companies to headquarters in order to renew the supply of ammunition, and this was accordingly done.

This regiment had been issued some time previous 300 Krag-Jorgensen rifles, and the four companies of this battalion had been armed with this rifle before starting out on this expedition.

The superiority of this rifle for this sort of work was so apparent, and the work done by these four companies so excellent, that I immediately decided to make requisition for these rifles for the entire regiment, they having fully demonstrated their ability to use them to good advantage.

In the engagement 6 men of this regiment were wounded, as follows: Company G—Corpl. John T. McCorkle, shot through right thigh, serious; Corpl. Leonard E. Phillipi, shot through head, fatal, death resulting April 1, at 11 a. m.; Private John Dennis, shot through neck and right shoulder, serious. Company C—Private George P. Dickerman, shot through left shoulder, slight; Private Charles Hutchinson, shot through left thigh, slight; Private Henry E. Redmon, shot through face and neck, serious.

The battalion was returned to camp, which was reached about 1.30 p. m., ammunition supply renewed and the companies allowed to get dinner, and at 3 o'clock they were started for La Loma church, going by the way of the Mariquina road. The roads were heavy, it having rained very hard, and the troops tired out; on this account the march to La Loma church was not made as quickly as it might have been, as the troops were frequently allowed to rest. We reached La Loma church about 9 o'clock p. m. with all but four of the men with which we started, and these reported to their various company commanders about one hour after the column arrived there. We went into camp in front of La Loma church, where we stayed until 6 o'clock p. m., April 1, when, by direction of the brigade commander, the battalion was returned to the camp at the pumping station, which point was reached at 10 o'clock p. m.

The brigade commander on March 31 had excellent opportunity to judge whether or not the men of this regiment are capable of using the magazine rifle, and if in his opinion the work was satisfactorily performed by these four companies with this rifle, I have the honor to request that he recommend as strongly as possible we be furnished with this rifle to outfit the remainder of the men of this regiment. The magazine rifles which are now in possession of this regiment are distributed 25 rifles to each company.

Very respectfully,

HENRY B. MCCOY,
Colonel First Regiment, Colorado Infantry, U. S. A.

APPENDIX 27.

MANILA, P. I., April 6, 1899.

Brig. Gen. R. H. HALL,
*Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division,
Department of Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.*

SIR: I have the honor to report the movements of myself and regiment in the engagement with insurgents on March 25, 1899, near the village of Baulac. Pursuant to orders from your headquarters the regiment took position in extended order on the Mariquina road, covering a front of about 3,000 yards. The First Battalion was commanded by Maj. A. M. Diggles, the Second Battalion by Capt. J. P. Masterman, and the Third Battalion by Capt. C. T. Spear.

About 5.30 o'clock a. m. the command "Forward" was given and the entire regiment moved forward steadily in a direction a little west of north, keeping guide to the right as ordered. After advancing about 300 yards the insurgents opened fire upon our line from heavily intrenched positions situated on high ground in bamboo thickets directly in our front. Their fire was answered by heavy volleys from my regiment and a continued advance, in some instances amounting to a charge, until the insurgents in our front were forced to retreat after a very stubborn resistance.

Companies F and I, on the extreme right of the regiment, together with two companies of the First Colorado Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, were obliged to execute a flank movement to protect the flank of the regiment, and after successfully routing the enemy rejoined the line. In giving way to the right by a right oblique movement of the regiment, I found that the two companies on the extreme left, Companies H and E, had become separated from the command, and, from the heavy firing from their direction, were meeting with stubborn resistance from the enemy. Upon reporting the fact to you a halt was made, and after investigation it was found that they had routed the enemy and driven them back to the north, and the companies soon joined the line.

The position now occupied was decided to be the objective point of the movement and the halt was prolonged, awaiting orders.

During the engagements of the morning many insurgents were reported by the officers and men as killed and wounded, some being found on the field, but most of them were carried away by the retreating insurgents, so it is impossible to give an estimate of the casualties on their side.

The topography of the country was such that food and ammunition had to be brought up from the Mariquina road by means of relays of men taken from the fighting line, which was very exhausting, and it was late in the evening before bull teams were successfully brought through on the rough trail.

The regiment bivouacked for the night on the ridge where the original halt was made. During the night the First Battalion was ordered to support the two companies of the First Colorado Volunteers on our right, who were attacked, but no serious trouble was encountered.

The morning of March 26 I was ordered to place the regiment in motion, and the First Battalion was directed to take their original stations on the Santalon road, the Second Battalion to take their original stations at Deposito, except that Company M was placed at the fork of the road instead of at the magazine. The Third Battalion took stations on the Mariquina road, the companies occupying positions about half a mile distant from each other, connecting with the Colorado Battalion at the most easterly end.

I desire to speak in highest terms of the conduct of the officers and men of my regiment while under fire and in the face of the enemy, and in enduring the extreme heat and exhaustion incident to the movement.

The following is the full list of the casualties (total, 12): Andrew Martinson, private, A, wounded in both feet; Bert Parsons, private, C, wounded in right hand; Arnold Ameson, private, C, wounded in forehead; Edward B. McInnis, corporal, I, wounded in right hand; Allen A. Grimes, private, I, wounded in head (severely); Lennard A. Porter, private, I, wounded in right thigh; Frederick Ekman, private, I, wounded in buttocks; John Connolly, corporal, K, wounded in left thigh; John F. Whalen, private, K, wounded in right hip; James C. McGee, private, K, wounded in right hand; Harry M. Glazier, private, L, wounded in right hip; Paulinus G. Huhn, private M, wounded in left shoulder (severe).

Attached are reports of battalion commanders.

Respectfully submitted.

FRED. W. AMES,
Colonel Thirteenth Minnesota, U. S. V.

HQRS. SECOND BATTALION, THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS,
IN THE FIELD ON LINE MANILA AND DAGUPAN RAILROAD,
Marilao, March 5, 1899.

Col. F. W. AMES,
Commanding Thirteenth Minnesota.

SIR: I respectfully report the actions of the Second Battalion of Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of March.

In compliance with orders on the afternoon of the 24th of March, prepared companies for the field by breaking camp and providing command with one day's field rations and 150 rounds of ammunition; no blankets or packs; battalion bivouacked at Deposito on the night of the 24th. Orders directed battalion to be at a point on the Mariquina road about 4 miles east of Deposito at 4 o'clock for an hour's rest. Movement to begin at 5 a. m. Battalion left Deposito at 3.10 a. m., after having coffee and hard-tack, and proceeded on Mariquina road, until meeting left of First Battalion, about 4 miles. Line of skirmishers was formed, and, upon arrival of Third Battalion, began advance to the north. Engaged the enemy's outpost about 6 a. m., and kept on the advance, the enemy retreating. Orders being to guide right, was obliged to halt the battalion twice in order to connect with the First Battalion, and allow the Third Battalion to connect. About 7 a. m. lost touch with the First Battalion by reason of a movement to the right, which was later regained by a movement to the right oblique; at about 8.30 halted on line of First Battalion, where remained for the day. Bivouacked on the night of the 25th on the same line, establishing strong outposts at night. During the night attack made on right flank of First Battalion, Second Battalion ordered ready to move. No orders came to leave position, and in the morning battalion returned with regiment to former stations at Deposito. During advance from Mariquina road, ammunition carts were stationed on road in rear of battalion, and details were sent back for ammunition. On the evening of the 25th, details brought up the necessary commissary supplies, so that the battalion had fair breakfast before the return march.

During the advance the following casualties occurred in Second Battalion: Company K—Private John T. Whelan, shot in right side; Private James C. McGee, shot through right hand; Corpl. John Connolly, jr., shot through left thigh. Company L—Private Harry L. Glazier, shot in left thigh. Company M—Private P. G. Huhn, wounded in left lung. Company G (no casualties).

The behavior of officers and men was excellent, movements being promptly executed and the fire discipline very fair considering the fact that many of the men had never been under fire before.

Very respectfully submitted.

JOS. P. MASTERMAN,
Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, Commanding Second Battalion.

COMMANDING OFFICER THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience with orders received on the night of March 24, 1899, with the Third Battalion, consisting of Companies C, D, E, and H, I took up a position in line of skirmishers at 4 a. m. the morning of March 25, connecting the right of my line with the left of the Second Battalion shortly before 5 a. m., the hour set for an advance. The battalion on my right gave way, and it was necessary for me to close this interval, causing the left of my battalion to double time in order to get the proper distance before the advance. Immediately upon closing the interval the advance began. We had advanced only a short distance before my entire front was engaged, beginning on my right. Company E and the left of Company H met with considerable resistance, but soon cleared the front. About this time a heavy fire had begun from the woods on the left of E Company, and finding it necessary to clear these woods I directed Company E to do so by executing left turn, rejoining the line immediately, with instructions to Captain Bjornstad to keep connected on the right. The fire from this direction increased, and Lieutenant Mellinger being on the extreme left of Company E, I found it necessary to take command of the right of E Company, being the closest officer, and advance by rushes across the field, Captain Bjornstad being directed to support Company E on account of the heavy fire. About this time the command "by the right flank" was given, and not having been heard either by Captain Bjornstad or myself, the line became disconnected, and meeting with considerable resistance I found it necessary to continue forward, in order to prevent a flank attack, although diligent efforts were being made to connect with the left of Company D. From this time on no firing was heard on our right to indicate the position of the balance of the regiment, and consequently, according to orders received the night before, I proceeded with the two companies (E and H) toward the Caloocan road, halting 1,000 yards in rear, where we could plainly see the enemy retreating in large numbers.

Not thinking it advisable to get further separated, scouting parties in large numbers were sent out on the right for the purpose of locating the left of Company D. During their absence First Lieutenant Garcelone, battalion adjutant, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., came up and informed us that D Company were some distance to the rear and right, where they were instructed to wait for Companies E and H to join, which was promptly done.

During the early part of the engagement Private Bert W. Parsons, Company E, was hit by a Mauser bullet, penetrating the right hand, shattering the bone. Private Arnold Arneson, of the same company, received a scalp wound. About 11 a. m. Corpl. David Kimball, C Company, was ordered by Lieutenant Snow, his commanding officer, to go back after ammunition, and while engaged in this duty was slightly prostrated by heat, and upon reporting to the surgeon was ordered to hospital. Private George M. Landon, of Company D, sprained his ankle.

I wish to say in connection with this report that the positions on the right of my battalion were not taken in time, and consequently causing my battalion to move at double time, and before the men had a chance to rest the advance was commenced, and Company E on the left were practically exhausted, which made it extremely difficult to charge the enemy's position as well as they would, could they have had a little rest. If my understanding is correct it was decided that the regiment should be in position at 4 a. m. in order to rest the men before advancing. Most of the firing was done by volleys from E Company, principally by squads and sections, with very satisfactory results.

I wish especially to call your attention to the fact that the lines advanced steadily and without confusion, and too much credit can not be given the noncommissioned officers and squad leaders for their work.

After Companies E and H had joined the balance of the regiment we went into camp, and the next morning returned to Deposito, remaining there until 3.30 p. m., when we took up positions on the Mariquina road, with intervals of about half a mile between companies, connecting with the Colorado Regiment on the right and the Second Battalion of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V., on the left.

Very respectfully submitted.

C. T. SPEAR,
Captain and Commissary, Third Battalion, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.

HQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 PAY DEPARTMENT, AYUNTAMIENTO,
Guiguinto, P. I., April 5, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following movements and engagement with the enemy of my battalion on March 25, 1899:

The companies (A, B, I, and F) of this battalion were encamped along the Santalon road, occupying a distance of about 2½ miles. On the morning of the 25th of March, at 2.30, Company A left camp for point of assembling of the regiment. Each company joined the column as we passed, the battalion arriving in its position on the Mariquina road, and formed line of squads on the right of the regiment, and was in position at 4.45 a. m., March 25, 1899.

At 5.30 a. m. the order to advance was given, my battalion being the guide. After advancing about 200 yards, line of skirmishers was formed, and 300 yards farther on we encountered the enemy. All the companies seemed to have found him at the same instant, and opened fire. We advanced steadily for some distance, until we encountered a sharp fire on our right flank. Companies I and F, being on the right, changed direction to the right and faced the music. At this point Company I had 4 men hit, none killed. Soon after, two companies of the First Colorado Regiment came upon our right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, and these four companies soon routed the enemy, but not without sharp fighting, as the rebels were well intrenched on a hill. Companies I and F then joined the battalion, which had halted a short distance to the front to wait for them. Then we advanced for some distance farther, halting about 8.30 a. m., having covered a distance of about 3½ miles in a northerly direction from the Mariquina road.

At 4 p. m. we occupied a ridge a short distance to the rear, and bivouacked for the night. At about 11.30 p. m. the enemy opened fire on the two Colorado companies, and General Hall ordered the First Battalion to their relief (Companies A, B, I, and F). We advanced in line of skirmishers for about one-half mile in a westerly direction to the position held by Colonel Moses. We were not engaged, as all demonstration by the enemy had subsided. We stayed at this point until daylight, when we returned to our place in line, ate what we could get for breakfast, and started for our old camping places on the Santalon road, where we arrived about noon, March 26, 1899.

The arrangements for caring for the wounded were very poor.

I would like to mention the bravery of Lieutenant Gregg, of General Hall's staff, as well as all the staff officers with us; they gave us all the aid in their power. Among our own men and officers I did not notice a case of hesitancy; all seemed to push to the front as fast as keeping a line would allow.

Colonel Moses and his two companies of the First Colorado did us good and timely service, coming up on our right as they did.

The list of casualties is: Corpl. Edward B. McInnis, I, shot in right hand; Private Allen A. Grimes, I, shot through neck and mouth; Private Leonard A. Porter, I, shot through right hip; Private Frederick Ekman, I, shot through both thighs; Private Andrew Mortensen, A, shot in both feet. None of these casualties were fatal.

During the engagement Captain Clay, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, received a wound in the neck while endeavoring to reach the two companies who had turned to the right. Up to that time he had been very active in assisting in the advance.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

A. M. DIGGLES,

Major, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, Commanding First Battalion.

Col. F. W. AMES,

Commanding Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.

APPENDIX 28.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST WYOMING INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
San Felipe Convent, P. I., May 19, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry for the month of April, 1899:

The Wyoming Volunteer Infantry has continued during the month to occupy the line from San Juan del Monte to the Pasig River, performing general guard, outpost, reconnoitering, and patrol duty.

With the exception of a few shots by outposts at natives attempting to enter our lines, the command has not been actively engaged.

Very respectfully,

F. M. FOOTE,
Major First Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 29.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,
On line of intrenchments between Deposito and Blockhouse No. 4, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions of this date from your headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Seventeenth Infantry for the month of April, 1899:

The companies of the regiment have occupied different camps during the month, all of which were on this line, extending from the Deposito to near Blockhouse No. 4.

The headquarters, the band, and Companies A, C, E, and F, of the regiment, arrived in Manila Harbor from the United States on April 14, 1899, and since April 15 have been on duty with the remaining companies of the regiment.

On April 17 a detachment of 30 enlisted men of Company B, Second Lieut. Raymond Sheldon commanding, left camp about 6.20 a. m., marched about 18 miles through hostile territory, encountered no enemy; destroyed about 3,000 pounds of rice, and returned to camp at 5.30 o'clock p. m. the same date.

On April 17 a detachment of 26 enlisted men of Company C, Capt. Edward Chynowith commanding, made a reconnoissance; marched across San Juan River near San Francisco del Monte, advanced about 3½ miles to the front of Company C's position, then marched in an easterly and southerly direction to the Mariquina road, and returned across the San Juan River to camp, marching in all about 9 miles, and covering the front of the Seventeenth Infantry's position. No armed insurgents were found, but a great many friendly Filipinos were seen. Many farms were passed which showed no signs of cultivation.

On the 25th of April Company F (2 officers and 47 enlisted men), Capt. C. St. J. Chubb commanding, made a reconnoissance along the front of the lines of the regiment, marching a distance of about 9 miles.

On the 27th of April Company E (2 officers and 79 enlisted men), Capt. W. C. Wren commanding, marched about 8½ miles to the pumping station via Deposito, placed 10 men on outpost duty, and camped for the night; left camp at 6.30 a. m. next day, arriving at former trenches at 9.30 a. m.

On April 28 at 4.30 p. m. a detachment of 20 enlisted men of Company C, First Lieut. W. D. Davis commanding, proceeded northeastward with instructions to locate the site of fire seen on the previous day, and after a march of about 1½ miles came upon site of the fire, a small nipa hut, then returned to camp, arriving about 6.30 o'clock p. m.

The companies have performed during the month outpost, picket, patrol, and trench guard duties, also other duties incidental to service in a hostile country.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES F. ROBE,
Lieutenant-Colonel Seventeenth Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 30.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH INFANTRY,
La Loma Church, Near Manila, P. I., May 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions received yesterday, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the regiment during the month of April, 1899:

The regiment remained in camp in trenches near La Loma Church, Manila, P. I., during the month, performing outpost and patrol duty.

The Second Battalion, consisting of Companies A, E, G, and M, under command of Capt. Butler D. Price, Fourth Infantry, left the trenches near Blockhouse No. 4, about 2.30 p. m. April 8, 1899, pursuant to telephone instructions from headquarters Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, and marched to Malate, reporting to the provost-marshal-general for duty.

On April 15, 1899, the same battalion moved to camp in trenches at Pasay, occupying trenches vacated by the First Idaho Volunteer Infantry. Total distance traveled by Second Battalion, about 7 miles.

Of the First and Third Battalions, Company B was, until the afternoon of April 4, on the road leading from Manila to Caloocan and in the vicinity of Caloocan, Company L being at the same time on the road from Caloocan to Malabon, with an outpost on the railroad near Caloocan. These companies, on the evening of April 4, took station on the north side of La Loma Church, extending toward Caloocan, company B being at Blockhouse No. 2.

On April 14 Company B took part in a reconnoissance conjointly with two companies of the First Colorado Regiment in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte. Nothing of special importance was developed by this movement. Company B marched about 10 miles on this date.

On April 23 Companies L and F marched to Novaliches and return to scout in rear of General Lawton's advancing column and maintain his communications. The distance traveled was about 15 miles, and the companies encountered no opposition. The same duty was performed by Companies I and D on the 24th and by Companies B and H on the 25th.

Patrols to the front have kept the country under careful observation. Such parties were sent out daily. On the 28th 240 men of the regiment were deployed in line covering our entire front, and advanced nearly 3 miles searching for Captain Rockefeller, Ninth Infantry, who had wandered away from his camp the night before. On the 29th this search was continued in the vicinity of our line, several heavily wooded ravines being thoroughly examined. but without result.

Very respectfully,

J. M. J. SANNO,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fourth Infantry, Commanding.

APPENDIX 31.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., March 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Relating to the recent operations of this brigade in connection with the movements of Major-General MacArthur's Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I have to report that I was directed in orders from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps to report for temporary duty, with my brigade, to General MacArthur March 22, 1899. The brigade consisted of one battalion Third U. S. Infantry, just landed from transport, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, and 11 companies Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; in all, 2,241 officers and men effective for duty.

The night of March 24 the brigade relieved the First Brigade, Second Division, Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, in the trenches extending from the left west of Caloocan to the vicinity of La Loma Church. This disposition was made in the darkness without the enemy gaining any knowledge of it, although his intrenchments were close in front and our movements exposed to his short-range fire. The Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry was placed on the left; Twenty-second U. S. Infantry on the right; the battalion Third U. S. Infantry in the inclosure or wall about Caloocan Church and near the center.

On March 25, soon after daylight, Major-General MacArthur commenced his movement by advancing his right brigade to attack the enemy in the trenches in his front and to advance his right on Polo. Soon after, his left took up the movement and advanced to the front and left, his artillery near the center advancing with the line.

As soon as his left brigades moved I advanced one battalion Twenty-second U. S. Infantry on my right to cover the movement of the Third U. S. Artillery, foot, on General MacArthur's left. The turning movement having sufficiently developed to threaten the rebel intrenchments on their left flank, I directed that fire be opened



FIRE CAUSED BY GENERAL WHEATON'S FLYING COLUMN DURING ADVANCE ON MALOLOS.

on the rebel intrenchments in my front by the guns of the Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, First Lieut. George W. Gibbs, and at 8.30 a. m. directed my whole line to advance in the following order: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Col. H. C. Egbert, on the right to endeavor to keep touch and communication with the Third U. S. Artillery, on the left of Otis's brigade, MacArthur's Division; one battalion Third U. S. Infantry, Captain Cooke, center; two companies on the east side of the railroad track and two on the west side; second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, Col. O. Summers, left extending to near the channel separating Malabon from the mainland.

The rebels were found in their intrenchments in great force and line after line of their works was carried with the utmost gallantry. The roll of infantry fire was now continuous and intense, the heaviest fighting at this time falling on the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry and two companies of the Third U. S. Infantry.

By 11.30 a. m. the enemy was thrown to the line of intrenchments in my front along the Tuliahan River, he having been driven from his successive lines of intrenchments with great slaughter. I now brought 2 guns of the Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, under Lieut. Geo. A. Seaman, from our line of works in front of Caloocan to a point on the railroad track 900 yards from the bridge across the Tuliahan; sent a Hotchkiss revolving cannon to my extreme left to keep down the fire of the enemy coming across the channel near Malabon. Shelled his blockhouses and intrenchments along the river on the north bank.

A battalion of two companies of the Twenty-third Infantry (U. S.), 159 officers and men, Capt. S. B. Pratt, having been sent out from the city, I placed them on my right with instructions to connect with the left of Otis's brigade of MacArthur's division, which was done by fording the Tuliahan. Late in the afternoon I received a dispatch from Major-General MacArthur that it was probable, owing to difficult country, he would not be able to place his right in Polo during the day, but hoped to be there early next morning. I had now suspended my forward movement in order that the enemy might not be driven beyond Polo or Malinta before the ground in that vicinity had been seized by General MacArthur. Night closed with my right connecting with Otis's brigade of the Second Division, and my line close to the Tuliahan, with the enemy all driven to the north bank.

March 26 at daylight the indications were that the enemy was preparing to retreat. The city of Malabon on my left was on fire and a stream of fugitive soldiers of the enemy and inhabitants was pouring from the city toward the north. I directed Colonel Egbert with his regiment, the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, to ford the Tuliahan near my right and form line perpendicular to the river, his right to the north, the left of the Twenty-second to be supported by the battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry. By 11 a. m. all intrenchments near the river were carried; the second Oregon Volunteer Infantry on the left meeting with an obstinate resistance. I crossed the river in person at this time near the railroad bridge, and the rebels opened fire from an intrenchment halfway from Malinta, from walls loopholed for musketry about the church and from intrenchments at Malinta. I directed the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to form line facing the intrenchments and to charge and carry them, which the regiment did with great gallantry. Col. H. C. Egbert was mortally wounded in this charge and died soon after. At the same time the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry on my left carried everything before it. The Third Artillery now, about 12 m., entered Malinta, my right and the Second Oregon, my left, entering about the same time. The enemy fled north pursued by Major-General MacArthur's center and right. Went into camp at Malinta with whole brigade, the two remaining battalions of the Third U. S. Infantry having joined from the transport about dark.

March 27.—Under orders from the division commander, left the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry at Malinta and joined head of column with Third U. S. Infantry and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry. The battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry was returned to Manila. At 8.40 a. m. received a telegraphic dispatch from department commander to be under his orders direct and to keep railroad open in the rear of General MacArthur's division.

March 28.—Marched Third and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry to Marilao.

March 29.—Crossed the Marilao and marched up the railroad. The Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry was assigned to my command.

March 30.—Column moved at 6.30 a. m. All trains left at Bocaue with one battalion Twenty-second U. S. Infantry as guard. Column reached Guiguinto at 9.30 a. m. and before dark the Third U. S. Infantry (Colonel Page) and two battalions Twenty-second U. S. Infantry were in bivouac one-half mile in the rear of Major-General MacArthur's line of battle, $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles from Malolos.

In conference with Major-General MacArthur it was decided that I should support his attack on the enemy's position in front of Malolos by supporting his right with

three battalions Third U. S. Infantry and left with two battalions Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

March 31.—Soon after daylight the five battalions mentioned were placed, deployed in two lines of skirmishers, closed to $2\frac{1}{2}$ paces interval, distance between lines 500 yards, the right and left battalions to lap over or beyond the line of battle of the division. Action commenced about 7 a. m., the left occupying Malolos, the enemy's capital, early in the day. I was with the right and opened fire on an intrenchment of the enemy with Hotchkiss revolving cannon soon after the line was formed. After some maneuvering Hale's brigade in my front carried the enemy's work and pursued him in the direction of Calumpit. The entire movement from our lines in front of Caloocan to Malolos was a complete success.

Great damage and heavy loss in killed and wounded has been inflicted upon the rebels and nowhere was the enemy able to considerably retard our advance. He was in strong force in front of our lines on March 25. In front of my brigade his intrenchments were held by not less than 4,000 men, mostly armed with Mauser rifles.

The conduct of our officers and men was distinguished by daring and the utmost energy. I desire to express the highest admiration for the distinguished gallantry of Col. H. C. Egbert, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, who fell at Malinta during the charge of his regiment upon the enemy's intrenchments. He should be held in grateful remembrance by his countrymen.

The gallant conduct of Col. O. Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, on March 25 and 26 is worthy of the highest praise. He maneuvered his regiment with ability and did excellent service, inspiring his command, which fought with great courage and determination. The conduct of Capt. John G. Ballance, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, was distinguished for courage and skill. His ability in handling the battalion he commanded under the enemy's fire is worthy of the highest consideration.

I am indebted for the valuable assistance of Capt. H. C. Cabell, Third U. S. Infantry, captain and assistant adjutant-general of volunteers; First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp; First Lieut. H. E. Ely, Twenty-second Infantry, brigade quartermaster and acting commissary of subsistence; Second Lieut. W. D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, acting aid-de-camp; and Second Lieut. A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, acting aid-de-camp. They carried my orders to all parts of the field during these operations. They have my thanks for the courage and ability with which they conveyed my orders. Maj. G. F. Shields, brigade surgeon of volunteers, rendered valuable service in bringing wounded from the most exposed places and in many instances conveying my orders under the heaviest fire of the enemy.

Very respectfully,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 32.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 13, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: At 1 o'clock a. m. the 11th instant I received a dispatch from the commanding officer at Bigaa that the enemy had attacked in force at Bocaue; that he was attacked and that he wanted reinforcements. In compliance with instructions from Major-General MacArthur, commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I immediately proceeded (on foot) in the direction of points attacked, taking with me a detachment of 25 men of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry (dismounted) under command of Lieut. Charles Boyd, Fourth U. S. Cavalry. Upon reaching a company of the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, encamped $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Malolos and along the railroad track, I found an additional company had been sent there from Guiguinto. I directed the company to follow me, and also one platoon of the other company. Upon arriving at the bridge, 1 mile or less from Guiguinto, I ordered the company there to follow me.

I arrived at Guiguinto as the enemy attacked the outposts. The commanding officer seemed to have made no adequate preparations for combat. I immediately deployed the whole force, amounting to about 400 men, along the railroad track, and pushed, by hand, the armored train lying there into position to command the ground east and north of Guiguinto.

The enemy now attacked by firing from all the bamboo thickets and timber near the station and north and east of the depot. I opened fire from the 6-pound rifle

and Hotchkiss revolving cannon and two machine guns on the armored train. The whole infantry line opened fire and before daylight the enemy was driven off and dispersed. I then proceeded to Bigaa, taking the troops at Guiguinto with me and leaving the detachment Fourth U. S. Cavalry to guard the station until relieved by troops sent from Malolos by the division commander. The armored train I had pushed by hand.

Drove the enemy from the vicinity of Bigaa and taking the troops there, excepting detachment left as guard, proceeded to Bocaue. Upon arriving within a mile of that place I found the troops yet engaged. Opened on the enemy with machine guns and attacked him with infantry deployed in extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue. Found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue and that the four companies of infantry in the vicinity had preserved the railroad intact and had inflicted loss upon the enemy.

Learned that the three companies of the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry at Marilao had been attacked by about 400 rebels, who were driven off. The telegraph line between Bocaue and Marilao had been cut in several places and it was not until afternoon that the line was restored. The enemy had attacked in considerable force all the places held by troops from Marilao to Guiguinto, inclusive; he was beaten off everywhere by daylight, and driven from the vicinity of all stations before 6.30 a. m. I ordered four companies Second Oregon from Malinta and two from Marilao, and with two companies Second Oregon at Bocaue, assembled at that point two battalions of the regiment and had there the entire Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. Major-General MacArthur sent me from Malolos one 3.2-inch gun and one Hotchkiss revolving cannon. At daylight the morning of the 12th instant I moved on Santa Maria with this force. Opened upon the position and intrenchments of the enemy at that place with artillery and advanced the infantry in extended order.

The enemy, eleven companies of infantry, offered a feeble resistance and fled north and east of Santa Maria. Sent strong detachments on all north and east roads. They pursued the enemy in every direction, but were unable to come up with him, as he had dispersed. Returned to Bocaue during the afternoon and from there sent troops to the several stations they occupied before the enemy's attack upon the points held by our troops along the railroad. From information obtained from prisoners and from escaped Spanish refugees it was learned that this attack upon our communications was made under the orders and supervision of Aguinaldo, who was at Santa Maria the 11th instant.

The loss of the enemy, as near as could be ascertained, was about 250 killed and wounded.

Thanks are due Col. Owen Summers, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, for prompt cooperation, and to Capt. H. C. Cabell for ably assisting me; also to First Lieut. F. D. Webster, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp, and First Lieut. H. E. Ely, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, acting assistant quartermaster and acting commissary of subsistence. Major Bell, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, of Major-General MacArthur's staff, rendered valuable service on the 12th instant, and had charge of an important reconnoissance made from Santa Maria.

Very respectfully,

LOYD WHEATON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

APPENDIX 33.

CAMP AT CALOOCAN, P. I., *April 5, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions from your office, I have the honor to report that on the 24th of March Cooke's battalion (Companies E, F, G, and M) was ordered to report to General Wheaton, in the vicinity of Caloocan; they left camp on the Lunette at 5 p. m. I inclose report of Captain Cooke as to the duties performed by his battalion, and, as it went into action under the eye of the brigade commander, I will leave it to him to recommend the officers for gallantry.

On the 25th of March, Hannay's battalion (Companies A, H, I, and K) reported for duty to Brigadier-General Hughes, U. S. V., for duty in the city of Manila. Brinkerhoff's battalion (Companies B, C, D, and L) was held in readiness to be called out by General Lawton if required. On the 26th the regiment was ordered to the front and reported for duty to General Wheaton, brigade commander, at Polo, March 26. On

502 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

March 27, marched to Marilao. On the 28th marched to Bigaa. On the 29th marched to Guiguinto, and on the 30th marched along railroad to within one-half mile of General MacArthur's headquarters, where the regiment came under fire of the advance post of the enemy; went into camp along the railroad, threw out B Company (Captain Williams) as a picket, where 1 man was wounded.

On the 31st of March supported the First Nebraska and Montana regiments as they made the attack on Malolos, where the regiment lost 1 officer and 3 enlisted men wounded. Returned same day to old camp on railroad.

Very respectfully,

JOHN H. PAGE,
Colonel Third U. S. Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

CAMP NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., April 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT THIRD INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Battalion, while detached, from March 24 to 26, 1899. Pursuant to verbal orders of the colonel commanding the regiment, I marched with the Second Battalion (Companies E, F, G, and M) to Caloocan church, on the evening of March 24, reporting about 8 p. m. to Gen. Loyd Wheaton, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, and made camp in the churchyard. At 7.10 a. m., March 25, under orders of the brigade commander, I marched to the burial ground northeast of church, in support of the Second Oregon, occupying their trenches as they moved to attack the enemy, about 8.30 a. m., coming under a severe dropping fire from our left front as the men went into the works. Under orders of the brigade commander, Company M (Captain Day) and Company G (Lieutenant Hannay) were detached in support of the Second Oregon as they advanced to the west side of the railroad in a charge over open ground under a stiff fire against a line of rifle pits supported by trenches, a distance of from 800 to 900 yards to a wooded ridge. Company G came into line on the right of the Oregon regiment on the far slope at the edge of the timber, and Company M on the left of the right battalion of that regiment, where it relieved Company K, Second Oregon, on the firing line. A brisk fire was exchanged with the enemy for about one hour, and the whole line advanced in a charge over open ground and over a well-constructed trench, about 800 yards distant, into timber, driving the enemy to and across the Tuliahan River, near the stone bridge on the Malabon causeway at the village Tinajeros, occupying a line of stone walls and rubbish of dismantled buildings near said bridge at about 11 a. m. Firing was continued until about 4 p. m., when the enemy's fire was silenced and only reopened at infrequent intervals during the day and night. The first span of the bridge had been broken down, but a crossing of bamboo poles remained. The Oregon troops in the early evening occupied and reversed a breastwork on the bridge, and at 5 a. m. next morning Company M (Day's) placed a strong platform over the broken span. The town of Tinajeros was then occupied, the enemy being found in retreat.

At 8 a. m. Companies M and G marched 1 mile northeast to brigade headquarters on the railroad and took position on both sides of the railroad, covering the railroad and artillery (Utah Battery) there stationed. The railroad bridge crossed the river at this point distant 800 to 900 yards, and several trenches on the opposite side were held by the enemy. During the morning and up until 1 p. m. Company M had excellent target practice on these trenches and detached men of the enemy, who from time to time fled to the rear. About this time Company M cleared the ground to the river, the advance of the turning movement on the right causing the enemy to evacuate said trenches opposite. Captain Day reported to me about 2 p. m., and the battalion was reunited.

In the charges mentioned above Company M lost 3 men killed and 10 wounded, 7 men overcome by the heat, which was intense. Company G suffered a loss of 3 killed and 5 wounded (1 of whom has since died), and 8 men dropped out overcome by the heat. Upon the detachment of Captain Day with Companies M and G, I received orders to move forward in support of the Twenty-second Infantry with Companies F (Cooke's, Lieutenant Wygant in command) and E (Lieutenant Giddings in command) east of the railroad. The movement from trenches forward in line of skirmishers was over high, open, rolling ground, and under a nasty, dropping, enfilading fire from my left. At about 10 a. m. I received orders to advance to the firing line in my front, my left near the railroad. Finding two companies of the Twenty-second Infantry in the position assigned me, I moved my two companies by the right flank, leaving 200 yards interval on my left, my right reaching the Tuliahan River, with an open "paddy" field in my front. The enemy in strong force held a well-constructed

line of shelter trenches on the other side of the river directly in my front, from 300 to 400 yards distant. This movement was governed by a desire to fill a wide and dangerous interval then existing in our lines between the left of the Third Artillery and our right. I learned of this from Major Bell, on General MacArthur's staff, and reported it to General Wheaton, who had already taken measures to fill it. Later in the day a battalion of both the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Infantry filled this gap with my battalion. From about 10.30 a. m. at intervals the enemy received some considerable reenforcement, and a lively fire was exchanged with them at frequent intervals till night. We bivouacked on the firing line, and established Cossack posts in my front at night. The ground was the front of a timbered slope, the cover being merely a screen. The right was better protected under cover of natural breastworks.

During the night the enemy seemed to increase in number, and they were hard at work extending their trenches. The utmost silence prevailed with us, and at dawn my line was occupied and in readiness. At 5.56 a. m., by my watch, I noticed 20 or 30 of the enemy above their works exposed in plain view, evidently trying to locate my line. I opened the fight with a well-directed volley from my nearest section, dropping 7 of the enemy. A brisk fire was maintained until about 9 a. m., when the enemy commenced to retire in consequence of the turning movement of our right.

Company E lost 3 wounded and 1 overcome by heat, and Company F 1 wounded and 2 with Cuban fever. The enemy had disappeared from my front about 10.30 a. m. The battalion remained in line until 3 p. m., when orders were received from brigade commander to report to colonel commanding Third Infantry, upon his arrival at location of Utah Battery, which I did at 6.15 p. m.

I can not close this report without paying a tribute to the good conduct of the men of this battalion. The great majority had had very little drill, and no training whatever; many had never fired a gun. They were cool and collected and obeyed orders implicitly. The noncommissioned officers displayed as a whole fine abilities as squad and section leaders. Many served in Cuba and repeated the superb coolness and soldierly bearing that characterized them there. Considering 53 days of close confinement on board ship, it is remarkable that so small a percentage under the strain of intense heat fell out on the second day ashore.

They suffered a considerable loss and advanced under a fire that was felt at the very start, and that might fairly be termed brisk, yet they seemed only to desire to close with the enemy. Their whole conduct was praiseworthy. Captain Day needs no commendations from my pen. I would fail in my duty, however, not to say that I found him cool, brave, energetic, resourceful, and loyal. He has been of great assistance to me from the beginning. Lieutenant Giddings' conduct was commendable in a high degree. He commanded his company well, is full of the instincts of the soldier, and exhibited on these two days the fact that he possesses the qualifications of a good soldier, and can be relied upon to care for his men and perform everything that any situation may require, no matter where or how he is placed. Lieutenants Hannay and Wygant commanded companies under fire for the first time and displayed commendable qualities. Lieutenant Pond (my adjutant), under fire for the first time, was cool and intelligent in the execution of his duties. Dr. Bauman, acting assistant surgeon, under fire for the first time, was prompt and efficient in the discharge of his duties. The lists showing killed and wounded have already been submitted. The brigade commander saw fit to verbally acknowledge the services of my battalion in the following language: "Captain (Cooke), your battalion did good work; we smashed them and killed a great many of them" (the enemy).

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. W. COOKE,
Captain, Third Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

APPENDIX 34.

HDQRS. TWENTY-SECOND U. S. INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: In compliance with paragraph 1, General Orders, No. 72, Adjutant-General's Office, 1898, and telegram dated Malolos, P. I., April 4, 1899, from commanding officer Third Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the regiment from March 24, 1899, to March 31, 1899, inclusive.

Left Manila with regiment at 7.30 a. m., March 24, and marched 7 miles to trenches between La Loma and Caloocan, relieving Montana Volunteers. At daylight March 25, regiment advanced over the trenches and engaged with the enemy intrenched in front. Enemy was driven across the Tuliahan River to strong position in front of Malinta. Camped along river, with considerable firing throughout day and night.

March 26 at 8 a. m. crossed river by ford 1 mile to right of railroad and made turning movement to the left, driving the enemy behind stone wall and trenches at Malinta. At about 12 m. advanced and charged enemy's position, who retreated along the railroad.

March 27, 28, 29 and 30 marched along railroad in rear of firing line (MacArthur's division), camping at Meycauayan, Malao, San Marco River, and point $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Malolos. March 30 Companies D, E, G, and M, Second Battalion, Captain Lockwood commanding, was left at San Marco River as guard to entire wagon train.

March 31 posted as support to firing line, advancing toward Malolos under fire for a short time, entering Malolos at noon.

On March 25, Captain Lockwood's battalion, Companies D, E, G, and M, was on the right and he displayed great judgment and energy in locating the enemy's intrenched position.

On March 26, Captain Ballance's battalion, Companies A, F, K, and I, and Company L, were more especially engaged in the charge and I especially recommend Capt. John G. Ballance, Twenty-second Infantry, for a brevet for the judgment and gallantry he displayed in leading his command under a very heavy fire. I especially and personally noticed on this occasion the behavior of First Lieut. Herman Hall, adjutant Twenty-second Infantry, First Lieut. Albert C. Dalton, commanding Company F, Twenty-second Infantry, and First Lieut. Peter W. Davison, commanding Company K, Twenty-second Infantry. These three officers remained erect at the firing line when the fire of the enemy was so severe that it was absolutely necessary to fire from a prone position. They walked along the line, coolly directing the men, and inspiring confidence in the men by their coolness and most conspicuous bravery. I, therefore, recommend that each of these be brevetted captain for conspicuous bravery in action. All the other officers, I have no doubt, acted with equal courage, but I mention these by name as they were near me and came under my personal observation. All the recommendations of battalion and company commanders I heartily concur in, and recommend brevets and distinctions as recommended by them.

Capt. John S. Kulp, assistant surgeon, U. S. A., and Acting Asst. Surg. I. N. Brewer, U. S. A., were very tireless and courageous in attending to the wounded under fire, and suitable recognition is recommended for the conspicuous courage and zeal displayed by them.

Attention is invited to inclosure of recommendation in case of Sergt. George C. Charlton, Company B, Twenty-second Infantry.

I desire to report that Gen. H. C. Egbert commanded the regiment from the time it left the barracks on March 24 until the capture of the insurgents' intrenchments on March 26, when, after most gallantly conducting his regiment to the charge, he fell mortally wounded, just after the capture of the enemy's position. I then assumed command of the regiment and commanded it during the remainder of the expedition.

Following is a list of killed and wounded:

Wounded March 25, 1899, at Caloocan, P. I.—First Lieut. Harold L. Jackson, Twenty-second Infantry; Privates Edward B. Miller, Company B; George C. Richards, Company D; Nicholas Gearin, Company D; Fred W. Arnold and William Howard, Company E; William Meyer, Company F; Bert E. Clough, Company G; Sergt. Albert E. Axt, Company H; Privates Frit Herber, Company H, Spurgeon A. Cain, Company K; Morton R. Hunsicker, Company L; Edward F. Lammers and Louis Skillman, Company M, and Sergt. Laverne L. Gregg, Company M, Twenty-second Infantry.

Killed March 26, 1899, at Malinta, P. I.—Col. Harry C. Egbert, Twenty-Second Infantry; First Sergt. Charles F. Brooke, Company L, and Private John Miller, Company I, Twenty-second Infantry.

Wounded March 26, 1899, at Malinta, P. I.—Privates William E. Geyer and Harry Scanlan, Company A; First Sergt. Patrick J. Byrne, Company B, and Ole Waloe, Company F; Artificer John A. Hogeboom, Company I, and William Dunlap, Company L, Twenty-second Infantry.

Missing—None.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEO. O. PARKER,
Major Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding.



TWENTY-SECOND UNITED STATES INFANTRY ADVANCING ON MALOLOS MARCH 26 1899

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MANILA, P. I., April 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: Pursuant to verbal instructions of the regimental commander, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the First Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, from March 24 to March 31, 1899:

The battalion was composed of four companies, Twenty-second Infantry, as follows: Company I, Lieut. W. A. Campbell commanding; Company F, Lieut. A. C. Dalton commanding; Company A, Lieut. W. H. Wassell commanding; Company K, Lieut. P. W. Davison commanding; Lieut. I. W. Leonard, adjutant.

The battalion, as part of the regiment, left Nipa Barracks, Manila, at 7.15 a. m. March 24, marched to a point between La Loma church and Caloocan, where it went into camp until dark. It then marched to the trenches in front and to the right of the railroad buildings of Caloocan, as indicated by the brigade commander during the day, relieving the First Montana Volunteer Infantry.

The Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, was on my left and the Second Battalion, under Captain Lockwood, on my right, the regimental line occupying the line of trenches from the railroad buildings to the left of the Third Artillery.

The action commenced at daylight the following morning about 2 miles to our right, and proceeded from right to left until the whole opposing line was firing at our lines.

My original orders required me to make a gradual turning movement to the left, conforming to the movements of the Second Battalion, on my right. The latter was directed to cover the left flank of the Third Artillery. The Third Artillery, after advancing, made a complete change to the left, necessitating a similar movement of the battalion on my right, both of which passed across my front and passed beyond it to the left, completely masking my fire. I was directed by General Egbert to remain in the line during the preceding movement. Later I was directed to make a partial change of direction to the left, form line of skirmishers, and proceed northwest. Line was formed and proceeded unwaveringly toward the line of intrenchments of the enemy, who hastily abandoned them and retreated toward the line of the railroad.

The battalion proceeded in line of skirmishers with half-distance intervals, three companies being in the firing line and Company I being in reserve.

The battalion proceeded in this order until it reached the railroad near where it crosses the Tuliahan River, driving the insurgents before it. At this point the insurgents were discovered in force behind intrenchments across the river, which was not passable at this point on account of its depth, muddy bottom, and the well-defended intrenchments. Large numbers of insurgents, bearing the dead and wounded, were seen retreating toward Malinta.

The battalion engaged the insurgents all afternoon in a hot fire, but owing to the impassability of the river could not drive them out. During the afternoon the two other battalions of the regiment came up, and also two pieces of artillery.

The following morning the regiment proceeded about a mile and a quarter up the river, where the men crossed, the water being breast high.

After all had crossed the river a skirmish line was formed at right angles to the river, the left resting on the river, the Second and First battalions in the firing line and the Third in reserve. The Second Battalion was on the left.

Capt. T. W. Moore, Twenty-second Infantry, reported to me with two companies, with orders to protect my right flank. We were ordered to proceed in that order to the railroad and to take the line of intrenchments in reverse.

The movement was most beautifully executed by my battalion. The company commanders kept the men under perfect control and as well dressed and with as uniform intervals as was possible.

Owing to the almost impenetrable thickets at some parts of the line the movement was slowly executed.

After proceeding about a mile in this order the strong intrenchments which had enabled the insurgents to hold in check our forces the previous day were taken in reverse, and the battalion proceeded to the railroad. Lieutenant Murphy, commanding Company C, was on the left of my battalion and in touch with it, and was with it when the trenches were taken in reverse and the march made to the railroad. Two insurgents were killed by the fire of this company.

A few insurgents were seen retreating in the bushes beyond the railroads and a small white flag was seen displayed about three-quarters of a mile beyond the track, but as I had been ordered not to go beyond the railroad track I halted the battalion at the track.

There was with me at this time the four companies of my battalion and Company C. The remainder of the regiment was back of the line and out of sight.

I went to the right of the line for the purpose of making observations, being preceded by four scouts from Lieutenant Dalton's company.

At a cut through which the railroad passed an advanced post of eight insurgents was encountered, which opened fire on us. I formed line across the railroad track and reconnoitered the enemy's position.

He was found strongly intrenched about 300 yards beyond the railroad cut.

I directed Lieutenant Dalton to form his company in line of skirmishers with diminished interval, his left resting on the railroad. Lieutenants Davison and Wassell were formed on his right and directed to push through the underbrush and attack the intrenchments on the enemy's left flank.

Lieutenant Campbell's company was formed in line of skirmishers on the left of the track and at right angles to it.

Word was sent to Lieutenant Murphy to form his company to the left of Lieutenant Campbell and attack the enemy's right flank. The messenger returned, stating that Lieutenant Murphy had gone back to join his battalion, which left me with the four companies of my battalion only.

I then had Lieutenant Campbell extend his line to the left by taking full interval.

Word was sent back to General Egbert by my adjutant, Lieutenant Leonard, what I had discovered in my front and the dispositions I had made. I recommended that one company be sent to extend my flank farther to the left, and started a movement slowly forward, directing Lieutenants Campbell and Dalton to attack in front.

Just as the battalion reached the rise of ground through which the railroad cut was made I received orders from General Egbert, communicated through one officer and two orderlies, to halt, which was done.

Later General Wheaton sent an aid-de-camp to ascertain what I had developed in my front. I reported and also expressed full confidence of my ability to take the intrenchments with my battalion and requested permission to do so. Very soon thereafter General Wheaton gave me the desired permission.

The battalion proceeded up the rise of the ground to the crest, where it was met by a galling fire from the intrenchments. The men lay down and returned the fire.

Not having sufficient cover on the crest, it was thought best to charge the intrenchments, and the troops were moved forward.

This necessitated a forward movement of over 200 yards down the slope of the hill into a small valley, then up the hill where the intrenchments were.

After passing into the valley I had Musician Kaercher sound the charge, which the men obeyed with the greatest alacrity, and with cheers charged up the hill and took the intrenchments.

On arriving at the intrenchments they were met by a well-directed and hot fire from the wall around Malinta church and some intrenchments, and a raised road leading to a bridge from 600 to 800 yards distant.

The fire was so accurately delivered that my men were compelled to lie very close to the ground on the reverse side of the intrenchments and deliver their return fire from there.

It was during this fire that I was informed that General Egbert was killed.

At first some of the firing of our troops was at will, but later I directed company commanders to fire volleys only.

After about half an hour's continuous firing we succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire and, causing them to retreat from their defenses, permitted the head of General MacArthur's column, which was marching along the road coming from the right, to take their transportation over the bridge into the town.

Part of the defenses of the enemy consisted of a solid stone wall 2 feet thick around a churchyard, which could have been held by a comparatively small number of men against five times their number of infantry.

A large number of Mauser and some Remington shells were found behind this wall, showing where much of their fire came from.

The fire on our troops in this advance was very much better directed than any before or since, and is accounted for by the fact that the enemy had measured the ground along a straight line from the railroad bridge to Malinta church, which was the direct line of our advance, and had erected along it poles about 50 feet high and about 75 meters apart, and nailed to every alternate one a nipa flag. By means of these poles the enemy were enabled to tell within a few feet the exact distance we were from them, and regulate their sight accordingly.

Their intrenchments were fortunately faultily constructed, being on the crest of a high rise of ground, with a parapet about 5 feet thick and horizontal on top.

When our troops moved forward from the crest of their first position down the slope, the enemy in the intrenchments were unable to depress their pieces sufficiently, and all shots passed over our heads in this forward movement and charge.

I think all our casualties happened after we had taken the first line of works. The men were then protected by the earthwork.

For these two reasons our loss was comparatively small, although the enemy's fire was very hot and delivered with an absolutely accurate knowledge of the distance.

Having driven the enemy out of their defenses around Malinta, the battalion was directed to camp there for the night.

Lieutenant Wolfe, commanding Company L, brought his company up and took part in the charge of my battalion, and after the intrenchments were taken, formed on the left and did effective firing.

I wish to especially mention Lieut. W. A. Campbell, Lieut. A. C. Dalton, Lieut. W. H. Wassell, and Lieut. P. W. Davison, in command, respectively, of Companies H, F, A, and K, Twenty-second Infantry, for the skillful and effective way in which they handled their companies from the time they forded the river until the capture of Malinta church, and for the cheerfulness and accuracy with which they carried out every detail of the orders I gave them. The troops composing these companies were most all recruits, and their effective action is due in a very large measure to the strong personality of these officers, and to their hard work and determined efforts to make an effective force out of them during the short time they have been in the service. For the above reasons, and for their gallantry and bravery in the capture of Malinta church, I recommend that each of these officers be given the brevet of captain in the Regular Army.

I deem it proper to mention the conspicuous bravery of Lieut. Herman Hall, adjutant Twenty-second Infantry. He came up on the firing line, took command of detachments of some companies that were near him, placed them on the firing line behind the parapet, and had them deliver well-regulated and effective volleys at the enemy, walking up and down the firing line in full view of the enemy and exposed to a heavy fire. For conspicuous bravery on this occasion I respectfully recommend that Lieut. Herman Hall be given the brevet of captain in the Regular Army.

I desire to commend Lieut. I. W. Leonard, the battalion adjutant, for his efficiency in the performance of his duties, cheerfully going on foot from one end of the line to the other to convey orders to different parts of the line, moving freely where the firing was heaviest, without the slightest thought for his personal safety. I recommend that Lieutenant Leonard be appointed a first lieutenant by brevet in the Regular Army.

Musician William Kearcher, Company I, Twenty-second Infantry, is deserving of special commendation for the faithful and efficient performance of his duties as orderly and trumpeter, as cheerfully carrying messages where bullets were flying thick as when at a post, and I recommend that he be given a certificate of merit.

The battalion left Malinta church at 7 a. m., March 27, and marched past Polo to the railroad station at Meycauayan, where it camped.

March 28.—Marched to Marilao and camped.

March 29.—Broke camp at 6.30 a. m., marched along the railroad to San Marco River, which we crossed, and camped, leaving the wagon train in charge of the Second Battalion.

March 30.—Marched along the railroad 2 miles, and camped with the Third Infantry.

March 31.—Marched by battalion, in two lines, as support for the Third Artillery and First Montana, and moved to the attack and capture of Malolos, into which we marched about 11 a. m. Marched through the city and camped near the railroad station.

The following is the list of killed and wounded: Company I—Artificer John A. Hogeboom, wounded slightly along the back; Private John Miller, killed, March 26. Company F—Private William Meyer, wounded severely in the head, March 25; First Sergt. Ole Waloe, wounded in left arm. Company A—Private William Guyer, wounded in left forearm; Private Harry J. Scanlon, wounded in the chest, March 26. Company K—Private Cain, wounded in right great toe.

I inclose herewith the reports of the company commanders and adjutant, called for by verbal instructions of the regimental commander. I invite attention to their recommendations of enlisted men deserving of special mention and hope their recommendations may be given full effect.

I can from personal knowledge indorse the commendation of Musician Kaercher by the commanding officer of Company I, and that of the battalion adjutant.

I wish here to mention particularly my great satisfaction at the conduct of officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the battalion during all the time the battalion has been in the Philippines.

The zeal of all to follow out my minutest instructions is exceedingly gratifying,

and this with the fearlessness shown by them under fire (the great majority of whom had never before heard a hostile bullet) shows them to be of material which will become nearly invincible after more experience.

I doubt if any battalion that had been organized so short a time as this were ever more zealous than this one in carrying out the orders of its commander.

Very respectfully,

JOHN GREENE BALLANCE,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

NIPA BARRACKS, *Manila, Luzon Island, April 4, 1899.*

Maj. JOHN GREEN BALLANCE,
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my company (I, Twenty-second Infantry) marched from this place to Caloocan, Luzon Island, on March 24, and took position during the evening in the trenches about a half a mile east of the stone church, relieving a company of the First Montana Volunteers. About 7 a. m. on the morning of the 25th of March the company was moved out about 100 yards in front of the trenches, supporting a portion of Major Lockwood's battalion, but it was soon recalled, and about 8 a. m. Company I was placed in support of the battalion during the general advance toward the Tuliahan River. The company remained in support of the battalion all day, receiving a dropping fire for a considerable portion of the time, but there were no casualties.

On the morning of the 26th the company moved with the other companies of the battalion about three-quarters of a mile to the east, forded the Tuliahan River, and was deployed on the left of the battalion with instructions to keep in touch with the right of the company of Major Kell's battalion, which was on the left. About 10.15 a. m. an advance was made down the river toward the railroad, which was reached without resistance about 11 a. m. Shortly after reaching the railroad it was discovered that the enemy was intrenched on the left side of the railroad between us and the town of Malinta, and Company I was thrown across the railroad, the battalion turning to the right and advancing toward the intrenchments. When within about 800 yards of the enemy the company was halted by your command and scouts were sent forward to a small knoll about 300 yards to the front. They reported that several of the enemy were sitting on their intrenchments about 500 yards in advance, but that some appeared to be moving to the right. After waiting for some minutes for orders to advance, fire was opened upon us by the enemy and I suddenly heard the charge being sounded and saw a company about 200 yards in my rear advancing in double time. I immediately ordered the company forward in double time and on reaching the crest of the knoll in front began firing at the enemy, who were behind intrenchments about 500 yards in front. After firing five or six rounds the signal to cease firing was given and the order to charge repeated. By this time Company L had intermixed with Company I and the whole line advanced, the enemy leaving the intrenchments and taking up a position behind a stone wall inclosing an old church, and behind some rice mounds on the right of the railroad. Upon reaching the enemy's intrenchments the company halted with the others and after a few individual shots began firing volleys at the stone wall and rice bank about 500 yards distant.

During the firing Artificer John A. Hogeboom was wounded and Private John Miller killed. The enemy's fire was soon silenced, and the line advanced toward the church of Malinta, near which the regiment bivouacked for the night. The number of shots fired averaged 35 rounds per man. So far as I could see, the only man deserving particular mention is Musician Kaercher. From this time to the surrender of Malolos, on March 31, the company was not actively engaged with the enemy, its duties being those of a support.

Very respectfully,

W. A. CAMPBELL,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry.

NIPA BARRACKS, *Malate, April 5, 1899.*

Capt. J. G. BALLANCE,
Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Company F, Twenty-second Infantry, in the operations against the enemy from March 24 to 31, 1899, inclusive:

March 24.—The company, as part of First Battalion, left Nipa Barracks, Malate,

about 7.30 a. m., marched to Caloocan, and occupied during the night an advanced post in the trenches east of Caloocan.

March 25.—The company moved forward about 6 a. m., taking part in the general advance to within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Malinta Church. Engaged the enemy about noon along railroad near railway bridge over Tuliahan River until about 3 o'clock p. m.; Private William Meyer seriously wounded in head. Bivouacked during the night about one-half mile from railway bridge over Tuliahan River, on line of railway.

March 26.—Left camp about 8.30 a. m., marched east three-fourths of a mile and forded the Tuliahan River. Advanced as part of firing line to railway about 600 yards north of bridge. Engaged the enemy about 12.30 p. m., and after a sharp engagement drove him from his intrenchments. Bivouacked near the village of Malinta during the night. First Sergt. Ole Waloe wounded in left arm.

March 27.—Broke camp about 7.30 a. m., crossed the river and bivouacked during the night at Meycauayan Station, on west side of railway.

March 28.—Remained in camp at Meycauayan during the day. Left Meycauayan about 3.30 p. m., marched along railway to within 2 miles of Bocaue. Bivouacked for the night west of railway.

March 29.—Broke camp at 6.30 a. m. and marched along railway, passing Bocaue about noon. Bivouacked for the night 1 mile south of Bocaue.

March 30.—Broke camp at 7 a. m. and marched south along railway to Bigaa Station. Left Bigaa about 10 a. m. Bivouacked about one-half mile south of Guiguinto.

March 31.—Broke camp about 6 a. m., in support of right wing of firing line of regiment. Advance continued until within one-half mile of Malolos, which was entered about noon. Bivouacked on line of railway near Malolos during the night.

I have the honor to invite the attention of the battalion commander to the meritorious services of Private Charles H. Bishop, Company F, Twenty-second Infantry, who behaved with great coolness and gallantry at the engagement near Malinta Church, he being the first enlisted man to reach the enemy's trenches when the charge was made upon the works. His services during the recent maneuvers on the Pasig River were particularly meritorious, having volunteered on several occasions to perform most hazardous duties.

Very respectfully,

A. C. DALTON,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company F.

MALATE, P. I., April 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT FIRST BATTALION, TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

Malate, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of Company A, Twenty-second Infantry, from March 24 to March 31, 1899:

March 24.—The company (1 officer and 76 enlisted men) in battalion, Capt. J. G. Ballance, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding First Battalion, left barracks at Malate at 7.30 a. m., marched to Caloocan, relieved a company of the First Montana, and bivouacked in the trenches east of Caloocan.

March 25.—Moved north at 6 a. m. to within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Malinta, encountering an occasional weak fire from the insurgents. At about noon the company was put in position near the railroad, slightly in rear of our firing lines.

March 26.—Moved at 8.30 a. m., forded the Tuliahan River, and took part in the flank movement on the trenches engaged on the previous day. The movement was made without opposition, the trenches having been abandoned during the night. Reaching the railroad some scattering shots were received from the direction of Malinta. With Company K, Twenty-second Infantry, on its left the company moved toward Malinta to reconnoiter. Advancing one-half mile a considerable force of intrenched insurgents was encountered. Sharp firing was opened on both sides and when reenforced by the remainder of the First Battalion the works were charged and carried. Firing was then directed toward the enemy in Malinta, and in a short time the enemy's fire was silenced. During this engagement the company lost 2 men, both wounded. The company bivouacked at Malinta.

March 27.—Moved at 7 a. m., marched northwest, and bivouacked on the railroad at Meycauayan.

March 28.—Moved at 3.30 p. m., marched to within 2 miles of Bocaue, and bivouacked along the railroad.

March 29.—Moved at 6.30 a. m., marched along the line of the railroad, passed Bocaue at noon, and bivouacked 1 mile south of Bigaa.

March 30.—Moved at 7 a. m., marched west along the railroad, reached Bigaa at 8 a. m., left Bigaa 10 a. m., bivouacked about one-half mile from Guiguinto, the company being on outpost during the night.

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March 31.—Moved at 6 a. m. The company was the left of the supporting line in the attack on Malolos, lay under a sharp fire for about five minutes when near the city, and entered Malolos at noon.

Bivouacked in Malolos near the railroad.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM H. WASSELL,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company A.

COMPANY K, TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY,
Ermita Barracks, Manila, P. I., April 5, 1899.

Capt. JOHN GREEN BALLANCE,
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Major, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Battalion Twenty-second Infantry.

SIR: Company K, Twenty-second Infantry, left Ermita Barracks about 7 a. m., March 24, toward Caloocan, halting about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in rear of trenches surrounding that place. At dusk Company K was moved to line of trenches and relieved a company of the First Montana Volunteers. The next morning, March 25, it took part in the general advance and proceeded in line of skirmishers toward Maligta, halting on the bluffs south of the railroad crossing Tulihan River. This point was reached about noon and the company lay behind the firing line under cover during the afternoon, its own front being occupied by other troops of the regiment. The company bivouacked in rear of the hill for the night, and the next morning, March 26, moved up the river about 1 mile, forded the river, and took part in the flanking movement on the insurgent trenches on the right bank of the river. The company advanced in line of skirmishers until the railroad bank was reached and was there formed under cover.

Scouts sent to right along track drew some fire from hills in that direction, and Companies A and K of the First Battalion were sent to reconnoiter the position. A line of trenches was discovered and its fire from them was returned by the two companies sent to reconnoiter, and as soon as the remainder of the battalion came up the position was charged and carried. Our fire was then directed on the town, into which we soon advanced and camped for the night.

During the advance of March 25 Private Cain, who was detached from the company and was on duty with the pioneer corps, was wounded in right big toe.

March 27 left camp about 7.30 a. m. and proceeded to Meycauayan, arriving there about noon. No skirmishing. Marched along road all the way. Bivouacked at Meycauayan that night and left camp about 1.30 p. m.

March 28 proceeded along railroad to the north about 2 miles and bivouacked for the night at Marilao.

March 29 Company K left camp about 7 a. m. and marched about 6 miles and went into camp near Bulacan.

March 30 broke camp about 7 a. m. and proceeded up the track and went into camp near Guiguinto about 4.30 p. m. During this advance Company K was detached and acted as escort for the Hotchkiss rapid-fire gun, which was sent with the regiment. Shortly after arriving at camp the battalion was formed into line of battle to the left and skirmished through the woods about 1 mile after forces of insurgents reported to be collected there. None were found and troops were marched back to original camp and bivouacked along railroad track for the night.

At 7 a. m., March 31, Company K took part in the advance on Malolos. The company, acting with the battalion, was formed as a support to First Montana Volunteers and Third U. S. Artillery, and supported them on the advance into the city, which was entered about 12 m. The company was under straggling fire of retreating insurgents during the approach to the city, but no fire was returned by Company K, on account of the troops in our front, which we were supporting. Company K went into camp on outskirts of Malolos along railroad track and there remained till April 2, about 4 p. m., when, in accordance with orders, it proceeded to Ermita Barracks at Manila by rail, arriving there about 9 p. m.

In connection with this report I feel it my duty to mention First Sergt. George Scott and Sergt. Richard Maney, who, though suffering from Cuban fever, went through the entire campaign doing their duty creditably and faithfully and only leaving their posts when ordered by the surgeon to temporarily remain in the hospital when the attacks of fever were especially bad. Corporals Brown and Gentil also did valuable service and greatly assisted the company commander in handling the men of the company, both on the firing line and in camp. Full credit should be given them for their eagerness to faithfully perform duties which were assigned to them.

Very respectfully,

P. W. DAVISON,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company K.

NIPA BARRACKS, Manila, P. I., April 5, 1899.

Capt. J. G. BALLANCE,

Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

SIR: In compliance with your order I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the First Battalion in the operations against the enemy from March 24 to March 27, 1899, inclusive:

March 24.—The battalion, with the rest of the regiment, left the barracks and marched to a point about three-quarters of a mile south of Caloocan and on the east side of the railroad through that place, arriving there at about 10.30 o'clock a. m. and bivouacing for dinner and supper. At dusk the battalion broke camp and with the regiment proceeded to the intrenchments east of Caloocan, and as center battalion relieved part of the First Montana Volunteer Infantry.

March 25.—The battalion breakfasted before daylight and at 7.40 a. m. moved out of the trenches, forming a line of squads at right angles to the line of intrenchments and advanced upon the insurgent intrenchments directly north, crossing first a level rice field to a bamboo hedge or thicket about 400 yards distant, passing through the thicket, and then traversing a second open field about 200 yards wide to a second bamboo wood, behind which the insurgent intrenchments were located. The battalion during this movement passed through a fire from the enemy to the left, directed probably at the Oregon Volunteer Infantry on that flank, which was considerably advanced beyond our regiment, the bullets coming over their heads and those of Captain Kell's battalion of our regiment. One private of Company F was fatally wounded by this fire. The battalion received no fire from the trenches in front, and found them deserted.

The advance was continued through the woods beyond the insurgent trenches, with a slight change of direction to the left, until the left of the battalion reached the railroad about 700 yards from where it crosses the Tuliahan River. Here the battalion moved by the left flank until Company F was on the west side of the railway, with K and A upon the east side and I upon the west side in rear of Company F, in support, these having been the relative positions of the several companies of the battalion when it left the intrenchments. The battalion here exchanged a few volleys with the enemy until about noon, after which it rested in the woods on the right and behind the rice dikes on the left of the railroad until night. At dark the companies on the east of the track were moved to the west side and there bivouaced for the night. While there one private of Company K was wounded by a stray shot. During the afternoon I was sent by General Egbert to Caloocan for rations and returned with the train on which they came.

March 26.—The battalion breakfasted just before daybreak and about 6 o'clock I was again sent back to Caloocan for headquarters' baggage, and on my return, being told that the road west of the railway would carry me practically to where the battalion had bivouaced the night before, I went that way, but found myself, after a mile and a half's travel, at Tinajeros. I accordingly sent the cart with the baggage back, with instructions to the driver to seek a road to where the battalion lay, and myself crossed the fields to where I had left it. Upon arriving there I learned that the regiment had moved a mile and a half east to a ford over the Tuliahan River, and was expected to cross there and then move west toward the railroad in order to flank the insurgents, who the day before had been firing upon us from intrenchments near the railroad and north of the stream. But while this was being explained to me Company I of this battalion came into sight on the other side of the river, and I accordingly proceeded down the railroad and joined the battalion as it reached the track.

I found the railroad ties and the rails at the bridge taken up, as was also the case for about 300 yards beyond, and at this distance from the bridge the earth had been piled up into a sort of barricade about 6 feet high and 10 feet thick. Near the river's edge on the north side and east of the railroad, and at right angles thereto, the insurgents had constructed an elaborate bombproof trench to accommodate about 50 men. Open trenches were also constructed on the west side of the track, facing south. About 200 or 300 yards north of the river, on the west side of the railway, the insurgents had also built a small but very strong earthwork facing south and west, apparently intended to accommodate artillery. Beyond this 200 or 300 yards was a slight knoll, and about 400 yards still farther north on a much higher hill, a massive stone church or monastery, surrounded on the west, south, and east by a stone wall about 1 foot thick and originally 6 feet high, but now broken down to about 4 feet. On the west side of the railway the ground was clear between the river and church for almost 600 or 800 yards, beyond which it was wooded, the woods bending in toward the church at the north. A highway passed east and west on the north side of the church and by a viaduct crossed the railway, which passed through a deep cut at that point. On the east side of the railway the ground was cleared a distance of about 400 yards,

at which distance it began to rise in continuation of the slight knoll or ridge first mentioned above, and was from there on to opposite the church more or less wooded. All the cleared ground on both sides of the railway was cut into rectangles and triangles by low dikes used for rice cultivation, but now soddled over.

When I reached the battalion Mr. W. A. Campbell was reporting that his scouts had discovered a small redoubt occupied by insurgents just beyond the brow of the small knoll on the west side of the railway. Upon your order the battalion was at once deployed, facing north, with the left extending to the western extremity of the knoll in question, and the right into the woods east of the track. You then directed me to report to General Egbert that you had extended the right as far as you cared to and that you desired the reinforcement of one additional company on the left, as you were about to charge and desired to envelop the redoubt on the knoll, so as to capture the insurgents inside of it. General Egbert ordered that the movement should not be made but that the battalion should halt. During all this time some fire was received from the insurgents, especially along the railroad, but no execution was done by it. In the course of about half an hour Brigadier-General Wheaton arrived and soon thereafter directed General Egbert to dispose the regiment for attack and then charge the redoubt on the knoll. At about 12.30 o'clock, Company L having been placed to the left of the First Battalion, a charge was ordered and the battalion thus reinforced, passed at a run to the redoubt at the left of the railway and to a corresponding position in the woods on the right of the track. But the insurgents had in the meantime abandoned the redoubt, crossed over into the woods east of the railroad and made their way to the church. However, a large body of the enemy, occupying the church and surrounding stone wall and a trench behind the road leading to the viaduct, maintained an intense fire during the time the charge was being made and for about fifteen minutes after the battalion reached the redoubt. No one was injured, however, until after the troops laid down behind the slight embankment in front of the redoubt, but during the next few minutes the following casualties occurred on our side: General Egbert, killed; First Sergt. Charles F. Brooke, Company L, killed; First Sergt. Ole Waloe, Company F, wounded in left shoulder; First Sergt. Patrick J. Byrne, Company B, wounded in leg below knee; Private John Miller, Company I, killed; Artificer John Hogeboom, Company I, wounded in back; Private Harry J. Scanlan, Company A, wounded across back; Private William E. Geyer, Company A, wounded in right forearm.

Immediately upon lying down at the conclusion of the charge the companies of the battalion commenced to fire volleys at the church, wall, and road, in and behind which the enemy were posted and in about fifteen or twenty minutes their fire was silenced. After resting a few minutes, the battalion with the balance of the regiment, advanced to the church and Malinta village near it, and bivouacked for the night. Headquarters' baggage not yet having arrived, you sent me back to Caloocan for it, and I brought it up that night by way of Tinajeros.

March 27 camp was broken at daylight and at 7 o'clock a. m. the battalion as support of the regiment moved to the north. At Polo I was, by order of the commanding officer, transmitted by yourself, transferred to Captain Lockwood's battalion and placed in command of Company M, relieving Captain Krepps, who had been taken ill.

I have the honor to invite your attention to the exceptionally brave and meritorious conduct of Musician Kaercher, of Company I, during the engagement at Malinta, who when not engaged with other duties, assisted the hurt, regardless of danger to himself, and during the hottest fire calmly walked up and down the line reporting to his comrades the effect of their volleys and encouraging them by his example.

Very respectfully submitted.

IVERS W. LEONARD,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, and Adjutant First Battalion.

MANILA, P. I., April 5, 1899.

REGIMENTAL ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY,
Nipa Barracks, Manila, P. I.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions received this day, I have the honor to submit the following report of movements, battles, and engagements participated in by the Second Battalion of Twenty-second Infantry during the period from March 24 to March 31, 1899.

Left barracks at Manila March 24 at 7 a. m. and marched to Caloocan, where the battalion relieved the Montana Volunteers in the trenches.

At 6 o'clock a. m. of the 25th the battalion was deployed to protect the left flank of the Third Artillery, while the same was making wheel to the left. I advanced my command to within 300 yards of the enemy's works under a severe fire, losing

several men. I was ordered to halt my battalion as soon as the Third Artillery had gained the woods in my front. About 8 o'clock a. m. I received orders to advance and protect left flank of Third Artillery. After advancing for a mile and a half I received orders to close in on right of my regiment. In making this movement I discovered the enemy to be strongly intrenched behind the Tausa River. After gaining my new position I became hotly engaged with the enemy, which was kept up until dusk. My battalion laid in line of battle all night. I received orders in the morning to pull my command out and join rest of the regiment to move by the right flank to cross the river and take the enemy in flank, which movement was beautifully executed, driving the enemy to its works in rear. Here the regiment changed direction to the right under a heavy fire, when we received orders to charge the enemy's works which the regiment did in fine style. Our gallant colonel fell in this charge, at the head of his regiment. I was ordered to move my battalion to the left and joined the Second Oregon Volunteers. After advancing for over a mile I was ordered to join the rest of my regiment, where we went into camp.

We broke camp on the morning of the 27th, following as reserve to General MacArthur's division. My battalion participated in all the movements of the Third Brigade, First Division, up to the fall of Malolos.

I would most respectfully call the attention of the regimental commander to the conspicuous gallantry of the following officers: Capts. J. F. Kreps and T. W. Moore; First Lieut. Isaac Newell; Second Lieuts. H. R. Campbell and R. B. Parrott. All of these officers were in the front leading their men. I would also call your attention to the personal reports of company commanders hereto attached.

Very respectfully,

B. C. LOCKWOOD,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

MANILA, P. I., April 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT SECOND BATTALION, TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with verbal instructions of the battalion commander, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of Company M, Twenty-second Infantry from March 24 to March 26, 1899, inclusive.

The company as part of regiment left its barracks, Manila, P. I., at about 7 a. m. and proceeded to the vicinity of Caloocan, where after dusk it was placed in trenches before occupied by the Montana regiment (volunteers), on the left of the Third Regiment Regular Artillery.

March 25, at about 6 a. m., the company moved forward as the right of a line of skirmishers to protect the left flank of the Third Artillery. It executed a change of direction to the left, and within half an hour was under fire of Filipino trenches, from 800 to 1,000 yards distance. Under orders of the brigade commander, the advance was stopped between 300 and 500 yards from Filipino works. The battalion was soon after assembled and moved down to the railroad, Company M being placed along the east of the railroad facing east, with its left about 400 yards from the bridge over Tuliahan or Tausa River, its rear protected by railroad bank. It remained there until dusk under the fire from the enemy's works north of the river, aiding in keeping down the fire therefrom. Before daybreak next morning, March 26, the company, which had been withdrawn from its position the evening before, returned to its place along the railroad, which it held until about 7 a. m., when it was withdrawn and formed part of the battalion which advanced up the river to a ford, where the whole command crossed.

The company was one of the reserve companies in rear of the regimental line, which position it held, being under quite heavy fire, while the firing line rushed and took the enemy's position in front of Malinta. After this the company was moved to the left, forming part of the main line, but was not under fire. It returned and bivouacked at Malinta for the night, moving out next morning in a northerly direction along the railroad. About noon the undersigned was overcome by the heat and chills and fever, and was returned to Manila to the hospital.

In the first engagement near Caloocan in front of our trenches the company lost the following: Private Edward H. Lammers, seriously wounded right arm and left breast; Private John T. Skillman, wounded left arm near elbow; Sergt. L. L. Gregg, slightly wounded between fingers of right hand and did not leave the company. There were no other casualties.

J. F. KREPS,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company M.

514 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

MANILA, P. I., April 4, 1899.

Capt. B. C. LOCKWOOD,
Twenty-second Infantry, Manila, P. I.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions received this day, I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements, battles, and engagements participated in by Company E, Twenty-second Infantry, during the period from March 24 to March 31, 1899.

The company left Nipa Barracks, Manila, P. I., as part of the Second Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, March 24, 1899, at about 7 p. m., and marched through Manila to a position in rear of the trenches occupied by the Montana Volunteer Infantry, going into camp about 10.30 a. m. Broke camp about 6 p. m. and moved into the trenches. Distance traveled, about 6 miles.

On March 25, 1899, about 6 a. m., the company left the trenches and advanced on the enemy who were also intrenched, compelling them to retreat. At about 10 a. m. the company took up a position near the Dagupan Railroad, which it held until the morning of the 26th. During the day there was some firing from the enemy, and Privates Fred U. Arndt and William Howard were wounded.

At about 8 a. m., March 26, the company left the railroad and moved to the right across the river, acting as reserve for the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, and protecting its flank in the movement against Malinta, camping for the night at Malinta church. Distance traveled, about 6 miles.

At about 9 a. m., March 27, the company broke camp and marched to Meycauayan, where it camped for the night. Distance traveled, about 3 miles.

At 4 p. m., March 28, broke camp and marched to Marilao, camping for the night. Distance, 2 miles.

At 8 a. m., March 29, broke camp and marched to Bocaue, camping there for the nights of March 29 and 30. Distance traveled, about 3 miles.

At 8.30 a. m., March 31, broke camp and marched to Bigaa, camping there for the night. Distance traveled, about 2 miles.

The casualties for the period were, none killed, 2 wounded, none missing.

Very respectfully,

R. B. PARROTT,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company E.

MANILA, P. I., April 4, 1899.

Capt. B. C. LOCKWOOD,
*Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion,
Twenty-second Infantry.*

SIR: Pursuant to instructions received this day, I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements, battles, and engagements participated in by Company G, Twenty-second Infantry, as part of Second Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, during the period from March 24 to March 31, 1899, both dates inclusive.

Left barracks at Manila, as part of Second Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, March 24, 1899, about 7 a. m. Marched about 6 miles and went into camp at Calocan, occupying trenches vacated by Montana Volunteer Infantry.

Left trenches about 6 a. m. March 25, 1899. Battalion advanced on the enemy. Company was in the reserve until 12 m.; then engaged enemy intrenched across river. Firing continued until nightfall. Casualties: One private (Bert E. Clough) wounded as trenches were left. Camped for night along Dagupan Railroad.

Broke camp about 8 a. m. March 26, 1899, and moved to the right across river, acting as reserve for right wing of regiment. Enemy engaged at Malinto Hill, driven from their position by a charge. Camped for the night at Malinto Church. Distance marched about 6 miles.

Broke camp about 9 a. m. March 27, 1899, and marched to Meycauayan, where we camped for the night. Distance, about 3 miles.

Broke camp about 4 p. m. March 28, 1899, and marched to Marilao, where camped for night. Distance, about 2 miles.

Broke camp about 8 a. m. Marched to Bocaue. Camped night of March 30, 1899.

Broke camp about 3 p. m., March 30, 1899. Moved back across river, camping near railroad bridge, battalion acting as guard for divisional wagon train.

Broke camp about 8.30 a. m. March 31, 1899. Recrossed river and marched to Bigaa. Camped for night. Distance, about 2 miles.

No further casualties occurred.

Very respectfully,

T. W. MOORE,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company G.

MALATE, *Nipa Barracks.*

On March 24 the company proceeded with the regiment to Caloocan and occupied the trenches vacated by the Montana regiment at 6.15 a. m. On the 25th Company D, on the left of Company M, advanced to protect the left of the Third Artillery. It advanced within 600 yards of the enemy's trenches, losing 2 privates wounded, namely, George C. Richards and Nicholas Gearin. The company then moved forward with the regiment till it came to the Tausa River. Moving down the river by the left flank, found the enemy intrenched across the river near railroad bridge. The company took up position on right of battalion and kept up a desultory fire till after dark; range, 300 yards. Private Ira W. Cox became exhausted from heat and loss of blood from his lungs and was sent to the hospital. That night company retained offensive position till next morning, March 26, then moved with regiment upstream $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, crossed the Tausa River, and moved down river and struck the enemy's trenches in flank, causing the enemy to retreat. At this time I turned the command of Company D over to Lieutenant Campbell on account of sickness.

Very respectfully,

ISAAC NEWELL,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry.

On March 26, about 9 o'clock, Lieutenant Newell turned the command of Company D, Twenty-second Infantry, over to me on account of sickness, and the company was moved on until it was about 100 yards from the railroad, where it remained until the advance on Malinta, when it moved forward in support of the First Battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry. After the town was taken the company moved to the left as far as the river and then forward along the river bank about 900 yards, then returned to Malinta, where we camped. The next day we moved forward with the regiment, which with the rest of General Wheaton's brigade, was in support of General MacArthur's division, as far as Meycauayan, where we camped that night, and the next day about 2 o'clock moved forward to Bocaue, and again went into camp. About 10 o'clock the next morning we moved forward in support of the firing line as far as Bigaa, where the regiment camped for the night. The next three days the company stayed at Bigaa as a guard for the wagon train. The next move was to Bulacan, where the company stayed as a guard to the wagon train until April 2, when we were ordered to our barracks, arriving at latter place about 9 o'clock that night.

Very respectfully,

H. R. CAMPBELL,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry.

NIPA BARRACKS, *Manila, P. I., April 5, 1899.*

Capt. B. C. LOCKWOOD,

Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion.

SIR: In pursuance of orders, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the part taken by Company M, Second Battalion U. S. Infantry, in the operations against the enemy from March 27 to April 3, 1899, inclusive.

On the order of commanding officer of the regiment I reported to you at the town of Polo at about 10 o'clock a. m., March 27, and in compliance with your order, assumed command of Company M, and, together with the rest of the battalion, moved to the right beyond the railroad to a stream in that vicinity, being deployed in line of skirmishers and on the right of the battalion which was on the right of the regiment. After a halt of about thirty minutes at the river mentioned, and the enemy to the railroad and proceeded thereon to Meycauayan, where dinner and supper were not appearing in any force, the company moved with the battalion by the left flank eaten, and the battalion with the remainder of the regiment, bivouacked for the night. While at Meycauayan on this date, by your direction I sent Sergeant Gregg and 20 men to the northeast of the railroad to gather up insurgent wounded. They found and brought in 9 wounded and reported having found 19 dead.

The company with the regiment remained at Meycauayan until about 4 o'clock p. m., March 28, when it proceeded to Marilao and bivouacked for the night.

March 29 the company with the battalion and regiment broke camp and moved at 8 o'clock a. m. to a point about midway between Bocaue and Bigaa, where the Dagupan Railway crosses a river, and bivouacked for the night on the north bank of the

river just west of the railroad. March 30, the battalion being left as guard for the wagon train, while the rest of the regiment moved forward toward Malolos, Company M remained with the battalion in the camp of the preceding night until about 4 p. m., when it moved with the battalion back to the opposite side of the stream and camped there for the night.

March 31 camp was broken at 7 a. m. and the company with the battalion marched as guard to the wagon train to the bank of the river opposite church and monastery of Bigaa and bivouacked.

April 1 camp was broken at daylight and Company M was, under your orders and direction, ferried across the river to the monastery of Bigaa and then ferried the wagon train of our regiment and Third Artillery across. The balance of the battalion also crossing the stream, it proceeded with the train to a point about 2 miles beyond the river, when orders being received from the front to return, it turned back to the monastery and cathedral at Bigaa and bivouacked for the remainder of the day and that night, Company M occupying the monastery.

April 2 reveille was sounded at 4.30 a. m., and immediately after breakfast, under your orders I reported to First Lieut. Wilson Chase, quartermaster, Twenty-second Infantry, as guard for the regimental train; ferried it back across the river and proceeded to about a quarter of a mile south of Caloocan, arriving there about 10 o'clock that night after a march of about 15 miles, and encamped for the night. Dinner was eaten that day at a point midway between Bocaue and Marilao, and supper at Tinajeros.

April 3 the company broke camp at daybreak and marched to its barracks, arriving here at about 10.30 a. m., when I reported and turned the company over to Capt. J. F. Kreps upon order of commanding officer.

Sergeant Neberoth, Corporal Cole, and Privates Dean and Roof broke down during the return march, all except Private Dean being sufferers from Cuban fever; Private Dean suffered from dysentery. The rest of the members of the company stood the march fairly well.

Very respectfully submitted.

I. W. LEONARD,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry.

NIPA BARRACKS, Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT TWENTY-SECOND U. S. INFANTRY,
Nipa Barracks, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of the Third Battalion, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, in the recent advance on Malolos.

The battalion left Nipa Barracks about 7.15 a. m., March 24, 1899, taking the advance of the Twenty-second Infantry. The command moved to within 1 mile of Caloocan, where it rested until dusk, when it took up the march and moved to the trenches in front of Caloocan, the battalion taking position on the left of the regiment, joining on the right of the Oregon regiment in the angle at this part of the line. On the following morning the battalion moved out of the trenches, taking up the march with the troops on the right. This movement was about 8 a. m.

Previously to leaving the trenches Lieut. H. L. Jackson, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding Company C, Twenty-second Infantry, was seriously wounded by a shot from the enemy's line. He was immediately sent to the rear, and I directed Lieutenant Murphy, acting adjutant, to take charge of the company.

After moving forward about one-half mile a staff officer of General Wheaton's staff detached Company H (Captain Hodges) to move forward and take the railroad embankment in front. This company, afterwards becoming separated from the command, joined in with the Oregon regiment, where it did excellent service with the volunteers.

Subsequently Companies B and C moved up to the line of the railroad and took position. Company B, on the left, had a very effective fire on the enemy, which was firing on the Oregon regiment from the woods in front. Company L soon after this moved up and took position on this line, and in doing so Private Hunsicker, Company L, Twenty-second Infantry, was seriously wounded.

About 9.30 a. m. the battalion was ordered forward to the river on left of the railroad. Here it encountered the enemy, who was occupying a fort on the line of the railroad, about 1,500 yards back from the river. In front of this, and about half the distance from the fort to the river, the enemy was also discovered well intrenched. There was also another farther to the left and rear. From these the enemy kept up an incessant fire nearly all day on the command, the battalion replying at intervals.

At dark the battalion was ordered to join the regiment about 500 yards to the rear, where it rested for the night.

On the morning of the 26th, at 7 a. m., the command was ordered to the right, and while waiting to get position in column, Private Dunlap, Company L, Twenty-second Infantry, was wounded in the hand. After having marched about 1 mile the command crossed the river, the water being over waist deep. After crossing, the command was formed in line of squads, facing west, the left of the battalion touching on the river, and the objective being the railroad, the First Battalion on the right and the Second Battalion and part of the Twenty-third Infantry following in reserve.

In this position the troops were moved forward to the railroad, the ground being almost impassable on account of the swamps and dense brush. After a great deal of difficulty the railroad was reached, the enemy retreating hastily to the rear. Having rested a few minutes here, the regimental commander (Colonel Egbert) came up in person and directed me to change direction to the right and move forward to the wood in front and take position on the right of the First Battalion.

In front was a place called Malinta, which was held by the enemy and well intrenched; distance to these trenches about 1,500 yards.

Soon firing was heard on the left of the regiment, the enemy keeping up a constant fire, bullets falling quite thick among the men of the Third Battalion. I could hear cheering by our men on the left as they were charging the enemy. Company L, Twenty-second Infantry, Lieutenant Wolfe commanding, being in the open ground on the left, joined in the charge, losing his first sergeant, Charles F. Brooke, Twenty-second Infantry.

On account of the dense brush the balance of the command had no open fire to the front and did not fire a shot on this part of the line.

Captain Hodges went forward with a few scouts to reconnoiter the ground; shortly after he signaled to move forward as he had found open ground.

At the time of the firing on the left heavy firing was heard on our right, which proved to be from the Third Artillery. During this advance First Lieut. Patrick J. Byrne, Company B, Twenty-second Infantry, was wounded in the leg. The command rested at Malinta for the night.

On the morning of the 27th the battalion moved at 6 o'clock a. m. along the railroad in the direction of Meycauayan; Company B, of the battalion, was detached to march on the railroad track.

The battalion reached the town at 4.30 p. m. Captain Hodges with his company was detached to guard the town.

The 28th, 29th, and 30th was occupied by the battalion in moving forward slowly as part of the rear guard for General MacArthur's division.

On the morning of the 31st the regiment moved forward in line of skirmishes on the left of the railroad, the Third Battalion in support of the First Montana and Twentieth Kansas regiments. In this position the command entered Malolos without opposition.

The command remained in camp here until the 2d of April, 1899, when it was ordered to proceed to its barracks in Malate.

The greater part of the Twenty-second Infantry at the time of its arrival here was composed of recruits, about 70 per cent averaging about three months' service. The old men could not be relied upon for the reason that they had contracted malaria in Cuba and had to be constantly sent to the rear. This was also the case among the officers. But as far as the action of the recruits on the firing line is concerned, it could hardly be surpassed. All they require is more drill and instruction in guard duty, and I have no doubt but they will soon become excellent soldiers. There was an average of one officer to a company in the Third Battalion, and the work of the company commanders was incessantly hard.

In this connection I desire to commend Capt. H. C. Hodges, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding Company H; First Lieut. O. R. Wolfe, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding Company L; Second Lieut. Charles A. Bridges, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding Company C; Second Lieut. David L. Stone, Twenty-second Infantry, commanding Company B; also the acting adjutant, Second Lieut. Charles N. Murphy, Twenty-second Infantry, for their efficiency and ability displayed during this campaign.

Reports of company commanders herewith inclosed.

Very respectfully,

W. H. KELL,
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

514 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY

NIPA BARRACKS, NIPA, P. I., April 2.
ASSISTANT THIRD BATTAL, TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY.

MARCH, P. I.

The following is a report of the operations of C. H. Twenty-second Infantry, from March 24 to April 2, 1899.

The company, as part of the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, I. Barracks at Nipa, P. I., on March 24, 1899, and marched through Manila the next morning, March 25, 1899, and there halted and remained until dark when the company was marched to Caloocan Church, taking position right of the church in trenches occupied by the First Montana Volunteer Infantry.

The company passed in position two nights about 900 yards in advance trenches. No movement on the part of the insurgents during the night.

On March 25, 1899, the company was active early. At 5 o'clock a. m. it came to the front of the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry. At 9 o'clock the company was ordered to the left directly to the railway embankment and the trenches of the insurgents, protecting the approaches to Malabon from the station. Immediately executed the order. On moving beyond the railway track a strong line of trenches from which the insurgents had already been driven I reached the position occupied by the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry engaged with the enemy entrenched at the edge of bamboo thicket about 800 yards away. As the entire available space was occupied by the Oregon regiment, my company could not be used to extend the firing line, so my company relieved a company of the Oregon regiment temporarily, and for a time practically, with the exception of a company on the left, alone continued the fire against the insurgents. The Oregon regiment prepared to charge the trenches. During this engagement Albert E. Axt was wounded in the left forearm and Private Fritz Herter was by a bullet at the right wrist. The surgeon of the Oregon regiment treated them. Private Herter rejoined his company almost immediately. When the regiment charged the insurgent trenches my company was moved forward in and after the trenches were taken was moved to the right and joined the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, and remained near the railway on the bank stream north of Malabon the remainder of the day. At dusk the battalion moved to the position held by the artillery on the railway track.

March 26, 1899.—The company, as part of its battalion, was moved about 1 mile east of its bivouac, to a ford of the river, crossed the river, and then returned to the railroad track. A sharp but short fire was opened on us from near Malinta. During the advance on Malinta and during the attack the company was in the woods to the right of the railway track and exposed at times to sharp fire, but not able to reply to it. The company bivouacked at Malinta.

March 27, 1899.—Marched along the road from Malinta to the railway at Meycauayan. At 7 o'clock p. m. my company was ordered to cross the river, Meycauayan and take necessary steps to repel any possible attack from that direction. This was done. The main body was placed between the cathedral and the and outposts properly disposed. No alarm of any kind.

March 28, 1899.—Patrols and two small outposts and a guard at the bridge continued. At 4 p. m. the company was ordered to join the battalion on the river. Bivouacked at Maricao; 2 miles.

March 29, 1899.—Marched along the railway track to a point a short distance beyond; 5 miles.

March 30, 1899.—Marched along the railway track to a point about 1 mile Guiguinto. At 5.15 p. m. was directed to take my company and establish it 1,000 yards to the northeast of the bivouac of the regiment. This was done. C were placed about 600 yards beyond the bivouac of the company.

March 31, 1899.—At 1.45 a. m. orders were received from the battalion commander for the company to rejoin the battalion, and ready to march at 4.30 a. m. They were aroused in time to prepare their breakfast. The company left its bivouac at 4.15 a. m. and was reported to the battalion commander at 4.30 a. m. At 6 a. m. marched. This company was deployed as the right company of the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, and formed part of the reserve.

In the movement on Malolos no difficulty of any kind was encountered by the company except such as arose from endeavoring to penetrate bamboo thickets time to time. Such an obstacle was particularly difficult immediately before Malolos. After capture of Malolos a bivouac was selected near the railway track.

April 1, 1899.—Remained in camp.

April 2, 1899.—Left camp at 8.15 a. m., marched one-half mile, and boarded for Manila. Reached Nipa Barracks 1.30 p. m.

Very respectfully,

H. C. HOBBS, JR.
Captain, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company

NIPA BARRACKS, *Manila, P. I.*, April 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT THIRD BATTALION.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a full report of Company L, Twenty-second Infantry, in the late campaign, from March 24, 1899, to April 2, 1899.

We left Nipa Barracks at 7 a. m. March 24 and marched 7 miles north of Manila, where we rested with the regiment until dusk; then marched 2 miles, camping in the trenches by Caloocan. We broke camp on the morning of March 25, and forming a line as skirmishers, acting as a reserve, we advanced on Malabon, where we had an engagement, with 1 man wounded. We then camped for the night north of Malabon on railroad track.

Breaking camp on the morning of March 26, we had 1 more wounded. Then we forded the river Bonsauga and charged on the enemy's trenches at Malinta, with 1 man killed. We then went into camp at the above place for the night.

March 27, broke camp at 8 a. m., marching from Malinta to Meycauayan (as reserve), a distance of about 6 miles; then went into camp.

March 28, left camp at 4 a. m., marching 2 miles; we camped at Marilao.

March 29, marched out of Marilao at 8 a. m. and camped for the night near Banco.

March 30, moved up the railroad, throwing out Third Battalion as skirmishers, and camped for the night about 3 miles north of Malolos.

March 31, broke camp at 4.30 a. m., still acting as a reserve; we marched into Malolos at 11.30 a. m., camping in outskirts of city, opposite railroad depot.

April 1 made no move, but still remained in camp opposite depot. On the morning of April 2 broke camp at 8 a. m., with orders to proceed by rail to Nipa Barracks, Manila, P. I., where we arrived at 2 p. m. same day and date.

Very respectfully,

ORRIN R. WOLFE,

First Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company L.

NIPA BARRACKS, *Manila, P. I.*, April 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT THIRD BATTALION, TWENTY-SECOND INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Company B, Twenty-second Infantry, from March 24, 1899, to April 2, 1899, inclusive:

The company, as part of the Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, left Nipa Barracks, Manila, P. I., at 7.15 a. m., March 24, 1899, and marched north to within 1 mile of Caloocan and there halted and remained until dusk, when the battalion advanced and took position in the trenches near Caloocan Church, relieving the First Montana Volunteer Infantry. Company B's position was in the left center of the battalion.

The trenches of the insurgents were about 600 yards distant and their voices could be plainly heard, but excepting some desultory firing they gave no trouble during the night.

About 6 o'clock the next morning (the 25th) quite a brisk fire was opened from the trenches of the insurgents, but no one in the company was hurt.

About 8 o'clock on the morning of the 25th the battalion moved out of the trenches and advanced toward the enemy. When about 400 yards from our trenches Private George C. Miller was wounded, the bullet passing through both legs. His wounds were immediately bandaged by members of the company and he was sent back to the dressing station.

The enemy were now in intrenchments in the edge of the woods on the left of the railroad, and were being engaged in the front by Company H, Twenty-second Infantry, and the Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. I was ordered by Captain Kell, commanding the Third Battalion, to take my company along the railroad and find a place from which a flank fire could be opened upon the insurgents. An admirable position was found and the company was able to open a very effective fire from the left flank of the insurgents, who were in the edge of the woods and were using black powder and were consequently a very plain target. After a short time the firing from the woods ceased, and I was ordered to join my battalion, which I did. Nothing further happened that day and at night we camped near the railroad north of Malabon.

March 26, 1899, the company, as part of the battalion forded the river about 1 mile from the railroad and advanced upon the insurgents, who were strongly intrenched at Malinta. The company was obliged to pass through woods and underbrush, and at times was exposed to a very heavy fire, but was unable to reply to it. At one time they had to pull down a bamboo fence under a heavy fire, and here First Sergt.

Patrick J. Byrne was wounded in the leg and was immediately cared for by the Hospital Corps. The company was cool and strictly attentive to orders throughout. I desire to mention the strict performance of duty and efficient work of First Sergt. Patrick J. Byrne, Sergt. Michael O'Flaherty, Sergt. George Charlton, Sergt. John Nelson, and Sergt. Archie Dubarry, all of Company B, Twenty-second Infantry.

The days of March 27, 28, 29, and 30 were spent in marching by slow stages toward Malolos. In the movement on Malolos on March 31, 1899, the company as part of the battalion was deployed as the left company and formed part of the reserve. No opposition was encountered in this movement and the company as part of the regiment entered the town and camped just outside the town until April 2, when the battalion returned to Manila by train.

Very respectfully,

DAVID L. STONE,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company B.

MANILA, P. I.

BATTALION ADJUTANT, *Third Battalion Twenty-second Infantry.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of Company C, Twenty-second Infantry, from March 24 to April 2, 1899:

Company C, Twenty-second Infantry, left Nipa Barracks with the regiment March 24, 1899, and marched to Caloocan; distance marched, about 9 miles. Before arriving at Caloocan a halt was made until about dusk, when the regiment moved up to trenches outside of Caloocan and there took position, relieving the Montana regiment, Company C taking position on the extreme left.

March 25, 1899, First Lieut. H. L. Jackson, commanding Company C, wounded; this at about 5 o'clock a. m., and I was attached to command the company. Moved out of trenches with command and received fire from enemy on the left. Moved out by left flank and took position on railroad track and opened fire on enemy. Marched forward with Third Battalion about 2 miles on railroad track and went to bank of river with Third Battalion; opened fire on enemy, who were in a block-house. Remained with battalion on river bank all day, and about dusk withdrew about a quarter of a mile and camped for night.

March 26, 1899, marched about 2 miles up river with regiment, crossed river and moved to railroad track. The direction was then changed to right, and Company C was on extreme right of Third Battalion, which occupied position on right of regiment. Moved through dense growth of brush and bamboo, under constant fire, to road leading to Malinta, which position the Second Battalion charged and carried; about the same time the Third Battalion arrived on road. Regiment bivouacked at Malinta for night. Outposts were placed in advance and on flanks of battalion. Nothing occurred during night.

March 27, 1899, marched along road from Malinta to Meycauayan and bivouacked here for night.

March 28, 1899, Lieutenant Bridges took command of company. Remained in camp at Meycauayan until 4 o'clock p. m., when regiment marched 2 miles and bivouacked at Marilao.

March 29, 1899, marched on the railroad track about 6 miles to the town of Bocaue and bivouacked there.

March 30, 1899, marched along track through town of Guiguinto and bivouacked about 2 miles beyond this place. At about 5.30 p. m., when camp for night was being prepared, report came in that the enemy had advanced and were occupying trenches about 200 yards on left. The regiment deployed as skirmishers, Company C occupying right of Third Battalion, and moved about a mile in direction the enemy was supposed to be, but encountered nothing. Marched back to camp.

March 31, 1899, Lieutenant Bridges relieved, and I again assumed command of company. Company C was deployed as left center company of Third Battalion, Twenty-second Infantry, and formed part of the reserve in the movement on Malolos. No resistance was offered at Malolos, and after the capture of the town this company bivouacked with regiment near railroad track just outside of town.

April 1, 1899, remained in camp.

April 2, 1899, left camp at about 9 o'clock a. m.; marched about three-fourths of a mile and took train for Manila. Marched about 2 miles from depot to Nipa Barracks, arriving at about 1.30 p. m.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. N. MURPHY,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Company C.

APPENDIX 35.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND OREGON INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
In the Field, Malinta, P. I., April 10. 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Malolos, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from March 24 to 31, 1899, inclusive:

In compliance with written instructions of the brigade commander, dated March 23, 1899, field, staff, noncommissioned staff, First Battalion, Maj. Percy Willis, commanding; Company B, Capt. John C. May, commanding, First Lieut. Frank B. Hamlin, Second Lieut. E. Thornton, and 81 men; Company E, Capt. R. E. Davis, commanding, First Lieut. T. N. Dunbar and Second Lieut. M. S. Jameson, and 67 men; Company I, First Lieut. M. D. Phillips, commanding, Second Lieut. J. U. Campbell, 77 men; Company M, Capt. J. M. Poorman, commanding, First Lieut. W. E. Finzer, and Second Lieut. C. R. Platts, 79 men; Second Battalion, Maj. P. G. Eastwick, jr., commanding; Company C, Capt. W. S. Moon, commanding, First Lieut. R. S. Huston, 78 men; Company F, Capt. J. F. Case, commanding, First Lieut. Edwin Grimm and Second Lieut. C. H. Muesdorffer, jr., 73 men; Company G, Capt. R. H. Barber, commanding, Second Lieut. D. J. Sutton, 74 men; Company K, Capt. E. O. Warrick, commanding, Second Lieut. C. A. Murphy, 80 men; Third Battalion, Capt. H. L. Heath, commanding; Company A, First Lieut. F. S. Kelly, commanding, Second Lieut. J. A. Young, 84 men; Company D, Capt. A. F. Prescott, commanding, First Lieut. George A. Hartman, jr., 76 men; Company L, Capt. H. C. Wells, commanding, First Lieut. Geo. F. Telfer, 69 men; Hospital detachment, U. S. Hospital Corps, First Lieut. C. F. de May, 9 men, and wagon train, left Camp Hughes at 7.30 o'clock a. m. on the morning of March 24, 1899, and marched to Caloocan, a distance of about 5 miles, arriving at 9.30 a. m. At nightfall companies entered the trenches and remained during the night, relieving the Twentieth Kansas U. S. Volunteers, March 25, 1899.

March 25, 1899, after receiving instructions from the brigade commander, left trenches at 8.30 o'clock a. m., forming a skirmish line on the extreme left of the line, the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry being on the right, and advanced upon the enemy. Were met by very hot fire and resistance on the part of the enemy from all sides and from Malabon. Took trenches by successive charges and rushes, and drove the enemy in disorder across the Tuliahan River, east of Malabon. During the advance, Company G, Lieutenant Hannay commanding, and Company M, Captain Day, commanding, Third U. S. Infantry, and one company of the First Montana U. S. Volunteer Infantry, reported to me on the line for duty, and remained with my command during the evening, doing excellent service. Arriving at the river the line was extended from the causeway leading into Malabon on the left, to the right of the stone bridge across the Tuliahan River on the right, Companies A, L, and D, on the left, throwing up intrenchments. During the day a continual fire was kept up by the insurgent sharpshooters in and about Tinajeros and from Malabon trenches on the left. At this point was stationed a revolving Hotchkiss cannon, under charge of Corporal Dusenberry, Utah Battery, to whom too much praise can not be given for the excellent work and execution done by him. Toward evening the fire from the enemy was silenced, and, in accordance with instructions, bivouacked for the night. Distance traveled, 2 miles.

The following morning, in compliance with instructions, regiment crossed the river and entered Tinajeros, and forming line of skirmishers, facing toward Polo and Obando, with the Third Battalion as reserve, advanced about 1,000 yards and awaited orders. At 11 o'clock a. m., in compliance with orders, the line was advanced parallel with road leading to Bulacan; here the enemy was encountered, very strongly intrenched in a series of trenches, which were taken by successive charges in face of a hot fire from the enemy in front, a flank fire on the right from across the Tuliahan River, and also from trenches about 1,500 to 2,000 yards on the left flank north of Malabon, covered by heavy bamboo thickets. Enemy were entirely dislodged, and retreated in disorder toward Bulacan and Polo. There being no enemy in front of us, returned, under orders, to Malinta, and went into camp, arriving at 4.30 o'clock p. m. Distance traveled, about 7 miles. The enemy estimated at about 2,500 to 3,000, and their loss in killed and wounded was considerable.

After the advance upon the enemy was commenced, Prince Lowenstein (with companion) was found mortally wounded inside insurgent lines taken by our forces, having previously passed through our lines; was warned by commanding officer not to go farther than advance guard, but insisted upon going. When warned by the commanding officer that he went at his own peril and risk, replied that he understood so, and that he went at his own risk.

March 27, 1899.—Companies A, L, and M took station at Caloocan and performed train-guard duty, the remaining companies remaining in camp at Malinta.

March 28, 1899.—Companies D and E, Captain Prescott commanding, took station at Malabon, and performed guard and patrol duty.

Major Willis, in command of Company I (Lieutenant Phillips), and one platoon of Company B (Captain May) left camp at 8 o'clock a. m., and marched north to Polo, entering from the east over stone bridge. Passed through Polo to Obando Church, marched south on Malabon road 1 mile and turned west, crossing several sloughs on bamboo bridges, and entered Malabon from the north; large buildings in the southern part of town were burning. Many natives and Chinese in city. On leaving city, marched southwest on causeway leading to Caloocan. One section (20 feet) of stone bridge destroyed, causeway cut in places, and trenches thrown up. Returned to camp at 3.45 p. m. Distance traveled, about 12 miles.

Major Eastwick, in command of Company C (Captain Moon), and one platoon of Company G (Lieutenant Sutton) left camp at 8.30 a. m. Marched east about 2 miles; country deserted, with the exception of a few old men and women. At a point about 2 miles from camp, advance guard sighted a number of natives carrying bundles and going northeast. Were fired upon on refusing to halt. After going east, moved in column of files northwest, captured two natives with knives. Formed in skirmish line and advanced 2 miles north and northwest, crossing railroad, and returned through Polo district, arriving at 12.35 p. m. Distance traveled, about 6 miles. No casualties.

March 29, 1899.—Major Willis's battalion, Companies B and I, left camp at 1.05 p. m. and marched northeast about 5 miles, from which point many natives—women, children, and some men, (a few in uniform) were seen going north. Formed skirmish line and turned west. Natives scattered in all directions. Traveled west $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles; then southwest $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to near railroad bridge; then south on railroad, arriving at camp at 8 o'clock p. m. Distance traveled, $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Eleven prisoners captured. No casualties.

March 30 and 31, 1899.—Different companies of the regiment retained relative positions of preceding day, performing guard, outpost, and patrol duty.

In concluding this, my report, I wish to respectfully call your attention to the great appreciation of myself toward every officer and member of my command for their strict compliance with orders and the successful termination of every duty assigned to them. It would be impossible for me at this time to make any specific mention of any officer or member of my regiment for any conspicuous bravery or actions during these several engagements, as every one proved equal to the tasks assigned them and performed them to the very best of their ability. However, I will have communications sent to the commanding officers of the several organizations of this regiment and ask them for their report on any meritorious cases of conspicuous bravery while in action, and will forward the same to you if, in my judgment, they are worthy of your consideration.

Respectfully,

O. SCHMERS,
Colonel Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. A.

Casualties.—March 25, 1899: Birt J. Clark, private, Company A, killed; William A. Cook, private, Company D, killed; Guy Millard, private, Company L, killed; L. V. Strawderman, private, Company L, killed; H. B. Taylor, private, Company L, killed; H. K. Wells, captain Company L, wounded in stomach by spent ball; A. J. Brazee, first lieutenant Company E, and battalion adjutant, wounded in left forearm; George C. Snyder, private, Company A, wounded in upper right chest; Frank H. Thompson, private, Company A, wounded in head; William B. Ungerman, private, Company A, wounded in scrotum and right thigh; Herman P. Adams, private, Company B, wounded below heart; William J. Armitage, private, Company B, wounded in arm; Elvin J. Crawford, wagoner, Company C, wounded in head; Bert B. Chandler, private, Company C, wounded in head; Earl Mount, private, Company C, wounded in right arm; Elmer C. Roberts, private, Company C, wounded in right side; James E. Snodgrass, private, Company C, wounded in right knee; James West, first sergeant Company D, wounded in right arm and left leg; Lee A. Morelock, sergeant, Company D, wounded in left foot; J. C. Headlie, private, Company D, wounded in right arm and upper chest; W. E. Searey, private, Company D, wounded through both buttocks; Asa L. Roberts, corporal, Company D, wounded in left ankle; John E. Davis, private, Company E, wounded in left shoulder; Jacob N. Smith, private, Company E, wounded in head; Charles Ruedy, private, Company F, wounded in head; Charles A. Marcy, private, Company G, wounded in right side; Albert N. Jordan, private, Company G,

wounded in both legs; Eugene Sampson, private, Company G, wounded in right arm; George Eichhamer, private, Company G, wounded in abdomen; George W. Spicer, private, Company G, wounded in upper jaw; Rudolph Gantenbein, corporal, Company I, wounded in right leg; Ray L. Antrim, private, Company K, wounded in left leg; Emmet L. Jones, private, Company K, wounded in back; John Jensen, private, Company K, wounded in left thigh; William F. Schwarz, private, Company K, wounded in left shoulder; W. W. Wilson, sergeant, Company L, wounded in right hand; Guy N. Saunders, private, Company L, wounded in right arm and neck; C. E. Saunders, private, Company L, wounded in left leg; Charles R. Rubart, private, Company L, wounded in right leg; W. T. Allen, private, Company L, wounded in thigh; B. F. Dunseth, private, Company L, wounded in right foot; John A. Bailey, private, Company L, wounded in right arm and hand; Frank E. Adams, private, Company L, wounded in right side; Brady F. Burnett, corporal, Company M, wounded in right shoulder; L. H. Holland, corporal, Company M, wounded in left shoulder; John Blosser, private, Company M, wounded in back side of face; Emmet Casper, private, Company M, wounded in right foot; A. J. Galiff, private, Company M, wounded in right arm; Ed. J. Colgan, quartermaster-sergeant Company K, injured in leg by piece of bursting shell striking leg; Edward Jaques, private, Company M, injured in left hand by rifle exploding.

March 26, 1899: Leo B. Grace, private, Company A, wounded in neck; Frank Woodruff, private, Company C, wounded in left heel; Richard E. Brickdale, jr., private, Company F, wounded in left leg; E. C. Thornton, private, Company G, wounded in left hand; Frank E. Edwards, corporal, Company M, wounded through both legs; Daniel C. Bowman, private, Company D, injured in hand by accidental discharge of rifle.

APPENDIX 36.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, April 8, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from the division commander, I have the honor to submit the following report of artillery operations in this division during the month of March, 1899:

Artillery in the division: Battalion Utah Light Artillery, Maj. R. W. Young, commanding, composed of Batteries A (Wedgwood's) and B (Grant's, temporarily commanded by Lieutenant Critchlow); one platoon Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery (Dyer's), Lieut. A. S. Fleming, U. S. A., commanding; detachment U. S. Marines (with Colt's gun), Ensign C. Davis, U. S. N., commanding.

Ordnance in use: Ten 3.2-inch B. L. steel rifles; one 3.6-inch B. L. steel mortar; three .50-caliber Gatling guns; four 57-millimeter Maxim-Nordenfelts (Spanish); three Hotchkiss revolving cannon; one Colt's automatic gun, caliber 6 millimeter. Total 22.

At the beginning of and during the principal part of the month, all the guns enumerated were in position on the Second Division lines, extending from the pumping station near Santalon, on the right, to Caloocan on the left; Battery A, Utah Volunteers, occupying the right, and Battery B, Utah Volunteers, and the platoon, Sixth Artillery, and the Colt's gun, the left of the line.

The reports of Captain Wedgwood, Lieutenants Gibbs, Critchlow, Naylor, Seaman and Hines, of the Utah Artillery, and of Lieutenant Fleming, Sixth Artillery, and Ensign Davis, U. S. N., are appended. Owing to my unfamiliarity with the operations covered by some of these reports, and the fact that the operations in which I participated are thoroughly covered by others, I consider it both unnecessary and undesirable for me to make this report in detail.

During the month my personal headquarters were at Caloocan, but I frequently visited other detachments along the lines. I was in charge of the artillery on the expedition to Malolos, and personally selected the site and superintended the firing in every instance in which any part of the artillery went into action.

I am able to state, as in preceding reports, that it has been the almost invariable rule that the artillery has been advanced to and frequently beyond the infantry skirmish lines, and has been used at ranges (notably at the Tuliahan and Marilao rivers) usually deemed impracticably close for artillery. In no instance during the advance to Malolos, save at the railway crossing near Malolos, was the artillery screened by sandbags or fieldworks.

The first movement was made on March 5. One Hotchkiss revolving cannon was moved on the Mariquina road for a distance of about 2 miles, the other to San Juan del Monte Church. Neither went into action, and were returned to their post at Deposito.

During the day twelve shots (7 shell and 5 shrapnel) were fired with 3.2-inch rifles, stationed at the pumping station, for the purpose of silencing sharpshooters annoying our outposts on the Mariquina road and our own men at position of gun. During the evening firing on the outposts at the Mariquina road was renewed and two 3.2-inch rifles were removed to the intrenchments on the top of the hill commanding the position of the Nebraska troops to the rear and the right and left flank. At daybreak on the morning of the 6th, the insurgents attacked on the Mariquina road, and one 3.2-inch rifle, under the immediate command of Sergeant Fisher, was

General Wheaton spoke to me in very flattering terms of the excellent service rendered by Corp'l. Harvey Du-enberry, Battery B, Utah Artillery, and his detachment, who were with a Hotchkiss revolving cannon, brought from Calocan to Malolos, in company with the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; also of the valuable service rendered by Lieut. G. A. Seaman and his platoon at the railway crossing of the Tuliahan. General Hale describes the services rendered by Lieut R. C. Naylor's platoon near San Francisco del Monte, March 25, as very creditable and effective.

There were but 3 casualties during the month—one serious and two light wounds—in Battery B, Utah Artillery, a remarkably low percentage in view of the frequent and close exposure of the cannoneers.

Total rounds fired during the month, approximately, 1,000.

I desire to record my judgment that the services of Lieutenants Critchlow and Fleming and of Ensign Davis, who were under my personal observation, have been marked by professional skill, judgment, and personal bravery of the highest order. That the services of the other officers of the command have been of a similar character appears certain in view of the flattering tributes from commanding and other officers who have served with them. The men of the several detachments, almost without exception, have performed their duties ably, cheerfully, and unflinchingly.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICHARD W. YOUNG,
Major Utah Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

PUMPING STATION, April 2, 1899.

Maj. R. W. Young,
Commanding Battalion Utah Volunteer Artillery.

Sir: In accordance with your telegraphic request I herewith submit a report of the operations of the two 3.2-inch guns, two Nordenfelts, stationed at pumping station, and two Hotchkiss revolving cannon and two Gatling guns stationed at Deposito.

The first movement was made on March 5. One Hotchkiss revolving cannon was moved on the Mariquina road for a distance of about 2 miles, the other to San Juan del Monte Church. Neither went into action, and were returned to their post at Deposito.

During the day twelve shots (7 shell and 5 shrapnel) were fired with 3.2-inch rifles, stationed at the pumping station, for the purpose of silencing sharpshooters annoying our outposts on the Mariquina road and our own men at position of gun.

During the evening firing on the outposts at the Mariquina road was renewed and two 3.2-inch rifles were removed to the intrenchments on the top of the hill commanding the position of the Nebraska troops to the rear and the right and left flank.

At daybreak on the morning of the 6th, the insurgents attacked on the Mariquina road, and one 3.2-inch rifle, under the immediate command of Sergeant Fisher, was

moved forward. The enemy was in considerable numbers and contested the ground very strongly, but were driven from their position and pursued for some distance by the middle of the forenoon. The gun did excellent work and was of great assistance in dislodging the enemy from their position of great natural strength among the rocks.

While this engagement was in progress the other 3.2-inch rifle was moved back to its regular position facing pumping station, and, together with Nordenfelts, shelled the position occupied by the left flank of the enemy.

While the engagement on the left was in progress an attack was made upon the right. The firing was heavy and one Nordenfelt was taken to a position near the infantry line, commanding the bamboo thickets along which the enemy was moving, apparently to gain a position in our rear. Going immediately into action, the further progress of the enemy was checked and their fire silenced.

In the meantime the second Nordenfelt had been taken to the top of the hill to a position commanding the approaches in the rear, but was not taken into action.

One Hotchkiss revolving cannon from the Deposito took part in the engagement on the left. It left the station at the Deposito about 5 o'clock, and, moving down the Mariquina road, took position to the left of the road and on the left of the 3.2-inch rifle. Two further advances were made by this gun—the last on the brow of the hill overlooking the Mariquina Valley.

During this engagement 41 shrapnel and 28 shell were expended by the 3.2-inch B. L. rifles; 62 shrapnel, 6 shell, and 5 canister by the Nordenfelts, and 190 percussion shell by the revolving cannon.

During the afternoon the other revolving cannon was again removed from the Deposito to San Juan del Monte Church and returned on the 14th.

On the night of the 6th I received telegraphic instructions from General Hale to be at Deposito with two 3.2-inch B. L. rifles at 5 a. m. the 7th. As directed, I reported to him and was then ordered to take position about 1½ miles south of the waterworks road and east of the village of San Juan del Monte. At about 6 o'clock we opened the engagement, the Wyoming battalion of infantry beginning an advance toward the east and the Nebraska troops in a line parallel with the waterworks road toward the south. By the time we had expended 3 shell and 7 shrapnel, the enemy had retired to such a distance and the position of our troops had so changed that we were obliged to discontinue our fire. We then moved gun to a position about a mile farther to the south, at the extreme end of the village, and before we could come into action the enemy again retired and our troops occupied their position.

After leaving San Juan del Monte Church we had to traverse a rough country with comparatively no road, and while the native ponies did good work considering their weight, the men were obliged to give them a great deal of assistance in moving guns in many places.

This engagement extended during its latter part as far east as pumping station, and, under the command of Lieutenant Gibbs, two Nordenfelt guns were taken to the extreme right of the Nebraska camp and assisted in forcing back the insurgents from that point toward the Pasig River. These guns expended 2 shrapnel and 29 shell.

On the 8th the revolving cannon, which had remained on the Mariquina road since the engagement of the 6th, was returned to Deposito. On the afternoon of this day a portion of the town of Mariquina was destroyed by fire, and at that time it appeared as though natives were gathering at the southeast portion of the town (to our front), and 2 shells and 1 shrapnel were fired from a 3.2-inch rifle to disperse them.

On the morning of the 14th heavy firing was heard on our right in the direction of Pasig, and numerous bodies of natives were seen to emerge from the woods east of that place. One 3.2-inch rifle was moved to trench at the extreme right of the Nebraska camp. During the day 11 shell were expended by the 3.2-inch B. L. rifles, for the purpose of preventing their occupation of the bamboo thickets on right of our position.

In the afternoon of March 15, 1 shell from 3.2-inch gun was fired at a point in the Mariquina Valley where, from appearances, an insurgent camp was being made.

During the engagement on the 16th, which took place between the Twenty-second Infantry and the insurgents near Cainta Church, a demonstration was made on the town of Mariquina by three companies of the Colorado regiment, under Colonel McCoy, and as a part of that demonstration 27 shell and 1 shrapnel were fired from the 3.2-inch rifle, from their position on the hill, at Mariquina and bamboo thickets surrounding it.

It appeared as though the insurgents were building intrenchments near bamboo thickets between our position and Cainta Church on the 18th, and 2 shell were fired at that point from 3.2-inch gun.

On the 19th 1 shell and 1 shrapnel were fired from 3.2-inch gun at a point on the left, where the insurgents seemed to be engaged in similar work.

On the 20th 1 shell from 3.2-inch gun was fired at Filipino outposts between our position and Mariquina. In the evening of that day the insurgents fired seven shots from cannon at Cainta Church, which had been placed in that position since the engagement of the 16th at that point. Two shells from 3.2-inch gun were fired in return, but its position was beyond our range.

On the morning of the 25th, to protect the advance of the Colorado and Montana troops under General Wheaton on the right flank, 19 shrapnel and 23 shell were fired at Mariquina and bamboo thickets along this side of Mariquina Valley. At 11 o'clock that night firing upon the outposts became heavy and we expended 3 shrapnel and 1 shell, which silenced the enemy's fire. It being a bright moonlight night, we were able to sight our guns with tolerable accuracy.

On the 31st one 3.2-inch B. L. rifle and one Nordenfelt took part with General Hale's brigade in the demonstration on Mariquina and up the San Mateo Valley. With one company of the Twenty-third Infantry as support, we left our camp at 5 a. m., crossing the San Mateo River and gaining the other side before daylight. We then followed the road down along the bank of the river to a point where it intersects the road to Mariquina and approached that town from the south, with a battalion of the Fourth Infantry on our left. The Nordenfelt gun took a position just inside the south side of the town, and just at that time the insurgents, from a point farther in, opened fire upon a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, which was approaching from the west. A few shots were fired from this gun and the gun advanced through the town as the enemy retreated. The 3.2-inch gun took a position on the right at the southeast corner of the town commanding the plain to the east and the bamboo thicket running from the town to the mountain. This thicket and the woods at the base of the hill were shelled by this gun so effectively that the enemy were obliged to abandon it. The advance was then made up the valley for a distance of about 3 miles, and the Nordenfelt was brought into action at the edge of the open plain beyond. The infantry having advanced to the opposite side of this plain, and the enemy's fire in the bamboo thicket having been silenced after a sharp engagement, orders were received from General Hale to retire and march at once to La Loma church. A brief time was taken to feed the teams as we passed the camp, and the march to the church was made through a rain storm and over slippery roads, where we arrived at 10 p. m. This, after the work of the morning, was a hard march for our small ponies, and they would have been unable to cover the last few miles without great assistance from our men. Ammunition expended during the day: 3.2 inch—19 shrapnel, 13 shell; Nordenfelt—10 shell.

During the month a detachment of 4 men and a noncommissioned officer has been stationed at blockhouse 7 with a Gatling gun. The detachment at Deposito, under the immediate command of Sergeant Bachman, of Battery B, consisted of 3 men of Battery B and 2 corporals and 6 privates of Battery A.

On the 7th Lieutenant Webb reported at this point for duty, and on the 9th was transferred to command of river gunboat. On the 8th Lieutenant Gibbs left this position and took command of the first platoon at blockhouse 5.

On the 15th the Colorado regiment, under command of Colonel McCoy, relieved the Nebraska regiment at this point.

Total amount of ammunition expended during the month: Ninety-eight shrapnel, 122 shell from 3.2 inch B. L. rifle; by Nordenfelts—45 shell, 64 shrapnel, and 5 canister.

Respectfully submitted.

EDGAR A. WEDGWOOD,
Captain, Commanding Battery A, Utah Volunteer Artillery.

MANILA, P. I., April 4, 1899.

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.

SIR: In compliance with your order, I have the honor to report the following operations in which the guns under my command took part since February 15, 1899, that being the date of my last report:

On the night of February 17, by orders of Major Mulford, of the First Nebraska, U. S. V., I took two Nordenfelt guns to the outpost on Mariquina road, returning therefrom at daylight, no action occurring.

On February 19 fired from 3.2-inch guns at bodies of insurgents, 7 shell and 3 shrapnel. On the same night two Nordenfelt guns were ordered to the outpost on Mariquina road, where they remained till daylight, returning to camp thereafter.

On February 22, at 3 a. m., proceeded with two Nordenfelt guns to the left of

Deposito by order of Colonel Stotsenburg. Being unable to get in contact with the enemy by reason of lack of transportation, was ordered to return to the right of Company K, First Nebraska, U. S. V., where we took position, firing 18 shrapnel at the retiring insurgents; afterwards returned to Camp Stotsenburg.

On the morning of February 24, by order of Colonel Stotsenburg, proceeded to the Cossack post on the Mariquina road about 2 a. m., remaining in position until daylight, when the enemy advanced. We were ordered by Major Mulford to open fire, which we did, causing the enemy to retire, after which we shelled their intrenchments, expending in all 27 shrapnel.

On February 25 was ordered by Colonel Stotsenburg to take position on the right of Company K, First Nebraska, U. S. V., and watch for insurgents in that vicinity. Fired 3 shell and 2 shrapnel, causing the insurgents to cease firing and retire; returned to camp.

On February 27 fired 4 shrapnel from 3.2-inch gun at insurgents massing in front, causing same to disperse.

On March 6, by order of Colonel Stotsenburg, one of the 3.2-inch guns went to the outpost of Mariquina road under command of Sergt. F. Fisher. By order of Major Mulford one 3.2-inch gun and the two Nordenfelts shelled the city of Mariquina, firing in all 130 shells.

On March 7, about 7 a. m., by order of Major Mulford, I moved two Nordenfelt guns to a position on the right of Company K, First Nebraska, U. S. V., with orders to intercept and fire upon any insurgents that might be seen in the vicinity. About 10 a. m. we discovered a line of insurgents firing into our line 2,600 meters to our right. We fired 4 shell and 2 shrapnel into them, causing them to cease firing and retire. About 1 p. m. we returned to camp. At 3 p. m. large bodies of insurgents were seen moving in the valley; by order of Major Mulford we opened fire on them, expending 23 shell, causing them to disperse.

On March 9 I was ordered by Capt. E. A. Wedgwood to take command of guns at Balic Balic. I reported March 11 at that point to Colonel McCoy, First Colorado, U. S. V.; from that day, including the 22d, no operations occurred.

On March 23 moved by your order the two 3.2-inch guns to Caloocan, relieving Lieutenant Fleming, Sixth Artillery, U. S. A., at Fort MacArthur.

On March 25, by order of General Wheaton, at 5.45 a. m. I opened fire with three 3.2-inch guns and one 3.6-inch mortar upon the insurgents' works. We kept up a rapid fire until troops advanced and charged the enemy. We continued to fire upon insurgents on the road leading into Malabon during the day, expending 99 shrapnel and shell. At 10.30 a. m., by order of General Wheaton, I sent two 3.2-inch guns, under command of Second Lieut. George A. Seaman, to a point in advance about 1½ miles, he remaining there until the morning of March 28, when, by order of the brigade commander, I moved them back into their original position.

In all operations stated in the foregoing report I would not do justice to the commands if I did not commend the faithful efforts of all officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of Batteries A and B who have been associated with me in the field.

Very respectfully,

GEO. W. GIBBS,
First Lieutenant, Utah U. S. V.

MALolos, P. I., April 6, 1899.

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to your instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the location and operations of the various detachments of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, from February 12 to March 31, inclusive, more particularly of that platoon composed of sections 2 and 3, which for the greater time has been under my immediate command:

On February 12 a detachment with three 3.2-inch guns, under Maj. F. A. Grant, was stationed at La Loma church cemetery; one at Caloocan, under Lieutenant Seaman; one at the waterworks near Mariquina, under Lieutenant Gibbs, and one at stone blockhouse No. 2, near La Loma, under myself. Furthermore, a detachment was serving on the U. S. gunboat *Laguna de Bay*.

From this date nothing worthy of record transpired until the 17th of February, when Major Grant was ordered away from the battery to take command of the U. S. gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, and I was placed in command of the battery.

From this time until the 25th of March I fired a few shots almost daily, several times to silence the enemy's fire annoying our outposts, at other times to interrupt hostile working parties and prevent construction of fortifications.

On the 23d of February several hundred of the enemy made an attack, advancing to a position 700 yards from our line, and pouring in a very warm fire, our pieces being struck a number of times. Although unable to use artillery to the greatest advantage against troops in skirmish order, a few shrapnel bursting on their line succeeded in driving them back to the shelter of the woods without the necessity of cooperation on the part of our infantry.

Again, on the 17th of March, we were attacked in a similar manner, the accuracy of the enemy's fire being evidenced by the occurrence of three casualties in the immediate vicinity of the guns. My platoon fired several shots, which seemed to be effective, but my position was soon masked by skirmishers from the Third Artillery and Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers.

At about this time each of my 3.2-inch guns was equipped with a pair of mules, but subsequently those with the Caloocan detachment and detachment on left of La Loma, under First Sergeant Hines, were ordered to me, making 4 mules for each section of this platoon.

On the 25th of March this platoon, consisting of 34 men, followed by a platoon of the Sixth Artillery, under Lieutenant Fleming, similarly equipped, started on the campaign which resulted in the capture of Malolos, March 31.

At 6 a. m. the infantry engaged the enemy, the artillery following at a few hundred yards, under the command of the chief of artillery. Proceeding northward along the Novaliches road, we reached a point near Cabalahan at 10.30 a. m., when the infantry developed a strong fire from the left front. Under the direction of the chief of artillery I took one section to a point about 400 yards to the left of the road and in advance of the firing line. Lieutenant Fleming with one piece and Lieutenant Davis, of the Navy, with a Colt's automatic gun, were also present. From this position we detected the enemy firing from strong intrenchments commanding the Novaliches and Malinta road, which was our route. Four shrapnel and 2 shell were fired from my piece. The enemy returned the fire with spirit, but were soon silenced and compelled to leave their works. Later developments showed also that our artillery fire had driven them from commanding trenches still farther to the left, a position which otherwise would have been costly to and difficult to take by infantry. These trenches were 12 feet in thickness and most strategic in situation.

From this position a detachment of 24 men of the Fourth Cavalry was sent forward to reconnoiter the crossing of the Tuliahan River. They developed a warm fire from the enemy almost at once, losing 9 men of the detachment in a few moments. One of my guns was ordered forward and advanced to a position 125 yards from their trenches and in advance of the cavalry detachment. We were screened from the enemy by a thin hedge. Under a searching fire from the enemy, in which the detachment miraculously escaped injury, we fired 4 shrapnel and 2 shell into their defenses. After the first projectile was fired their fire was more scattered, and within a few minutes they were entirely dislodged. These trenches were cleverly constructed, 12 feet in thickness and commanding well the approaches to the Malabon pumping station situated at this point, which they were intended to protect. Four of the projectiles were found to have taken effect upon them, three passing through the work and exploding on the farther side. The absence of a bridge and the precipitous nature of the banks rendered it necessary to improvise approaches. The platoon then went into camp on the right bank of the river.

On March 26 we broke camp at 6 a. m. and proceeded along the Malinta road parallel to the Tuliahan River. My platoon next came into action at 3 p. m. of this day, about 2 miles north of Malinta. The enemy was in strong force intrenched on either side of the railroad, some 1,700 yards distant. My platoon went into battery on the left of that of Lieutenant Fleming, some 500 yards in rear of our own lines. Our fire developed a vigorous response from the enemy, whose accuracy was demonstrated by a number of casualties in our immediate front and rear. My platoon fired 16 shell and 6 shrapnel. The disproportionate number of shell used in this action was due to the fact that friendly troops were lying in our immediate front, and experience had shown the use of shrapnel under these conditions unsafe. Thus, at this point, the artillery could not develop its greatest effectiveness. We advanced to their trenches, where were to be found evidences of the accuracy of our fire, and went into camp.

On March 27 we broke camp at 6.45 a. m. and proceeded north to Meycauayan, where several hours' delay was experienced.

Shortly after the advance from this point began, my platoon was halted on the Marilao road, as the infantry had developed a strong fire a few hundred yards beyond, the enemy being intrenched on the right bank of the Marilao River. The infantry had been attempting to dislodge the enemy for nearly two hours, but so well had the insurgents disguised their trenches and so commanding was their position that our lines had been, temporarily, pretty effectually checked. I was ordered to bring one

gun forward, which, with the support of one platoon of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry and the Colt's automatic gun, was placed within 50 yards of the enemy. Five shrapnel and 3 shell were fired among them; then my other gun was brought up, and the two guns standing on the open bank placed 3 shell directly into their trenches. Immediately a white flag was raised by the enemy, and resulted in the capture of some 25 insurgents with their arms. We were compelled to wait some two hours at this point, until the bridge across a small tributary to the river could be repaired.

We then proceeded to an open field 1,000 yards farther on, where again the platoon went into action. The infantry had advanced across the river by means of the railroad bridge and in boats and had engaged the enemy, who had rallied for an attack some 2,000 yards in advance of us. We were unable to cross the river and were masked from the enemy by a fringe of timber; but under the direction of the chief of artillery we began shelling at 2,000 yards, meanwhile receiving a lively fire from the insurgents. Both platoons placed a number of shell among them, as we learned from officers on the firing line. Seven shell were fired by my platoon. We went into camp on this field.

During the night a pontoon bridge was constructed by means of which we crossed the river in the morning. On March 28 we crossed the river and delayed for the day, rationing the troops, going into camp in the suburbs of Marilao.

The following day, March 29, proceeding northward, my platoon again went into action on the firing line at Bocaue, shelling the enemy at 800 yards. Four shrapnel and 3 shell were fired, hastening the enemy's retreat from trenches at railroad bridge across Santa Maria River. At this point the mules were swum across the river, the guns being pulled across the railroad bridge by hand. One gun went immediately into action on the opposite side, firing 5 shell at a train in hands of insurgents. The result of our firing was to prevent their burning the station and town at that point. About 1½ miles farther on we were compelled to cross another river in a similar manner, but with considerable difficulty, as the animals did not take kindly to the water. In this respect, among others, horses are far preferable to mules for artillery purposes.

At about 5 p. m. my platoon was again brought into action on the firing line. This took place at railroad bridge, crossed in similar manner as before, just beyond Guiguinto. From the railroad grade, under a harrassing cross fire from the enemy, who succeeded in wounding 1 man of my platoon, we fired 24 shrapnel and 8 shell, tearing out their works on the grade and completely silencing their fire. From the number of casualties on either side of us and in rear, with comparatively little cover, I deem it remarkable that there were not more casualties in my detachment. Leaving the pieces under guard we went into camp on the south side of the river.

On the following day, March 30, we experienced the greatest difficulty in swimming the mules across, which was, however, finally accomplished with safety.

Proceeding thence in a northerly direction we advanced to a point about 4 kilos from Malolos, with the enemy about 1,100 yards in our front. I was here ordered to construct embrasures with a view to protection when operations should begin in the morning. At a point 300 yards in advance of the firing line, and 15 yards on right of track, my men, kindly assisted by detail of 20 men from Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, constructed sandbag works, only possible under cover of the darkness. Lieutenant Fleming was similarly located on left of track. These were completed about midnight. Before daylight on the following morning, March 31, my pieces were placed in position.

About 6 a. m. my platoon and that of Lieutenant Fleming opened fire on the enemy's works. As the enemy left their trenches we gradually increased our range from 900 yards up to 3,800 yards, the latter being fired according to range taken from a map, directly into Malolos. Evidences of the accuracy of this fire were afterwards found in this place. Twenty-three had been driven not only from their first line of intrenchments, which were 20 feet in thickness, but also from a second line about 1,000 yards beyond.

One section proceeded along Malolos road, halting to fire 1 shell at cemetery near the town, while the other section advanced along railroad grade, being compelled to unhitch three times and pull gun over bridge by hand. At last bridge, the men were compelled to carry ties to fill in the damaged bridge before a crossing could be effected. We entered Malolos on the firing line about 10 a. m., and parked our guns in plaza before the "Hall of Congress" of the insurgent government.

During the entire campaign my platoon fired 70 shrapnel and 57 shell.

In concluding this report I take great pleasure in inviting attention to the fact that the chief of artillery was present at all times when my guns were in action, and to him is due in large measure their effective service.

Again, while there was no opportunity afforded individuals in my platoon for distinguished service, I desire to call your attention to their work collectively; and while it would be manifestly inappropriate to name them individually in this report, I would remind you of the efficiency of the acting chiefs of section, the excellence of the gunnery, and the prompt and efficient service of the cannoneers and drivers.

The noncommissioned officers were acting chiefs of section; John A. Anderson (first sergeant) and Charles Asplund (quartermaster-sergeant), Corpls. Don. C. Johnson, M. C. Jensen, and Nepti Otteson.

It is reported to me that Corporal Dusenberry and 2 other men of Battery B did distinguished service with Hotchkiss revolving cannon in General Wheaton's brigade, and I therefore take pleasure in recommending him for your consideration.

Lieutenant Naylor, after reporting to me for duty on March 23, did some excellent work with the Nordenfeldt guns.

First Sergt. F. T. Hines, promoted to second lieutenancy March 23, has been in command of a section continuously and has done most satisfactory service.

For the work of that portion of Battery B under Lieutenant Seaman, I would respectfully refer you to the report from that officer.

Respectfully submitted.

JNO. F. CRITCHLOW,
First Lieutenant, Commanding Battery B, Utah Light Artillery.

CAMP WEARISOME, April 1, 1899.

Maj. R. W. YOUNG.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following record of events which have occurred at Camp Wearisome, where I am in command of the second platoon, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, consisting of 30 privates, 3 corporals, and 1 sergeant, manning 2 Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns, model 1897.

By your personal request I was relieved from duty on the U. S. gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, and reported for duty with my command March 1, 1899. I was assigned for duty by you with the second platoon, Battery B, and assumed command March 3, relieving First Sergt. Frank T. Hines.

Nothing outside the camp routine happened until March 10, when we fired the first of the following shots:

Date.	Objective.	Range.	Number of rounds.	Kind of ammunition.	Remarks.
		<i>Meters.</i>			
Mar. 10	Enemy on earthworks.....	1,100	1	Percussion shell..	Excellent shot.
11	Enemy's earthworks	850-1,000	11	5 shrapnel, 6 percussion.	First 2 short at 850-900; others fair.
17do	1,150	2	Percussion	Very good shots.
	Enemy's firing line to cover retreat of skirmish line of Tenth Pennsylvania	1,300	1do	Very good shot.
22	San Francisco del Monte Church.....	1,750	1do	Fell short 50 meters.
25	Enemy's trenches	150-200 350-500	25	Shrapnel	Good execution.

All of the firing, with the exception of the 25 rounds on March 25, was prompted by my best judgment and I consider the ammunition well expended. The firing of March 25 was the outgrowth of orders received from yourself and General Hale on March 24 and 25, to the effect that I would be expected to advance with my command early on the morning of March 25 up the sunken road leading from my position to the San Francisco del Monte Church, crossing the insurgents' line of intrenchments 1,050 meters in advance, and be prepared to silence any fire from the enemy.

Having formed an advance guard of 9 enlisted men, who had reported to me from the Tenth Pennsylvania, we began the advance at 5.30 a. m. We pulled the pieces limbered to a widening in the road about 550 meters in advance and unlimbered, allowing the rear piece to pass the first limber. When we reached a point about 20 meters from the elevation we had to ascend before we could go into action, the insurgents fired two volleys at our advancing line of skirmishers. Then I immediately deployed my squad of infantrymen to the left of and out of the way of our guns, and ordered them to fire volleys at the insurgents at 200 yards, and then I soon had both guns in action at the top of the road. We fired about 18 rounds of shrapnel at ranges varying from 150 to 350 meters at the insurgents behind their

breastworks, before our advancing infantry, who were about 350 meters in my rear, had reached my front. The enemy's fire was almost wholly silenced by this time and they retreated, except a few who were either killed or taken prisoners. We then advanced with the firing line and at intervals fired 7 rounds more of shrapnel at the retreating insurgents with good effect. We continued the advance with the infantry along the road to a point within a short distance of where the road crosses the San Juan River. The insurgent fire had by this time almost ceased on our front, so General Hale ordered me to halt and rest my men, who were nearly exhausted from dragging the heavy guns without any aid, and there await further orders to advance—in case I received no orders within a short time, to return to my first position. No orders came, so we returned to camp.

The men who accompanied me in this action can not be excelled for brave, soldierly conduct. One prisoner was taken on March 25 and 11 on March 27 by a squad of 5 men under command of Corporal Busch. These were turned over to the provost guard. We did no more firing during the month of March, after the 25th. We had no casualties and the sick per cent was at no time in the month greater than 10 per cent, which seems remarkably low considering the fact that we had no medical attention.

Respectfully submitted, April 4, 1899.

RAYMOND C. NAYLOR,
Second Lieutenant, Utah Light Artillery.

MANILA, P. I., April 4, 1899.

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Commanding Utah Light Artillery.

SIR: I have the honor to furnish you report of my work from March 25 to March 27, inclusive, during which time I was in command of first section Battery A and fourth section Battery B.

I was given command of those 2 guns under command of Lieutenant Gibbs at Fort MacArthur, who was ordered by General Wheaton to send 2 guns by rail to the firing line, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north. The order came about 10 a. m., March 25, and inside of an hour we had gone into action on the line. We shelled trenches at ranges from 950 to 2,700 yards, firing 52 shots. We succeeded in running the insurgents from one strong trench and silencing them in the others. Just at evening Private Parker J. Hall, acting gunner, Battery B, was shot in the thigh, the bone being fractured.

Until the advance was made, about noon March 26, we placed occasional shots. I commend the bravery and excellent work of the men who unloaded the guns from the train and went into action so promptly under heavy fire.

Submitting the above,

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. A. SEAMAN,
Second Lieutenant, Utah Light Artillery.

IN THE FIELD NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., April 2, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Battalion Utah Volunteer Artillery.

SIR: I have the honor to herewith submit the following report of the part taken by one 3.2-inch fieldpiece, under my command, during the month of March, 1899.

Following instructions from First Lieut. J. F. Critchlow, commanding Battery B, on March 3, 1899, I took command of the first section of that battery, with one 3.2-inch fieldpiece, stationed in front of Battery H, Third U. S. Artillery, just to the right of Caloocan.

From this date until March 14 very little movement was noticed on the insurgents' lines, which were located along the edge of a woods about 2,000 yards to our front.

About 2 p. m. on the above date (March 14, 1899), the insurgents fired 2 shots at our lines, from what appeared to be an old fieldpiece, located to our left and front. I returned the fire with 2 percussion shells at 1,750 yards' range, which afterwards proved to be short. The firing from the enemy ceased, however.

On March 15 and 16 fired 4 rounds at insurgents working on intrenchments, and on both days caused them to leave their work unfinished.

During skirmish with insurgents on March 17, 1899, expended 8 rounds of ammunition in helping our troops to drive back a skirmish line thrown out by the insurgents.

While the advance was being made on March 25, 1899, only succeeded in firing 2 shots, when ordered to cease firing, as the troops were advancing so rapidly from the right as to make it dangerous to shell longer.

Since that date this detachment has not taken any part in engagements with insurgents, and still holds the position it had at the commencement of the month.

The only casualty in this detachment during month is that of Corp. H. V. Southers, who was wounded by spent ball passing through right thigh on the morning of March 25, 1889.

Total amount of ammunition expended during month.

	Rounds.
Percussion shell	11
Shrapnel	5
Cartridges	16

Ammunition on hand at present date.

	Rounds.
Percussion shell	36
Shrapnel	70
Canister	8
Cartridges	104

Respectfully submitted.
Your obedient servant,

FRANK T. HINES,
Second Lieutenant Battery B.

MALOLOS, April 5, 1899.

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In accordance with your instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my platoon of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery (Dyer's), in the campaign against the Philippine insurgents during part of the month of February and the month of March, 1899:

On February 11 (the day after the advance on Caloocan) I took position just north of that village in a sand-bag fort, about 50 yards east of the railroad. About February 13 I had command (owing to the temporary absence, on account of wounds, of Lieutenant Seaman, Utah Light Artillery) of my own 2 guns, a section of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, and a 3.6-inch field mortar under the immediate charge of Corporal Boshard, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery.

From February 11 until February 23 some desultory firing was done at insurgent working parties along the railroad, at ranges varying from 1,800 to 2,500 yards. About February 20 a 1.65-inch Hotchkiss mountain gun was ordered from the arsenal and installed just west of the railroad and some 100 yards in rear of the main battery. This gun was under the immediate charge of Acting Corporal Jones, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery. About a fortnight later it was moved to the extreme left of our line, where it did good work as long as it was in position—about two weeks.

About daybreak on February 23 the insurgents opened fire on our position with a piece of artillery of perhaps 5.6-inch caliber, firing 3 shots, 2 of which exploded from 100 to 250 yards in front of our lines, but none of which were effective. Their fire was at once returned with 2 field guns and the 1.65-inch Hotchkiss, which latter was the only gun from which their position could be seen. Shortly after firing these 3 shots the insurgents advanced in line of battle over the ridge 1,300 yards distant. The fire of my guns was at once changed to their personnel, and the greater part of their line that was in the open retreated. The balance of it (I refer to our immediate front only) advanced but 100 or 200 yards to a gully. The engagement was warm for some time, the insurgents under cover of trees and undergrowth advancing their lines to within 800 or 900 yards of ours, where they remained until driven out on March 25.

On the nights of February 24 and 26 the enemy opened a heavy fire, but in the bright moonlight our artillery was almost as effective as during daylight, and their fire was soon silenced in both cases.

From that time on until March 23 (with the exception of a few days, when what might perhaps be called a tacit truce existed) the artillery was called on almost daily to silence the fire of bodies of sharpshooters, and prevent the construction of

About 7.30 a. m. on the following day Acting Corporal Jones's section went into action in the village of Bocaue, firing 2 shrapnel and 1 shell at the fleeing insurgents beyond the river. A little later this river was crossed by pulling the guns by hand over the railroad bridge and riding the mules through the water, which was too deep to permit the guns to ford it. The guns were similarly transported over the river at Bigaa, the mules swimming. The platoon camped just east of the railroad bridge over the river at Guiguinto, and crossed the river early the next morning (March 30) in the same manner in which the former rivers had been crossed. Later that afternoon the insurgents were located near the railroad, just where the Malolos road crosses it, but abandoning that strongly intrenched position, they retreated about 1,100 yards to strong earthworks guarding the railroad nearer Malolos. No attack was made upon them that day, but just after dark my platoon was assigned to a position just southwest of the railroad, and, under cover of the darkness, the cannoneers, assisted by a detail of 20 men from the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, constructed a strong, screened emplacement for two guns, which was completed shortly after midnight. The guns were placed in position just before daylight the next morning. Exactly at 7 a. m. I opened fire on the enemy at 1,000 yards. In a very few moments the fire from my platoon, Lieutenant Critchlow's, and Lieutenant Davis's Colt automatic gun (these being located just across the railroad) drove the insurgents from their position. They were fired on with shrapnel whenever they appeared in sight, retreating along the railroad, and their line of retreat was as thoroughly covered by our fire as circumstances would permit. A few projectiles were also fired into Malolos (the range and direction being taken from maps), some fragments of which were afterwards found in this city.

In all, 37 projectiles were fired by my platoon, the last two after a short interval; the 35 fired continuously being fired in exactly 28 minutes. The limbers were then refilled, and, close behind the firing line, my platoon and one section of Lieutenant Critchlow's approached Malolos. In the suburbs of this city, one shell was fired at a cemetery wall behind which some insurgents had taken refuge, but nothing being developed, the artillery ceased firing. We entered Malolos not more than 150 yards in rear of our most advanced troops, these being a part of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry. About noon my platoon went into camp in the plaza immediately in front of the Philippine hall of congress.

In the advance from La Loma to Malolos 40 shell and 24 shrapnel were fired. Considering the character of the work done, the number of shell used was out of all usual proportion, but the all too frequent experience of shrapnel bursting in the guns has shown the danger of firing this class of projectile over friendly troops, which are within 600 yards of the guns. And until shrapnel which will withstand the shock of discharge with absolute safety shall have been furnished, the full effectiveness of artillery fire can never be utilized. A number of weak points were developed in the gun carriages. The mules were a source of constant trouble and once more demonstrated their unfitness for artillery purposes. I was fortunate in having no casualties in my platoon, which numbered 24 men. My detachment being small, I sometimes found it necessary to ask regimental commanders for details to assist me, and these were always cheerfully furnished. Nor were volunteers lacking in emergencies. These men (whom I would gladly mention did I but know their names) voluntarily exposed themselves to assist my cannoneers in some of the most dangerous places in which we were.

As regards my own men and 3 men of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery (who were attached to my platoon on March 30 and 31), I can say that under fire they have proved brave and worthy soldiers, and at all times they have, almost without exception, cheerfully and zealously performed the extraordinarily onerous duties of light artillerymen.

ADRIAN S. FLEMING,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery,
Commanding Platoon Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery.

U. S. S. HELENA, Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Colt automatic gun, manned by a detachment of marines from the U. S. S. *Helena*, from February 27, 1899, upon which date I reported at Caloocan for duty with the artillery of the Second Division, until April 5, 1899, when I was detached and ordered back to the *Helena*.

From February 27 to March 23 the gun was mounted on the firing line in the post at Caloocan as a support for the artillery, firing occasionally at the enemy's sharpshooters and exposed bodies of men.

On March 23 I proceeded to La Loma church in company with the artillery, one platoon of the Utah Battery, and one of the Sixth Light Artillery, and took part in the advance of the Second Division on Malolos.

On March 25 operations commenced. The general plan of advance was as follows: General MacArthur was in command. His division consisted of the First Brigade, Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis on the left, composed of the Third Artillery, Kansas and Montana regiments, and the Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Hale, on the right, composed of the Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Nebraska regiments. The divisions of artillery were in the center, which rested at La Loma.

This general formation was maintained until Malinta was reached, the center advancing along Caloocan-Novaliches road to Cabalahan, thence along the Malinta-Novaliches road to Malinta, the right wing swinging so as to preserve the front. At Malinta the divisions were joined by Brigadier-General Wheaton's independent brigade, consisting of the Third and Twenty-second Infantry, the Oregon, and part of the Minnesota Regiment, which had advanced along the railroad from Caloocan. From there on this brigade was in reserve, guarding the railroad's communications.

The front was now contracted and the advance continued with the center along the railroad track. The character of the country was extremely favorable for defensive warfare. The fields were rice land covered with numerous copses of dense bamboo thickets.

There was a network of tidewater rivers, mostly unfordable. In addition, the enemy had built strong intrenchments, from 10 to 25 feet thick, at short intervals along the road, on the river banks, and especially along the railroads. These trenches were of the most modern type. The advance of the army was so rapid that the enemy had no time to destroy the iron railroad bridges and the fordable streams were crossed on these with little delay, the mules and horses swimming.

The detachments under my command went into action in the following engagements:

Near Cabalahan on March 25, covering with the artillery the advance of the Montana and Pennsylvania regiments against strong intrenchments on the Malinta-Novaliches road. In the afternoon of the same day a platoon of 30 men from the Fourth Cavalry found the enemy strongly fortified on the opposite bank of the Tuliahan River, and engaged with heavy loss to themselves. The Colt gun, with one piece of artillery, went into action, under heavy fire on the left of the road, and the enemy shortly fled from their intrenchments.

At the Marilao River, March 28, the detachment advanced under cover to within 75 yards of the enemy's trenches, strongly drawn up on the bank across the river, and by a sweeping fire covering that trench, which was about 130 feet off, silenced the enemy's fire, and enabled the artillery to come up to the open road to within 70 yards of them. Twenty-three of them surrendered in this trench, though a deep river was between them. Of some twenty odd who attempted to escape nearly all were shot down.

As an instance of the accuracy of the Colt gun, Colonel Funston of the Twentieth Kansas and Assistant Surgeon Smith, attached to the artillery, reported that one man was found dead with 5 holes in his body in a space that could be covered by the hand, all made by 6 millimeter bullets from the Colt gun as he attempted to escape.

At Guiguinto on March 29 the enemy were encountered in force on the opposite bank of the river, retreating before the advance of our troops to a fringe of woods about 1,500 yards distant, from which they poured in a heavy and destructive fire as we crossed the river on the railroad bridge. Our troops were here under a great disadvantage, the Springfield rifles not being effective at this range. My detachment crossed the river under this fire and opened up at a range of from 1,600 to 1,900 yards with, it is believed, good effect.

Near Malolos on March 31 the artillery and the Colt gun commenced the action and in a few minutes the enemy retreated from behind a strong intrenchment. After the artillery had driven them from their works the Colt gun kept up a fire on the retreating enemy up to a range of 2,000 yards. Malolos was then occupied with little resistance. On April 4 I took part with the detachment in a reconnoissance northward as far as the Guingua River, where the enemy were encountered in some force, fortified on the opposite bank.

In my opinion the efficiency of the automatic gun in operations on shore was amply demonstrated in this campaign. The light weight of the gun and ammunition and its simplicity of handling make it available for various uses. As an adjunct to artillery, especially as the modern tendency seems to be toward closer ranges, it would seem to be invaluable. A gun tripod and 2,500 rounds of ammunition, the whole weighing less than 250 pounds, could be readily carried on the limber of each piece. But two men would be required to set it up and operate it, and it would be equivalent to the support of a company of infantry, with the additional advantage of

being able to fire over the heads of advancing troops with perfect safety, as was done at Guiguinto. Its portability is such that it could form part of the equipment of each infantry company or cavalry troop, and it is so small and compact that it can be taken with its tripod almost anywhere a man can go. Another point is its value for high-angle fire. The value of a battery of such guns to a regiment is obvious.

Very respectfully,

CLELAND DAVIS, *Ensign, U. S. A.*

Maj. R. W. YOUNG, U. S. V.,
Chief of Artillery, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

APPENDIX 37.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Manila, P. I., June 4, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations of the artillery of this division during the months of April and May, 1899.

Several of the appended reports have just been received. They describe the operations of the several units so minutely and accurately that it is unnecessary for me to make a detailed report. Appended please find the following reports:

- A. Report of Capt. E. A. Wedgwood.
- B. Supplementary report of Capt. E. A. Wedgwood.
- C. Report of Lieut. John F. Critchlow.
- D. Supplementary report of Lieut. John F. Critchlow.
- E. Report of Lieut. Adrian S. Fleming.
- F. Report of Lieut. C. H. Bridges.
- G. Report of First Sergt. John A. Anderson.

The two Gatling guns, which were obtained from the armored train and employed under the immediate command of Lieutenant Bridges, at Calumpit, have remained with the artillery and were used in the engagement at Santo Tomas, one under Lieutenant Naylor, as mentioned in Captain Wedgwood's report, and the other under my own command; the latter expended 3,000 rounds of ammunition during that engagement.

I append no supplementary report from Lieutenant Fleming, inasmuch as one of his pieces was detached during the period covered by his report to accompany General Lawton's advance to San Isidro, and has not since returned to this division, and the other piece was engaged but once during that part of May not covered by Lieutenant Fleming's report, which engagement is reported in Captain Wedgwood's report.

I shall submit within a few days recommendations for brevets and certificates of merit based upon the operations of this campaign. I heartily concur in Lieutenant Critchlow's estimate of the services of Dr. Adams, of the Montana regiment.

Very respectfully,

RICHARD W. YOUNG,
Major, Utah Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

A.

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., *May 18, 1899.*

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Commanding Battalion, Utah Light Artillery.

SIR: Agreeably to your request I have the honor to submit report of the operations of Battery A from April 1 to date.

On the 1st of April two Nordenfeldt guns, manned by two sections of battery, were stationed at waterworks pumping station; two 3.2-inch B. L. rifles and two sections at La Loma Church; two 3.2-inch B. L. rifles and two sections at Caloocan, and detachment of 8 men and 2 noncommissioned officers were also stationed at Deposito in charge of two revolving cannon and three Gatling guns. The detachment at Caloocan was under the immediate command of Lieutenant Gibbs, the remainder of the battery under my own. Up to the 24th of the month Lieutenant Naylor was in charge of

two Nordenfeldts and two sections of Battery B, stationed to the right of La Loma Church, on the line surrounding Manila, and for a portion of the time performed the duties of officer in charge of barracks. During all of the period covered by this report Lieutenant Webb has been detached from the battery and acted as commanding officer of a river gunboat. On the evening of April 1, by command of General Hall, brigade commander, the detachment at La Loma Church marched to its former position at waterworks pumping station. But 2 shots have been fired by this detachment, 1 shell on April 25, and 1 shrapnel on April 26, each directed at the town of Mariquina.

The two Nordenfeldts were returned to the arsenal on the 12th of April by order of brigade commander, they being Spanish property, and having been called for by that Government. In this connection I desire to say that these guns have proved a very satisfactory arm; although mechanically not so well made, they possess three distinct points of superiority over the B. L. rifle, viz, rapidity of fire, minimum of recoil, and facility of aim.

By order of the chief of artillery the two 3.2-inch B. L. rifles and sections 1 and 2 were transferred from Caloocan to Malolos on April 13, transportation being by rail. I accompanied these sections in command, Lieutenant Gibbs taking command at the waterworks. At Malolos these guns were supplied with mules.

An engagement occurred at Quingua, about 5 miles northwest of Malolos, on the 23d of the month, in which the artillery were suddenly called to take part. Two guns of Battery A, under my command, one of Battery B and one of the Sixth Regular Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Fleming, left Malolos about the middle of the forenoon. We approached the scene of action under a heavy fire, and Private Abplanalp, a driver of Battery B, was wounded in the hand and shoulder. An effective position selected by the chief of artillery was taken at the edge of the open country surrounding the town of Quingua, which position commanded the town and the intrenchments along the bank of the river on the left. All guns were brought into action with the greatest dispatch, and as rapid a fire as possible maintained for about forty minutes, at which time the insurgents could be plainly seen abandoning their trenches to their left and their barricades in the streets. At this time the infantry advanced and occupied a portion of the town, the artillery following as soon as it could be limbered up. Our average range of fire was about 1,000 yards. Through the engagement we were under heavy fire from the enemy, and Private Davis was wounded in the right leg below the knee. Greater loss was doubtless prevented by the fortunate selection of position, our guns being masked from the enemy by the foliage, and using smokeless powder our exact position was not disclosed. No. 1 gun was brought into action in the town at the rear of the church and 3 shots fired at retreating insurgents. We expended in this action both shell and shrapnel.

Lieutenant Naylor reported at Malolos, April 23, for duty and commanded the guns of Battery A in action at Bagbag and Rio Grande rivers; his report of the operations is as follows:

"Prepared to move against insurgents at Bagbag and adjoining country in the early morning of April 24. Had proceeded but a short distance from railroad station at Malolos when we halted, and awaited further orders from General MacArthur. In readiness to advance, we thus awaited all day, and parking our guns in the evening went into camp near by.

"About 7 o'clock in the morning of the 25th we advanced along the road leading to the Quingua River, with two troops of cavalry as an escort. Upon reaching the river, we took the road leading to our left along its bank. This road we followed to a point about 1,200 yards from the Bagbag bridge, where there is a big wash intersecting the road. After due caution had been taken to avoid blundering into the enemy we left section 2's gun in the wash under cover and proceeded with No. 1 gun up the road about 200 yards, and then took a road to the right which leads directly to the ferry at the junction of the Quingua with the Calumpit River. We had not moved more than 100 yards before we heard Lieutenant Critchlow's gun open fire, and immediately after the rapid-fire guns of the armored car, which latter seemed turned squarely upon us. The bullets from the rapid-fire guns continued to come so close that we were ordered to lie down by Major Young, in which position we were held for about ten minutes. This cross fire having ceased, we went into action about 25 yards more in advance, firing at the enemy behind earthworks along the bank of the Calumpit River, enfilading their lines, thereby covering the advance of General Hale. After a few shots, No. 2 gun was brought up and into action, and from this point we expended 60 shell and 23 shrapnel at ranges varying from 500 down to 150 yards.

"The enemy having retired from their position, and the bridge over the Bagbag being destroyed, camp was made near its bank about 2 o'clock p. m.

"The bridge over the Bagbag being repaired, crossing of that river was effected on the morning of April 27. The enemy was strongly intrenched on the farther bank of the Rio Grande River, but had abandoned the intervening country between the Bagbag and that river. A position was selected by the chief of artillery on the bank of the Rio Grande near its junction with the Calumpit underneath a nipa hut, at 200 yards range from the enemy's earthworks. Some slight protection for the guns was constructed of rocks. No. 2 gun went into action under the hut, and No. 1 in the road about 20 yards to the left. The enemy's fire was heavy throughout the action, which terminated between 11 and 12 o'clock. Platoon expended 16 shrapnel and 1 shell, ranges being from 200 to 1,500 yards. Private Selmer was wounded at camp by a stray Mauser bullet passing through the small of the back.

"On May 2 I, with two B. L. rifles, together with two of Sixth Regular Artillery, under Lieutenant Fleming, accompanied expedition under command of General Hale to Pulilan, returning the next day; we met no resistance.

"On May 3 camp was broken at Calumpit and our guns and escort wagons taken across the Rio Grande River."

On May 4, at daylight, an advance was begun toward the town of San Fernando, Lieutenant Naylor, with revolving cannon and Gatling, accompanying General Wheaton up the railroad track, I, with two 3.2-inch rifles, under command of chief of artillery, forming a portion of the advance guard of General Hale's brigade proceeding up the wagon road, the position of No. 1 gun in the advance being 50 yards in rear of first company. No opposition was encountered until the town of Santo Tomas was approached, where insurgents were located on the road. One gun and one Gatling were brought into action and a few shots fired to the front at about 600 yards range, and a few to the right at about a thousand yards. The position being abandoned by the insurgents, an advance was made to that point, when a halt was enforced by reason of partially constructed pitfalls in the road. These being wide ditches filled with water on each side, an advance was impossible until the guns were taken some distance to the rear, where the ground was solid, and brought up again on the other side of the ditch and a causeway constructed across it.

While this was being done the infantry had advanced half a mile to the front to the bank of a stream of water, where they were meeting with strong resistance. Arriving at the firing line, both guns and one Gatling were brought into action. After a few shots from No. 2 the vent bushing blew out, a portion lodging in the vent, and as it was not possible to remove it with tools at hand, the gun was put out of action and one of Battery B brought up in its place. The same accident happened to No. 1 gun, but not until the last shot.

Under cover of our fire the infantry closed into the town on the right and left of the road, but as there was no way of crossing the river the artillery remained at this point throughout the action, a period of about two hours.

Our fire was directed principally to the front and left, although some few shells and shrapnel were thrown a little to the right of the road before the advance of the infantry was made, the range of fire varied from 700 to 2,000 yards, and ammunition expended included both shell and shrapnel.

Lieutenant Naylor reports operations along the railroad substantially as follows:

"On the morning of May 4 I reported to General Wheaton at 5 o'clock with one revolving cannon and one Gatling, each of which was mounted on a platform constructed on the trucks of hand cars. A half hour later the advance was begun, Gatling gun in the front. Arriving at a point about 2,000 yards from the railroad bridge, near Santo Tomas, which had been wrecked by the insurgents, we heard firing on our right, advising us that General Hale's brigade had encountered the enemy. Advancing 600 yards farther, trenches, and insurgents in uniform were observed, and I opened with the Gatling, firing about 100 rounds at about 1,400 yards range. This was at the order of General Wheaton, but the range was too great for effective work. An advance of 250 yards was made and about 200 rounds fired; then a farther advance of about 200 yards, where the guns were unloaded from the platforms.

"At this point the fire of both guns was brought to bear on the enemy in their trenches on the opposite bank of the river, from which they commanded the bridge and its approaches. A company of infantry was deployed on each side of the railroad, and by their advance and our joint fire the enemy was forced to retire from that position, and under cover of our fire the crossing of the river was effected. After crossing the bridge the infantry was subjected to a heavy flank fire from trenches farther in advance, which, fortunately, was of short duration. As insurgents retreated I brought the Gatling to bear at about 600 yards' range with telling effect. Being unable to cross the bridge, my part in the action terminated at this point.

"The ammunition expended during the day was 100 rounds for revolving cannon and 3,800 for Gatling. During this engagement my men were in the most exposed

position, serving their guns and working them 'by hand to the front' on the railroad grade in plain view of the enemy.

"As a factor in the success of these engagements our effectiveness has been largely due to the ever prompt, cheerful, and intelligent manner in which the men of the command have performed their duties; under all circumstances they have put forth their best energies valiantly. Sergeants Johnson and Knease and Corporals Bachman and Jensen, also Corporal Bjornson, of Battery B are entitled to special commendation."

Lieutenant Naylor received personal commendation from General Wheaton for good work in the action of May 4.

Respectfully submitted.

EDGAR A. WEDGWOOD,
Captain, Commanding Battery A, Utah Light Artillery.

B.—CAPT. E. A. WEDGWOOD'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT.

SAN FERNANDO, *June 8, 1899.*

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Commanding Battalion, Utah Volunteer Artillery.

SIR: Complying with your request, I herewith submit supplementary report of operations of Battery A to June 1, 1899:

May 23 detachment consisting of Sergeant Johnson and 2 men with Hotchkiss 2-pound gun accompanied two troops of cavalry in a reconnoissance. Near the town of Santa Rita the enemy was encountered and a skirmish of about thirty minutes' duration ensued, when our force retired. Ammunition expended, 18 rounds.

May 24 a platoon of Battery A, together with Hotchkiss revolving cannon manned by detachment of Battery B, took part in an attack on insurgents in their trenches on the far side of the open field on the south side of San Fernando. The officers present were myself and Lieutenants Naylor and Seaman.

At about 10 o'clock a. m. troops of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry advanced on the right flank of the insurgent trenches; those of the Montana on the left. Our guns occupied position facing the center near the road on the fringe of trees skirting the extreme south line of San Fernando. As soon as Kansas and Montana were well engaged insurgents began retreating to the road commanded by our guns straight to the front. At this time we opened fire from the 3.2-inch rifle, 8 shell and 1 shrapnel; from the revolving cannon, 15 rounds. Further firing then became inadvisable on account of the near approach of our infantry to our field of fire.

This attack was well planned and admirably carried out. The insurgent loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was heavy.

About the middle of the afternoon of the same day two 3.2-inch rifles and one Gatling gun were ordered out. I took them down the road, beyond the old church, leading to the north, and went into action with both 3.2-inch rifles, one of which was B's; one, Sixth Artillery. Lieutenant Seaman was with me. Each gun expended 9 shell. Both did good shooting. The position of detachments of battery remains the same as at last report.

Respectfully submitted.

EDGAR A. WEDGWOOD,
Captain, Commanding Battery.

C.—LIEUTENANT CRITCHLOW'S REPORT.

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., *May 15, 1899.*

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to your instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations and movements of that part of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, which has been under my immediate command from April 1 to May 15, 1899:

In camp before the Hall of Congress at Malolos, on the 3d of April was ordered to man the Hotchkiss revolving cannon and a Hotchkiss mountain gun (to be secured from the First Nebraska Regiment), and to send same with reconnoissance party. Said detachment, under First Sergt. John A. Anderson, left camp at 6 a. m. and proceeded with cavalry eastward to the town of Quingua. No resistance was met, but the enemy was seen to be in some force a short distance beyond the town. The detachments did not go into action, returning to camp after a few hours.

540 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

On the 7th of April I was ordered to take one 3.2-inch gun and to accompany a reconnaissance party at 6 a. m. I joined two troops of the Fourth Cavalry, taking section 3. We proceeded northeast along the Pulilan road to the Quingua River at a point near the town of Pulilan. The object of the reconnaissance was to discover a ford without attracting the enemy's attention. This was successfully accomplished. The ford was found and the enemy seen intrenched and intrenching on the opposite bank. We withdrew unnoticed. No shots were fired.

On the 13th of April the city of Malolos was attacked by the enemy. One section (section 2) of Battery B was ordered out, and proceeded to west limit of city. It was found impossible to get nearer than about 1,000 yards distant from the attacking party because of a river, over which there was no substantial bridge. We first went into action on the bank of this river, firing several shell in direction of insurgent fire. A better position was soon found some hundred yards to left, and several bodies of insurgents were routed and dispersed, and never repeated the attack from that direction. The range varied from 1,000 to 2,000 yards. The ammunition expended was 16 shrapnel and 8 shell.

On the 21st day of April I was ordered to send one section back to Bocaue to join General Lawton's command. The second section, under command of First Sergt. John A. Anderson, proceeded to Bocaue accordingly, leaving at 6 a. m., under escort of one troop of the Fourth Cavalry. Since that time this section has been in that command, and a report of its operations will be submitted at a later date.

On the 23d of April a cavalry reconnaissance party became unexpectedly implicated in an engagement with the enemy to the extent that reinforcements of infantry and artillery were required. Section 3 of Battery B, two sections of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, and one piece of the Sixth U. S. Artillery were ordered out and went into action on the Quingua road, about 1,000 yards from the enemy, intrenched in front of the town of Quingua. A brisk fire was sustained by the insurgents for about three-quarters of an hour, inflicting considerable damage upon our troops. Considering the fact that the artillery was masked from view, but not protected from the effect of the hostile fire, it was to be expected that there should be at least several casualties. Fortunately only two were sustained—a driver in Battery B shot in right hand and arm and a cannoneer in Battery A shot in the right leg. Upon dislodging the enemy from this position, the artillery advanced to the town, one piece of the Sixth Artillery and one of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, going into action again in the streets against the retiring enemy. During this latter action Captain Wedgwood was wounded and returned to Malolos.

At this time Lieutenant Fleming was directed to bring from Malolos his other section and the revolving cannon (Hotchkiss) manned by 7 men from Battery B under Corpl. M. C. Jensen, in order to proceed with General Hale on the following day. Meanwhile the platoon of Battery A and my section went into battery on Quingua road and shelled the town of Pulilan with the object of causing the insurgents to vacate the town or present less resistance to the troops on the next day's advance. We fired at ranges varying from 1,800 to 2,100 yards. The ammunition expended by my section for the day was 15 shell and 5 shrapnel. These three sections, with an escort of cavalry, returned to Malolos for the night. For the part taken by the detachment with the Hotchkiss gun I would respectfully refer you to the report of Lieut. A. S. Fleming, Sixth Artillery, as it was under his command from this time until Calumpit was taken.

On the following day it was intended that the platoon of Battery A and section of Battery B should proceed to the Quingua River at a point opposite Pulilan to work in conjunction with General Hale, but with a necessary delay in that brigade this movement did not occur until the 25th. We went into camp on the east side of the railroad at Malolos.

On the 25th of April we broke camp at 6 a. m., and proceeded under escort of the Fourth Cavalry eastward on the Pulilan road to the Quingua River, as above indicated, thence northward to the Bagbag River. At this point my section went into action, about 150 yards on the right of the railroad and about 350 yards from the enemy's trenches, constructed on the far side of the river, the platoon of Battery A some hundred yards to my right. We took position on the road, which gave us an unobstructed view of a portion of the earthworks, but was partially screened from the greater part of their defenses by a small bamboo fence. No protection from the effect of the insurgent fire was available. We opened fire first upon the trenches in view, then gradually elevating to 1,100 and 1,300 yards, getting meanwhile very little return fire. Simultaneously, General Hale's brigade became warmly engaged on the opposite side of the Quingua River. After firing some 25 rounds, as above described, and receiving only a desultory fire, I advanced the pieces 75 yards, first going forward alone as a measure of precaution. The portholes in the enemy's works were plainly visible and apparently unoccupied, but a vicious fire was at once

directed against the section in its new position, now only about 225 yards from that of the enemy. Our fire was at once directed at the line of portholes, and, though the piece was fired as rapidly as possible, one and sometimes two volleys succeeded every shot. Meanwhile, the infantry was 50 yards in the rear, prone, and therefore masked from the enemy, and unable, from their position, to render any real support. This was rectified as soon as possible. To retire to a less exposed position, thus inviting an uninterrupted fusillade from the enemy, was manifestly impossible. Early in the action Private Max Mattison was killed instantly, Private Frederick Bumiller shortly afterward sustained a fatal wound, and, later, Private John Braman was seriously wounded, while two other cannoneers were struck on their clothing by glancing balls. The piece is also not without scars of an undoubted character. Thus it will be seen that in a detachment of 8 men 5 were struck, 2 killed, and 1 seriously wounded, an exceedingly high percentage.

This action lasted about one and one-half hours, during which time 59 rounds of ammunition were expended.

In the Hotchkiss detachment above alluded to Corpl. M. C. Jensen, Battery B, sustained a fatal wound in this capture of the Bagbag. We went into camp on the south side of the river.

This section, together with a platoon of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Naylor, and two Gatling guns, next went into action on the Rio Grande.

Breaking camp at 8.30 a. m., the guns were moved across the hastily repaired bridge by hand and installed in position about 100 yards from the enemy. By the direction of the chief of artillery, hasty protection was thrown up beneath a nipa hut, which formed an effectual mask to the enemy. The action was short but effectual. The artillery engaged consisted of a platoon of the Sixth Artillery, under Lieutenant Fleming, and a Hotchkiss revolving cannon, under Corporal Bjornsen, on the left, and the above-mentioned guns on the right. In less than an hour we had taken the strongest position we had yet encountered, the American forces engaged numbering about 1,500 as against 5,000 insurgents. By my section, 7 shell and 1 shrapnel were expended. The artillery was then parked on the hither bank of the river, on the left of the railroad track.

On the 3d of May the artillery was taken across the Rio Grande on a raft, preparatory to an advance toward San Fernando.

On the following day we broke camp at 6 a. m., all the artillery proceeding along the road through Apalit, excepting the Hotchkiss cannon, manned by a Battery B detachment, and one Gatling mounted on trucks, which, under Lieutenant Naylor, advanced along the railroad track.

Obstructions taking the form of pitfalls were encountered in the road, some 4 miles from Calumpit. With little delay a road passing around them was made and the advance continued.

At about 10.30 a. m., the section was brought into action against the enemy which had taken position beyond a bridgeless river some 900 yards distant, first firing to the right of Battery A's position, then to the left, at ranges varying from 900 to 1,600 yards. The insurgent fire at this point was not heavy, though a number of casualties occurred about us in the infantry ranks. The latter soon advanced and masked our fire, driving the demoralized insurgent forces a distance of several miles. Meanwhile the detachments on the railroad, under Lieutenant Naylor, were doing most effective work against trenches in their front, assisting very materially in the capture of Santo Tomas.

From my piece 18 shell and 5 shrapnel were fired. Theoretically, shrapnel would have been the proper projectile to use in this engagement, but the frequency with which it burst in the bore of the piece rendered its use again unsafe. It being impossible to cross the river until some means was constructed, we returned to a point about three-quarters of a mile from the scene of the action and camped for the night.

The following day, May 5, at about 11 a. m., we began transporting the guns and equipage across the river above mentioned on a small raft constructed by engineers, this tedious and laborious task consuming the remainder of the day, and went into camp about 1 mile beyond.

On May 6 we proceeded to San Fernando, which the enemy had partially burned and evacuated the previous day. Our guns were parked in an inclosure in the south portion of the city and the men afforded the shelter of a commodious house.

During the period covered by this report 89 shell and 55 shrapnel were fired.

This, in brief, is the history of these detachments of Battery B directly under me, without pausing, as I should do if writing more at length, to point out the great strength of the enemy's position in certain places, their superiority in numbers, the unhesitating spirit of the men under me, and their bravery and discipline under fire, particularly at the Bagbag, where for a time it seemed as though all must be annihilated.

trouble by miring themselves. About 11 a. m. the column reached the railroad crossing about 1,000 yards south of the Bagbag River. Shortly afterwards the enemy was located in the vicinity of the railroad bridge over this river, and one of my guns went into action near the railroad crossing. At my request, Lieut. Cleland Davis, U. S. N., took command of this gun; and taking personal command of the other, I conducted it across the railroad and along a road parallel to the railroad and about 600 yards from it.

This road makes a slight bend some 200 yards south of the river and ends at the river. It had been reported that there were insurgents in the trenches on the north (right) bank of the Bagbag River, and upon reconnoitering I found this to be true. On both sides of the road the country was impassable for artillery on account of dense thickets, so that to get the gun into action it was necessary to pass the bend in the road referred to and move about 30 to 40 yards along the road, in plain view of the enemy intrenched not more than 300 yards distant, and having an enfilading fire along the road. The piece was unlimbered out of sight around the bend and run by hand to the front some 60 yards, when, turning to the left through an opening previously made, it gained its position, which was screened from view but entirely exposed to fire. During this advance to the support of the infantry not a single shot was fired to cover our unprotected advance, and I was afterwards informed that they had orders not to fire. Yet, while making it, we were exposed to a vicious fire which was mercifully inaccurate.

As soon as this gun was in position I reported the fact to the chief of artillery, and suggested that the other section and Lieutenant Davis's Colt's automatic gun be brought up. In the meantime I did not open fire, as the infantry had not yet engaged the enemy and were awaiting orders. A few moments later the chief of artillery arrived and directed me to open fire. This I did, with good effect on the limited portion of the enemy's extensive works which could be covered by the fire of one gun, the range being about 300 to 400 yards. Yet so numerous were the enemy and so widely distributed that every shot from the gun was followed by a hailstorm of bullets. A dozen rounds were fired as rapidly as possible, with no support from our infantry between rounds, by which time the cannoners, previously wearied by getting the gun into position by hand over a long stretch of difficult ground, were exhausted, and I was directed to cease firing. In the meantime the other gun had come up, and I at once installed it on the left of the road under exactly the same conditions as prevailed when the first gun was installed. But one shot was fired from this gun while it was in this position, and that was fired during my temporary absence. No further firing was done by the gun which was first placed in position.

About an hour later I received orders to withdraw both guns as quietly as possible, which resulted in their being withdrawn as they had been advanced—in full view of the enemy, under heavy fire, and without any support whatever. In fact the only assistance I had from the infantry, which lay in skirmish order on both sides of and between the guns, was rendered by some 10 or 12 gallant men of the Montana regiment, who volunteered to help advance and withdraw the guns, which could only have been moved with fatal slowness by the small number of cannoners with my platoon. Some of these men and some of my own were shot through their clothing, but fortunately there were no casualties among them. I had 2 mules slightly wounded, but not incapacitated for duty. As soon as the guns were withdrawn the column returned to Malolos.

On the afternoon of April 11, in accordance with your instructions, I proceeded to Bocaue by rail with one gun of my platoon (with its team of 4 mules) and a Hotchkiss revolving canon (unhorsed), manned by a detachment of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, under the immediate charge of Corpl. M. C. Jensen, of the same battery, and reported to Brigadier-General Wheaton.

At daybreak next morning I accompanied his brigade in its advance on Santa Maria. About 6 a. m. a couple of shrapnel were fired by his order at what was thought to be an earthwork in a patch of woods, but nothing was developed. He then directed me to open fire on the church in Santa Maria. Only the dome could be seen and thick woods between our position and the church made it impossible to observe the fall of a single shot. The range was long—about 3,500 yards—and the fire was so unsatisfactory that I stopped it after firing 5 rounds.

During this advance the artillery followed the firing line at a distance of from 75 to 100 yards, and though somewhat delayed at the only critical period of the day by necessity of making a detour to avoid the fierce heat of the burning nipa huts of the village fired by our firing line, it arrived on the firing line and went into action there a very few minutes after our troops had opened fire on the insurgents in Santa Maria. A few shots in conjunction with the infantry fire dislodged them. At this time the Hotchkiss cannon, which had followed the left of the line across the fields, being drawn by a detail of 20 infantrymen, came up, it having been found necessary to return to

the road on account of the rough and broken nature of the country. Both parties were active, a hundred yards further on, firing at a few insurgents who still held position in a cornfield, and later firing at the retreating enemy. Only 3 or 4 projectiles were fired from the field gun and perhaps 25 or 30 from the Hotchkiss cannon. Returning we reached the railroad about 1 p. m., but being unable to secure transportation that day we camped with the infantry bridge guard and taking the train next day (April 13) reached Malolos at 11 a. m.

A period of quiet ensued, lasting until the morning of April 23. About 10.45 a. m. on that date word suddenly reached me that one of my sections was ordered to proceed at once to Quingua. One section of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, was placed under my command by the chief of artillery. About 11 a. m. these two guns and also two guns of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, left Malolos for Quingua arriving within half a mile of that village by noon. Here the First Brigade, Second Division, was awaiting the arrival of the artillery, preparatory to renewing the attack on the enemy intrenched in the outskirts of the village. In a very few minutes a position was selected and the artillery was in action. Nor did the enemy long remain in his trenches, which were at an average distance of 1,000 yards from our position. Some of them retreated in column, affording a fine target, although but a momentary one on account of the many trees. In this engagement the two guns under my charge fired about 30 projectiles. One of the drivers of the Utah section under my charge, Private Alblplanalp, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, was shot while with his team in rear of firing line just before the guns went into action, the ball passing through his hand and grazing his shoulder. One shell was also fired after entering the village. Some two hours later I was directed by the chief of artillery to return to Malolos and bring up the other section of my platoon. Arriving there, I found that the Hotchkiss revolving cannon had also been ordered to Quingua by the division commander. I reached Quingua on my return about 6 p. m., and was directed by the chief of artillery to report to General Hale, commanding the First Brigade, Second Division, for instructions. Having done this, the artillery under my command was encamped for the night near the cathedral. I should also state here that during my temporary absence at Malolos the section that had been in action during that day was again in action just before dark, firing some 4 shells and shrapnel at close range into the trenches of the insurgents immediately across the Quingua River.

Before daybreak the next morning one section (Sergeant Markland's) was installed on the bluff overlooking the Quingua River, commanding the insurgent trenches and the bamboo footbridge on which it was expected to cross most of the troops. In the meantime the other section (Acting Corporal Jones's) and the Hotchkiss cannon took the position from which Corporal Jones had done his last firing the preceding afternoon. This position was well screened, and while it commanded the enemy's trenches it did not command the bridge head, so that the guns were run forward into an open field before opening fire. Fire was opened at 6 a. m., all three guns firing rapidly. I was at the last position described and Corporal Miller directed the fire of the other gun (Markland's section), and I observed from my position his work was admirable.

In a few moments the enemy retired from his most advanced trenches—those at the river—and began firing from a fringe of trees 1,000 yards distant. He was searched out with shrapnel and soon retired again. In the meantime the infantry began to cross the river by the bridges and by fording. After covering their crossing until it became evident that no immediate resistance was to be apprehended, the artillery forded the Quingua River and was all assembled on the further side an hour before the last of the infantry had crossed. After crossing the Quingua River, the enemy was next struck about a mile northward on the Pulilan road, and one section of my platoon went into action behind a slight rise in the road, firing shrapnel against insurgents in a breastwork 100 yards distant down the road. At the second shot they abandoned it and I hastened to the other two guns which, by direction of the brigade commander, were coming into action on the right side of the road. A rather large number of the enemy was seen about 1,000 yards to our right moving toward our rear. A few shrapnel and a few shots from the Hotchkiss cannon caused them to alter their purpose, if this was to attempt a flank movement, and they hastily retreated.

The brigade stopped at Pulilan for dinner and then continued the advance toward the Bagbag River. The enemy was again encountered about 4 p. m., intrenched just to the right of the road, and from the end of this trench occupying a curved line slightly concave toward us, 1,000 or more yards in extent, and 1,200 to 1,500 yards distant from us. When they opened fire the artillery had just halted a few yards in rear of the firing line and I had followed the brigade commander a few rods off the road to the right. Here there was a deserted insurgent earthwork which, strangely enough, faced directly toward the line then occupied by the enemy. This work






afforded excellent cover for my guns, and I at once brought them into action behind it and opened fire almost as soon as our infantry did. The Hotchkiss cannon did good work here, although it became jammed for the second time in action that day, due to poor ammunition. Only four or five shots were fired from the field guns before our infantry advanced and the enemy fled. The command encamped for the night very near the captured position.

At 6.45 a. m. on the following day (April 25) it was again on the march. No sign of the enemy was seen until we came in sight of the railroad bridge over the Bagbag River, where the enemy was strongly intrenched. At 10.30 a. m. one section (Sergeant Markland's) went into action on the right bank of the Quingua River and opened fire at 1,700 yards on the insurgent position on the right (north) bank of the Bagbag River, which is a continuation of the Quingua. A number of shell and shrapnel, probably 25, were fired, and the fire was kept up as long as it was possible without danger to our infantry, which had again begun to advance. The cannoneers were under rather a heavy fire and the limber had been somewhat withdrawn in order to insure the safety of the mules. In some much-to-be-regretted way the limber pole was snapped in two while the gun was in action, so it was impossible, in the limited time which ensuing circumstances allowed, to get this gun into the closer action which resulted at the river bank. Yet had that action been of longer duration this gun could have done good work, as the pole was temporarily repaired and the gun brought forward in wonderfully short time, although it arrived just too late to be of further actual service. In the meantime, about 10.35 a. m., the other section and the Hotchkiss cannon went into battery by direction of the brigade commander some 300 yards nearer the insurgent position. After firing a few shots the guns were ordered forward. I conducted them (one 3.2-inch field gun and one Hotchkiss revolving cannon) to the river bank opposite the insurgent trenches and about 60 yards from them. They were taken in under a vicious fire, unlimbered, the field gun being loaded. The position was, of course, far closer than necessary and entirely exposed, except for a slight ridge or breastwork some 15 inches in height in front of it. But this ridge had a shallow ditch on our side of it and this afforded good protection to our infantry, which had just occupied it, so that if the artillery was to be used at all it was necessary for the guns to advance to that line.

The accompanying sketch shows the relative positions of the First and Second brigades of the Second Division, and the position of the insurgents. It will be noticed that each brigade, in addition to its direct fire, had an enfilade fire against the enemy.



All the artillery of the division was now (at 11.15 a. m.) in action, that with the Second Brigade having first opened soon after my first shots were fired. Yet the enemy's fire was scathing. Bullets struck the gun, the ground, and passed through the clothing of the cannoneers, yet, fortunately at this time, only 1 man was wounded. The guns were worked as rapidly as possible, now firing against the trenches facing us, now enfilading the other face of the enemy's work. When the insurgent's fire began to slacken slightly, I sent Corporal Jensen, with his Hotchkiss cannon, further to the right where some opposition was still being encountered, and he did his work splendidly.

At this point the infantry began fording at the fork of the rivers, and as soon as a number of them had reached the further side of the river the insurgents abandoned their position. During this entire action my platoon fired 30 shell and 42 shrapnel, and about 130 projectiles were fired from the Hotchkiss revolving cannon. Private Simmons, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, was shot in the right leg above the knee; wound slight. Corporal Jensen, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, was shot in the abdomen, and died of his wound the next day. One mule was shot through the leg, but was not permanently disabled.

I desire especially to mention Corporal Jensen for gallantry in this action, and for good, efficient service during the two days he was under my command. His fearlessness undoubtedly cost him his life. I desire to also mention Acting Corporal Jones for his cool, splendid work under a close and galling fire. In all, the cannoneers did their duty and more.

About 1.30 the artillery forded the Rio Chico, all the ammunition being taken out of the limber chests and carried across by hand. The ford was most difficult, the exit, where shallow, having muddy and precipitous banks. At one point both guns and limbers disappeared entirely from sight. After crossing this river my command encamped in the immediate vicinity for the night.

At 11 a. m. the following day (April 26), I received orders to move forward and take position on or near a road running, roughly speaking, parallel to the Rio Grande, and about 500 yards from it. The position had been well selected, and commanded the insurgent earthworks on the opposite side of the Rio Grande and west of the railroad admirably, being at the same time screened from hostile view. At 3.15 p. m. I was directed to open fire on the enemy's works, and some seventeen 3.2-inch projectiles and perhaps twice as many Hotchkiss projectiles were fired at ranges varying from 800 to 1,000 yards, with apparently good effect; the insurgents had a gun (about a 3.3-inch muzzle-loading rifled howitzer) which they fired several times before we took position, but to no good effect; but it was on the opposite side of the railroad and we were unable to locate it definitely, or reach it from our position. At 6.10 p. m. it was again fired, but was silenced after the first shot, although subsequent investigation proved that it was impossible for us to make a direct hit from where we were.

At 7.30 the next morning, by direction of the chief of artillery, I moved one section (Sergeant Markland's) to the railroad storehouse, where a porthole was knocked through the brick end of the building. As soon as it was installed this gun was ordered by Brigadier-General Wheaton to begin firing. The other two guns opened fire shortly afterwards, firing slowly. Soon the enemy's fire slackened and all but ceased, and, being with them at the moment, I stopped the fire of the two guns which still retained their positions of the preceding day.

As there was considerable firing farther down the river I then moved the Hotchkiss revolving cannon down the road and opened fire on the detached works which lined the other bank at short intervals. The hostile fire was soon silenced, but the revolving cannon had scarcely regained its former position when I again hurried it down the river to cover the crossing on rafts of part of the Twentieth Kansas under Colonel Funston. This crossing was entirely successful. Although a number of insurgents who had been driven from their trenches endeavored to reenter them, they were easily repulsed by a few well-directed shots from the Hotchkiss cannon. Leaving this gun to meet any emergency that might arise, I returned to the gun located in the warehouse. It was doing beautiful work and the insurgents were already beginning to run. A number of shrapnel were burst among them as they retreated. Seeing a chance to use the Hotchkiss on the right of the railroad I hastily sent for it and it came up with remarkable promptness, but nothing was left for it to do. During this affair of April 27, 28 shrapnel and 33 shell were fired by my platoon, and about 70 projectiles by the Hotchkiss. There were no casualties. That afternoon all the divisional artillery encamped together on the left bank of the Rio Grande.

On the afternoon of May 1 the chief of artillery directed me to report at 3 o'clock the following morning to Brigadier-General Hale, at the Bagbag River, with one section of my platoon, one section of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, and one Gatling gun. Second Lieut. R. C. Naylor, Utah Light Artillery, was also attached to this command. Accordingly, I reported to General Hale at 4.50 a. m., on May 2, and was directed to ford the Rio Chico and wait for the infantry. This was done by 5.45 a. m. The column proceeded to Pulihan where it camped until the following morning, when it returned to the Bagbag River and I returned to the camp at the Rio Grande. That same day (May 3) all of the artillery was ferried across the river, and about 6.45 the next morning took part in the advance on Santa Tomas and San Fernando. My guns were at the rear of the artillery column, and although always well up, such was the nature of the country and such the positions of the enemy that at no

time could all the guns be brought to bear, so that my guns took no part in the fight which occurred at Santa Tomas and vicinity. Two unfordable streams with no bridges over them delayed the progress of the artillery until provision was made by the engineers for our crossing. Yet, as there was no further fighting during the next day or two, this delay was immaterial.

The artillery reached San Fernando on May 5, where it has since been in camp.

On May 11 I received orders to send one section of my platoon to report to Major-General Lawton, and I selected Sergeant Markland's for this duty. He left San Fernando with his section the same afternoon.

During the fight at the Rio Grande it became necessary to send Sergt. Hamilton Markland, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, with a limber to the rear for ammunition. It was a hazardous duty, as during nearly the entire trip (about 2 miles) he was under a warm fire (although not an aimed one). He was supported by none of the excitement of battle, though exposed to all its dangers; yet he returned with the ammunition in almost an incredibly short time. So important do I consider this service that I unhesitatingly recommend that he be granted a certificate of merit.

During the bombardment of the insurgent trenches at Quingua River, on the morning of April 24, Corpl. William Miller, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, had independent charge of his gun, which was in position some 300 yards farther up the river than the main battery. His gun was not over 100 yards from the enemy and had practically no protection from their fire. During the action both pivot bolts of the elevating device broke simultaneously, completely disabling the gun. Yet this able gunner, under a fire which he could not return, calmly repaired the breakage, and then continued his fire. He is certainly entitled to a certificate of merit for "distinguished service."

I also recommend that certificates of merit be awarded to Corpl. M. C. Jensen, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, and Acting Corpl. Charles E. Jones, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, for distinguished service during the engagement at the Bagbag River on April 25, the details of which I have given above.

Very respectfully,

ADRIAN S. FLEMING,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

F.—LIEUT. C. H. BRIDGES'S REPORT.

GUIGUINTO, P. I., May 29, 1899.

Major Young,
Chief of Artillery, Second Division, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report:

At 8 o'clock on the morning of April 25, 1899, the armored train was pushed from Malolos to a point on the track about 1,200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments on the Bagbag River. From this point, at about 11 a. m., we opened fire on the enemy's works, and advancing slowly under fire we continued firing with good effect until within about 150 yards of the intrenchments, when the enemy retreated, leaving the trenches to be captured by our infantry. Our only casualty during the engagement was John Turnquist, private, Sixth Artillery, wounded.

The enemy having destroyed a span of the bridge over the Bagbag River, it was impossible to advance further with the armored train. By order of Major Young, chief of artillery, Second Division, two Gatling guns were removed from the train and mounted on field carriages. We proceeded with the Utah Battery on April 27 to take position in front of the enemy's intrenchments behind the Rio Grande at Calumpit. The position selected for the artillery was at a point on the right of the Montana Regiment, about 200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. In the engagement here on April 27 the Gatlings did very effective work in keeping down the fire on the Utah Battery. No casualties in this engagement.

Respectfully submitted.

C. H. BRIDGES,
Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry, Commanding Armored Train.

P. S.—I am authorized by Lieutenant Bridges to add that there were fired from the armored train at Bagbag the following ammunition: 6-pound shell, 140; Hotchkiss 1-pounders, 1,000 (?); Gatling (smokeless), 6,000.

R. W. YOUNG, *Major.*

G.—SERGT. JOHN A. ANDERSON'S REPORT.

CANDABA, Luzon, P. I., June 1, 1899.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of the second section of Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, since leaving my battery commander at Malolos, April 21, 1899.

I received orders on April 20 to report to Lieutenant Boyd, of the Fourth Cavalry, to be escorted to Bocaue, reaching there in the afternoon of the same day.

April 22 Col. O. Summers took command of the provisional brigade. I reported my detachment and received orders to march April 23, my position being on the left of the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry. About 4 p. m. orders came to take the artillery to the front. We advanced about 2 miles on the gallop, going into action on the brow of the hill overlooking Norzagaray. We opened fire on the insurgents, intrenched 1,500 yards in front of us, firing 4 shrapnel and 1 percussion shell, and silencing the front line. The natives tried to turn our right flank, so action right was ordered and we threw 3 shrapnel into their advancing column, sending them in all directions. We were then ordered to withdraw for the night.

April 24 we started on the march for Norzagaray at 5 a. m., the section of artillery advancing with the firing line. The natives opened fire about 1 mile from the camp. The section went into action four times, and used 10 shrapnel, shelling the timber in front of our advance. At 800 yards from the town Colonel Summers gave orders to shell the city with percussion shells. I directed 10 percussion shells at stone buildings, and then we entered town and went into camp. We had advanced 2 miles and gone into action five times in one hour.

Colonel Summers, before the staff officers and the commander of the Thirteenth Minnesota Regiment, complimented the detachment for its efficiency and quickness in handling the gun.

About 10 a. m. the natives opened fire on our left flank from across the river. I was ordered out, and we went into action and fired 4 shrapnel and 3 percussion shells, dislodging the enemy and sending them running toward the foothills.

April 25 we received orders to march to Ongaut, about 3 miles distant. The natives opened fire on us at about 1,500 yards, and Colonel Summers ordered the infantry to lie down and the artillery to open fire. I went into action with gun at 1,400 yards, firing 8 shrapnel at natives on the outer edge of town and 9 percussion shells at a church and stone wall surrounding it. After entering town the natives opened fire on our left. I was told to use my own judgment in the matter, and I went into action in three places, using 9 shrapnel and 6 percussion shells at ranges from 800 to 1,500 yards. During the engagement the entire town was burned. We were then ordered back to Norzagaray to await General Lawton. The same day the natives opened fire on our watering place from across the river, and I was ordered to dislodge them. We went into action firing 1 percussion shell at intrenchments and 3 shrapnel at retreating natives, killing and wounding quite a number of the latter.

On the 26th I received orders to report to Lieutenant Scott, of the Sixth Artillery. We went into camp below Ongaut until May 1.

On May 1, under direction of Lieutenant Scott, my section went into action on the west side of San Rafael, using 16 shrapnel and 1 percussion shell.

On May 2, under Lieutenant Scott's direction, we went into action, firing 5 shrapnel and 1 percussion shell at 2,000 yards range, entering Baliuag.

May 4 I received orders to report to Colonel Summers. I started at once to San Miguel. Corporal Peterson being sick, he was sent to the hospital. The insurgents were strongly intrenched at Maasin. They opened up a heavy fire on our front, and I was ordered to fire upon them at once. The gun went into action, firing 1 percussion shell and 4 shrapnel, all taking effect on the breastworks. Colonel Summers complimented J. W. Meranda on his good shots. We went into camp at Maasin until May 13.

On the 13th we marched to San Miguel, and camped there till the morning of the 15th, when we started for San Isidro. On the night of the 16th Lieutenant Scott's battery came up with us, and I again reported to him.

May 17, on account of Lieutenant Scott's guns getting stuck in the river, I was ordered to the front with my gun. I fired 3 percussion shells at the retreating natives before Lieutenant Scott joined us, then fired 2 percussion shells under his directions.

On May 18 one section of the Sixth Artillery was attached to my command.

On May 20 we marched down to the river crossing about 12 miles below San Isidro, then marching down to Candaba, crossed the river again.

May 24 I received orders to report to Major Ballance, of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry for duty, and have been here since.

Respectfully,

JOHN A. ANDERSON,
First Sergeant Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, Commanding Detachment.

APPENDIX 38.

HEADQUARTERS UTAH LIGHT ARTILLERY,
Manila, P. I., June 4, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Division, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the division commander, I have the honor to submit the following supplementary and more extended report on the action at the road crossing on the Tuliahan River, March 25, 1899:

The general, accompanied by his staff, a platoon of Battery B, Utah Artillery, under First Lieut. John F. Critchlow, a platoon of Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, under command of Second Lieut. Adrian S. Fleming, Sixth Artillery (both platoons being under my command as chief of artillery of the division), troop of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, under command of Major Rucker, and Ensign Cleland Davis, U. S. N., in command of a Colt's automatic gun and detachment, had halted temporarily at a small church on the road from Cabalahan to Malinta to enable the general to reestablish his lines, the component regiments of which having temporarily failed on account of the density of the timber and underbrush to keep in close touch with each other. Lieutenant Whitworth of the staff had been sent forward along the road with a message having this purpose in view, and was fired on by a party of insurgents intrenched at the river crossing. Having reported this to the general, the latter sent forward a detachment of dismounted cavalymen from Troop E, under Captain Wheeler and Lieutenant Batson. The detachment advanced in skirmish order and was soon heard to be heavily engaged. After the firing had continued for about a half hour Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. V., who had gone forward with the detachment for the purpose of observation, sent an orderly back to the general asking for reinforcements. The former stated that no other troops were then available, but on my request to take a gun with Lieutenant Davis's automatic gun to the front, the general directed the orderly to ask Major Bell to report whether these guns could be used. The latter rode up at the time for the purpose of requesting that a gun be sent to the aid of the hard-pressed troops.

In order that this report may be more easily understood, I will undertake to make the following rough sketch of the scene of action:¹


The banks of the Tuliahan River, where intersected by the road, were from 15 to 20 feet perpendicular height. The abutments of a former bridge remained, one on either bank of the river; but a very steep and sidelong road, passable for only light carromatos and little used, crossed the chasm a few rods above the dismantled bridge. The Filipinos had made a strong breastwork of stones and earth on the right abutment, and had so arranged a heavy steel bridge beam over the top of the breastwork as to leave a continuous loophole, or slot, from which the opposite approaches might easily be commanded. Adjacent to this approach, and just below it in the stream, was a boiler and engine house, said to be the pumping station for the Malabon or Polo waterworks. With a few feet interval, still lower in the stream, began a fieldwork of semi-permanent character, about 200 feet in length along the river. The exterior and interior slopes were sustained by bamboo wickerwork. A slot, about 6 inches in vertical height at the interior slope and flaring to about 18 inches at the exterior, ran from end to end. Above was a layer of earth, about 2 feet in thickness, sustained by a bamboo flooring.

Upon receiving the order to take the guns I instructed Lieutenant Critchlow to order his leading piece forward and for Lieutenant Davis to come. Advancing a few hundred yards, we came to the top of a small hill, on the other slope of which the bullets were falling thickly. Halting the guns until the ground might be reconnoitered, I rode forward with Major Bell. No available position could be found near the crest of the hill, and we rode well forward to the bottom of the hill, where I selected a position which commanded an excellent view of the intrenchment across an open field and furnished a slight screen of underbrush in a row of bamboos for the guns and personnel, and a ruined stone foundation as shelter for the mules.

The enemy's work was scarcely 100 yards distant. While selecting the site Captain Sawtelle appeared on the ground and remained with the detachment until the enemy was dislodged.

The guns were brought down by Lieutenants Critchlow and Davis at a rapid gait. A bamboo fence was cut through, and the 3.2-inch rifle run in and unlimbered near the stone foundation and the mules speedily placed under cover. The piece was run forward by hand through the rough intervening space, obstructed by banana trees and other plants, to a position behind the screen.

¹ See page 550.



Under my instructions the 3.2-inch rifle was loaded with percussion shell, and both it and the Colt's automatic were directed to aim at the slot in the hostile fieldwork. Firing was opened simultaneously and was continued as rapidly as possible on the part of the fieldpiece and continuously by the Colt's until the former had discharged 3 shots, when the enemy was seen to be evacuating the intrenchment. We then followed them up the hill with shrapnel and the automatic-gun fire, with apparent telling effect. After our first shots the insurgents, who had been pouring a murderous fire into the woods with a view of controlling the road, redoubled their exertions and apparently devoted their chief attention to our position, which, on account of our using smokeless powder, they could not definitely locate, but which, on account of the nearness of the explosion of our guns, they were able accurately to approximate. The bullets fell in a storm at and around our position, but fortunately—almost miraculously, in view of the absence of bullet-proof cover—no one was hit.

At Major Bell's information that the enemy still remained in the engine house and bridgehead, we limbered the gun and ran it to a position near the cavalry, where these positions were visible. One shell was fired into the boiler house, and the remnant of the defending force was dislodged. The insurgents were estimated at over 100 men.

The cavalry when I first saw them occupied a position scarcely 75 yards from the enemy—this the position which I understood they had occupied from the beginning of the engagement.

An inspection of the works showed that two of our shells had struck the floor of the slot, exploding at the interior face with disastrous result, and that the third had struck the exterior face, but had failed to perforate the wall, which was about 10 feet in thickness. The effectiveness of the cavalry fire may be judged by the fact that the steel beam referred to, forming a cap to the bridgehead, which was about 20 feet in length and 18 inches in height, was struck by no less than 90 Krag-Jorgensen carbine bullets.

If I may be permitted, I desire to commend as worthy of special recognition for bravery and efficiency Major Bell, Captain Wheeler, Captain Sawtelle, and Lieutenants Critchlow, Batson, and Davis.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICHARD W. YOUNG,
Major Commanding Utah Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

APPENDIX 39.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,
Manila, June 10, 1899.


ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Division.

SIR: Having been requested by the division commander to furnish him a special report on the use of the artillery in the engagement at Marilao, I have the honor to submit the following:

On the morning of April 27, 1899, I was ordered to take position with the artillery in advance from Meycauayan to Marilao, immediately in the rear of the leading battalion of the Kansas regiment. The artillery under my command at that time consisted of one platoon of Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, under command of Lieut. John F. Critchlow, one platoon of Dyer's Light Battery, Sixth U. S. Artillery, under command of Lieut. Adrian S. Fleming, and one Colt's automatic gun, under command of Lieut. Cleland Davis, U. S. N. The advance was ordered about 11 a. m. We proceeded along the wagon road about 500 yards in the rear of the Kansas battalion, which moved out in column of fours, but was soon afterwards deployed to the left of the road. The other battalions of the Kansas regiment were immediately in our rear in column. We had moved forward less than a mile when the infantry engaged with the enemy 800 or 1,000 yards to our front. I rode forward with Lieutenant Davis to reconnoiter the ground with a view to ascertaining if the guns could not advantageously be employed. Upon reaching the rear guard we dismounted, leaving our horses in the timber, and walked out into the open field in search of Colonel Funston, or the other officer in command. The battalion was entirely deployed and engaged quite actively with the enemy intrenched on the other side of the Marilao River. Some of our troops advanced to the bank of the stream and found it to be deep and unfordable, and without bridges or boats.

552 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Major Metcalf, then in command, brought his battalion back a distance of 500 or 600 yards and withdrew them under cover, having suffered a number of casualties during the advance. Meanwhile Colonel Funston appeared, and a consultation followed as to the best means of carrying the position. He stated that he believed he might be able to get possession of several rafts which had been seen on the opposite side of the river if the insurgent fire could be kept down while making the attempt. I told him I would order Lieutenant Davis with the automatic gun to a position on the road as near the enemy's trenches as practicable, if he would detail a company to assist. The offer was immediately accepted and Captain Orwig was ordered to perform the duty. Lieutenant Davis with his detachment and gun immediately proceeded up the road and with a platoon of Captain Orwig's company crept into a very secure position, screened by vegetation and protected by the raised road-bed from the enemy's trenches not more than 75 yards distant across the stream. Major Metcalf's battalion was immediately deployed and advanced to a renewal of the attack. I went forward to look for a gun position and found an advantageous location under a native hut, which commanded a full view of the trenches scarcely 60 yards away, with a slight screen of vegetation, but entirely without protection. I immediately sent orders to Lieutenant Critchlow to bring up one of his guns, leaving the mules well under cover down the road. The order was promptly complied with and the gun was run into the position selected, the limber being left in the road, hidden from the view of the enemy by the trees along the roadway. The following is a rough sketch from memory of the scene of action:



I instructed Lieutenant Critchlow to fire as rapidly as consistent with accurate aiming at the trenches on the opposite bank of the river, with both shell and shrapnel, and to devote some attention to the open country, slight glimpses of which could be gotten through the trees bordering the stream. The insurgent trench, though but a comparatively short distance away, was scarcely visible, being dug into the ground and the dirt therefrom scattered over the adjoining space without at any time raising it into a conspicuous parapet. The Colt's automatic gun and the platoon of infantry were vigorously employed during our firing, and served to make the enemy extremely inaccurate in aim. The fire being kept down so successfully, I sent back ordering up one of Lieutenant Fleming's pieces, but was informed soon afterwards that Major Bell, who had been upon the ground previously, had, upon his own responsibility, ordered a second gun, of Lieutenant Critchlow's platoon, forward. Upon its arrival both guns were run into the road and forward beyond the intervening timber to the bank of the river, where several shots were directed at the insurgent trench, at the point of the river directly opposite, and from 40 to 50 yards distant. After 3 or 4 shots, delivered from the position at the road, 3 or 4 white rags, tied to sticks or guns, were shoved up above the insurgent trench. A few minutes before this event a part of the Pennsylvania regiment and a few men from the Third Artillery had taken position on the same bank of the river as ourselves and were firing vigorously at the opposite trenches. Upon the appearance of the white flags firing immediately ceased along our front at this point, and the insurgents were told in Spanish to stand up, an order which they conformed to with apparent reluctance. Lieutenant Coulter, of the Pennsylvania regiment, with one of the enlisted men of that command, stripped and swam the river and gathered the guns and other arms of those who surrendered. In the meantime quite a party of insurgents scampered out of the trench back into the woods and escaped. At about the same moment Lieutenant Coulter reached the trench, Colonel Funston and a squad of men from his regiment emerged from the trees to the left and rear of the insurgent position, having crossed on a raft lower

down the stream. About 25 men surrendered. Many of those who had been in the trenches at the point of the river and all who were in position above or below that point had escaped soon after the guns opened.

The arch of the stone bridge over the confluent, immediately to the right of firing position, had been destroyed, and it was impossible for us to cross until the engineers had constructed a bridge. About half past 4 in the evening we moved forward to a position south of the Marilao River not far from the railroad, the infantry, with the exception of the Montana regiment, which was in reserve, having crossed the river on the railway bridge, and being deployed in their several positions and engaged in making camp for the night. At the moment of reaching our camping ground the enemy advanced in considerable force, in an extended order, upon our infantry line. It was impossible on the south side of the river to find a position from which the enemy could be seen.

Having been forward to our infantry lines, I felt satisfied that the artillery might be brought into battery and used advantageously by firing over the screen of bamboos 300 or 400 yards to our front. This I directed, and we fired nearly 30 shells over the heads of our troops, who were invisible, at the invisible enemy, at ranges of from 2,000 to 2,500 yards. It was gratifying to learn that several, at least, of the shots thus fired under difficulties had fallen directly into the ranks of the attacking party.

I have mentioned, and desire to mention again, the intelligent and fearless service rendered on this occasion by Lieutenants Critchlow and Davis.

Very respectfully,

R. W. YOUNG,
Major, U. S. V., Chief of Artillery.

APPENDIX 40.

WATERWORKS PUMPING STATION,
Near Manila, April 8, 1899.

Brigadier-General HALL.

SIR: Herewith report of operations of detachment consisting of 4 guns, Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Artillery, stationed at waterworks pumping station, near Manila, P. I., from March 24 to April 8, 1899:

On the morning of March 25, 19 shrapnel and 23 shell were fired from 3.2-inch rifles, from their station on waterworks hill, at various points in the town of Mariquina and the San Mateo Valley to the north, for the purpose of protecting the right flank of Montana and Colorado infantry in their advance from Mariquina road.

At 11 o'clock that night firing from the town of Mariquina upon our outposts became heavy, and we expended 3 shrapnel and 1 shell, which silenced the enemy's fire. It being a bright, moonlight night, we were able to sight our guns with tolerable accuracy.

On March 31, one 3.2-inch rifle and one Nordenfeldt gun took part in the demonstration on Mariquina and the advance toward San Mateo. With Company D, Twenty-third Infantry, as support, we left camp at 5 o'clock, crossing San Mateo River to the right of the pumping station, and following the road on the opposite side of the river in the direction of Pasig until the intersection of that road with the road from Pasig to Mariquina was reached; from that point we approached Mariquina from the south, with battalion of Fourth Infantry on our left. The Nordenfeldt gun took position just inside the south side of the town. A few shots were fired from that point, and the gun advanced in northeasterly direction through the town as the enemy retreated. The 3.2-inch rifle, taking position at the southeast corner of the town, commanding the plain to the east, and a bamboo thicket, which connects the town with the foot of the mountain, directed its fire upon this thicket and others to the right at the base of the mountain. This gun then advanced to the position occupied by the Nordenfeldt on the east side of the town, and a few shots were fired from there. The fire of the enemy having ceased from the bamboo thicket and the base of the mountains, both guns were advanced through the town to the north in rear of Fourth Infantry, and the Nordenfeldt brought into action on the plain beyond. Ammunition expended during engagement: Nordenfeldt—10 shell; 3.2-inch rifle—13 shell, 19 shrapnel.

From that point, by your order, together with our escort, we commenced the march for La Loma church, stopping at our camp one hour for dinner and to feed the horses. We arrived at the church about 10.30 that night. The next day, April 1, at 7 p. m., the return march was commenced, and camp reached about midnight.

I estimate the distance traveled in this engagement and the marches at 30 miles. Our ponies were much exhausted, and would not have accomplished it without much

554 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

help from the men with drag ropes. A gun is too much of a load for 4 ponies; we should have 6. If given two additional for each gun, in the way of harness we would need only collars and hames; the rest we could improvise.

Respectfully submitted.

EDGAR A. WEDGWOOD,
Captain, Commanding Battery A, Utah Light Artillery.

APPENDIX 41

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., June 20, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of work done by armored train since April 1, 1899:

On March 31 I was sent by General Wheaton to Guiguinto with orders to take charge of armored train and guard and keep open the railroad from Malinta to open end of track. The train consisted of 3 flat cars protected by iron plate of sufficient thickness to stop small-arm bullets. On one of the cars was mounted a Hotchkiss rapid-fire navy gun, commonly known as a 6-pounder, and a Gatling gun, caliber .45; on another was mounted a Hotchkiss revolving cannon and a Gatling gun, caliber .45, and on the third was stored the ammunition for use in these guns. The train was guarded by a detachment of 20 men of the Twenty-second Infantry and the guns were manned by 9 men of Battery D, Sixth Artillery.

There being no engine available, the track was not patrolled as intended, but the train was kept at Guiguinto, this place being at a point midway between Malinta and open end of track at that time. Everything was undisturbed along the track until the night of April 10, when the insurgents made an attack along the track from Guiguinto to Bocaue. When the firing was heard the train was pushed by hand from Guiguinto in the direction of Bocaue, and although the darkness prevented any great accuracy in the firing of the guns, the great volume of fire issuing from the train completely demoralized the enemy and they retreated at all points on the approach of the train without having done any damage whatever to the track or telegraph line. In this engagement 17 6-pound shells, 177 Hotchkiss revolving cannon shells, and 4,200 caliber .45 cartridges were fired. The shells for Hotchkiss revolving cannon were somewhat disappointing; the cases persisted in breaking, and this caused the gun to jam. The navy gun was found to be damaged by reason of a defect in the recoiling device, and it was replaced by a gun of same kind.

The train was kept at Bigaa until April 23, when it was ordered to Malolos to take part in the attack on the Bagbag River.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of April 25 the armored train was pushed from Malolos to a point on the track about 1,200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments on the Bagbag River. At about 11 a. m. we opened up on the enemy's works, and, advancing slowly under the fire of the insurgents, continued firing with good effect until within about 150 yards of the intrenchments, when the enemy retreated, leaving the trenches to be captured by our infantry.

Casualties in this engagement on train were 1 killed and 2 wounded. The bridge over the Bagbag River having been destroyed, it was impossible to advance farther with armored train; but by order of General Wheaton 2 Gatling guns were removed from the train and mounted on field carriages.

In the engagement at the Bagbag 115 6-pound shells, 60 Hotchkiss revolving cannon shells, and 3,800 caliber .45 cartridges were fired. The Hotchkiss revolving cannon shells gave the same trouble as before mentioned.

On April 27 the Gatlings accompanied the Utah Artillery and took position in front of the enemy's intrenchments behind the Rio Grande at Calumpit. In the engagement here the Gatlings were very effective in keeping down the fire on the guns of the Utah Artillery. There were no casualties in this engagement. About 10,000 .45-caliber cartridges were fired. The Gatlings were turned over to the Utah Artillery at Calumpit, and I returned to the armored train at the Bagbag.

The train was removed from the Bagbag to Guiguinto about May 1, and remained at the latter place until June 12, when it was taken to San Fernando by order of General MacArthur, where, during the attack on the morning of June 17, it was used to patrol the track between Calumpit and San Fernando.

Respectfully submitted.

C. H. BRIDGES,
*Second Lieutenant, Twenty-second Infantry,
Commanding Armored Train.*



PUSHING ARMORED CARS TO THE FRONT DURING ADVANCE ON CALUMPIT, APRIL 25, 1899.



FOURTH UNITED STATES CAVALRY ON NIUVAICHES RIVER MARCH 15 1892

APPENDIX 42.

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., June 5, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions I respectfully submit the following report:

On the 25th of March, 1899, early in the afternoon, I was ordered to dismount half my troops and clear the woods in front of our line of march from some insurgents, reporting to Maj J. F. Bell, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, who proceeded to the front with the detachment. I deployed a skirmish line on each side of the road, with a small advance guard under First Sergeant Davidson, and moved along the road. After going a few hundred yards all the men were brought into the road, as obstructions along the side made progress too slow. On approaching the Tuliahan River, which at this point runs nearly at a right angle to the road, insurgents were reported across the river by the advance guard, and, deploying both sides of the road, we advanced and attacked the enemy's position, which consisted of a breastwork in the approach to the bridge, the latter having been destroyed. This had stone walls to the front and sides, with iron girders doubled and placed in front as a head protection. To the enemy's right was a loopholed earthen breastwork, about 50 yards long, with flank protected, and to their left they occupied a ridge in the edge of timber, with men scattered along rice dikes and behind a small earthwork. From their fire and the insurgents seen by me, I estimated their number at about 150. The ford being so thoroughly covered by their fire, I did not consider it best to cross immediately, and my men were posted in the brush, a few being in the open ground, where their fire would be as effective as possible. We were within 100 yards of the insurgents, whom I heard plainly talking and shouting to each other, and had no cover worth speaking of.

I reported to Major Bell within a half hour that a number of men had been shot, when he directed me to place the men under cover as far as possible and occupy the enemy while he went for reinforcements. He soon returned with one gun of the Utah Artillery, under First Lieutenant Critchlow, and a rapid-fire, small caliber, navy gun, which were put in position to my left and rear. Just before these guns arrived the insurgents began to withdraw in small parties, who were fired on as they crossed a space of open ground about 200 yards wide. After the artillery fire had continued for perhaps twenty minutes the parties of the enemy crossing the open became more numerous, and the field gun was brought up the road, and one shot fired at close range, though I did not believe any men were left in the works. My detachment then crossed and occupied the position, where we found between the earthworks the pumping station for Malabon.

We found 1 dead insurgent in the nearest work, a wounded man, whom I had seen fall near the road, and I afterwards saw 2 dead insurgents in the edge of the woods, while 3 or 4 badly wounded ones were found in the vicinity. Our loss was Private William E. Tufts, mortally wounded; First Sergt. A. H. Davidson, Q. M. Sergt. Charles Hiatt, and Private Harry A. Howe, seriously wounded; Saddler Samuel H. Evans and Private Charles Rice, slightly wounded.

The artillery was of material assistance in dislodging the enemy. One private from the First Montana Volunteers joined my detachment and behaved well all through the action.

My force consisted of Lieutenant Batson and 23 men, Troop E, Fourth Cavalry.

I desire to mention First Lieut. M. A. Batson, Fourth Cavalry, for coolness and efficiency under fire. First Sergt. Davidson and Q. M. Sergt. Hiatt, both wounded severely, I desire to recommend for certificates of merit for coolness, efficiency, and setting a good example to the other men.

Very respectfully,

FRED WHEELER,
Captain, Fourth Cavalry, Commanding Troop E.

APPENDIX 43.

FUERZA DE SANTIAGO,
 Manila, P. I., March 29, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Third Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, attached to your brigade, during the 25th and 26th instant:

The battalion, commanded by Captain Bolton, and consisting of Company B

(Lieutenant Stevens and 25 men), Company D (Lieutenant Hampton and 45 men), Company E (no officer, 38 men), Company L (Lieutenant Taylor and 47 men), Assistant Surgeon Clayton, U. S. A., detachment of Hospital Corps, detachment of band, Twenty-third Infantry, as litter bearers, and Lieutenant Hagadorn, adjutant Twenty-third Infantry, reported to the brigade commander about 1½ miles north of Caloocan, on the afternoon of the 25th, and was directed to proceed up the river (Tuliahán) and take position so as to connect the Third Infantry with Third Artillery. The Third Infantry was found to be on the south, and Third Artillery on north bank of river. The Twenty-third Infantry crossed that evening and took up a position on left of Third Artillery, extending well to the left so as to protect right flank of Third Infantry. I joined the battalion at this place about 9 p. m., 25th, and took command.

In the morning a squad under command of Lieutenant Taylor made a reconnoissance toward our left and front, and came upon a party of 20 insurgents, who immediately retreated upon seeing they were discovered. They were about 100 yards from the squad when first seen, and about 500 yards from our lines. Later a large party returned and opened fire, but mostly against the Third Infantry. The Third Artillery left their position about 7.30 a. m. and proceeded up the river. About 8 a. m. the Twenty-second Infantry began crossing the river to my side, and I received instructions to support the left flank of that regiment in a turning movement toward the railroad, and to comply with any directions from its commander.

My battalion was accordingly formed in support and followed the movement of the Twenty-second Infantry to the railroad. All the intrenchments lining the river, and there were a great many, had been deserted. After the completion of this movement General Egbert directed me to place three of my companies on the right of the right battalion of the Twenty-second, keep one company in reserve, and to keep in touch with his right battalion. The advance was sounded and we moved forward, but we soon lost touch with the Twenty-second, as the right of the latter had to pass through some woods and thickets. Hearing very heavy firing to my left and, as I thought, my front, we pushed forward, hoping to flank the enemy. The firing sounded to us as though it were very near, and we expected at each rise of the ground and at each clearing to come upon the enemy, but we reached a position flanking the railroad and in advance of the left of the Twenty-second without encountering him. We then discovered that this portion of the Twenty-second was occupying some intrenchments which it had gallantly captured, and was firing volleys at the enemy in the church in the village of Malinta. The firing soon after ceased, and we were concentrated in the village, whence my battalion was sent down a road to the left, toward the bay, to communicate with the Second Oregon. Upon our return I was directed to go into camp and return to our post the following morning.

Though not actually engaged, I take pleasure in stating that Assistant Surgeon Clayton and Lieutenant Hampton, though much exhausted from the heat, and Lieutenant Stevens, though ill, insisted on remaining throughout with their commands. Captain Bolton, though a battalion commander, asked to be placed in command of a company, and his assistance was very much appreciated.

The following were overcome by the heat: Sergeant Lehman and Private Davis, Company B; Sergeant Casad, band, and Musician Mooreland, Company E.

Very respectfully,

E. B. PRATT,
Captain, Twenty-third Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

APPENDIX 44.

FUERZA DE SANTIAGO,
Manila, P. I., April 7, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Third Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, attached to your brigade, on the 31st ultimo:

The battalion, consisting of Company C, Captain Nichols; Company D, Lieutenant Hampton; Company E, Lieutenant Howland; Company L, Lieutenant Taylor; 5 members of the Hospital Corps, and 14 men of the band as litter bearers, left bivouac west of pumping station at 5 a. m.

Company D was detached and ordered to report as support to the battery. This company rejoined me upon my return to pumping station, and as it was separated

from me during the movement from and return to bivouac, the report of its commanding officer is hereto attached and is not embodied in my own.

Crossing the San Mateo River the battalion deployed on a plain north of the village of Santalon in the following order: Companies C and E in extended order, Company L, line of squads as support. The necessary dispositions having been made, we moved north toward the village of Mariquina. Proceeding about a mile we again crossed the river, and, passing over the large bend which the river here forms, soon came in sight of the village on the opposite bank. Our scouts on left front discovered the enemy and opened fire. The battalion (or rather the firing line) quickly reached the river, where, well protected by trees and ridges, it opened fire on the enemy, whose position was disclosed by the smoke of their firing, concealed in bamboo and cane fields on opposite side. The greater part of the enemy appearing to be in my left front, I retained Company C on left to keep down their fire, pushed Company E rapidly across the river, and effected a lodgment on that side; then calling up the support (Company L), had it cross and form on right of Company E, then withdrew Company C from its position, had it cross and form on left of Company E. We then pushed through the village and emerged on a large rice plain, on which I advanced for some distance and halted, awaiting instructions. I then directed Company C to return to village and march through it, and rejoin me farther to my left, to which point I would conduct the other two companies. This was effected and nothing of the enemy was discovered in the town.

In crossing the river many of the men had to wade in water up to their chins, and while under a heavy fire, but, strange to relate, not a casualty occurred. After emerging on the plain the enemy was discovered at a great distance, passing along our front from left to right. We opened fire on him, but the distance was too great to expect any good results. I then discovered a body of troops about three-fourths of a mile on our left, which I ascertained was the Colorado battalion. I was then directed to connect with this battalion, and when it was moved forward I received instructions to move by my left flank and follow in column of files the flags of the Colorado battalion, which were on its extreme right.

The enemy soon opened on us, and the advance having made a change of direction to left we received their fire both from front and flank. Silencing the fire of the enemy in my own front and flank, I again moved by the flank, following the colors before mentioned, and having crossed a lagoon with very little room between it and the Colorado battalion, I could open fire with only one company.

When in this position the enemy opened heavily upon us from a point of woods about 900 yards in our front. The order to retire having been sounded, I moved to the rear by company, directing the rear company to fire volleys to keep down the fire of the enemy, which was doing us some damage, and moved the battalion into some woods on our left (in retiring) to obtain partial cover. At this time the advance was sounded, and I directed Company E to move straight to the front from this position, intending to endeavor to flank the enemy out of its position, as we were concealed from him by the woods I have mentioned. I also sent for Company L to rejoin the battalion, as this company, which led in the movement to the rear, had proceeded some distance. Company E soon met with a very heavy fire from the right flank, but, the cover being excellent, met with no loss. I moved up Company C on its right as support and soon silenced the enemy's fire and resumed the advance. Emerging from the woods, Company L reported to me on my left, connecting me with the Colorado battalion, which had now apparently ceased to advance. I continued my advance, gradually changing direction to the left, meeting long-range fire from my right, and arrived within about 300 yards from the point of woods where the enemy had been, but which now appeared to be deserted. While in this position I received orders to retire. This movement was performed in echelon from the right without any loss, and, having removed all the wounded and exhausted, the battalion was assembled in a village, where I was directed to detach one platoon to escort the wounded. One insurgent was captured and sent into Manila.

The battalion then returned to its bivouac near the pumping station, and having dined at 3.15 p. m., proceeded to La Loma, where I reported to Major Bubb, Fourth Infantry, and was placed in the trenches east of the church, connecting with the Fourth Infantry on my right. Many of the men became exhausted before and during this march to La Loma, about 18 miles in all that day, but they either all rejoined me at La Loma the next day or some few reported sick at their station in Manila. Captain Nichols became exhausted on the return from Mariquina while near the pumping station and was sent into Manila.

I do not know what loss was inflicted by my battalion on the enemy, but as we frequently silenced his fire and caused him to retire, I feel convinced we must have done some damage.

(Lieutenant Stevens and 25 men), Company D (Lieutenant Hamrill); Private Harry Company E (no officer, 38 men), Company L (Lieutenant T. B. Cason, Company C (arm); Assistant Surgeon Clayton, U. S. A., detachment of Hospital; B. Cason, Company E band, Twenty-third Infantry, as litter bearers, and Lieut. John A. Jones, Company Twenty-third Infantry, reported to the brigade commander (breast); Private William Caloccan, on the afternoon of the 25th, and was killed (breast); Private William (Tuliahuan) and take position so as to connect the conduct of Captain Nichols and lery. The Third Infantry was found to be on the river, coolness, and exposure to danger. The Twenty-third Infantry Of the men themselves, I can speak tion on left of Third Artillery, extending there were many who deserve mention of Third Infantry. I joined the battle. I would like to call attention to the following: command.

In the morning a squad under the command of Captain Nichols and immediately retreated up the river, coolness, and exposure to danger. The Twenty-third Infantry Of the men themselves, I can speak yards from the squad. I would like to call attention to the following: large party returned. I would like to call attention to the following: Third Artillery led. I would like to call attention to the following: About 8 a. m. I would like to call attention to the following: received instruction. I would like to call attention to the following: ment town. I would like to call attention to the following:

My horse
the Twenty-third
and
more
of
the

F. B. PRATT,
Captain, Twenty-third Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

FUERZA SANTIAGO, MANILA, P. I., April 2, 1899.

Capt. F. B. Pratt,
Twenty-third Infantry.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Company D, Twenty-third Infantry, under my command, on March 31, 1899. Leaving camp at 8 a. m., I joined the two guns of the Utah battery at the waterworks pumping station, and proceeded with them as a support into the San Mateo Valley. Having crossed the river, I formed an advance and rear guard, and took due precautions to prevent the guns being surprised and attacked on the march. Passing through the village of Santolan, we turned and proceeded up the valley toward Marquina. On approaching the town, half the company was thrown out in a line of skirmishers to the front. Just as we entered the outskirts a force, which proved to be the other three companies of the battalion, Twenty-third Infantry, on the opposite side of the river, engaged the enemy in the town, with the object of forcing a crossing. This was about 700 yards from my position. As soon as I located the enemy's position I saw that I held a position which flanked it, and at once opened fire upon it, with the object of covering the crossing of the battalion, and maintained a fire until the troops crossing the stream made it unsafe to continue firing at this point. The guns separating here and beginning to fire on the scattering enemy, the company was divided, and half went as support with each gun. Both First Sergeant Maher and Sergeant Skala rendered very creditable service in handling these supporting platoons. The company passed through the town with the guns. While halted near the upper end of the town a native sprang out from the houses and fired a shot, which did not take effect. He was immediately fired upon and killed by men of the company.

While returning to the waterworks 5 men were overcome by the heat and fell out, but joined the company during the halt made near the waterworks.

In the afternoon the company started for La Loma, acting as an escort for the guns. The ponies hauling the guns becoming tired out about dark, the men of the company were compelled to help haul the guns over difficult pieces of the road. The march from the waterworks to La Loma proved to be most severe, and over 20 men fell out from exhaustion on the way. All but 2 rejoined the company during the night.

The guns having been brought safely to the firing line, I rejoined the battalion about 9 p. m.

Privates Cooper and Nicholson returned to the company quarters, having fallen out on the march; Private Cooper rejoined at La Loma the next morning; Private Nicholson remained in quarters.

Very respectfully,

CELWYN E. HAMPTON,
First Lieutenant, Twenty-third Infantry, Commanding Company D.

APPENDIX 45.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY A, BATTALION OF ENGINEERS,
Manila, P. I., April 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations, from March to April 3, 1899, of the detachment of engineers attached to the Second Division. The detachment was sent out under verbal orders from Lieut. Col. C. L. Potter, engineer Eighth Army Corps. These orders were that 2 noncommissioned officers and 20 men should go to the engineer storehouse in Manila on the evening of March 22; obtain certain material to be indicated by the superintendent of the storehouse, proceed to the church at La Loma, and await orders. The detachment was joined on March 23 by Capt. F. R. Shunk, corps of engineers, and 2 additional non-commissioned officers.

The material furnished from the storehouse was as follows: Six shovels; 2 picks; 2 mattocks; 6 axes; 2 hatchets; 1 saw; 1 adze; nails, rope, etc., and trestles, balk, and chess for 90 feet of foot-bridge.

The detachment moved forward with the wagon train from La Loma on Saturday morning March 25. A corporal and 10 men were employed during the day in repairing and making passable the road leading to Caloocan from the first crossroad north of La Loma. In the evening, the train had reached the Bagon crossing of the Tuliahan River. The bridge at this place had been destroyed, apparently by a flood.

The river was easily fordable, but the approaches were impracticable for wagons. A footbridge about 90 feet long was built on the evening of March 25, and approaches to the ford were made on the morning of March 26. The work on the approaches was begun at about 4 and finished at about 6.30 a. m. The engineers were assisted in this work by a company of the First Montana Infantry, who reported at 3.30 and were relieved at 5; and by a company of the First Nebraska Infantry, who reported at 5 and were relieved when the work was finished. Picks and shovels were borrowed from the Montanas and the Tenth Pennsylvania.

Nothing of importance was done by the engineers during the remainder of March 26.

On March 27 the detachment replaced a number of loose rails, fish plates, etc., on the railroad between Meycauayan and Marilao. In the afternoon it was found that a stone arched bridge over a small stream crossing the main road south of Marilao had been destroyed. Suitable lumber being found in the village of Saloysoy, a wooden bridge was built resting on the old abutments. The abutments appeared to be somewhat unstable, and were braced with heavy timbers. This work began about 4 and was finished at about 5.15 p. m.

The detachment then moved up to a point opposite the church of Marilao, where it was necessary to build a bridge, work on which was begun at 9 p. m. Some cascos were found in the river and lumber was obtained from the church. This lumber was very hard and heavy. Much of it had to be sawed into suitable lengths, and we were very much delayed by having only one saw.

The bridge was supported by two cascos, one transverse to the length of the bridge, the other longitudinal. The bridge was finished at 7.30 a. m. March 28. The engineers were assisted by details from the infantry, of 60 men at a time, for periods of two hours.

Under the stresses due to heavy rolling loads, the seams of the longitudinal casco opened, and she sank when the train was about half over. The railroad bridge in the vicinity had by this time been secured, and as it was easy of access, it was deemed expedient to floor it with plank rather than repair the ponton bridge. This was done by the engineer detachment of the Third Brigade, First Division.

On March 29 both detachments proceeded to Bocaue. Here, in the afternoon, the railroad bridge was planked by the engineers of the Third Brigade, First Division, while an approach was built by those of the Second Division. This approach was built of some heavy timbers which were found in the vicinity, and was of the bridge type, 40 feet long with one intermediate support.

On March 30, the detachment went to Bigaa, where the highway bridge had been burned. No suitable bridge material being found, a ferry was constructed. The float was a bamboo raft planked over, and was pulled too and fro by means of cables. Bamboo being scarce, the raft was small and inconvenient, but answered its purpose. In its construction the detachment was assisted by the engineers of the Third Brigade, First Division, who joined after building a bridge over a small stream between Bigaa and Guiguinto.

On March 31 the engineers of the Second Division went to Guiguinto, where a ferry was built, similar to that at Bigaa, but considerably larger and stronger.

The detachment was detained at Guiguinto until after noon of April 1, by a misunderstanding of the orders issued to the wagon train. It then proceeded to Malolos, finding nothing to do by the way, and reached that town about sunset. Nothing was done on April 2, and on April 3 the command of the detachment was transferred to Second Lieut. William P. Wooten, Corps of Engineers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK R. SHUNK,
Captain, Corps of Engineers.

APPENDIX 46.

SAN FERNANDO, May 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the operations of my detachment of engineers from March 23, 1899, to April 30, 1899:

On the morning of March 23 I went out to Caloocan under instructions from the chief engineer, Eighth Army Corps, and assumed command of a detachment of 2 noncommissioned officers and 20 privates from Company A, Battalion of Engineers, which had been sent out the night before to accompany General Wheaton's brigade in the advance which was to be made from that point.

The detachment remained at Caloocan until the morning of March 25, when the advance began. Our tools and material had been loaded on railway cars, and our train followed immediately in rear of the firing line. By noon the troops having advanced to within 900 yards of the Tuliahan River, a halt was ordered until the following afternoon, when the advance was resumed. As soon as the enemy had been driven from their trenches on the north bank of the Tuliahan the engineers' cars were pushed by hand down to the railroad bridge. Here it was found that the track had been destroyed over the bridge and for a distance of 150 yards on the south side, while on the north side the roadbed had been entirely cut away for a short distance, and in another place an embankment had been thrown across the road. The ironwork of the bridge was uninjured, but an effort had apparently been made to destroy one abutment. Our first work here was to lay a footbridge, over which some of the troops of the brigade passed, the others having previously crossed at points above and below this bridge. At 4 o'clock I began repairing and relaying the track with the help of 50 Chinamen, whom Major Devol, the transportation quartermaster, had placed at my disposal. By working continuously, stopping only for meals, this was completed by noon the following day, March 27, and by 6 p. m. the track had been repaired to Malinta, where the brigade camped for the night.

By noon of the 28th we had advanced to Marilao, making a few necessary repairs to the railroad as we advanced.

At Marilao the detachment planked over the railroad bridge for the wagon train, completing the work in about one hour and a half. We camped at Marilao for the night.

Next day (March 29) the track was repaired as far as Bocaue, most of the damage done consisting in the removal of the fish plates and spikes from portions of the tracks. Arriving at Bocaue about 5 p. m., the railroad bridge near there was planked over, and the wagon train started across it by 7 o'clock.

March 30 I was directed to assist Captain Shunk and his detachment in the construction of a ferry across the Bigaa River. This work having been completed, in the evening my detachment marched to Guiguinto, arriving there about 11 p. m.

On the following day, March 31, Malolos was captured, and it was found that the railroad track for the distance of about half a mile before reaching the station had been utterly destroyed. In addition to my detachment the transportation quartermaster furnished a detail of 20 white men and 50 Chinamen, and by noon April 2 the track was completed.

After arriving at Malolos the detachments commanded by Captain Shunk and myself were combined and reduced; Captain Shunk returning to the company at Malate and I being left in command of a detachment of 4 noncommissioned officers and 30 men. While at Malolos the detachment constructed about 20 bamboo footbridges and one wagon-road bridge, and dug out two 6-inch breech-loading rifles which had been buried by the insurgents.

On the morning of April 13 we were sent out toward Paombon to repair a bridge which had been burned by the insurgents in an early morning attack. A few insurgents still remained in the vicinity and kept up a desultory fire on the bridge while it was being repaired, but no casualties resulted.



RAILROAD BRIDGE JUST AFTER BATTLE OF BAGRAG RIVER APRIL 25, 1900 ENGINEER BATTALION BUILDING STEPS FOR
PASSAGE OF TROOPS





TAKING GUNS ACROSS BIGAA RIVER OVER BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED BY ENGINEER BATTALION

On the evening of April 23 the detachment, with 10 men furnished by the quartermaster and 12 men by the Kansas regiment, was sent out 3 miles beyond our outposts and within a mile of the insurgent lines to repair a portion of the track for the advance which was to be made by our troops on the 25th. This work was completed, and the detachment returned about 11 o'clock at night.

When the insurgents were driven from the Bagbag River on the 25th it was found that a span of the iron bridge (railroad) about 65 feet long, at that point, had been cut and the railroad track entirely destroyed from there to beyond the Rio Grande, at Calumpit, about 2 miles distant. A footbridge was constructed over the broken railroad bridge, across which the troops passed the next morning. As soon as the troops passed over we began the construction of a wagon bridge. This involved the planking over of the three uncut spans, the bridging of the cut span, the height of the bridge above the bottom of the river being about 30 feet; the construction of the trestle work over 60 feet of roadway, which had been cut out to a depth of 10 feet just beyond the north abutment of the bridge, and the cutting away of an earth-work which had been thrown across the road. By working continuously, stopping only for meals, this was completed by 10 o'clock the following morning (April 27).

April 28 and 29 were occupied in the construction of a footbridge and a bamboo ferry over the Rio Grande, the condition of the railroad bridge not permitting it to be planked over for a wagon train. So much damage had been done the railroad track and bridges between the Rio Bagbag and Rio Grande that it was not deemed advisable to employ the engineer detachment in repairing it, as the detachment would be needed for other purposes during the time that such extensive repairs would necessarily take.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. P. WOOTEN,

Second Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers, Commanding Detachment.

APPENDIX 47.

MALOLO, P. I., April 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of Eighteenth Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, for the month of March, 1899:

At the beginning of the month, Lieuts. F. H. Bailey and Gordon, with squads of men named in previous reports, were at Caloocan and Deposito, respectively, and operators at the various city and outpost stations, as heretofore noted. On March 5 I proceeded with Lieutenant Bailey's squad from Deposito to blockhouse near pumping station, taking a cart loaded with insulated wire. The office in pumping station was discontinued; Corporal Speer and Private Maguire took charge of blockhouse station; the rest of the party ran an insulated-wire line over to Mariquina road outpost, about 2 miles distant, where a sharp engagement had taken place the night and forenoon before. The office was established under a tree at the roadside and left in charge of Privates Gable and Ives. On March 7 Lieutenant Bailey and party repaired and partly reconstructed the insurgent line from Deposito up Mariquina road to the outpost, replacing the insulated wire on the ground. A call bell was put on the table with instrument, thus obviating the necessity for a night operator.

On March 12 Lieutenant Bailey and party recovered the insulated wire.

On March 14, with assistance of Corporal Brooks, a telephone was installed in Caloocan Church, connected with an instrument in the center of the Kansas trenches.

On March 16, when it appeared that General Wheaton's operations might be north of the Pasig, I took Sergeants Flannery and Crowder, Corporal Kirby and Private Wissman, to Deposito from Caloocan Church, and with necessary wire, tools, and instruments for the construction of 8 miles insulated-wire line, loaded into two carts, proceeded on the forenoon of the 17th to the pumping station. The operations not tending northward, on the 18th I returned with 4 men named to Signal Corps barracks in Manila. The next few days were utilized in getting instruments ready and insulated-wire coils in good condition.

On March 24, accompanied by Lieutenant Bailey, First Class Sergeants Strachauer and Flannery; Sergeants Morgan and Byrne; Corporals Moss and Gable, and Private Wissman, Eighteenth Company, and Privates Pease and Myer, Nineteenth Company, I proceeded to La Loma church. The men were rationed for five days.

The supplies, consisting of 10 miles insulated wire, 4 sets of field instruments and office supplies, the barrow reel, and an assortment of small tools, were loaded on 2 pony and 2 bull-team carts furnished by quartermaster's department.

Leaving Corporal Nimmo and Private Mingus in charge of La Loma office, an independent line was carried out from the church on the Novaliches road with the advance on the morning of March 25. Field offices were cut in at a few minutes' notice whenever desired.

About noon the current failed and it was found that the line had been broken by cavalry crossing it. During the afternoon the wagon train cut the line by crossing it. These breaks were quickly located and repaired. Late in the afternoon at Tuliahan Ford it was again broken by wagons. As it was late and the line was now 5 miles long, it took several hours to repair break. Our carts were taken over the steep banks of the Tuliahan Ford by hand, using a prolonge rope borrowed from the artillery. An office was established for the night at the pumping station at the ford. During the night Private Pease, who had been taken sick, was replaced by Private Wickersham from Nineteenth Company. He and Sergeant Jones, Nineteenth Company, came up during the night with additional wire. Private Crawford, transferred from the Nineteenth to the Eighteenth Company, joined on the morning of the 26th. Difficulty in getting the wagon train across the ford delayed the start of division until about 10.30 a. m. The wire had again been cut by the wagon train and the repairman was again sent back. The wire was carried forward with the command and came up about 12.30 p. m., when messages were exchanged. About 1 mile east of Malinta and railroad track final messages were sent and the line abandoned. About 8 miles of wire in all had been laid.

We then went to Malinta, where we found Lieutenants Gordon and Cunningham, with men of their party, at a field office established under the bridge, connecting with the general system at Caloocan Church.

Following the forward movement, an office was established at 4 p. m. 1 mile up the track, when the engagement at Polo took place. The line was carried forward by bridging over gaps in the pole line with insulated wire. The line was on poles about 20 feet high, strung with three No. 8 wires. The poles are badly rotted and in very shaky condition, making repairs very difficult and dangerous to the linemen. Climbers could scarcely be used, due to hardness of the wood, so a bamboo ladder was utilized. After the engagement south of Meycauayan the headquarters and telegraph office for the night were established by the side of the track about 1 mile south of Meycauayan station. On the morning of March 27 Lieutenant Gordon and a party consisting of Sergeants Strachauer and Alexander, Corporal Kirby, and Privates Weir and Storey, Eighteenth Company, and Privates Medley, Groves, Sanford, and McKeon, Nineteenth Company, took one of the bull carts and proceeded to recover insulated wire toward Tuliahan Ford. Lieutenant Bailey took charge of the property and wagons. With Lieutenant Cunningham and party I went up the railroad with division headquarters, using hand car for transporting repair tools and materials.

A field office was established at Meycauayan station about two hours. On approaching Marilao, where much heavy fighting was done, field offices were frequently established. Due to destruction of wagon bridge and the resistance to be overcome at railroad bridge, no farther advance was made. That afternoon a field office near the track, about three-fourths mile south of bridge, was put in for the night, where our camp was established.

On the morning of the 28th the command and wagon train moved over the pontoon bridge across the river, and an office was established at Marilao station. Lieutenant Gordon and party, who had been carrying a second galvanized wire line north from where Lieutenant Rudd, Nineteenth Company, had constructed it to Malinta, reported at noon at Marilao. Line trouble having come up, Lieutenant Gordon and party returned to put line in good condition. It was decided to remain at Marilao over night, so two insulated wires were carried over to headquarters, about one-half mile west of track, to the office established there. A start forward was made at 5 a. m. on the 29th, Lieutenant Bailey coming with repair party up the track, Lieutenant Cunningham going with wagons. The wires were found in fair condition up to about one-fourth mile south of Bocaue station. There we found the track torn up, station burned, and telegraph line entirely destroyed. A field station was established and Private Wissman was sent back to bring up all available insulated wire. This was laid from Bocaue north about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Again the pole line was used for about three-quarters of a mile, when destruction of pole line made it necessary to use insulated wire for probably a mile. At Bigaa the pole line again began.

Lieutenant Gordon and party rejoined again at Bigaa and proceeded to patch up an old push car for use in place of our broken-down hand car. From Bigaa to

Guiguinto but few repairs of line were needed. At Guiguinto, where the possession of railroad bridge was stubbornly contested, a field office was established about 5.30 p. m., but a partial ground south of us prevented any communication. This is believed to have been due to hasty construction between Caloocan and Malinta, as numerous crosses were found there next morning by Lieutenant Gordon. He was sent back during the night with Private Medley, Nineteenth Company. The wire came up about 7 a. m. on the 29th. Before starting, Lieutenant Bailey and party constructed a line as far as the break extended, about one-fourth mile beyond the bridge. The signal wagons came up early in the morning, Lieutenant Cunningham having carried them across the two railroad bridges by hand and swam the horses.

On the advance that day communication was satisfactorily maintained, and but little repairing was necessary. At the halt that afternoon, about 2 miles from Malolos, a field office was cut in which was subsequently taken into a native hut by headquarters. Line trouble developed about dark showing a partial ground between the office and Guiguinto. Messengers to and from Guiguinto were employed for important work during the night, and there was only a slight delay. Next morning early the trouble was removed by Lieutenant Bailey and Corporal Gable.

About 7 a. m. on the 31st we moved forward with the command. A mile south of Malolos the line was found destroyed, and galvanized wire was put up on the poles. Field offices were cut in from time to time as messages from the General were received. The news of the fall of Malolos was transmitted to Manila within fifteen minutes after the event. This was accomplished through the skill of Private Johnston, whose superb management of a very leaky wire is worthy of all praise. The line was carried up to the Filipino Congress Hall by means of a half mile of insulated wire; subsequently the office was moved to its present location in headquarters on the main plaza.

To the officers with me is due the acknowledgment of services well and faithfully performed. Lieutenant Bailey, whose sound judgment and reliability under all conditions, contributed largely to the success of our work. Lieutenant Gordon is always energetic and enthusiastic in the discharge of his duties. Lieutenant Cunningham, who joined at Caloocan, showed such zeal and thorough acquaintance with all details of the work as to make himself invaluable. First-Class Sergeant Strachauer, Sergeants Morgan and Byrne, and Private Crawford demonstrated by their excellent work the wisdom of taking good men as linemen. First-Class Sergeant Flannery labored unceasingly, looking after wagons, property, and mess affairs, and could give intelligent assistance in any work. First-Class Sergeant Paulsen, Corporals Moss, Gable, and Kirby, and Private Weir, were tireless, working with equal efficiency as linemen and operators. Private Wissman, whose good-natured and hearty assistance could be counted upon, however hard the work. Private Johnston, who joined at Marilao, is a fine operator and willing at any work. To the men of the Nineteenth Company, already named, thanks are due especially to Privates Medley and Groves, whose excellent work speaks well for their future use in the Signal Corps.

The labor performed by the men was of the most exhausting kind, in the extreme heat prevailing, and one day it was done with nothing to eat and bad water to drink. But it has been done cheerfully and uncomplainingly under all circumstances of danger and difficulty.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDGAR RUSSEL,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

APPENDIX 48.

EIGHTEENTH COMPANY, VOLUNTEER SIGNAL CORPS,
Headquarters, Bagbag River, P. I., May 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following operations of the Eighteenth Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, during the month of April, 1899:

On April 1, the Second Division headquarters then being at Malolos, there were offices along the railroad to Caloocan, Melinta, Guiguinto, and Malolos.

On April 2 Lieutenant Gordon, with a party of 3 men assisted by 12 Chinamen, put up the poles where they had been torn down by the enemy for about 2½ miles between Marilao and Bigaa. Sergeant Paulsen with another party followed, replacing the insulated wire on the ground with one on poles, and running another wire,

connecting with "local wire," ending north of Marilao. The work was completed about April 6.

On April 4, in accordance with orders from Chief Signal Officer, the Eighteenth Company was relieved from telegraphic duty in and around Manila and Cavite, and assigned to the railroad and field communications of the Second Division. Accordingly, all operators in the city were relieved and reported to the company commander at Malolos.

On April 7 Lieutenant Bailey and party ran an insulated wire to Battery H, Third Artillery, stationed at Paombon, a distance of about 2 miles, and extended the pole line to an office at the front, about 1 mile.

An office was opened at Marilao on April 8 and one at Bigaa on April 9. A day office at the railroad station at Malolos was opened on April 9.

On the night of April 13, when the attack was made on the railroad, about 2½ miles of line were torn down by the enemy between Bigaa and Meycauayan. Fortunately the placing of a main-line battery at Malolos enabled communication to be maintained with Bigaa, giving great assistance in conducting operations. Lieutenant Bailey and a party of 7 men started south at 3 a. m., and by energetic work succeeded in reestablishing communication at 3 p. m. with the city. The office was removed from Bigaa temporarily to Bocaue Bridge.

A determined attack was made on the Third Artillery outpost on the morning of April 15, preceding which the wire was cut in many places. The repair of these breaks was made under my personal observation by Sergeant Flannery, under a sharp fire from the enemy posted about 800 yards from the open road along which the wire lay.

On April 21 the withdrawal of troops from Malinta, Marilao, and Bigaa, necessitated abandoning the offices at those places. The office at Bocaue Bridge was reestablished.

The preparations for advance on the 23d made the recovery of the Paombon wire necessary. The offices at Paombon and headquarters at Malolos were closed.

On April 24 Lieutenant Bailey and a party of 6 men laid an insulated wire to the Quingua River, about 4½ miles out, establishing communication during the day until late that evening with General Hale's brigade advancing along the north bank of the river. They recovered the wire, coming in that night. Next morning at 9 o'clock several cars were pushed up the track by Chinamen, following the advance of the division. On two of these the signal corps property was loaded. Insulated wire was necessary to fill in a gap of 1½ miles torn down by the enemy.

In this instance, as well as in several preceding cases, it is found to be a great assistance to have a separate battery and instruments for the flying line, thus not interrupting business on the line already built. The line was carried, with the division headquarters, to the Bagbag River, and an office established in the car.

On the 27th Sergeant Morgan with 3 men and a gang of Chinamen returned and carried the two-wire line from Malolos to the Bagbag, and recovered the insulated wire, doing remarkably quick and efficient work. Lieutenant Bailey and a party on the 26th carried an insulated line forward about three-fourths mile across the river to a field office at the firing line.

On the morning of the 27th this was carried three-fourths of a mile farther to the freight house on the bank of the Rio Grande, where the successful attack on the enemy was made. (The insulated line was carried across the Rio Grande about a mile and a half to the position of the Montana regiment and another field office established.)

On the 29th, Lieutenant Bailey and party built the 2-wire pole line from the Bagbag to the Rio Grande.

No further changes were made before the end of the month.

It is a source of congratulation that the heat and hard service had so little effect on the health of the men.

During the month the following changes were made in the offices at Manila: A train dispatcher's office was opened April 10 in the quartermaster depot building with Private Weir in charge, assisted by Private Young. Private Mingus was placed in charge of the Eighteenth Company instrument in the palace on April 5.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDGAR RUSSEL,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps



DISMANTLED CHURCH AND CONVENT AT PARAÑAQUE OCCUPIED BY FILIPINO INSURGENTS AS BARRACKS WITH TELEGRAPH OFFICE ROOM IN ANNEX OCCUPIED AS UNITED STATES SIGNAL CORPS TELEGRAPH OFFICE



APPENDIX 49.

EIGHTEENTH COMPANY, VOLUNTEER SIGNAL CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., May 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of the Eighteenth Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, during the month of May, 1899:

At the beginning of the month the line extended to the field office north of the Rio Grande, with 9 officers and 11 operators on duty. On May 1 a separate table, with instruments on Eighteenth Company wires, was placed in the central office. Sergeant Burgin was placed in charge and Corporal Gable and Private Ives assisted in care of office and batteries.

On May 2 Sergeant Strachauer and party replaced the insulated wire on the ground from Calumpit to Montana headquarters, about 1 mile north of the river, with a pole line. On the same day the office at Bagbag was removed from the car and placed in a wall tent by the track, Sergeant Moss in charge. Corporal Kirby was placed in charge at Calumpit.

On May 3 we broke camp at Bagbag and proceeded to Rio Grande Bridge, taking 1 horse and 2 bull carts for heavy equipment and cooking utensils. Two hand cars were utilized for wire, construction materials, etc.

The start from Rio Grande Bridge was made early the morning of the 4th. Sergeant Flannery took charge of the carts coming with wagon train. Sergeant Alexander and Private Wissman remained in charge of the transportation at Bagbag.

As line was entirely destroyed, insulated wire was reeled off the hand car. At the broken bridge 4 miles north of Apalit, where the first resistance was met, an office was established for several hours. Here, through the most exhausting labors on part of the men, all the heavy impedimenta, including the two cars, were carried across the destroyed section of track and the broken bridge, and the line laying resumed in a short time after the fight at Santo Tomas, 1½ miles north. Arriving at Santo Tomas, an office was established at General MacArthur's headquarters about 5 p. m. The men were very much exhausted by the heavy labor, heat, and lack of water.

The removal of headquarters to San Fernando took place on the morning of May 6. Meantime, Sergeant Alexander and a party of Chinamen brought up some insulated wire from Bagbag to replenish our almost exhausted stock.

The insulated wire line was carried to San Fernando, 1½ miles, by 9 a. m., Corporal Nimmo being left in charge of office at temporary headquarters at Santo Tomas. Sergeant Gordon, First Company, went forward to take his usual place as operator at headquarters at San Fernando. The office and headquarters there were established at the Hizon House. The Signal Corps was comfortably quartered in a roomy house near by.

On the afternoon of the 6th the circuit was interrupted, and Lieutenant Bailey, with Sergeants Paulsen, Morgan, and Crowder, Corporal Gable, and Privates Crawford and Boggess, went back to repair and commence replacing insulated wire with a pole line. The break was found and repaired within an hour. At Bagbag they collected material and, assisted by a gang of Chinamen, started a pole line north on the morning of the 8th. Sergeant Paulsen took Sergeant Alexander's place at Bagbag, the latter joining construction party. The pole line was finished by the evening of the 11th, about 8 miles of insulated wire having been replaced.

No further work of note was done, except that performed by Lieutenant Cunningham's party of men from all the companies (Sergeants Alexander, Crowder, Corporal Brooks, and Private Ives, being sent from the Eighteenth) in constructing line from Calumpit to Candoba. This will be set forth in his report. An office was opened to accommodate the railroad management at the San Fernando freight house, May 27.

The effect of the heat and severe work began to tell upon the men during the month, as many have had to be sent in to Manila for sick report, two being seriously ill at present, and all feel the effects of continuous campaigning.

It is a source of gratification to note that, although some wire troubles have existed, at no time for the past six weeks has General MacArthur been deprived of his communications with the city for more than one hour in all. This is due to the men's vigilance in maintaining and prompt action in repairing the line.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDGAR RUSSEL,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

APPENDIX 50.

OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 18, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to herewith respectfully submit report of the medical department, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, for the month ending March 31, 1899.

From March 1 to 24th, inclusive, dressing and ambulance stations were maintained at Caloocan Church, Caloocan railway station, La Loma Church, Blockhouse No. 4, Deposito, and waterworks. During this time, as a result of skirmishes and sharpshooters, 8 of our men were reported as killed and 46 wounded, all of which were promptly forwarded to First Reserve Hospital. As the topography of the country prohibits ambulance service except on established roads, which are scarce, the situation often compelled the transportation of men killed or injured for a long distance on litters, which labor in this climate is extremely arduous upon the bearers—privates from the ranks or Hospital Corps. Recommendation was made and approved that Chinese coolies be substituted as litter bearers, and, as a result, 150 were employed by the Quartermaster's Department and distributed throughout the regiments, 18 for a full regiment and smaller organizations pro rata, leaving a surplus of 12 to draw from in emergencies. Two were assigned to a litter under the direction of a private of the Hospital Corps.

March 23.—Directed by the division commander to prepare for advance to commence March 25 at daylight with La Loma Church as center. The following instructions were at once communicated to brigade surgeons, First, Second, and Third Brigades:

"You are herewith directed to instruct regimental surgeons in your brigade regarding anticipated engagement as follows: While 'first-aid' dressing should be promptly applied, the wounded should not be sent to the rear under severe fire or over very exposed positions. It is better to wait until the danger is somewhat minimized than to expose men to chances of secondary wounds and possible loss in Hospital Corps. Man with each cooly litter should be with same constantly during engagement, directing their movements always with the view of getting as much protection as possible from nature of surroundings. While men should be firm with the Chinese, I do not approve of force in case of exhibition of timidity.

"The wounded in your brigade will at first be forwarded to Manila in ambulances. Unless case is one where immediate transportation might save life, do not forward ambulance until filled or nearly so. If you have telegraphic communication, wire as soon as ambulance is started to have it replaced with an empty. If no wire, then ambulance going in must send one back as soon as it arrives at hospital. Wire or send these requests to Captain Kiefer, First Reserve Hospital. Should condition arise warranting same, forward all injured to Caloocan, using railroad from that point. In this contingency Captain Kiefer must be wired when train will arrive at captain of posts' office, that he may transfer to hospital per launch. No operating in field except to save life, and no redressing of first aid except for unchecked hemorrhage or disarranged bandages. You will inform this office as soon as possible where you wish to establish the first ambulance station in your brigade, stating road to same, and two will at once be ordered to report to you for duty.

"Daily reports of casualties, showing name, rank, station, and character of wound, should be wired chief surgeon Eighth Army Corps, and this office direct, by regimental surgeons."

Arrangements were made to have all wounded that could be sent in via railway to be promptly transferred to First Reserve Hospital in launches. Ambulances, six in number, were parked and distributed from La Loma Church. The first-dressing and ambulance station established after advance began was in church near crossing at Tuliahan River; the next at crossing on west side of river. The killed and wounded occurring March 25 were all transported to First Reserve Hospital by ambulance except those on extreme left, which went by railway.

March 26.—Troops advanced very rapidly and no dressing station was established. All wounded were taken in by ambulances, as track was torn up north of Caloocan.

March 27.—As line advanced north each side of railroad track, ambulance and dressing station was established at Meycauayan, on railway, and placed in charge of Major Neff, regimental surgeon, Tenth Pennsylvania U. S. Volunteer Infantry. A fair road was found some distance west of railway and parallel to it that was used by ambulances in bringing wounded from the extreme left to dressing station¹ on

¹ No road east of railway track, so wounded were carried from the right of the line by litters to track and run into dressing station.

an old hand car that was put together with temporary platform, having a capacity of 6. Railroad was repaired and train came up to the line at Marilao River about 8 p. m., taking a number of wounded that were just being loaded into ambulances at that point, together with those accumulating during the day at Meycauayan, into Manila during the night.

March 28.—Forwarded ambulance and dressing station to Marilao. Crossed ambulances over river on casco bamboo bridge. Fifteen wounded Filipinos were sent in on train to hospital from this point.

March 29.—Advance began 6 a. m. Bridges over Bocaue River were destroyed and ambulances left behind, it being impossible at that time to cross them. Construction train repairing track in our rear smashed into hospital hand car, disabling it and injuring two of its crew. At next station, Bigaa, a dismembered, dismantled hand car was found in different places about the station, put together, covered with a large Filipino cane-bottomed bed taken from the station house, and when complete propelled along the track by the hospital corps in rear of the line. Guiguinto reached at 5 p. m. Established dressing station in freight house and after engagement that occurred at this point and across river, brought all wounded in on hand car, which was then used in transporting supplies to troops on the firing line. Track repaired and train arrived in Guiguinto about 3 a. m., on which wounded were at once transferred to hospital in Manila.

March 30.—Advanced to trenches some distance beyond Guiguinto. All injured in engagement that occurred here were sent back to dressing station on the hand car and then to Manila by train.

March 31.—After advance moved dressing station to trenches occupied as camp previous night. Entered Malolos 10.20 a. m. and established dressing station in railway station, also small medical-supply depot. While there was a noticeable lack of good roads through country traversed, a small supply of ambulances for number of troops engaged, a very meager allowance of transportation for the medical department, and not a complete complement of medical officers, yet through the untiring exertions of those on duty all obstacles were overcome, the wounded well cared for and with very little delay sent in to the First Reserve Hospital. From their care and treatment after reaching the hospital I have only good reports. Attention is also invited to the fact that when at Marilao, March 27, Drs. Haas and Chaffee, of the United States Navy, reported as having been ordered by Admiral Dewey to offer their services. Dr. Haas was assigned to Tenth Pennsylvania U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and Dr. Chaffee to Third U. S. Artillery. Owing to our scarcity of medical officers their appearance was doubly welcome and it is with pleasure that I report the most excellent and faithful service from each. They are still with the command. It should also be stated as a matter of record that the employment for the first time of the Chinese coolie as litter bearer on the battlefield, by the American Army, has been a success. To his brave and faithful services from the firing line to the rear is largely due the fact that very little delay occurred in getting wounded to the dressing station. From the nature of the country this was often a task of several miles in extent, where any sort of wheeled vehicle would have been impossible. The transportation of men in litters by coolies accustomed to that kind of labor is done more gently than by any other method, which fact seems worthy of note.

The following table shows in partial detail the casualties that occurred in the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, from March 25 to 31, inclusive, viz :

Organization.	Mar 25.		Mar 26.		Mar 27.		Mar 28.		Mar 29.		Mar 30.		Mar 31.	
	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.
First Montana	5	15	2	9	2	7
Twentieth Kansas	3	13	1	5	3	3	26	1
Third Artillery	4	28	..	3	3	14
Tenth Pennsylvania	1	4	1	4	..	2	..	2	13	1	1	1
First South Dakota	1	..	5	7	27	..	1	10	..	4	3
First Nebraska	1	14	..	7	..	15	..	1	15	..	19	1	10	..
First Colorado	1	5	..	8
Utah Light Artillery	2	1
Fourth Cavalry	9
Total each day.	15	91	2	29	15	70	4	9	71	4	24	1	16	..

Staff officers wounded, 2.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY F. HOYT,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 51.

OFFICE OF CHIEF SURGEON,
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Calumpit, P. I., May 1, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to herewith respectfully submit brief report of medical department, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, for month of April, 1899.

April 1.—Camp at Malolos, P. I. Dressing station and temporary local medical supply depot established in railway station house. Made inspection of troops, finding them in fairly good condition, recuperating slowly from the effects of the rapid advance and hot weather during campaign at Malolos.

April 4.—Considerable diarrhoea among troops. Inspection revealed impure water supply. Recommended condensed water be supplied per trains from Manila, which was so ordered by division commander.

April 6.—Made medical and sanitary inspection of entire division. Sanitary condition, excepting bathing facilities, good. Troops improving physically.

April 9.—After experimenting for some weeks with native plant known as "sam-bong," as a prophylactic against insolation, it was thought best to instruct troops as to its appearance, location, and practical use, which was accordingly done by specimens of the plant being distributed, etc., by brigade, regimental, and assistant surgeons.

April 14.—Major Neff, regimental surgeon, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, being ordered to Cavite with regiment, Maj. R. C. Warne, regimental surgeon, First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, was placed in charge of dressing station and supply depot.

April 23.—Engagement of Second Brigade resulted in 43 wounded and 7 killed, all of whom were promptly brought in by ambulances and transferred to hospital, Manila, per train.

April 24.—Engagement on the right resulted in 11 wounded and 6 killed. Some delay in bringing them to dressing station, as ambulances were unable to find ford across Quinga River.

April 25.—Command advanced to Bagbag, where temporary dressing station was established in church. Station and supply depot was forwarded from Malolos in the afternoon and located in station house by railroad track, where main dirt road from Malolos to Bagbag crosses. After attending to forwarding casualties occurring in First Brigade and armored car, discovered ambulances of Second Brigade with 4 dead and 26 wounded on north side Bagbag River and unable to cross. A small canoe was found, the only one for some distance up or down the river, and one by one the wounded were safely crossed, placed in ambulances, carried to the dressing station, and without delay were en route per train to Manila. Considerable credit is due a Kanaka boy from Honolulu, with the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, and a Filipino prisoner, for skillful handling of the canoe, as our men were both inexperienced and exhausted.

April 26.—Major Rafter, regimental surgeon, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, was sent to Malolos to take charge of convalescents left there, some 150 in number.

April 27.—During advance Twentieth Kansas and First Montana north of Rio Grande, 1 was killed and 11 wounded; also 9 wounded Filipinos cared for. All were transported to Rio Grande by litter and hand car, thence across the river by canoe. A temporary dressing station had been placed in sugar warehouse, south side Rio Grande. Wounded were then placed in ambulances, carried to Bagbag River, where a damaged approach to bridge necessitated transferring across the bridge on litters. They were again put in ambulance, taken to dressing station, cared for during the night, and forwarded to Manila next morning on train. This entire incident occurred during a very heavy, chilling rainstorm. It is with great pleasure that I invite attention to the special bravery of a medical officer of this division, Capt. H. D. Smith, assistant surgeon, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, a man that has often been called and never found wanting, and who accompanied Col. F. D. Funston as he crossed the Rio Grande on a raft, and was with the fighting line during the battle that followed this memorable event. Dr. J. S. Chaffee, assistant surgeon of the *Monadnock*, U. S. N., has been giving excellent service during the month with the Third U. S. Artillery and a squadron of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, both attached to this division. It should also be reported that Lieut. R. P. Jensen, assistant surgeon,

First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, has not reported for duty with his regiment since it left Manila.

Medical officers on duty, including chief surgeon	19
Hospital stewards	14
Acting hospital stewards	9
Privates, including 18 with ambulances	57
Ambulances	6
Coolies, litter bearers, from about	100 to 125

The following table shows number of casualties in the different organizations for April, 1899, that have been reported to this office, viz:

Organization.	Killed.	Wounded.
Fifty-first Iowa		15
Twentieth Kansas	3	12
Fourth Cavalry	3	6
First Montana	4	18
First South Dakota	8	23
Third Artillery	2	5
Sixth Artillery		2
First Nebraska	8	47
Utah Artillery	2	6
Total	30	134

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY F. HOYT,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 52.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON,
San Fernando, P. I., June 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to herewith submit report of the movements of the medical department, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, from May 1 to May 31, 1899, inclusive:

May 1.—Dressing station and local medical-supply depot still established in railway substation house at crossroads below Bagbag, in charge of Maj. R. C. Warne, regimental surgeon First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

May 3.—Moved dressing and supply station to vacant warehouse on south side Rio Grande, just below bridge. Brought up hospital hand car and had it in readiness on railroad track north side of Rio Grande. Four ambulances were taken across river on raft and placed on road in rear of Second Brigade. Two were left at Rio Grande dressing station to transport to and from end of track at Bagbag. Advanced north about 5 a. m.; First Brigade on, and Second Brigade to right of, railroad track. Second Brigade became engaged with enemy about 9 and First Brigade about 10 o'clock a. m., at Santo Tomas River. Crossed river about 1 p. m. Shortly afterwards engaged enemy again near railway station at Santo Tomas. Day was intolerably hot and men suffered greatly from heat and thirst, as canteens were emptied early in the day, and the water at Santo Tomas and vicinity was found to be brackish. The wounded in Second Brigade on south side Santo Tomas River were sent to dressing station by ambulances. Those of First Brigade south of river were sent in by hand car. All injured on north side of river were carried on litters to the railway bridge 1 mile from station, ferried across on two cascoes lashed together, and sent to the dressing station 5 miles distant on hand car. Our men being all in an exhausted condition, Filipino prisoners were impressed to propel hand car. Wounded were cared for in dressing station and all but last load on hand car were sent to hospital in Manila by train. The remainder, together with 9 wounded Filipinos, were sent in next morning.

May 6.—Ambulances succeeded in crossing Pambaling and Santo Tomas rivers and reported at headquarters, which had been established at San Fernando. Major Warne was directed to turn over dressing and supply station to Major Rafter, regimental surgeon Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, and report at headquarters. Three suitable houses were selected in San Fernando and a temporary hospital at once established.

May 7.—Major Warne reported and was placed in charge of hospital at San Fernando. All extra cots, blankets, and medical supplies were brought forward as rapidly as possible by the ambulances on their return trips from transporting sick and injured to the north end of the Rio Grande bridge.

May 11.—After personal inspection and receipt of reports from medical officers, made report to division commander on general physical condition of troops. Report unfavorable; men very much exhausted and debilitated.

May 22.—Diarrheal troubles being on the increase in command, recommendations were made by this office that the sale and consumption of fruit be regulated and restricted, it being possible that the indiscriminate use of same by troops assisted in increasing the sick rate.

May 23.—Made following report on army ration to chief surgeon, Eighth Corps, in response to circular from that office under date of May 18, 1899.

* * * "In compliance with your request under date May 18, for report on army ration, I have the honor to submit the following:

"*Field ration.*—Amount of rice per ration per day should be increased to 6 ounces. Company commanders should encourage its use and see that cooks prepare and serve it in palatable form.

"*Travel ration.*—Instead of canned corned beef, which has been universally condemned by troops in this division during the present campaign, would supply same quantity of either boiled sliced ham or a sausage, three parts beef and one pork. In place of beans would issue a well-seasoned, nutritious vegetable soup. These articles, as well as the tomatoes every four days, should be put up in flat cans more convenient to carry than the present shape. The quality of the component parts of the ration should be of the very best." * * *

May 24.—Engagement occurred west of town, in which First Montana, Twentieth Kansas, and part of Utah Light Artillery took part. Wounded were brought in by ambulances, cared for at hospital, and sent to Manila on train at 3 p. m. Thirty-five wounded Filipinos were sent in also.

May 25.—By verbal authority from division commander, five buildings were selected on corner of Calles Maura and Dolores and a division field hospital established therein, the first in the Filipino war. It was arranged for the present with a maximum capacity of 200 beds. Maj. Guy L. Edie, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., having reported for duty, was assigned by division commander as officer in charge. The wounded, occurring in engagement on front Second Brigade, 3 p. m., were brought in by ambulances, cared for in division field hospital, and sent to Manila by train next day.

May 29.—Made following report and recommendations to division commander:

* * * "I have the honor to respectfully invite your attention to the following facts and recommendations regarding sanitary matters at this camp. At present the excreta of the men is, with few exceptions, deposited in the ordinary sink dug from 2 to 6 feet in depth, and deodorized by frequent applications of earth. The exceptions are closets built over the edge of river bank, the excreta dropping into the river. If this is to be a permanent camp, the sink system will soon become an objection and a nuisance, as the shallowness of the soil will necessitate frequent removals, which will in time honeycomb the adjacent vicinity with sinks. Would recommend that where quarters are within 300 feet of river bamboo closets of proper dimensions be built over the river bank, extending out sufficiently to allow excrement to be dropped into the current. Where this is not practicable and where house closets are used that are not drained into river, would recommend the earth closet. A scavenger department equipped with native laborers should be organized, whose duties should be to clean streets, remove and dispose of all refuse. Men should police their own quarters, depositing the refuse in convenient place to be removed by scavengers. Cooks should do the same with kitchens and garbage. The contents of earth closets should be removed at regular intervals by scavengers and dumped into the river at some point below any habitation. The street sweepings, animal manure, and camp refuse generally should be carted out and dumped in some ravine at least a mile from camp, where, if possible, it should be burned from time to time." * * *

Was granted permission and exchanged Chinese coolies employed at hospital for Macabebes. The coolie is very satisfactory as a litter bearer, but is not efficient as an all-around worker in a hospital.

May 31.—At this date the troops that have been with this division on this expedition since February 4, 1899, are in an exhausted and debilitated condition. This statement refers particularly to the First Nebraska, First South Dakota, First Montana, and the Twentieth Kansas, all United States volunteer infantry. They were practically exhausted when this camp was reached May 6, and under the influence of guard and outpost duty, several short marches, engagements in the daytime, and an occasional alarm at night, that they have participated in since that date; it is observed that their recuperation is slow.

The following is a numerical report of casualties occurring in the division during the month:

Organization.	Killed.	Wounded.
Fifty-first Iowa.....		8
Twentieth Kansas	3	21
First Montana	1	8
First South Dakota.....	1	7
Fourth U. S. Cavalry		3
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry		1
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	1	4
Total.....	6	52

The numerical report of the personnel of the medical department of this division, on duty during the month, was as follows:

Medical officers, including the chief surgeon.....	27
Hospital stewards	19
Acting hospital stewards	17
Privates, including 18 with ambulances	110
Ambulances.....	9
Coolie litter bearers.....	78

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY F. HOYT,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 53.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE,
San Fernando, P. I., June 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of the service of the subsistence department in the Second Division for the period from March 20, 1899 (date of my last report), to May 31, 1899:

From March 20 to March 25 the division remained in the lines occupied on the former date, and the subsistence service continued of the character then reported.

From March 25, when the command moved on Malolos from the positions at Calocan and La Loma, the organizations still maintained their supply by means of the regimental transportation, drawing subsistence stores directly from the issuing commissary at Manila; and this continued until the arrival of the division at Marilao station, March 28. At that point supplies reached the division by rail, and it became necessary to appoint an issuing commissary for the command, Lieut. James Harkins, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, commissary Second Brigade, being assigned to that duty. On same date Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., was relieved from duty as commissary First Brigade and assigned to the charge of sales of subsistence stores. From that time to the present the system then adopted has continued in practice. Stores are shipped from Manila to the issuing commissary of the division and by him issued to the organizations, either on invoice or on ration return, as may be desired. This system gives more satisfactory results than a rigid insistence upon uniformity in making all issues by the issuing commissary on a ration return. The issue of a travel ration or of certain desired components of the field or garrison ration, to meet especial exigencies of the service, thus becomes at all times practicable; whereas it would be manifestly very difficult for a regimental commissary who had already drawn his stores for any given period upon a ration return to issue either

the travel ration or any especial ration directed for the same period. The necessarily frequent use of the travel ration during the late movements made this apparent, and especially was its advantage shown during and just preceding the campaign from Malolos to San Fernando, April 23 to May 6.

An expedition started from Bocaue for cooperation with Major-General Lawton's column on April 23, and the Second Division broke camp at Malolos on same date for a movement over a difficult country, in advance of railway communication. The transportation was limited, and the major-general commanding the Second Division directed that the subsistence stores carried should consist of certain specified components, forming, substantially, an issue of the travel ration, with bacon substituted for corned beef. Owing to the damaged condition of much of the bacon then arriving at Manila, about one-fourth of the intended issue of bacon was made in canned corned beef, which caused some of the regimental commissaries to express a strong request for a larger proportion of bacon—a fact which emphasized the fitness of the substitution made.

Notwithstanding the fact that about one-half of the bacon and about one-third of the tomatoes then received at Malolos from Manila were so damaged as to be unfit for issue, the special issue directed for the movements mentioned made practicable a satisfactory degree of subsistence service which it would have otherwise been impossible to maintain. The circumstances made necessary a continuous living on the travel ration or on some practicable substitute; and if the full proportion of canned corned beef in the travel ration had then been issued the troops would have simply thrown a large portion of it away. But if the issuing commissary had been compelled to issue invariably on a ration return, the special issue above mentioned, notwithstanding its obvious advantage, would have been impracticable. From March 25 to 31 (the campaign from Loma to Malolos), the troops subsisted mainly on the travel ration. From April 25 to May 6 (the campaign from Malolos to San Fernando), the ration was substantially the same, with bacon substituted for about three-fourths of the canned corned beef. During the division's occupation of Malolos and vicinity, March 31 to April 23, the troops were supplied by rail, and daily issues of fresh beef, bread, and vegetables were made, as in Manila. Since the reopening of the railway communication, after reaching San Fernando, the same character of supply has been maintained. The details as to kinds and quantities of stores furnished were fully stated in my report for the period February 4 to March 20.

During the entire period of this report, except for the march from Loma to Marilao, March 25 to 28, a subsistence sales room has been in operation, to the great convenience of both officers and enlisted men.

An average of about 100 native laborers accompanying the division have been subsisted on the Indian ration during and since the recent movements.

The division has lost, during the period reported for, a large number of commissary officers. From the First Brigade, Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., brigade commissary, was ordered to Corregidor Hospital April 1; Capt. Seth M. Milliken, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., his successor, was sent to Cavite Hospital April 14, since which date no officer has been assigned as commissary First Brigade; Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary Second Brigade, a brave and accomplished officer, was killed on Sunday, March 26, in the action near Polo. His successor, Lieutenant Harkins, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was ordered to the United States March 31; Lieutenant Holly, Fourth U. S. Infantry, next assigned, was ordered to hospital at Manila April 5, being relieved by Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., on duty since April 15 as issuing commissary.

The fact that, in spite of these frequent changes, the satisfactory character of the subsistence supply has been maintained while the division was covering in its operations a wide extent of extremely difficult country speaks of itself in praise of the valuable service of the issuing commissaries to whom this duty has been intrusted. In particular I wish to mention Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., who has since his assignment, on April 15, discharged the duties of his position, made difficult by the necessary separation of troops and multiplication of depots, with extraordinary ability and efficiency. From May 3 to 15 he was conducting at the same time four issuing depots and three sales rooms, with a force usually considered not too large for one station.

And I desire to repeat the acknowledgment made in my former report of the very efficient transportation furnished by the quartermaster's department, which has made practicable the subsistence service rendered.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. FITZHUGH,
Major and Chief Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Chief Commissary, Second Division.

APPENDIX 54.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
In the field, San Fernando, P. I., May 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, San Fernando, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations and service of the quartermaster's department of the Second Division for the time from March 15 to May 31, 1899.

From March 15 to March 25 the conditions were as set forth in my last report—the regiments were being supplied daily from the depots in the city, the Twentieth Kansas, Utah Battery, First Montana, and Third Artillery using the railroad service, two trains running each way daily; the Tenth Pennsylvania, First South Dakota, and First Colorado regiments making use of their regimental trains; the water being supplied from the condensers at the First Reserve Hospital and the two condensers set up and operated by Maj. C. A. Devol, near the railroad terminus. The forage rations, supplies, and clothing were readily obtained and transported by the regimental quartermasters. One hundred and fifty Chinamen were supplied as coolie litter bearers, and these were turned over to the different organizations for service and instruction, under direction of the division surgeon and the regimental surgeons, the basis of division being 6 coolies per battalion. These have been invaluable, not only as litter bearers in bringing in dead and wounded, but have also been available with the buffalo-cart drivers for doing certain heavy carrying and unloading work, which in the deadly midday heat would doubtless have caused fatalities or sickness in our troops. All the expectations and advantages of the Chinese service have been realized in the litter bearers, the coolies being controlled easily even when under fire and doing their work faithfully when supervised and directed intelligently. Later on larger gangs of coolies, as laborers, who worked under the immediate direction of the Chinese cabos, the latter speaking neither Spanish nor English, were found to be difficult to control or to direct to intelligent results, but only, I believe, because of lack of organization in the gangs and impossibility of conveying through any other media than personal force the idea of what was to be done.

On March 25 the division began its advance on Malolos, and the First Colorado Regiment for all purposes of quartermaster administration became a separate regiment. Additional transportation was secured and distributed, so that the division wagon train formed at La Loma church the morning of March 25 was constituted as follows:

	Four-mule teams.	Bull teams.	Pack horses.	Pony vehicles.
FIRST BRIGADE.				
Third Artillery	2	13	8
Twentieth Kansas	2	20	8	2
First Montana	2	12	8	3
SECOND BRIGADE.				
Tenth Pennsylvania.....	2	11	10	4
First South Dakota	2	11	27	3
First Nebraska.....	2	18	10	4
Fourth Cavalry.....	3	2
Artillery (Utah and Sixth).....	2	4

The regimental quartermasters were in charge of their own transportation, on which was loaded ten days' rations and at least 350 rounds of ammunition per man, the regimental impedimenta, and intrenching tools. The transportation being fresh and the weather cool, the loads, daily increasing, were heavy—from 1,500 to 2,000 pounds per bull cart and 4,000 to 5,000 pounds per escort wagon. A good unit of loading in cool weather over fair roads I have found to be about 500 rations per bull cart and 1,500 rations per escort wagon; while under unfavorable conditions of intense heat and poor roads the weights should never exceed 800 pounds per bull cart and 2,000 pounds per army escort wagon.

By regimental administration the pack animals and light pony transportation followed the firing line with reserve ammunition and three days' travel ration.

The division wagon train was formed at daylight at La Loma church March 25, and at 8 o'clock moved out on the Novaliches road under the personal command of

the division quartermaster. A detail of 20 troopers under Lieutenant Boyd, of the Fourth Cavalry, was escort. The verbal orders of the major-general commanding the division were for me to keep the head of the column as close to the advancing firing line as was safe. The order of the train was as follows: Escort wagons with ammunition, the artillery wagons in advance, followed by the bull carts and pony transportation, that of each organization being kept together.

Right of way was given to the signal-corps wagons laying the telegraph line and the hospital ambulances which formed no part of the train. A part of the engineer corps went in advance repairing the road, which about 3 miles from La Loma became very bad. The division quartermaster, inspecting the wagon road in front of his train, was able to take part in the engagement of the Tuliahan defile with Captain Wheeler's troop of the Fourth Cavalry. The train was parked at 9 p. m. in the Tuliahan defile, on east side of the river; distance traveled, 6 miles; casualties, 1 mule slightly wounded on artillery escort wagon at Talipapa road, latter part very rocky and bad for 4 miles.

March 26, at 3 a. m., engineers under the direction of Maj. W. A. Shunk, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, with relief details of 50 men began cutting approaches and building crossing at Tuliahan River, and at 12 m. the train succeeded in crossing and moved on to Malinta, which was reached about 3 p. m., meeting General Wheaton's brigade at that point. The train advanced about a mile on the road to Polo and went into park about 1½ miles in rear of the firing line.

The division quartermaster, in reporting to the commanding general, was able to take part in the engagement at the railroad bridge crossing the Tinajeros River. The distance marched was 6 miles; the roads excellent. The escort for this day and the rest of the advance to Malolos consisted of three troops of the Fourth Cavalry under command of Maj. L. H. Rucker, Fourth Cavalry.

March 27 the wagon train broke park at daylight and advanced to Meycauayan, where it was halted for several hours. Then it moved on to the Marilao River and went into park, after the battle, in the evening. The division quartermaster, going up to inspect a destroyed bridge, was able to take part in the engagement of the Marilao River bank with the Utah Artillery; the distance traveled was 7 miles; the road excellent. As the train was being brought up to park the enemy resumed fighting and the wagons were halted under an indirect, long-range fire to allow the First Montana Regiment to pass; this regiment, at this point, lost 5 or 6 men, but the train escaped without casualty. It was noted that here, as well as other times, the Chinese bull-cart drivers were unconcerned under fire. During the night of the 27th and 28th the engineers under Major Shunk built a casco pontoon bridge across the Marilao River, and in the morning of the 28th the artillery mules, ambulances, and 17 escort wagons and 5 bull carts crossed the bridge, when the main casco filled and sank, breaking the bridge. The railroad bridge was then floored with planking brought up on the train, the railroad having been repaired to this point, and the rest of the train crossed by 5 p. m. The entire train was parked in the plaza in front of the church.

At 6 o'clock a. m. the wagon train moved out with a battalion of the Third Infantry as a rear guard. At the Bocaue River, 3.5 miles north of Marilao, the wagon bridge was found destroyed and it was necessary to build an approach to and floor the railroad bridge. Early in the afternoon it was apparent that the approach and bridge would not be completed until dark. The division quartermaster, leaving the wagon train in charge of Major Rucker, went forward to report to the commanding general, and so was present at the Guiguinto fight. The wagon train crossed the Bocaue bridge early in the evening. The Bigaa River railroad bridge, only superficially damaged by the enemy, was repaired during the night and the wagon train was ordered unloaded and left in charge of Major Rucker and the cavalry escort; all the supplies were loaded on a railroad train and this service was maintained to Malolos. The supplies reached the army at Guiguinto at 10 a. m. on the 30th and in the evening the train was advanced to the 33-kilometer post, where the army bivouacked.

On the 31st the army took Malolos about 10 a. m., and immediately the train was brought up, the enemy having been forced back so rapidly that the railroad from Bigaa to Malolos was uninjured. Major Rucker was directed to bring up the wagon train, which arrived in Malolos in good condition April 2.

From March 31 to April 25 the division occupied Malolos, and the quartermaster's department was busied in supplying all deficiencies of clothing and supplies lost or worn out during the campaign from Caloocan. These supplies were drawn either on special requisitions from the depot in Manila or from the regimental stores there. The wagon transportation was thoroughly overhauled and repaired. The railroad on April 22 was running two trains daily between Manila and Malolos, transporting

vegetables, forage, ordnance, mails, supplies, and daily issues of bread, meat, condensed water, and zacate, or grass for native ponies, not only to the troops guarding the railroad, but also those occupying Malolos. Second Lieutenant Gardenhire, First Montana Regiment, was detailed to distribute supplies along the road, take command of the train guards and superintend the loading of supplies for Malolos, and this duty he performed efficiently and with a conscientious regard to detail.

By direction of the division commander, the quartermaster purchased fuel for the troops, and, where possible, grass for the horses, contracted for the lighting of the city at night and employed native labor for the loading and unloading of trains, storing supplies, and other necessary labor, for which, had details of our soldiers been used, they would have suffered by reason of the intense heat.

On April 14 the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment was relieved by the Fifty-first Iowa, the latter regiment receiving all the Pennsylvania transportation, and in addition 9 bull carts and bulls. On April 23 the city of Malolos was abandoned, and all wagon transportation parked at the railroad station, one of the railroad storehouses used to store quartermaster supplies and ammunition. Major Kobbé's command of the Third Artillery was intrusted with the guarding of the station and supplies.

On the 25th the Bagbag River, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles north, was passed by the army. Railroad communication with the division was maintained to the Bagbag River. The bridge over this river was seriously disabled, one bay having had its steel girders cut, dropping it in the river. The wagon transportation was brought up from Malolos, April 26.

During the period from April 27 to May 4 the engineers repaired the railroad bridge at Bagbag, and constructed a bamboo-raft ferry across the Rio Grande at Calumpit, and by 4 o'clock a. m. May 4 the entire wagon train had crossed the Rio Grande and was stretched out on the road in Apalit ready to advance. Meanwhile the railroad service which obtained at Malolos was maintained with the terminus at Bagbag. The division began its forward movement at daylight, followed by the wagon train at 6.30 a. m.

At 11 o'clock a. m. the wagons were parked on the north side of the barrio of Santa Maria. The road between Santa Maria and Santo Tomas for about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles is very heavy. Two bridges crossing esteros were totally destroyed by the enemy, and the road at one point was rendered temporarily impassable by pitfalls. Here the engineers, under command of Lieut. W. P. Wooten, Corps of Engineers, did yeoman service building the bridges and repairing the road. In the meantime ammunition and supplies were ferried across the esteros in small dugouts and carried by the men and pack horses to their organizations on the firing line.

May 5 the division advanced to San Fernando, and in the evening of the same date the wagon train, under command of the division quartermaster, returned to Bagbag for supplies, starting to return the evening of the 6th. The bridges were completed by the engineers on the morning of the 7th, so that the supply train reached San Fernando about 10 a. m. of that date.

The wagon train had now wholly to be relied upon for supplies, until such time as the railroad could be repaired. The intense heat required that all marching be done at night. Three trips were made to the Bagbag and return, all wheeled vehicles of the command being pressed into service.

The march to the Bagbag was done in the first night, the loading and return ferrying by day and the return march the second night, making forty hours of continuous labor. The round trip was 28 miles and the roads heavy, especially through the swamps, and the ferrying across the Rio Grande was very hard work and told heavily on the men and transportation.

Two freight cars were found at San Fernando which had been burned by the enemy, but whose running gear was uninjured. These were fitted up, propelled by Chinese coolies, and a daily service with a capacity of 60,000 pounds of supplies was inaugurated May 17, bringing up much-needed fresh meat and vegetables to the troops. The engineers had repaired the Santo Tomas railroad bridge, destroyed by the enemy, with about 100 yards of track. The wagon-train service was discontinued. The railroad repair party completed its labors on the Bagbag bridge, track, and Rio Grande bridge at Calumpit on May 22 and on May 23. One train daily was run to and from Manila. From then up to date the quartermaster's department has been busied in refitting the men with clothing and supplies, overhauling and repairing transportation, reshoeing animals, quartering and making sanitary the quarters of the men. The water supply is excellent, and the railroad facilities here are excellently adapted for making San Fernando a terminus, there being about one-fourth mile of siding, a turntable, a water tank, and two standpipes, and a very good store shed.

The question of offensive military operations in this country in the rainy season has received considerable thought and investigation on my part.

The condition of the roads during the rainy season eliminates the possibility of using wheeled vehicles. The repairing of the existing railroads and building new ones consumes too much time and restricts the theater of operations too much, as also does the sole dependence on river and lake transportation. There is left to consider, then, first, cooly or native bearers; second, pack animals; and third, carts or sledges drawn on runners.

In my last report I recommended the use of coolies and the organization of the gangs. I now respectfully submit the following ideas and the resulting conclusions.

A mule pack train I believe to be impracticable for these cardinal reasons:

First. Scarcity of mules, the difficulty, expense, and time necessary to secure them.

Second. The amount of forage to be carried on the train for the subsistence of the mules, and the fact that this forage must be imported.

Third. The inability of mules to cross swamps and rivers, and the fact that when a mule is once mired or submerged he gives up and no longer tries to extricate himself.

A buffalo pack train I believe to be practicable and efficient for the following reasons:

First. The water buffalo is almost amphibious. (I had one submerged for over a minute trying to swim with a too heavy load of ammunition across a river and he came out ultimately with his load.)

Second. Capacity; he can carry a load of from 250 to 400 pounds freely and march 12 miles a day with it.

Third. Forage; no forage to be carried. The bull can live on the country.

Fourth. Supply; bulls disabled or sick can always be substituted by fresh ones seized or requisitioned for in the field.

Fifth. Rivers and marshes are no obstruction to his progress and are impassable for wagon or pack mules. I have swum a buffalo across a river 50 yards wide, 30 yards swimming with a load of 284 pounds on his back. The animal took it as a matter of course, swam freely and easily, and climbed up a steep bank on the other side with his load.

Sixth. Training unnecessary. I have now packed 5 bulls with loads without trouble, and 2 bulls were green ones, picked up during our advance.

Seventh. Economy. The buffalo costs \$20 or \$30 (Mexican) in the country, and can always be obtained. A mule costs, including transportation from the United States and six months' imported forage, at least \$1,000 (gold).

The aparejo set up with bamboo or rattan and rice straw fits a buffalo as if made for him; the cinch straps and rigging only have to be lengthened because of his girth.

For 100 bulls are necessary 10 experienced packers, 30 assistants (soldiers), 100 natives to lead the bulls and secure food for them, and 100 complete pack outfits. Allowing 300-pound loads, a regiment of 1,000 men needs 200 bulls to carry ten days' rations and 200 rounds reserve ammunition per man, for men and officers. To each 100 pack bulls I would add 10 bulls and drivers and 10 18-foot bancas, to be drawn as sledges, used as such and for purposes of ferriage. A train of 400 pack bulls would enable a column of 2,000 men to make a raid of 100 miles undelayed by destroyed bridges or marshy country. Pack outfits and packers, if cabled for at once, could be here in a little over a month.

In concluding my report I wish to bear personal testimony to the fact that all of the regimental quartermasters were, under the trying conditions of the campaign, keenly alive to the needs and comfort of their regiments and met every necessity as fully and promptly as possible, and conscientiously and faithfully performed their several duties. Especially energetic and zealous were Lieut. W. P. Hull, Twentieth Kansas, and Lieut. F. D. Burdick, First South Dakota, and Quartermaster-Sergeant (now Second Lieutenant) Ryan, First Nebraska; and it gives me pleasure to thus specially recognize their services.

Respectfully submitted.

C. G. SAWTELLE, Jr.,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

APPENDIX 55.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., June 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE DIVISION.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from the major-general commanding the division, I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the forcing of the defile at the Tuliahan River on March 25.

The commanding general had directed me to reconnoiter a road which leaves the Balinaoag-Novaliches road, near Talipapa, and goes to Malinta, to see where it crossed the Tuliahan and to examine the character of the ford. Starting (mounted) down the road mentioned, I soon met Private Kerr, of the Colorado regiment, orderly for General Hale, who informed me that he had just returned from a point about a quarter of a mile farther down the road, where he had encountered an insurgent outpost consisting of a half dozen men or more. Immediately returning to the commanding general and reporting the information received, I asked for a patrol. He directed me to take half of a troop of cavalry, which was then near by. Requesting Capt. Fred Wheeler, Fourth Cavalry, who was in command of the troop, to dismount half of his men and leave the horses with the rest, we proceeded on the road toward the Tuliahan. With a noncommissioned officer and 5 men I went in advance, followed at a short distance by the rest of the detachment, under command of Captain Wheeler, and accompanied by Lieut. M. A. Batson, an officer of the troop.

At about 200 yards from the river there was an open space caused by a gap in the bamboo, banana, and other foliage, which, as usual, here fringed both sides of the road. Concealed in the edge of the foliage we halted to further reconnoiter, and soon observed several insurgents standing in the open on the rice fields across the river. Fearing detection if so many men went through the open space together, I left the patrol where it was and crept forward until within about 50 yards of the river. From here I discovered a field work, constructed of earth with bamboo revetments, and situated on the farther bank of the river, a short distance down the stream from the ruins of a stone arch bridge which once spanned the river at this point. It was about 50 yards long and had a traverse at each end to protect its defenders from flank fire. It also had a head protection constructed of bamboo and earth and arranged in such a fashion as to effectually prevent the insurgent soldiers from firing high—a very prevalent habit among them. They had to fire through a slot or continuous horizontal embrasure and could not elevate their guns more than was sufficient to sweep the crest on the opposite side of the stream. As I crouched, reconnoitering the work, a large number of men could be observed through the slot moving about behind it. The men in the open now leisurely strolled back to their comrades, and, taking advantage of their having ceased to watch, I quickly returned for Captain Wheeler and the detachment. We crept forward under screen of the bamboo and scattering bushes. Near the river, concealed by foliage on the left side of the road, was a ditch which had been washed pretty deep by surface drainage. In this our men noiselessly approached, entirely unobserved, to within less than a hundred yards of their main work. Their instructions to load magazines, remain under cover, take good aim, and keep up as hot a fire as possible into the long embrasure of this work, were given in whispers. When all was ready they opened fire. From where Captain Wheeler and I stood I could see with my glasses that the insurgents behind the work were upset by sudden fright and astonishment, but they recovered sufficiently to open a brisk fire. As our ditch was parallel with the road, and this earthwork was a short distance down the river from where the road crossed the stream, we had a good position from which to keep up an oblique fire at a very short range in which every man could participate. So accurate was the fire from our men that the embrasure of the enemy's work was kept full of dust from the bullets passing through. But now we plainly heard a rapid popping of Mausers from a direction across the river immediately opposite us. Sergt. Charles Hiatt, in order to locate the source of this fire, followed the ditch (from which our men were firing) farther down toward the river to the edge of the foliage. He immediately returned with a disfiguring wound in the face, made by one of 50 bullets fired at him. Moving a few paces nearer the river and into the middle of the road, Captain Wheeler and I became exposed to this fire from straight across the river, and thus located a source of danger to us greater than the fire from their earthwork.

The fire came from a barricade constructed as follows: The stone arch bridge which once formed the continuation of the road across the stream had been washed away, but the perpendicular abutment wall, together with the wing walls, bordering the approach to the bridge, still stood intact on the farther side. By raising the abutment a few feet higher with stones from the ruined bridge and filling in with dirt from behind, the insurgents had constructed from one wing wall to the other a barricade which to the casual observer seemed but a portion of the ruined bridge. To make a head protection, they had placed over the top of this barricade a long steel beam shaped like the letter I, which had been brought there for the purpose of building another bridge. Between this beam (about 15 inches high) and the barricade was a narrow slot through which the insurgents fired their pieces. The wing walls of the bridge approach afforded them perfect protection from flank fire. The

only way we could possibly damage them was through the narrow slot under the steel beam.

As that portion of the road to which Captain Wheeler and I advanced was right in the focus of fire, several men were rushed across to the right-hand side, where the ground gradually rose away from the road, to a considerable elevation. I accompanied them, and finding some low rice banks at the edge of the bluff behind a fringe of bushes, disposed them under fair cover, and they soon had a very hot fire concentrated on the insurgents who were firing from the barricade.

Continuing to the top of the elevation the shallow stream at the bottom of the defile came in view, and it was evident that it offered no obstacle to our crossing on either flank of the insurgents, but I was immediately saluted with fire by a portion of their force from behind an earthwork higher up the stream, protecting their left flank. Now realizing that they were too strong for our small party, I returned to Captain Wheeler, who still stood upright in the road directing the fire of the men in that vicinity, while Lieutenant Batson directed the fire of those still in the ditch. Asking Captain Wheeler to keep the men under cover and hold the position, I stated my purpose of going for reinforcements. As I passed Lieutenant Batson I heard him say to a young soldier who did not seem to see anything to shoot at, "Here, if you are not going to use your gun, give it to me; I can see them," and suiting his action to his words he took the gun and began to fire from an erect position with very deliberate aim, while the bullets were whistling all around. A few paces farther to the rear a corporal was piling carbines against a tree. I counted seven. "Whose guns are those, corporal?" "They belong to the men who are knocked out, sir." "Why, you don't mean to tell me seven men are killed already?" (It did not seem to me more than five minutes since the fight had opened.) "No, sir," he replied, "they are only wounded, but some rather badly." This discovery hastened my progress. I ran to where I had left my horse and, mounting, soon reached the commanding general. I informed him that they were too strong for us and requested reinforcements. He asked if I thought we could drive them out with the assistance of a fieldpiece, to be followed by a company of infantry as soon as one could be got. I thought we could, and Major Young was directed to send one gun to our assistance. He designated the one commanded by Lieutenant Critchlow, of the Utah battery, and Lieutenant Davis of the Navy requested permission to accompany us with his Colt's rapid-fire gun, manned by two marines.

While going to the rear I had looked over the ground with a view to conducting reinforcements to the front, and now proceeded ahead of the guns with Major Young. I showed him a place behind a hedge from which the guns could command the earthworks. It was less than 200 yards from the enemy's line, but unhitching the mules and placing them behind a stone wall for protection, the guns were run by hand to the position without hesitation. When all was ready the fieldpiece was fired and then Lieutenant Davis immediately opened fire with his Colt until the fieldpiece was again loaded. This alternate fire was kept up until 7 shots were fired from the fieldpiece, when the insurgents abandoned their trenches and fled in disorder up and over the hill across the river, under a hot fire from the cavalry detachment and a cross fire from a Montana battalion which was then coming to our assistance, about 800 or 900 yards down the river. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, of the Montana regiment, hearing the firing up the river, had marched his battalion in that direction, and had it been possible for him to get up a little sooner few insurgents would have escaped. As it was, a number dropped, evidently wounded, as they ran, and higher up the hill several were observed giving assistance to wounded comrades.

On crossing the river we found 2 men lying prone behind the barricade, one dead, with his head and face blown open, the other badly wounded. Another was found near by too badly wounded to escape. The small cavalry detachment of 6 men firing at the barricade had made 90 hits on the steel beam, besides those that they put through the slot. The fire from this barricade had been entirely silenced for some time. The artillery had hit with every shot except the first one fired. The value of accurately aimed fire was well illustrated in this affair.

Though the coolness and courage of all the officers and men concerned was most admirable, I was especially impressed with the fearless imperturbability of Captain Wheeler, coolly directing the fire of his men and keeping them under cover. I do not know how a better example of courage could have been shown than that displayed by him as he stood exposed, trying to show a private, who stood near him, behind a stone post, just where an insurgent was concealed across the river. Just then a bullet struck the private in the head, spattering blood on the captain as he fell. Seeing me start to pick him up, he quietly told a private to help me take the poor fellow to the rear, and went on with his business.

Rice Fields

Sketch of
COMBAT
AT TRENCH NEAR MARILAO.
March 27th
To accompany report
of
Major J. F. Bell.

LEGEND.

Church

S

D.H. Blakelock, Del.

Traced in M. I. D., A. G. O., War Department.

War 56 1

There were 25 men in the cavalry detachment engaged in this affair. One was killed and 7 wounded. I did not hear of any other casualties. There appeared to be two small companies of insurgents, numbering about one hundred men.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

APPENDIX 56.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, June 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE DIVISION.

SIR: Pursuant to the instructions of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the fight at the Marilao River in which a number of insurgents were killed, wounded, and captured in a trench.

The commanding general directed me to reconnoiter the highway leading from Meycauayan to Marilao over which the First Brigade had been directed to resume its movements northward. Proceeding along the road I was joined by Dr. Adams, of the Montana regiment, and we had reached a point about 30 yards from a small bridge (marked destroyed on map) in an open space on the road where it skirts the river, when a fusillade was opened on us from a well-concealed trench immediately across the Marilao River. We turned and galloped away without injury, but bullets from this fire fell around the commanding general and his staff and the troops near by. Requesting Dr. Adams to report the location of this trench to the commanding general of the First Brigade, I returned and reported to the commanding general of the division. Part of our command had already passed to the right flank of this trench and was heavily engaged with the enemy northward of it.

While standing on the railroad track opposite its location, I observed 4 Chinamen who were carrying 2 wounded men from the front on litters, proceeding to the rear along a road which ran immediately in front of this trench. I started to warn them of their danger, but before I proceeded a hundred yards at double time the insurgents opened fire on them, and dropping the litters the Chinamen fled, leaving in the road the wounded men, who promptly sought cover. With a view of preventing a repetition of this error, I pointed out the approximate location of the trench to our troops, and the commanding officer of Battery G, Third Artillery, kindly loaned me 5 sharpshooters from his battery—a noncommissioned officer and 4 men. We carefully reconnoitered the approach to the trench from that direction, but it was so well concealed that we could not locate it until the insurgents opened on us at a range of about 150 yards. No damage was done. Under cover of rice banks and bamboo hedges we crept forward to within about 50 yards of the trench behind the stone wing walls at the northern approach of the destroyed bridge. From this point we opened such an accurately aimed fire that several insurgents were soon shot through the head. We were so close that we could see the effects of our shots. Several others jumped out of the trench and started to run for their lives, but were killed by the detachment. Another who fired from a casco moored on the farther bank of the river was killed in the boat. This so frightened the insurgents that they no longer took accurate aim, but would jump up and fire and immediately crouch behind the trench, or else stick their guns up over the tops of their heads and pull the triggers without aim.

In the meantime the Kansas Regiment was approaching the Marilao River farther down the stream, and seeing that their right flank would soon become exposed to an enfilading fire from this trench, I wanted to warn them and point out a way to bring troops under cover nearer the trench. I started to wade the small slough, spanned by the broken bridge, but came under such heavy fire from the insurgents farther up the stream that I had to give it up. About this time my party was increased by a citizen named John Fox, employed by the Hospital Corps, who had borrowed a rifle from a wounded man. Realizing the impossibility of driving the insurgents away with six men, I returned to the railroad and secured the services of Company I, Tenth Pennsylvania. We approached the river opposite the insurgents who were farthest upstream and soon had them fleeing for their lives. Then, working our way down to the broken bridge, the company lined the bank of the river, cheering lustily and pouring in a hot fire upon the trench. The insurgents became demoralized and would stick up the muzzles of their guns and fire in the air.

I could now cross the slough, and after doing so found that half of a Kansas company under Captain Orwig had crept up behind the fill which formed the southern approach to the small bridge and were helping to keep the insurgents down. They had come there to protect the artillery, which had opened from a fringe of timber a short distance to the rear.

Finding Major Young, of the Utah Artillery, I explained that the insurgents' fire was entirely silenced, and pointed out a place on the road about 50 yards from the trench to which he could bring his pieces with perfect safety and have a clear sweep of the entire trench. He promptly had two pieces rolled forward by hand, accompanied by Lieutenant Davis, of the Navy, with his Colt rapid-fire gun.

While all this was going on a portion of the Kansas regiment, under Colonel Funston, was preparing to cross the river farther down the stream. Lieutenant Hardy and Corporal Ferguson had volunteered to swim the river and tie a rope to a raft moored on the farther shore. With this raft Colonel Funston succeeded in crossing a small detachment of men. Captain Orwig's company now came into the road at the side of the fieldpieces, and the fire from these men, the Third Artillery, the Pennsylvania company, and the Colt rapid-fire gun made it impossible for any insurgent to show himself above the trench. After three shots from the fieldpiece a white flag was raised and all firing ceased. Three insurgents now jumped out of the trench and started to run to the rear. Two of them were immediately killed by a rain of bullets, but, strange to say, one escaped with his life. A second flag now made its appearance and fire ceased again. I called loudly across the stream to the insurgents to come out, that they had nothing to fear, when they began to reply from behind their trench. I told them to stand up, and finally a boy about 15 years of age mustered courage to rise, and stated that they wanted to surrender. He was followed by others, and a lieutenant of the Pennsylvania company, accompanied by several of his men, swam across the river to accept their surrender. They had them walking out of the trench and were piling up their guns when Colonel Funston and his detachment, who had in the meantime succeeded in crossing the river, approached the trench from the rear at double time. Colonel Funston then completed the arrangements for securing the guns and taking charge of the prisoners. Though he would undoubtedly have succeeded in finally capturing them or killing some and driving the others away, that portion of the regiment he commanded had little or nothing to do with their actual surrender, which was really caused by the artillery fire. The Pennsylvania company, accompanied in this engagement by Major Bierer, conducted itself exceedingly well; so did Captain Orwig's men, the Utah Artillery, and Lieutenant Davis's detachment. No men could have possibly behaved with greater fearlessness than did the Third Artillery detachment. They never fired a wild shot, but crouched, holding their loaded guns at their shoulders, with their eyes on the trench, ready to snapshoot any insurgent who appeared above it. They all conducted themselves in a soldierly manner, but I wish to especially commend Sergeant Richardson and Private Lundblad for their exceptional courage and coolness under hot fire.

Thirteen insurgents were found dead behind the trench, about 15 were wounded, and 30 odd surrendered. All their rifles were obtained. One man of the Pennsylvania regiment was wounded. I do not know what the casualties of the other troops were.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 57.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
San Fernando, P. I., June 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE DIVISION.

SIR: Pursuant to the instructions of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to make the following report of an engagement which occurred at Quinga on April 23:

During the afternoon of the 22d I had been instructed to take a troop of cavalry and make the next morning an early reconnoissance of this village to ascertain whether any insurgents were there and if so in what force, and also to reconnoiter the road leading from Quinga down to the river opposite Pulilan, including the insurgent trenches along the north bank of the river.

With Lieutenant Rutherford's troop (K, of the Fourth Cavalry) we left Malolos at 3 a. m. The road we followed was skirted on each side by a fringe of bamboo, banana, and other trees, with scattering houses here and there. About 1,000 yards from the outskirts of Quinga this fringe of timber ceases, and from there to the town extends an open flat with a few rice banks on the south side of the road. We arrived at the edge of this timber at 4.30 a. m., and it being still dark we waited there for daylight. I was in front with a detachment of 5 scouts, and when daylight came, discovered an insurgent trench toward the northwestern edge of the town about 1,500 yards away. From this trench 17 insurgents soon showed themselves. A little farther southward another trench was discovered, and a little to the south of that, crossing the road we were approaching on, was a third intrenchment, in which I counted 10 insurgents. With the detachment of scouts I advanced a short distance into the open, hoping to draw their fire and further develop their strength, but they remained inactive, no change occurring in conditions during about half an hour. I continued reconnoitering but discovered nothing further. Wishing to comply with my instructions, I concluded to dismount the troop (which had remained hidden in the brush) and either develop their strength or drive them away if weak. Dismounting all except horse holders, Lieutenant Rutherford advanced in a skirmish line into the open and halted behind rice banks which afforded good cover, on the south side of the road. The insurgents opened fire and, unfortunately for us, immediately shot one of our men through the head. I directed that he be removed to the rear at once, but the fire speedily increased and became so hot that the men carrying him would halt behind the rice banks. The fire had now commenced from several directions and we could see a considerable force of insurgents moving into the fight from a direction to the left of their line. Seeing that they were too many for us to handle, I requested Lieutenant Rutherford to withdraw the troop alternately by platoons with a view of mounting and retiring. Wishing to hurry the carrying of the wounded man to the rear, I ran over and placing myself between his legs directed two other men to take him by the shoulders and thus we carried him back to the horses. While on our way to the rear two of the men who were helping to carry him were wounded. When we got him to the horses, the man shot through the head was dead. I directed that his horse be brought to put his body on and then returned to the firing line, which I met in the edge of the timber.

In the meantime the insurgents seeing us retiring had advanced upon us at a rapid gait. As they advanced from under a heavy mist and fog which had arisen with the sun, we could see a very large number of well-uniformed troops, mostly armed with Mausers. The extreme ends of their lines began a rapid advance in column of files for the purpose of enveloping us, but having got the wounded men safely mounted and started to the rear, a part of the rest of the troop was mounted and retired down the road leading the horses of those who remained dismounted to return the fire of the insurgents and delay their advance while we were retiring.

I then discovered that our men had been unable to put the body of the dead man on his horse, a restless and fractious animal. Lieutenant Rutherford and I had mounted our horses while superintending the retirement, but the insurgents did not follow us far, contenting themselves with driving us away and harassing our flanks for about half a mile. One of the wounded men died on his way to the rear, so our casualties amounted to 2 killed and 4 wounded. Several horses were shot, my own among them.

Returning near the outposts of Malolos, I sent a mounted messenger to the rear, asking that a company of infantry be sent to my assistance, with a view of returning for the body of the dead soldier. An Iowa company very promptly came forward, and Major Mulford, of the Nebraska regiment, hearing the heavy fire, had ordered his battalion to get ready to follow out the road. General Hale, commanding the Second Brigade, also sent me a note, stating that he had ordered an Iowa battalion to move out to the front. Finding these battalions ordered out, I directed the Iowa company to return to the outposts, as it had gone there to relieve the company then on duty, just as my messenger arrived. With the Nebraska battalion following on the road, we returned to the place where the soldier's body had been left, and found that the insurgents had taken it off into the town. After consulting Capt. James Lockett, aid-de-camp to the commanding general, who had in the meantime joined me, I concluded it best to attack the insurgents and drive them out for two reasons. I wanted our man's dead body, and I knew the movement against Pulilan the following day could not be made until these insurgents were driven away from Quingua.

Just then we saw the Iowa battalion advancing on our right flank in a line of skirmishers. Captain Lockett rode over to their line, and directed its movement to the front. Major Mulford deployed two companies of his battalion, and took the position

previously occupied at our first engagement by the troop. Fearing a possible attack on our left flank, the troop was dismounted in a ravine in that direction, and advanced into another ravine on the left of our line. Very soon a Hotchkiss mountain gun, which had been sent for, arrived, and opened on the trenches from the edge of the timber. Very shortly afterwards General Hale arrived in person and took command, accompanied by Major Young, with four field guns, and two additional battalions of his brigade from the Nebraska and Iowa regiments. The guns had fired only a few rounds when Colonel Stotsenburg arrived on the field, and immediately took command of his regiment. As he ran up behind the line, he ordered it to commence firing, and immediately advanced against the insurgent position. On General Hale's arrival, I had joined the cavalry troop, and, observing Colonel Stotsenburg's advance, advanced the troop in unison with him. The insurgents, seeing our advance, abandoned their trenches and fled, not, however, before they had inflicted upon us, in the death of Colonel Stotsenburg, the most serious loss our Army had yet suffered. In justice to his memory, I wish to pay an especial tribute to this fearless, brave, and gallant soldier, for, as soon as he arrived, he placed himself in front of his regiment, and with hat in one hand and pistol in the other, led it against the trenches of the insurgents, routing them completely. It was solely due to this gallant act that we won the fight so promptly after his arrival, for the insurgents did not appear to have been shaken until our advance began.

In this second fight the cavalry lost 1 man killed and 1 man wounded. Two of the men killed were members of my detachment of 5 scouts, and belonged to Troop I, Fourth Cavalry. The total casualties of the cavalry for the day was 3 men killed and 5 wounded.

Lieutenant Rutherford of the Fourth Cavalry, who was in command of Troop K, was cool and collected, and handled his men in a most admirable manner. By his coolness and courage he rendered me very great assistance in extricating his troop from a most difficult position. I would recommend that he be given such credit as is due exceptional gallantry under fire.

The gallantry of another officer came under my notice during the day. Lieutenant Moore of the Nebraska regiment was wounded in the calf of the leg early in the fight. Removing his legging, he sat down under fire, and had a first-aid bandage placed upon the wound. Subsequently he took charge of the Hotchkiss gun, and also voluntarily carried a message for General Hale back to the firing line under a hot fire. I would recommend him to the notice of his superior for his gallant conduct.

I also wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me by Capt. James Lockett, who fearlessly rode through fire several times to the Iowa line to give them necessary counsel and assistance.

The body of the dead cavalryman, which the insurgents had carried off, was found by the Iowa regiment and sent to Manila.

After the fight was over, I took the troop and completed the reconnoissance ordered, again coming under heavy but ineffective fire.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A.

APPENDIX 58.

MANILA, P. I., June 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to the instructions of the major-general commanding the division, I have the honor to make the following report of a combat with the insurgents which occurred between San Fernando and Bacolor, P. I., on May 24, 1899:

On the previous day the commanding general of the division directed me to report to General Funston, who had just taken command of the First Brigade, for the purpose of showing to him the position of the insurgent trenches and conducting him to the same places where he had previously had me take General Wheaton, the predecessor of General Funston in command of the First Brigade. This was for the purpose of making General Funston familiar with the terrain and with the best lines of approach to the said insurgent trenches, found occupied by about 500 or 600 insurgents, under the command of a Colonel Arce. These troops were a part of those commanded by the Insurgent General Mascardo, whose headquarters were then at Porac. Having pointed out the situation to General Funston, and accomplished the duty assigned me, I returned with him to the commanding general of the division,

who thereupon gave General Funston his orders for an attack he had planned on this portion of the insurgent's position the following day.

The undesirability of a frontal attack was increased by the natural character of the terrain, which lent itself admirably to flank attack. The plan adopted by the commanding general contemplated simultaneous attacks on both flanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, with two battalions of the Montana regiment, guided by Lieut. Charles W. Mead, First Montana, a member of the headquarter detachment of scouts, was assigned to the duty of conducting the attack on the right flank of the enemy, and Major Whitman, Twentieth Kansas, with two battalions of the Kansas regiment, guided by myself, was assigned the duty of attacking their left flank. General Funston had immediate charge of the movement, supervised by the commanding general, who was himself present on the field. As the flanks of the enemy were wide apart, I know nothing personally of the movements of the other column, and must confine myself to a description of that portion of the combat which I personally witnessed.

Moving out of our lines entirely under cover of hedges and irrigating ditches, Major Whitman's two battalions, following me, succeeded in getting within 200 yards of the enemy before they discovered a one of us, although every man of our command was compelled to crawl on his hands and knees several times before we reached the position where the combat opened. As I was in the extreme advance, accompanied by 2 or 3 scouts, they discovered me first, and knowing we could conceal our position no longer, I immediately suggested to Major Whitman that he deploy the leading battalion promptly and open fire on the trench. It was our purpose to send the other battalion straight past this position of the insurgents in order to take them in their rear, but the fire was so hot that both battalions became immediately engaged in order to protect themselves. We did not expect to find our end of the trench so strongly held, but observing about 10 men on the extreme right of our line, who had not yet become engaged, though nearest the insurgent trenches, I called to them to follow me, and running as fast as I could, without stopping to fire, jumped into the trench occupied by the insurgents and took them squarely on their flank. They were thrown into great confusion, and although there were so few of us, we easily drove them helter skelter, accompanied by our entire line, which advanced as rapidly as they could in the same direction we were driving the insurgents. Every man that appeared above the intrenchments was either killed by the small detachment with me or by the two battalions marching along in a direction practically parallel with the trench and firing obliquely down it.

The flank movement at this portion of the engagement was an entire and complete success; but, owing to the fact that we had to march through a rice field where the rice had fallen in a very tangled position and where water stood from 6 to 12 inches deep, our progress was very slow, and we did not succeed in getting one battalion in rear of the insurgents as planned because they abandoned their trenches and ran directly to the rear and not down the trench toward the center of their line as we had hoped they might.

Major Whitman continued with one battalion straight down the trench, driving the insurgents ahead of him, killing many, while I accompanied the other battalion toward the rear of the insurgents across a second rice field to the road which had been our original destination. Our progress, naturally slow, was further delayed by our men stopping to fire at fleeing insurgents, a delay which I was too worn out to prevent. Having reached this road, and realizing that the insurgents had gotten beyond it, I continued with the battalion across a third rice field to a second parallel road, pursuing and firing at insurgents all the way. This road was followed into Bacolor, which was reconnoitered, and out of which 2 men, who accompanied me, drove about 15 armed insurgents in a wild panic. This portion of the Kansas regiment was then assembled in Bacolor, where they met a portion of the Montana regiment, which had been sent in pursuit of the insurgents, who retired along the highway running to Guagua through Bacolor. Having accomplished our purpose, we now returned to San Fernando, where I reported to the commanding general. I do not know the losses suffered by our side, but I personally assisted in counting the killed, wounded, and captured among the insurgents, which amounted to about 100 persons. All of their guns were captured and some which were thrown away by those who fled. I afterwards heard on very good authority that over 40 of the insurgents who escaped were wounded.

Major Whitman conducted the operations of his two battalions with skill and success, and deployed his men under a strong fire without the slightest confusion.

I wish to commend the courage and fearlessness of the 8 or 10 men who so willingly and promptly ran with me into the insurgent trenches. They did their work admirably and well, certainly killing and wounding more than one-half of the men killed and wounded that day, and worked with a will and rapidity until they were worn

out and unable to go further. Unfortunately I do not know their names, but presume they could be found out by inquiry in the Kansas regiment.

Our progress was through rice fields full of water the entire day, and the men arrived at the point of combat considerably fatigued.

In our pursuit of the insurgents toward Bacolor, Capt. E. Boltwood and Lieut. E. C. Hardy, Twentieth Kansas, led their companies away ahead of the rest of the battalions in a very fearless and aggressive manner.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 59.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
San Fernando, P. I., June 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with the instructions of the division commander I have the honor to submit the following report:

Since resuming my duties as inspector-general of the division upon my return from special duty at Iloilo, Island of Panay, about February 15, 1899, I have been on duty with the division in the field, participating with it in the series of engagements resulting in the capture of Malolos and incident to the occupation of that point. In addition to the usual duties of an inspector in the field, such as making frequent inspections of troops and of the sanitary conditions of camps, inspecting property presented for condemnation, making such investigations as are ordered, etc., I have performed such other duties as have been required from time to time, involving reconnoissance work, inspection of outposts, etc.

The following inspections, of which verbal reports were rendered at the time, may be considered of sufficient importance to be here summarized and made of record.

The division remaining in camp at Malolos nearly the entire month of April, I made in that month an inspection of the sanitary condition of the camps of the various organizations, investigated the quality and sufficiency of the rations furnished, the healthfulness and sufficiency of the water supply, and the amount and serviceability of the clothing in possession of the troops. The camps were found to be in good sanitary condition, being sufficiently policed and suitable sinks having been dug and generally used. Water fit for drinking purposes was at first scarce, but good potable water, generally in sufficient quantities, was after a few days regularly supplied from Manila by train. When the well supply of water was used the regulation that it should be boiled was complied with whenever practicable. The clothing was, as a rule, sufficient for the actual requirements of campaign and was fairly serviceable. The rations were regulation in amount and excellent in all respects, Australian beef of excellent quality being furnished from cold-storage ships, and potatoes and onions in a good state of preservation being supplied from the United States. Roasted and ground coffee was on request also furnished from Manila by the subsistence department.

A similar inspection made at San Fernando about the middle of May did not show as satisfactory conditions existing as at Malolos in the matter of rations, for, while the rations issued were regulation in amount, it had been impossible since leaving the vicinity of Calumpit early in May to furnish the troops with fresh beef and fresh vegetables, owing to the destruction of railroad and wagon bridges by the insurgents as they successively abandoned positions. The travel ration, of which a considerable supply had been transported in carts, was therefore largely used, canned corned beef, however, being varied with bacon and salmon. Unfortunately, owing probably to the intense heat, a considerable portion of the bacon had spoiled and had to be condemned. In the matter of vegetables, the canned tomatoes were supplemented to some extent by corn and other vegetables found by the men in abandoned native fields. Chickens, which in the end might have starved owing to the flight and continued absence of their native owners, also contributed to the squad messes.

The command was found also to be badly off in the matter of clothing, owing to the rough usage the field uniforms of the men had been subjected to as a result of marching and fighting in swamps and bamboo jungles.

As soon as the bridges could be repaired and torn-up railroad track replaced the needed variety in rations was furnished.

The inspection which I am now making shows that the rations are, and for some time have been, excellent in all respects; also that suitable and sufficient uniform and other clothing are either in possession of the men or will soon be received from Manila; also that very satisfactory sanitary conditions obtain.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major and Inspector-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 60.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., March 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with the instructions of the division commander, I visited, on the 16th instant, the First Reserve Hospital, to inquire into the condition of the sick and wounded officers and men of this division, and to ascertain if they had any complaints to make as to improper or insufficient medical treatment, nursing, etc.

Having first called upon the medical officer in charge, Maj. W. D. Crosby, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., I visited the surgical wards, where wounded men are treated, and the medical wards also, and interviewed a number of officers and men. All expressed themselves as entirely satisfied with the medical and surgical treatment, nursing, and food they were receiving, and had no complaints whatever to make, many, especially among the volunteers, being even enthusiastic in their praise of everything connected with the hospital.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major and Inspector-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 61.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Malolos, P. I., April 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with the instructions of the division commander, I proceeded to Manila on the 18th instant and inspected the First Reserve Hospital, in so far as the condition, treatment, etc., of the sick and wounded men of this division are concerned. The surgeon in charge, Maj. W. D. Crosby, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., afforded me every facility for performing this duty. I visited the wards, some twenty in number, both medical and surgical, and questioned the patients, with a view to ascertaining whether they had any complaints to make in regard to improper or insufficient medical attendance, nursing, or food. No complaints whatever were made of lack of proper medical or surgical treatment, and there was also universal commendation of the work of the female nurses. A few patients, principally in wards 2, 4, and 19, complained that soldier nurses did not display interest in their work, it seeming to be their object to avoid doing whatever they could. Major Crosby, when informed by me of this, stated that it was difficult to get enlisted men who, without previous training, could be made efficient nurses.

A few men in ward 19 complained that the food was not served in an appetizing manner, everything being placed on one plate at the same time, and that food which was intended to be served hot was cold before it reached them.

Major Crosby, in explanation, stated that he had about 1,000 United States soldier patients in the hospital, besides some 200 Filipinos, and that it was very difficult to cook for so many at one time and to serve the food properly; that it was impossible to serve the food in courses, or to have more than one plate or dish to each man without a very large and expensive addition to the table equipment.

Two or three men in wards 2 and 19 complained that coffee and tea were sometimes served without sugar, or without sufficient sugar. Major Crosby stated that if such complaints had been made at the time they would have been corrected, as there

is always plenty of sugar. One man in ward 18 complained that good milk, and in sufficient quantities, was not always furnished when needed. Major Crosby informed me that the milk problem in Manila is a very difficult one, and that on the advice of the chief surgeon of the department he would be compelled to discontinue the use of fresh milk altogether in the hospital on account of its impurity.

A few men remarked that the food furnished men on full diet was no improvement on the regular army ration, although in view of the money allowance for patients in hospital a difference was to be expected.

A great majority of patients had no complaints whatever to make, but expressed their entire satisfaction with everything connected with the hospital. Most of the few who made complaints added that they believed that the best was being done that was possible in view of the facilities at hand and the large number of patients.

The wards appeared to me to be clean and well looked after and the water-closets, kitchen, and premises generally in a good state of police. No evidences of lack of proper care and attention were visible in the persons or surroundings of the patients.

In my opinion a considerable improvement could be made in preparing and serving the food if, instead of the two kitchens (general and special) now used, it were practicable to have a special-diet kitchen and an ordinary one for each group of four or five wards, and if the stock of tableware were so added to that anything in the nature of dessert could be served in a separate plate or other receptacle from the rest of the meal.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major and Inspector-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 62.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I.

Señor Col. RUPERTO ARCE:

On this date I have thought it best to add to the company which Señor Major Norberto de Lara commands Captain of Infantry Señor Quirino Velleza and the 2 second lieutenants, Señores Juan Rivera and Moises Cabiling, with 10 private soldiers, in order that the said captain may take charge of the company referred to, the major aforesaid, nevertheless, continuing as its superior officer.

You, as well as the chiefs and officers under your orders, will give military instructions to the soldiers, inculcating in them subordination and discipline, reading to them at least twice a day the penal laws, making them understand their duties as defenders of the country, and inflicting upon them the disciplinary punishments which they may deserve.

And, in order that the enemy may not be able to distinguish from a distance our soldiers when, for instance, a plan is being made to surprise or ambush him, make them dress as country people, not permitting all, including the officers, to wear uniform.

In all movements you may make with the command you will always observe much prudence, employing every kind of artifice to defeat the plans of the enemy.

May God preserve you many years.

Headquarters at Porac, 21st of May, 1899.

The general in chief of operations:

[SEAL.]

TOMÁS MASCARDO.

The foregoing is a translation of a letter found in trenches near the Bacolor road, from which the insurgents fled precipitately after being routed by our forces May 24, 1899.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major and Inspector-General, U. S. V.

APPENDIX 63.

Col. RUPERTO ARCE, *Santa Rita*:

I am just informed reliably that our enemy intends to attack your town to-day with a force of 300 cavalry. I hope, therefore, that you, in your bravery and patriotism, will prepare a defense which shall give him exemplary chastisement.

Just now I am directing a communication to Major Jajard, so that, should he hear

shots in the direction of your lines, he will go to lend you aid immediately and foil the plans of the enemy.

Dios, etc.

Cuartel General of Porac, May 23, 1899.

The general in chief of operations:

TOMÁS MASCARDO.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL

Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations for June:

The latter part of May, Major Kobbé's command advanced up the Rio Grande from Calumpit to Candaba, toward General Lawton, who was operating to the northeastward. As the placing of a wire along the river to Candaba would give Lawton an additional outlet, a detachment under Lieutenant Cunningham was sent to execute the work.

After shipping his material up the river by gunboats and arranging for its distribution at advantageous points, Cunningham proceeded overland with his party to Bagbag on the 15th, reached Calumpit the evening of the following day, set up an independent battery at that point and constructed a few miles of line. This he finished through to San Simon on the 19th, and the day following began work toward San Luis, but by this time the signal party, which, unfortunately, was operating with heavy unwieldy material, had fallen behind the main column and the insurgents had closed in, cutting them off. The situation, however, was soon observed and remedied by Kobbé.

The following day the party reached San Luis and found that the insurgents had thrown the material left at that point for line construction into the river. The line reached Candaba and an office was established on the 25th, giving a stretch of 20 miles of what has proven to be a most excellent piece of telegraph, which will stand as long as Candaba is needed as a station. The construction party returned to Manila June 3.

On the 3d of the month General Hall pushed his brigade out eastward from the pumping station toward Maraquina, and Lieutenant Gibbs, with a detachment of the Nineteenth Company, was sent to give wire.

The country was exceedingly rough, and a few miles out it became necessary to turn back all wheeled vehicles except the most essential ammunition and signal carts, and even these were abandoned later, as the trails became impassable.

About 7 miles out camp was made on the mountain and an office opened, but almost immediately the circuit was broken. While making repairs, First-Class Sergt. Charles F. Wadak was cut off by a small band of insurgents, but escaped capture through the prompt and gallant action of Lieutenant Gibbs.

The wire was cut again and again and it soon became apparent that the telegraph just laid, and which ran for the greater part of its length through a country in which the natives were particularly aggressive, could not be maintained. Captain McKenna, who came out over the line to repair it, not only found numerous breaks, but such great lengths had been bodily taken away that it was useless to hope to establish communication unless the line were constantly patrolled.

The signal party therefore returned to Pasig and ran forward a second line, the work being performed by a detachment under First-Class Sergt. John C. Hadley, to whom much credit is due because of the character and rapidity of his work and the risks run in operating without an escort through a country bitterly hostile but a few days before.

An old Spanish telegraph through this section was utilized by the sergeant, who reached Cainta with his line on the 5th, Taytay on the 6th, and inspected the line thence to Antipolo on the 7th.

This expedition demonstrated the futility of following a command with wire through a country that is left to the enemy after the passage of the troops.

On June 10 General Lawton's expedition to Cavite Province started southward from San Pedro Macati and was furnished communications for part of the time by the Eighteenth Company, under Captain Russel. Fifteen miles of wire was run toward Las Pinas in following Wheaton's brigade toward the lake during the fight of Guadalupe Ridge and subsequent swing to the right.

The end of the first day saw the complete prostration of not only most of the signalmen, but a large part of the army, from excessive heat. So great was the dis-

ness that several days' rest was necessary before operations against Zapote Bridge, and thence on southward against Bacoar could be undertaken.

As the line run by Russel in following the troops could be bettered by an interior and direct one, Lieutenant Gibbs, with a squad of the Nineteenth Company, pushed through a wire from Passai to Las Pinas, in time for the movements beyond.

The fight at Zapote Bridge—one of the bitterest of the campaign—so demoralized the insurgents that the march to Bacoar and thence southward to Imus was made without much opposition and the line was carried forward without incident.

On the 19th of June a battalion of the Fourth Infantry, under Major Bubb, was dispatched on reconnoissance toward Dasmarinas. Lieutenant Cunningham accompanied, and for his efficient and brave conduct under fire for several hours has been personally commended by the brigade commander and repeatedly complimented. He entered Dasmarinas on the 20th, participating in the fight in which the enemy were so roughly handled that further resistance was not made at the town.

The field line from Bacoar and thence to Imus, and also the Calumpit-Candaba telegraph, have now been made permanent lines of the system, all field wire being taken out.

On the 8th of June the relief of the First Company was begun, men of the new organization, Company E, being gradually substituted. The First Company sailed for the United States June 14.

The number of messages handled on signal lines for June is 31,045.

With the exception of the extension of the telephone line from the Tennessee headquarters to Molo, in advance of the occupation of the town by our troops, signal operations at Iloilo for June have consisted almost entirely in routine work attendant on the maintenance of communications already established.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. THOMPSON,
Major and Chief Signal Officer.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH U. S. INFANTRY,
Angeles, Luzon, P. I., August 28, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to respectfully report the operations of the Twelfth U. S. Infantry, on the 9th instant, in the general advance of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, from San Fernando to Calulut.

On the night of the 8th of August I received personal instructions from division and brigade commanders as to position and general movements. In general terms I was instructed to have the regiment in line on the left of the Ninth Infantry, right resting near my northwestern outpost, and the line extending toward Bacolor, parallel to and about 600 yards from the Bacolor-San Fernando macadam road. The troops were ordered to march at 3 a. m. and take this position as soon as possible, and not later than 5.15 a. m., at which hour it was expected the general advance would be made. The Second Battalion, under Captain Waltz, Twelfth Infantry, was sent to the left of the line, to be held by the regiment, with instructions to reach the enemy's line of intrenchments which intersects the Bacolor-San Fernando road, to proceed along the line and, if insurgents were discovered, to deploy, drive them out, and occupy the position assigned to the battalion on the left of the regiment. He was ordered to deploy so that he could connect his right with left of Captain Wood's battalion (Third), the second in line. The latter battalion had its left refused in order to make everything secure; the right of Captain Evans's battalion joined the Ninth Infantry; the left of the Ninth Infantry was indicated in orders as the guide for the Twelfth Infantry in the general advance.

Captain Waltz carried out his orders so well that when the line was straightened at 5 o'clock a. m., there was a continuous line of skirmishers extending from the artillery, which was placed between Ninth and Twelfth Infantry, to the heavy bamboo lines filled with native huts on our left. My line was formed by 5.15 a. m. and at about 6 a. m., after considerable firing by the battery on my right, the line moved forward. I had been informed that Colonel Bell with his command would take care of the left of the division, but I soon discovered that my left was unprotected, and, during the combat of the 9th instant, my heaviest fighting was on my left and by my left battalion, excepting about 7 o'clock, when Captain Wood's battalion (center) was hotly engaged. This work on the part of the left battalion caused some gaps at times between the Twelfth and Ninth Infantry, as it was most important that I should keep insurgents moving in front of my left instead of allowing them to get in our rear. The brigade commander, not realizing the importance of this, which I being on the ground knew, seemed by his manner to think I had not kept in as close touch with the Ninth Infantry as he had wished. However, the work of the Twelfth Regi-

ment was supervised by me in person, although Captain Evans on the right was ordered to guide on the Ninth Infantry, he could not do so at times owing to my having to hold him in proper touch with the other battalions on his left. Firing by the Twelfth Regiment commenced very soon after the general move in a northerly direction and ceased about 10.30 a. m. At this time I took measures to find out the exact location of the Ninth Infantry, from which we became separated by the exigencies of the combat. About 12 o'clock m. an orderly from the brigade commander reached me, and conducted the right of the Twelfth Infantry to the brigade commander who was waiting for me; this movement required a march by the right flank. Soon after the connection was made between Ninth and Twelfth Infantry, we moved into Calulut and bivouacked for the night.

The next morning at 7 o'clock Captain Evans, Twelfth Infantry, with his battalion, made a reconnoissance toward Porac, returning late in the evening. The usual outpost duty was inaugurated and carried on at Calulut. On the 14th of August I was directed to send one company of the regiment to a town named Dolores, to the southwest of and 3 miles from Calulut; Captain Anglum, commanding Company K, was designated. I accompanied Captain Smith, adjutant-general First Brigade, to Dolores, and after relieving two companies of Thirty-sixth Volunteer Infantry, returned to Calulut. The remaining companies of the Twelfth Infantry remained at Calulut without adequate shelter until the morning of the 16th of August, 1899.

A separate report will be made of the operations of the 16th of August at Angeles.

I inclose a copy of Captain Anglum's report of an engagement he had at Dolores, August 16, 1899. This, it appears, was a very successful one, and the division commander complimented Captain Anglum and his command for the work performed.

On account of the high water the country in many places was almost impassable on August 9, 1899, and the men moved with the greatest difficulty through watery and miry fields. The officers and men vied with each other in obeying orders, and the battalion commanders (Captains Evans, Wood, and Waltz), handled their commands with skill and gallantry. I can make no special mention of the company commanders and subalterns, as all performed their duties well, as the Twelfth Infantry expects. Captain Winn, adjutant, and Lieutenant Creary, commissary of the regiment, were under my immediate observation during the combat, and carried my orders promptly and with good judgment; they assisted me very materially. They were under very hot fire at times, and displayed coolness worthy of commendation. Captain Ballou, regimental quartermaster, was in charge of wheel transportation of the regiment and followed the command, under many difficulties, much to his credit.

One incident occurred on our advance that I deem worthy of attention. Among the dead and wounded insurgents passed over on the 9th instant one special case came under my notice. A fine physical specimen of the Filipino was badly shot through the lower leg, and as I approached him he said, "Buenas dias, Colonel. Bananas." A few soldiers around him had been recognized by him, and they informed me that he had been in San Fernando selling bananas in our camp before our advance. I certainly think these "amigos" should be under surveillance and not allowed to come in and go out of our lines with the freedom heretofore permitted.

Strength of command engaged August 9, 1899: Twenty-seven officers and 884 enlisted men; First Battalion, A, B, D, F; Second Battalion, C, K, L, M; Third Battalion, E, G, H, J.

Casualties: Three enlisted men wounded, viz, Corpl. William Barnes, Company F, Twelfth Infantry; Corpl. Albert Beyrow, Company H, Twelfth Infantry; Private George Plummer, Company M, Twelfth Infantry. Plummer has since died.

Prisoners taken, 22.

The wounds of several Filipinos were dressed on the field and the remains of their dead buried.

Respectfully submitted.

J. H. SMITH,
Lieutenant-Colonel Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH U. S. INFANTRY,
Angeles, Luzon, P. I., September 1, 1899.

ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Sindalan, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operation which resulted in the capture of the town of Angeles, Luzon, P. I., on the 16th of August, 1899.

The troops composing the command were Companies B, D, F, First Battalion; C, L, M, Second Battalion; E, G, H, and I, Third Battalion; Twelfth U. S. Infantry, and two guns (one 3.2-inch B. L. R. and one mountain Hotchkiss) of Light Battery E, First Artillery, under command of Lieutenant Kenly, First Artillery, all under

my command. The evening of the 13th of August, 1899, this force was in bivouac at Sindalan and Calulut, two adjoining villages, about 5 miles north of San Fernando on the railroad leading from Manila, P. I. I was sent for by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V., the evening of the 15th of August, 1899, and directed by him to take the force named, make a reconnoissance toward Angeles, a town located about 5 miles north of Calulut and Sindalan, and to enter the place. He informed me that my artillery would consist of one 3.2-inch rifle and two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss guns. One of these guns did not arrive. I was directed to start at or near daylight the next morning. The start was made at 5.15 a. m., the earliest moment the artillery could get onto the railroad embankment. The railroad was the backbone of my route and subsequent engagement. After proceeding about 2 miles along the railroad, Captain Evans, with the First Battalion, was directed to move to the right and then forward parallel to the track at a convenient deploying distance from it. Captain Wood, with the Third Battalion, was directed to follow the paths and road to the left of the track. Captain Waltz, with the Second Battalion, continued along the track and in support of the guns. The outposts of the enemy were encountered shortly after this disposition was made, as indicated by the first firing at 7.20 on the left and at 8 o'clock on the right. A little later, at 8.20, the command was ordered deployed, the First Battalion with its left about 100 yards from the railroad and the Third Battalion in a similar position on the left. The other battalion was continued in support of the artillery. This order was complied with as nearly as the character of the ground would permit.

At 8.50 the first hostile shots were fired at the troops on the track, and at 9 o'clock the artillery was directed to go into action and shell the cover of the enemy. When we reached the last bend in the railroad, where it curves toward the west before entering the town, I held back my left (Wood's battalion) and swung Evans's battalion forward to make the line conform to the general directions of the railroad. At 10.30 a. m. an open culvert obstructed further forward movement of the artillery at a point 1,100 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. I had deemed it advisable to send a company to the right and rear of Evans's battalion, to forestall any attempt of the enemy turning my right flank. This proved successful, but not before a volley from the right wounded Lieutenant Williams, adjutant Second Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, who had gone into the above-mentioned culvert to get out men who were stopping there. However, Company D, Captain Ayer, got in position, and with three well-directed volleys doubled the insurgents up and sent them scampering to their main intrenchments. At 10.30 a. m. the insurgent fire was very general and very heavy; the engagement continued very sharply for thirty minutes, when the hostile fire somewhat slackened as the result of the artillery fire and the steady volleys of the regiment.

The insurgent trenches were well located and concealed in the bamboo thickets which skirt the southern edge of the town and face the open rice fields over which my command had to pass. In front of Captain Wood the outlying houses were occupied and the roads barricaded. A charge was then ordered, and although many were overcome by the heat and exhaustion, the line moved forward at a good pace and the town of Angeles was in our possession at 11.30 a. m. The fire from the insurgents was very heavy and they evidently expected us to retire, as two other reconnoissance expeditions had done, under orders, I believe. The insurgents were stubborn in their resistance, but could not withstand the steady style of the Twelfth Infantry advance.

I am indebted to Captains Winn and Ballou and First Lieutenant Creary, of the regimental staff Twelfth Infantry; also to Captain Howland, of General Wheaton's staff; Captain Davidson and First Lieutenant Ross, Fifty-first Iowa, U. S. Volunteer Infantry, for carrying my orders promptly and at times under circumstances of a very dangerous character. Lieutenant Ross was very valuable as guide to Captain Wood's battalion. The battalion commanders, Evans, Wood, and Waltz, handled their commands in proper manner and carried out my views and instructions promptly. Before the final charge was made I had the ten companies of the Twelfth Infantry in the line, as my estimate of the enemy's strength, judging from the length of their line and the volume of fire, was 1,500, although information has since been received that they were 2,500 strong; we know they held a defensive position of exceptional strength. Lieutenant Kenly rendered gallant and skillful service in handling his guns under many difficulties. Lieutenant Wills, Twelfth Infantry, was in immediate charge of the 1.65-inch gun.

All the officers and men of the command performed their duties so very well that I can not make special mention of any particular one. All are entitled to the thanks of the nation for their conduct on the 16th day of August, 1899.

As my orders were to return to Calulut and Sindalan after taking the place, I prepared to leave in the afternoon after a rest, and was about ordering the assembly,

when Captain Howland returned from General Wheaton, to whom he had reported our situation, with orders to remain for the night. The next morning I received orders to hold Angeles. Among the results of this operation were the capture of 3 locomotives, 25 cars, and a large quantity of unhulled rice. Angeles is a town of much importance; roads from the south, southwest, west, east, southeast converge, and a main road to the north leaves here. The buildings and streets are in relatively good condition. The native population, consisting probably of over 12,000 people, has departed. There are ample accommodations for any command that it may be desired to shelter here. The water, however, is obtained from wells which may easily become polluted. The drainage is good.

Strength of Twelfth Infantry engaged: Twenty-seven officers and 627 men. Detachment Light Battery E, First Artillery, 1 officer and 21 men.

Casualties: Killed, 2 enlisted men (Edward E. Householder, private, Company D, and Edwin S. Boatwright, musician, Company C). Wounded, 1 officer (First Lieut. Will H. Williams, battalion adjutant 2nd Battalion), very seriously, I fear. Wounded, enlisted men, 13, of whom 2 have since died (John P. Brooks, private, Company C, and Albert Irvine, private, Company M).

Respectfully submitted.

J. H. SMITH,
Lieutenant-Colonel Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

THIRD BATTALION, TWENTY-FOURTH INFANTRY,
Camp Alva, P. I., August 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL THIRD BRIGADE,
El Deposito, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from your office to have reconnoissance made to immediate neighborhood of recent fight with Filipinos north of Mariquina, I made attempt to do so this morning and failed, because of accident to ferry at pumping station and drowning of some of my men. The test for that ferry was 40 men; this morning there were on board 23 men in all when the accident occurred.

At 6.30 my detachment arrived at the ferry and a trial crossing was made with 5 or 6 men on boat. Passage was made safely, but as the tripod support of cable on far side proved to be unsteady 2 men were left on far side to look after it. That support gave no more trouble, and two sets of fours, and others to work the boat, also Lieutenants McMaster and Sanford, then boarded the boat and started off, with repeated caution from me to stand steadily on the boat. When the boat got into the current it was pulled tight away from the cable downstream, and little boat on upper side began to fill and the men got excited. The boat appeared to stop mid-stream, in strongest part of current, and the means of handling boat by means of rope and tackle failed. The men became panic-stricken, and in spite of my oft-repeated caution to be steady on the boat and not to leave it, they jumped into the water with clothing and belts on and attempted to swim back to shore. From shore 3 dugout boats were hurried out to them, also quite a number of bamboo poles, and several men jumped in with clothes on to help. One of these was drowned; the others escaped with difficulty. Lieutenant Smedberg was one of those who attempted thus to assist, and found it impossible to save a drowning man near by, so strong was the current. By means of the dugout boats and bamboo poles those rescued were brought ashore. Every effort was made to rescue the unfortunate. I was present superintending the work of crossing and attempts to rescue. The drowned are, with one exception, from my own company, the exception being Private J. E. Poole, of Company H, who jumped in with clothes on in his eagerness to save his comrades. Besides Private Poole, the drowned were the following men, of Company F: Sergt. Thomas W. Countee, Privates William Carter, John Dean, J. E. Johnson, Edward Jones, Thomas Russell, Emmett McMillan, George Moody, Hampton Kendall; also an unknown cavalryman while attempting to rescue a drowning man.

Not a man would have been drowned had they remained on the boat, as repeatedly ordered by me. The boat, with no one clinging to it, was without difficulty pulled back, with assistance of the current.

It will be necessary to wait till the river waters get lower before trying again.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. J. CRANE,
Captain, Twenty-fourth Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

[First indorsement.]

HDQRS. THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH CORPS,
El Deposito, Luzon, August 21, 1899.

Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general First Division, Eighth Corps.

This is a deplorable incident of war. The loss of life is due to panic. My aid, Lieutenant Smedberg, has just returned from the scene, and reports every effort being made, under the direction of Captain Crane, to recover bodies.

S. B. M. YOUNG, *Brigadier-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST NORTH DAKOTA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Manila, P. I., July 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the late expeditions to San Isidro and Morong:

The regiment left barracks in Malate at 2 o'clock p. m., April 21, 1899, and marched to place of rendezvous near La Loma, where the command went into camp at 4 p. m. The column started next morning at 5 o'clock, with the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry in advance, Captain Eddy's company, H, as advance guard and Capt. William E. Birkhimer acting as guide. The enemy was encountered near Novaliches, which place was occupied after a short but sharp engagement in which both battalions of my command were engaged. A full report of this engagement has been furnished your department.

The march from Novaliches was continued next morning, bad roads being encountered a short distance from the town and progress was slow. Men and animals suffered greatly from heat, but all worked with a will.

General Lawton having pushed ahead left me in command of the column. April 24 the column started again at daylight, the roads, if anything, poorer than before—mere paths over a rough country, crossing numerous ravines, necessitating letting down wagons and carts by means of ropes and pulling them up the opposite sides. Rivers were forded in similar manner. Day by day the roads became more difficult. Men and animals were thoroughly exhausted at night, but cheerfully took up the road again the next morning. The heat was intense and a number of caribao fell dead by the wayside, the men having to drag along the heavily laden carts. Officers vied with their men in overcoming the difficulties encountered. They drove mule teams, worked with pick and shovel, assisted in construction of bridges, and pulled on the ropes—by their example cheering and encouraging the men. Finally, on April 26, about 5 p. m., the column camped at Angat, where the command rested till the 29th.

On April 29, at 5 a. m., the column started in the direction of San Rafael, Colonel Summers's column crossing the Rio Grande at Marunco, my command, composed of Third U. S. Infantry, Scott's battery, and First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, moving by the road on the south or west bank of the stream. At about 9.30 our advance guard encountered the outposts of the enemy at about 2 miles from San Rafael. I deployed the Third Infantry and the First Battalion of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, with Scott's battery, in the road. The enemy made only a short stand, and my whole line pushing forward soon drove him from the field. While the fight was still in progress orders came from General Lawton to re-form and after a short rest march back to Angat. Major Fraine's battalion was ordered to ford the river and communicate with Colonel Summers, who had just entered San Rafael with his command without opposition. Both columns returned to their respective camps, my command arriving at Angat at 4.30 p. m. During this brief engagement Lieutenant Todd, of the Third Infantry, was wounded in the groin, and Private Emil Pepke, Company I, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, was wounded in the abdomen, and a number of men overcome by the severe heat. The enemy's loss could not be ascertained. A number of dead were found on the field.

Five days' rations were drawn at Angat, and on May 1 the column marched again in the direction of San Rafael, my command, consisting of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, and Hawthorne's battery, Major Starr accompanying the column. Colonel Summers's column proceeded on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande. The scouts who were in advance of the column came upon the enemy near the position held by him on the 29th ultimo. I ordered Major Fraine to deploy his battalion and Company H of the First Battalion. The enemy

occupied a strong position on high ground, with barricades commanding the road. These were shelled by Hawthorne and from Scott's battery on the opposite side of the river with good effect, and Major Fraine's battalion attacking in front and flank soon had the enemy retreating in the direction of Bustos. Our loss was one man wounded—Private Olstad, of Company G, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, shot through fleshy part of leg; not serious. The enemy's loss was unknown; a number of dead and wounded were seen to be carried off the field. One insurgent was killed by our scouts near the road, and his Remington rifle and ammunition were secured. The command camped on the field with orders to march at 6 a. m.

May 2 the column marched at 6 a. m., scouts preceding the advance guard. According to orders received that morning from General Lawton, the wagon train was left in camp, together with Major White's battalion of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry and one company of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry. About 9 a. m. Mr. Young, chief of scouts, sent back word that his detachment had the enemy engaged on the outskirts of Bustos, where strong barricades were constructed across the road. I ordered Major Parker, of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, to deploy his command, Captain Ballance commanding the First Battalion to the right of the road, with orders to keep the right of his line on the river bank in order to be able to cooperate with Colonel Summers's command; Hawthorne's battery on the road and the other two battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry on the left of the road; Major Fraine's battalion I held as reserve in the road. The enemy held a splendid position behind stone walls and barricades and kept up a hot fire without exposing himself. Near Bustos the river makes a wide bend to the right, and this necessitated Captain Ballance to stretch out his line in order to thoroughly scour the fields and thickets between the river and road, it being my plan to cover the ground between road and river with a thin skirmish line, as it afforded an excellent hiding place for the enemy. It was fortunate that this was done, for quite a large force of the enemy were found in hiding in these thickets and were surprised by Captain Ballance's advance and a sharp engagement ensued. This force was evidently lying in wait to harass our flank. In the meantime I had ordered Major Parker to swing his left around so as to encircle the flank of the enemy's position. This movement was made through an open cane field. Hawthorne's battery, having taken up a position in a field to the left of the road, got an effective fire on the enemy's barricades. The scouts and Captain Ballance's line coming up from the direction of the river and the flanking movement on the left forced the enemy out of town, a portion of his force retreating on the south bank of the stream, the remainder crossing over to Baliuag. I was in full possession of Bustos by 11 a. m. without the loss of a man, either killed or wounded. Touch had been lost with Colonel Summers's column, with whom I was ordered to cooperate, after taking Bustos, against Baliuag, lying on the opposite bank of the river. My scouts, however, forded the river expecting to find the advance of Colonel Summers's column in Baliuag, but instead they encountered the rear guard of the insurgent column retreating from the town. They promptly engaged it and followed it some distance. Shortly after Colonel Summers's command occupied the town of Baliuag. My command had operated over difficult ground under a very hot sun and a number of men had succumbed to the heat. The command was quartered in vacant houses in Bustos, the Twenty-second Infantry furnishing the provost guard, and in a very short time, the natives seeing that their property was not being molested, returned to the town in large numbers. Large stores of rice, sugar, and corn were found in the warehouses. Outposts were established and the wagon train and rear guard soon joined the command.

On May 3 I was ordered to move my command into quarters in Baliuag, leaving one company for outpost duty in Bustos. The command rested in Baliuag several days waiting for rations and supplies. On May 6 Company C of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry and a troop of the Fourth Cavalry were sent back with a detachment of the Signal Corps to Angat to take up the wire and to watch the movements of a column of General Pilar's forces, said to be coming from the direction of Antipolo to threaten our rear. Next morning Major Fraine, with the balance of his battalion, was sent to San Rafael to watch the movements of the enemy from that direction. The scouts accompanied this column and gathered much valuable information. They pushed far into the foothills, where large stores of the enemy's supplies were found hidden. Major Fraine's battalion returned to Baliuag on the 9th. The troops did outpost duty and guard duty at Baliuag and Bustos until Monday, May 15.

The column marched at 5 a. m. that date in the direction of San Ildefonso, resting at Maasin from 9.30 a. m. to 3 p. m. to allow wagon train to come up. Left Maasin at 3 p. m., arriving at San Ildefonso at 4.30 p. m., where command went into camp. The water at this place was poor.

May 6 the column marched at 5 a. m., arriving at San Miguel at 8.30, where command rested until 3 p. m., when the march was resumed. The roads from this point were poor and the bridges in bad repair. The column had not proceeded over a mile when a bridge gave way, precipitating one of Scott's guns, together with the mules and drivers, to the bottom of a ravine. No one was hurt, but it took some time to drag the gun to the top of the steep bank. A crossing was found some distance up the ravine and the balance of the train was sent around that way. A heavy rain had made the roads very soft and progress was very slow. Arrived at Salacot at 6 p. m., where the command went into camp. About 7 p. m. orders were received to push on with two battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry, one battalion of North Dakota, and Scott's battery to join Colonel Summers's command some 6 miles farther ahead near San Isidro, where an engagement was expected next morning. It was necessary to wait for the ammunition train, which had not yet come up, and promptly at 9 p. m. the column started on its night march. Major Fraine's battalion was left behind as a guard for the train with orders to march next morning at daylight. It was a cool moonlight night and in spite of the hard march of the day the column made good progress and arrived at Colonel Summers's camp at midnight.

The next day, May 17, the column marched at 5 a. m. a distance of about 5 miles to Tarbon Bridge, the burnt bridge near San Isidro, which had been taken by our scouts the previous day, where disposition of the troops was made for an attack on the insurgent stronghold. I was given command of the right wing, composed of Major White's battalion of the North Dakotas and Major Willis's battalion of the Second Oregon. (A full report of the operations of my command in this engagement has been forwarded.) Major Fraine's battalion and the wagon train arrived at San Isidro at 5 p. m., having to repair the burnt bridge, which took some time. On the 18th of May the column left San Isidro at 3 p. m., under command of Colonel French, in following order: Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Scott's battery, and First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. About 4 p. m., near the village of San Fernando, the advance guard of the Twenty-second Infantry suddenly came upon the enemy's outposts. The fire came from a series of trenches commanding the road and from the other side of the river. The Twenty-second Infantry was deployed and a part of Major Fraine's battalion. Scott's battery took up a position near a bend of the road on the bank of the river and shelled the enemy's works on the opposite side of the stream. Company D of Major Fraine's battalion supported the battery. Major White's battalion was with the train as rear guard. It was dark before the enemy was repulsed. Strong outposts were put out to protect our position and the troops camped for the night.

On the morning of the 19th the command was on the march at 5 o'clock, Major Fraine's battalion of the North Dakotas in advance. When nearing Cabiao I had the entire battalion deployed. There was a small force of the enemy in the village, and we were also fired upon from the bamboo thickets across the river. The enemy made but a feeble stand at the village and retreated in the direction of Arayat. We were in possession of Cabiao at 8 a. m., which was soon filled with refugees, mostly well-to-do Chinamen, who related stories of robbery and plunder on the part of the insurgents while they occupied the town. These refugees, numbering over 100 men, women, and children, were allowed to follow the column on its way toward Calumpit.

The march was continued on the 20th, the column leaving Cabiao at 3 p. m. The roads were good and the command made excellent progress in spite of the excessive heat. The natives along our route appeared very friendly, and standing by the roadside supplied the troops with water and fruit. Two companies of the Twenty-second Infantry had been ordered to the opposite side of the river, and, proceeding by a parallel road, protected the flank of the marching column. The troops went into camp at sundown, having marched about 10 miles.

At 6 o'clock the following morning the march was resumed, and by 7 o'clock the head of the column reached the river, where a crossing was to be effected. Outposts were posted to protect the troops in crossing and only a few shots were fired by small parties of the enemy, and they were quickly dispersed. The entire morning was spent in cutting down a steep bank to make an approach to the ferry, which was being repaired in order to carry over the troops and supplies. Shortly after noon a suitable ford was found farther up the stream, and Scott's battery crossed without trouble. It was suggested to attempt to float the loaded carts over on canoes. It proved a success, and soon, under the direction of Major White, Captain Eddy, and other North Dakota officers, a scheme was devised for crossing streams with loaded carts which is safe and expedient, and may prove of benefit to future expeditions. A runway is made of two timbers so laid that a bull cart can be run onto it, the ends extending into the stream. A banca, or canoe, is placed between the timbers and the cart run off the timbers so as to straddle the canoe. By passing a bamboo pole

through the wheels, with men at either end to prevent it from tipping, and others to push it over the stream and pull it up the opposite bank, the crossing of ammunition and supplies became an easy matter.

The brigade quartermaster, who had labored all morning to repair the ferry, abandoned his work, adopted our plan and appropriated our apparatus, and began sending his wagons over. We soon found another canoe and constructed a second runway, and began crossing with our carts. Everybody worked with a will, and in less than two hours my regiment and carts, without having to unload a single one or damaging an ounce of rations, was safely on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande, a wide stream about 4 feet deep with a considerable current. My command continued the march to Arayat, where we arrived at 5 p. m. and went into quarters with orders to march at 5.30 next morning.

Promptly at daylight on May 22 the column marched in the direction of Candaba, which was reached about 9 a. m., the command remaining on this side of the stream and taking quarters in vacant buildings, of which there were but few, and in order to obtain shelter from downpouring rain, all were very much crowded. A number of sick and wounded were put aboard the river gunboats and sent to Calumpit.

On May 24 I was ordered to proceed with my regiment, Scott's battery, and a battalion of the Ninth Infantry to Calumpit and thence to Manila. The column left Candaba at 9.45 a. m., reached San Luis by 12.30, where we rested till 2.30 for dinner, arriving at Apalit about 6 p. m. Left Apalit at 5 a. m. on the 25th, arriving at Calumpit at 6.30 a. m. The troops crossed the river by means of the railroad bridge and went into camp, the wagon train crossing on the ferry.

On the afternoon of May 26 my command and Scott's battery were loaded on a train sent from Malolos, the battalion of the Ninth Infantry being left in camp. At 6 p. m. the train started for Manila, where the command arrived at 8 p. m. and marched to their quarters.

I am pleased to report that the regiment on its return to Manila, after an expedition of thirty-six days, during which time a number of engagements and battles had been fought, and almost insurmountable obstacles overcome, was in good physical condition and had more men present for duty than when it left on the 21st of April. Sick men who had been left in quarters from the former expedition to Santa Cruz, after recuperating, joined the command at Angat and Baliuag, and more than balanced my loss in sick and wounded during the expedition.

The troops of this expedition were ordered to go in light marching order with the minimum amount of transportation, but through the courtesy of General Lawton my regiment was permitted to take their mess wagons, light two-wheeled carts drawn by one or two ponies. Each company had one of these carts, capable of carrying the cooking utensils and a day's rations. They have been a part of my command since the outbreak of hostilities and found to be a great convenience. They always kept me up to the marching column and my men never had long to wait for their meals.

I have none but the highest praise for the officers and men of my command. All orders were obeyed promptly and intelligently. During the days when the transportation problem so seriously interfered with the progress of the expedition officers worked with pick and shovel shoulder to shoulder with their men, and by their energy and example cheered on the exhausted men, and no obstacles were so great that some practical way was not found to overcome them.

June 2, 1899, at 3.30 p. m., orders were received to hold command in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Promptly at 5.30 the command proceeded to San Pedro Macati, arriving at 6.45, and reported to Colonel Wholley of the First Washington Volunteer Infantry. On the morning of June 3 at 6 o'clock the march was continued to Pasig. The crossing of the ferry required about 1½ hours and by 9.30 the command had crossed the river in safety, arriving at Pasig about 10 a. m., where dinner was prepared. At 2 p. m. I was ordered to proceed with my command and one piece of Scott's battery to the position before Cainta to cooperate with Colonel Wholley's column, composed of the First Washington Volunteers, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, and Scott's battery, which had left Pasig by way of the Mariquina road, thence turning to the right to attack the flank of the enemy's position at Cainta.

My line was soon in its prescribed position in the edge of the bamboo of an open field, the fieldpiece in a favorable position. When Colonel Wholley's line was seen advancing from the left, I ordered the battery to open fire on the insurgent trenches near the ruins of the church and along the edge of the woods, with seemingly good effect. As Colonel Wholley's line became engaged I ordered an advance across the field. The ground was soft and muddy in places and several streams traversed the field with muddy bottom. The gun was dragged across one of these with some difficulty, but as the ground became more muddy I deemed it advisable to send the piece over to the road to our left to rejoin the line at the ruins of the church.

My line crossed the open field without loss and took up a position near a stream, connecting with the right of the Twelfth U. S. Infantry near the church. The enemy made a vigorous stand in a well-intrenched position on the other side of the stream, but was forced to retire to Taytay, which was on higher ground and also strongly intrenched.

About 5 p. m. I was ordered to report to Colonel Wholley, who informed me that he would return to Pasig with the Washington regiment, and placed me in command with orders to hold my position, keeping the enemy engaged the following morning to allow General Hall's column to get in rear of their position, and to get into communication with said officer. The fighting continued until after dark and there was some firing during the night, the principal loss occurring in the Twelfth Infantry.

The troops remained in their position till morning, when I sent my chief of scouts, Killian, with a party of 12 men, to communicate with General Hall, whose command was supposed to be on the other side of the ridge. Killian's party succeeded in reaching General Hall's headquarters and returned with verbal orders that I was to hold my troops in their present position. They also reported firing on small bodies of the enemy retreating over the ridges. The engagement had been renewed in the morning; sounds of firing were also heard from the ridges back of Taytay, which I concluded was General Hall's advance. The fire of the enemy was feeble, and it soon became evident that his main force had retreated during the night and a small rear guard left in the town.

Soon after the handsome church in Taytay, which had been such a conspicuous landmark, was seen to be on fire, which fire spread rapidly to adjoining buildings. Insurgent bugle calls could be heard, a certain indication that the enemy was vacating the town and attempting to destroy it by fire. At this time General Lawton arrived on the field and ordered the entire line forward. The line was soon in hot pursuit of the fleeing insurgents, driving them into the hills toward Antipolo and the interior of the Morong Peninsula.

Leaving a force at Taytay, and ordering Major White's battalion to proceed some distance down the road toward Angona, I proceeded with Major Fraine's battalion and the Twelfth Infantry and Scott's battery along the Antipolo road, a distance of about 3 miles, where General Hall's column was met with. It was a very hot morning, and the road was uphill all the way, and the men were much fatigued and suffered greatly for the want of water, and a large number had to fall out. Under orders from General Lawton I reported to and conferred with General Hall as to further movements, and was ordered by the latter to return to Taytay, rest my troops for dinner, and then proceed by the way of Angona and Binangonan around the Peninsula of Morong till I met his column on the other side.

It was now noon, and as the bull carts had arrived in Taytay with rations, dinner was prepared and orders issued to march at 3 p. m. My column, composed of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, and Scott's battery, moved promptly at the appointed time, overtaking Major White's battalion, which joined the column and formed the advance. The road was excellent and the command made good progress, passing many groups of "amigos"—men, women, and children—carrying white flags and returning with their bundles of effects from the numerous ravines among the hills toward Taytay. Many of them were young men who without doubt had been with the enemy's forces only a short time before, but had found it expedient to change their uniforms for a white suit, and hiding rifles and ammunition, carried white flags instead, and mingling with the fugitive inhabitants, returned to their homes to take up their weapons at a more opportune moment. Instances of this kind are numerous throughout the campaign and show the difficulties encountered.

Angona was reached at 5 p. m. A force of the enemy retreated from the place when our scouts entered it and a few shots were exchanged. On emerging at the other side of the village it was found that quite a force of the enemy was in hiding among the hills and in our front. I had Major Fraine's battalion deployed and advanced across the field. The battery shelled the position with good effect and the enemy was soon in full retreat. The troops were camped for the night. Angona is situated on the Laguna de Bay, and it was from near this point that a battery of the enemy had fired on our gunboats on the lake. Search was made for the location of the battery and three earthworks were discovered—two on the line of road and one near the shore, all well constructed and giving a good view of the lake. Evidences were also found that a small field piece had been recently removed from one of the trenches, the marks of the wheels showing plainly in the soft ground. From one of the inhabitants I learned that it had been taken to Antipolo the day before.

The march was continued on the morning of the 5th, Major White's battalion proceeding along the crest of a range of hills running parallel with the shore. Small bodies of the enemy were seen, but retreated on approach of the column. Binangonan, an important town, was reached at 11 a. m. There was no opposition and the troops camped and prepared dinner, with orders to march at 3 p. m. About 2 p. m. a gunboat and launch, coming from the direction of Pasig, were seen approaching. An attempt was made to communicate with them but failed, and they proceeded on their way. At 3 p. m. the column continued on its march.

At Binangonan the road which up to this point follows the shore line turns at right angles across the peninsula and becomes steep and rough, passing over the mountains and through narrow defiles. The column was fired on several times, but being well protected by flankers and an efficient advance guard, met with no loss, and arriving at Cardona about 6 p. m. occupied quarters. My troops were about out of rations, and I sent the sergeant-major of the Twelfth Infantry and a party forward to Morong to communicate with General Hall. They returned during the night with orders to remain in Cardona, where the other column would join us next day.

On June 6, shortly after noon, General Hall's column passed through Cardona and I was ordered to proceed with my regiment, the First North Dakota, to Morong, where I was to draw rations, the Twelfth Infantry and Scott's battery to join General Hall's column. Morong was reached at 4.30 p. m. and was occupied by Captain Gale's squadron of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry. Rations were brought up from the landing and issued. Outposts were established and scouting parties sent out daily. One of these parties sent out on the 9th under Chief of Scouts Killian in the direction of Baras, was fired upon by the enemy's outposts and Killian was killed. During the days that followed our scouting parties were frequently fired on, but met with no further loss.

Sickness in the command was on the increase, chiefly stomach and bowel disorders. The water was obtained from an only well in the town and in spite of boiling was of poor quality. The lake water, being shallow, was also poor. Request was made to be supplied with distilled water, but none was furnished.

At 3.30 a. m., June 24, a Chinese cook died very suddenly, having been ill only a few hours. The surgeon attending the patient, Dr. R. Fleming Jones, pronouncing the symptoms as those of Asiatic cholera, and recommending that stringent measures be taken at once to prevent spreading the disease. The body was removed to a vacant shack and burned, as were also the buildings in which the Chinaman had been quartered. A part of the command was removed from that part of the town and the well near the vicinity was sealed and water for cooking and other purposes hauled from the lake. A report was prepared, which I took to Manila that day and submitted to the chief surgeon. Major Starr and Major Raymond, division surgeon, returned with me to Morong the following day to inspect the camp.

On the morning of July 5 the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, assisted by the gunboats *Napindan* and *Oeste*, made a landing near Pililla and drove the insurgents from the town. I sent out a portion of my command in the direction of Baras to cooperate in case assistance was required. Later in the afternoon a body of insurgents, estimated at about 250 or 300, was seen to move from Baras in the direction of Tanay, where it was joined by others, the column moving along a road leading into the hills, where it disappeared. White flags appeared on the church towers at Baras and Tanay, and the Fourth Cavalry entered the latter place the following morning without opposition.

Late in the evening of July 6 two companies of the Twenty-first U. S. Infantry arrived, the remaining four companies being unloaded next morning. Captain Elton-head, commanding, had orders to relieve my command, which I was directed to load on the cascoes and return to our barracks in Manila. Quartermaster transportation, horses, and equipments were turned over to Lieutenant Love, quartermaster of the Twenty-first Infantry, and by 2 p. m. my command was aboard the cascoes and started for Manila. On account of wind and rain progress was slow and the last of the companies arrived at their barracks in Malate at midnight.

Very respectfully,

W. C. TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.

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